Latest / Distillations | Science History Institute / Cigarettes in America, Part 2: The Reckoning
Transcript
- 0:02From the Science History Institute, I'm Alexis Pedrick.
- 0:05Welcome to the new season of Distillations: American Vice.
- 0:10We're diving into stories about our appetite for risk, how science
- 0:14plays a role in it, and how it's shaped the American experience.
- 0:18This is Cigarettes in America, part two: The Reckoning.
- 0:26If you haven't listened to the first part, go back and start with Cigarettes
- 0:29in America, part one: The Rise
- 0:36Chapter 3: Mr. Butts
- 0:42Ever since those first cancer studies in the early 1950s, people
- 0:46had been suing cigarette companies.
- 0:49In fact, hundreds of liability lawsuits had piled up against them, seeking damages
- 0:54for smokers who had gotten lung cancer.
- 0:57But the decades went by, and by the 1980s, not a single plaintiff had yet to win.
- 1:06Tonight on Frontline, if you get sick from smoking cigarettes, can
- 1:10you sue the tobacco companies?
- 1:12Is it right to pay damages to someone for their having engaged in an activity which
- 1:19they knew carried with it claimed risks?
- 1:23Uh, is it fair to let them turn around and say, "Give me money for
- 1:26that, although I made my choice"?
- 1:28Tonight, tobacco on trial.
- 1:30As I started to study this more and I would be meeting with lawyers who
- 1:35wanted to sue the companies, I mostly would say to them in those days,
- 1:40"You'll never win." It was very hard to convince a judge or jury that the
- 1:46companies were responsible for the decisions that an individual had made.
- 1:54This is Allan Brandt, a historian of science and the author of
- 1:57The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of
- 2:01the Product That Defined America.
- 2:04Because American culture is so committed to the idea that individuals
- 2:11must and should take responsibility for their health, and we rely on
- 2:15that in a self-protective way when we say, "Well, so-and-so got sick.
- 2:21They did something they should not have done," you know.
- 2:25"So-and-so's a drug addict.
- 2:26Whose fault is that?"
- 2:28But there was a bit of a silver lining as the cases piled up.
- 2:32Each one went through a process called discovery, where two sides
- 2:37in a trial hand over evidence.
- 2:39This means that each case resulted in documents being squeezed
- 2:43from the tobacco companies.
- 2:45Document by document, a slow and steady drip until…
- 2:50It was about 11 o'clock in the morning, I remember, 'cause I was
- 2:53getting ready to go teach statistics.
- 2:56Uh, my name's Stanton Glantz.
- 2:58I'm a retired professor of medicine at the University of California San Francisco.
- 3:04On the morning of May 12th, 1994, a mysterious box showed
- 3:09up in Stanton's office.
- 3:12He didn't think much of it at first.
- 3:14It was just a nondescript cardboard banker's box.
- 3:19But then he noticed the label.
- 3:22The return address was Mr. Butts, the Doonesbury cartoon character.
- 3:27Mr. Butts was a talking cartoon cigarette that appeared regularly in
- 3:32the Pulitzer Prize-winning comic strip.
- 3:35Now, the character was a personification of the tobacco industry.
- 3:39His naive personality was meant to be a satirical takedown.
- 3:43Stanton was intrigued, and he opened the box to find, well, a mess.
- 3:51You know, these were all just papers thrown in a box, and they
- 3:54were, they were not organized.
- 3:57They were not clipped together in separate documents.
- 4:01But gradually, the return address started to make sense.
- 4:05There were about 4,000 pages dating back as far as the 1950s.
- 4:10Memos, scientific reports, meeting minutes, and letters, all from a
- 4:15company called Brown & Williamson, which at the time was the third-largest
- 4:21cigarette maker in the US.
- 4:23Its brands included Kool, Capri, and Viceroy.
- 4:27There were also documents from Brown & Williamson's parent
- 4:30company, British American Tobacco.
- 4:33And interestingly, most of the memos were labeled confidential or privileged.
- 4:41As I started looking through them, I, it was like I just got sucked into them.
- 4:46I tell people it was like a archeologist finding a new tomb.
- 4:53Whoever this Mr. Butts was, they were clearly a tobacco industry insider,
- 4:59a whistleblower who wanted the world to see what the cigarette companies
- 5:02were up to behind closed doors.
- 5:05The documents revealed things that those companies would have
- 5:08never admitted publicly, and they threatened to bring a carefully
- 5:12constructed facade crumbling down.
- 5:15The thing that was most important overall was that it was the
- 5:19industry speaking in its own words and how frank they were about it.
- 5:25That was the thing that struck me just immediately was that, boy,
- 5:30you know, all these things we thought about these guys are true.
- 5:35In fact, it was even worse than a lot of the things we thought.
- 5:44Mr. Butz's real name was Merrell Williams Jr. He was a paralegal working for the
- 5:50law firm Brown & Williamson hired because they were being sued several times over.
- 5:55He was working out of the law firm offices in Louisville, Kentucky,
- 5:59going through the company memos and internal documents day in and day out.
- 6:04And he saw all kinds of outrageous stuff.
- 6:08You know, other people have said he just was a- appalled by what he was reading,
- 6:13and decided it needed to be liberated.
- 6:17We know that tobacco companies that were being sued would often try
- 6:20to purge incriminating documents before they handed them over in
- 6:25discovery, but that wasn't so easy.
- 6:28Now, the problem was in doing that, that these companies are, among
- 6:33other things, giant bureaucracies.
- 6:36And what do people in bureaucracies do?
- 6:38They write memos, and they CC people and, you know.
- 6:41And so, so even if they were trying to get rid of something, it, you know,
- 6:47usually there were so many copies floating around that it was very hard to do.
- 6:52There was plenty of juicy material to leak, but it wasn't as simple
- 6:57as putting papers in a briefcase and walking out the door.
- 7:00There were security protocols.
- 7:03Merrell Williams Jr. had to get creative.
- 7:08What he did was he built a, uh, a little harness un- fit under his shirt, and he
- 7:14put the documents in and snuck them out.
- 7:18Because they were crinkling, he would eat potato chips.
- 7:21He was, he was going past the armed guard, and then he would smuggle
- 7:25them back in, and he made copies of about 4,000 or 5,000 pages.
- 7:32There were a lot of people he could have sent the box to: lawyers, journalists.
- 7:38But ultimately, it went to Stanton Glantz.
- 7:41Because I had a reputation of having a backbone, and people thought
- 7:47I would do something with them
- 7:52Stanton was actually pretty well known in this arena already.
- 7:56In the late 1970s, he had been researching secondhand smoke and heart disease.
- 8:02It was an important issue because people smoked almost anywhere.
- 8:06I mean, you could smoke in airplanes, you could smoke on, uh, i- in
- 8:11elevators, in a lot of places.
- 8:13He got into politics, volunteering with a group that was working on an initiative
- 8:18called Proposition 5 in California.
- 8:21To put in place a, we- by today's standards, ridiculously mild,
- 8:27uh, restrictions on smoking.
- 8:30When Stanton showed up, he asked what one of the group's organizers would
- 8:33later describe as, "The dumbest question I've ever heard." He wanted to know if
- 8:39there was anything he could do to help.
- 8:42Stanton Glantz, the guy who was becoming the foremost scientific
- 8:47authority on the cardiovascular effects of secondhand smoke.
- 8:51Of course, he could help.
- 8:53When the, uh, people running the campaign found out I was a scientist with a PhD
- 8:58minor in economics, uh, they, uh, they said, "Boy, you have just the perfect
- 9:04credentials to play an important role in this campaign, uh, if you had a
- 9:09decent suit." Because at that point, the only suit I had was the one I got
- 9:14married in, which my wife made for me, which was orange, uh, which is my
- 9:19favorite color, and they didn't think that would play too well on television.
- 9:22So they went out and picked out a suit for me, and that's how my career got launched.
- 9:30Secondhand smoke was a relatively novel way to go after big tobacco.
- 9:35Like addiction, it chipped away at the whole personal freedom argument.
- 9:40Maybe the person smoking had made a choice, but the people next to them
- 9:44in elevators and restaurants, they hadn't consented to smoking, and
- 9:49yet here they were inhaling away.
- 9:52The campaign had some wins and some losses, but they got
- 9:56secondhand smoke on the radar.
- 9:59While we were trying to reduce secondhand smoke as air pollution, indoor air
- 10:05pollution, we inadvertently undermined the social acceptability of smoking.
- 10:11It wasn't because more people got convinced that smoking was bad for
- 10:16you, it was just that they got worried that it was bad for other people.
- 10:21And, you know, very, very few smokers, while they're willing to rationalize
- 10:27the fact that they're hurting themselves, very, very few smokers
- 10:32can rationalize hurting somebody else.
- 10:35Cigarette companies were not fans of Stanton Glantz.
- 10:39They tried to discredit his research, intimidate him, but he didn't stop.
- 10:44There have been some very, very hard times, and some of
- 10:48this stuff has been very scary.
- 10:52But, you know, you just have to deal with it.
- 10:55It's not fun, but it's just part of the cost.
- 11:06Stanton turned out to be the perfect person to send the box to.
- 11:11I just realized within a, you know, a short time, I mean, before I had to go
- 11:16off to class at noon, that I wanted to write something about these and just
- 11:22decided that that's what we were gonna do.
- 11:26And I figured we'd get sued at some point, but I wanted to get something written
- 11:31before we had to deal with the lawyers.
- 11:34And so while I was off teaching statistics, I got a couple of the staff
- 11:40in cardiology to Xerox the whole box.
- 11:43Uh, and we burnt out two Xerox machines xeroxing all those
- 11:49documents, and then we sent them, or I sent them to people out of state.
- 11:56Stanton described their reporting as a keyhole into the tobacco industry.
- 12:02It was just a small window into one company, but still,
- 12:06there was a lot to see.
- 12:08Glantz and a handful of his colleagues frantically got to work.
- 12:12They started writing articles that described the documents in detail.
- 12:16We were, like, really, really working our butts off to get this done, and
- 12:22I just spent so many hours on this that I ended up getting weakness
- 12:27in one hand from all the typing.
- 12:31Meanwhile, Brown & Williamson learned about the leak, but thought the
- 12:35documents had been sent to someone else, a lawyer named Dick Daynard.
- 12:40He was kind of the Stan Glantz of litigation.
- 12:43Now, he knew I had the documents, 'cause I had told him I had the documents, and
- 12:49he was a very good sport about it in that he let them sue him for months so
- 12:55they would be busy chasing after him.
- 12:57So I'd be talking to him at home, and his wife would get on and say,
- 13:01"How's your book coming?" 'Cause she wasn't totally being enjoy being sued.
- 13:08Stanton and his colleagues wrote six articles and submitted them
- 13:12to the Journal of the American Medical Association, or the AMA.
- 13:17And it ended up comprising most of the July 19th, 1995 issue.
- 13:24Not everyone was happy or as chill about being sued as Dick Daynard.
- 13:29This was done kind of over the dead body of the AMA's lawyer.
- 13:34He was very unhappy with them for doing this.
- 13:37And I remember before the press conference, he came in and gave me this
- 13:42speech that, you know, I, I needed to watch my language and, you know, not
- 13:47call the tobacco companies mother or something like that, which I was a
- 13:52little offended by because, I mean, I…
- 13:54By then I had a lot of media experience, and I knew you shouldn't do that.
- 13:58And I told him I would really work hard not to, but, you know, they are mother
- 14:04. Brown & Williamson argued that the documents had been stolen, which was
- 14:09true, and that anyone who published them was also breaking the law.
- 14:14Also, kind of, sort of technically true.
- 14:17But given the First Amendment protections for journalists exposing information
- 14:22that serves the public interest, the courts quashed their subpoenas.
- 14:27And so the documents made their way out into the world.
- 14:31Congressman Henry Waxman even read parts of them directly
- 14:35into the Congressional Record.
- 14:37Stanton Glantz gave the original box to the UCSF library, but by
- 14:42this point it was 1995, so there was something else they could do.
- 14:47The deputy director of the library came to me and said, "You know, I have this idea."
- 14:54"Why don't we put them on the internet?" To which I said, "What's the internet?"
- 15:05They put them on the World Wide Web, and they're still
- 15:09there, along with an expansive collection from other industries at
- 15:16industrydocuments.ucsf.edu, free and accessible to everyone.
- 15:22The cat was out of the bag, and Stanton and his colleagues edited
- 15:26the documents and their analysis into a book called The Cigarette Papers.
- 15:31But aside from some bad publicity, was there anything in the box that
- 15:35could really make a difference?
- 15:38The answer is yes.
- 15:43Chapter four: Secret Science.
- 15:47Remember when all those industry execs got up and testified that
- 15:51nicotine was not addictive?
- 15:53I believe that nicotine is not addictive.
- 15:56The timing was hilarious, if you like dark humor, because the proof
- 16:01that they were liars was delivered to Stanton Glantz in the Mr. Butts
- 16:05box less than one month later.
- 16:08I can tell you the most quoted line in the documents was, "We're in the business
- 16:13of selling nicotine, an addictive drug."
- 16:19That line is from a memo written by Brown & Williamson's vice president
- 16:23and general counsel in 1963, 25 years before the surgeon general said nicotine
- 16:30was addictive and 31 years before those tobacco CEOs testified before Congress.
- 16:37They lied about it for decades.
- 16:41Meanwhile, the documents showed that the company scientists had
- 16:44done sophisticated research into the pharmacology of nicotine and how it
- 16:49creates and reinforces addiction.
- 16:52That was done to develop products, to figure out how do you design a
- 16:56cigarette to make it more addictive.
- 16:58They did very detailed studies of what's called smoking topography,
- 17:03which is, like, how do you puff?
- 17:05How frequently do you wanna make the nicotine hit?
- 17:08How hard should it be?
- 17:10And how do you develop different products to get somebody new drawn
- 17:17in and then working them up to a really s- heavily addicted state?
- 17:22And all that stuff, if you look at it, just the science was extremely well done.
- 17:29Done to nefarious ends, but well done nonetheless.
- 17:33They did not screw around with that stuff.
- 17:35They did not spin it.
- 17:37They did not try to avoid it because see, that was informing product
- 17:42development and profits, and they, they wanted those decisions to
- 17:47be based on the best evidence.
- 17:49And that memo wasn't the only explosive document.
- 17:53Remember that meeting at the Plaza Hotel in 1953 after all those
- 17:58studies came out showing that cigarettes caused lung cancer?
- 18:02Well, the cigarette companies conspired to publicly say that they didn't
- 18:06believe it, but privately, their own scientists were confirming it was true.
- 18:12This is Allan Brandt.
- 18:14You know, on the one hand, you're following the public record where
- 18:16they say, "We don't know if it's cancer-causing or not." And then you
- 18:23come across a document that's s- you know, from late 1962, and it says,
- 18:27"We have now identified 17, you know, known carcinogens in tobacco smoke."
- 18:36Brown & Williamson's memos used code words.
- 18:40Lung cancer was referred to as zephyr, as in, "Tobacco smoke contains a
- 18:45substance or substances which may cause zephyr." That line is from a 1957 memo.
- 18:52There was also hippo.
- 18:54Hippo is the hypothalamus which nicotine, among other things, acts on
- 19:01Once it was clear that cigarettes did indeed cause lung cancer,
- 19:06cigarette companies did the next business savvy thing.
- 19:09They tried to engineer themselves out of the problem with a
- 19:12tech fix, secretly of course.
- 19:16And the idea back then is, well, okay, cigarettes are,
- 19:22you know, causing diseases.
- 19:25There's lots of bad things in cigarettes.
- 19:27And if we could just identify what they are, we could re-engineer
- 19:32the product to get rid of them.
- 19:35In other words, they tried to make a safe cigarette, just like our
- 19:39friend from Instagram suggested.
- 19:41The death thing is
- 19:43a problem.
- 19:44And you can just imagine the cigarette executives thinking,
- 19:47"How hard could it be, right? We'll have a safe cigarette in no time."
- 19:52Like, we can figure this out.
- 19:55We're smart.
- 19:56We're capable.
- 19:57They worked on that for about 20 years.
- 20:01And I, I think it was a genuine effort to, you know, by them to say, "Okay,
- 20:08well let's find the one or two or three or five or 10 bad things in cigarettes
- 20:13and re-engineer the cigarettes to get rid of that stuff." And they failed.
- 20:20Sure, they could re-engineer the cigarette to reduce the amount of benzopyrene, one
- 20:26of the carcinogens they identified early on, but when they reduced that, they
- 20:31unintentionally increased something else.
- 20:34It
- 20:35was like trying to shove a balloon into a box that isn't quite big enough.
- 20:40And so making a cigarette that was substantially less toxic
- 20:46than the average cigarette just turned out to be impossible.
- 20:51And then by the '70s, their lawyers were saying to them, "You know, this is very
- 20:56dangerous because legally, because if you, let's say you do make a cigarette
- 21:01which is safer than the other cigarettes, then product liability lawyers, if you
- 21:07don't stop selling everything else, they're gonna jump down you for that.
- 21:12And even if you do, they're gonna say, 'Well, why didn't you do this
- 21:16sooner?'" And so the lawyers pulled the plug on the safe cigarette research.
- 21:22Do you hear that Instagram lady?
- 21:24They tried.
- 21:25They couldn't do it.
- 21:27The documents also revealed the inside scoop on secondhand smoke, which
- 21:32got personal for Stanton Glantz.
- 21:35I mean, it was interesting because publicly they were just always trashing my
- 21:38work and saying it was flawed and I didn't know what I was doing, but internally
- 21:43they thought it was pretty good.
- 21:45So good, in fact, that they were worried, and they even tried to make a cigarette
- 21:50that produced less smoke, but that created a PR problem as well as the same legal
- 21:55trouble as making a less toxic cigarette.
- 21:58How do you make something safer when you've been clinging to a
- 22:02narrative that there's nothing dangerous about the original product?
- 22:06So they bagged that, too.
- 22:13And there was one more thing
- 22:15We know cigarettes were really pitched towards kids, and very young kids.
- 22:22Listen, the production team here at Distillations is old enough to
- 22:25remember the infamous Joe Camel.
- 22:28As children, we knew him as well as we knew Mickey Mouse.
- 22:32He was cool, and he was everywhere.
- 22:35And now we know why.
- 22:37More and more evidence came out that the industry knew that if they didn't
- 22:42get you using their product by the time you're 17 or 18, their chance
- 22:48of making you a smoker was very, very low, and getting lower all the time.
- 22:54So they denied that they pitched towards kids, but they had to
- 23:00to preserve their industry.
- 23:03It's one thing to say that grownups can make their own decisions.
- 23:07If they wanna poison themselves, that's up to them.
- 23:10But children are different.
- 23:12We think of kids as, you know, needing protection, not adequately
- 23:16educated yet, developmentally unable to always act in their best interest.
- 23:22But if the industry was going after them, you know, through like Joe
- 23:26Camel ads, which was a famous legal case, then the industry had done
- 23:32something wrong that compromised their arguments about individual autonomy
- 23:41The damning evidence was piling up and cigarette companies'
- 23:45luck was about to run out.
- 23:51Chapter five: The RICO Case
- 23:57The Mr. Butts box was an explosion of evidence that made it clear how
- 24:02corrupt the tobacco companies were and how all of their arguments were
- 24:07a house of cards ready to fall.
- 24:10But it still seemed impossible for individuals to go up against them.
- 24:14The industry had a very good track record at defeating those cases.
- 24:19They just made the plaintiff miserable, just chasing after them, harassing them.
- 24:26Just dragged the litigation on forever by endless fights about discovery and
- 24:33motions and appeals and stuff, and basically bankrupted the lawyers who
- 24:39were bringing the plaintiff's case.
- 24:45Something had to change, and it did
- 24:49Well, what happened in the '90s was a new set of legal theories emerged,
- 24:55and this is something Daynard actually had quite a lot to do with.
- 25:00And that was moving from the individual to, to looking at large numbers of people.
- 25:09Private cases merged into class action suits.
- 25:13Then a group of state attorneys general started grouping similar cases.
- 25:18But the theory wasn't tort, wasn't injury, it was fraud.
- 25:24Fraud.
- 25:25You know, like if you had lots of evidence that a company had lied to you
- 25:30repeatedly over the course of decades.
- 25:33The argument was that the cigarette companies had defrauded large numbers
- 25:37of people and should pay Medicare costs that the states had borne as a result.
- 25:42And by 1998, all 52 states and territories had signed the Master Settlement Agreement
- 25:48with the four biggest tobacco companies.
- 25:51It settled dozens of other lawsuits, and the companies also agreed to
- 25:56a number of conditions, including restrictions on advertising,
- 26:00targeting youth, using cartoons, and promoting smoking in TV and films.
- 26:06And then the Department of Justice brought their own case against cigarettes,
- 26:11The United States v. Philip Morris.
- 26:14And the DOJ handpicked none other than Allan Brandt to be an expert witness,
- 26:20which was good because if you can believe it, the cigarette companies had their own
- 26:25historian of medicine expert witnesses.
- 26:28Allan was determined not to let them speak for the entire field.
- 26:32I became alarmed that people would say, "Oh, that group of medical historians,
- 26:38even though they don't like smoking, they side with the industry's argument
- 26:43that this should be any individual's assumption and that the tobacco
- 26:48companies did not behave badly."
- 26:54Allen challenged the argument that the cigarette companies had been
- 26:57relying on since the very first studies came out, that the evidence
- 27:02was inconclusive, and he brought a visual aid with him up on the stand.
- 27:07I had drawn a chart that had public health, science, and medicine, I
- 27:13think a basic Venn diagram, and sort of the idea of what you know,
- 27:19how you know it, and when you act.
- 27:22He used the cholera story as an example, noting that we didn't wait
- 27:27until more and more people got sick.
- 27:30We looked around, said there's something in the water, so
- 27:33we better stop drinking it.
- 27:35You know, how much information do you need?
- 27:38There's accumulation of scientific knowledge, and at certain points
- 27:45you could act on that knowledge with confidence, even if there were things
- 27:49about it you didn't know, with the goal of saving lives and restoring a
- 27:55community from deathly disease to health.
- 28:01So I asked the question, what did we know and when did we know it?
- 28:06And what would've been the appropriate time to say, "We don't know everything
- 28:12about this risk, but we know a lot about it, and we've demonstrated it,"
- 28:17and the character of these scientific demonstrations were highly persuasive.
- 28:23And a company had worked to undermine public and
- 28:27scientific knowledge about this.
- 28:30And how many lives could we save if there hadn't been this cover-up,
- 28:36these deceptions, these lies?
- 28:41His testimony was an important counter to the defense's argument.
- 28:45The case was litigated before a judge without a jury, and in 2006, the
- 28:51judge found the companies guilty of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
- 28:55Organizations Act, otherwise known as the RICO Act, which should sound familiar
- 29:01if you've ever watched The Sopranos.
- 29:03It's the law that goes after organized crime, as in the mafia.
- 29:08The judge didn't go so far as to punish them financially beyond a
- 29:12few small penalties for destroying documents, which was a blow to the DOJ.
- 29:18But a legal ruling like this confirmed what the companies had done, and the
- 29:24outcome for the government was, you know, really very good because the judge found
- 29:31that the companies had acted criminally and that they should be punished.
- 29:37And the companies were required to put up ads that acknowledged, you know,
- 29:43that smoking was addictive, that it was harmful, that they'd known about it.
- 29:48Smoking kills on average 1,200 Americans every day.
- 29:52There is no safe level of exposure to secondhand smoke.
- 29:56All cigarettes cause cancer, lung disease, heart attacks, and premature death.
- 30:01There is no safe cigarette.
- 30:03And so, you know, the case is widely cited, and I think it's been influential
- 30:09in public health and public policy.
- 30:12But did it, you know, end the tobacco industry as we know it?
- 30:15No.
- 30:16They're still there, you know, which is too bad.
- 30:20But, you know, there's no question that fewer people are smoking, fewer
- 30:25people are using tobacco products.
- 30:28The tobacco companies have less power, and a lot of people are
- 30:32alive today that would be dead if the documents weren't out there.
- 30:38And they're still bouncing around, affecting public perceptions in the
- 30:43public debate, uh, all over the world
- 30:55We asked Allan Brandt if he'd noticed cigarettes getting popular
- 30:59again and how he felt about it.
- 31:02Yeah.
- 31:03I, I haven't really been surprised by it because I think that
- 31:08first of all, the industry is there waiting for opportunities.
- 31:14And what the industry has done is similar in some ways to World War I.
- 31:21We're living in a period of violence, uncertainty, and you sort of say, you
- 31:28know, "I could get killed in a car accident or in a protest or," you know.
- 31:36And so it's a very hard time to feel like you have control, and smoking purports to
- 31:45be something that you can decide to do.
- 31:48But what that often has failed to reveal is that there's somebody who
- 31:53wants us buying those cigarettes
- 32:05Americans have always gone to extreme lengths to uphold our
- 32:08values of personal freedom.
- 32:11We wanna believe that we're in charge of our own destinies, even when it's
- 32:16not in our best interests, even when the science points us in another direction.
- 32:22Because a myth can be more powerful than science.
- 32:26A myth can make us think it's our own choice to take a risk.
- 32:31But what happens when science is the one taking the risk?
- 32:35Is it okay if we think it'll save lives?
- 32:38Join us for our next episode when we get into it.
- 32:41There was this fear of chemicals in drinking water, and nobody wanted to do
- 32:45anything even though they knew it was causing typhoid fever and killing people.
- 32:52So they were very untrusting, the citizens were.
- 32:56But the water utilities, I mean, as long as nobody ever found out about
- 33:00it, they could do anything pretty much they could get away with.
- 33:06Distillations podcast is produced by the Science History Institute
- 33:09and recorded in the Laurie J. Landau Digital Production Studios.
- 33:14Our executive producer is Mariel Carr.
- 33:17Our senior producer is Rigoberto Hernandez.
- 33:20This episode was produced by Mariel Carr.
- 33:23It was fact-checked by Alexandra Etea, and the sound design was done by Seth Samuel.
- 33:29Support for Distillations has been provided by the Middleton Foundation
- 33:33and the Wyncote Foundation.
- 33:35You can find all of our podcasts as well as our videos and articles on
- 33:39our website at sciencehistory.org.
- 33:42And you can follow us on social media, @SciHistoryOrg, for news about our
- 33:47podcast and everything else going on in our free museum and library.
- 33:52For Distillations, I'm Alexis Patrick.
- 33:55Thanks for listening.