Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Britain's 1885 cable law is being replaced, and a longer sentence is not a resilience plan
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Sunday, the twenty-fifth of October, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:08This is the morning edition.
- 0:12Britain's 1885 cable law is being replaced, and a longer sentence is not a resilience plan.
- 0:23The government has put forward a replacement for a law passed in 1885, back when an undersea cable meant a
- 0:31telegraph line. The Submarine Telegraph Act is still the main statute protecting the cables that carry the UK
- 0:39's internet traffic. Ministers now want something fit for this century.
- 0:44The Record reported this week that a consultation white paper is out, open until 14 January 2027.
- 0:53It's worth reading, though not for the reason the headlines will give.
- 0:57So, what's actually being proposed?
- 1:03According to The Record, there are three tiers of offence.
- 1:06Up to 14 years for deliberate damage, ten for reckless damage, and two for gross negligence.
- 1:13Bratby Law's legal analysis puts today's ceiling at five years for wilful damage.
- 1:19Negligence carries three months and a £1,000 fine.
- 1:23I've seen the 14-year figure reported only once, so treat it as reported, not confirmed.
- 1:29The scope also widens to electricity interconnectors and pipelines.
- 1:34The more interesting half is the duties.
- 1:36The Record says the government wants statutory security and resilience requirements for subsea operators.
- 1:43Plus powers to direct cable and repair companies on national security grounds.
- 1:48Earlier plans, as Bratby Law describes them, modelled those duties on the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2
- 1:55021. Manage the risk, keep response plans, report incidents quickly.
- 2:01So why isn't a longer sentence a defence?
- 2:06Think of a motorway. A tougher penalty is a speed camera.
- 2:11It punishes the guilty afterwards.
- 2:13It doesn't clear a pile-up, and it doesn't stop a driver who has already decided to cause one.
- 2:19Resilience is the second road you can divert onto.
- 2:23The Record notes that the Estlink 2 cable between Finland and Estonia was damaged on Christmas Day 2024 by a
- 2:31tanker's anchor. Repairs were estimated at €50 to 60 million.
- 2:36Finnish investigators first suspected deliberate damage, but several officials later believed that and other
- 2:43Baltic breaks were accidental.
- 2:46The government itself says most UK faults come from anchors, fishing nets, environmental hazards or technical
- 2:53failure, while warning that suspicious activity is growing.
- 2:57A law that turns on proving intent leaves most of the everyday risk untouched.
- 3:03So, if you sit on a board, what should you do with this?
- 3:08Secure by Design here means assuming the cable will break and building for it.
- 3:14Ask yourself a few things.
- 3:16Do your primary and backup routes share a cable or a landing station?
- 3:20Has failover been tested, or only bought?
- 3:24Is your second cloud region really a second failure domain, or the same route under another name?
- 3:29And do your contracts promise repair times?
- 3:32With powers over repair providers on the table, repair capacity is plainly on ministers' minds.
- 3:38Bratby Law expects the operator duties to arrive no earlier than 2027, so waiting for regulation isn't a pla
- 3:46n. The questions are cheap.
- 3:48A genuinely separate second route is not.
- 3:51And that's a board decision, not an I T one.
- 3:55As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:59That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:05Thanks for listening.