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Middle Eastern Challenges · New Thinking for a New World

• 0:02
  Speaker 1: Welcome to New Thinking for a New World, A Tilburg Foundation podcast.
• 0:06
  Speaker 1: I am Alan Stoga your host.
• 0:09
  Speaker 1: Each week i bring you conversations with people who think differently about the great issues that are shaping our world Geopolitics Disruptive Tech Mass Migration The Changing Climate Culture Wars.
• 0:21
  Speaker 1: All of it is grist for our mill!
• 0:28
  Speaker 1: and that you join the conversation at tellbergfoundation.org.
• 0:33
  Speaker 1: And now for today's episode of New Thinking For A New World.
• 0:59
  Speaker 1: Rather, I want to focus on the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea area where a case can be made that elements of new regional order are beginning to emerge.
• 1:08
  Speaker 1: For better or for worse?
• 1:29
  Speaker 1: technological, ideological change in pressure and also by the reality that The Great Powers especially but not only the United States are still going.
• 1:39
  Speaker 1: But Not really gone.
• 1:41
  Speaker 1: witness the Jerry Ford and Abraham Lincoln sailing around the region to do God knows what.
• 1:46
  Speaker 1: if anything specifically I want to discuss the emerging rivalry between Saudi Arabia And the United Arab Emirates who have gone from allies two collaborators Two competitors and maybe on their way to something else, at least to confront each other if not even enemies.
• 2:07
  Speaker 1: Why?
• 2:07
  Speaker 1: What's its stake?
• 2:08
  Speaker 1: what could happen?
• 2:09
  Speaker 1: What do they want?
• 2:12
  Speaker 1: how does it matter?
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: into whom?
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: doesn't matter I doubt If there are answers but There surely can be informed speculation.
• 2:21
  Speaker 1: To that end i've invited professor rob geist pinfolded to speculate with us.
• 2:26
  Speaker 1: Rob is a lecturer in international security at kings college London a research fellow at the Peace Research Center Prague, and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University.
• 2:37
  Speaker 1: Welcome Rob to new thinking for New World!
• 2:40
  Speaker 0: Thanks Alan, pleasure to be here.
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: I'd like to start with fifty thousand feet.
• 2:45
  Speaker 1: can you frame for us The current state of the Saudi UAE relationship?
• 2:52
  Speaker 1: strategic competition ideological maybe personal between leaders
• 2:59
  Speaker 0: Sure.
• 2:59
  Speaker 0: And this is something that analysts have been scrambling to analyze and sort of offered their own take on this since December, last year when we saw the rivalry explode into the open particularly in Yemen with Saudi strikes airstrikes studies on Yemeni backed separatist forces within sorry UAE backed forces within Yemen.
• 3:23
  Speaker 0: now This really came out of the blue for many observers because Saudi Arabia and UAE have seemed to be on same page so long.
• 3:33
  Speaker 0: They are both led by strongmen leaders in the UAE, you have Mohammed bin Zayed in Saudi Arabia.
• 3:41
  Speaker 0: You also have Mohammed Bin Salman who is crown prince de facto leader of Saudi Arabia And these two men seem share similar regional visions were very, very assertive in confronting Islamist movements like for example the Muslim Brotherhood and its many offshoots.
• 4:01
  Speaker 0: And both men weren't prepared to use force in order to do so or at least significant coercive measures Like For Example The Blockade which Both those states pioneered against neighbouring Qatar from twenty seventeen until twenty twenty one.
• 4:18
  Speaker 0: now this fallout emerged as I say In Yemen But it was actually symptomatic of a broader malaise, something that had been bubbling under the surface for very long time.
• 4:30
  Speaker 0: Now if you'll indulge me in dipping into little bit political science language The way we tend to divide states and yes this is imperfect And its binary doesn't always represent world politics but We tend to divided state either status quo powers or revisionist powers.
• 4:48
  Speaker 0: status quo powers think the current balance of power in the region or worldwide works for them and therefore they want to perpetuate it.
• 4:55
  Speaker 0: They do so by various means, they can use military force ,they can use diplomacy or a mixture uh...of those two tools of statecraft and others.
• 5:04
  Speaker 0: revisionist powers are very different, revisionists' powers think that for whatever reason does not favour them, it's not legitimate.
• 5:13
  Speaker 0: It is in their national interests and therefore they tailor the grand strategies to try change the balance of power for them more.
• 5:21
  Speaker 0: now The UAE particularly under Mohammed bin Zayed Is a revisionist power.
• 5:27
  Speaker 0: Its very small state Has come into its own I think lately in terms of soft power And hard power.
• 5:34
  Speaker 0: Therefore wants to exert larger than life impact and imprint on not just the region, but geopolitics.
• 5:41
  Speaker 0: Saudi Arabia is a complete opposite.
• 5:44
  Speaker 0: it's been revisionist power sorry status quo power for very long because in the Gulf ecosystem It has long been the Hedgeman.
• 5:53
  Speaker 0: its dominant power Its much bigger than all of the countries around it.
• 5:57
  Speaker 0: Its got larger GDP Its got a larger population And Because Of That Its kind of baked into Saudi strategic culture to be a status quo Power.
• 6:07
  Speaker 0: If you are the hegemon, You don't want to change things.
• 6:10
  Speaker 0: Now all of that went out The window under Mohammed bin Salman where there seemed To be a strategic conversion between him and Muhammad bin Zayed.
• 6:17
  Speaker 0: Both states became revisionist powers.
• 6:20
  Speaker 0: now I'd argue That was very short lived And what we're seeing is Saudi Arabia reverting to form.
• 6:25
  Speaker 0: So the whole roots Of this crisis Is not that the UAE has changed and done Things previously considered beyond the pale.
• 6:34
  Speaker 0: It's that Saudi Arabia changed briefly but is now reverting to type, and that's the roots of the current crisis.
• 6:40
  Speaker 1: That makes a lot sense.
• 6:41
  Speaker 1: so let's pull on that thread for second.
• 6:46
  Speaker 1: We've watched as Muhammad bin Salman grew As leader.
• 6:52
  Speaker 1: we watch Tim with his family coup take power.
• 6:57
  Speaker 1: We watched him grow in a lot of ways And in a lotta grandiose way all of this spending the fabulous projects.
• 7:09
  Speaker 1: It was like a kid suddenly wakes up on Christmas morning with endless toys, some of what we may be seeing I put as question is somewhat were seen him maturing and understanding bit more about power ,about his own kingdom .
• 7:29
  Speaker 1: About threats that are quite real to him in his country?
• 7:36
  Speaker 0: I think there's a lot made here of personalities that as you say, the MBS suddenly did all these huge things.
• 7:43
  Speaker 0: These dramatic reforms both internally and externally are now... All of a sudden he is changing.
• 7:50
  Speaker 0: Yes!
• 7:51
  Speaker 0: He's changing.
• 7:51
  Speaker 0: And yes, he's maturing.
• 7:53
  Speaker 0: but You could also argue That he has basically been absorbed by Saudi heuristics.
• 8:01
  Speaker 0: or if you're in the West and your conspiracy theorists, call it The Deep State.
• 8:07
  Speaker 0: I don't want to give any of that traction but It's the tremendous power Of path dependency.
• 8:16
  Speaker 0: This is what we see all the time in geopolitics.
• 8:18
  Speaker 0: Why do states Do the same thing over-and-over again?
• 8:21
  Speaker 0: What are different administrations pursuing similar policies?
• 8:24
  Speaker 0: because Largely they see the world In the same way.
• 8:28
  Speaker 0: They influence by history by the strategic culture, by their biases which are unconscious.
• 8:34
  Speaker 0: And that's exactly what happened to Mohammed bin Salman.
• 8:37
  Speaker 0: I would argue he did flirt with revisionism but it backfired significantly for him and therefore Saudi Arabia is now reverting to type.
• 8:47
  Speaker 0: we saw for example that intervention in Yemen.
• 8:49
  Speaker 0: It Did Not Go Well For The Saudis.
• 8:52
  Speaker 0: It's Fair To Say.
• 8:54
  Speaker 0: Saudi Arabia was targeted its armed forces over relied on air power, for example.
• 9:00
  Speaker 0: And as a result Mohammed bin Salman did not get the results that he wanted.
• 9:05
  Speaker 0: so He pivoted pretty quickly to being a status quo power which is probably what many individuals in the Saudi bureaucracy Wanted him to do quite some time.
• 9:16
  Speaker 1: On the other hand you have The UAE Which under the leadership of MPZ Has transformed itself.
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: I remember the first time I was there back in the late seventies.
• 9:31
  Speaker 1: It wasn't quite what Singapore was fifty years ago, but it wasn't much different.
• 9:38
  Speaker 1: today is Shangri-La and that has been importantly under his leadership so its understandable.
• 9:48
  Speaker 1: he doesn't want to go into the little fishing village mentality regional player if not a global player.
• 9:57
  Speaker 1: So you've got the new kid on the block to use non-academic framing that has its own interests, which has charted it's own path and doesn't want to return.
• 10:12
  Speaker 1: do the notion.
• 10:21
  Speaker 0: Yeah, you're exactly right Alan and the UAE's transformation really has been incredible.
• 10:28
  Speaker 0: You alluded to it there but traditionally this sort of liberal state in the Gulf where a lot which had more soft power than other gulf states was Bahrain Right?
• 10:39
  Speaker 0: Now these days the UAEs GDP is ten times that of Bahrain despite their fact they have similar numbers of citizens.
• 10:46
  Speaker 0: The UAE just over one million Bahrain under one million.
• 10:51
  Speaker 0: So that transformation is really extremely impressive from a pure statecraft or grand strategic perspective here, but for the Saudis it's also a cause of concern because several decades ago when we'd be talking about The Gulf We would talk about Saudi Arabia.
• 11:09
  Speaker 0: in terms of traction in European capitals and DC It was the Saudies who were calling shots.
• 11:16
  Speaker 0: Other countries more-or less deferred to them And we've seen a diversification in regional power and centres of power.
• 11:26
  Speaker 0: That's not just the UAE, but also the rise of Qatar for example who have had difficult relationships with Saudi Arabia as well.
• 11:38
  Speaker 0: Saudi Arabia's hegemony has been challenged quite some time now trying to navigate those murky waters.
• 11:48
  Speaker 0: The impressive thing that the UAE managed to do is tilt Saudi straight statecraft and Saudi grand strategy more towards their revisionist vision.
• 11:58
  Speaker 0: And you mentioned this, all these impressive achievements are under MBZ... I'm going use my English pronunciation here of MBZ if you're an American!
• 12:07
  Speaker 0: This was under MBz who came into power more or less in twenty fourteen when his half-brother had a stroke so he became.
• 12:17
  Speaker 0: Same thing happened with MBS.
• 12:19
  Speaker 0: He came to power as defence minister in twenty fifteen, but now holds a lot more power behind the scenes.
• 12:26
  Speaker 0: so these two guys really sort too... There was there's clear strategic convergence But it also for the UAE is source of what?
• 12:35
  Speaker 0: In political science we're called derivative power.
• 12:38
  Speaker 0: We are very small where a small state or middle-power manages have a larger than life influence or import in world affairs, mainly by shaping the statecraft of a larger power.
• 12:51
  Speaker 0: So you know lot of time people focus on US-Israel relationship for example but here had dynamic where UAE was really shaping Saudi Arabia's Statecraft and someone like MBS.
• 13:04
  Speaker 0: that was actually kind of humiliating to use a crude analogy.
• 13:09
  Speaker 0: imagine if your were states more or less universal feeling that it was Canada, who's calling the shots and telling you what to do.
• 13:17
  Speaker 0: And guiding any sort of US administration.
• 13:20
  Speaker 0: so this is humiliating but also a problem for the Saudis given that Saudi has historically been a status quo
• 13:26
  Speaker 1: power.
• 13:27
  Speaker 1: So those are two players.
• 13:30
  Speaker 1: let us do two things.
• 13:31
  Speaker 1: on one hand I want talk about two key relationships from both them.
• 13:35
  Speaker 1: On other hand The three arenas in which they're competing Yemen Sudan and Ethiopia.
• 13:42
  Speaker 1: But let's start with the relationships because clearly, in some way... I'm leaving Iran out of this for a while.
• 13:49
  Speaker 1: The two most important relationships In terms that competition are with United States on one hand And Israel On other hand.
• 13:58
  Speaker 1: Arguably There is direct competition For Trumps favor.
• 14:02
  Speaker 1: You could probably do a balance sheet Showing who has paid how much.
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: And then separately, there's the Israeli thing where the Saudis as you know were on a path towards relationship and explicit above-bored relationships until Gaza.
• 14:20
  Speaker 1: The Emiratis are there have continued to deepen that relationship in really profound ways despite Gaza.
• 14:29
  Speaker 1: So let's talk about
• 14:30
  Speaker 1: U.S.,
• 14:31
  Speaker 0: first
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: how do you see for favour and for favours between the two.
• 14:42
  Speaker 0: Well, coming about this from a US perspective... This is exactly the problem with America's first vision or this grand strategic vision of the U.S.
• 14:51
  Speaker 0: retrenching itself and basically letting its regional allies whom it trusts run the show.
• 14:58
  Speaker 0: What do you when your regional allies have very different visions what their region should look like?
• 15:04
  Speaker 0: And how to get there?
• 15:05
  Speaker 0: obviously Also, Israel is the elephant in the room when it comes to this.
• 15:10
  Speaker 0: But also Saudi Arabia and the UAE then other countries too like Turkey or Qatar for example.
• 15:18
  Speaker 0: so The US wants to disengage And let these guys run the show but Then when they're actually competing with each other It's a recipe for dragging the us back In.
• 15:27
  Speaker 0: Actually obviously u s has potential role To play here as mediator For example between its different partners But the problem is when they start competing in other states.
• 15:40
  Speaker 0: So, you know You mentioned the obvious points of attention.
• 15:42
  Speaker 0: like Yemen for example likes Sudan.
• 15:45
  Speaker 0: but if you look at countries Like Bahrain and Egypt policy makers there are looking At this deepening UAE Saudi split with significant pessimism And worry.
• 15:56
  Speaker 0: simply because these States have an our reliant on Saudi and UAE money and aid, they do not want to have to choose between one or the other.
• 16:09
  Speaker 0: They don't want to bite the hand that feeds them.
• 16:14
  Speaker 0: so this is where it becomes a real US national security interest.
• 16:19
  Speaker 0: because if you have funds dry up for countries like Egypt and Bahrain who are both by way major US non-nato allies If those funds are dry up, then that means either the American taxpayer has to step in or someone else has to Step In.
• 16:34
  Speaker 0: Or if they don't That exacerbates the risk of instability and internal conflict And indeed state failure and collapse which again is a recipe for the US To get dragged back in.
• 16:46
  Speaker 0: so what?
• 16:47
  Speaker 0: The u.s needs to do Is Get involved but in a non-traditional sense.
• 16:53
  Speaker 0: it has a job to play here as a mediator.
• 16:56
  Speaker 0: these Saudis and the UAE have cooperated in the past, even when they disagreed.
• 17:02
  Speaker 0: When it comes to countries like Sudan for example.
• 17:05
  Speaker 0: we need to get back to that paradigm of I guess what you could call if using buzzwords cooperative coexistence and i think thats where US has a role to play here.
• 17:16
  Speaker 0: In managing tensions.
• 17:18
  Speaker 0: its unlikely were going see a rapprochement anytime soon.
• 17:21
  Speaker 0: but there have been clear lines agreement terms whats legitimate and illegitimate competition?
• 17:26
  Speaker 0: What are the legitimate and illegitimate spheres of influence?
• 17:29
  Speaker 0: And how to prevent this division from destabilizing the region, dragging the US back in.
• 17:39
  Speaker 1: Do you know leaders who regardless where they live or what they do Are changing world?
• 17:44
  Speaker 1: Leaders that aren't content with is working hard for could be.
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: Leaders with both a demonstrated track record AND potential for continued impact.
• 17:54
  Speaker 1: Leaders whose work is innovative courageous, rooted in universal values and global in approach or implication.
• 18:03
  Speaker 1: If so please nominate them for the Telberg SNF Eliason Global Leadership Prize at telbergprize.org.
• 18:11
  Speaker 1: I would agree with all that but color me profoundly skeptical That it is within The current administration's capacity to either understand Or execute what you so well articulated.
• 18:31
  Speaker 1: Let's look to the Israelis.
• 18:32
  Speaker 0: Yeah,
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: clearly you've got as You said a similar situation in that The Israelis are having have an amazing relationship with this administration.
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: Get most of what they want when they wanted.
• 18:51
  Speaker 1: They Have A
• 18:54
  Speaker 0: deep
• 18:56
  Speaker 1: mostly under-the-waterline Relationship With the UAE that has, if anything, intensified during the last year and a half.
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: Whereas the Saudi relationship which was on a path seems to have at least slowed down... If not completely stalled out?
• 19:15
  Speaker 0: Definitely
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: But given all of the regional instability we're about to talk about That relation with Israel is critical in terms of managing both the bilateral Saudi Emirati relationship, but also the region.
• 19:31
  Speaker 1: What the Israelis do regionally obviously matters and with whom they're in sync or not-in-sync matter?
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: How is... how do you see the Saudis' and the Emiratis competing for Israeli favor?
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: Or do you...?
• 19:47
  Speaker 0: Well hindsight's a wonderful thing right when we look back at Israel and the UAE normalizing relations in twenty-twenty.
• 19:55
  Speaker 0: And some analysts said, okay well you know this is kind of a trial balloon.
• 19:59
  Speaker 0: The Saudis are allowing This to happen because they want To see how this dynamic unfolds.
• 20:05
  Speaker 0: looking back at it?
• 20:06
  Speaker 0: This was actually one Of the first cracks or very visible cracks In the UAe Saudi relationship.
• 20:13
  Speaker 0: right.
• 20:13
  Speaker 0: the Saudis have Actually been pretty consistent when It comes to Israel.
• 20:17
  Speaker 0: They've Said we will Normalize Relations with Israel But it's conditional.
• 20:22
  Speaker 0: Israel has to agree To either a two-state solution or take some steps towards Palestinian statehood.
• 20:28
  Speaker 0: There was a degree of I guess loosening under Muhammad bin Salman, but they were still expecting Israel to do something.
• 20:35
  Speaker 0: the UAE ditched that Bitches that conditional approach right?
• 20:40
  Speaker 0: They went ahead and said actually we will normalize relations with Israel in twenty twenty and to stop Israel from annexing the West Bank.
• 20:48
  Speaker 0: That was all, you know... The public equation and there were all sorts of talk in Israel that okay this is going to start a new wave.
• 20:55
  Speaker 0: when will Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords?
• 20:58
  Speaker 0: This is what I kept saying for these Israelis.
• 20:59
  Speaker 0: You do not understand the Saudis.
• 21:01
  Speaker 0: Okay!
• 21:02
  Speaker 0: The Saudis will never Join the Abraham accords.
• 21:06
  Speaker 0: If they're ever gonna normalize relations with Israel it would be an agreement With different name.
• 21:10
  Speaker 0: How Saudi flags And Saudi imagery all over it as something that's fundamentally different to the UAE deal, right?
• 21:18
  Speaker 0: And that shows you the competition between both sides.
• 21:20
  Speaker 0: One of the interesting dynamics here is that the Saudis feel like the Emiratis force their hand because obviously if you fly from Tel Aviv to Abu Dhabi You have to fly over Saudi airspace.
• 21:34
  Speaker 0: The Saudis were not keen To let That happen but they felt Like They Were unable to stand up or unwilling to Stand Up against the Trump administration given the importance it placed in the Abraham Accords.
• 21:47
  Speaker 0: And to add insult or injury to the Saudis, you then saw Bahrain which is traditionally a Saudi ally.
• 21:54
  Speaker 0: then agreed-to-normalise relations—which shows you the growing role of the UAE in Bahrain and how this country has potential as a flashpoint for that deepening rivalry.
• 22:08
  Speaker 0: This is kind of the dynamic here.
• 22:10
  Speaker 0: When it comes to the UAE in Israel, there's also an interesting dynamic taking place.
• 22:14
  Speaker 0: I'd argue that going back to that poli-sci language That Israel was traditionally a status quo power Okay?
• 22:21
  Speaker 0: They had a qualitative military edge and they used that qualitative military Edge To protect the regional status quo.
• 22:28
  Speaker 0: If that meant tolerating Hamas and Gaza Hezbollah Lebanon The Assad regime in Syria So be it.
• 22:36
  Speaker 0: There were this feeling.
• 22:37
  Speaker 0: Quiet is better than instability.
• 22:40
  Speaker 0: The October seventh attacks were such a traumatic and indeed strategic shock for Israeli policymakers, the Israeli public that Israel ditched all of those assumptions.
• 22:52
  Speaker 0: And I would argue that Israel's now revisionist power using its qualitative military edge not to restore quiet but even remake the region.
• 22:59
  Speaker 0: So actually this brings it much closer To the Emirati worldview academics of long, when they talk about the UAE described as Little Sparta.
• 23:11
  Speaker 0: Benjamin Netanyahu is Israeli Prime Minister.
• 23:13
  Speaker 0: he himself referred to Israel as another sparta.
• 23:16
  Speaker 0: so we're seeing these and I think that analogy's crude for various reasons And i don't think it fits either Of those countries.
• 23:22
  Speaker 0: but...
• 23:23
  Speaker 1: ...and i'm not sure It's fair to Sparta But That's a different point.
• 23:25
  Speaker 0: Indeed right!
• 23:27
  Speaker 0: What you are seeing here Is The UAE & Israel having A. Having that strategic convergence, they had not only have a similar world view and vision for the region but also of you how to get there by using military force.
• 23:42
  Speaker 0: To confront hostile threats be it Iran or other groups in the axis of resistance into.
• 23:49
  Speaker 0: remake the region.
• 23:50
  Speaker 0: now this is I guess the opposite of Katnip for the Saudis.
• 23:53
  Speaker 0: to the Saudies This is instability.
• 23:55
  Speaker 0: This has a recipe for chaos as the rest beef disaster.
• 23:58
  Speaker 0: this imperils their and transformative vision.
• 24:03
  Speaker 0: You can't attract investors if the whole region around you is on fire, for example.
• 24:09
  Speaker 0: And also as I say Saudi Arabia has a long established tradition of being a status quo power.
• 24:14
  Speaker 0: they even reached a detente with Iran broken by China By the way in twenty-twenty three.
• 24:20
  Speaker 0: so They do not have the appetite for regional transformation.
• 24:23
  Speaker 0: The Israelis and the Emirates Do
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: So.
• 24:26
  Speaker 1: let's play that forward.
• 24:27
  Speaker 1: there are at least not counting Iran, not counting guys in the West Bank.
• 24:35
  Speaker 1: There are three centers of crisis at the moment Yemen, Sudan and Ethiopia.
• 24:41
  Speaker 1: The Saudis and Emiratis are actively playing against each other in all three with intensifying ferocity really close to direct confrontation.
• 24:56
  Speaker 1: probably has been some direct confrontation.
• 25:01
  Speaker 1: you argued earlier that, yep.
• 25:03
  Speaker 1: That's happening and that is a signal for the Americans or someone to come in say hey we need find some stability here.
• 25:15
  Speaker 1: if it doesn't happen how do see these confrontations playing forward?
• 25:21
  Speaker 1: because what happens exactly as you already identified which is having to choose one side or the others.
• 25:32
  Speaker 1: We've got the Egyptians lining up not surprised with the Saudis, apparently the Turks although I can't quite tell what game the Turks are playing.
• 25:40
  Speaker 1: you have other's aligning themselves usually this source of challenge.
• 25:48
  Speaker 1: we see it in Sudan and Ethiopia lining up with the Emiratis with Israelis sort there but not visibly their.
• 25:56
  Speaker 0: And the recognition of Somali land by Israel, right?
• 25:59
  Speaker 1: The recognition was one those things that shouldn't have surprised anyone because it had nothing to do with Isra and Somalia.
• 26:07
  Speaker 1: It has everything in this larger competition
• 26:10
  Speaker 0: Indeed.
• 26:11
  Speaker 1: So given all that we are slip-sliding seems into potential
• 26:18
  Speaker 0: chaos
• 26:20
  Speaker 1: That's without Iranians or whatever they're doing beyond our scope at the moment.
• 26:28
  Speaker 0: Yeah, The recipe for chaos is there and you mentioned those fronts where there has been a long-standing rivalry.
• 26:36
  Speaker 0: as I say Sudan... ...the UAE in the Saudis have been backing different parties there for a long time now but they've managed to more or less manage their rivalry and limit it that front.
• 26:48
  Speaker 0: But we're seeing potential of chaos elsewhere.
• 26:50
  Speaker 0: Just give an example.
• 26:52
  Speaker 0: look at Syria.
• 26:54
  Speaker 0: when you had the fall of the Assad regime in December of twenty-twenty four, The Gulf states were really first along with the Turks to place a vote of confidence and new regime.
• 27:07
  Speaker 0: To pressure the West particularly US but also EU to lift sanctions on the New Government in Syria And also to pour money into rebuilding an investing in Syria.
• 27:21
  Speaker 0: And it seemed like for a long time, all the Gulf states – Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia as well as Turkey were all singing from this same hymn sheet here.
• 27:31
  Speaker 0: They had basically the goal of reorienting Syria away form the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance and in order to do so they saw by strengthening their new regime With the UAE, we've seen some interesting moves in a different direction.
• 27:50
  Speaker 0: It actually looks like there's strategic convergence between Israel and the UAA.
• 27:54
  Speaker 0: now israel has not demonstrated a clear vote of confidence in the al-shara regime.
• 28:00
  Speaker 0: I think it's fair to say.
• 28:02
  Speaker 0: when the regime came into power Israel saw that as i guess an opportunity to occupy more territory.
• 28:09
  Speaker 0: what was previously demilitarized zone also carry out unprecedented number of strikes against former Assad regime weaponry.
• 28:18
  Speaker 0: Now, they justified this saying look we don't know what's happening.
• 28:21
  Speaker 0: This is all a temporary measure but as time went by Israel has settled into this new revisionist paradigm And the shift from being status quo power to a revisionist power in that Israel it quite happy to challenge borders.
• 28:40
  Speaker 0: It would rather basically exert its authority over large parts of Syria, then come to an agreement with the regime that it could be accused of breaking.
• 28:53
  Speaker 0: It would require them to limit their operational and military
• 28:58
  Speaker 0: freedom.".
• 28:59
  Speaker 0: Now, the UAE are interestingly aligning with Israel a lot more in Suwaida—in southern Syria.
• 29:09
  Speaker 0: horrible sectarian violence between local Arab Bedouins and Druze, the Druze minority group.
• 29:16
  Speaker 0: Now there is a very powerful Druze lobby in Israel.
• 29:21
  Speaker 0: The Druze are relatively integrated for non-Jewish citizens of Israel And as a result Israel has kind of recast itself In very sort of post nine eleven humanitarian intervention language as the protector of the Druze and other minority groups in Syria.
• 29:39
  Speaker 0: So what we saw last, uh... In July last year when the Syrian regime tried to exert its influence insuader um And to subdue the sectarian violence We sought Israel bomb The Defense Ministry in Damascus.
• 29:54
  Speaker 0: Now were hearing about the UAE and Israel working together Um To arm-and fund sectarian Druze sorry Druze secessionist groups in southern Syria.
• 30:06
  Speaker 0: This is a huge shift, and I think this really is emblematic of how this Gulf conflict can get out of hand.
• 30:13
  Speaker 0: We go from the Gulf states really agreeing that you know...this is how we rebuild Syria?
• 30:19
  Speaker 0: This is how he prevent an Iranian
• 30:21
  Speaker 0: resurgence?".
• 30:22
  Speaker 0: And now we see that divergence between the UAE uh..and the other Gulf States- and this is incredibly bad news.
• 30:29
  Speaker 0: i would argue um for regional stability and great news If we have all these different actors who share traditional hostility to Iran, turning their guns on each other maybe not literally yet.
• 30:45
  Speaker 0: It gives Iran the opportunity it needs –the essential breather-to restock rebuild and reassert
• 30:52
  Speaker 0: itself.".
• 30:53
  Speaker 0: So this is again where I think that U.S should play a pivotal role in saying okay you guys might disagree on issues XYZ but when it comes to Iran We need you to agree of agreeing collectively how we deal with Iran and its attempt to research itself.
• 31:12
  Speaker 1: We don't, unfortunately have time.
• 31:13
  Speaker 1: go to Iran.
• 31:14
  Speaker 1: but one could then take what you just said an imagine that if Iran is kept in the state of chaos internal chaos it's in.
• 31:25
  Speaker 1: If there is civil war on Iran?
• 31:28
  Speaker 1: If There Is Continual Unrest That's in the interest of the revisionist powers, because they don't have to worry about Iran.
• 31:41
  Speaker 1: They can worry about each other which is where I want to go with my final question Can you imagine a world that there are two possibilities here broadly and simply?
• 31:50
  Speaker 1: One at some point MBZ and MBS stand up and say we could do better.
• 31:56
  Speaker 1: We can figure out some way to have A new approach to this region.
• 32:01
  Speaker 1: or two perhaps through proxies, maybe directly in growing confrontation.
• 32:10
  Speaker 1: It's even less in the Saudi interest than on the Emirati interests but arguably it is neither of those two interests and may be too early to answer this question.
• 32:21
  Speaker 1: But if you had do where would your place for money?
• 32:24
  Speaker 1: For next year Two years
• 32:27
  Speaker 0: I think that we are going see the relationship getting messier.
• 32:32
  Speaker 0: I will temper that with a degree of optimism, but i think in the long term things can and will get better.
• 32:39
  Speaker 0: Simply because Gulf states are... Their ability to change their statecraft-their vision is incredible!
• 32:48
  Speaker 0: They're very versatile actors.
• 32:50
  Speaker 0: you know now we talk about the UAE going after the Muslim Brotherhood.
• 32:54
  Speaker 0: it didn't make The Muslim Brother Illegal until twenty fourteen.
• 32:59
  Speaker 0: many Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated members of al-Vemurati administrations before then.
• 33:06
  Speaker 0: And also look at Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Saudi Arabian Qatar are getting on better than they have done for a very long time possibly ever!
• 33:14
  Speaker 0: It wasn't that long ago that Saudi Arabia blockaded Qatar from twenty seventeen to twenty twenty one... ...and there was even rumours the Saudis were going send troops into Qatar to bomb the studios of Al Jazeera None of which happened, partly because the Americans played a pivotal role in saying okay we might support your blockade but don't get carried away.
• 33:36
  Speaker 0: Don't go too
• 33:37
  Speaker 0: far.".
• 33:38
  Speaker 0: And that was the Trump administration and Rex Tillerson by the way.
• 33:41
  Speaker 0: so there is potential here to reign this in.
• 33:44
  Speaker 0: I don't think it's anyone's interest for this rivalry escalate... ...and its not even Israel's interests for this rivalry to escalate.
• 33:51
  Speaker 0: remember at end today one reason why Israelis were happy about Abraham Accords wrongly.
• 33:59
  Speaker 0: But they did see it as a route to normalize relations with Saudis.
• 34:02
  Speaker 0: Saudi Arabia is still, you know the main prize.
• 34:06
  Speaker 0: I remember A lot of my friends in The Gulf were disgusted when the finance minister Betel El Smotrich the Israeli Finance Minister said that Saudi Arabia Saudis should basically go and ride camels use some sort of racist language To describe them saying we're not going to give you anything You can normalise with us but don't expect anything.
• 34:25
  Speaker 0: And they are outraged by his racism.
• 34:28
  Speaker 0: I'm unfortunately desensitized to his racism because Betel El Smotrich does horrible things about various minority groups, more or less every month.
• 34:35
  Speaker 0: What was interesting is that he was forced to apologise and retracted his statement And i think it illustrates these Israelis even under this far-right government still want relations with the Saudis.
• 34:47
  Speaker 0: Saudi Arabia for them is their ultimate prize.
• 34:50
  Speaker 0: So they use the UAE to get to Saudi Arabia.
• 34:53
  Speaker 0: They don't wanna insert themselves into a very nasty Divide and then take a side.
• 34:59
  Speaker 0: They are at risk of doing so.
• 35:01
  Speaker 0: But I think that has the ability to change.
• 35:06
  Speaker 0: And, uh-and Of course it's not in the US' interest.
• 35:08
  Speaker 0: The only person...the Only state who is interested this rivalry Is Iran You know because this gives Iran the breathing room.
• 35:16
  Speaker 0: It give them the ability To rebuild..to reassert themselves.
• 35:20
  Speaker 0: It means other states Take their eye off the ball.
• 35:22
  Speaker 0: The U S takes Their Eye Off the Ball.
• 35:24
  Speaker 0: So Even if in the short term things are going to get worse, my optimistic take and granted optimism doesn't go very far on the Middle East but allow me a degree of optimism.
• 35:34
  Speaker 0: My optimistic take is that in the long run this isn't no one's interest for it continue except Iran therefore will be reined-in.
• 35:42
  Speaker 0: we might not see two sides agree everything share regional vision what I call cooperative coexistence.
• 35:54
  Speaker 1: Rob, thank you very much both for the conversation and for ending on an up note.
• 36:01
  Speaker 1: I'm not sure if it's optimistic or hopeful but it is an upnote and we certainly need more of those.
• 36:05
  Speaker 1: this conversation has to continue sometime sooner rather than later.
• 36:10
  Speaker 1: Thank You again!
• 36:24
  Speaker 1: Remember, tell us what you think at telbergfoundation.org.