Latest / The CMO Podcast with Fexingo: Marketing Leadership, Budgets, and Executive Strategy / DTC Brands Hit the Wholesale Wall
Transcript
- Lucas: There is a moment every successful direct to consumer brand reaches where the math on staying online-only stops adding up. Customer acquisition costs are climbing, the addressable market starts to feel tapped out, and the board starts asking: when do we get real distribution? Luna: Right, and that pressure has pushed a lot of once-pure DTC names into retail — sometimes into their own stores, sometimes into wholesale partnerships. Lucas: And the results have been brutally mixed. So today I want to look at what happens when a digitally native brand tries to go wholesale — specifically through the lens of Allbirds, which might be the most expensive case study in failed retail expansion we've seen in the last five years. Luna: Allbirds lost about $230 million in 2024, if I'm remembering their latest filing correctly. Lucas: That's the number. And they are not alone — but their trajectory is especially instructive because of how deliberately they built the brand. Allbirds was the poster child for sustainable, comfortable, direct to consumer footwear. They had a cult following. They had a clear story. And then they tried to get into every shoe store in America. Luna: They started selling through Nordstrom, REI, Zappos. And the narrative shifted from 'we make the world's most comfortable wool sneaker' to 'oh, those are the shoes that are always on sale.' Lucas: Exactly. And that brand dilution is one problem. But there's a deeper structural issue that a lot of CMOs underestimate when they make this pivot — and it's the difference between controlling your customer relationship and renting shelf space. Lucas: When you sell direct, you own the data, you control the pricing, you control the unboxing experience. The minute you sell through a wholesaler, you are competing for attention against every other brand on that shelf. And you are almost certainly going to have to discount to move units. Luna: And the wholesale margin structure is punishing. You're typically giving up 50 to 60 percent of the retail price to the retailer. So unless you have a massive volume uplift, the unit economics get ugly fast. Lucas: Allbirds tried to compensate with owned stores too. At their peak they had around 60 locations. But they never got the unit economics to work in either channel. Their gross margin in 2024 was around 42 percent — compare that to a traditional footwear company like Deckers, which runs closer to 55 percent. Luna: So what went wrong specifically? Was it the product, the pricing, or just the strategy of trying to be everywhere? Lucas: I think the answer is: they tried to be a platform company and a wholesale company simultaneously, and they ended up being mediocre at both. The DTC channel requires constant investment in digital marketing, retention, and community. The wholesale channel requires a completely different set of capabilities — trade marketing, retail sales reps, co-op advertising, managing chargebacks. Lucas: And the C-suite at Allbirds kept switching priorities. One quarter they'd talk about e-commerce growth. Next quarter they'd announce a big wholesale push. The brand never built a consistent muscle. Luna: It reminds me of that line from former Nike CMO Greg Hoffman — he talks about the 'retail empathy gap' that digital-first founders have. They don't understand how a buyer thinks, how a floor set works, what it means to negotiate for end-cap placement. Lucas: That's exactly the concept I wanted to land on. The retail empathy gap. Hoffman argues that DTC founders are so used to optimizing a funnel that they underestimate the relationship-based, messy, human side of retail. You can't A-B test your way into a better relationship with a Nordstrom buyer. Lucas: And the data backs this up. A McKinsey study from last year found that digitally native brands that added wholesale distribution saw their gross margins decline by an average of 8 to 12 percentage points in the first two years. Only about 30 percent of them ever recovered to pre-wholesale margin levels. Luna: So who did it right? Are there brands that made the transition successfully? Lucas: Warby Parker is the most cited example. They started with a controlled wholesale — they partnered with a few select retailers early on, but their main bet was on owned retail stores. They opened their own shops, controlled the experience, kept the margin. They've been profitable on an adjusted EBITDA basis for several quarters now. Luna: Right, but Warby Parker also had a higher average order value and a recurring prescription model. Eyewear is different from a forty-dollar pair of sneakers. Lucas: That's a fair point. A better analogue might be M.M.LaFleur, the women's workwear brand. They started DTC, then opened their own showrooms — not full retail stores, but appointment-based showrooms in a handful of cities. They never went mass wholesale. They kept the experience controlled. And they've been profitable since 2019. Lucas: Their CEO, Sarah LaFleur, has been very public about saying: we will not sell through Nordstrom or Bloomingdale's because we cannot control the brand story there. That takes discipline. Luna: So the lesson isn't 'never go wholesale.' It's 'go wholesale only if you have a differentiated product that can command full-price sell-through, and only after you've proven the unit economics of your owned channel.' Lucas: Exactly. And that's the framework I think CMOs should take away. If you're a brand leader today and the board is pushing you to expand distribution, the first question shouldn't be 'which retailers should we target?' It should be 'do we have the margin structure and brand power to win on shelf without destroying the business?' Lucas: Allbirds didn't ask that question until after they'd already signed the deals. And now they're in the middle of a turnaround plan that involves closing stores, pulling back from wholesale, and trying to rebuild the DTC love. It's a painful, expensive reset. Luna: How much of the original brand equity is left at this point? Can they actually pull it off? Lucas: That's the open question. Their new CEO, Joe Zwillinger — one of the co-founders — has been saying all the right things about focusing on product innovation and direct relationships. But the window for a clean reset is narrow. The market has moved on. There are newer, cooler DTC sneaker brands now. And the customer who bought Allbirds in 2018 because it felt like a discovery? That customer might not come back. Luna: It's a cautionary tale about growth for growth's sake. Not every brand needs to be in every channel. Lucas: And that's the conversation I hope more marketing leaders are having inside their own companies. Because the pressure to expand is real. But the cost of expanding badly can be existential. Lucas: I'll be watching Allbirds' next earnings to see if their gross margin shows any sign of recovery. If it doesn't, they may become the textbook case of how not to scale a DTC brand. Luna: And maybe the playbook for how a brand should think about physical retail — not as a distribution channel, but as a brand investment. Lucas: Exactly. Owned retail is an expression of brand. Wholesale is a transaction. And confusing the two is what gets you into trouble.