Latest / Reasonably Safir: Florida Criminal & Injury Caselaw / First Things First: Florida Caselaw, Week of November 13, 2026
Transcript
- In April of twenty fifteen, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office got a warrant for a man’s arrest on attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was hard to find. That fall, state agents learned he’d be at a big music festival in Suwannee County, and on November second they took him down there, acting on the outstanding Duval warrant. He had drugs in his pocket, and there was a gun and more drugs in his car. Suwannee County booked him only on its own local charges, and Duval put a detainer on him. He was convicted on the local charges and did his time. Two days before that sentence ended, in April of twenty seventeen, he was taken to Jacksonville and served with the old warrant, and the State charged him the next day. That was nearly eighteen months after the festival arrest. He pleaded to the Duval charges and got twenty years. The Fifth District vacated the convictions under a twenty-five-year-old Florida Supreme Court case that said, in effect, if the State doesn’t file charges until speedy trial time has already run, the defendant walks. This week the Florida Supreme Court receded from that case and put the twenty years back. The reason comes down to one piece of paper he never filed. I’m Rory Safir, and this is Reasonably Safir. This one is the caselaw edition: the decisions Florida’s appellate courts handed down this week, case by case, for the lawyers who’d rather hear them than read them. Here’s the thing about this week. Over and over, the remedy depended on doing the steps in the right order. Discharge for a speedy trial violation comes after a notice and a recapture period, not before. A criminal contempt conviction built on a party’s allegations needs those acts sworn to. A sanction against a prisoner needs a show cause order first. An inventory search needs proof of a policy. And on the injury side, a tort reform statute applied only because of when a lawsuit was filed, and the legislature said so in the bill itself. So that’s the theme. First things first. Let’s get into it. The first case is the one I opened with. State against Robinson, from the Florida Supreme Court, on a certified question from the Fifth District, out of Duval County. Justice Francis wrote it. Chief Justice Couriel and Justices Muñiz, Grosshans, Barrios and Tanenbaum joined. Justice Labarga concurred in the result. Episode seventeen opened on a speedy trial case too, and this one picks up right where that one left off. The precedent was State against Williams, from two thousand one. Williams held that the speedy trial clock starts when the accused is taken into custody and keeps running even if the State does nothing, and that the State may not file charges based on the same conduct after the period has expired. The result was automatic discharge, with no recapture period for the State. In Robinson’s appeal, two of the three Fifth District judges found the festival takedown was an arrest on the Duval charges, and all three agreed that if it was, Williams required discharge. But all three questioned whether Williams was right, and they certified the question. The Supreme Court answered it. Under the text of the pre-twenty twenty-five rule, the remedy for a missed deadline was never automatic discharge. The defendant had to file a notice of expiration of speedy trial time. That triggered a hearing within five days, where the court had to make the inquiry under subdivision (j), and then, absent a reason under (j), the State got the recapture period to bring the case to trial. Only if that period passed through no fault of the defendant was there a discharge. The Court said Williams bypassed those steps and created the equivalent of a substantive right with no basis in a statute or either constitution. Quoting its own Nelson decision, the Court said the constitutions guarantee a right to speedy trial, not a right to speedy discharge without trial. It found no real reliance interest, because Williams governs what the State does, not what defendants do, so it receded from Williams. Then it applied the rule to Robinson. Even assuming the clock ran out before he was charged, he never filed a notice of expiration, so he never complied with the steps that would have entitled him to discharge. And the State was entitled to the recapture period. Fifth District quashed, convictions and sentences reinstated. Justice Labarga agreed Robinson wasn’t entitled to automatic discharge, but wrote separately to say he still adheres to his dissent from last year’s rule amendments. The practice point is short. If you have a case still governed by the old rule, a late information is no longer a free discharge. You file the notice of expiration, you go to the hearing, and the State gets its recapture window. The deep dive at the end is about exactly this: what speedy trial actually gets your client in Florida now, under the old rule and the new one. Hold that thought. The next case is a DUI lawyer’s case even though nobody was charged with DUI. Broughton against the State, Sixth District, out of Lee County, Judge Nicholas Thompson below. Judge Smith wrote it, with Chief Judge Traver and Judge Wozniak. Fort Myers police arrested a driver for reckless driving and towed his car. Before the tow, they did an inventory search and found cocaine, a gun holster and two handgun magazines. He was a convicted felon, and he pleaded no contest to reckless driving, cocaine and possession of ammunition by a felon, reserving the suppression issue. The whole inventory record was two officers. The first said that when the registered owner is arrested, they tow, because they aren’t allowed to turn the car over to anybody else, and they inventory it for the safety of the property inside. The second confirmed the towing policy and the rule against releasing cars to third parties. No written policy came in. Defense counsel argued that “our policy says” testimony was conclusory, and that the State could have brought the actual policy. Affirmed. The court said that while the testimony was basic, it was enough to show a policy existed and was followed. It walked through Opperman, Lafayette, Bertine and Florida against Wells, and said none of them requires any particular quantity or quality of proof beyond evidence that the policy exists. It relied on a Third District case with similar testimony, and on federal circuits holding the policy doesn’t even have to be written. The court distinguished the Second District’s Beezley and the Fifth District’s Leary as cases with no evidence of a policy at all. One detail matters: there was no closed container here. Wells, the court noted, was a closed container case, where the State put on no evidence of any Highway Patrol policy on opening closed containers. So, two practice points. First, because two sentences of policy testimony can be enough, the fight on an inventory after a DUI or a driving arrest has to be about the facts. Get the written policy in discovery, compare it to what the officers actually did, and cross on what it says about closed containers. Second, watch your concessions. Defense counsel conceded at the hearing that there was at least some testimony that a policy existed, and the court’s holding opens with that concession. The next case is about the paper behind a contempt charge. Pugh against the State, Fourth District, out of Martin County, Judge Michael McNicholas below. Judge Klingensmith wrote it, with Chief Judge Gerber and Judge Shepherd. A mother was held in indirect criminal contempt for violating a timesharing order and got four days in jail. The order to show cause didn’t state the facts itself. It attached highlighted parts of two of the father’s motions: a contempt motion with what purported to be a notarized affidavit, filed April ninth, and an emergency child pickup motion, filed April twenty-third, that wasn’t sworn. It had only a signed acknowledgment that he understood he was swearing to the truth. Reversed. Rule 3.840(a) requires an order to show cause based on the court’s own motion or the affidavit of someone with knowledge of the facts, and the court has to comply strictly. The violations she was convicted for happened on April eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and twenty-third, after the sworn motion was filed, so they appeared only in the unsworn one. The earlier affidavit couldn’t supply sworn facts about later events, and an acknowledgment at the end of a pleading isn’t an affidavit. The reversal is without prejudice to new proceedings that comply with the rule. If you defend contempt, line up every act the court relies on against the sworn document that alleges it. The next case is a juvenile case where the State tried to hold a judge to the plea deal. State against C.H.R., First District, out of Walton County, Judge Jeffrey Lewis below. Judge Osterhaus wrote it, with Judge M.K. Thomas, and Judge Treadwell concurred with an opinion. A juvenile charged with armed robbery and related counts entered a plea under an agreement that called for commitment to a secure Department of Juvenile Justice program. The judge then ordered a predisposition report, and the department said he scored low risk and recommended probation. Over the State’s objection, the judge imposed a suspended moderate-level commitment, with intensive probation, electronic monitoring and a long list of conditions. The State appealed, and the court dismissed. The State can appeal a juvenile disposition only if it’s illegal, meaning beyond the court’s statutory authority. And a judge isn’t bound by a plea agreement, even one the court accepted, so departing from it isn’t illegal by itself. Certiorari wasn’t available either. Judge Treadwell’s concurrence goes further. He wrote that when a judge rejects a deal, the State gets to back out of its own promise and argue for any sentence, but it doesn’t get to undo the defendant’s plea, because the plea was the defendant’s obligation. And he described a different case: if the State had reduced the charges in exchange for the plea, a sentence on those reduced charges after the judge rejected the deal would likely be illegal and appealable. Last week, in Nobles, we talked about a judge who got too involved in a plea. This is the other side: a judge who isn’t a party to the deal at all. The next one is a quick update on six-person juries, which we’ve been tracking since episode nine. Velazquez against the State, Sixth District, out of Lee County, Judge Nicholas Thompson below, Judge Pratt writing with Judges Nardella and Kamoutsas. The claim was unpreserved, and there was no fundamental error, because Williams against Florida, the nineteen seventy case that approved six-person juries, is still binding. The court quoted the Second District’s Mullins decision from episode nine: a grant of certiorari decides nothing and overrules nothing. Two Fourth District opinions this week, Beauzier and Jones, both out of Palm Beach County, affirmed on the same issue with a “but see” cite to Kian. Same advice as before. If you’re trying a felony to six, object before jury selection and get a ruling. Three quick sentencing reminders. In a Lee County probation case from the Sixth District, which is a sex offense case, so no name, the judge pronounced a fifty-dollar public defender application fee, a hundred dollars for costs of prosecution and a hundred-dollar defense fee, and the written judgment said a hundred ninety, three hundred twenty-eight and three hundred. The oral pronouncement controls, and the written judgment gets corrected. In Connor, out of Broward, the State tacitly conceded two of three probation violation grounds, and because the Fourth District couldn’t tell whether the judge would have revoked on the remaining ground alone, it reversed for reconsideration. And in Cohen, out of Indian River, the Fourth District struck eighteen firearm points from a scoresheet because the attempted murder conviction was statutorily excluded from that assessment. The error was harmless, but the court still required the correction. Read every line of the written judgment and the scoresheet. One more from the Fifth District, Derting, out of Duval. A prisoner’s late habeas petition was treated as a 3.850 motion and denied as untimely, and the court referred him to the Department of Corrections for discipline. That part was reversed, because rule 3.850(p)(3) requires an order setting out the facts and directing him to show cause first. Same theme: the steps come before the sanction. Quick pause, colleague to colleague. My firm handles DUI, criminal defense, and personal injury across Tampa Bay. If a case walks through your door that you’d rather send out, call or text 727-472-8096. I gladly accept referrals. Now the injury side. The first case is Unsworth against Barsoumian, Second District, out of Hillsborough County, Judge Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe below. Judge Guard wrote it. Judge Labrit concurred, and Judge Khouzam concurred specially. It’s the Second District’s answer on whether the twenty twenty-three tort reform’s collateral source statute reaches older cases. In April of twenty twenty, there was a crash on Interstate 275 in Tampa. He sued that September, and the defendant admitted liability. Before trial, the defense moved to bring in evidence under section 768.0427, the House Bill 837 statute that changed the evidentiary side of the collateral source rule, which kept juries from hearing about insurance and other benefits. The plaintiff objected because the bill applies to causes of action filed after its effective date, March twenty-fourth, twenty twenty-three. The trial judge ruled it procedural and applied it anyway, and also put the burden on the plaintiff to prove what his health insurance would pay. He testified about his insurance, his premiums and his copays. When he offered no evidence of what insurance would pay for future care, the judge directed a verdict on future medical expenses. The jury awarded every dollar of past medical expenses he asked for, found no permanent injury, and awarded nothing for pain and suffering. After the Fifth District’s Wolf decision, the trial judge granted a new trial while criticizing Wolf, then limited it to medical expenses. The Second District agreed the new trial was required and reversed the limit. Section thirty of the bill says that except as otherwise expressly provided, the act applies to causes of action filed after its effective date, and nothing in the act says this statute works any other way. So the court didn’t have to decide whether the statute is procedural or substantive. The legislature decides how far back a law reaches, and here it said. The court also held the plaintiff preserved the issue even though he put the insurance evidence in himself, under the Florida Supreme Court’s Sheffield decision: once the court unequivocally rules the evidence in, presenting it first doesn’t waive the error. The error wasn’t harmless. And because permanency, causation and damages are intertwined, the new trial covers all of them. Practice points. If your client’s case was filed before March twenty-fourth, twenty twenty-three, you now have Wolf from the Fifth District and Unsworth from the Second, and the Fourth District has read section thirty the same way, in a footnote about a different provision. Make the objection in a motion in limine and get an unequivocal ruling. And if the error reached the damages verdict, ask for a new trial on everything it touched, including permanency and causation, not just the line item that went wrong. The second injury case is Crocker against Rein, also Second District, also out of Hillsborough. Judge Khouzam wrote it, with Judges Northcutt and LaRose. A passenger on the back of a motorcycle was hurt when the driver lost control and ran off the road. There was no evidence of a collision, road debris or intoxication, and the parties stipulated there was no mechanical defect. The driver said it started to fishtail right after she leaned forward and pointed to show him where her daughter lived. Her own expert admitted a passenger can move enough to cause a loss of control, couldn’t rule out other causes like an unnoticed hazard, and agreed a motorcycle can act that way with no rider error at all. Her lawyers asked for the res ipsa loquitur instruction, the inference of negligence when the defendant had exclusive control and the accident ordinarily wouldn’t happen without negligence. The trial court gave it, and she won. Reversed for a new trial. The Florida Supreme Court has called res ipsa a doctrine of extremely limited applicability, and it’s ordinarily unavailable in auto cases, with narrow exceptions like a wayward wheel or a defective loaned vehicle. Neither element was met here. The plaintiff’s own expert said a passenger can exert control, and that motorcycles crash without negligence. And the error wasn’t harmless, because the instruction let the jury infer negligence unless it affirmatively found there was none, which flipped the burden or at least greatly reduced it. The lesson for plaintiffs: in a single-vehicle crash with no explanation, res ipsa can cost you the verdict. Build the negligence case with proof. The third is about arbitration clauses and slip and falls. Boberg against Ox of South Florida, Fourth District, out of Martin County, Judge William Roby below, per curiam from Judges Ciklin, Conner and Klingensmith. A homeowner hired a company to coat the floor around his pool. The contract said the company didn’t warrant a slip-resistant surface, disclaimed slip and fall injuries, limited tort liability and gave the company the option to arbitrate anything “arising out of or relating or pertaining to” the agreement. He slipped, sued, and the trial court sent everything to arbitration. Reversed on the negligence count. Under the Florida Supreme Court’s Seifert decision, even a broad clause needs a contractual nexus, and a duty imposed by law and owed to invitees and visitors generally doesn’t come from the contract. The contract’s own references to slipperiness and negligence didn’t change where the duty came from. Plead the negligence count on the general duty, separate from the contract. And one short one from the Sixth District, out of Polk County. Vaughan against USMI Properties Five. A rotten oak on the neighbor’s land fell on the plaintiff’s house, and the complaint alleged the owner knew for years it was rotten, after a tenant complained about falling limbs. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings, finding no duty. Judge Mize, joined by Judge Pratt and Associate Judge Beamer, reversed. Under McCain, a known rotten tree creates a foreseeable zone of risk, and the so-called Massachusetts rule, that a landowner isn’t liable when the limbs of healthy trees grow over a neighbor’s land, doesn’t reach diseased trees. This was property damage, but the duty analysis is the same one you’d use if the tree had hit a person. And a rules note for anyone who tries civil cases. On Thursday the Florida Supreme Court reorganized rule 1.530 so motions for new trial and motions for rehearing are handled in separate subdivisions, and it clarified that a motion for rehearing may be directed only to a final judgment or final order. The changes take effect January first, twenty twenty-seven. One more thing before I let you go, because ten minutes of holdings is a digest, and this show doesn’t do digests. Every Friday this segment takes the one doctrine the week actually turned on and gets into the deep end. This week it’s speedy trial, and the question Robinson forces: after Robinson and the twenty twenty-five amendments, what does the speedy trial rule actually get your client? Start with the constitution. Both the Sixth Amendment and article one, section sixteen of the Florida Constitution guarantee a speedy trial, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s test, from Barker against Wingo in nineteen seventy-two, is a balancing test, not a number of days: the length of the delay, the reason for it, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice. Florida went further. The legislature directed the Supreme Court to provide procedures for realizing the right, and in nineteen seventy-one the Court adopted rule 3.191 with fixed periods. When it was first adopted there was no recapture period. A defendant past the deadline could generally get discharged on motion. In nineteen eighty-four the Court took automatic discharge out and added recapture. Then came the line that culminated in Williams, the decision Robinson receded from. Agee in nineteen ninety-three, Genden in ninety-four, and Williams in two thousand one read the old subdivision (o), the nolle prosequi provision, to bring automatic discharge back when the State dropped charges, filed a no action or filed nothing, and then tried to file after the period ran. In State against Nelson, in twenty ten, the Court described the recapture period in the words Robinson borrowed this week: a right to speedy trial, not a right to speedy discharge without trial. Then the twenty twenty-five amendments, effective July first, twenty twenty-five, which we went through in episode seventeen. There were four changes. The clock now starts at the formal charge, not the arrest. Subdivision (o), the nolle prosequi provision behind the Williams line, was deleted, and the rule now says recapture is mandatory before any remedy. The recapture period went from ten days to thirty. And a discharge is without prejudice unless the court finds a constitutional speedy trial violation, which requires discharge with prejudice. The Court also took the words “or the court” out of the discharge provision, to make clear the court doesn’t have to act until the defendant files. Justice Labarga dissented, and his concern was people under long investigations. In twenty nineteen, in Davis, the Court had already adopted a formal arrest standard over his partial dissent, and he wrote that starting the clock at the formal charge goes even further. So which rule governs your case? The Fourth District, in State against Thomas last year, applied the version in effect at the arrest, noting that Florida rules have only prospective effect absent an express statement otherwise, and the amendment had none. The Sixth District, in Hipolito this April, applied the twenty twenty-four version to a demand case, and reversed a discharge because the trial court never made the subdivision (j) inquiry the rule requires before any remedy. Robinson now resolves the late-charging problem under the old rule. Under either version, the State gets its recapture window. And here’s the piece of the twenty twenty-five amendments that’s easy to miss. Rule 3.134 kept its protection for clients held before a formal charge, and added one for clients who are out. A client in custody who hasn’t been formally charged has to be released on his own recognizance by the thirty-third day, or the fortieth if the State shows good cause, and nobody stays in custody past forty days uncharged. The new provision covers clients on pretrial release: if no formal charge is filed within sixty days, the court, with notice to the State, has to order release on recognizance on the sixty-third day, or for good cause continue pretrial release up to thirty more days. After that, if there’s still no formal charge, a motion with notice gets the client released from bail and all pretrial conditions. That doesn’t end the case. But it does take the restraints off while the State decides. So here’s the working playbook. First, find the dates and figure out which rule applies. Arrest date, any notice to appear, the formal charge, and every continuance and who asked for it. The Fourth District looked to the version in effect at the arrest, so for an older arrest, read the old rule, now without Williams. Second, file the separate notice of expiration, and do it on time. Robinson’s twenty years came back on the one filing that was never made. Some courts have treated a discharge motion as the notice, but don’t count on it. Third, be ready for trial when you file. Under subdivision (g), a demand for speedy trial is a pleading that your client is available, has diligently investigated the case, and is prepared or will be within five days. Hipolito shows how a string of new substantive motions can put that in question, and subdivision (j) lets the court deny discharge for delay attributable to the defense or an invalid demand. Make the record show that the delay belongs to the State. Fourth, use rule 3.134 before the charge comes. If your client is sitting in jail or on conditions with no formal charge, the release mechanism is the remedy the rule gives you while the State decides. Fifth, under the new rule, build the constitutional claim from day one, because it’s the only way to a discharge with prejudice. That means the Barker factors: assert the right in writing early and often, document why the delay happened, and document prejudice: lost witnesses, faded memories, months in jail, and a lost job. A rule-only discharge now leaves the State free to refile. And the limit. Robinson didn’t decide when the festival arrest started the clock for the Duval charges. It assumed the period had run and still reinstated the convictions. And nothing in this week’s cases decides when pre-charge delay becomes a constitutional violation in Florida under the new rule. I’m telling you where the steps are, not that the rule got any kinder. It didn’t. The record you build is the remedy. If you want the set, Robinson, Williams, Nelson, the twenty twenty-five amendment opinion with Justice Labarga’s dissent, Thomas and Hipolito, plus a one-page speedy trial date worksheet built on those five points, email me and I’ll send them over. So that’s the week. The Supreme Court receding from a twenty-five-year-old speedy trial precedent, and twenty years reinstated, because the State gets its recapture period and a notice was never filed. An inventory search upheld on two officers’ say-so about policy. A contempt conviction reversed for want of a sworn statement of the acts. A judge free to reject a juvenile plea deal, and a concurrence on when that would cross a line. On the injury side, the twenty twenty-three collateral source statute kept out of a case filed in twenty twenty, res ipsa thrown out of a motorcycle crash, a slip and fall negligence claim kept out of arbitration, and a complaint about a known rotten tree that adequately alleged a duty. The pattern, if you want one: in nearly every case, the right step, taken at the right time, decided who won. One caveat, colleague to colleague. These are summaries, most of these decisions aren’t final until the rehearing time runs and any timely motion is decided, and nothing in this episode is legal advice. Pull the opinion before you rely on a word of it. If you want any of this week’s opinions, or the speedy trial date worksheet from the deep dive, email me at Rory at the Safir lawyer dot com and I’ll send them over. Take care of yourself, and take care of your clients.