Latest / Stage Talks with Bellingcat / "Exposing Leaked Intimate Imagery Forums" with Bellingcat and The Press
Transcript
- 0:02You're listening to a stage talk titled Exposing
- 0:05Leaked Intimate Imagery Forums. This week, we
- 0:09were joined by my colleague, Bellingcat's Kolina
- 0:11Koltai and the Press New Zealand's Michael Wright.
- 0:14The two of them broke down their recent investigation
- 0:16into Leaked BB, a site that had over 2 .3 million
- 0:20registered users, rewarding them for distributing
- 0:23leaked nude photos and videos. After they identified
- 0:27links between an admin account on the website
- 0:29and a New Zealand -based man and reached out
- 0:32to this individual for comment, LeeakedBB appeared
- 0:35to have gone offline. Listen in as they walk
- 0:37us through how they found these links and what
- 0:40possible pathways exist to report on this type
- 0:43of website. You can find links to all the resources
- 0:46mentioned in the talk in the podcast description.
- 0:48This talk was hosted by me, Shalimar. on Thursday
- 0:51the 13th of August, 2026, in the Bellincgcat
- 0:54Discord server. Thanks for joining us in this
- 1:05stage talk. First, a content warning. We will
- 1:07be discussing themes of digital sexual exploitation
- 1:10and revenge porn today. So if at any point you
- 1:13need to leave the live audience or just step
- 1:15away from your laptop, please do. and please
- 1:18remain respectful in the comments on behalf of
- 1:21anyone who may have lived experience of this.
- 1:23Today we're talking about an investigation into
- 1:25the website Leaked BB, a forum that for years
- 1:28facilitated the trading of intimate images that
- 1:31appeared in many cases to have been stolen, hacked
- 1:33or shared without consent. Bellingcat and the
- 1:37press followed a trail that crossed archive webpages,
- 1:39domain registrations, DNS records, company filings,
- 1:43payment systems, old usernames, social media
- 1:46accounts, and even pieces of software to discover
- 1:48the likely key admin of the site. Sites like
- 1:51this can be remarkably resilient. They move between
- 1:54jurisdictions, use third -party hosting and payment
- 1:57providers, hide behind pseudonyms, and can simply
- 1:59disappear and reappear elsewhere. So what does
- 2:02it take to actually investigate them? Well, today
- 2:05we'll find out. I'm joined by the key researchers
- 2:08on this project, Bellingcat's Kolina Koltai,
- 2:11and The Press' Michael Wright. We'll go behind
- 2:13the scenes on the methodology of this investigation,
- 2:16and we'll look at the bigger question. Why are
- 2:18sites like this so difficult to tackle? And where
- 2:21can journalism, policy, and legal actually intervene?
- 2:24As usual, we will have plenty of time to answer
- 2:27your questions, so you can place your questions
- 2:28in the chat accessible on the right hand corner
- 2:31of your screen. But please remember that this
- 2:33is being audio recorded for the podcast, so if
- 2:36you don't want me to mention your username, please
- 2:38add that as a note in your question. Okay! All
- 2:42that being said, Kolina, I will mute for now
- 2:45and hand it over to you. Thanks, Charlie. I am
- 2:50so excited to be on the stage talk. I think it's
- 2:52been a hot minute since I've last done a stage
- 2:54talk. And these are always so fun. So thanks
- 2:56for everyone for being here today. And thanks
- 2:59to my colleague, Michael Wright, for being here.
- 3:01I'll talk a little bit first before handing it
- 3:03over to him to talk about this because in true
- 3:06Bellingcat fashion, this was an international
- 3:10investigation that crossed time zones, legal
- 3:14headaches, all sorts of stuff. nothing I ever
- 3:17do can ever just be easing in straightforward.
- 3:19I feel like that is the name of the Bellingcat
- 3:22motto, I guess. So today, I am so excited to
- 3:27talk to you about this investigation. I really
- 3:29do feel like I'm quite proud of this. And as
- 3:33Charlie mentioned, we will be talking about some,
- 3:35I think, really difficult topics as the nature
- 3:37of the site. So please, if you feel like this
- 3:40is too much, don't feel like you have to. uh
- 3:42go through it because uh one question I get when
- 3:45doing these kinds of investigations is how do
- 3:47you deal with uh going through this kind of content
- 3:50through this kind of sites and I feel like we
- 3:52all have our own different tolerances to the
- 3:55kind of content we investigate like I have colleagues
- 3:57here that investigate war crimes and I just don't
- 4:00have the stomach for it so um you know please
- 4:03always be gentle for yourself when uh we're talking
- 4:06about these kind of topics that being said Leap
- 4:09BB is the site we investigated, and if you hadn't
- 4:13heard of that site beforehand, don't feel bad.
- 4:16I think most people... hadn't because it was
- 4:19a very sort of niche topic, a photographic topic
- 4:23sort of website that exists in some of these
- 4:26like darker kind of components of the internet.
- 4:28And when I say darker, not necessarily offline,
- 4:32like on hidden websites, it was easily accessible
- 4:34via Google or going to the web domain itself.
- 4:37But it was a site that predominantly focused
- 4:39on sharing what is sometimes called leaked images
- 4:41or leaked nudes. And while some people take this
- 4:44to be maybe like content stolen from maybe an
- 4:48OnlyFans or Fansly or some other adult sex worker
- 4:51that posts content online for sale, then people
- 4:54take that and post it. A large portion of the
- 4:57website featured people who are not online sex
- 5:00workers. And so this site did a variety of different
- 5:05harms to people online, from people having their
- 5:08copyrighted images stolen and then shared online.
- 5:11But then even I think more egregiously, content
- 5:14from women who might have sent a photo to a partner,
- 5:18photos that they did not necessarily post online,
- 5:22content that might have been hacked from their
- 5:23accounts, and then shared and posted onto this
- 5:26forum. In fact, the sharing of the content was
- 5:29integral to this platform because people could
- 5:32even get paid out. So if you're a heavy contributor,
- 5:35finding leaked or stolen images of women, non
- 5:39-consensually taken images, and posted it, you
- 5:41could even No one becomes such a prolific partner
- 5:44in there, but you can earn crypto currency, get
- 5:47paid out financially. So there's even a bit of
- 5:49a financial incentive to contributing to the
- 5:52website. In addition to that, they had forums
- 5:55from which they were able to talk about how to
- 5:58hack or potentially to acquire this kind of content.
- 6:01People would offer their services on how to do
- 6:04so and a variety of other things. And the other
- 6:06thing I want to touch on this is that Although
- 6:09we personally didn't necessarily see it ourselves
- 6:12or were able to verify any of this, there were
- 6:14also discussions of potentially underaged content
- 6:17on the site. So images, nude images of girls
- 6:21and women who are under, or people who are under
- 6:2418, whose images were on this site, either sometimes
- 6:28without their knowledge or with their knowledge
- 6:29and having a hard time to get it removed. So
- 6:32that gives you a sort of overview of what the
- 6:36site is. And I don't think they were hiding it
- 6:39very clearly. They even held a annual Christmas
- 6:42contest that you would get paid out in cryptocurrency,
- 6:46thousands of dollars worth, if you're like the
- 6:48biggest contributor in December. So... The site
- 6:53had been operating since 2019. They had millions
- 6:57of posts, millions of users, hundreds of thousands
- 7:00of threads, and each thread would oftentimes
- 7:03be a particular victim, would then link to other
- 7:07off -site hosting platforms that wish they would
- 7:11have videos, images, you name it. And the other
- 7:14bit with this is they often also include... the
- 7:18personal identification information about these
- 7:20people. Oftentimes, what their social media handles,
- 7:23maybe like what city did they live, where did
- 7:25they work, where did they go to school. Things
- 7:28that made it easy for people to track down and
- 7:31find these women and girls. That's a long explanation
- 7:37to say. I don't want anyone to say that this
- 7:39site, oh, this is just. because that might be
- 7:42one criticism you might hear. It's like, oh,
- 7:44this is a site that's just had leaked OnlyFans
- 7:46content, and it's not. It was a site that, which
- 7:50has fortunately been offline since we've reached
- 7:52out to the suspected owner, was very clearly
- 7:56conducting a lot of harms and a lot of things
- 7:58that are illegal, I think, across multiple countries'
- 8:00jurisdictions. So that being said, that's a lot
- 8:04of sort of say, like, how did we go about this
- 8:06investigation? We get, I think, a lot of like...
- 8:10tips and heads up, people can email us all the
- 8:12time or send us DMs, say like, hey, here's a
- 8:15site that I think is doing kind of sketchy stuff
- 8:17or things that are, you know, to go check it
- 8:21out. And so on the sort of tip of a, hey, go
- 8:25check out the site, I did. One of the, there's
- 8:29a few different sort of techniques that I like
- 8:30to use in trying to determine maybe who's ownership
- 8:34or who's an administrator or someone like a real
- 8:37person attributed to these types of So one of
- 8:42the first things I do is I try to look at websites,
- 8:45how websites are built or in how they are established.
- 8:48I often will look up like a Whois record. Oftentimes
- 8:51those are redacted. So that's one kind of component,
- 8:55but there are a lot of other sort of. digital
- 8:58markers on websites, one of them being like DNS
- 9:01records. And so one of the very first things
- 9:03I did without getting too technical into it was
- 9:06look at, use a variety of different tools that
- 9:08we have to look at everything from like what
- 9:11IP addresses do they use, what sort of mailbox
- 9:14did they use, or like a mailing address. When
- 9:17I said a mailing address, could be like say proton
- 9:19mail, not like an actual physical mailing. address,
- 9:22things like that. And so one thing we sort of
- 9:25noticed a little bit, and this was usually my
- 9:28first step, which doesn't necessarily mean as
- 9:31it gets, it's immediately anywhere, was looking
- 9:33at these records. You found records that were
- 9:35linked into other domains. And at the moment,
- 9:38we're just like, oh, is that really going to
- 9:40be enough? And I'll get back to it, because I
- 9:43want to circle back to those domains. Because
- 9:45as I talk about all the evidence and the way
- 9:47that we went about this, we take a sort of, I
- 9:50think, methodical process and we want to have
- 9:54a high degree of certainty before we decide to
- 9:57say, like, hey, we think this person might be
- 9:59connected. You know, sometimes can you explain
- 10:01it through other ways? So we started seeing records
- 10:03to some particular domains through DNS records,
- 10:06and we're like, okay, let's hold off on there.
- 10:09And then the next step was basically go through
- 10:11the website itself. So, you know, I created an
- 10:14account on the website. I never made any sort
- 10:16of purchases. You could make payments on the
- 10:18site if you wanted to be able to get access to
- 10:19all the materials without having to contribute.
- 10:22You could do that. So, to be clear, I never made
- 10:25any payments on the site, but I did have a free
- 10:27account, which made it easy for me to be able
- 10:30to browse threads and content, which took me
- 10:33probably, I think, almost like two days. I read
- 10:36through every single thread I could. related
- 10:41to payments. So from the beginning of the site,
- 10:45which was hundreds if not thousands of threads,
- 10:49and was essentially what I'm looking for in reading
- 10:51every one of these in a very manual way, as any
- 10:54sort of clues or any other mentions of an identifier.
- 10:58So I was looking like, did someone mention a
- 11:01email address? Did someone mention a... company?
- 11:05Did someone mention what kind of payment provider
- 11:07that processor they're using? Is there anything
- 11:10here that can give me a clue that'll help me
- 11:13identify maybe who's responsible for the website?
- 11:16So in that process, I did find several posts
- 11:21indicating a particular business name, which
- 11:24was Logica LTD, was processing payments. And
- 11:28so oftentimes when people want to accept payments
- 11:30for websites, they don't just say like, oh, I
- 11:33am the owner of HBV. I want to like take payments
- 11:36because, but yes, we do. And the people would
- 11:38go check out the website and be like, oh, no,
- 11:40this is illegal content. We're not going to process
- 11:43payments. So oftentimes they'll set up a, might
- 11:46want to call it a decoy or redirect site or some
- 11:48sort of like shell company, if you can imagine.
- 11:51So sort of like. benign looking company, benign
- 11:54looking website that'll take payments for some
- 11:56sort of digital. And when people make payments
- 11:59on there, they're in fact actually getting access
- 12:01to LeakBB. So in this case, Logic LTD, which
- 12:04was shared in screenshots from like their Apple
- 12:08Pay that was set up at the time. We had people
- 12:11mentioning that they're making payments to Logica.
- 12:14We had people have shared screenshots after they
- 12:18had made purchases, which had the Logica email.
- 12:21Oh, sorry. the Logica website listed there. So
- 12:23we had multiple indicators that this was a consistently
- 12:28used site. And then in searching for Logica,
- 12:32we have found a connection to a business registry
- 12:35in New Zealand. And that could be one signal.
- 12:40But also, again, we have to look at multiple
- 12:42signals because it could have been someone else's
- 12:44using some other name. There could be multiple
- 12:46Logica's registered around the world. So how
- 12:48do we know if this is the correct one? And related
- 12:52to this, we also looked at a YouTube video that
- 12:55was shared on the homepage of LeakDB, how to
- 12:59make payments. In that payment system, that YouTube
- 13:02video that was made publicly available, a person
- 13:05walked through how to use their credit cards
- 13:07and how to make purchases. And in that video,
- 13:10they had a clear sort of screenshots of people
- 13:13making purchases on a website that looked like
- 13:16to be for digital avatar packs. So like packs
- 13:19of JPEGs of, you know, whatever sort of product.
- 13:23And these would be items that priced out, match
- 13:27the prices of the like BP website. So the next
- 13:32thing that we do is also that we'll go look using
- 13:34something like the internet archive to look at
- 13:36archive versions of the site. We go, I went to
- 13:39the web domain that was like shared in the threads.
- 13:43I, which was like Logica .nz. NZ being New Zealand,
- 13:47so we're now also getting another signal that
- 13:49this might be the same New Zealand business.
- 13:53And from there, we are able to see archived versions
- 13:58of these websites that match the sort of exact
- 14:01images that were included in the YouTube video,
- 14:04and also ones that were shared in the screenshots
- 14:06and the threads. This I thought was a nice, very
- 14:11clear indicator that this is probably the same
- 14:13website, possibly the same business. We also
- 14:15looked at a platform called OpenCorporates, and
- 14:19they had listed the same website, Logica .NC,
- 14:24as being the affiliate website domain for the
- 14:26business Logica LTD. So now we have a lot of
- 14:30clear evidence about what's a business here,
- 14:34but we're like, okay, do we still want to say
- 14:36what is our level of connection there? Another
- 14:39way that I also like to do is we look at using
- 14:42Internet Archive again, is I want to go through
- 14:45the oldest versions of the website. I will say
- 14:48just personally for me, it's not always the case,
- 14:50but usually if a website is older and there's
- 14:52a lot of history there. So in this case, it had
- 14:54been up for seven years. When people first get
- 14:58into, I think, dodgy businesses or dodgy websites,
- 15:02they make a lot of mistakes because they're new
- 15:04to the game. They were like, maybe got better
- 15:06about like, oh, let me tighten down about like
- 15:08maybe personal information here or particular
- 15:11clues as they get better about their digital
- 15:13safety. So brand new websites can sometimes be
- 15:15tricky, but older websites that have been around
- 15:19for a while, there's usually maybe more bits
- 15:21of evidence, particularly if it's been archived.
- 15:25And in this particular case, we did get another
- 15:27clue in that sense. We went to the archive of
- 15:32their payment screen. So like when you were looking
- 15:35at different payment options. So we went to the
- 15:38oldest saved archive version of that. And then
- 15:40what you're able to do is inspect the HTML of
- 15:42the website. Inspecting, which is basically the
- 15:45fancy bit for the code. So you have what you
- 15:47see, which is a screenshot. But there's also
- 15:50a lot of bits that will go into building what
- 15:52you physically see in there. So looking in that.
- 15:55We looked at one of the payments options they
- 15:59had was PayPal at the time. By the time, of course,
- 16:02in 2026, PayPal was not processing. But at the
- 16:04very beginning, they were saying they were accepting
- 16:06PayPal payments. There was an email address associated
- 16:10with their payment form. So this would be the
- 16:14email address associated with the PayPal account
- 16:16that was accepting payments at the time. And
- 16:20at the surface, it doesn't look like he gives
- 16:21very much clues. It was a string of numbers at
- 16:24a proton email that really wasn't used anywhere
- 16:27else. I tried searching. I say, like, is this
- 16:29number been used? Excuse me, this email had just
- 16:32been used to register at other sites, and it
- 16:34hadn't been. But at the time, I still held it.
- 16:37I kept the notes on it. And as I went through
- 16:40the investigation and evidence began to point
- 16:42to a particular person, we start looking at does
- 16:46this particular person, which ended up being
- 16:48Jitendra Maharaj, have consistent bits of evidence
- 16:52that point to him being affiliated as a main
- 16:56point of contact for this domain? And in particular,
- 17:00we believe that he is. So his name was on the
- 17:04Alaska LTD New Zealand Company's office listings,
- 17:08which we have multiple connections to as facilitating
- 17:10payments. What we found is that the string of
- 17:14numbers, I was associated with the Proton account,
- 17:17that was a phone number, that was a Fijian phone
- 17:21number, and Jatindra had been originally from
- 17:24Fiji. And that phone number was listed on Whois
- 17:28websites registries for websites that were publicly
- 17:31registered to Jatindra. So Jatindra back 10,
- 17:3415 years ago had, like many people, have been
- 17:39able to register website for whatever business
- 17:43or whatever personal reasons, they don't hold
- 17:45it anymore and then they get rid of it. By the
- 17:47time he had put in information that was non -redacted,
- 17:51which is that whois record, and we saw the phone
- 17:53number there. So we see his name and we see this
- 17:55phone number and that phone number was the same
- 17:57matching digits of that proton email used to
- 18:01accept payments. Then in particular, if we go
- 18:03about circle back now onto those DNS records,
- 18:06We found a mailing record that was sent out for
- 18:10an MX record to another like domain, which is
- 18:14leakbb .net. Leakbb .net wasn't necessarily a
- 18:17site that was functioning for anything, but someone
- 18:20had owed this domain and he was using it to emails
- 18:23for leakbb .com. This was later changed to proton
- 18:27mail, but for a small period of time, it was
- 18:30leakbb .net. Looking at LeakBB .net, we were
- 18:33able to then see records connecting it to various
- 18:37websites, including websites that used Jitendra's
- 18:41name in it. So sites that we were able to, I
- 18:43think, connect for one reason or another to Jitendra.
- 18:47So we have these records, and these records couldn't
- 18:49have been put in by anyone else except someone
- 18:51who would have some sort of administrator access
- 18:53to grant that connection between those records.
- 18:56So that is all to say that in this process, we
- 19:00don't just look for one bit of evidence and just
- 19:03to suggest that there might be connection, we
- 19:04saw repeated evidence over time across multiple
- 19:08different avenues that connected this person
- 19:10as being an important figure, even from the beginning.
- 19:14So it's the start of the website back in 2019
- 19:16that connected Jitendra Maharaj to LeadBB. And
- 19:21I know I'm almost a little bit at my time, but
- 19:23I'll mention from this point then we go and we
- 19:27looked a little bit more into Jitendra to know
- 19:29who he is as a person. Like, is this person that
- 19:33we see him like, especially because Jitendra
- 19:36Maharaj is not a completely uncommon name. There
- 19:38could be multiple Jitendra Maharaj. So when we
- 19:40identify the person associated, we want to make
- 19:43sure we are the correct point. In particular,
- 19:45we saw several things. So, the Dachandra we found,
- 19:49one was originally in Fiji and now lived in New
- 19:53Zealand, which kind of matches what we were thinking
- 19:55for this person. We found that the Dachandra
- 19:58also used to be an avid user and, in fact, a
- 20:02staff member onto something called MyBB. And
- 20:06BB stands for bulletin board. So MyBB was an
- 20:08open source software that a lot of people used
- 20:12back in like the early 2000s to build websites,
- 20:15build forums, things like that. And he was a
- 20:18really avid user on there to the point he was
- 20:20a staff member. And so it's interesting that
- 20:23this Jitendra who was very familiar with using
- 20:25MyBB had multiple websites making plugins and
- 20:29website designs for MyBB. then also is connected
- 20:32to a site called leaked BB that uses my BB as
- 20:35its format to build a website and even in its
- 20:39title like leaked bulletin board. So when we
- 20:42were going through and I again read through thousands
- 20:46of his posts on this my BB forum from his account.
- 20:51We found a couple different posts that also indicated
- 20:55that this was going to be the right jitendra.
- 20:57We found one post that mentioned that he was
- 21:00interested in using MyBB to create an adult forum.
- 21:04And also for wares, wares being a term for elicit,
- 21:08I would say elicit content or pirated digital
- 21:10content, which is sort of what LeetBB was about
- 21:13is pirated digital content. So he was expressing
- 21:17an interest in that content from early on, particularly
- 21:20using his forum for it. And I particularly also
- 21:22mentioned the selling of a platform or a website
- 21:25you own called mybbplugins .com. And mybbplugins
- 21:28was the site that connected us to leakbb .net
- 21:31because this is the site that was issuing all
- 21:34those DNS certifications. So here we have him
- 21:37saying explicitly, I own this site. We see him
- 21:40initially being registered onto the site before
- 21:42redacting it. And in particular, we also found
- 21:45some of his other online accounts. We have an
- 21:48account that we suspect is his old Twitter or
- 21:52ex account. And while it might have been cleaned
- 21:55up, we were able to look and use the Internet
- 21:57Archive to look at archived tweets from that
- 21:59account. And that account was posting, posted
- 22:03quite a few tweets, sharing links to leakbb .com
- 22:08in in November shortly after the launch of the
- 22:11site. So there's other bits when we can also
- 22:14talk about his GitHub, his other online profiles.
- 22:17There are so much more that I wish I could include.
- 22:20I'm not going to badmouth our editors, but if
- 22:22we didn't have an editor, this would probably
- 22:23be like a 60 -page report with every little bit
- 22:26of evidence that I found. But we were not able
- 22:30to include all that. But essentially, what we
- 22:35can gather from this is that Jitendra Maharaj
- 22:38seemingly on the surface is a successful maybe
- 22:42businessman, a family man, his partner, multiple
- 22:45kids, as Michael talked about who actually got
- 22:49to visit his home, seemingly lives in a nice
- 22:51place, in a nice neighborhood, has a cryptocurrency
- 22:55related startup, and seemingly on the surface
- 23:00would be a regular person, but I think through
- 23:05our digital footprint tracing and our trails
- 23:08were able to find sort of these online profiles
- 23:11that are connected to him that were either his
- 23:14main profiles to his alternative or an alt of
- 23:17profile. And then these sort of digital sort
- 23:20of footprint he's left on the internet have been
- 23:23repeatedly over multiple instances connected
- 23:26us to leakedbb .com. That is a very long. explanation.
- 23:32And if you're interested in that, please read
- 23:35the article. I'm also happy to answer any questions.
- 23:38I'm sure questions might have come in. I've not
- 23:39been looking at the chat. I stand and I kind
- 23:41of walk around my microphone. But I will leave
- 23:46it at that. So the next stage, we have figured
- 23:49out that we believe that Jatendra is the suspected
- 23:54odor and probably the key administrator of this
- 23:57site. and he's located in New Zealand. So I am
- 24:02not in New Zealand and considering the sort of,
- 24:06I would say legal level, because that's not the
- 24:08right words, but considering the severity of
- 24:10what we'd be accusing him of, we thought it'd
- 24:13be really critical to reach out to a local partner
- 24:15and that's where the press and Michael Wright
- 24:18here really came in because I think While I might've
- 24:22done all this, like the digital footprint stuff,
- 24:24I think to really push us through sort of finishing
- 24:27the investigation, Michael here was really instrumental
- 24:30on that. So I would love to hand it over to Michael
- 24:33to talk about sort of the next stage. After I
- 24:36did all this digital stuff, I'm like, Michael,
- 24:37please take it over and I'll leave it over to
- 24:40you. Thanks, Kolina. I hope everyone can hear
- 24:42me fine and I sound okay. It's very early and
- 24:45very cold here in New Zealand and I'm sitting
- 24:47in the dark with my hood on. I'll speak hopefully
- 24:51clearly and off -camera. We came into this investigation,
- 24:55as Colina said, well into it. And I should stress
- 24:59that 90, 95 % of what you might read in either
- 25:02story, even the one with my byline, is written
- 25:05by Colina. All of that research was done before
- 25:09we were even contacted. I think the first draft
- 25:13of the story was about 2 ,000 words, and that
- 25:15doubled while we were there, but all of the information
- 25:17she just described was already there. It was
- 25:21clear that these links had been established between
- 25:24LinkedIn BB and this person who lived in Christchurch.
- 25:28So the first stage was to reach out on email,
- 25:31given the detail involved. So that was quite
- 25:34an abnormally long email contact to somebody
- 25:38to say, hi, I'm a reporter. I'm from New Zealand.
- 25:40I'm working with this overseas journalism collective
- 25:44whose name you might not recognize, but we are
- 25:46sort of the local masthead newspaper in the city
- 25:49you live in. We have a little bit more brand
- 25:51recognition. Here are 10 also very complicated
- 25:54questions that implicate you in this not -unserious,
- 25:59apparently illegal -looking website. What do
- 26:01you have to say? So I did that. This is, I think,
- 26:06early June. We gave him several days to come
- 26:11back to us, just for politeness, but also there,
- 26:15the nature and detail that was required to come
- 26:17back to us. And he didn't, but I got a letter
- 26:22from his lawyer, an email back from his lawyer,
- 26:25let's say four and a half days into a five -day
- 26:27grace period. Well into it. And the first thing
- 26:31I noticed, I don't think I've told you this,
- 26:33Kolina, but the lawyer had deleted the thread
- 26:36between him and his client in between coming
- 26:39into me and saying, my client is over six. We'll
- 26:42get to this in a minute. But I could see the
- 26:45timestamp that showed Jatendra had sent the email
- 26:49to his lawyer about half an hour after I sent
- 26:51it to him four and a half days ago. So he was
- 26:54very much across this and aware of what we were
- 26:56doing and had been for several days by the time
- 26:58we heard back from anyone. Anyways, lawyer comes
- 27:02back and says, I'm very sorry, my client is overseas.
- 27:05He's had a family bereavement, he's in Fiji and
- 27:07he'll be there for at least two weeks. For the
- 27:10next two weeks I can't take any instruction in
- 27:12the meantime so we're going to need more time.
- 27:14So first things we did were check with our lawyer.
- 27:16Do we need to do this? Suspecting we knew the
- 27:19answer, and that was yes. As Kolina says, when
- 27:22you have something this serious, you really do
- 27:24need to try as hard as you can on right of reply,
- 27:29despite how much evidence you might have amassed
- 27:32beforehand. Second thing we did was get in the
- 27:36car and drive to his house just to check he wasn't
- 27:37lying. And I was a little bit excited then because
- 27:40we showed up to his house. That's the same one.
- 27:42You can see him in the photos of these stories.
- 27:45There was a dog in the backyard, like a nice
- 27:47husky. There was, I think, a light on. There
- 27:49was a couple of windows cracked. It's winter
- 27:51in New Zealand. So we thought, oh, someone's
- 27:53home. And they weren't. I think someone was just
- 27:56looking after his house. He was genuine me overseas.
- 27:59So I went back and forth with his lawyer once,
- 28:01maybe twice in the meantime. And we just had
- 28:04to wait two weeks or so and then go and knock
- 28:07on his door again. So we did that. He was home
- 28:11the second time. It was one of those... I'm standing
- 28:14at his doorstep for 20 seconds about to leave
- 28:18when he opens the door. Situation. It's also
- 28:22the middle of winter in New Zealand. It was raining
- 28:24and really crap weather as we were doing this.
- 28:27And he was standing there as you see him in the
- 28:29photo on his doorstep. Hi, I'm Michael Wright.
- 28:32I'm from the press. Did you get my email? Yes.
- 28:34And he didn't want to say anything. But he also
- 28:38didn't stop talking. If anyone here is a reporter,
- 28:41you'll know the situation where... Somebody you
- 28:45really want to get answers from is giving them
- 28:47to you, but they're also not slamming the door
- 28:48in your face. So you just keep them talking,
- 28:52keep circling the same couple of points to get
- 28:55things moving. I was on his doorstep getting
- 28:58very wet on the backside of myself. He was in
- 29:01his doorway. I could see his kids sort of playing
- 29:03in the hallway. It was one of those awkward situations
- 29:06where you really just want to make the most of
- 29:08it. And we circled the same two or three points.
- 29:11The detail that Kolina had amassed was too much
- 29:14for me to have in my head and to extemporize
- 29:16and think quickly with at the time so I had sort
- 29:18of two or three key points to cling to and keep
- 29:22putting to him. One was the link to the Logica
- 29:24NZ company and the payment information that she
- 29:28found and also the proton email and the match
- 29:32of the digits to his phone number. Just a couple
- 29:35of things to say look dude here are some clear
- 29:37links can you please explain and answer these,
- 29:41yeah, pretty straightforward questions. We circled
- 29:44this for a while. It was on the record and then
- 29:46off the record. Off the record, he offered a
- 29:49little bit more detail, but nothing that would
- 29:51have cleared all of this up. And we left it at
- 29:55that. That was, oh, again, Octa Ferticalina.
- 29:59I think it was July. And we took what we had,
- 30:04which wasn't very much, but we were pretty satisfied
- 30:06at that point that we had given him every right.
- 30:10to answer our questions, to explain away, if
- 30:15this wasn't anything to do with him, what all
- 30:17this was about, and really enough to go with
- 30:19the story at that point. The other side of it
- 30:21from my end was what were the New Zealand legal
- 30:24implications for this? I could talk about that
- 30:27a little bit when we move into Q &A, if you like.
- 30:30But yeah, the story was 95%, Kolina. Thank you,
- 30:34Kolina. And we eventually were able to pin him
- 30:36down, which was a small but quite crucial element
- 30:40to the story. That's about all I have at the
- 30:42moment. Do you want me to get into the other
- 30:45side of what I did here? Or do you want to sort
- 30:46of move subject -wise, Charlie, into the next
- 30:50stage? I think it might be useful here to pause
- 30:55for questions and then perhaps we can bring up
- 30:58those stages as we go through the questions because
- 31:01there's a lot of questions, for example, about
- 31:03legal repercussions. And I want to make sure
- 31:07that we also have time for all of the questions.
- 31:10So if that's all right, I'd love to go into the
- 31:13question part. I also wanted to thank Michael
- 31:16and Colleen of both being here. We're currently
- 31:18talking across the globe at various different
- 31:22times in the day and the evening. So I really
- 31:25appreciate everybody joining. I wanted to quickly
- 31:28ask, just to kick the questions off, is LeetBB
- 31:32a standalone or are there other websites just
- 31:35like this one? How do we estimate the scale of
- 31:38the issue here? And what does the popularity
- 31:42of a site like this tell us? Perhaps you can
- 31:45both have a crack at that and we can then go
- 31:48to some of the more specific questions on legal
- 31:52and things like that. Yeah, I'll quickly jump
- 31:54in on that. I would like to say that this was
- 31:58a standalone, but unfortunately it's not. There
- 32:01are a number of websites that offer sort of these
- 32:06same types of images. but so they love to let
- 32:10people host leaked images. However, I will say
- 32:13this site was particularly egregious because
- 32:16it had a variety of other content. So if you
- 32:18go to other websites, you might say they might
- 32:21specialize just in OnlyFans or leaked content
- 32:24from adult creators or specifically adult creators.
- 32:26Some of them will have those disclosures. We
- 32:28only host leaked content from adult creators.
- 32:32Some might have other images that have been stolen
- 32:35from other sites and like shared there. But I
- 32:38think what pushed LeakB over the edge was particularly
- 32:41the forum component in which people were able
- 32:43to sell hacking or blackmailings type services
- 32:48or pressuring to get news to coerce women to
- 32:50give their nudes, particularly that they had
- 32:53absolutely no problem with leaked images from
- 32:56people who were not adult content creators. So
- 32:59imagine just like a woman going about her life.
- 33:02And I think that's what also just made the site
- 33:06I think worse than even some of the other leaked
- 33:08sites that exist out there. I will note that
- 33:10like these types of sites have been coming under
- 33:14greater scrutiny over the year so maybe a site
- 33:16will come down and then someone else will take
- 33:18a name over it. So I will say that even for something
- 33:21like Leaked BB if you're to search it there is
- 33:24someone who was a big fan of the site that credit
- 33:26is now creating their own version of that try
- 33:29to recreate it. you know, they said they have
- 33:32a lot of the content that's unfortunately been
- 33:34saved on their own platform, on their own devices
- 33:36over the years. And we see this time and time
- 33:39happen again, even with our Mr. Deepfakes investigation.
- 33:43After the site came down, after years are being
- 33:46up, someone else who's not necessarily affiliated
- 33:49with the website, who's just been a fan, decides
- 33:53to try to like do their own version of it, carrying
- 33:56on the mantle, if you will. So, I like to say
- 34:00that it is a bit of a whack -a -mole type situation,
- 34:05but I think each time we try to have when these
- 34:09sites get taken down, they never come back at
- 34:12full force. They lose, I think, a lot in that
- 34:15process. And I like to think that there is continued
- 34:19pressure to keep these sites down. So while this
- 34:21is not a unique and only site, LeapBB was particularly
- 34:24egregious. And it, I think, is It's like pulling
- 34:29weeds. If you keep at it, you're eventually going
- 34:31to get the weeds. I don't have too much to add
- 34:34to it, only to say that one thing I forgot to
- 34:36mention, maybe Colleen had did, was when it came
- 34:39to this site, which I think as far as we know
- 34:41is a standalone site and that it was the only
- 34:43one that Jatendra Maharaj appeared to be connected
- 34:46to. In denying any links to it, the website,
- 34:51again, correct me on the dates here, I think
- 34:52it was two days after I sent an email to him,
- 34:56it was disabled. Um, yeah, I think the 48 hour
- 34:59period. Yeah, absolutely. I think that's also
- 35:02a pretty, um, damning, uh, connection that if,
- 35:05uh, within 48 hours of Michael sending these
- 35:07emails, the site coming offline and not coming
- 35:09back online on czar, uh, that is, um, he is,
- 35:15uh, responsible for the turning off of that site.
- 35:18Logica limited, which has its own site, logica
- 35:20.nz is still down as of about 10 minutes ago.
- 35:23I just had another look and it's, yeah, it's
- 35:24been disabled for, for weeks now as well. That
- 35:28leads me nicely to the next question, but I just
- 35:32wanted to mention that in the chat, I've put
- 35:34the link to the Mr. Deepfakes investigation that
- 35:36you mentioned and also somebody said wasn't them
- 35:39motherless .com also one of these sites and yes
- 35:43it was. And we had a chat on that recently too
- 35:46with the CNN team. You can listen back to that
- 35:49on our podcast. But yeah, we've had a few questions
- 35:53on what taking action looks like. Perhaps we
- 35:57can potentially talk about how far journalists
- 36:01can take this. How far can we take action against
- 36:05these kinds of sites? And then maybe we can go
- 36:10more into the legal and the law and where the
- 36:14jurisdiction is there. How can researchers or
- 36:17overseas researchers or journalists like yourselves
- 36:20tackle these sites? How far can you go? and when
- 36:25reporting on this. Oh, gosh. I mean, I think
- 36:28there's a particular, you know, we, particularly
- 36:32at Valley Castle, I don't know, I don't want
- 36:33to speak for the press. But I know for us, we
- 36:37don't want to like transition into activist territory
- 36:40necessarily. So I think for me, my big role is
- 36:44to shine a light on accountability for these
- 36:47kind of sites. Oftentimes, when someone's behind
- 36:50a site like this that's hosting a lot of non
- 36:53-consensual imagery or what I oftentimes do my
- 36:57research on which is on deep fake knock central
- 36:59imagery. The person who is profiting off of this
- 37:03hosting the site, facilitating the creation of
- 37:06those images and hosting of those images is obscured
- 37:09in some way. So I find that consistently when
- 37:13we identify a person who is behind it and we
- 37:16say we are going to make this known to the world.
- 37:18the site that comes off light. And that is, I
- 37:21think, a major step towards reducing the harm
- 37:24that's obviously being caused by that site. And
- 37:27so I feel like for me, that's really immense
- 37:30power as a journalist and where we also have
- 37:34a lot of responsibility in doing this safely,
- 37:37in doing this ethically, in doing this also that
- 37:41we're not also misidentifying someone because
- 37:43that would be obviously a lot of reputational
- 37:46harm to everyone involved. And I think that is
- 37:50where our role plays. I'm not a lawyer. I'm not
- 37:54an investigator. I'm not at any sort of police
- 37:56or law enforcement agency. I'm just a woman who
- 38:01sits at a computer all day. And that's kind of
- 38:05where I feel like our role as investigators is
- 38:08to see some sort of harm that's happening and
- 38:11where can we apply that skill set. in a legal
- 38:15and safe way that can reduce that harm. And in
- 38:17these cases, I think just even the identification
- 38:20of those owners, particularly when they're doing
- 38:23something that is anti -social in this nature
- 38:26can have an immense impact. But I don't know
- 38:31what, Mike wants to add anything out from his
- 38:33standpoint. Not too much, only then to seek into
- 38:36that yes, activist or activism type. journalism
- 38:40is generally a no unless you sort of embrace
- 38:43that as the thing that you are doing in whatever
- 38:46subject or story you happen to be turning your
- 38:49attention to. The story here is to do your job,
- 38:52as you say, in journalism and if the site is
- 38:55disabled or comes down, that is a happy byproduct
- 38:59of that fact. harm reduction is the main thing.
- 39:03And when we get into the legal side of things
- 39:05in New Zealand, that is how the law is built.
- 39:07That is the focus of law here when it comes to
- 39:11harmful online content is to end the harm first
- 39:14and perhaps expose or unmask those responsible
- 39:19second. We often talk about when we're doing
- 39:22these kinds of investigations, and I know, Eklina,
- 39:25for example, you've come on to a stage talk before
- 39:28and talked about the importance of really investigating
- 39:31the payment providers and because that is also
- 39:35a section where we can often implement some change.
- 39:40On sites like these, are the payment providers
- 39:43often aware of the connection between the site
- 39:47and their Do you often find that the chain kind
- 39:53of stops with the site itself and are these payment
- 39:58providers often surprised that their infrastructure
- 40:01is being used by these kinds of forums? In this
- 40:05case, with the payment systems that you contacted,
- 40:08did they respond at all to any of the information
- 40:11that you shared with them? Yeah, great question.
- 40:16not just in this case, but in previous cases,
- 40:18when we talk about sort of, I think, your mainstream
- 40:21payment processors. So you imagine PayPal, Stripe,
- 40:26Klarna, those sort of are name brand ones that
- 40:29a lot of people recognize. They have really strong
- 40:33terms of service agreements. And those are also
- 40:37name brands that people trust when people are
- 40:38making payments to a site that you know is a
- 40:41little bit dodgy and you want to know you're
- 40:43getting your dodgy sort of purchase. you feel
- 40:46better using a name brand platform. And so there
- 40:50is desire to use those because people are more
- 40:52likely to facilitate transactions using that.
- 40:55But since those oftentimes are not allowed, they
- 40:59created these like redirect sort of hidden obscured
- 41:01systems. So in this case, it was Logica. as this
- 41:05website and business that may look normal, but
- 41:08in reality was facilitating these transactions.
- 41:11So on the side of the payment processor, it just
- 41:13looks like they're processing payments for Logica.
- 41:15That doesn't look like they're processing payments
- 41:17for leaked BB. And similarly for the consumer
- 41:21on their billing statement, it'll say they made
- 41:24a purchase of Logica. It's not going to say they
- 41:26made a payment to an adult site. So I think there's
- 41:31really incentive on there. Some sites get consistently
- 41:33kicked off of those and they get discovered.
- 41:36Each payment processor has their own system for
- 41:39identifying when people are misusing their platform.
- 41:43And so they'll go oftentimes then to some cryptocurrency
- 41:46related companies or other sketchy sites that
- 41:49maybe don't care as much about that. We've seen
- 41:52that happen as well. I would say that, fortunately
- 41:55in this case, I think maybe within 12 hours,
- 41:59maybe not a full 24 hours, the payment processor
- 42:02that they were using at the time, right before
- 42:05the site went offline, it immediately was responded.
- 42:09It was like, we're preventing it. We're blacklisting
- 42:11this person. Don't worry. They were like very
- 42:13clearly in their response was not happy with
- 42:16the use of their... a platform to process payments
- 42:20and quickly shut it down. And then when I went
- 42:22onto the site and went through the steps of trying
- 42:25to process a payment, it immediately was giving
- 42:27me an error message. So I would say for the most
- 42:30part, these sites do respond pretty quickly,
- 42:34especially as they try to be more mainstream,
- 42:36more legitimate. But I still find processors
- 42:39out there that will take a riskier business.
- 42:44They still process payments. And I think that
- 42:47is oftentimes one of the best sort of like leverage
- 42:50points in identification because at the end of
- 42:54the day, I think it comes down to money. People
- 42:57want to make money off this kind of a list of
- 42:59content. They want to be able to make money off
- 43:01of the non essential imagery. And I think not
- 43:05only is it a great way to be able to identify
- 43:07who is behind it because the money has to go
- 43:09somewhere. It's also a great way to sort of get
- 43:14people to, they maybe stop investing resources
- 43:16and trying to get the payment systems up and
- 43:17going because if they're not able to process
- 43:19payments, they're probably not going to keep
- 43:21the site up and going for much longer. Thanks
- 43:24so much for that context. We've got about 15
- 43:27minutes left. So if you want to pop a question
- 43:29in the chat, do so now because we only have a
- 43:32few more minutes left to explore them. I want
- 43:36to now approach the question of legal. Is it
- 43:40legal to operate a site like LeapBB and what
- 43:43legal protections are there for those who may
- 43:46have been victimised by websites like this? And
- 43:49Michael, maybe you can give us an insight into
- 43:51whether there's better legal pathways to explore
- 43:54in New Zealand and if the jurisdiction of the
- 43:56alleged admin of the site matter here at all.
- 44:01Yes. So as you'll see in both versions of the
- 44:03story, one of the elements was what are the implications
- 44:07for if Jitendra Maharaj and Alik Bipi are based
- 44:10here legally. New Zealand has a law called the
- 44:16Harmful Digital Communications Act, which is
- 44:20pretty old. It's more than 10 years old. It's
- 44:22been around for a long time and it's looked at
- 44:24globally as a reasonable version of this type
- 44:28of law. It responded well to deep fake AI, which
- 44:31has come into existence since the laws passed,
- 44:34for example. But Speaking to the person in this
- 44:38case, a guy from NetSafe, which is a private
- 44:42agency, but the approved agency under this law,
- 44:45they can act and work with the courts under the
- 44:47law. The limitations of it in a context like
- 44:51this are that it was really set up for one individual
- 44:55seeking to do harm to another individual. And
- 44:59if there was a platform, third -party platform
- 45:02involved, it was still only on that one -on -one
- 45:04basis and that someone was hosting something.
- 45:06So when it comes to something like League2BB,
- 45:09wherever it might be hosted, the law in New Zealand
- 45:13kind of gets left behind. In that sense, there
- 45:17is not much you can do, especially if a third
- 45:20party is a bad actor or just refuses to engage.
- 45:25And it's not a major meta or social media platform
- 45:28that wants to or be seen to be doing the right
- 45:31thing and being a good corporate and online citizen
- 45:34and working with law enforcement, all those sorts
- 45:37of agencies when issues are brought to their
- 45:39attention. In that sense, there wasn't much law
- 45:47in New Zealand that you could have used if you
- 45:51discovered to your horror that your content was
- 45:55on this site and being used and exposed and shared.
- 45:59well past how much you might even know. When
- 46:04we used the phrase, revenge porn, the point is,
- 46:08by definition, that the person who is the subject
- 46:11of the content knows. It's unfortunately what
- 46:14that is about. And in this case, while Kolina
- 46:17found some examples of people who had discovered
- 46:20that their content was on, leaked to be being
- 46:23shared, The vast majority probably didn't and
- 46:26that was the point was this was a leak and we
- 46:29can do this privately amongst ourselves without
- 46:33these people for the most part being aware of
- 46:35that. We had a question earlier about do laws
- 46:39regarding coercion or coercive violence, are
- 46:43they any help in these kinds of cases or is it
- 46:46just because it's digital and on a specific forum
- 46:50that makes that kind of... legal pursuit difficult.
- 46:57I can defer to Colleen there for the most part,
- 47:01but in the New Zealand sense, the same issue
- 47:03would apply in that the people involved, the
- 47:07individuals would need to be in New Zealand or
- 47:10New Zealanders for the law here to be able to
- 47:13do anything about it. I think it's a hard question
- 47:18to answer because there are a lot of factors
- 47:20here. Because on a site like leakedVB, you have
- 47:25a person's images being shared by an anonymous
- 47:28account. And then, of course, you have someone
- 47:30who might be the admin or the hoster of that
- 47:33page. One law that's come into the conversation,
- 47:36particularly in the US, is the Take It Down Act,
- 47:39which requires platforms to respond within 48
- 47:43hours of a request to remove non -concentral
- 47:49imagery and content. And the thing is though,
- 47:53the site this is where it becomes a global problem
- 47:56because this is a law in the U .S., but this
- 48:00was a site where the admin that we discovered
- 48:03was based in New Zealand is not necessarily maybe
- 48:06known to be a U .S. site or it's unclear about
- 48:08where the origins of the site is. So they may
- 48:12choose to not follow or respond to any of those
- 48:15requests. you know, this might vary versus say
- 48:19like a social media platform like say Facebook
- 48:21that might be clearly based and originated in
- 48:24the US, even though it's used across the world
- 48:26globally. And so I think, you know, the sort
- 48:30of blurring a sort of legal jurisdiction when
- 48:32it comes to platforms and content is really difficult.
- 48:35And in particular, so I think pursuing this if
- 48:37you are a victim, and again, I'm not a lawyer,
- 48:40but you know, a lot of laws are designed to say
- 48:43like go after the person who posted the images.
- 48:46and I think that becomes really difficult. It's
- 48:49hard to identify someone beyond an anonymous
- 48:52username. So if my images were stolen or taken
- 48:56from me and people, multiple people are posting
- 48:58them on variety of different websites and I don't
- 49:00know who those people are, I have very little
- 49:03recourse action until I can maybe invest my own
- 49:07resources or time or something into identifying
- 49:09who is the person responsible. And sometimes
- 49:12it's, you know, obvious, but it's a, I think,
- 49:16arduous journey for victims of this kind of content.
- 49:18So oftentimes, their only recourse or the easiest
- 49:21bit of recourse is just trying to get those images
- 49:23removed off offline and no real harm or consequences
- 49:27happen to the people who post it. So, you know,
- 49:29they have, you know, the... digital, there's
- 49:33a copyright law, DMCA, here in the US, which
- 49:37is, if you have a copyright violation, people
- 49:40post stuff, that's your copyrighted images, that
- 49:43you can take it down, but that's usually something
- 49:45that doesn't fall under the, for people who are
- 49:49non -content creators. And that's where the Take
- 49:52It Down Act kind of like came in, as that was
- 49:54allowed anyone to be able to do this, regardless
- 49:57of a copyright, because it's your imagery. I
- 50:00think that is only part of the solution. I think
- 50:04that it's an incredibly tricky and arduous bit
- 50:08of where, what are you actually reducing the
- 50:10harm? What kind of recourse do you have as a
- 50:12victim? How can you go out of way? You don't
- 50:15know who the owner of the site is. There's other
- 50:16sites I've been investigating for years that
- 50:19we still don't know who the... owner or the person
- 50:23who is responsible for the platform that crosses
- 50:25that and that platform causes harm globally to
- 50:28women across the world. And, you know, between
- 50:32like site hosters, payment processors, where
- 50:35people are physically located to where victims
- 50:38are physically located are all varying factors
- 50:42in how, from a legal sense, what action you can
- 50:45possibly take. In addition to that, and then
- 50:47the evidence you would need and what court they
- 50:49would go to. And so it's really difficult. And
- 50:51so I do think legal regulations are necessary
- 50:55and helpful. It could be maybe help in discouraging
- 50:58the behavior, but ultimately it is a hard avenue
- 51:01to pursue. in this case. And so that's why I
- 51:05think even from our roles as journalists, to
- 51:07go back to your previous question, in being able
- 51:09to highlight or identify the person who was behind
- 51:12the site, that is a great way. So even to bring
- 51:16up the Mr. B fake investigation again, I don't
- 51:19think any legal consequences happened to this
- 51:21person. David Doe, who was a Canadian pharmacist
- 51:25who was behind this website that went up. I think
- 51:27also since 2019, maybe 2017. for a number of
- 51:32years, the largest non -consensual deep fake
- 51:35celebrity pornography site in the world. And
- 51:38he did lose his job as a pharmacist, but no legal
- 51:42harm came to this person. And I think that is,
- 51:47as you've seen, I think so few cases in which
- 51:50the website owner or website administrator of
- 51:54these types of platforms and sites receive any
- 51:57sort of consequence besides a sickening, besides
- 52:00them themselves turning off their own sight.
- 52:03Terrifying. I am conscious of time, but I just
- 52:06wanted to mention that we did have a talk recently
- 52:09with Image Angel, which is a company that's building
- 52:13protective tech to try and deal with this. Somebody
- 52:16in the chat said, as a follow -up, it does get
- 52:19tricky helping survivors, victims in the sense,
- 52:21but there is civil litigation. However, that
- 52:24presents a barrier due to financial costs. And
- 52:26I will say there are a few law firms in the US
- 52:28who are adding digital behavioural forensics
- 52:30to their teams to help. It's kind of what Image
- 52:32Angel are also doing. They're doing digital watermarking
- 52:36as well. We've had a question whether, as journalists,
- 52:39you would ever notify the victims of such sites.
- 52:42And I think you've mentioned already when you
- 52:45were describing this investigation, how, you
- 52:48know, there was a lot of people who may be unaware
- 52:51that their material is on there. And often the
- 52:55posters, I've read some of the posts having worked
- 52:58on this investigation as well, about how a lot
- 53:02of the posters were quite boastful, let's put
- 53:05it, about some of the ways that they'd obtained
- 53:07or said that they'd obtained this kind of material.
- 53:11Would you as journalists, both of you, would
- 53:14you ever feel the desire to notify victims in
- 53:18these cases? And are there any ethical or moral
- 53:20concerns with doing that? I don't know if you
- 53:24want to take that first, Michael, and then I'll
- 53:27comment afterwards. Sure. I have never had that
- 53:32situation where I knew about something like that,
- 53:36that the person who was at the center of it did
- 53:38not. Outside of anything with League BB, say,
- 53:43There would be a scenario where you would do
- 53:46that, yes. If the situation demanded it, I would
- 53:51feel comfortable doing that, but it would be
- 53:53very much case by case. It's a funny line when
- 53:57we say we're not activists here, we are just
- 53:59looking to report what we report. But if somebody
- 54:04is in that position and you know and they don't,
- 54:06there is absolutely an avenue by which it would
- 54:09be the right and responsible thing to do, I think.
- 54:12to let them know so that they can do whatever
- 54:15they would like to do about it. But it's complicated.
- 54:20I remember that movie she said when one of the
- 54:22New York Times reporters shows up trying to interview
- 54:25a potential victim and encounters the husband
- 54:28first, who has no idea what might have happened
- 54:3010 years ago with Harvey Weinstein. And you can
- 54:34get into difficulties pretty quickly when you
- 54:37get into that territory. I agree with Michael.
- 54:41really complicated. I think there's been a couple
- 54:45of times in stories in which I did reach out
- 54:48to the victim, especially when I was doing one
- 54:50of my first stories in this, and they chose not
- 54:52to respond to me. And it did make me think that,
- 54:56you know, not everyone wants to know. It's like
- 54:58you are then telling this person, like, the question's
- 55:01like, I think about it for myself. If there was
- 55:04non -consensual imagery or deep fake imagery
- 55:07of myself on the internet, which is always a
- 55:09risk, being a woman as a journalist in this area
- 55:14is, like, what I myself want to know. And I don't
- 55:18think so necessarily. Like, if, you know, if
- 55:20I come across or a fighter comes out, then, okay,
- 55:22I've kind of, like, mentally prepared for it.
- 55:24But that could be a really, I think, damaging
- 55:26thing if you don't already know. So I think unless,
- 55:30like, it's a, it is also, I think, pretty much
- 55:33a case -by -case basis because otherwise, I'd
- 55:35be spending all my time... I think identifying
- 55:38victims and contacting them. And that's not my
- 55:41job. It's not my role to do so. I think if there
- 55:44is... I would ideally would want to reach out
- 55:47to someone who already knows, especially if I
- 55:49want to interview them from their story. If they
- 55:50already know their images on that site, that
- 55:53would be the ideal. Because you do risk being
- 55:56the person that introduces that trauma to them.
- 56:00Because there has been research now about the
- 56:04sort of the... emotional and mental harms that
- 56:08can happen once someone realizes non -consensual
- 56:12imagery of them is either authentic or deep fake
- 56:17is spreading of them on the internet and they
- 56:20have little little recourse. They could really
- 56:22damage their lives in a way. So it's tough. It's
- 56:26a really tough question and I don't think there
- 56:28is a perfect answer for that. I think for this
- 56:33story in particular, we discussed it with our
- 56:36editorial team. And ultimately, the only person
- 56:39we thought about that we would reach out to would
- 56:42be victims who already know that their image
- 56:44is on there because we are not re -exposing them
- 56:49or exposing them as their first initial surprise,
- 56:52like, hey, this content is as obvious as on these
- 56:54sites. And I think that would probably just be
- 56:57the best situation, but I think there are a lot
- 57:01of ethical moral concerns in being the person
- 57:05to tell people that their images are spreading
- 57:08online to be the first person to do so. Yeah,
- 57:11I just want to very, very, very quickly, because
- 57:13I know we're about to go to time, ask you, Kolina,
- 57:16because archive pages were really quite important
- 57:19in this investigation, as you mentioned. If somebody
- 57:22is doing a similar investigation or if you were
- 57:25going to go back and do this investigation again,
- 57:28what data would you be particularly interested
- 57:31in archiving or making sure that you had saved
- 57:34versions of? I'm not talking about, for example,
- 57:37the material that you might find on the site,
- 57:38but what kind of information was really vital
- 57:41to the investigation that was important was saved
- 57:44on archive pages? Yeah, I think one of the most
- 57:48important or a couple of important things was
- 57:52those early captures of the website that it's
- 57:56like beginning days, particularly the HTML that
- 57:59was saved because that's how we were able to
- 58:01find that proton email address that used the
- 58:04phone number as the username. If that wasn't
- 58:07archived, then we just wouldn't have that link
- 58:11because later versions of the website... Certainly,
- 58:15I think probably after PayPal discovered that
- 58:18they are being used to facilitate these kind
- 58:20of payments, that clue, that bit was no longer
- 58:25saved. So I think that was really important bit
- 58:30of evidence that was for us. I also think that
- 58:33sites that archived the history of DNS certificates
- 58:39and website information about the websites, like
- 58:43including the MX address that was used, that
- 58:47was also important because the history of that,
- 58:51because we didn't obviously investigate this
- 58:53website in 2020, we're investigating it in 2016.
- 58:58Those are, I think, important clues that led
- 59:01us to identify this person. And it's those repeated
- 59:04bits of evidence that gives us the confidence
- 59:07in an identification. And I think the other component
- 59:14about this that's always the worry is owners
- 59:17of websites can request their content being removed
- 59:20from the Internet Archive. We've seen that in
- 59:22investigations before. In one of my previous
- 59:26ones, we had a bunch of stuff archived on the
- 59:29Internet Archive. There had already been a history
- 59:31of it because the site's been up. And after we
- 59:34reached out to the person about the website to
- 59:36do our write or apply, we checked sort of our
- 59:40links or evidence in the Internet Archive, and
- 59:42it had all been removed. because the owner of
- 59:44the site can remove it. And also, people can
- 59:47put up blockers to make it hard for a site to
- 59:49get archived. And so, I'll also note that another
- 59:52thing that I do on our end is use a tool called
- 59:55Hunchly to help sort of give redundancy in our
- 59:59archiving process. And I will also use something
- 1:00:03called our Bellingcat Auto Archiver because even
- 1:00:06these archive services which we're really great
- 1:00:09for looking at historical stuff. We also want
- 1:00:11to archive to maintain sort of evidence chain
- 1:00:14for our own purposes or for later on. Thank you
- 1:00:21so much for those key tips there. I will make
- 1:00:23sure to include links to those tools as well
- 1:00:26that you mentioned in the description of the
- 1:00:27podcast, but we are absolutely out of time. Thank
- 1:00:31you so much, both Kolina and Michael, for joining.
- 1:00:35this talk and for taking us through your amazing
- 1:00:38investigation. Please do go and read it, both
- 1:00:42versions on the Presser's site and on Bellingcat's
- 1:00:44if you haven't already. And yeah, thank
- 1:00:48you so much for joining us. We'll be back in
- 1:00:50two weeks time with another stage talk, but for
- 1:00:52now, thank you all. Thank you for listening to
- 1:00:56the stage talk. If you'd like to catch a stage
- 1:00:58talk live where you can ask the guest questions,
- 1:01:02Join the Bellingcat Discord server by visiting
- 1:01:05www .discord .gg slash Bellingcat. The music
- 1:01:11you've heard is titled Dawn by Newer Self and
- 1:01:14is courtesy of Artlist.