Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2016] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Berkshires gain in net worth
- 0:06during 2016 was $27.5 billion, which increased the per share
- 0:11book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.7%.
- 0:17Over the last 52 years, that is since present management took
- 0:21over, per share book value has grown from $19.00 to
- 0:24$172,108.00, a rate of 19% compounded annually.
- 0:30During the first half of those years, Berkshire's net worth was
- 0:33roughly equal to the number that really counts the intrinsic
- 0:37value of the business. The similarity of the two
- 0:40figures existed then because most of our resources were
- 0:44deployed in marketable securities that were regularly
- 0:47revalued to their quoted prices list, the tax that would be
- 0:50incurred if they were to be sold.
- 0:52In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very
- 0:55large part mark to market. By the early 1990, yes.
- 0:59However, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of
- 1:03businesses, a shift that materially diminished the
- 1:06relevance of balance sheet figures.
- 1:08That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules commonly
- 1:12referred to as J that apply to companies we control differ in
- 1:15important ways from those used to value marketable securities.
- 1:20Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that
- 1:23the carrying value of losers be written down when their failures
- 1:27become apparent. Winners, conversely, are never
- 1:31revalued upwards. We've experienced both outcomes.
- 1:34As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often
- 1:38deliver surprises. After the Edos, I've made some
- 1:41dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill
- 1:44off companies we acquired that later led to goodwill write offs
- 1:49and to consequent reductions in Berkshire's book value.
- 1:52We've also had some winners among the businesses we've
- 1:55purchased, a few of the winners very big, but have not written
- 1:58those up by a penny. We have no quarrel with the
- 2:01asymmetrical accounting that applies here, but over time it
- 2:04necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire's intrinsic
- 2:08value and its book value. Today, the large and growing
- 2:12unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for
- 2:15Berkshire's shares that far exceeds their book value.
- 2:19The overage is truly huge in our property casualty insurance
- 2:23business and significant also in many other operations.
- 2:27Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic
- 2:30value. That's what has happened at
- 2:32Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company's 52 year market
- 2:36price gain shown on the facing page materially exceeds its book
- 2:40value gain. All per share figures used in
- 2:43this report apply to Berkshire's A shares.
- 2:45Figures for the B shares are 11,500 THF those shown for A
- 2:51three. What we hope to accomplish
- 2:53Charlie and Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner and
- 2:57I expect Berkshire's normalized earning power per share to
- 3:00increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will
- 3:04sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the US
- 3:09economy. In addition, insurance mega
- 3:12catastrophes or other industry specific events may occasionally
- 3:16reduce earnings at Berkshire even when most American
- 3:19businesses are doing well. It's our job, though, to
- 3:22overtime deliver significant growth, bumpy or not.
- 3:26After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors
- 3:30have opted to retain all earnings.
- 3:33Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016, Berkshire ranked first among
- 3:38American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings
- 3:41retained in each year, reinvesting many billions of
- 3:45dollars more than did the runner up.
- 3:47Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.
- 3:50Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we
- 3:53achieve will be minor. Very occasionally, the cash
- 3:56register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan
- 4:00to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally
- 4:04and financially to act fast when opportunities present
- 4:07themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds
- 4:11will fill the economic skies and they will briefly rain gold.
- 4:15When downpours of that sort occur, it's imperative that we
- 4:18rush outdoors carrying wash tubs, not teaspoons.
- 4:22And that we will do. I earlier described our gradual
- 4:25shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from
- 4:28investment activities to one that grows in value by owning
- 4:31businesses launching that transition.
- 4:34We took baby steps, making small acquisitions whose impact on
- 4:38Berkshire's profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable
- 4:42securities. Despite that cautious approach,
- 4:45I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring
- 4:48Dexter Shoe for $434 million in 1993.
- 4:53Dexter's value promptly went to zero.
- 4:56The story gets worse. I used stock for the purchase,
- 4:59giving the sellers 25,203 shares of Berkshire that a year in 2016
- 5:05were worth more than $6 billion. That wreck was followed by three
- 5:09key happenings, 2 positive, one negative that set us firmly on
- 5:13our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we
- 5:17acquired the half of GEICO we didn't already own, a cash
- 5:21transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio
- 5:23investment into a wholly owned operating business.
- 5:27GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the
- 5:31centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the
- 5:34world's premier property casualty business.
- 5:37Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly
- 5:40using Berkshire stock, a boatload of stock, to buy
- 5:43General Reinsurance in late 1998.
- 5:46After some early problems, General Rhee has become a fine
- 5:50insurance operation that we prize.
- 5:52It was nevertheless a terrible mistake on my part to issue
- 5:56272,200 shares of Berkshire and buying General Rhee, an act that
- 6:02increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%.
- 6:06My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more
- 6:10than they received, a practice that despite the biblical
- 6:13endorsement, is far from blessed when you are buying businesses.
- 6:17Early in 2000 I atoned for that folly by buying 76% since grown
- 6:22to 90% of Mid American Energy, a brilliantly managed utility
- 6:26business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make
- 6:30profitable and socially useful investments.
- 6:33The Mid American cash purchase I was learning firmly launched us
- 6:37on our present course of one, continuing to build our
- 6:40insurance operation, 2 energetically acquiring large
- 6:44and diversified non insurance businesses and three, largely
- 6:47making our deals from internally generated cash.
- 6:50Today I would rather prep for a Colon OS copy than issue
- 6:54Berkshire shares. Our portfolio of bonds and
- 6:57stocks de emphasized though it is has continued in the post
- 7:011998 period too grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains,
- 7:06interest and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have
- 7:10provided us major help in financing the purchase of
- 7:13businesses. Though unconventional,
- 7:15Berkshire's two pronged approach to capital allocation gives USA
- 7:19real edge. 4 hay race. Our financial record since 1999
- 7:24when the redirection of our business began in earnest.
- 7:28During the 18 year period covered Berkshire's outstanding
- 7:32shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring
- 7:37when we purchased BNSF. That, I'm happy to say was 1.
- 7:41Issuance of stock that made good sense after tax earnings in
- 7:45billions of dollars. Capital Capital Year Operations
- 7:491 Gains 2 Year Operations One Gains 219990.670.89 2008
- 7:579.644.652 Thousand 0.942.39 2009 7.570.49 2001 0.130.92 2010
- 8:1211.09 91.87 2002 3.720.57 2011 10.780 Point 5/2/2003 Five Point
- 8:25422.73 2012 12.602 Point 2-3 2004 5.052.26 2013 15 Point
- 8:37144.34 2005 5.003.53 2014 Sixteen Point 553.32 2006
- 8:499.311.712 Thousand 1517.366.73 2007 9.633.58 2016 17.576 Point
- 9:03501 Including interest and dividends from investments, but
- 9:07excluding capital gains or losses.
- 9:10Two. In very large part, this
- 9:12tabulation includes only realized capital gains or
- 9:16losses. Unrealized gains and losses are
- 9:19also included. However, when GAP requires that
- 9:22treatment, our expectation is that investment gains will
- 9:25continue to be substantial, though totally random as to
- 9:29timing and that these will supply significant funds for
- 9:32business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire's superb
- 9:36core of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at
- 9:39the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them
- 9:43to grow by making bolt on acquisitions.
- 9:46By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement
- 9:49in earnings will translate into equivalent per share gains.
- 9:53Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings
- 9:56of Berkshire will be a dos they have been throughout our
- 10:00managerial tenure by America's economic dynamism.
- 10:03One word sums up our countries achievements, miraculous from a
- 10:07standing start 240 years ago, a span of time less than triple my
- 10:12days on Earth. Americans have combined human
- 10:14ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious
- 10:19immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any
- 10:23dreams of our forefathers. You need not be an economist to
- 10:27understand how well our system has worked.
- 10:29Just look around you see the 75,000,000 owner occupied homes,
- 10:34the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper
- 10:38productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent
- 10:42filled universities, you name it.
- 10:44They all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren
- 10:48lands, primitive structures, and meager output of 1776.
- 10:53Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling $90
- 10:57trillion. Five.
- 10:59It's true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos,
- 11:03and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance
- 11:07their purchases. If an owner defaults, however,
- 11:10his or her asset does not disappear or lose its
- 11:14usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily
- 11:17passes to an American lending institution that then disposes
- 11:20of it to an American buyer. Our nation's wealth remains
- 11:24intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, money
- 11:27is always there, but the pockets change.
- 11:30Above all, it's our market system, an economic traffic cop
- 11:34ably directing capital, brains, and labor, that has created
- 11:37America's abundance. This system has also been the
- 11:40primary factor in allocating rewards.
- 11:43Governmental redirection through federal, state and local
- 11:47taxation has in addition determined the distribution of a
- 11:51significant portion of the bounty.
- 11:53America has, for example, decided that those citizens in
- 11:56their productive years should help both the old and the young.
- 12:00Such forms of aid sometimes enshrined to send entitlements
- 12:03there generally thought of as applying to the aged.
- 12:06But don't forget that 4 million American babies are born each
- 12:10year with an entitlement to a public education.
- 12:13That societal commitment, largely financed at the local
- 12:16level, costs about $150,000 per baby.
- 12:20The annual cost totals more than $600 billion, which is about 31
- 12:26two percent of GDP. However our wealth may be
- 12:29divided, the mind boggling amounts you see around you
- 12:32belong almost exclusively to Americans.
- 12:36Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion
- 12:40of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of
- 12:43little importance to our national balance sheet.
- 12:46Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in
- 12:49value. Early Americans, we should
- 12:52emphasize, we're neither smarter nor more hardworking than those
- 12:56people who toiled century after century before them.
- 12:59But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed
- 13:03human potential and their successors built upon it.
- 13:06This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our
- 13:10progeny far into the future. Yes, the build up of wealth will
- 13:14be interrupted for short periods from time to time.
- 13:17It will not, however, be stopped.
- 13:20I'll repeat what I've both said in the past and expect to say in
- 13:24future years. Babies born in America today are
- 13:27the luckiest crop in history. America's economic achievements
- 13:31have led to staggering profits for stockholders.
- 13:34During the 20 TH century, the Dow Jones industrials advanced
- 13:38from 66 to 11497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially
- 13:46boosted by steadily increasing dividends.
- 13:49The trend continues. By year end 2016, the index had
- 13:54advanced a further 72% to 19763. American business and
- 14:00consequently a basket of stocks is virtually certain to be worth
- 14:04far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains,
- 14:08entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to
- 14:12that. Ever present naysayers may
- 14:14prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts, but heaven
- 14:18help them if they act in the nonsense they peddle.
- 14:20Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail.
- 14:25Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism.
- 14:28Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major
- 14:32market declines, even panics that will affect virtually all
- 14:36stocks. Noon can tell you when these
- 14:38traumas will occur. Not me, not Charlie, not
- 14:41economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York
- 14:44Fed aptly described the reality of panics.
- 14:48We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk.
- 14:51In truth, however, it tend SD of Indus.
- 14:55During such scary periods, you should never forget two things.
- 14:59First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor because it
- 15:03serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your
- 15:07enemy. It will also be unwarranted.
- 15:10Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply S
- 15:14it for an extended period with a collection of large,
- 15:18conservatively financed American businesses will almost certainly
- 15:21dowel. As for Berkshire, our size
- 15:24precludes a brilliant result. Prospective returns fall as
- 15:27assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire's
- 15:30collection of good businesses, along with the company's
- 15:33impregnable financial strength and owner oriented culture,
- 15:37should deliver decent results. We won't be satisfied with less.
- 15:41Six Share repurchase S In the investment world, discussions
- 15:45about share repurchase S often become heated, but I'd suggest
- 15:49that participants in this debate take a deep breath.
- 15:53Assessing the desirability of repurchase S isn't that
- 15:57complicated. From the standpoint of exiting
- 15:59shareholders, repurchase S are always A+.
- 16:03Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually
- 16:06minuscule, it's always better for a seller to have an
- 16:09additional buyer in the market. For continuing shareholders,
- 16:13however, repurchase S only makes sense if the shares are bought
- 16:17at a price below intrinsic value.
- 16:19When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an
- 16:23immediate gain in intrinsic value.
- 16:26Consider a simple analogy. If there are three equal
- 16:29partners in a business worth $3000 and one is bought out by
- 16:33the partnership for $900, each of the remaining partners
- 16:37realizes an immediate gain of $50.
- 16:40If the exiting partner is paid $1100, however, the continuing
- 16:45partners each suffer a loss of $50.00 The same math applies
- 16:49with corporations and their shareholders.
- 16:52Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value
- 16:56enhancing or value destroying for continuing shareholders is
- 17:00entirely purchase price dependent.
- 17:02It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase
- 17:06announcements almost never refer to a price above which
- 17:09repurchase S will be issued. That certainly wouldn't be the
- 17:12case if a management was buying an outside business.
- 17:16There, price would always factor into a buy or pass decision.
- 17:20When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company,
- 17:24though, they all too often seem oblivious to price.
- 17:28Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private
- 17:30company with just a few owners and we're evaluating the wisdom
- 17:34of buying out one of them? Of course not.
- 17:36It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which
- 17:39repurchase S should not take place, even if the company's
- 17:43shares are underpriced. 1 is when a business both needs all
- 17:47its available money to protect or expand its own operations and
- 17:51is also uncomfortable adding further debt.
- 17:54Here, the internal need for funds should take priority.
- 17:57This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a
- 18:01decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are
- 18:04made. The second exception, less
- 18:06common, materializes when a business acquisition or some
- 18:10other investment opportunity offers far greater value than do
- 18:13the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser.
- 18:17Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these
- 18:20alternatives. A tour present size, the issue
- 18:23is far less likely to arise. My suggestion before even
- 18:28discussing repurchase as ACEO and his or her board should
- 18:32stand join hands and in unison declare what is smart at 1 price
- 18:37is stupid at another. To recap Berkshire's own
- 18:40repurchase policy, I am authorized to buy large amounts
- 18:43of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our
- 18:48board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly
- 18:51bring an instant and material benefit to continuing
- 18:54shareholders. By our estimate, a 120% of book
- 18:58price is a significant discount too Berkshire's intrinsic value
- 19:03a spread that is appropriate because calculations of
- 19:06intrinsic value can't be precise.
- 19:08The authorization given me does not mean that we will prop our
- 19:12stocks price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached.
- 19:17We will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful
- 19:20purchases at a value creating price with a related goal of not
- 19:25over influencing the market. To date, repurchasing our shares
- 19:29has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have
- 19:32been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby
- 19:35have signaled our view that Berkshire's intrinsic value is
- 19:39significantly higher than 120% of book value.
- 19:43If so, that's fine. Charlie and I prefer to see
- 19:46Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around
- 19:49intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted
- 19:53high price. It's now fun having owners who
- 19:55are disappointed with their purchases, nor one too low.
- 19:58Furthermore, are buying out partners at a discount is not a
- 20:02particularly gratifying way of making money.
- 20:05Still, market circumstances could create a situation in
- 20:08which repurchase S would benefit both continuing and exiting
- 20:13shareholders. If so, we will be ready to Act
- 20:167. One final observation for this
- 20:18section. As the subject of repurchase S
- 20:21has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them
- 20:25UN American, characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that
- 20:28divert funds needed for productive endeavors.
- 20:31That simply isn't the case. Both American corporations and
- 20:35private investors are today awash in funds looking to be
- 20:39sensibly deployed. Am not aware of any enticing
- 20:42project that in recent years has died for lack of capital.
- 20:46Callous if you have a candidate. Insurance.
- 20:49Let's now look at Berkshire's various businesses, starting
- 20:51with our most important sector, insurance.
- 20:54The Property casualty PC branch of that industry has been the
- 20:58engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we
- 21:02acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National
- 21:06Fire and Marine, for $8.6 million.
- 21:10Today, National Indemnity is the largest property casualty
- 21:13company in the world as measured by net worth.
- 21:16One reason we were attracted to the PC business was its
- 21:19financial characteristics. PC insurers receive premiums
- 21:23upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims
- 21:28arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch
- 21:31over many decades. This collect now, pay later
- 21:34model leaves PC companies holding large sums, money we
- 21:38call float that will eventually go to others.
- 21:41Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own
- 21:44benefit. Though individual policies and
- 21:47claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds
- 21:51usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume.
- 21:54Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float and how
- 21:59it has grown as the following table shows.
- 22:02Year Flaught and millions 1970 dollars Thirty Nine 1980230719
- 22:1091,632 Two Thousand 27,871 2010 65,832 2016 91,577 We recently
- 22:25wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than
- 22:28$100 billion. Beyond that one time boost float
- 22:32at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost
- 22:36certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity's reinsurance
- 22:40division however is party to a number of large runoff contracts
- 22:45whose float is certain to drift downward.
- 22:48We may in time experience a decline in float.
- 22:50If so, the decline will be very gradual.
- 22:53At the outside no more than 3% in any year.
- 22:57The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can
- 23:00never be subject to immediate or near term demands for sums that
- 23:04are of significance to our cash resources.
- 23:07This structure is by design and is a key component in the
- 23:10unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies.
- 23:13It will never be compromised if our premiums exceed the total of
- 23:18our expenses and eventual losses.
- 23:20Our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit
- 23:24that adds to the investment income the flow produces.
- 23:27When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money and
- 23:31better yet, get paid for holding it.
- 23:34Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy
- 23:37result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed
- 23:42that it sometimes causes the PC industry as a whole to operate
- 23:45at a significant underwriting loss.
- 23:48This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its
- 23:51float. Competitive dynamics almost
- 23:54guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float
- 23:57income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record
- 24:01of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared
- 24:05to other American businesses. 8 This outcome is made more
- 24:09certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now
- 24:12exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of
- 24:16almost all PC companies, though not those of Berkshire, are
- 24:19heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high yielding legacy
- 24:24investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding A
- 24:27pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall.
- 24:30For that reason, and others as well, it's a good bet that
- 24:34industry results over the next 10 years will fall short of
- 24:37those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case
- 24:41of companies that specialize in reinsurance.
- 24:44Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects.
- 24:47Berkshire's unrivaled financial strength allows us far more
- 24:51flexibility in investing than that generally available to PC
- 24:55companies. The many alternatives available
- 24:57to us are always an advantage. Occasionally they offer us major
- 25:02opportunities. When others are constrained, our
- 25:05choices expand. Moreover, our PC companies have
- 25:09an excellent underwriting record.
- 25:10Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14
- 25:14consecutive years, our pre tax gain for the period having
- 25:17totaled $28 billion. That record is no accident.
- 25:23Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our
- 25:26insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable,
- 25:30its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
- 25:34All insurers give that message lip service.
- 25:37At Berkshire, it is a religion, Old Testament style.
- 25:40So how does our float affect intrinsic value?
- 25:42When Berkshire's book value is calculated, the full amount of
- 25:46our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to
- 25:50pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it.
- 25:52But two think of float as a typical liability is a major
- 25:56mistake. It should instead be viewed as a
- 25:59revolving fund. Daily we pay old claims and
- 26:02related expenses a huge $27 billion to more than 6,000,000
- 26:07claimants in 2016. And that reduces float.
- 26:11Just as surely, we each day write new business that will
- 26:15soon generate its own claims Adding to float I4 revolving
- 26:19float is both cost less and long enduring, which I believe it
- 26:23will be. The true value of this liability
- 26:26is dramatically less than the accounting liability owing
- 26:30$1.00. That in effect will never leave
- 26:32the premises because new business is almost certain to
- 26:35deliver a substitutious worlds different from owing $1.00 that
- 26:39will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced.
- 26:43The two types of liabilities however, are treated as equals
- 26:47under GAAP. A partial offset to this
- 26:49overstated liability is a $15.5 billion goodwill asset that we
- 26:54incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included
- 26:58in our book value figure. In very large part, this
- 27:01goodwill represents the price we paid for the float generating
- 27:04capabilities of our insurance operations.
- 27:07The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its
- 27:10true value. For example, if an insurance
- 27:13company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses,
- 27:17any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed
- 27:20valueless, whatever its original cost.
- 27:23Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire.
- 27:26Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance
- 27:30goodwill, What we would happily pay for float of similar quality
- 27:34were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it'll be
- 27:38far in excess of its historic carrying value.
- 27:41Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in
- 27:46our insurance business was already on our books in 2000
- 27:50when float was $28 billion. Yet we have subsequently
- 27:54increased our float by $64 billion.
- 27:57Again, that in no way is reflected in our book value.
- 28:00This unrecorded asset is one reason, a huge reason, why we
- 28:05believe Berkshire's intrinsic business value far exceeds its
- 28:08book value. Berkshire's attractive insurance
- 28:11economics exist only because we have some terrific managers
- 28:15running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard
- 28:18to replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major
- 28:22units. First by float size is the
- 28:25Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by AJ Jane.
- 28:29AJ. It insures risks that no one
- 28:31else has the desire or the capital to take on.
- 28:34His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most
- 28:39important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance
- 28:42business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire
- 28:45to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. 9
- 28:50Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk
- 28:53than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance
- 28:57industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega
- 29:02catastrophe, a loss about triple anything it has ever
- 29:05experienced, Berkshire as a whole would likely record a
- 29:08large profit for the year are many streams of non insurance
- 29:12earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain
- 29:15awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance
- 29:19market that might well be in disarray.
- 29:22Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming
- 29:26in red ink if not facing insolvency.
- 29:29When AJ entered Berkshire's office on a Saturday in 1986, he
- 29:33did not have a day's experience in the insurance business.
- 29:36Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of Insurance,
- 29:40handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance
- 29:44business. With that move, Mike achieved
- 29:46sainthood. Since then a Jay IT has created
- 29:4910s of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.
- 29:53If there were ever to be another AJ it and you could swap me for
- 29:56him, Don't hesitate, make the trade.
- 29:59We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Rhee,
- 30:02managed until recently by T Admont Ross.
- 30:05After 39 years at General Rhee, Tad retired in 2016.
- 30:11Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks.
- 30:14Kara Ryguewell, who has worked with AJ at for 16 years, is now
- 30:19CEO of General Rye. At bottom, a sound insurance
- 30:22operation needs to adhere to 4 disciplines.
- 30:25It must, one, understand all exposures that might cause a
- 30:29policy to incur losses, to conservatively assess the
- 30:32likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the
- 30:36probable cost if it does. Three, set a premium that on
- 30:40average will deliver a profit after both prospective loss
- 30:44costs and operating expenses are covered.
- 30:46And four, be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium
- 30:50can't be obtained. Many insurers pass the first
- 30:53three tests and flunk the 4th. They simply can't turn their
- 30:56back on business that is being eagerly written by their
- 30:59competitors. That old line, the other guy is
- 31:02doing it, so we must as well. Spells trouble in any business,
- 31:07but in none more so than insurance.
- 31:09Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy
- 31:12underwriting, and neither will Cara.
- 31:15Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart of
- 31:18fire 66 years ago and for which the flame still burns.
- 31:22GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and
- 31:26completed 55 years of service in 2016.
- 31:31Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993 and since then the company has
- 31:35been flying. There is no better manager than
- 31:38Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and
- 31:42soundness to the job. The latter quality is essential
- 31:46to sustain success. As Charlie says, it's great to
- 31:49have a manager with a 160 icon less he thinks it's 180 dot like
- 31:54AJ it Tony has created 10s of billions of value for Berkshire.
- 31:59On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the
- 32:03huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the
- 32:07industry. It was clear to me that GEICO
- 32:09would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
- 32:12The company's annual sales were then $8 million in 2016.
- 32:17GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.
- 32:21Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families.
- 32:25Savings matter to them and only a low cost operation can deliver
- 32:29those. In fact, at least 40% of the
- 32:32people reading this letter can save money by insuring with
- 32:35GEICO. So stop reading right now and go
- 32:38to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.
- 32:43Gicos. Low costs create a Moat and
- 32:46enduring one that competitors are unable to cross.
- 32:49As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year,
- 32:53ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume.
- 32:58That's up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control
- 33:03of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from
- 33:078575 to 36,000 and 8510. Geico's growth accelerated
- 33:13dramatically during the second-half of 2016.
- 33:17Lost costs throughout the auto insurance industry had been
- 33:20increasing at an unexpected pace, and some competitors lost
- 33:24their enthusiasm for taking on new customers.
- 33:27Geico's reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to
- 33:31accelerate its new business efforts.
- 33:33We like to make hay while the sunsets, knowing that it will
- 33:36surely rise again. GEICO continues on a roll as is
- 33:40end you this letter. When insurance prices increase,
- 33:43people shop more and when they shop, GEICO wins.
- 33:47Have you called yet? 800-847-7536 or go to geico.com.
- 33:53In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a
- 33:57collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial
- 34:00coverage S In aggregate, these companies area large, growing
- 34:05and valuable operation that consistently delivers an
- 34:08underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported
- 34:12by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this
- 34:15group has earned $4.7 billion from underwriting about 13% of
- 34:20its premium volume, while increasing its float from
- 34:23$943,000,000 to $11.6 billion. Less than three years ago, we
- 34:30formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance B HSI, which
- 34:34is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put
- 34:38Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run.
- 34:42We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter
- 34:46built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a
- 34:49worldwide operation. Instead, he and his crew
- 34:52delivered significant underwriting profits throughout
- 34:55the startup period. BHS ICE volume increased 40% in
- 34:592016, reaching $1.3 billion. It's clear to me that the
- 35:05company is destined to become one of the world's leading PC
- 35:08insurers. Payrace our cap of pre tax
- 35:11underwriting earnings and float by division underwriting profit
- 35:15year and float in millions. Insurance Operations 2016 2015
- 35:222016 2015 BH Reinsurance 822 Dollars 421 Dollars Forty 5081
- 35:32Dollars $44,108.00 General Rhee 191 Hundred 321769918560 GEICO
- 35:44462 Four 601714815148 Other Primary 650 Seven 800-2411
- 35:54649-9906 2001 131 Dollars 1837 Dollars 91,577 Dollars $87,722
- 36:10Berkshire's great managers premier financial strength and a
- 36:14range of business models protected by wide moats amount
- 36:17to something unique in the insurance world is a huge asset
- 36:20for Berkshire shareholders. That time will only make more
- 36:24valuable regulated capital intensive businesses.
- 36:28Our BNSF Railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy B he are 90%
- 36:33owned utility business share important characteristics that
- 36:37distinguish them from Berkshire's other activities.
- 36:40Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter
- 36:43and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP
- 36:46balance sheet and income statement.
- 36:49These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire's
- 36:53after tax operating earnings last year. 11 A key
- 36:57characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very
- 37:01long lived regulated assets with these partially funded by large
- 37:06amounts of long term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire.
- 37:10Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning
- 37:14power that even under terrible economic conditions would far
- 37:17exceed its interest requirements.
- 37:20Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads
- 37:24beat NSF's interest coverage was more than 6 colon one.
- 37:28Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before
- 37:31interest and taxes too interest note bit dangerous, a commonly
- 37:35used measure we view as seriously flawed.
- 37:38At Behe, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company's ability to
- 37:42service its debt under all circumstances.
- 37:45The first is common to all utilities, recession resistant
- 37:49earnings, which result from these companies offering an
- 37:52essential service for which demand is remarkably steady.
- 37:56The second is enjoyed by few other utilities, a never
- 38:00widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield be he from
- 38:03being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.
- 38:07These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent
- 38:10advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have
- 38:14allowed be HE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly
- 38:18lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both
- 38:22us and our customers. All told, be He and BNSF
- 38:26invested $8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a
- 38:31massive commitment to their segments of America's
- 38:33infrastructure. We relish making such
- 38:36investments as long as they promise reasonable returns, and
- 38:40on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future
- 38:43regulation. Our confidence is justified both
- 38:46by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will
- 38:50forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy.
- 38:54It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital
- 38:58providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of
- 39:01funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our
- 39:05self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns
- 39:08the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
- 39:12Low prices area powerful way to keep these constituencies happy.
- 39:16In Iowa, BH ES average retail rate is 7.1 per kWh.
- 39:22All I and the other major electric utility in the state
- 39:25averages 9.9. Here are the comparable industry
- 39:29figures for adjacent states, Nebraska 9.0, Missouri 9.5,
- 39:35Illinois 9.2, Minnesota 10.0. The national averages 10.3.
- 39:41We have promised Iowa, NS that our base rates will not increase
- 39:45until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock bottom prices add up to
- 39:50real money for paycheck strapped customers at BNSF.
- 39:53Price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult
- 39:57to make because of significant differences in both their mix of
- 40:00cargo and the average distance the load is carried to supply a
- 40:04very crude measure. However, our revenue per ton
- 40:08mile was three last year while shipping costs for customers of
- 40:11the other four major US. Based railroads range from 4:00
- 40:16to 5:00. Both B he and BNSF have been
- 40:19leaders in pursuing planet friendly technology.
- 40:22In wind generation. No state comes close to rivaling
- 40:26Iowa, where last year the MW hours we generated from wind
- 40:30equaled 55% off all MW hours sold to our Iowa retail
- 40:34customers. New wind projects that are
- 40:37underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.
- 40:41Bargain basement electric rates carry 2nd order benefits with
- 40:44them. Iowa has attracted large, high
- 40:47tech installations both because of its low prices for
- 40:50electricity, which data centers use in huge quantities, and
- 40:54because most tech CE OS are enthusiastic about using
- 40:57renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy,
- 41:00Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.
- 41:03BNSF, like other Class 1 railroads, uses only a single
- 41:08gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles.
- 41:13Those economics make railroads 4 times as fuel efficient as
- 41:16trucks. Furthermore, railroads alleviate
- 41:20Hwy. congestion and the taxpayer funded maintenance expenditures
- 41:23that come with heavier Travis in a major way. 12 All told, be he
- 41:29and B NSF own assets that are of major importance to our country
- 41:32as well as to shareholders of Berkshire.
- 41:35Here are the key financial figures for both BNSF Earnings
- 41:39in Millions 2016 2015 2014 Revenues $19,829 Twenty 1967
- 41:51Dollars $23,239 Operating Expenses 1314414264 Sixteen 1237
- 42:03Operating Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 6680 Five
- 42:097703 Seven 1002 Interest Net 992,928,833 Income Taxes. 2120
- 42:23Four 2520 Seven 2300 Net Earnings 3569 dollars 4248
- 42:34Dollars $3869 Berkshire Hathaway Energy 90% Owned Earnings in
- 42:41Millions 2016 2015 2014 UK dot Utilities 367 dollars 460
- 42:51dollars $527.00 Iowa Utility 392,292,270 Nevada Utilities
- 43:03559,586,549 Pacific OR primarily Oregon and Utah 11051026 1010
- 43:17Gas pipelines Northern Natural and Kern River 413,401,379
- 43:26Canadian Transmission Utility 14717016 Renewable Projects
- 43:34157,175,194 Home Services 225,191,139 Other net 734954
- 43:50Operating Earnings Before Corporate Interest and Taxes
- 43:543438 Three thousand 353,138 Interest 465,499,427 Income
- 44:07Taxes 431,481,616 Net Earnings 2542 dollars 2370 dollars $2095
- 44:22Earnings applicable to Berkshire 2287 dollars 2132 dollars $1882
- 44:33Home Services may appear out of place in the above table but it
- 44:37came with our purchase of Mid American now behind 1999, and we
- 44:41are lucky that it did. Home Services owns 38 Realty
- 44:45companies with more than 29,000 agents who operate in 28 states.
- 44:49Last year it purchased 4 Realtors, including Ho, Lih and
- 44:54Lawrence, the leader in New York's Westchester counting a
- 44:58transaction that closed shortly after year end.
- 45:00In real estate parlance, representing either a buyer or a
- 45:04seller is called aside, with the representation of both counting
- 45:08as two sides. Last year, our own Realtors
- 45:11participated in 244,000 sides totalling $86 billion in volume.
- 45:18Home Services also franchises many operations throughout the
- 45:21country that use our name. We like both aspects of the real
- 45:25estate business and expect to acquire many Realtors and
- 45:28franchisees during the next decade. 13 manufacturing,
- 45:33service and retailing operations.
- 45:35Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell
- 45:39products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes.
- 45:42Let's look though at a summary balance sheet and earnings
- 45:45statement for the entire group. Balance Sheet 123,116 Inches
- 45:52Millions Assets Liabilities and Equity Cash and Equivalents 8073
- 45:58dollars Notes payable 2054 dollars Accounts and Notes
- 46:04Receivable 11183 Other Current liabilities 12,464 Inventory
- 46:1315727 Total Current liabilities 14,518 Other Current assets 1039
- 46:23Total current assets 36,000 and 22 Deferred taxes 12,000 and 44
- 46:31Goodwill and Other intangibles 71473 Term Debt and Other
- 46:37Liabilities 10,943 Fixed assets 18915 Non Controlling interests
- 46:45579 Other assets 3183 Berkshire Equity 91,500 Nine 129,593
- 46:57dollars $129,593 Earnings Statement in Millions 2016 2015
- 47:052014 Revenues 120,000 and 59 dollars 107,825 dollars $97,689
- 47:19Operating expenses 111,380 Three 100,607 Ninety 1788 Interest
- 47:28expense 214,103,109 Pre Tax Earnings 8460 Two 7100 Fifteen
- 47:406792 Income Taxes and non Controlling Interests 2830 one
- 47:472430 Two 2324 Net Earnings 5631 dollars 4683 dollars $4468
- 48:02Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that
- 48:05report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in
- 48:09turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella.
- 48:13For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units serving
- 48:18widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive
- 48:22owns 83 dealerships operating in nine states.
- 48:26This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew.
- 48:30Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net
- 48:34tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that in a couple of
- 48:38instances exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses
- 48:42generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20% fourteen a
- 48:48few. However, these are serious
- 48:50blunders I made in my job of capital allocation produced very
- 48:53poor returns in most cases. I was wrong when I originally
- 48:57sized up the economic characteristics of these
- 49:00companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are
- 49:04now paying the price for my misjudgments.
- 49:06In a couple of instances is tumbled in assessing either the
- 49:10fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in
- 49:14place. I will commit more errors.
- 49:16You can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie never
- 49:19bashed Fearless around to say no to my worst ideas.
- 49:23Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing
- 49:26service and Retailing group are an excellent business.
- 49:30They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets
- 49:34during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of
- 49:39excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after
- 49:44tax on that capital. Of course, a business with
- 49:47terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at
- 49:50too high a price. We have paid substantial
- 49:53premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a
- 49:56cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our
- 50:00balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles.
- 50:03Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital
- 50:07we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings
- 50:11from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because
- 50:15Duracell and Precision Cast Parts, both bought in 2016, will
- 50:19for the first time contribute a full year's earnings to this
- 50:23group. Additionally, Duracell incurred
- 50:25significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.
- 50:30We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them
- 50:33individually. Moreover, there competitors both
- 50:36current and potential, read this report.
- 50:39In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if
- 50:42outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our
- 50:46operations that are not of a size material to 1 evaluation of
- 50:50Berkshire, we only disclose what is required.
- 50:53You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our
- 50:56operations on pages 90 to 94. Be aware though that it's the
- 51:01growth of the Berkshire Forest that counts.
- 51:04It would be foolish to focus over intently on any single tree
- 51:09for several years. I have told you that the income
- 51:11and expense data shown in this section does not conform to
- 51:14GAAP. I have explained that this
- 51:16divergent occurs primarily because of gap ordered rules
- 51:20regarding purchase accounting adjustments that require the
- 51:22full amortization of certain intangibles over periods
- 51:26averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those
- 51:30amortization expenses are not truly an economic cost.
- 51:34Our goal in diverging from gap in this section is to present
- 51:37the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which
- 51:40Charlie and I view and analyze them.
- 51:43On page 54, we itemize $15.4 billion of intangibles that are
- 51:48yet to be amortized by annual charges to earnings.
- 51:52More intangibles to be amortized will be created as we make new
- 51:55acquisitions done on that page, we show that the 2016
- 52:00amortization charge to gap earnings was $1.5 billion, up
- 52:04$384 million from 2015. My judgement is that about 20%
- 52:10of the 2016 charge is aerial cost.
- 52:14Eventually amortization charges fully right off the related
- 52:17asset. When that happens most often at
- 52:19the 15 year mark, the gap earnings we report will increase
- 52:23without any true improvement in the underlying economics of
- 52:27Berkshire's business that MY gift to my successor.
- 52:30Now that I've described a gap expense that I believe to be
- 52:33overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion
- 52:37produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is gap
- 52:41prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on
- 52:44historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those
- 52:47charges materially understate true economic costs.
- 52:51Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the
- 52:541970s and early 1980s when inflation was rampant.
- 52:59As inflation subsided thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker,
- 53:03the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue.
- 53:08But the problem still prevails big time in the railroad
- 53:11industry, where current costs for many depreci able items far
- 53:16outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that
- 53:19reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are
- 53:22considerably higher than true economic earnings. 15-ATB NSF.
- 53:28To get down to particulars, our gap depreciation charge last
- 53:31year was $2.1 billion, but were we to spend that sum and no more
- 53:37annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less
- 53:40competitive. The reality is that simply to
- 53:43hold our own, we need to spend far more than the cost we show
- 53:47for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will
- 53:50prevail for decades. All that said, Charlie and I
- 53:53love our railroad which was one of our better purchases.
- 53:56Too many management S and the number seems to grow every year
- 54:00are looking for any means to report and indeed feature
- 54:04adjusted earnings that are higher than their company's GAAP
- 54:07earnings. There are many ways for
- 54:09practitioners to perform this Ledger domain.
- 54:12Two of their favorites are the omission of restructuring costs
- 54:16and stock based compensation as expenses.
- 54:19Charlie and I want management S in their commentary to describe
- 54:23unusual items, good or bad, that affect the gap numbers.
- 54:27After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to
- 54:30make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly
- 54:34attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting adjusted
- 54:38per share earnings makes us nervous.
- 54:40That's because bad behavior is contagious.
- 54:43CE OS who overtly look for ways to report high numbers, tend to
- 54:47foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be
- 54:50helpful as well. Goals like that can lead, for
- 54:54example, to insurers underestimating their loss
- 54:57reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry
- 55:00participants. Charlie and I cringe when we
- 55:03hear analysts talk admiringly about management S who always
- 55:06make the numbers. In truth, business is too
- 55:10unpredictable for the numbers always to be met.
- 55:13Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, ACEO, whose focus
- 55:17is centered on Wall Street, will be tempted to make up the
- 55:20numbers. Let's get back to the two
- 55:22favorites of Don't Count This managers, starting with
- 55:25restructuring. Berkshire, I would say, has been
- 55:28restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965.
- 55:32Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other
- 55:35choice and today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every
- 55:39year at Berkshire. That's because there are always
- 55:42things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses.
- 55:45Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant
- 55:49sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.
- 55:52We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and
- 55:56told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning
- 55:59power. If there were to be some truly
- 56:01major expenses in a single year, I would of course mention it in
- 56:06my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total
- 56:09rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz
- 56:13merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one
- 56:16time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained
- 56:20clearly to owners. That's precisely what the CEO of
- 56:24Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company's
- 56:27directors, who include me. But to tell owners year after
- 56:31year don't count this when management is simply making
- 56:35business adjustments that are necessary is misleading and too
- 56:38many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.
- 56:42To say stock based compensation is not an expense is even more
- 56:45cavalier. CE OS who go down that road R in
- 56:49effect saying to shareholders, if you pay me a bundle in
- 56:53options or restricted stock, don't worry about its effect on
- 56:57earnings. I'll adjusted a way to explore
- 56:59this maneuver further. Join me for a moment in a visit
- 57:03to a make believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is
- 57:06to juice Berkshire's reported earnings.
- 57:08Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.
- 57:1216 Listen carefully while I tell.
- 57:15These enable Rs that stock based compensation usually comprises
- 57:19at least 20% of total compensation for the top 3 or 4
- 57:24executives at most large companies.
- 57:26Pay attention two as I explained that Berkshire has several
- 57:30hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them
- 57:34similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so.
- 57:37I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all
- 57:42of these payments to Berkshire's executives as an expense.
- 57:46My accounting minions suppress A giggle and immediately point out
- 57:49that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount
- 57:54to cash paid in lieu of stock based compensation and is
- 57:57therefore not a true expense. Supresto Berkshire too can have
- 58:02adjusted earnings back to reality.
- 58:04If CEOs want to leave out stock based compensation in reporting
- 58:08earnings, they should be required to affirm to their
- 58:11owners one of two propositions, why items of value used to pay
- 58:15employees are not a cost, or why a payroll cost should be
- 58:19excluded when calculating earnings.
- 58:22During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the
- 58:241960's, the story was told of ACEO who as his company revved
- 58:30up to go public, asked prospective auditors what is 2 +
- 58:342? The answer That one.
- 58:35The assignment, of course, was what number do you have in mind?
- 58:39Finance and financial products. Our three leasing and rental
- 58:43operations are conducted by Court Furniture, XDRA Semi
- 58:47trailers and Marm on primarily tank cars, but also freight
- 58:51cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes.
- 58:55Each is the leader in it's field.
- 58:57We also include Clayton Homes in this section.
- 59:00This company receives most of its revenue from the sale of
- 59:03manufactured homes, but derives the bulk of its earnings from
- 59:06its large mortgage portfolio. Last year, Clayton became
- 59:10America's largest home builder, delivering 42,000 and 75 units
- 59:15that accounted for 5% of all new American homes.
- 59:19In fairness, other large builders do far more dollar
- 59:23volume than Clayton because they sell site built homes that
- 59:26command much higher prices. In 2015, Clayton branched out,
- 59:31purchasing its first site builder. 2 similar acquisitions
- 59:34followed in 2016, and more will come.
- 59:38Site build houses are expected to amount to 3% or so of
- 59:42Clayton's unit sales in 2017 and will likely deliver about 14% of
- 59:47its dollar volume. Even so, Clayton's focus will
- 59:51always be manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of
- 59:55new American homes costing less than $150,000 Clayton
- 1:00:00manufacturers, close to 1/2 of the total.
- 1:00:03That is a far cry from Clayton's position.
- 1:00:05In 2003, when Berkshire purchased the company, it then
- 1:00:09ranked third in the industry in units sold and employed 6731
- 1:00:15people. Now, when its new acquisitions
- 1:00:17are included, the employee count is 14677.
- 1:00:22And that number will increase in the future.
- 1:00:24Clayton's earnings in recent years have materially benefited
- 1:00:27from extraordinarily low interest rates.
- 1:00:30The company's mortgage loans to home buyers are at fixed rates
- 1:00:34and for long terms, averaging 25 years at inception.
- 1:00:38But Clayton's own borrowing, as are short term credits that
- 1:00:40reprice frequently. When rates plunge, Clayton's
- 1:00:44earnings from its portfolio greatly increase.
- 1:00:47We normally would shun that kind of lend long borrow short
- 1:00:50approach, which can cause major problems for financial
- 1:00:53institutions as a whole. However, Berkshire is always
- 1:00:57asset sensitive, meaning that higher short term rates will
- 1:01:00benefit our consolidated earnings, even as they heard at
- 1:01:04Clayton 17. Last year, Clayton had to
- 1:01:07foreclose on 8304 manufactured housing mortgages, about 2.5% of
- 1:01:13its total portfolio. Customer demographics help
- 1:01:16explain that percentage. Clayton's customers are usually
- 1:01:20lower income families with mediocre credit scores.
- 1:01:23Many are supported by jobs that will be at risk in any
- 1:01:27recession. Many similarly have financial
- 1:01:30profiles that will be damaged by divorce or death to an extent
- 1:01:34that would not be typical for a high income family.
- 1:01:37Those risks that our customers face are partly mitigated
- 1:01:40because almost all have a strong desire to own a home and because
- 1:01:44they enjoy reasonable monthly payments that average only
- 1:01:47$587.00, including the cost of insurance and property taxes.
- 1:01:53Clayton also has long had programs that help borrowers
- 1:01:55through difficulties. The two most popular are loan
- 1:01:59extensions and payment forgiveness.
- 1:02:01Last year, about 11,000 borrowers received extensions
- 1:02:05and 3800 had $3.4 million of scheduled payments permanently
- 1:02:10cancelled by Clayton. The company does not earn
- 1:02:13interest or fees when these loss mitigation moves are made.
- 1:02:17Our experience is that 93% of borrowers help through these
- 1:02:21programs in the last two years now remain in their homes since
- 1:02:25we lose significant sums on foreclosures.
- 1:02:28Losses last year totaled $150 million.
- 1:02:31Our assistance programs end up helping Clayton as well as it's
- 1:02:35borrowers. Clayton and Berkshire have been
- 1:02:37a wonderful partnership. Kevin Clayton came to us with a
- 1:02:40best in class management group and culture.
- 1:02:43Berkshire in turn provided unmatched staying power when the
- 1:02:47manufactured home industry fell apart during the Great
- 1:02:50Recession. AS other lenders to the industry
- 1:02:53vanished, Clayton supplied credit not only to its own
- 1:02:57dealers, but also to dealers who sold the products of its
- 1:03:00competitors. At Berkshire, we never count on
- 1:03:03sign or geese when we acquire companies.
- 1:03:06Truly important ones, however, surfaced after our purchase of
- 1:03:10Clayton. Marmont's railcar business
- 1:03:12experienced a major slowdown in demand last year, which will
- 1:03:16cost earnings to decline in 2017.
- 1:03:19Fleet utilization was 91% in December, down from 97% a year
- 1:03:25earlier, with the drop particularly severe at the large
- 1:03:28fleet we purchased from General Electric in 2015.
- 1:03:32Marmons crane and container rentals have weakened as well.
- 1:03:36Big swings in rail car demand have occurred in the past and
- 1:03:39they will continue. Nevertheless, we vary much like
- 1:03:43this business and expect decent returns on equity capital over
- 1:03:46the years. Tank cars are Marmons specialty.
- 1:03:50People often associate tank cars with the transportation of crude
- 1:03:54oil. In fact they are essential to a
- 1:03:56great variety of shippers. Over time we expect to expand
- 1:04:01our railcar operation. Meanwhile, Marmon is making a
- 1:04:04number of bolt on acquisitions whose results are included in
- 1:04:08the manufacturing service and retailing section pay race.
- 1:04:12The pre tax earnings recap for our finance related companies
- 1:04:16investments. Below we list our 15 common
- 1:04:19stock investments that at year end had the largest market
- 1:04:22value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz
- 1:04:25holding because Berkshire is part of a control group and
- 1:04:28therefore must account for this investment on the equity method.
- 1:04:32The 325442152 shares Berkshire owns of Kraft Heinz are carried
- 1:04:37on our balance sheet at a gap figure of $15.3 billion and had
- 1:04:42a year in market value of $28.4 billion.
- 1:04:46Our cost basis for the shares is $9.8 billion.
- 1:04:50Exclude shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
- 1:04:54This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
- 1:04:58GAA cost differs in a few cases because of write downs that have
- 1:05:02been required under GAAP rules. Some of the stocks in the table
- 1:05:05are the responsibility of either Todd comb sorted.
- 1:05:08We SC Hilur, who work with me in managing Berkshires investments,
- 1:05:13each independently manages more than $10 billion.
- 1:05:17I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at
- 1:05:20monthly trade sheets. Included in the $21 billion that
- 1:05:24the two manage is about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets
- 1:05:29of certain Berkshire subsidiaries.
- 1:05:32As noted, pension investments are not included in the
- 1:05:35preceding tabulation of Berkshire Holdings.
- 1:05:38Excluded from the table, but important is our ownership of $5
- 1:05:42billion of preferred stock issued by Bank of America.
- 1:05:46This stock, which pays us $300 million per year, also carries
- 1:05:50with it a valuable warrant allowing Berkshire to purchase
- 1:05:54700 million common shares of Bank of America for $5 billion
- 1:05:58at any time before September 2nd, 2021.
- 1:06:02At year end, that privilege would have delivered us a profit
- 1:06:06of $10.5 billion. If it wishes, Berkshire can use
- 1:06:10its preferred shares to satisfy the $5 billion cost of
- 1:06:14exercising the warrant. 19 If the dividend rate on Bank of
- 1:06:18America common stock, now $0.30 annually, should rise above
- 1:06:22$0.44 before 2021, we would anticipate making a cashless
- 1:06:27exchange of our preferred into common.
- 1:06:29If the common dividend remains below $0.44, it is highly
- 1:06:34probable that we will exercise the warrant immediately before
- 1:06:37it expires. Many of our invest EES,
- 1:06:40including Bank of America, have been repurchasing shares, some
- 1:06:44quite aggressively. We very much like this behavior
- 1:06:48because we believe the repurchase shares have in most
- 1:06:50cases been underpriced. Undervaluation, after all, is
- 1:06:55why we own these positions. When a company grows and
- 1:06:58outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders.
- 1:07:02It's important for you to understand that 95% of the $86
- 1:07:06billion off cash and equivalents which in mind mind includes you
- 1:07:11S treasury bills shown on our balance sheet are held by
- 1:07:14entities in the United States and consequently is not subject
- 1:07:19to any repatriation tax. Moreover, repatriation of the
- 1:07:23remaining funds would trigger only minor taxes because much of
- 1:07:26that money has been earned in countries that themselves impose
- 1:07:29meaningful corporate taxes. Those payments become an offset
- 1:07:33to you S dot tax when money is brought home.
- 1:07:36These explanations are important because many cash rich American
- 1:07:40companies hold a large portion of their funds and jurisdictions
- 1:07:43imposing very low taxes. Such companies hope Ann may well
- 1:07:47be proved right that the tax levied for bringing these funds
- 1:07:51to America will soon be materially reduced.
- 1:07:54In the meantime, these companies are limited as to how they can
- 1:07:57use that cash. In other words, offshore cash is
- 1:08:01simply not worth ass much. Is cash held at home?
- 1:08:04Berkshire has a partial offset to the favorable geographical
- 1:08:07location of its cash, which is that much of it is held in our
- 1:08:11insurance subsidiaries. Though we have many alternatives
- 1:08:14for investing this cash, we do not have the unlimited choices
- 1:08:18that we would enjoy if the cash were held by the parent company,
- 1:08:22Berkshire. We do have an ability annually
- 1:08:25to distribute large amounts of cash from our insurers to the
- 1:08:28parent, though here too there are limits.
- 1:08:32Overall, cash held at tour insurers is a very valuable
- 1:08:36asset, but one slightly less valuable to us than is cash held
- 1:08:40at the parent level. Sometimes the comments of
- 1:08:42shareholders or media imply that we will own certain stocks
- 1:08:46forever. It is true that we own some
- 1:08:48stocks that I have no intention of selling for as far as the eye
- 1:08:51can see, and we're talking 2020 vision, But we have made no
- 1:08:55commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable
- 1:08:59securities forever. Confusion about this point may
- 1:09:02have resulted from a too casual reading of Economic Principle 11
- 1:09:06on pages 110 to 111, which has been included in our annual
- 1:09:11reports since 1983. That principle covers controlled
- 1:09:15businesses, not marketable securities.
- 1:09:17This year I've added a final sentence to 11 to ensure that
- 1:09:21our owners understand that regard any marketable security
- 1:09:25as available for sale, however unlikely such a sale now seems.
- 1:09:29Before we leave this investment section, a few educational words
- 1:09:33about dividends and taxes. Berkshire, Like most
- 1:09:36corporations, that's considerably more from a dollar
- 1:09:39of dividends than it reaps from a dollar of capital gains.
- 1:09:43That will probably surprise those of our shareholders who
- 1:09:45are accustomed to thinking of capital gains as the route to
- 1:09:49tax favored returns. But hey, race the corporate
- 1:09:52math. Every $1.00 of capital gains
- 1:09:54that a corporation realizes carries with it $0.35 of federal
- 1:09:58income tax. In often state income tax as
- 1:10:01well. The tax on dividends received
- 1:10:04from domestic corporations, however, is consistently lower,
- 1:10:08though rates vary depending on the status of the recipient. 20
- 1:10:12For an on insurance company, which describes Berkshire
- 1:10:15Hathaway, the parent, the federal tax rate is effectively
- 1:10:18101 two cents per $1.00 of dividends received.
- 1:10:22Furthermore, an on insurance company that owns more than 20%
- 1:10:26of an Invest EE OS taxes of only $0.07 per $1.00 of dividends.
- 1:10:31That rate applies for example, to the substantial dividends we
- 1:10:35receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held
- 1:10:40by the parent company. The rationale for the low
- 1:10:42corporate taxes on dividends is that the dividend paying Invest
- 1:10:46EE has already paid its own corporate tax on the earnings
- 1:10:50being distributed. Berkshires insurance
- 1:10:52subsidiaries pay a tax rate on dividends that is somewhat
- 1:10:55higher than that applying to non insurance companies, though the
- 1:10:59rate is still well below the 35% hitting capital gains.
- 1:11:03Property casualty companies owe about 14% in taxes on most
- 1:11:07dividends they receive. Their tax rate falls though to
- 1:11:11about 11% if they own more than 20% of OS based invest EE.
- 1:11:17And that's our tax lesson for today.
- 1:11:19The better how your money finds its way to Wall Street.
- 1:11:22In this section, you will encounter early on the story of
- 1:11:26an investment bet I made nine years ago, and next some strong
- 1:11:30opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to
- 1:11:34briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played
- 1:11:38a role in the bet. Long Bets was seeded by Amazon's
- 1:11:41Jeff Bezos and operates as a nonprofit organization that
- 1:11:45administers just what you'd guess long term bets.
- 1:11:49To participate, proposer OST a proposition at Longbetsorg that
- 1:11:54will be proved right or wrong at a distant date.
- 1:11:57They then wait for a Contra reminded party to take the other
- 1:12:00side of the bet. When a doubter steps forward,
- 1:12:03each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if it's
- 1:12:06side wins, parks its wager with Long Bets and posts a short
- 1:12:10essay defending its position on the Long Bets website.
- 1:12:14When the batiste concluded, long Bets pays off the winning
- 1:12:17charity. Here are examples of what you
- 1:12:19will find on Long Bets. Very interesting site.
- 1:12:22In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Cap or asserted that by 2029, no
- 1:12:27computer or machine intelligence will have passed the Turing
- 1:12:31Test, which deals with whether a computer can successfully
- 1:12:34impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the
- 1:12:37opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with
- 1:12:40$10,000. I don't know Who Will Win this
- 1:12:43bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever
- 1:12:47replicate Charlie. That same year, Craig Mundy E of
- 1:12:50Microsoft asserted that Pilot Less planes would routinely fly
- 1:12:54passengers by 2030. While Eric Schmidt of Google
- 1:12:57argued otherwise, The stakes were $1000 each.
- 1:13:01To ease any heartburn Eric might be experiencing from his
- 1:13:05outsized exposure, I recently offered to take a piece of his
- 1:13:08action. He promptly laid off $500.00
- 1:13:12with me. I like his assumption that it'll
- 1:13:14be around in 20-30 to contribute my payment should we lose now to
- 1:13:18my bet and it's history. In Berkshire's 2005 annual
- 1:13:22report I argued that active investment management by
- 1:13:26professionals in aggregate would over a period of years
- 1:13:29underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who
- 1:13:33simply S it. Still, I explained that the
- 1:13:35massive fees levied by a variety of helpers would leave their
- 1:13:39clients, again in aggregate, worse off than if the amateurs
- 1:13:42simply invested in a non managed low cost index fund.
- 1:13:46See pages 114 to 115 for a print of the argument as I originally
- 1:13:51stated it in the 2005 report. 21 Subsequently, I publicly offered
- 1:13:57to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a
- 1:14:01set of at least five hedge funds, wildly popular and high
- 1:14:05fee investing vehicles that would, over an extended period,
- 1:14:08match the performance of an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund
- 1:14:14charging only token fees. I suggested Aiden your bet and
- 1:14:18named a low cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender.
- 1:14:22I then S it back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund
- 1:14:26managers who could include their own fund as one of the five to
- 1:14:30come forth and defend their occupation.
- 1:14:33After all these managers surged others to bet billions on their
- 1:14:36abilities, why should they fear putting a little of their own
- 1:14:39money on the line? What followed was the sound of
- 1:14:42silence. Though there are thousands of
- 1:14:44professional investment managers who have amassed staggering
- 1:14:47fortunes by touting their stock selecting prowess, only one man,
- 1:14:51Ted Seda, stepped up to my challenge.
- 1:14:54Ted was a Co manager of Proc Partners, an asset manager that
- 1:14:58had raised money from limited partners to form a fund of
- 1:15:01funds. In other words, a fund that
- 1:15:03invests in multiple hedge funds. I hadn't known Ted before our
- 1:15:07wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money
- 1:15:10where his mouth was. He has been both straightforward
- 1:15:14with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both
- 1:15:17he and I have needed to monitor the bet.
- 1:15:20For Proc Partners side of our 10 year bet, Ted picked 5 funds of
- 1:15:24funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my
- 1:15:28Vanguards and P Index fund. The five he selected had
- 1:15:31invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which
- 1:15:35meant that the overall performance of the funds of
- 1:15:37funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a
- 1:15:41single manager. Each fund of funds of course,
- 1:15:44operated with a layer of fees that S at above the fees charged
- 1:15:48by the hedge funds in which it had invested.
- 1:15:51In this doubling up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by
- 1:15:55the underlying hedge funds. Each of the fund of funds
- 1:15:58imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting
- 1:16:02hedge fund managers. Here are the results for the
- 1:16:05first nine years of the BET figures.
- 1:16:07Leaving no doubt that Girls Incorporated of Omaha, the
- 1:16:10charitable beneficiary I designated to get any B twinning
- 1:16:14SI earned, will be the organization eagerly opening the
- 1:16:18mail next January. Fund of Fund of Fund of Fund of
- 1:16:21Fund of S&P Year Funds A Funds B Funds C Funds D Funds E Index
- 1:16:27Fund 2008 - 16.5% - 22.3% - 21.3% - 29.3% - 30.1% - 37.0%
- 1:16:412911.3 percent 14.5 percent 21.4 percent 16.5 percent 16.8
- 1:16:49percent 26.6% 2010 5.9 percent 6.8 percent 13.3 percent 4.9
- 1:16:58percent 11.9% Fifteen Point 1% 2011 - 6.3% - 1.3 percent 5.9% -
- 1:17:086.3% - 2.8% Two Point 1% 2012 3.4 percent 9.6 percent 5.7
- 1:17:18percent 6.2 percent 9.1 percent 16% 2013 10.5 percent 15.2
- 1:17:26percent 8.8 percent 14.2 percent 14.4 percent 32.3% 2014 4.7%
- 1:17:35Four percent 18.9 percent 0.7% - 2.1 percent 13.6% 2015 1.6
- 1:17:44percent 2.5 percent 5.4 percent 1.4% - 5.0 percent 1.4% 2016 -
- 1:17:532.9% One point 7% - 1.4 percent 2.5 percent 4.4 percent 11.9%
- 1:18:02Game 2 Date 8.7 percent 28.3 percent 62.8 percent 2.9 percent
- 1:18:107.5 percent 85.4% Footnote Under my agreement with PROC Partners.
- 1:18:16The names of these funds of funds have never been publicly
- 1:18:19disclosed I however, see their annual audits the compounded
- 1:18:24annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1% which is a
- 1:18:29return that could easily prove typical for the stock market
- 1:18:32over time that's an important fact a particularly weak nine
- 1:18:36years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have
- 1:18:40probably helped the relative performance.
- 1:18:42Of the hedge funds because many hold large short positions
- 1:18:45conversely 9 years of exceptionally high.
- 1:18:48Returns from stocks would have provided A tailwind for index
- 1:18:52funds. Instead, we operated in what I
- 1:18:54would call a neutral environment.
- 1:18:56In it, the five funds of funds delivered through 2016 an
- 1:19:01average of only 2.2%. Compounded annually, that means
- 1:19:05$1 million invested in those funds would have gained
- 1:19:09$220,000. The index fund would meanwhile
- 1:19:12have gained $854,000.22. Bear in mind that every one of
- 1:19:18the 100 plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a
- 1:19:21huge financial incentive to do his or her best.
- 1:19:25Moreover, the five funds of funds managers that Ted selected
- 1:19:29were similarly in Cinevis Ed to select the best hedge fund
- 1:19:33managers possible, because the five were entitled to
- 1:19:36performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.
- 1:19:40I'm certain that in almost all cases, the managers at both
- 1:19:43levels were honest and intelligent people.
- 1:19:46But the results for their investors were dismal.
- 1:19:49Really dismal. And alas, the huge fixed fees
- 1:19:52charged by all of the funds and funds of funds involved, fees
- 1:19:56that were totally unwarranted by performance, were such that
- 1:19:58their managers were showered with compensation over the nine
- 1:20:02years that have passed, as Gordon Gek Kale might have put
- 1:20:06it. Fees never sleep.
- 1:20:08The underlying hedge fund managers in our bet receive
- 1:20:11payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a
- 1:20:14bit under the prevailing hedge fund standard of 2 and 20,
- 1:20:17meaning a 2% annual fixed fee payable even when losses are
- 1:20:22huge and 20% of profits with no claw back if good years were
- 1:20:26followed by bad once under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge
- 1:20:30fund operator's ability to simply pile up assets under
- 1:20:34management has made many of these managers extraordinarily
- 1:20:38rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.
- 1:20:42Still, we're not through with fees.
- 1:20:44Remember, there were the fund of funds managers to be fed as
- 1:20:47well. These managers received an
- 1:20:49additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets.
- 1:20:54Then despite the terrible overall record of the five funds
- 1:20:57of funds, some experienced a few good years and collected
- 1:21:01performance fees. Consequently, I estimate that
- 1:21:04over the nine year period, roughly 60% gulp of all gains
- 1:21:09achieved by the five funds of funds were diverted to the 2
- 1:21:12levels of managers. That was their misbegotten
- 1:21:15reward for accomplishing something far short of what
- 1:21:17their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly
- 1:21:21Ann with virtually no cost achieved on their own.
- 1:21:24In my opinion, the disappointing results for hedge fund investors
- 1:21:28that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in the future.
- 1:21:32I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was
- 1:21:35posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced Ann that
- 1:21:39is still posted there. Here's what I asserted Over 18
- 1:21:42year period commencing on January 12008 and ending on
- 1:21:47December 312017, the S&P 500 will outperform a portfolio of
- 1:21:53funds of hedge funds when performances measured on a basis
- 1:21:57any Toffees costs and expenses. A lot of very smart people set
- 1:22:01out to do better than average in securities markets.
- 1:22:05Call them active investors, they're opposites.
- 1:22:08Passive investors will by definition do about average in
- 1:22:12aggregate. There positions will more or
- 1:22:14less approximate those of an index fund.
- 1:22:17Therefore, the balance of the universe of active investors
- 1:22:20must do about average as well. However, these investors will
- 1:22:24incur far greater costs, so on balance, their aggregate results
- 1:22:29after these costs will be worse than those of the passive
- 1:22:32investors. Costs skyrocket when large
- 1:22:34annual fees, large performance fees, and active trading costs
- 1:22:38are all added to the active investors equation.
- 1:22:42Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because their
- 1:22:45fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge
- 1:22:49funds in which the funds of funds are invested.
- 1:22:52A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds,
- 1:22:55but to a great extent there efforts are self neutralizing
- 1:22:59and their IQ will not overcome the cost they impose on
- 1:23:03investors. Investors on average and over
- 1:23:06time will do better with a low cost index fund than with a
- 1:23:10group of funds of funds. 23 So that was my argument and now let
- 1:23:15me put it into a simple equation.
- 1:23:17If Group active investors and Group B do nothing, investors
- 1:23:21comprise the total investing universe and B is destined to
- 1:23:24achieve average results before costs, so 2 must A.
- 1:23:30Whichever group has the lower costs will win.
- 1:23:32The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very
- 1:23:36minor point, not worth detailing that slightly modifies this
- 1:23:39formulation. And if Group A has exorbitant
- 1:23:42costs, its shortfall will be substantial.
- 1:23:44There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are
- 1:23:47highly likely to outperform the S&P over long stretches.
- 1:23:52In my lifetime, though, I've identified early on only 10 or
- 1:23:56so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.
- 1:24:00There are no doubt many hundreds of people, perhaps thousands,
- 1:24:03who me have never met and whose abilities would equal those of
- 1:24:07the people I've identified. The job, after all, is not
- 1:24:11impossible. The problem simply is that the
- 1:24:13great majority of managers who attempt to over perform will
- 1:24:17fail. The probability is also very
- 1:24:19high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the
- 1:24:22exception. Who does well?
- 1:24:24Bill Rua NEA truly wonderful human being.
- 1:24:28Andaman, whom he identified 60 years ago as almost certain to
- 1:24:32deliver superior investment returns over the long haul, said
- 1:24:36it well. In investment management the
- 1:24:38progression is from the innovators to the imitators to
- 1:24:41the swarming incompetence. Further complicating the search
- 1:24:44for the rare high fee manager who is worth his or her pay is
- 1:24:48the fact that some investment professionals, just as some
- 1:24:51amateurs, will be lucky over short periods.
- 1:24:55IF1000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a
- 1:24:58year, it's very likely that the calls of at least one will be
- 1:25:02correct for 9 consecutive years. Of course, 1000 monkeys would be
- 1:25:07just as likely to produce a seemingly all wise profit, but
- 1:25:11there would remain a difference. The lucky monkey would not find
- 1:25:14people standing in line to invest with him.
- 1:25:17Finally, there are three connected realities that cause
- 1:25:20investing success to breed failure.
- 1:25:23First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money.
- 1:25:26Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment
- 1:25:31performance. What is easy with millions
- 1:25:33struggles with billions. SOB.
- 1:25:36Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money
- 1:25:39because of their personal equation, namely, the more funds
- 1:25:42they have under management, the more their fees.
- 1:25:45These three points are hardly new ground form.
- 1:25:48In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million, I wrote my
- 1:25:54limited partners. I feel substantially greater
- 1:25:57size is more likely to harm future results than to help
- 1:26:01them. This might not be true for my
- 1:26:03own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your
- 1:26:06results. Therefore, I intend to admit no
- 1:26:09additional partners to be PL. I have notified Susie that if we
- 1:26:12have any more children, it is up to her to find some other
- 1:26:16partnership for them. The bottom line, when trillions
- 1:26:19of dollars are managed by Wall Streeter S charging high fees,
- 1:26:23it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not
- 1:26:27the clients. Both large and small investors
- 1:26:29should stick with low cost index funds.
- 1:26:32If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done
- 1:26:36the most for American investors, the hands down choice should be
- 1:26:40Jack Bjogle. For decades, Jack has urged
- 1:26:43investors to invest in ultra low cost index funds.
- 1:26:47In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth
- 1:26:50that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their
- 1:26:54investors large rewards while delivering them nothing or, as
- 1:26:58in our bet, less than nothing of added value.
- 1:27:01In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the
- 1:27:04investment management industry. Today, however, he has the
- 1:27:08satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors
- 1:27:11realize far better returns on their savings than they
- 1:27:14otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and tome.
- 1:27:18Over the years, I've often been asked for investment advice and
- 1:27:21in the process of answering I've learned a good deal about human
- 1:27:25behavior. My regular recommendation has
- 1:27:27been a low cost S&P 500 index fund.
- 1:27:31To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have
- 1:27:34usually followed my suggestion 24.
- 1:27:38I believe, however, that none of the mega rich individuals,
- 1:27:41institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice
- 1:27:45when I've given it to them. Instead, these investors
- 1:27:48politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to
- 1:27:52the siren song of a high fee manager, or in the case of many
- 1:27:56institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper helper
- 1:27:59called a consultant. That professional, however,
- 1:28:02faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment
- 1:28:05consultant telling clients year after year to keep adding to an
- 1:28:09index fund replicating the S&P 500?
- 1:28:12That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper
- 1:28:16helpers. However, if they recommend small
- 1:28:19managerial shifts every year or so, that advice is often
- 1:28:23delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable
- 1:28:27investment styles are current economic trends.
- 1:28:30Make the shift appropriate. The wealthy are accustomed to
- 1:28:33feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food,
- 1:28:36schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports
- 1:28:40ticket, you name it. Their money, they feel, should
- 1:28:44buy them something superior compared to what the masses
- 1:28:47receive in many aspects of life. Indeed, wealth does command top
- 1:28:52grade products or services. For that reason, the financial
- 1:28:55elets, wealthy individuals, pension funds, college
- 1:28:58endowments and the like have great trouble meekly signing up
- 1:29:02for a financial product or service that is available as
- 1:29:05well to people investing only a few $1000.
- 1:29:09This reluctance of the rich normally prevails, even though
- 1:29:12the product at issue is, on an expectancy basis, clearly the
- 1:29:16best choice. My calculation, admittedly very
- 1:29:19rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment
- 1:29:23advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than
- 1:29:26$100 billion over the past decade.
- 1:29:29Figure it out. Even a 1% fee on a few trillion
- 1:29:33dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor
- 1:29:36who put money in hedge funds 10 years ago lagged S&P returns.
- 1:29:40But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is
- 1:29:44conservative. Much of the financial damage
- 1:29:46befell pension funds for public employees.
- 1:29:49Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because
- 1:29:53they have suffered a double whammy, poor investment
- 1:29:56performance accompanied by huge fees.
- 1:29:59The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades
- 1:30:02have to be made-up by local taxpayers.
- 1:30:05Human behavior won't change. Wealthy individuals, pension
- 1:30:08funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they
- 1:30:12deserve something extra in investment advice.
- 1:30:15Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get
- 1:30:19very rich. This year the magic potion may
- 1:30:21be hedge funds. Next year, something else.
- 1:30:24The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted
- 1:30:28in an adage. When a person with money meets a
- 1:30:31person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the
- 1:30:35money, and the one with money leaves with experience.
- 1:30:38Long ago a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a
- 1:30:42Commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards.
- 1:30:46I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to
- 1:30:49handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the
- 1:30:53BIG4 Packers, Swift, CUDA, High, Wilson, and Armor.
- 1:30:57After all, hogs were hogs. In the buyers were experts who
- 1:31:00knew to the penny how much any animal was worth.
- 1:31:03How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better
- 1:31:07result than any other? Homer gave me a pitying look and
- 1:31:10said, Warren, it's not how you sell them, it's how you tell
- 1:31:14them what worked in the stock yards continues to work in Wall
- 1:31:17Street. And finally, let me offer an
- 1:31:20olive branch to Wall Street or S many of them good friends of
- 1:31:24mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees,
- 1:31:26even outrageous fiesto investment bankers who bring us
- 1:31:29acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid
- 1:31:32substantial sums for over performance to our two in house
- 1:31:35investment managers and we hope to make even larger payments to
- 1:31:39them in the future. To get biblical Ephesians 3
- 1:31:42verse 18. I know the height and the depth
- 1:31:45and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that
- 1:31:48simple 4 letter word fusion. It is spoken to Wall Street and
- 1:31:52when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully
- 1:31:56write a big check. 25 the annual meeting Last year, we partnered
- 1:32:00with Yahoo to air the first ever webcast of our annual meeting.
- 1:32:04Thanks to Andy SER Wer and his Yahoo crew.
- 1:32:08The production was a success in all respects, registering 1.1
- 1:32:12million unique visits in real time viewing and 11.5 million
- 1:32:17more in replays. Many of those, to be sure,
- 1:32:20called up by viewers interested in only certain segments of the
- 1:32:23webcast. Berkshire's thank you mail for
- 1:32:26initiating the webcast included many notes from three
- 1:32:29constituencies, the elderly who find travel difficult, the
- 1:32:33thrifty who find it expensive to travel to Omaha, and those who
- 1:32:37cannot attend a Saturday meeting for religious reasons.
- 1:32:41The webcast cut attendance at last year's meeting to about
- 1:32:4437,000 people. We can't get a precise count,
- 1:32:47which was down about 10%. Nevertheless, both Berkshire
- 1:32:51subsidiaries and Omaha hotels and restaurants racked up huge
- 1:32:55sales. Nebraska Furniture Mart sales
- 1:32:58broke their 2015 record volume by 3% with the Omaha store
- 1:33:03recording one week volume of $45.5 million.
- 1:33:08Our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink were open from noon
- 1:33:11until 5:00 PM on Friday and drew a crowd of 12,000 bargain
- 1:33:15hunting shareholders. We will repeat those Friday
- 1:33:18shopping hours this year on May 5th TH.
- 1:33:21Spring Money. The annual meeting falls on May
- 1:33:236th TH and will again be webcast by Yahoo, whose web address is
- 1:33:28https://finance.yahoo.comber K live stream.
- 1:33:33The webcast will go live at 9:00 AM Central Daylight Time.
- 1:33:36Yahoo will interview directors, managers, stockholders and
- 1:33:40celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break.
- 1:33:44Both those interviews and meeting will be translated
- 1:33:47simultaneously into Mandarin. For those attending the meeting
- 1:33:50in person. The doors at the CenturyLink
- 1:33:53will open at 7:00 AM on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to
- 1:33:57our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30.
- 1:34:00The question and answer period will start at 9:30 and run until
- 1:34:053:30 with a one hour lunch break at noon.
- 1:34:08Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting.
- 1:34:12It will run an hour or so. That is somewhat longer than
- 1:34:15usual because 3 proxy items are to be presented by their
- 1:34:19proponents who will be given a reasonable amount of time to
- 1:34:22state their case. On Saturday morning, we will
- 1:34:25have our 6th international newspaper tossing challenge.
- 1:34:28Our target will again be the porch of a Clayton home located
- 1:34:32precisely 35 feet from the throwing line.
- 1:34:35When I was a teenager, in my 1 brief flirtation with honest
- 1:34:39labor, I delivered about 500,000 papers, so I think I'm pretty
- 1:34:44good at this game. Challenge me, humiliate me,
- 1:34:47knock me down a peg. The papers will run 36 to 42
- 1:34:51pages and you must fold them yourself.
- 1:34:53No rubber bands allowed. The competition will begin about
- 1:34:577:45 and it'll take on 10 or so competitors selected a few
- 1:35:01minutes earlier by my assistant, Deb Boss and Neck.
- 1:35:04Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300 square foot hall
- 1:35:09that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of
- 1:35:13our subsidiaries will be for sale.
- 1:35:15Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining
- 1:35:19their exhibits and be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad
- 1:35:23layout that salutes all of our companies.
- 1:35:26Your children and you will be enchanted with it.
- 1:35:28Brooks, our running shoe company, will again have a
- 1:35:31special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting after you
- 1:35:35purchase a pair with them on Sunday at our 4th Annual
- 1:35:38Berkshire 5K, an 8:00 AM race starting at the CenturyLink.
- 1:35:43Full details for participating will be included in the
- 1:35:46Visitor's guide that will be sent to you with your meeting
- 1:35:49credentials. Entrance in the race will find
- 1:35:51themselves running alongside many of Berkshire's managers,
- 1:35:55directors and associates. Charlie and I, however, will
- 1:35:59sleep in the fudge and peanut brittle we eat throughout.
- 1:36:03The Saturday meeting takes its toll.
- 1:36:05Participation in the 5K grows every year.
- 1:36:09Help us set another record 26 A GEICO booth in the shopping area
- 1:36:14will be staffed by a number of the company stop counselors from
- 1:36:17around the country. At last year's meeting, we set a
- 1:36:20record for policy sales, up 21% from 2015.
- 1:36:25I predict we will be up again this year, so stop by for a
- 1:36:28quote. In most cases, GEICO will be
- 1:36:31able to give you a shareholder discount, usually 8%.
- 1:36:34This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in
- 1:36:39which we operate. 1 supplemental point The discount is not
- 1:36:43additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that
- 1:36:46available to certain groups. Bring the details of your
- 1:36:49existing insurance and check out our price.
- 1:36:52We can save many of you real money.
- 1:36:54Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.
- 1:36:57Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha based retailer will
- 1:37:00carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new
- 1:37:05titles. The best book I read last year
- 1:37:07was Shoe Dog by Nike's Phil Knight.
- 1:37:09Phil is a very wise, intelligent and competitive fellow who is
- 1:37:14also a gifted storyteller. The Bookworm will have piles of
- 1:37:17Shoe Dog as well as several investment classics by Jack
- 1:37:21Bogle. The Bookworm will once again
- 1:37:23offer our history of the highlights and low lights off
- 1:37:26Berkshire's first 50 years. Non attendees of the meeting can
- 1:37:30find the book on eBay, just type in Berkshire Hathaway Inc
- 1:37:34celebrating 50 years of a profitable partnership to.
- 1:37:38In the edition. An attachment to the proxy
- 1:37:40material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can
- 1:37:44obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the
- 1:37:47meeting and other events. Keep in mind that airlines have
- 1:37:51sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend, though I
- 1:37:54must admit I have developed some tolerance bordering on
- 1:37:57enthusiasm for that practice now that Berkshire has made large
- 1:38:01investments in America's four major carriers.
- 1:38:04Nevertheless, if you are coming from far away, compare the cost
- 1:38:08of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha.
- 1:38:11The drive between the two cities is about 21 hours, and it may be
- 1:38:15that Kansas City can save you 2 significant money.
- 1:38:19The savings for a couple could run to $1000 or more.
- 1:38:22Spend that money with us at Nebraska Furniture Mart, located
- 1:38:26on a 77 acre site on 72 in D Street between Dodge and
- 1:38:30Pacific. We will again be having
- 1:38:33Berkshire Weekend Discount pricing To obtain the Berkshire
- 1:38:36discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday,
- 1:38:41May 2nd in D and Monday May 8th TH inclusive and must also
- 1:38:45present your meeting credential. The period special pricing will
- 1:38:49even apply to the products of several prestigious
- 1:38:52manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against
- 1:38:56discounting, but which in the spirit of our shareholder
- 1:39:00weekend, have made an exception for you.
- 1:39:02We appreciate their cooperation during Berkshire Weekend.
- 1:39:05In FM, we'll be open from 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM Monday through
- 1:39:09Friday, 10:00 AM to 9:30 PM on Saturday, and 10:00 AM to 8:00
- 1:39:15PM on Sunday. From 5 Colon 30P dot m.to 8:00
- 1:39:19PM on Saturday In FM is hosting a picnic to which you are all
- 1:39:23invited. This year we have good news for
- 1:39:25shareholders in the Kansas City and Dallas metro markets who
- 1:39:28can't attend the meeting or perhaps prefer the webcast.
- 1:39:32From May 2nd and D through May 8th TH shareholders who present
- 1:39:37meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire
- 1:39:40ownership, such as brokerage statements to their local NFM
- 1:39:43store will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those
- 1:39:46visiting the Omaha store. At Borschi IMS, we will again
- 1:39:50have two shareholder only events.
- 1:39:53The first will be a cocktail reception from 6:00 PM to 9:00
- 1:39:56PM on Friday, May 5th TH. The second the main gala.
- 1:40:01Will be held on Sunday, May 7th TH from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM.
- 1:40:07On Saturday we will remain open until 6:00 PM.
- 1:40:10Remember, the more you buy, the more you save, or so my daughter
- 1:40:14tells me. When we visit the store 27, we
- 1:40:17will have huge crowds at Borschi IMS throughout the weekend for
- 1:40:21your convenience. Therefore, shareholder prices
- 1:40:24will be available from Monday, May 1st SD through Saturday, May
- 1:40:2713th TH. During that period, please
- 1:40:30identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting
- 1:40:33your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you
- 1:40:37on our stock. On Sunday in the mall outside of
- 1:40:40Borgie, IMS Norman Beck, a remarkable magician and
- 1:40:44motivational speaker from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers
- 1:40:48on the upper level. We will have Bob Ham and and
- 1:40:50Sharon OS Berg, 2 of the world's top bridge experts, available to
- 1:40:55play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
- 1:40:58If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject.
- 1:41:02I will join them at some point and hope a Jayet, Charlie and
- 1:41:05Bill Gates will do so. Also.
- 1:41:07My friend Ariel Shane will be in the mall as well on Sunday,
- 1:41:11taking on challengers at table tennis.
- 1:41:14I met Ariel when she was 9, and even then I was unable to score
- 1:41:18a point against her. Ariel represented the United
- 1:41:21States in the 2012 Olympics. Now she's a senior at Princeton
- 1:41:26after interning last summer at JP Morgan Chase.
- 1:41:29If you don't mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills
- 1:41:32against her beginning at 1:00 PM.
- 1:41:34Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he
- 1:41:37may be ready to again challenge her.
- 1:41:39Dot, MY Advice Bed and Ariel Gore Otts will be open
- 1:41:43exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th
- 1:41:46TH, serving from 1:00 PM until 10:00 PM.
- 1:41:50To make a reservation at Gore Otts, call 402-551-3733.
- 1:41:56On April 3rd or but not before show you are a sophisticated
- 1:42:01diner by ordering the T-bone with hash Browns, we will have
- 1:42:05the same three financial journalists lead the question
- 1:42:07and answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me
- 1:42:10questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.
- 1:42:13The journalists and their e-mail addresses are Carol Loomis, the
- 1:42:18preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be emailed
- 1:42:21at loomisbrkgmail.com, becky.quickofcnbc@berkshirequestioncnbc.com
- 1:42:30and Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times
- 1:42:33addersorkanytimes.com. From the questions submitted,
- 1:42:36each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the
- 1:42:40most interesting and important to shareholders.
- 1:42:43The journalists have told me your question has the best
- 1:42:46chance of being selected if you keep it concise, Avoid sending
- 1:42:50it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire related and include
- 1:42:53no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them.
- 1:42:57In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would
- 1:42:59like your name mentioned. If your question is asked, an
- 1:43:02accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts
- 1:43:05who follow Berkshire this year. The insurance specialist will be
- 1:43:09Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non
- 1:43:12insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Rua
- 1:43:16Northeast, CUNNIFF and Gold Far B and Greg Warren of
- 1:43:20Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting
- 1:43:23is a shareholders meeting, our hope is that the analysts and
- 1:43:26journalists will ask questions that add to our owners
- 1:43:30understanding and knowledge of their investment.
- 1:43:32Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the
- 1:43:35questions headed our way. Some will be tough for sure and
- 1:43:39that's the way we like it. Multi part questions aren't
- 1:43:42allowed. We want to give as many
- 1:43:44questioners as possible a shot at us.
- 1:43:46Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about
- 1:43:49Berkshire then when you came and for you to have a good time
- 1:43:52while in Omaha. All told, we expect at least 54
- 1:43:56questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and
- 1:43:59journalist and for eighteen from the audience.
- 1:44:02The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means
- 1:44:05of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 AM on the morning
- 1:44:10of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones
- 1:44:13installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to
- 1:44:17speak, a drawing 28. While I'm on the subject of our
- 1:44:21owners gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I
- 1:44:24believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to
- 1:44:27new information that Berkshire releases and if possible, should
- 1:44:32also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any
- 1:44:36trading takes place. That's why we try to issue
- 1:44:39financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays, and why
- 1:44:43our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday, a day that
- 1:44:47also eases traffic and parking problems.
- 1:44:49We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one
- 1:44:53with large institutional investors or analysts, treating
- 1:44:57them instead as we do all other shareholders.
- 1:45:00There is no one more important to us than that shareholder of
- 1:45:03limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or
- 1:45:07her savings. As I run the company day-to-day
- 1:45:10and as I write this letter, that is the shareholder whose image
- 1:45:13is in my mind. For good reason, I regularly
- 1:45:16extol the accomplishments of our operating managers.
- 1:45:19They are truly All Stars who run their businesses as if they were
- 1:45:23the only asset owned by their families.
- 1:45:26I also believe that mindset of our managers to be as
- 1:45:29shareholder oriented as can be found in the universe of large
- 1:45:33publicly owned companies. Most of our managers have no
- 1:45:36financial need to work. The joy of hitting business home
- 1:45:40runs means as much to them as their paycheck.
- 1:45:43Equally important, however, are the men and women who work with
- 1:45:47me at our corporate office. This team efficiently deals with
- 1:45:51a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements.
- 1:45:55Files a 30,450 page federal income tax return overseas, the
- 1:46:00filing of 3580 state tax returns.
- 1:46:04Responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries.
- 1:46:08Gets out the annual report. Prepares for the country's
- 1:46:11largest annual meeting. Coordinates the boards
- 1:46:14activities, fact checks this letter in the list goes on and
- 1:46:17on. They handle all of these
- 1:46:19business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency,
- 1:46:23making my life easy and pleasant.
- 1:46:25Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to
- 1:46:28Berkshire. Last year, for example, they
- 1:46:31dealt with the 40 universities selected from 200 applicants who
- 1:46:35sent students to Omaha for AQ and a day with me.
- 1:46:39They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange
- 1:46:43my travel, and even get me hamburgers in French fries,
- 1:46:46smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course, for lunch.
- 1:46:49In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help carries OVA,
- 1:46:53our talented ringmaster at the annual meeting deliver an
- 1:46:56interesting and entertaining weekend for our shareholders.
- 1:47:00They are proud to work for Berkshire and I am proud of
- 1:47:03them. I'm a lucky guy, very fortunate
- 1:47:05in being surrounded by this excellent staff.
- 1:47:08A team of highly talented operating managers in a
- 1:47:11boardroom of very wise and experienced directors.
- 1:47:15Come to Omaha, the cradle of capitalism, in May 6th TH and
- 1:47:19meet the Berkshire bunch. All of us look forward to seeing
- 1:47:21you. February 252017 Warren E
- 1:47:26Buffett, Chairman of the Board.