Latest / Vietnam- The Advisory Years to 1965 / 013 - Farm Gate and the Vietnamese Air Force
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- 0:00Speaker 1: Chapter twelve Vietnam The Advisory Years to nineteen sixty five
- 0:03Speaker 1: by Robert Futrell and Martin Blumensen. This is a LibriVox recording.
- 0:07Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
- 0:10Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
- 0:15Speaker 1: by Tatiana Chichilla, Columbus, Ohio. Chapter twelve farm Gate and
- 0:21Speaker 1: the Vietnamese Air Force farm Gate Detachments seven through ten
- 0:25Speaker 1: and miscellaneous units contained eight hundred thirty eight US Air
- 0:29Speaker 1: Force personnel by the end of nineteen sixty one. Together,
- 0:32Speaker 1: these units made up a modest strike, photo reconnaissance, and
- 0:35Speaker 1: airlift force, but far more significant, they were the nucleus
- 0:39Speaker 1: of a rapidly expanding American effort. Since the Rules of
- 0:42Speaker 1: Engagement confined US Air Force planes to missions the Vietnamese
- 0:45Speaker 1: were unable to perform, strengthening the Vietnamese Air force was
- 0:48Speaker 1: all important. The first Fighter Squadron at Bien Hui owned
- 0:52Speaker 1: twenty eighty sixes, each capable of flying one operational sortee
- 0:57Speaker 1: per day. The second Fighter's Squadron at Natrez was being
- 1:00Speaker 1: ready for combat because it was to receive thirty t
- 1:03Speaker 1: twenty eight a's and fourteen T twenty eight b's. The
- 1:06Speaker 1: pilots would require transition training in gunnery, bombing, and rocketry.
- 1:11Speaker 1: The first, second and third Liaison squadrons had fifteen L
- 1:15Speaker 1: nineteens apiece and needed more pilots, Hence additional officers would
- 1:19Speaker 1: undergo flight training. In the United States. The eighty six
- 1:22Speaker 1: pilots were proficient in daytime flight, but their former carrier
- 1:25Speaker 1: aircraft lacked the landing lights. This and the frequently inoperable
- 1:29Speaker 1: flight instruments prevented pilots from gainey experience in night and
- 1:32Speaker 1: all weather flying. They showed slight interest in flying night combat,
- 1:36Speaker 1: even though the Vietcong operated mostly during the hours of
- 1:39Speaker 1: darkness to secure combat missions. Colonel King had proved that
- 1:43Speaker 1: T twenty eights and B twenty six's could fly night
- 1:46Speaker 1: missions under flarelight furnished by SC forty sevens, but when
- 1:50Speaker 1: saddled with training the Vietnamese, the farm Gate commander was
- 1:53Speaker 1: surprised and disappointed. He continued to discuss with General anthis
- 1:57Speaker 1: second Advon commander whether training was the cover for combat
- 2:01Speaker 1: or the primary mission. As King later frankly admitted, he
- 2:04Speaker 1: resisted anthus instructions grudgingly, farm Gate commenced the training. Vietnamese
- 2:09Speaker 1: eighty six pilots served as crew members on B twenty
- 2:12Speaker 1: sixes and T twenty eight s, but disliked flying in
- 2:15Speaker 1: the T twenty eight rear seats. Yet they could not
- 2:17Speaker 1: take over the front seat on combat missions until they
- 2:20Speaker 1: were qualified in every respect. At that point, no need
- 2:23Speaker 1: existed for a farm Gate instructor in the rear seat.
- 2:25Speaker 1: Back seat combat training was more political than practical. The
- 2:29Speaker 1: basing of farm Gate in the Vietnamese eighty sixes at
- 2:31Speaker 1: Bienhois might have eased combined missions, but the Air Operation
- 2:35Speaker 1: Center went on issuing separate orders. Colonel King nevertheless promoted
- 2:39Speaker 1: training and demonstrated that air detachments could operate from remote
- 2:42Speaker 1: locations a long while. This success eventually moved the first
- 2:46Speaker 1: Fighter's squadron to Stage two A D sixes each to
- 2:48Speaker 1: play Coup and Dan Nang. King also sent four T
- 2:51Speaker 1: twenty eight pilots to not training to give Vietnamese instructors
- 2:54Speaker 1: flight training. More to farm Gate's liking was the mission
- 2:58Speaker 1: of January third, nineteen sixty two, alerted to Viet Kong
- 3:01Speaker 1: sampans drawn up under camouflage south of Saigon. Colonel King
- 3:05Speaker 1: and Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Gleeson made an afternoon flight
- 3:08Speaker 1: and took photographs of the exact spot. Shortly after dark,
- 3:12Speaker 1: King led obomb and rocket strike. The SC forty seven
- 3:15Speaker 1: flare ship approached the target area with the T twenty
- 3:17Speaker 1: eights in trail and about two thousand feet higher. After
- 3:21Speaker 1: the flares ignited, the strike aircraft swooped down and demolished
- 3:23Speaker 1: the enemy boats. Photos revealed that one five hundred pound
- 3:27Speaker 1: bomb dropped by Captain William E. Doherty scored a perfect
- 3:30Speaker 1: strike in the middle of the sampans. Such rapid reaction
- 3:33Speaker 1: induced the Joint Operations Center to place an SC forty
- 3:36Speaker 1: seven on strip alert, ready to join T twenty eights
- 3:39Speaker 1: and B twenty six is in night action. While these
- 3:41Speaker 1: tactics failed to wipe out enemy units, they forced the
- 3:44Speaker 1: viet Cong to break off attacks and fade into the jungle. Meanwhile,
- 3:48Speaker 1: Vietnamese C forty seven crews were sufficiently trained by February
- 3:51Speaker 1: nineteen sixty two to fly night missions with farm Gate.
- 3:55Speaker 1: Farm Gate experience in the first months of nineteen sixty
- 3:57Speaker 1: two dictated a change in ordnance loads. The detachment sharply
- 4:01Speaker 1: cut back on general purpose bombs and shifted from the
- 4:04Speaker 1: two hundred fifty pound bomb to the M one A
- 4:06Speaker 1: two cluster of six twenty pound bombs. By June, farm
- 4:10Speaker 1: Gate uped its use of rockets, napalm, and strafing. Sometimes
- 4:14Speaker 1: more than one canister of napalm was required to burn
- 4:16Speaker 1: a hole in the ground. Cover strike aircraft inhibited the
- 4:19Speaker 1: Vietcong from firing. If the air crew spied the source,
- 4:22Speaker 1: they quickly opened up a formidable fire power. The T
- 4:25Speaker 1: twenty eight packed two fifty caliber machine guns the B
- 4:28Speaker 1: twenty six eight. Both planes carried bombs and rockets. The
- 4:32Speaker 1: white smoke of the M nineteen marker dissipated too swiftly,
- 4:35Speaker 1: while the air crews rarely saw the red smoke of
- 4:37Speaker 1: the M eighteen through the jungle canopy. Smoke bombs in
- 4:40Speaker 1: general were unreliable, and the method of dropping them on
- 4:42Speaker 1: poorly defined targets was most ineffective. The first combined American
- 4:47Speaker 1: Vietnamese air operation occurred near the end of December nineteen
- 4:50Speaker 1: sixty one.
- 4:51Speaker 2: Two U. S.
- 4:52Speaker 1: Army helicopter companies whisked three hundred and sixty Vietnamese troops
- 4:55Speaker 1: to five landing zones and the Vietcong dominated Zone D
- 4:59Speaker 1: then someveral days later brought in additional troops. A Vietnamese
- 5:03Speaker 1: L nineteen forward air controller and two eighty six bombers
- 5:06Speaker 1: orbited the area that saw no targets. The troops failed
- 5:09Speaker 1: in their main mission capture of a radio transmitter, but
- 5:12Speaker 1: killed two Vietcong, wounded one, and captured forty six suspects.
- 5:17Speaker 2: A larger operation took place on.
- 5:18Speaker 1: January fifth, nineteen sixty two, to rescue prisoners in a
- 5:21Speaker 1: Vietcong camp in near Saigon. A Vietnamese forward air controller
- 5:25Speaker 1: directed A D six's T twenty eights and B twenty
- 5:28Speaker 1: six's to fly preparatory strikes. Under this cover, thirty one
- 5:32Speaker 1: to twenty one helicopters shuttled in one thousand Vietnamese troops.
- 5:35Speaker 1: These efforts went for naught. The information about the prison
- 5:38Speaker 1: camp proved to be erroneous. A number of the problems
- 5:41Speaker 1: in search and destroy operations stemmed from three factors. Preliminary
- 5:45Speaker 1: air reconnaissance tended to destroy, surprise plans on occasion were
- 5:49Speaker 1: too complex for the fledgling Vietnamese Air Force to carry through,
- 5:52Speaker 1: and coordination between ground and air units was weak. The
- 5:55Speaker 1: air defense system likewise left much to be desired, since
- 5:59Speaker 1: the Soviet Union had had transport aircraft at Hanoi. A
- 6:02Speaker 1: key aim of the American presence was to deter this
- 6:04Speaker 1: airlift from extending to Laos and from affording air support
- 6:07Speaker 1: to the Vietcong. Rumours in early nineteen sixty two told
- 6:10Speaker 1: the Vietcong and the Central Highlands receiving secret air supply drops.
- 6:14Speaker 1: Time and again. The air warning radars at Tansan, Newt
- 6:17Speaker 1: and don Nang, together with the light radar at Pleiku,
- 6:20Speaker 1: picked up unidentified tracks.
- 6:22Speaker 2: At times these turned.
- 6:23Speaker 1: Out to be tricks of the atmosphere, but often were
- 6:25Speaker 1: US Army aircraft on flights the reporting center knew nothing of.
- 6:29Speaker 1: On the other hand, the don Nang radar could not
- 6:31Speaker 1: detect planes flying at low and middle levels because the
- 6:34Speaker 1: terrain to the rust screened them. Furthermore, the eighty six's
- 6:38Speaker 1: T twenty eights and B twenty six's were unsuitable for
- 6:41Speaker 1: intercepting Communist aircraft penetrating South Vietnamese airspace. In February nineteen
- 6:46Speaker 1: sixty two, General O'Donnell called for unified air action to
- 6:50Speaker 1: establish law and order in the air. He suggested that
- 6:53Speaker 1: the air operations center control and coordinate all air operations,
- 6:56Speaker 1: including helicopter combat support. Two mutants to Vietnamese flyers first
- 7:01Speaker 1: tested the air defense system designed to signal Communist intrusion.
- 7:05Speaker 1: On the morning of February twenty sixth, nineteen sixty two.
- 7:08Speaker 1: The two diverted their eighty sixes from a planned strike
- 7:11Speaker 1: in the Delta and zeroed in on President DM's palace.
- 7:14Speaker 1: The first fighter squadron scrambled two flights of eighty sixes
- 7:18Speaker 1: to intercept the rebels, but the planes merely gathered hits
- 7:20Speaker 1: from small arms fire. Farm Gate aircraft took to the
- 7:23Speaker 1: air to elude possible destruction on the ground. Anti aircraft
- 7:27Speaker 1: fire downed one of the two attacking planes, and its
- 7:30Speaker 1: pilot was captured. The other escaped of non Pen, Cambodia,
- 7:33Speaker 1: where he emerged unscathed from a crash landing. Interrogation of
- 7:37Speaker 1: the captured flier confirmed that the two pilots were engaged
- 7:39Speaker 1: in a vendetta against DM's brother Ungdin Knew, although there
- 7:44Speaker 1: appeared to be no general plot against the government, DM
- 7:46Speaker 1: grounded the Vietnamese Air force temporarily. Later, he permitted the
- 7:50Speaker 1: Vietnamese strike planes to carry only twenty millimeters ammunition.
- 7:54Speaker 2: Still later, he.
- 7:54Speaker 1: Ostensibly authorized the planes to carry a full array of ordnance,
- 7:58Speaker 1: but the Joint General Staff restricted bomb loads for missions.
- 8:01Speaker 1: In two and three, Corps Ambassador and Nolting secured permission
- 8:04Speaker 1: from Washington for farm Gate aircraft to support ground operations.
- 8:08Speaker 1: To dispel the impression that the United States was taking
- 8:10Speaker 1: over the fighting, eight sixes had to accompany American planes.
- 8:14Speaker 1: In March nineteen sixty two, a total of one thousand,
- 8:16Speaker 1: eight hundred sixty one incidents attacked, acts of terrorism, sabotage,
- 8:21Speaker 1: s a version stirred apprehension that the Communists were about
- 8:24Speaker 1: to step up the war Playkoup radar on the evening
- 8:27Speaker 1: of the nineteenth showed seven unknown flight tracks over the
- 8:29Speaker 1: Central Highlands. Farm Gates scrambled at B twenty six from Bienhoi,
- 8:33Speaker 1: and when it reached the area, radar control placed the
- 8:36Speaker 1: aircraft directly over one of the tracks. The crew saw nothing.
- 8:39Speaker 1: The next day, reconnaissance pilots noticed some bundles in the trees.
- 8:43Speaker 1: On the night of the twentieth, Tan saw nude radar
- 8:45Speaker 1: detected unknown tracks leading out of Cambodia. Two farm Gate
- 8:49Speaker 1: T twenty eights were scrambled, but the tracks faded. Soon after,
- 8:52Speaker 1: these T twenty eights were recalled. Playcou reported ten to
- 8:55Speaker 1: fifteen low altitude tracks emerging from Cambodia. One SC forty
- 8:59Speaker 1: sive Than and two RB twenty sixes were dispatched from Vienhois.
- 9:03Speaker 1: The SC forty seven dispensed flares, while the RB twenty
- 9:06Speaker 1: sixes searched in Vain. Upset over the sharp rise in
- 9:09Speaker 1: Viet Coong incidents, President Diam asked for US jet interceptors
- 9:13Speaker 1: to deal with enemy overflights. Ambassador Nolten quickly cleared the
- 9:17Speaker 1: request with Washington. On March twenty second, the four hundred
- 9:20Speaker 1: fifth Tactical Fighter Wing deployed a detachment of the five
- 9:23Speaker 1: hundred ninth Fighter Interceptor Squadron from Clark Air Base to Tansannut.
- 9:28Speaker 1: The detachment's aircraft consisted of three single seat one O
- 9:31Speaker 1: twos and one TF one O two with side by
- 9:34Speaker 1: side seating. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Americans to
- 9:37Speaker 1: engage and destroy hostile aircraft encountered over South Vietnam. The
- 9:42Speaker 1: speedy arrival of the F one O twos pleased the
- 9:44Speaker 1: Vietnamese government. Still, the air defense system was far from perfect.
- 9:47Speaker 1: In training exercises, the F one o twos flew much
- 9:50Speaker 1: too fast to intercept the slow liaison planes that acted
- 9:53Speaker 1: as enemy intruders. Experience also taught that two pilots in
- 9:56Speaker 1: a TF one O two had a better chance to
- 9:59Speaker 1: intercept than one pie in a F one O two.
- 10:01Speaker 1: Further t F one o twos were therefore drawn from
- 10:03Speaker 1: the fifth and thirteenth Air Forces. On July twenty first,
- 10:06Speaker 1: Admiral Felt ordered three Navy A D five Q interceptors
- 10:10Speaker 1: from QB Point, Philippines to relieve the F one o twos.
- 10:13Speaker 2: From then on, F one o.
- 10:14Speaker 1: Twos and Navy interceptors alternated six week tours of air
- 10:17Speaker 1: defense duty. As air defense and traffic control improved, the
- 10:21Speaker 1: unknown radar tracks diminished to help radartel friendly from enemy planes.
- 10:26Speaker 1: MCVEE on August twenty second ordered every American military aircraft
- 10:30Speaker 1: to omit identification friend or foe impulses if equipped to
- 10:33Speaker 1: do so. When months passed without enemy air activity, General
- 10:37Speaker 1: Harkins said it was certain that there was no air
- 10:39Speaker 1: battle in Vietnam and there are no indications that one
- 10:41Speaker 1: will develop.
- 10:42Speaker 2: The sudden jump in Vietcong incidents during March.
- 10:45Speaker 1: Nineteen sixty two led US Air Force officers to raise
- 10:48Speaker 1: the question of the enlarging farm Gate. With four B
- 10:50Speaker 1: twenty six's now in the Far East and with four
- 10:52Speaker 1: T twenty eights, they reasoned that B twenty six's were
- 10:55Speaker 1: the best tactical aircraft for counterinsurgency. T twenty eights were
- 10:59Speaker 1: needed for detachment at smaller airfields, and Vietnamese forces were
- 11:02Speaker 1: still learning how to use air power with ground operations.
- 11:05Speaker 1: General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting backed the proposal. Defense Secretary McNamara, however,
- 11:11Speaker 1: noted that the Vietnamese second Fighter Squadron was becoming operational.
- 11:15Speaker 1: He asked how much longer American pilots had to fly
- 11:17Speaker 1: with the Vietnamese. General anthus replied that farm Gate would
- 11:20Speaker 1: have to serve as a demonstration force and to check
- 11:22Speaker 1: up the state of Vietnamese training and standardization for quite
- 11:25Speaker 1: a while. McNamara okayed the request, but delivery of the
- 11:28Speaker 1: planes to farm Gate was delayed due to the Vietnamese.
- 11:31Speaker 2: Air force build up.
- 11:32Speaker 1: During General Amaze's Vietnam visit in April nineteen sixty two,
- 11:35Speaker 1: the initial expansion of Vietnamese strike aircraft neared its end
- 11:39Speaker 1: the thirty US Air Force C forty seven pilots assigned
- 11:42Speaker 1: to the first Transportation Group had released seasoned Vietnamese pilots
- 11:46Speaker 1: to fighter cockpits. Moreover, twenty five T twenty eight pilots
- 11:50Speaker 1: were combat ready for the second fighter Squadron. With thirty
- 11:53Speaker 1: flying hours a month planned for T twenty eights and
- 11:55Speaker 1: twenty five for the eight six's, the Vietnamese could complete
- 11:58Speaker 1: one hundred, forty two eight and fifty five eighty six
- 12:01Speaker 1: soorties each week. Since the training of T twenty eight
- 12:04Speaker 1: pilots was drawing to a close, Farmgate found it harder
- 12:07Speaker 1: to get Vietnamese crewmen for its flights. Though le Maay
- 12:11Speaker 1: noticed market improvement among the Vietnamese, he doubted they would
- 12:14Speaker 1: meet all the operational.
- 12:15Speaker 2: Demands for some time to come.
- 12:17Speaker 1: Because farm Gate was flying less than it could, LeMay
- 12:20Speaker 1: wanted the crews to log more missions. This would allow
- 12:22Speaker 1: American airmen rotating through Vietnam to attain valued experience that
- 12:26Speaker 1: might well be needed elsewhere. He suggested relaxing the restrictions
- 12:30Speaker 1: calling for a Vietnamese crewmen to be aboard Farmgate planes
- 12:33Speaker 1: and confining farm Gate to offensive missions beyond the competence
- 12:36Speaker 1: of the Vietnamese General Le Maay won little support for
- 12:40Speaker 1: these proposals.
- 12:40Speaker 2: In Washington.
- 12:42Speaker 1: Secretary McNamara sought to shave American participation in Vietnam so
- 12:46Speaker 1: as to attain an all out Vietnamese military effort. Counterinsurgency
- 12:50Speaker 1: doctrine required indigenous forces to fight their own war. McNamara
- 12:54Speaker 1: was thus interested in having the Vietnamese take over the
- 12:57Speaker 1: farm Gate planes as soon as possible. By the original
- 13:00Speaker 1: rules and restrictions and the scarcity of Vietnamese trainees, General
- 13:04Speaker 1: anthus secured the assignment of eleven Vietnamese aviation cadets to
- 13:08Speaker 1: Farmgate until they could attend flight training in the United States.
- 13:11Speaker 1: The cadets served as the Vietnamese member of every farm
- 13:14Speaker 1: Gate crew based at Nautreng, with a detachment of sixty
- 13:17Speaker 1: to twenty eights at don Nang. The second Fighter Squadron
- 13:20Speaker 1: became fully operational in mid nineteen sixty two. This afforded
- 13:24Speaker 1: much needed air power in the central and northern areas
- 13:26Speaker 1: of Vietnam, freeing the First Fighter Squadron and farm Gate
- 13:30Speaker 1: for operations in the south. As a result, Vietnamese and
- 13:33Speaker 1: Farmgate sorties multiplied, mainly for interdiction and close support. Still,
- 13:37Speaker 1: the Vietnamese asked for two few air missions. They neglected,
- 13:40Speaker 1: to have aircraft cover convoys and trains, to escort helicopter
- 13:44Speaker 1: assault operations, and to fly even more interdiction.
- 13:47Speaker 2: In close support strikes.
- 13:49Speaker 1: But augmenting the Vietnamese Air Force seemed to have been successful.
- 13:52Speaker 1: Secretary Macnamara was so pleased with the progress that he
- 13:55Speaker 1: told General Harkins to firm up a program for a
- 13:58Speaker 1: phase out of major US combat advisory and logistic activities
- 14:02Speaker 1: within three years. The Secretary was unaware of the glaring
- 14:05Speaker 1: deficiencies that impeded the Vietnamese pilots continued in short supply,
- 14:09Speaker 1: and many of those flying needed more training. The two
- 14:12Speaker 1: fighters squadrons had fewer than a dozen qualified flight leaders,
- 14:15Speaker 1: and ground personnel were generally inefficient.
- 14:17Speaker 2: The T twenty eighth.
- 14:18Speaker 1: Lacked ample fire power and would someday have to be replaced,
- 14:21Speaker 1: calling for more pilot training. A lack of proficiency at
- 14:24Speaker 1: night and all weather flying diluted efficiency. Rather than the
- 14:28Speaker 1: average of one hour or less, Vietnamese turnaround time between
- 14:31Speaker 1: missions averaged between two and three hours. The fastest scrambled
- 14:34Speaker 1: time for Vietnamese sea forty seven flair ship was forty
- 14:37Speaker 1: minutes and over an hour was normal. The Vietnamese were
- 14:40Speaker 1: cleared to operate with a full array of ordinance, but
- 14:43Speaker 1: their strike aircraft were armed solely with napalm rockets, small
- 14:47Speaker 1: fragmentation bombs and cannons.
- 14:49Speaker 2: They were reluctant to.
- 14:50Speaker 1: Move aircraft to advance locations because of poor housing and
- 14:53Speaker 1: messing at Don Nang and Pleai Coup and the low.
- 14:55Speaker 2: Pay for very duty.
- 14:57Speaker 1: General anthus estimated that the two Vietnamese fighter squadrons with
- 15:01Speaker 1: twenty seventy to twenty eights and twenty two eighty six's
- 15:04Speaker 1: should generate one thousand, four hundred seventy operational sorties a month,
- 15:08Speaker 1: seventy percent for combat and thirty percent for training and maintenance. Actually,
- 15:13Speaker 1: an average of seven eighty sixes, eleven twenty eights, eleven
- 15:16Speaker 1: L nineteen's, and eight C forty sevens were available each
- 15:19Speaker 1: day to the.
- 15:19Speaker 2: Tactical air control system.
- 15:22Speaker 1: Since the number of Vietnamese combat sorties fell short of
- 15:24Speaker 1: meeting the rising demands for air missions, farm Gate operations.
- 15:28Speaker 2: Reached high levels. By August.
- 15:30Speaker 1: It was clear that farm Gate had to have fresh
- 15:32Speaker 1: aircraft and crews the coming of two new US Army
- 15:35Speaker 1: helicopter companies in September meant even greater requirements for escort
- 15:39Speaker 1: and supply sorties by strike aircraft. This clash with Secretary
- 15:43Speaker 1: MacNamara's desire to phase out American units. General Ampus had
- 15:47Speaker 1: foreseen that mission demands would compel farm Gate planes to
- 15:50Speaker 1: stretch beyond monthly programmed flying hours. He suggested that additional
- 15:54Speaker 1: US Air Force units be allocated to Vietnam, chiefly to
- 15:57Speaker 1: allow air strike teams to be kept permanently on stage
- 16:00Speaker 1: at Plai Coup and Saktrang. Thirteenth Air Force in mid
- 16:03Speaker 1: August sent Farmgate four B twenty sixes from Far East assets.
- 16:08Speaker 1: Farmgate continued to fly too many hours, and in September
- 16:11Speaker 1: anthus asked for ten more B twenty six's five to
- 16:14Speaker 1: twenty eights and two C forty sevens. General Harkins made
- 16:18Speaker 1: no reply, but PACAF recommended that the Air Staff put
- 16:22Speaker 1: the proposal on the agenda of the October Secretary of
- 16:25Speaker 1: Defense Conference.
- 16:26Speaker 2: General Walter C.
- 16:27Speaker 1: Sweeney, Junior Commander of Tactical Air Command, and Brigadier General
- 16:31Speaker 1: Gilbert L. Pritchard, Special Air Warfare Center Commander, agreed that
- 16:35Speaker 1: the Air force could furnish chaplaines and crews. However, they
- 16:38Speaker 1: cautioned Anthys to go slow in adding to Farmgate until
- 16:41Speaker 1: he was completely convinced that the Vietnamese were doing as
- 16:44Speaker 1: much as they could. Sweeney did not want farm Gate
- 16:46Speaker 1: to become a crush to compromise progressive and objective development
- 16:49Speaker 1: of indigenous capabilities, Allegedly to confuse the viet Cong, the
- 16:53Speaker 1: Vietnamese renumbered their squadrons in September. With the new designations
- 16:57Speaker 1: went in emphasis on the organizational unity the Vietnamese Air Force.
- 17:01Speaker 1: Perhaps the structure was partly inspired by the proposal of
- 17:04Speaker 1: the U. S. Army Chief of Staff, General George H.
- 17:07Speaker 1: Decker to transfer Vietnamese helicopter and liaison squadrons to the
- 17:10Speaker 1: Vietnamese Army, securing the go ahead from the Air Staff
- 17:14Speaker 1: in October to give additional aircraft to farm Gate, PACAF
- 17:18Speaker 1: suggested his action to sink Pack. Briefed on October eighth
- 17:21Speaker 1: in Hawaii, Defense Secretary McNamara was still bent on building
- 17:25Speaker 1: a wholly adequate Vietnamese Air Force. He said that there
- 17:28Speaker 1: should not be one hundred thirty, but three hundred or
- 17:31Speaker 1: more Vietnamese officers taking flight training in the United States.
- 17:34Speaker 1: Since no Vietnamese pilots were in training to fly B
- 17:37Speaker 1: twenty six's, the Secretary asked Admiral Pelt to explore the
- 17:40Speaker 1: prospect of procuring thirty Chinese nationalists for the Vietnamese C
- 17:44Speaker 1: forty sevens. This would release thirty transport pilots for B
- 17:47Speaker 1: twenty six transitional training. As for farm gate expansion, McNamara said,
- 17:52Speaker 1: if General Harkins needed a bigger program, he should present
- 17:55Speaker 1: his case to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He himself
- 17:58Speaker 1: was cool to the idea, for it was co entrary
- 18:00Speaker 1: to the President's desire to build indigenous forces. Farm Gate
- 18:03Speaker 1: oughts to train Vietnamese.
- 18:05Speaker 2: Rather than to operate.
- 18:06Speaker 1: Farm Gate operations in August had soared to sixty five
- 18:09Speaker 1: percent over those in July, but in September they had
- 18:12Speaker 1: to be prune to thirty seven percent of the July totals,
- 18:15Speaker 1: owing chiefly to the one crew per aircraft manning ratio
- 18:18Speaker 1: not enough to sustain the high rate of missions the Vietnamese.
- 18:21Speaker 1: One of the eleven aviation cadets returned for language training
- 18:24Speaker 1: before going on to the United States to become pilots
- 18:27Speaker 1: to furnish the crewmen required on farmgate planes. The Vietnamese
- 18:31Speaker 1: Air Force sent fifteen non commissioned officers to farm gate.
- 18:34Speaker 1: This plugged the gap, but was a subterfuge because the
- 18:37Speaker 1: enlisted Vietnamese were uninterested in flight training. When General Mormon,
- 18:41Speaker 1: thirteenth Air Force commander, heard of the arrangement, he urged
- 18:44Speaker 1: Anthis to do his best to meet McNamara's wishes. Admiral
- 18:48Speaker 1: Felt visited Vietnam in late October and talked with Anthis.
- 18:52Speaker 1: He said Vietnamese opposition had scuttled the prospect of using
- 18:55Speaker 1: Chinese pilots to fly Vietnamese transports. Any farm gate growth
- 18:59Speaker 1: would have to be small Inithmule. Acting on Anthus's suggestion
- 19:02Speaker 1: to shore up farm gate, General Harkins in November asked
- 19:05Speaker 1: for five T twenty eights, ten B twenty six's, and
- 19:08Speaker 1: two C forty sevens, more he said would likely be
- 19:11Speaker 1: required in the future. Admiral Felt routed the request to
- 19:14Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs, adding that he saw no other way
- 19:16Speaker 1: to secure the urgently needed combat air power. The Joint
- 19:20Speaker 1: Chiefs of Staff well knew that President Kennedy wished the
- 19:22Speaker 1: Americans to prepare the Vietnamese to fight their own war. Hence,
- 19:25Speaker 1: in November and December, the chiefs carefully weighed the question
- 19:28Speaker 1: of bolstering farm Gate. They likewise plum to the off
- 19:31Speaker 1: stated position that counterinsurgency was for the most part of
- 19:34Speaker 1: ground war, with air forces accounting for maybe ten percent
- 19:37Speaker 1: of the effort.
- 19:38Speaker 2: Some U.
- 19:38Speaker 1: S Air Force officers viewed counting viet con casualties as
- 19:41Speaker 1: an unpleasant task and not necessarily a military objective. Even so,
- 19:45Speaker 1: statistics on the number of enemy killed, wounded, and captured
- 19:49Speaker 1: were important. In all known cases where ground forces entered
- 19:52Speaker 1: areas struck by air, their actual body count exceeded aircrew claims.
- 19:56Speaker 1: Of the estimated number of enemy casualties in nineteen sixty two,
- 20:00Speaker 1: quo twenty eight percent were due to Vietnamese and American
- 20:02Speaker 1: air power. Yet air operations did more. They shrunk the
- 20:06Speaker 1: enemy's options, crimped his movements and attacks, flew in men
- 20:09Speaker 1: and supplies to assault him, protected surface convoys and trains
- 20:13Speaker 1: as well as heliborne assaults, and thwarted the foe from
- 20:16Speaker 1: massing large forces in the field. Air power had proved,
- 20:19Speaker 1: at least to US Air Force officers, that it held
- 20:22Speaker 1: equal rank with ground operations in any counter insurgency venture.
- 20:26Speaker 1: This assessment was not altogether shared in Washington. Following a
- 20:29Speaker 1: visit to Southeast Asia in December nineteen sixty two, Roger Hillsman,
- 20:34Speaker 1: Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and the
- 20:37Speaker 1: President's Special Assistant for Far Eastern Affairs, Michael V. Forestahl,
- 20:41Speaker 1: reported on the use of air power and the danger
- 20:44Speaker 1: of adverse political effects. Our impression is that the controls
- 20:47Speaker 1: on air strikes and the procedures for checking intelligence against
- 20:50Speaker 1: all sources are excellent. In spite of this, however, it
- 20:53Speaker 1: is difficult to be sure that air power is being
- 20:55Speaker 1: used in a way that minimizes the adverse political effects
- 20:58Speaker 1: and the use of air powers going on enormously. In December,
- 21:02Speaker 1: the Joint Chiefs recommended expanding farmgate so it could keep
- 21:05Speaker 1: abreast of the burgeoning requests for air support. The Secretary
- 21:08Speaker 1: of Defense concurred, and the State Department agreed, and on
- 21:11Speaker 1: the last day of the year, the President approved the
- 21:13Speaker 1: requested increase in farmgate aircraft end of chapter twelve. Recording
- 21:19Speaker 1: by Tatiana Chichilla, Columbus, Ohio