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05 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Book five. Now, therefore, let us direct our attention to justice and
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injustice, and consider with what kind of actions they are conversant, what kind
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of medium justice is, and of what things the just is the medium.
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But let our survey be made according to the same method as the preceding discussions.
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We see therefore that all men are willing to call that kind of habit
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justice, through which we practice just things, or are inclined to the works
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of justice, and through which we act justly and wish what is just.
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And after the same manner injustice is that habit through which men act unjustly and
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wish what is unjust. Hence, these things must first be adumbraided by us,
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since there is not the same mode of subsistence in the sciences, in
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powers and inhabits. For there is the same power, indeed, and the
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same science of contraries, but there is not the same habit of contraries.
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Thus, for instance, contrary operations are not performed by health, but those
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only which are salubrious. For we say that a man walks in a healthy
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manner when he walks in such a way as a healthy man walks frequently.
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Therefore, a contrary habit is known from a contrary habit, But frequently habits
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are known from their subjects. For if a good habit of body is apparent,
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a bad habit of body will also be apparent. And from things which
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produce a good habit of body, this good habit will be known, and
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from this good habit its producing causes will be known. For if a good
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habit of body is a density of the flesh, a bad habit of body
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will necessarily be a rarity of the flesh, and that which produces a good
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habit of body will be productive of density in the flesh. It follows,
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however, for the most part, that if one contrary is predicated multifariously,
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the other also will be multifariously predicated, as if the just, so likewise
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the unjust, But justice and injustice are predicated multifariously. Though through the proximity
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of their homonymy this is latent, nor is it more apparent, as is
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the case in those things which are remote, for the difference according to idea
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or form is great. Thus, for instance, clavis is predicated homonymously,
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for it signifies both that part which is under the neck of animals and that
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by which gates are shut viz. A key. We must consider therefore,
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in how many ways an unjust man is denominated. But it appears that he
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is an unjust man who acts illegally, and he who takes to himself more
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of external goods than he ought, or who is avaricious, and also he
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who is unequal i e. Who takes to himself less of evils than is
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equitable, So that it is evident that he will be a just man who
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acts legally, and he who is equal or equitable. The just therefore will
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be both the legal and the equal, but the unjust will be the illegal
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and the unequal. Since, however the unjust man is avaricious, he will
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be conversant with good, yet not with every kind of good, but with
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that in which there is prosperous and adverse fortune, and which is indeed simply
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always good, but to a certain person not always. But men pray for
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and pursue this good, though they ought not. For they should pray indeed
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that things which are simply good, such as riches, may also be good
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to them. But they should choose such things as are good to their possessor,
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such as virtue and wisdom. The unjust man however, does not always
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choose that which is more. But in things which are simply evil, he
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chooses the less. But because the less evil appears in a certain respect to
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be good, and of what is good, there is a desire of possessing
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more of it than is equitable. On this account, the unjust man appears
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to be avaricious. He is also unequal, and acts illegally. For this
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very thing, the acting illegally or inequality, comprehends all injustice, and is
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common to all injustice. Since, however, he who acts illegally is unjust,
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but he who acts legally is just. It is evident that everything which
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is legal is in a certain respect just. For the things which are defined
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by the legislative science are legal, and we say that each of these is
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just. But the laws speak about everything looking either to that which is advantageous
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in common to all men, or to the best of men, or to
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those in authority, and this either according to virtue or some other mode.
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Hence, after one manner, we call those things just which are capable of
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producing and preserving felicity, and the parts of it by political communion. The
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law, however, ordains that the works of the brave man should be done,
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such as that a soldier shall not leave his rank, nor fly from
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the enemy, nor throw away his arms. And likewise that the works of
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the tempered man shall be done, such as not to commit adultery, nor
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behave with insolent wantonness, and also those of the mild man, such as
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not to strike another person, nor to fame any one. And the law
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or deigns similarly with respect to the other virtues and vices, partly commanding and
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partly forbidding the law indeed doing this rightly which is rightly framed, but that
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which is rashly framed erroneously. This justice, therefore, i e. Legal
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justice is indeed a perfect virtue, yet not simply but with reference to another
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thing. And on this account justice frequently appears to be the best of the
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virtues. Nor is either the evening or the morning star so admirable. We
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likewise say proverbially, every virtue is comprehended in justice. And legal justice is
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especially a perfect virtue because it is the use of perfect virtue. But it
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is perfect because he who possesses it is also able to employ virtue towards another
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person, and not only towards himself. For many persons are indeed able to
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employ virtue in their own affairs, but not in the affairs of others.
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And on this account it appears to have been well said by Bias that dominion
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shows the man, for he who governs has relation to another person, and
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is now conversant with the communion of life. For the very same reason,
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also, justice alone, of all the virtues, appears to be a foreign
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good because it has reference to another person, since it performs what is advantageous
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to another, viz. Either to a ruler or to the community at large.
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He therefore is the worst of characters, who acts deprivdly both towards himself
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and towards his friends. But he is the best of men, not who
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acts virtuously towards himself, but towards another person, for this is a difficult
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work. This justice, therefore, is not a part of virtue, but
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is universal virtue. Nor is the injustice, which is contrary to it,
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a part of vice, but universal vice. What the difference, however,
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is, between virtue and this justice, is evident from what has already been
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said, For it is indeed the same with it, but not essentially,
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for so far indeed as it has reference to another person, it is justice.
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But so far as it is habit of a certain description, it is
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simply virtue. Chapter two. We investigate, however, that justice which is
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a part of virtue, for there is, as we say so, justice,
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And in a similar manner we investigate the injustice, which is a part
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of face. But that there is such a justice is indicated by this that
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he who energizes, according to other depravities, acts unjustly, indeed, but
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does not assume to himself more of external good than he ought, such for
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instance, as the man who throws away his shield through timidity, or he
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who speaks ill of another firm asperity, or who does not give pecuniary assistance
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to another through illiberality. But when he assumes to himself more than he ought,
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he frequently is not vicious according to any one of such faces, nor
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yet according to all devices, but according to a certain depravity, for we
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blame him, and for injustice. There is therefore a certain other injustice,
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as being a certain part of universal injustice, and a certain something unjust,
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which is a art of the whole of the unjust, that is contrary to
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law. Farther Still, if one person indeed should commit adultery for the sake
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of gain, and should receive money for so doing, but another should give
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money and sustain an injury in his property by doing it in consequence of being
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under the influence of strong desire, the latter, indeed will rather appear to
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be intemperate than one who assumes to himself more than he ought. But the
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former will be unjust, but not intemperate, and it is evident that he
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will not because he acts with a view to gain. Again, in all
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other unjust deeds, there is always a reference to a certain depravity. Thus,
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if a man commits adultery, the reference is to intemperance. If he
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abandons his post in battle, the reference is to timidity. But if he
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strikes another person to anger, if however, he obtains money by it,
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the reference is to no other depravity than to injustice. Hence, it is
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evident that there is a certain other injustice which ranks as a part besides universal
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injustice, and which is synonymous with it, because the definition of each is
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in the same genus, for both possess their power in a reference to another
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person. But the injustice which ranks as a part is conversant with honor,
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or riches, or safety, or if all these could be comprehended in one
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name, it is conversant with them, and this on account of the pleasure
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which results from gain. Universal injustice, however, is conversant with all such
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things as a worthy man is conversant with in the exercise of justice. That
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there are many kinds of justice, therefore, and that there is a certain
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justice which is different from universal virtue is evident. What it is, however,
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and what kind of thing it is must be explained. The unjust,
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therefore, has been distinguished by us into the illegal and the unequal, and
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the just into the legal and the equal. But the prior injustice of which
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we have spoken subsists according to the illegal, Since, however, the illegal
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and the unequal are not the same, but different as a part with reference
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to a whole. For everything unequal is illegal, but not everything which is
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illegal is unequal. Hence, the unjust and injustice are not the same with
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these, but different from them in the same manner as parts and wholes.
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For this injustice is a part of the whole of injustice, And in a
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similar manner, this justice is a part of the whole of justice. We
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must therefore speak concerning the justice and injustice which ranks as parts, and after
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the same manner, concerning the partially just and unjust, the justice therefore and
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injustice, which are arranged according to universal virtue, and of which the former
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is the use of the whole of virtue, and the latter of the whole
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of vice. With reference to another person, we shall admit it is likewise
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evident how the just and the unjust, which are arranged conformably to these are
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to be distinguished. For nearly most of those things which are legal are ordained
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from universal virtue. For the law orders men to live conformably to every virtue,
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and forbids them from acting conformably to any one of the vices. But
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the efficient causes of the whole of virtue are those legal actions which are established
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by the laws for the purposes of public discipline. Concerning the discipline, however,
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of an individual, according to which he is simply a good man,
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whether it pertains to the political or another science, will be determined hereafter.
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For perhaps it is not the same thing to be a good man and a
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good citizen. But there is one species of the justice which subsists according to
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a part and of the just pertaining to it, and which consists in the
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distributions either of honor, or riches, or such other things as may be
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divided among those who partake of the same polity. For in these it is
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possible that one person may share unequally and equally with another. But another species
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of justice is that which possesses a corrective power in contracts. Of this however,
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there are two parts four of contracts. Some are voluntary, but others
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are involuntary. The voluntary, indeed, are buying, selling, putting out
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money at interest, serteeship, lending anything on hire, pledging, and hiring
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a slave or an artificer. But these contracts are said to be voluntary because
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the principle of them is voluntary. And of involuntary contracts some are clandestine,
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such as theft, adultery, witchcraft, prostitution, deceiving the slave of another
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person, insidious murder, and bearing false witness. But the violent are such
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as blows, bonds, death, plunder, mutilation, slander, and contumily.
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Chapter three thinks, however, the unjust man is unequal, and also
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the unjust belongs to the unequal it is evident that there is a certain medium
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of the unequal. But this is the equal. For in whatever action there
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is the more and the less, there is also the equal. If therefore
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the unjust is unequal, the just will be equal, which, indeed,
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without any reasoning process, is manifest to all men. But since the equal
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is a medium, the just will be a certain medium. The equal,
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however, is in two things at least. It is necessary therefore that the
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just, which is a medium and equal, should be referred to a certain
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thing and to certain things. And so far indeed, as it is a
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medium, it is referred to certain things. But these are the more and
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the less. And so far as it is equal, it is referred to
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two things. But so far as it is the just, it is referred
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to certain things. Hence, it is necessar that the just should be in
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four things at least, for the persons to whom the just pertains are too,
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and the things in which it consists are two. And there will be
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the same equality between the persons to whom justice pertains and the things in which
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it consists. For as is the relation of the former to each other,
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such also is that of the latter. For if the persons are not equal,
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they will not have equal things. Battles, however, and accusations hence
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originate when either equal persons do not obtain equal things, or those that are
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not equal have an equal distribution of things. This also is evident from distribution
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according to dessert. For all men acknowledge that the just in distribution should be
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made according to a certain dessert. All men, however, they not say
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that there is the same dessert. But democratic men indeed say that dessert is
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liberty. And of the oligarchists, some say that it is wealth, but
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others that it is nobility. But the aristocrats say that it is virtue.
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The just therefore is something analogous. For the analogous is not only the peculiarity
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of manatic number or number consisting of units, but of number universally. For
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analogy or proportion is equality of ratio an consists in four things at least that
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disjunct proportion therefore consists in four terms is evident. And this is also the
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case with continued proportion. For this uses one thing as two things, as
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for instance, as A is to B, so is B to C.
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Hence B is twice assumed, so that if B is placed twice, the
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analogous things will be four. But the just also consists in four things at
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least, and the reason is the same. For the persons to whom justice
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is distributed and the things which are distributed, are similarly divided. As the
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term A therefore is to B, so will C b to D. And
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therefore, alternately, as A is to C, so is B to D.
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Hence the whole will be compared with the whole which the distribution conjoins.
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And if they are thus compounded, they will be justly conjoined. The conjunction
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therefore of the term A with C and of B with D forms the justice
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which is in distribution, and the just is the medium of that which is
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foreign from the analogous, for the analogous is a medium, and the just
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is analogous. Mathematicians, however, call such an analogy or proportion as this
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geometrical, For in geometrical proportion, it happens that the whole is to the
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whole, as all the parts to all. But this proportion is not continued,
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for the same thing is not assumed as the person to whom a distribution
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is made, and as the thing distributed. This justice therefore consists in proportion.
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But the unjust is foreign from proportion. And hence one person has more,
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but another less than he ought, which also happens to be the case
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in actions. For he indeed who does an injury has more, but he
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who is injured has less of good than he ought. The contrary, however,
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takes place in evil, for a less evil has the relation of good
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with respect to a greater evil, for a less is more eligible than a
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greater evil. But the eligible is good, and that which is more eligible
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is a greater good. This therefore is one species of the just Chapter four.
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The other remaining species of justice is corrective, which is conversant both with
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voluntary and involuntary contracts. But the form of this justice is different from the
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former. For the justice which is distributive of common things or things of a
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public nature, always subsists according to the above mentioned proportion. For if the
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distribution is made from common property, it will be according to the same ratio
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as the things introduced have to each other. And the unjust, which is
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opposed to this justice, is foreign from proportion. The just, however,
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which is in contracts, is indeed a certain equality, and the unjust is
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inequality, yet not according to geometrical but arithmetical proportion. For it makes no
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difference whether a worthy deprives a bad man of his property, or a bad
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a worthy man, nor whether a worthy or a bad man commits adultery.
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But the law only looks to the difference of the injury, and uses the
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persons as if they were equal. Though the one indeed should injure, but
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the other should be injured, And though the one should do, but the
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other should suffer harm. Hence this injustice. Since once it is unequal,
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the judge endeavors to equalize. For when one man indeed inflicts a blow,
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but another is struck, or one man kills but another is killed, the
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suffering and the action are divided into unequal parts. But the judge, by
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the punishment which he inflicts, endeavors to produce an equality by detracting from the
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game. For in things of this kind, in short, though to some
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things name will not be appropriate, the injury is denominated gain, and the
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endurance of the injury loss. But when the suffering is measured, the one
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is called loss, but the other gain. Hence, of the more and
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the less, the equal is the medium. With respect to loss and gain,
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however, the one is more, but the other less contrarily, for
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the more of good, but the less of evil, is gain, and
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the contrary is loss, of which the equal is the medium, which we
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say is the just. Hence, the justice, which is corrective, will
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be the medium of loss and gain. Hence, too, when men contend
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with each other about legal affairs, they fly to the judge. But to
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go to a judge is to go to justice. For a judge is nothing
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else than, as it were, animated justice. They also search for judge
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who is a medium, and some persons call judges mediators, as if they
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should obtain justice if they obtain to the medium. The just, therefore is
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a certain medium, since the judge is also. But the judge equalizes,
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and as if a line were cut into unequal parts, he takes away from
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the greater section that by which it exceeds the half, and adds it to
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the less section. When, however, the whole is divided into two equal
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parts, then men say they have what is their own when they obtain the
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equal. But the equal is the middle of the greater and the less,
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according to arithmetical proportion. Hence, also the just bracket decay can close bracket
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is denominated because it is divided into two equal parts bracket O d ditcha eston
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close bracket, just as if it should be said to be de chayan,
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and the judge is called die castes, as if he were die Chastes,
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or one who divides a thing into two equal parts. For if when two
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things are equal, that which is taken from the one is added to the
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other, the latter will exceed what the former then becomes by two such parts.
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For if what is taken away from one of the equal things were not
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added to the other, the one would exceed the other by one such part.
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Only the thing therefore to which something is added exceeds the medium by one
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part. And the medium also exceeds by one part that from which something is
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taken away. By this, therefore we may know what ought to be taken
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away from him who has more, and what ought to be added to him
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who has less. For it is necessary to add to him who has less
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that by which the medium exceeds, but to take away from the greatest that
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by which the medium is succeeded. Let there be three lines AA, B,
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B, C C, equal to each other. From AA, let
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AE be taken and added to C C, and let that part be c
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D. Hence the whole line D c C will exceed the line a E
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by the line c D and the line f C, and therefore it will
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exceed the line b B by the line c D. This also takes place
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in other arts, for they would be subverted unless that which suffers suffers the
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same in quantity and quality as that which acts. But these appellations loss and
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gain are derived from voluntary contracts. For when a man obtains more than his
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own, he is said to gain, but when he has less than what
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he had at first, he is said to have lost, as in buying
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and selling, and such other things as the law permits. When however,
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men have neither more nor less, but give as much as they receive,
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they are said to have their own, and neither to lose nor gain.
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Hence, the just is the medium of a certain gain and loss in things
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which are not voluntary, so that each of those who form a contract may
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have as much afterwards as before. Chapter five. To some persons, however,
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retaliation appears to be simply just, and this also was the opinion of
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the Pythagoreans, for they to find the just to be simply retaliation. But
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retaliation is neither adapted to distributive nor to corrective justice. Though rhadamanthus in Eschylus,
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appears to assert that justice is this quote, and that the punishment will
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be equitable when a man suffers the same thing as he has done. Close
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quote, for retaliation is frequently discordant. Thus, for instance, if a
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magistrate should strike a man, it is not proper that the man should strike
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him in return. And if anyone strikes a magistrate, he ought not only
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to be struck, but to be punished more severely. Again, there is
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a great difference between the voluntary and the involuntary. But commercial intercourse is preserved
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by a justice of this kind if the retaliation is made according to proportion and
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not according to equality. For by analogous retaliation, the union of a city
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becomes permanent. For men either endeavor to return evil for evil, for it
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appears to be slavery if they cannot retaliate, or they wish, when they
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benefit others, to be themselves benefited in return. Since if this does not
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take place, there is no compensation by which the permanent union of society is
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affected. Hence the Temple of the Graces is built in a conspicuts part of
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the city for the purpose of producing remuneration. For this is the peculiarity of
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grace or favor. For it is requisite to return a favor to him who
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has conferred one, and he again should begin to confer a favor. But
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a conjunction according to a diameter produces the retribution which is according to analogy.
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Thus, for instance, let the builder of a house be a a shoemaker
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b, the house c and the shoe d. It is necessary therefore that
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the builder of the house should receive from the shoemaker his work and give his
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work to him in return. Hence, if the first equality is that which
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is according to analogy, and afterwards a retaliation is made, it will be
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that which we have mentioned. But if not, there will neither be equality,
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nor will the bond of society remain. For nothing hinders but that the
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work of the one may be more excellent than the work of the other.
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It is necessary therefore that these should be equalized. But this also takes place
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in the other arts, for they would be subverted unless that which is passive
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suffered the same in quantity and quality as the agent effects. For the communion
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of society is not produced from two physicians, but from a physician and a
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husbandman, and in short, from different and not from equal characters. But
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it is necessary that these should be equalized. Hence, it is requisite that
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all things should be capable of being compared with each other, of which there
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is an exchange. And for this purpose money was adopted and becomes in a
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certain respect a measure, for it measures all things, so that it likewise
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measures excess and defect, and therefore determines how many shoes are equal to a
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house or to nutriment. It is necessary therefore that such as the ratio is
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of the builder of a house to a shoemaker, such should be the ratio
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of the number of shoes to a house or to nutriment. For if this
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does not take place, there will neither be exchanged nor communion, and it
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will not take place unless the things compared are in a certain respect equal.
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Hence, it is necessary, as has been before observed, that all things
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should be measured by one certain thing, And this is in reality indigence,
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which connects all things. For if mankind were not in want of anything,
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or if they were not similarly in want, either there would be no exchange
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or not the same. But money was adopted by compact as a subsidiary exchange
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for indigence, and on this account money was called bracket no misma close bracket,
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because it is not established by nature but by law, and it is
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in our power to change it and render it useless. Retaliation, therefore,
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will then take place when there is an equalization. Hence, as the husbandman
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is to the shoemaker, so is the work of the shoemaker to the work
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of the husbandman. But it is necessary to bring them to the form of
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proportion when an exchange takes place, for without this one of the extremes will
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have both the excesses. When, however, each person has his own.
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They will thus be equal and communicate with each other, because this equality can
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be produced among them. Let the husbandman be a the nutriment c and the
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work of the shoemaker equal to the nutriment be d. But without this retaliation
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there would be no communion of society. That indigence, however, connects as
29:29
being one certain thing is evident because when men are not in want of each
29:33
other, either both or one of them. No exchange takes place as it
29:37
does when one is in want of what the other possesses, as for instance,
29:41
wine, for which an exportation of corn is granted. It is necessary
29:45
therefore that this should be equalized in order to future exchange. However, if
29:52
nothing should at present be wanted, that it may be obtained when it is
29:56
wanted, money becomes as it were asserted to us. For it is requisite
30:02
that he who brings money should take what he wants in exchange for it.
30:06
Money therefore also suffers this very same thing, for it does not always possess
30:11
an equal power, but at the same time it is more permanent. Hence,
30:15
it is necessary that all things should be estimated, for thus there will
30:18
always be an exchange, and if there is an exchange, there will be
30:22
a communion. Money therefore, as a measure, having made things commensurate,
30:26
equalizes them, for there would be no communion without exchange, nor exchange without
30:33
equality, nor equality without commensuration. In reality, therefore, it is impossible
30:38
that things which so much differ should become commensurate. But for the purposes of
30:44
indigence, this is sufficiently possible. Hence it is necessary there should be one
30:48
certain thing as a measure, and this from assumption. Hence it is called
30:53
money. For this causes all things to be commensurate, since all things are
30:59
measured by money. Let a house be a ten mina B and a bed
31:03
c. A therefore will be the half of B. If the house is
31:07
worth five mina or is equal to the value of five mina. But let
31:12
the bed c be it the tenth part of B. It is evident therefore
31:18
how many beds are equal in value to the house fiz. Five. That
31:22
such, however, was the exchange before there was money is manifest, for
31:26
it makes no difference whether five beds or as much as the worth of five
31:30
beds are given for the house. Thus, therefore we have shown what the
31:34
unjust, and also what the just is. But these things being determined,
31:40
it is evident that a just action is a medium between doing and receiving an
31:44
injury, for the former is to have more, but the latter less than
31:48
is just. Justice, however, is a medium not after the same manner
31:52
with the former virtues, but because it pertains to a medium between the more
31:56
and the less. But injustice pertains to extremes, and justice indeed is that
32:01
according to which a just man is said to act justly from deliberate choice,
32:06
and to distribute justice, both to himself in making a compact with another person,
32:10
and to another who makes a compact with another, Yet not so as
32:15
to attribute more of what is eligible to himself and less to his neighbor,
32:19
and the contrary of that which is hurtful, but so as to distribute the
32:22
equal to himself and others, according to analogy, and he adopts the same
32:28
mode of conduct towards another person who forms a compact with another. Injustice,
32:32
on the contrary, is not according to which an unjust man is said to
32:37
act unjustly from deliberate choice, and to distribute injustice both to himself and others.
32:43
But this is the excess and deficiency of that which is beneficial or hurtful,
32:47
contrary to the analogous. Hence, injustice is excess and deficiency, because
32:53
it pertains to excess and deficiency to the unjust man himself. Indeed, it
33:00
is an excess of that which is simply beneficial, but a deficiency of that
33:05
which is hurtful. But to others it distributes in a manner wholly similar,
33:08
and in whatever way the distribution may happen to be made, it is contrary
33:13
to the analogous of an unjust action. However, the less extreme is to
33:19
be injured, and the greater to injure. After this manner, therefore,
33:22
we have discussed justice and injustice, and have shown what is the nature of
33:27
each. And similarly we have discussed universally the just and the unjust. Chapter
33:34
six. Since, however, it is possible that he who acts unjustly may
33:38
not yet be unjust. For what kind of iniqueous deeds will a man be
33:43
unjust? According to each species of injustice? For instance, will it be
33:47
as a thief, or as an adulterer, or as a robber? Or
33:52
thus, indeed, will the difficulty still remain? For a man may have
33:55
connection with a woman, knowing who she is, yet not from a principle
34:00
of deliberate choice, but from passion. Hence, in this case he acts
34:05
unjustly but is not unjust, as neither is a thief though he may have
34:09
committed theft, nor an adulterer though he may have committed adultery, and in
34:15
a similar manner in other things, in what manner therefore, retaliation subsists with
34:21
reference to justice? Has been shown by us before. It is necessary,
34:24
however, not to be ignorant that what we at present investigate is the simply
34:30
just and the politically just. But this justice takes place among men connected together
34:36
in society, and these liberal and equal men, either according to analogy or
34:40
according to number, with a view to a sufficiency of the necessaries of life.
34:46
Hence, those among whom this is not found have no political justice towards
34:51
each other, but a certain justice, and which subsists according to a similitude
34:57
to political justice. For there is justice among those with whom there is also
35:01
law, but there is law among those with whom there is injustice. For
35:07
justice is the judgment of the just and the unjust. But with those with
35:10
whom there is injustice, there is also acting unjustly. But with all those
35:15
with whom there is acting unjustly, there is not injustice. But injustice consists
35:21
in a man distributing to himself more of what is simply good and less of
35:24
what is simply evil than he ought. Hence, we do not suffer a
35:28
man to govern, but to reason, because he does this to himself,
35:31
i e. Distributes to himself more of what is good and less of what
35:36
is evil and becomes a tyrant. He, however, who governs, is
35:39
the guardian of justice. But if of justice, he is also the guardian
35:45
of the equal. But since if he is a just man, it does
35:47
not appear that he possesses more of external good than others, For he does
35:52
not distribute more of what is simply good to himself unless it belongs to him
35:55
by analogy. Hence he distributes the simply good to another. And on this
36:00
account it is said that justice is a foreign good, as we have before
36:05
observed, a certain reward therefore must be given to him. But this is
36:09
honor and a gift. Those persons, however, to whom these are not
36:14
sufficient to become tyrants. But despotic and paternal justice, or the justice of
36:19
a master towards his servants, and of a father towards his children, are
36:22
not the same with this, but similar to it. For there is no
36:25
injustice simply of a man towards his own property, but a possession or a
36:30
slave, and a child, while he is little and not yet separated from
36:35
his parents, are as it were, a part of the man. And
36:37
no one deliberately chooses to injure himself. Hence there is no injustice of a
36:43
man towards himself, and consequently, neither is their injustice nor political justice.
36:50
For justice is conformable to law, and subsists among those with whom law is
36:54
naturally adapted to exist. But these are persons with whom there is an equality
36:59
of governing and being governed. Hence, there is more of political justice between
37:04
a man and his wife than between a father and his children, or a
37:07
master and his servants. For this latter is economical justice. But this is
37:12
different from political justice. Chapter seven. With respect however, to political justice,
37:20
one kind is natural, but the other legal, And the natural,
37:22
indeed is that which has everywhere the same power. And this is not because
37:28
it appears or does not appear to be justice. But the legal is that
37:31
respecting which from the first it is of no consequence whether it is established in
37:36
this or in that way. But when it is established is of consequence,
37:40
such for instance, as that captives shall be redeemed for a minor, or
37:45
that a goat shall be sacrificed, and not two sheep. And farther still,
37:51
such laws as are promulgated about particulars, such as that sacrifices shall be
37:55
offered, to Brasidas, and whatever is established by a public decrees to some
38:00
persons. However, all political justice appears to be of this kind, because
38:06
that which has a natural subsistence is not mutable, and everywhere possesses the same
38:10
power, just as fire burns, both here and in persia. But just
38:15
things are seen to be mutable. This, however, is not entirely,
38:20
but only partially the case, though perhaps with the gods it is by no
38:23
means to be admitted that justice is mutable. But with us there is something
38:29
which is naturally mutable, though not everything. But at the same time,
38:34
justice is partly from nature and partly not what. However, the justice is
38:38
which is from nature, is evident from contingencies in things which have a various
38:43
subsistence, and also what the justice is, which is not from nature but
38:47
is legal and established by compact. Since both are similarly mutable, the same
38:53
distinction likewise will be adapted to other things. For the right hand is natural,
39:00
more excellent, i e. Is more adapted to motion than the left,
39:04
though it is possible that some persons may be ambidexter. The justice,
39:08
however, which is from compact and utility, resembles measures for the measures of
39:15
wine and corn are not everywhere equal, but with those who buy wine and
39:19
corn they are greater, and with those who sell them less. In a
39:22
similar manner, justice, which is not natural but human, is not everywhere
39:28
the same, since neither are polities, but everywhere one polity alone is conformable
39:34
to nature, viz. That which is the most excellent. Everything just,
39:37
however, and everything legal are as universals two particulars. For actions are many,
39:44
but each of them is one thing. For it is a universal,
39:47
but an unjust action, and the unjust differ, and also a just action,
39:53
and the just. For the unjust subsists either by nature or i order.
40:00
But the very same thing, which, when done is an unjust action,
40:05
is not so before it is done, but is unjust, and in
40:08
a similar manner with respect to a just action. But that which is common
40:14
is rather called a deed justly done, but the correction of an unjust deed
40:19
a just deed. With respect to each of these, however, what the
40:22
quality and number of their species are, and what the particulars are with which
40:27
they are conversant, we shall hereafter consider Chapter eight. Since therefore things just
40:35
and unjust are those which we have enumerated. A man then indeed does an
40:39
injury or acts justly when he thus acts voluntarily. But when involuntarily he neither
40:45
does an injury nor acts justly, except from accident. For it happens that
40:51
the things which he does are either just or unjust, but indeed unjustly done.
40:57
And a just action are defined by the voluntary and the involuntary. For
41:02
when an action is voluntary, it is blamed, but at the same time
41:07
it is then a deed unjustly done. Hence, there will be something unjust
41:12
which is not yet a deed unjustly done, unless the voluntary is added to
41:16
it. But I call a voluntary indeed, as has been before observed,
41:22
that which a man does of things which it is in his power to do
41:25
knowingly and not ignorantly, viz. Not being ignorant of the circumstances of the
41:31
action, as for instance, who it is he strikes, and with what
41:37
he strikes, and on what account, and when he does this, either
41:43
from accident nor by compulsion, as would be the case if someone taking his
41:47
hand should strike another person with it, for he would then not strike willingly,
41:53
because it was not in his power to avoid giving the blow. It
41:58
may happen, however, that he who is struck is a father, But
42:00
he who strikes him may merely know that he is a man, or some
42:05
one of those who are present, but may be ignorant that it is his
42:08
father. A similar distinction also must be made in that for the sake of
42:13
which a thing is done, and concerning the whole action. Hence, that
42:16
which is not known, or which is known indeed, but is not in
42:20
the power of him who acts, or which he is compelled to do,
42:23
is done involuntarily. For we both do and suffer many things which have a
42:29
natural subsistence, knowingly no one of which is either voluntary or involuntary, such
42:34
as to grow old or to die. That which is accidental, however,
42:38
similarly takes place in things unjust and just. For if a man returns a
42:44
deposit unwillingly and from fear, he cannot be said either to perform a just
42:47
deed or to act justly, except from accident. In a similar manner,
42:52
he who, from compulsion and unwillingly does not return a deposit must be said
42:58
to be unjust and to do an unjust deed from accident. But of voluntary
43:04
actions, some indeed we perform with previous choice, and others without previous choice.
43:08
With previous choice such as have been the subjects of previous deliberation, but
43:14
without it, such as have not been deliberated on previously. Since therefore,
43:19
there are three kinds of harm in social communion. Those which are accompanied with
43:22
ignorance are errors. When a man neither apprehends who the person that is injured
43:28
is, nor the mode, nor the instrument, nor that for the sake
43:31
of which the harm is done. For in this case, he will think
43:36
either that he has not struck the person, or not with this instrument,
43:39
or not this person, or not on this account. But something else happened
43:45
different from what he expected. Thus, one man may strike another not for
43:49
the purpose of wounding, but of stimulating him, and in so doing may
43:52
accidentally wound him. Or he may not strike the person whom he intended to
43:57
strike, or not in the way he intended. When therefore, harm is
44:01
done unintentionally, it is a misfortune. But when it is done not unintentionally
44:07
yet without vice, it is an error. For a man then errs when
44:12
the principle of the cause is in himself. But he is unfortunate when the
44:15
principle is external to him. When, however, harm is done knowingly but
44:21
without previous deliberation, it is a deed unjustly done, as, for instance,
44:27
whatever happens to men through anger or other passions which are necessary or natural.
44:31
For those who injure others and err through the influence of these passions act
44:37
indeed unjustly, and their deeds are unjustly done. Nevertheless, they are not
44:42
yet unjust on account of these actions, nor deprived, for the harm which
44:45
they did was not through depravity. But when a man injures another from deliberate
44:51
choice, he is unjust and deprived. Hence, those deeds which are the
44:54
effect of anger are well judged not to be the result of previous design,
44:59
For the principle of action is not in him who is angry, but in
45:02
him who excited his anger. Again, when one man hurts another from anger,
45:07
there is no controversy about the deed as to its having been dead,
45:10
but about the justice of it, for anger is excited on account of apparent
45:15
injustice. For here there is no controversy about the existence of the thing,
45:22
as there is in contracts in which it is necessary that one of the contractors
45:25
should be a depraved character, unless his conduct is the effect of oblivion,
45:30
but acknowledging the fact they controvert the justice of it. He, however,
45:36
who hurts another person deliberately, is not ignorant of the deed. Hence the
45:39
one of these thinks he is injured, but the other thinks he is not.
45:44
But he who does harm to another person from deliberate choice acts unjustly.
45:49
And he who injures another according to those deeds which are done unjustly, is
45:52
unjust when he acts contrary to proportion or to the equal in a similar manner.
45:59
All so, he is just when he acts justly from previous choice,
46:04
but he acts justly if he only acts willingly. Of involuntary actions, however,
46:08
some deserve to be pardoned, but others do not. For such involuntary
46:14
errors as are not only committed ignorantly but also through ignorance, deserve to be
46:19
pardoned. But such as are not committed through ignorance but ignorantly yet from passion,
46:24
neither natural nor human, do not deserve to be pardoned. Chapter nine.
46:31
It may, however, be doubted whether a distinction has been sufficiently made
46:37
by us between being injured and injuring in the first place. Indeed, if
46:42
the thing is as Euripides asserts it to be, when he absurdly says,
46:46
quote to speak briefly, I may kill my mother, both of us being
46:52
willing, or I being unwilling and she willing close quote For is it true
46:58
or not that a person can be willingly injured? Or is every one unwillingly
47:02
injured in the same manner as every one who does an injury? Does it
47:07
willingly? Or do some person suffer an injury voluntarily and others involuntarily? And
47:15
a similar inquiry may also be made with respect to obtaining justice, For to
47:20
act justly is wholly a voluntary thing. Hence, the being injured and obtaining
47:25
justice are deservedly opposed in a similar manner to each other, so that they
47:30
are either voluntary or involuntary. It may, however, appear to be absurd
47:37
that in obtaining justice the whole should be voluntary, For some persons obtain justice
47:42
unwillingly, And this also may be doubted whether every one who suffers something unjust
47:47
is injured, or whether, as it is in acting so, it is
47:52
in suffering. For it is possible in both these to obtain what is just
47:57
from accident. And it is evident that the like also may take place in
48:01
things unjust, For it is not the same thing to do unjust things and
48:07
to do an injury, nor is it the same thing to suffer unjust things
48:10
and to be injured. The like also takes place in acting justly and obtaining
48:15
justice, For it is impossible to be injured unless there is some one who
48:20
does the injury, or to obtain justice unless there is some one who acts
48:24
justly. But if to do an injury is simply to hurt some one willingly,
48:29
and to hurt willingly is to do so knowing the person who is hurt,
48:32
and the instrument and the manner in which he is hurt. But the
48:37
intemperate man willingly hurts himself. If this be the case, he will be
48:40
voluntarily injured, and it will be possible for a man to injure himself.
48:45
This, however, is also one of the things which are dubious whether it
48:51
is possible for a man to injure himself. Farther still, a man may
48:54
voluntarily, through intemperance, be injured by another person, so that it will
49:00
be possible for a man to be injured voluntarily, or shall we say that
49:05
the definition which we have given of doing an injury viz. That it is
49:08
to hurt some one voluntarily, is not right. But we must add the
49:14
words to hurt, knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument,
49:17
and the manner in which he is hurt contrary to his will. A man
49:22
therefore may be hurt and suffer unjust things willingly. But no one is willingly
49:28
injured. For no one wishes to be injured, not even the intemperate man.
49:32
But he acts contrary to his will. For neither does anyone wish for
49:37
that which he does not fancy to be good. But the intemperate man does
49:42
that which he does not think ought to be done. But he who gives
49:45
what is his own. As Homer says, Glaucus gave to Diomede quote for
49:51
Diomed's brass arms of mean device, for which nine Oxen paid a vulgar price.
49:57
He gave his own of gold, divinely wrong, a hundred beeves,
50:01
the shining purchase bought close. Quote is not injured, for it is in
50:07
his power to give or not to give. But to be injured is not
50:12
in his power. But it is necessary that the person should exist by whom
50:16
the injury is done concerning the being injured. Therefore, it is evident that
50:22
it is not voluntary. Of those things, however, which we propose to
50:25
discuss, two particulars remain to be explained, whether he does an injury who
50:30
distributes to another person more than he deserves, or the person who receives the
50:35
distribution. For if what we before observed is possible, and he who distributes,
50:40
but not he who possesses more, does the injury. If any one
50:45
distributes to another more than to himself knowingly and willingly, he will himself injure
50:50
himself, which modest men appear to do. For a worthy man distributes less
50:54
to himself than to others. Or shall we say that neither is this thing?
50:59
So? For he who distributes less to himself than to others of certain
51:04
good things will vindicate to himself more of some other good if it should so
51:08
happen, as for instance, of renown or of that which is simply beautiful
51:14
in conduct. Again, the dote is also dissolved from the definition of doing
51:19
an injury, for he who does it suffers nothing contrary to his will.
51:23
Hence he is not on this account injured. But even admitting that he is,
51:28
he is only hurt. It is also evident that he who distributes more
51:31
than the receiver deserves does an injury, but not the receiver. For it
51:37
is not the person in whom injustice is inherent who does the injury, but
51:40
he to whom to do this is voluntary. But this is the man from
51:45
whom the principle of the action proceeds, which is in the distributor, but
51:50
not in the receiver. Farther still, since to act is predicated multifariously in
51:55
things inanimate, in a certain respect, kill the band as well as the
52:00
servant by the command of his master. These indeed do not act injuriously,
52:04
but they do unjust things. Again, if a man, being indeed ignorant,
52:08
judges, he does not do an injury according to the legally just,
52:13
nor is his judgment unjust. Yet in a certain respect it is unjust,
52:17
for the legally just differs from the first justice, or that which has a
52:22
natural subsistence. But if he should judge unjustly, knowingly, he will vindicate
52:29
to himself more, either of favor or of vengeance. As therefore, if
52:34
some one should partake of a deed unjustly done. Thus, Also, he
52:37
who, on account of these things, judges unjustly, will possess more.
52:43
For in those things, he who judges a field to another person receives in
52:46
return not a field but money. Men, however, are of opinion that
52:52
it is in their power to do an injury, and that on this account
52:54
it is easy to be just. But it is not so for connection with
53:00
the wife of a neighbor. To strike another person, and to give money
53:05
with the hand are things easy and in the power of those who do them.
53:08
But to do these things with a certain disposition of mind is neither easy,
53:13
nor in the power of those who do them. In a similar manner.
53:16
Also, the multitude fancy that there is no portion of wisdom in knowing
53:21
what is just and what is unjust, because it is not difficult to understand
53:24
those things about which the laws speak. These things, however, are not
53:30
just except from accident. But they are then just when they are performed after
53:35
a certain manner and distributed after a certain manner. But this is a greater
53:39
work than to know things that are salubrious. For there indeed, it is
53:45
easy to know honey and wine and hellebore, and burning and cutting. But
53:49
how it is necessary to distribute these in order to produce health, and to
53:53
whom and when they are to be distributed, is as great a work as
53:58
to be a physician. On this very account, the multitude fancy that it
54:01
is no less the province of a just man than of an unjust man to
54:06
do an injury, because the just man is no less, but is even
54:09
more able to do each of these than the unjust man. For according to
54:15
them, a just man may have connection with the wife of another man,
54:19
and may strike another person. And a brave man may throw away his shield
54:22
and be taking himself to flight, may run where he pleases. To act
54:27
cowardly, However, and to do an injury is not merely to do these
54:30
things, except from accident, but it consists in doing them with a certain
54:36
disposition of mind, i e. With promptitude and delight. Just as to
54:40
perform the office of a physician and to restore to health does not merely consist
54:45
in cutting or not cutting, in giving or not giving medicine, but in
54:50
doing these after a certain manner. But just things subsist among those with whom
54:54
there is a participation of things which are simply good, And in these there
55:00
is also excess and defect. For to some beings, as perhaps to the
55:05
gods, justice is not a good, because in them there is no excess
55:08
or deficiency. But to others, as to men incurable and vicious, no
55:14
part of things simply good is beneficial, but all of them are noxious,
55:17
and to others they are useful to a certain extent. And on this account
55:22
justice is a human good. Chapter ten. It now follows that we should
55:29
speak concerning equity and the equitable, and show how equity indeed subsists with reference
55:35
to justice, and the equitable with reference to the just. For to those
55:38
who consider rightly, the equitable appears to be neither simply the same, nor
55:44
yet different in genus from the just. And at one time indeed we praise
55:49
the equitable and the man of equity, so that, also transferring this name
55:53
to other things, we praise a man by calling him a more equitable instead
55:59
of a good man, manifesting by this that it is a better appellation.
56:02
But at another time, to those who follow reason, it appears to be
56:07
absurd that the equitable, if it is something different from the just, should
56:10
be laudable, For either the just is not a worthy thing, or the
56:15
equitable is not just if it is different from the just, or if they
56:20
are both worthy things, both are the same. The doubt therefore concerning the
56:24
equitable, nearly happens through these particulars. All these, however, are after
56:30
a certain manner right, and there is nothing in them which is contrary and
56:34
adverse to itself. For the equitable, being something that is just, is
56:38
a better just thing, and is not better than the just, as if
56:43
it were some other genus. The just, therefore and the equitable are the
56:46
same thing, and both of them being worthy things, the equitable is the
56:52
more excellent of the two. A doubt, however, still remains that though
56:55
the equitable is indeed just, yet it is not the legally just, but
57:00
is a correction of it. But the cause of this is that every law
57:04
indeed is universal, but it cannot speak universally with rectitude about certain particulars.
57:09
In those things therefore, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but
57:15
in which this cannot be done rightly, the law assumes that which happens,
57:17
for the most part, not being ignorant of the fault which has been committed,
57:22
and in thus doing it acts no less rightly. For the fault is
57:25
not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of
57:30
the thing, for such directly is the manner of the thing which pertains to
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action. When the law therefore speaks universally in something after this should happen.
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Besides, then it is right to correct what the legislator has omitted and the
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error which he has committed in speaking simply, since the legislator himself would adopt
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such correction if he were present, and would have legally established this if he
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had known it. Hence, the equitable is just, and is better than
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a certain justice. It is not, however, better than what is simply
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just, but it is better than the justice which errs through speaking simply and
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generally. And this is the nature of the equitable, that it is a
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correction of law where law is deficient on account of speaking universally, For this
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is the cause by all things are not according to law, that concerning certain
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things it is impossible to establish a law. Hence a decree is necessary.
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For of the indefinite, the rule also is indefinite. Just as of a
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Lesbian building, the rule is let in. Since the rule is bent conformable
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to the figure of the stone and does not remain the same. Thus,
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also a decree is adapted to things themselves. It is evident therefore, what
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the equitable and the just are, and what the justice is which the equitable
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excels. It is likewise manifest from this who is an equitable man? For
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he who deliberately chooses and practices things of this kind, and who is not
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an accurate distributor of justice in the rigid sense of the word, but remits
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something of the rigor of the law, though the law is favorable to such
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rigor, is an equitable man. And the habit itself is equity, being
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a certain justice and not a different habit Chapter eleven. For what has been
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said, also, it is evident whether it is possible for a man to
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injure himself or not, For there are some just things established by law which
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pertain to the whole of virtue. Thus, for instance, the law does
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not order a man to destroy himself, and it forbids what it does not
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command. Again, when one man hurts another contrary to law, who has
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not hurt him, he does an injury willingly. But he does an injury
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willingly, who does it knowing the person whom he injures, and the instrument
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and the manner in which he does it. But he who destroys himself through
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anger does this willingly, contrary to right reason, which the law does not
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permit. Hence he does an injury. But to whom is it Not to
1:00:01
the city, but not to himself, For he voluntarily suffers, but no
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one is voluntarily injured. Hence also the city punishes him, and a certain
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disgrace is attached to him who destroys himself, as one who injures a city.
1:00:17
Farther still, it is not possible for a man to injure himself in
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that way in which he is unjust, who only acts unjustly and is not
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entirely depraved, for this character is different from him. For the unjust man
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is, in a certain respect so depraved as the timid man is, but
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not as possessing the whole of depravity. Hence, neither, according to this
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improbity, does he do himself an injury. For if he did, the
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same thing might be taken away and added at the same time to the same
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thing. But this is impossible. It is, however, necessary, that
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the just and the unjust should always exist in more than one person. Again,
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he who does an injury does it voluntarily and from deliberate choice, and
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with a precedency in time. For he who injures another because he has been
1:01:08
injured by him, does not appear to act unjustly. But he who injures
1:01:13
himself suffers and does the same things. At the same time. Farther still,
1:01:17
a man would be injured willingly, to which may be added that no
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one does an injury without a particular species of injustice. But no one commits
1:01:25
adultery with his own wife, nor does any one dig through his own wall,
1:01:30
nor commit a theft on his own property. In short, the impossibility
1:01:36
that a man should injure himself is evident from the conclusions made by us respecting
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the being voluntarily injured. It is likewise evident that both to be injured and
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to injure are bad things, for the one is to have less, but
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the other more than the medium in the same manner as the salubrious in medicine,
1:01:53
and that which contributes to a good habit of body in the gymnastic art.
1:01:58
At the same time, however, it is worse to injure than to
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be injured, for to do an injury is accompanied with vice and is blameable,
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and with vice which is either perfect and simply vice, or nearly so.
1:02:10
For not everything which is voluntary is accompanied with injustice. But to be
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injured is without vice and injustice. Essentially. Therefore, it is less bad
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to be injured than to do an injury. But from accident nothing prevents it
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from being a greater evil. Art, however, pays no attention to this.
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But it says that the pleurity is a greater disease than a lame foot,
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though it may happen that the latter may be a greater evil than the
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former, if a man, in consequence of being lame, should fall and
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thus be taken by enemies and put to death. Metaphorically speaking, however,
1:02:45
and from similitude, the whole man is not just to the whole of himself,
1:02:50
but one part of him towards another part. Yet not according to every
1:02:54
kind of justice, but according to the despotic or economic. For in these
1:03:00
discussions it must be admitted that the rational differs from the irrational part of the
1:03:04
soul. And if we look to these it appears that there is a certain
1:03:07
injustice of a man towards himself because it is possible in these parts for a
1:03:14
man to suffer something adverse to his own appetites. As therefore, between a
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governor and him who is governed there is a certain justice towards each other.
1:03:22
This is also the case between these parts of the soul. After this manner,
1:03:27
therefore we have discussed justice and the other ethical virtues. End of Book five.