Latest / Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge / Episode 65 - The PAVE Checklist - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

Transcript

Episode 65 - The PAVE Checklist - Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge · Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge

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The paved checklist. Another way to mitigate risk is to perceive hazards by incorporating
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the paved checklist into pre flight planning. The pilot divides the risks of flight
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into four categories Pilot in Command p I C, Aircraft Environment, end External
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Pressures p a v E, which form part of a pilots decision making process.
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With the paved checklist, pilots have a simple way to remember each category
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to examine for risk prior to each flight. Once a pilot identifies the risks
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of a flight, here or she needs to decide whether the risk or combination
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of risk can be managed safely and successfully. If not, make the decision
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to cancel the flight. If the pilot decides to continue with the flight,
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he or she should develop strategies to mitigate the risks. One way a pilot
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can control the risks is to set personal minimums for items in each risk category.
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These are limits unique to that individual pilot's current level of experience and proficiency.
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For example, the aircraft may have a maximum crosswind component of fifteen knots
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listed in the Aircraft Flight Manual AFM, and the pilot has experience with ten
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knots of direct crosswind It could be unsafe to exceed a ten knot crosswind component
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without additional training. Therefore, the ten knots crosswind experience level is that pilot's
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personal limitation until additional training with a certificated Flight instructor CFI provides the pilot with
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additional experience for flying in crosswinds that exceed ten knots. One of the most
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important concepts that safe pilots understand is the difference between what is legal in terms
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of the regulations and what is smart or safe in terms of pilot experience and
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proficiency. P equals Pilot in command PIC. The pilot is one of the
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risk factors in a flight. The pilot must ask, am I ready for
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this trip in terms of experience, recency, currency, physical and emotional condition.
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The im safe checklist provides the answers A equals aircraft? What limitations will
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the aircraft impose upon the trip? Ask the following questions, is this the
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right aircraft for the flight? Am I familiar with? And current in this
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aircraft? Aircraft performance figures in the AFM are based on a brand new aircraft
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flown by a professional test pilot. Keep that in mind while assessing personal and
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aircraft performance. Is this aircraft equipped for the flight instruments, lights, navigation,
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and communications equipment adequate? Can this aircraft use the runways available for the
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trip with an adequate margin of safety under the conditions to be flown? Can
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this aircraft carry the planned load? Can this aircraft operate at the altitudes needed
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for the trip? Does this aircraft have sufficient fuel capacity with reserves for trip
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legs planned? Does the fuel quantity delivered match the fuel quantity ordered? V
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equals environment weather Weather is a major environmental consideration. Earlier, it was suggested
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pilots set their own personal minimums, especially when it comes to weather. As
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pilots evaluate the weather for a particular flight, they should consider the following.
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What are the current ceiling invisibility in mountainous terrain? Consider having higher minimums for
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ceiling invisibility, particularly if the rain is unfamiliar. Consider the possibility that the
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weather may be different than forecast. Have alternative plans, and be ready and
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willing to divert should an unexpected change occur. Consider the winds at the airports
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being used and the strength of the cross wind component. If flying in mountainous
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terrain, consider whether there are strong winds. Aloft Strong winds and mountainous terrain
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can cause severe turbulence and down drafts and be very hazardous for aircraft even when
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there is no other significant weather. Are there any thunderstorms present or forecast?
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If there are clouds, is there any icing current or forecast? What does
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the temperature? Do points spread? And the current temperature at altitude? Can
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discent be made safely all along the route? If icing conditions are encountered.
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Is the pilot experienced at operating the aircraft's de icing or anti icing equipment?
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Is this equipment in good condition and functional for what icing conditions? Is the
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aircraft rated if any terrain Evaluation of terrain is another important component of analyzing the
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flight environment. To avoid terrain and obstacles, especially at night or in low
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visibility, determine safe altitudes in advance by using the altitude shown on VFR and
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i FR charts. During preflight planning, use maximum elevation figures me efs,
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and other easily obtainable data to minimize the chances of an inflight collision with terrain
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or obstacles. Airport What lights are available at the destination and alternate airports?
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VASSI or pappy or ils glides slope guidance. Is the terminal airport equipped with
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them? Are they working? Will the pilot need to use the radio to
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activate the airport lights? Check the notices to airmen, notems for closed runways
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or airports. Look for runway or beacon lights out nearby towers, etc.
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Choose the flight route wisely. An engine failure gives the nearby airports supreme importance.
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Are there shorter or obstructed fields at the destination and or alternate airports airspace?
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If the trip is over remote areas, our appropriate clothing, water,
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and survival gear on board in the event of a forest landing. If the
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trip includes flying over water or unpopulated areas with a chance of losing visual reference
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to the horizon, the pilot must be prepared to fly IFR. Check the
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airspace in any temporary flight restriction TFRs along the route of flight. Nighttime night
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flying requires special consideration. If the trip includes flying at night over water or
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unpopulated areas with a chance of losing visual reference to the horizon, the pilot
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must be prepared to fly IFR. Will the flight conditions allow us safe emergency
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landing at night? Preflight. All aircraft lights interior and exterior for a night
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flight carry at least two flashlights, one for exterior preflight and a smaller one
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that can be dimmed and kept nearby. E equals external pressures. External pressures
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are influences external to the flight that create a sense of pressure to complete a
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flight, often at the expense of safety. Factors that can be external pressures
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include the following someone waiting at the airport for the flight's arrival, a passenger
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the pilot does not want to disappoint, the desire to demonstrate pilot qualifications,
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the desire to impress someone. Probably two most dangerous words and aviation are watch
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this, the desire to satisfy a specific personal goal get home itis, get
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their itis, and let's go itis. The pilot's general goal completion orientation,
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emotional pressure associated with acknowledging that skill and experience levels may be lower than a
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pilot would like them to be. Pride can be a powerful external factor managing
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external pressures. Management of external pressure is the single most important key to risk
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management because it is the one risk factor category that can cause a pilot to
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ignore all the other risk factors. External pressures put time related pressure on the
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pilot and figure into a majority of accidents. The use of personal standard operating
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procedures SOOPS is one way to manage external pressures. The goal is to supply
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a release for the external pressures of a flight. These procedures include, but
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are not limited, to allow time on a trip for an extra fuel stop
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or to make an unexpected landing because of weather. Have alternate plans for a
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late arrival or make backup airline reservations for must be their trips. For really
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important trips, plan to leave early enough so that there would still be time
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to drive to the destination. Advise those who are waiting at the destination that
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the arrival may be delayed, know how to notify them when delays are encountered.
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Manage passengers expectations. Make sure passengers know that they might not arrive on
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a firm schedule, and if they must arrive by a certain time, they
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should make alternative plans. Eliminate pressure to return home even on a casual day
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flight, by carrying a small overnight kit containing prescriptions, contact lens, solutions
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toiletry, or other necessities on every flight. The key to managing external pressure
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is to be ready for and accept delays. Remember that people get delayed when
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traveling on airlines, driving a car, or taking a bus. The pilot's
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goal is to manage risk, not create hazards. Refer to Figure seventeen dash
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six human behavior. Studies of human behavior have tried to determine an individual's predisposition
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to taking risk and the level of an individual's involvement in accidents. In nineteen
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fifty one, a study regarding injury prone children was published by Elizabeth Metchem Fuller
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and Helen B. Bond of the University of Minnesota. The study was comprised
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of two separate groups of second grade students. Fifty five students were considered accident
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repeaters and forty eight students had no accidents. Both groups were from the same
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school of six hundred, and their family demographics were similar. The accident free
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group showed a superior knowledge of safety, were considered industrious and cooperative with others,
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but were not considered physically inclined. The accident repeater group had better gymnastic
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skills, were considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated rebellious behavior when under stress,
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were poor losers, and liked to be the center of attention. One interpretation
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of this data an adult predisposition to injuries stems from childhood behavior and environment,
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leads to the conclusion that any pilot group should be comprised only of pilots who
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are safety conscious, industrious, and cooperative. Clearly, this is not only
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an inaccurate inference. It is impossible pilots are drawn from the general population and
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exhibit all types of personality traits. Thus, it is important that good decision
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making skill be taught to all pilots. Historically, the term pilot error has
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been used to describe an accident in which an action or decision made by the
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pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the accident. This
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definition also includes the pilot's failure to make a correct decision or take proper action.
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From a broader perspective, the phrase human factors related more aptly describes these
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accidents. A single decision or event does not lead to an accident, but
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a series of events and the resultant decisions together form a chain of events leading
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to an outcome. In his article Accident Prone Pilots, doctor Patrick R.
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Valetti uses the history of Captain Everyman to demonstrate how aircraft accidents are caused more
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by a chain of poor choices rather than one single poor choice. In the
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case of Captain Everyman, after a year up landing accident, he became involved
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in another accident. While taxing a beach fifty eight p baron out of the
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ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher, every Man neglected to
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complete the fuel cross feed check before taking off. Every Man, who was
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flying solo, left the right fuel selector in the cross feed position. Once
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aloft and cruising, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected with ailer on
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trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding off the left wing's
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tank, making the wing lighter. After two hours of flight, the right
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engine quit when every Man was flying along a deep canyon gorge. While he
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was trying to troubleshoot the cause of the right engine's failure. The left engine
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quit. Every Man lended the aircraft on a river sand bar, but it
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sank into ten feet of water. Several years later, every Man flew at
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Havel and twin Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. When he returned
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to home base and landed the air aircraft veered sharply to the left, departed
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the runway, and ran into a marsh three hundred and seventy five feet from
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the runway. The airframe and engines sustained considerable damage. Upon inspecting the wreck,
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accident investigators found the nosewheel steering tiller in the fully deflected position. Both
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the after takeoff and before landing checklist required the tiller to be placed in the
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neutral position. Every man had overlooked this item now is every man accident prone
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or just unlucky? Skipping details on a checklist appears to be a common theme
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in the preceding accidents. While most pilots have made similar mistakes, these errors
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were probably caught prior to a mishap due to extra margin, good warning systems,
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a sharp copilot, or just good luck. What makes a pilot less
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prone to accidents? The successful pilot possesses the ability to conson trait, manage
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workloads, monitor and perform several simultaneous tasks. Some of the latest psychological screenings
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used in aviation test applicants for their ability to multitask, measuring both accuracy as
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well as the individual's ability to focus attention on several subjects. Simultaneously, the
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FAA oversaw an extensive research study on the similarities and dissimilarities of accident free pilots
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and those who were not. The projects surveyed over four thousand pilots, half
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of whom had clean records, while the other half had been involved in an
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accident. Five traits were discovered in pilots prone to having accidents. These pilots
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have disdained toward rules, have very high correlation between accidents on their flying records
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and safety violations on their driving records. Frequently fall into the thrill and adventure
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seeking personality category, are impulsive rather the methodical and disciplined, both in their
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information gathering and in the speed and selection of actions to be taken. A
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disregard for and under utilization of outside sources of information, including copilots, flight
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attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors, and air traffic controllers. End
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of Part two of Chapter seventeen.