Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / Why Hypersonic Missiles Matter
Transcript
- 0:16For decades, missile defense systems operated on one core
- 0:20assumption that incoming missiles would follow broadly
- 0:23predictable trajectories. Hypersonic weapons are designed
- 0:26to break that assumption. Not by being faster than
- 0:30anything else in the sky, though they are fast, but by being
- 0:33faster, lower, and unpredictable simultaneously.
- 0:37That combination is what makes them strategically significant,
- 0:41and it is why every major military power on Earth has been
- 0:45racing to develop them. Today's episode is a deep dive
- 0:48into hypersonic weapons, what they actually are, how they
- 0:51work, why they matter, and what they mean for the future of
- 0:55warfare. Start with the terminology
- 0:57because it is widely misunderstood.
- 1:00Hypersonic speed is defined as flight at Mach 5 or above five
- 1:04times the speed of sound, or roughly 6000 kilometers per hour
- 1:08at sea level, and somewhat faster at high altitude, where
- 1:10the air is thinner and the speed of sound itself changes.
- 1:14By that definition, hypersonic flight is not new.
- 1:17Intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBM's, have been
- 1:21flying at hypersonic speed since the 1950s.
- 1:24The standard warhead re entering the atmosphere from an ICBM
- 1:28trajectory travels at Mach 20 or more during its terminal phase.
- 1:33The physics of high energy ballistic re entry have always
- 1:36produced hypersonic velocities. Ballistic missiles have been
- 1:39hypersonic for 70 years. So when modern analysts talk
- 1:43about hypersonic weapons as something new, they're not
- 1:47talking about speed alone. They're talking about a specific
- 1:50combination of speed, maneuverability, and flight
- 1:53profile that creates A qualitatively different
- 1:55challenge for missile defense systems.
- 1:58The category that matters is not hypersonic missiles as a general
- 2:01class is maneuvering hypersonic weapons that fly at sustained
- 2:05hypersonic speeds outside the traditional ballistic arc.
- 2:08There are two principal types. The 1st is the hypersonic glide
- 2:13vehicle. The second is the hypersonic
- 2:15cruise missile. They are different in how they
- 2:18achieve flight, and they pose different challenges to the
- 2:21people trying to stop them. A hypersonic glide vehicle, or
- 2:25HGV, is launched on a conventional ballistic rocket,
- 2:28often an existing ICBM or intermediate range missile.
- 2:32The rocket boosts the glide vehicle into the upper
- 2:35atmosphere, at which point the vehicle separates and begins
- 2:39gliding back toward the target at hypersonic speeds.
- 2:42Unlike a traditional ballistic warhead, which follows a fixed
- 2:45parabolic arc back to Earth, the glide vehicle maneuvers during
- 2:49its descent. It can shift its trajectory
- 2:52laterally. It can extend or shorten its
- 2:55range. It can alter its final approach
- 2:57angle. These maneuvers are limited.
- 3:00The physics of hypersonic flight constrain how sharply any
- 3:03vehicle can turn at that speed and altitude, but they are
- 3:06enough to complicate targeting solutions for missile defense
- 3:09systems that were designed to engage ballistic trajectories.
- 3:12The second type is the hypersonic cruise missile.
- 3:16Rather than being boosted by a rocket and then gliding, A
- 3:18hypersonic cruise missile uses air breathing propulsion to
- 3:22sustain hypersonic flight throughout its journey.
- 3:25The dominant propulsion system for this category is the
- 3:27scramjet, A supersonic combustion ramjet.
- 3:31A scramjet draws oxygen directly from the atmosphere rather than
- 3:34carrying its own oxidizer, which means it is significantly
- 3:37lighter than a rocket powered system and does not deplete an
- 3:41onboard fuel oxidizer combination the way rockets do.
- 3:44The trade off is that it requires the vehicle to be
- 3:47moving fast enough to compress incoming air before combustion
- 3:50can occur. Scramjets cannot start from a
- 3:53standstill. They must be accelerated to
- 3:56hypersonic speeds before ignition, typically using a
- 3:59rocket booster stage, and they perform best at altitudes and
- 4:03speeds at place. Extreme thermal stress on the
- 4:05airframe. The leading edges of a scramjet
- 4:08powered vehicle experience temperatures that challenge the
- 4:11limits of known material science.
- 4:13Sustained scramjet flight is among the hardest engineering
- 4:17problems in modern aerospace. The performance envelope is
- 4:20narrow, the thermal environment is punishing, and the guidance
- 4:23systems must function reliably in conditions that no
- 4:26conventional aircraft or cruise missile has ever had to endure.
- 4:30Both vehicle types share certain characteristics that make them
- 4:33difficult to intercept. They fly at altitudes below the
- 4:37traditional engagement envelope for systems designed to stop
- 4:40ballistic missiles, typically between 20 and 100 kilometers,
- 4:44but above the altitude at which most air defense systems
- 4:46designed for aircraft and cruise missiles are optimized to
- 4:49operate. This in between zone, sometimes
- 4:52called the hypersonic gap, is where radar coverage and
- 4:55interceptor performance are weakest.
- 4:57Existing missile defense architectures were not built for
- 5:00threats operating in that band. Consider how the major Western
- 5:04missile defense systems work. The Patriot system is designed
- 5:08to engage shorter range ballistic missiles and aircraft
- 5:11in their terminal phase, the final moments of flight before
- 5:14impact. It is effective against targets
- 5:17that follow predictable trajectories at moderate
- 5:19altitudes. THAD, the Terminal High Altitude
- 5:23Area Defense system, engages longer range ballistic missiles
- 5:26at the top of their flight path, outside the atmosphere or just
- 5:29within it, while the incoming warhead is still following a
- 5:32fixed arc. Aegis, deployed on surface
- 5:35warships intercepts ballistic missiles in their mid course
- 5:38phase over water. Each of these systems was
- 5:40optimized against the threat that follows predictable
- 5:43physics. A maneuvering glide vehicle
- 5:46flying at lower altitudes and shifting its trajectory fits
- 5:49none of these engagement profiles cleanly.
- 5:52The issue is not simply one of speed.
- 5:55Modern radar systems and interceptors can physically
- 5:58react quickly enough to engage hypersonic targets in certain
- 6:01scenarios. The deeper problem is
- 6:04uncertainty. A ballistic warhead gives
- 6:06defenders a trajectory they can compute from the moment of
- 6:09launch. Within seconds of a ballistic
- 6:12missiles ignition, analysts can project where it is going with
- 6:15high confidence. That gives missile defense crews
- 6:18a working solution, a predicted impact point around which they
- 6:21can Orient their interceptors. A maneuvering glide vehicle
- 6:25removes that certainty. Radar operators can track the
- 6:28vehicle, but they cannot reliably project where it will
- 6:31be 10 or 15 seconds from now because the vehicle itself may
- 6:35change course before then. Interceptors must be queued
- 6:38toward a predicted impact point. When that prediction keeps
- 6:42changing, the engagement window collapses.
- 6:45The time available to make a firing decision, calculate an
- 6:48intercept solution, and launch an interceptor shrink sharply.
- 6:52Compressed decision times are not an abstract concern.
- 6:56In practice, they mean commanders have less time to
- 6:59confirm a target's identity, verify the engagement solution
- 7:03and authorize a response. The risk of errors, firing at
- 7:06the wrong target, failing to fire in time, or making a
- 7:10miscalculation under extreme time pressure rises accordingly.
- 7:14Now examine the specific systems that have been developed and
- 7:17deployed by major powers. Russia's avant-garde system is
- 7:21the most operationally deployed hypersonic glide vehicle in the
- 7:25world. Carried on the UR100 in UTTH
- 7:28Heavy ICBM, avant-garde is described by Russian officials
- 7:32as a strategic nuclear delivery system capable of maneuvering at
- 7:35speeds above Mach 20. Russia declared avant-garde
- 7:39operational in late 2019. How many are deployed and what
- 7:43their actual performance parameters are is not publicly
- 7:47confirmed. Russian officials have made
- 7:49substantial claims about the system's speed and penetration
- 7:52capabilities, and independent analysts treat those claims with
- 7:56caution. What is broadly accepted is that
- 7:58avant-garde represents a genuine hypersonic glide vehicle in
- 8:02operational service, that it is nuclear capable, and that it is
- 8:05intended to defeat American missile defense systems
- 8:08protecting the continental United States.
- 8:11Russia also fields the Kinsel, an air launched ballistic
- 8:14missile carried by MIG 31 interceptors.
- 8:17Russian officials classify the Kinzhole as a hypersonic weapon
- 8:21and has been used in Ukraine. However, most Western analysts
- 8:25consider the Kinzhole to be a modified air launch ballistic
- 8:28missile rather than a true maneuvering hypersonic glide
- 8:31vehicle. It flies at hypersonic speeds
- 8:34during parts of its trajectory, but its maneuverability is more
- 8:38limited than dedicated glide vehicles.
- 8:40Ukraine claimed in 2023 to have intercepted A Kinzhole using a
- 8:44Patriot system, an event that, if confirmed, would suggest the
- 8:48missile is less capable than Russian propaganda has
- 8:51maintained. Russia disputed that account.
- 8:55China's DF 17 is a medium range ballistic missile specifically
- 8:59designed to carry a hypersonic glide vehicle warhead, the DFZF.
- 9:04The DF 17 was publicly unveiled at China's National Day Parade
- 9:08in 2019. It is assessed as having a range
- 9:11sufficient to threaten American and allied military bases
- 9:14throughout the Western Pacific, including air bases in Japan,
- 9:18South Korea and Guam, as well as carrier strike groups operating
- 9:22in the region. The DF 17 is widely seen as the
- 9:26most operationally mature dedicated hypersonic weapon in
- 9:29Chinese service. China is assessed to have
- 9:32additional hypersonic development programs underway,
- 9:35including longer range systems and hypersonic cruise missile
- 9:38concepts. Though precise capability
- 9:41details are contested, the United States has been slower to
- 9:44field operational hypersonic weapons than Russia or China, a
- 9:48fact that has generated considerable political attention
- 9:50in Washington. Several programs are in
- 9:53development. The Long range Hypersonic weapon
- 9:57intended for the Army. The Hypersonic attack cruise
- 10:00missile intended for air launch. The conventional Prompt Strike
- 10:04program for use from surface ships.
- 10:07As of the mid 2000 and 20s, none of these had reached full
- 10:10operational status. American officials attribute
- 10:14this partly to the United States prioritizing hypersonic defense
- 10:17and sensing alongside offensive development, and partly to the
- 10:20technical difficulty of producing reliable systems and
- 10:24volume. Critics argue the programs have
- 10:26moved too slowly given the pace of Russian and Chinese
- 10:29deployments. Iran and North Korea occupy a
- 10:32different position. Neither country has demonstrated
- 10:36a true maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.
- 10:39Both have invested heavily in ballistic missile programs that
- 10:42incorporate some maneuvering features or sometimes called
- 10:45quasi ballistic or depressed trajectory missiles.
- 10:48And both have publicly claimed hypersonic capabilities that
- 10:51independent analysts assess has likely exaggerated.
- 10:54Iran's Fata missile, unveiled in 2023, was described by Iranian
- 10:59officials as hypersonic. Most Western analysts assessed
- 11:03it as a maneuvering ballistic missile with some limited
- 11:06trajectory variation capability, rather than a dedicated glide
- 11:09vehicle in the class of avant-garde, or DF 17.
- 11:13The distinction matters, but the underlying trend does not.
- 11:17Even limited maneuverability on ballistic missiles complicates
- 11:20defense planning, and the trajectory of both programs
- 11:23points toward more capable systems over time.
- 11:26The question of what hypersonic weapons actually threaten is as
- 11:29important as the question of what they are.
- 11:32The targets that matter most are the ones that underpin
- 11:35conventional military power projection.
- 11:38Aircraft carriers are perhaps the most visible example. the
- 11:41United States Carrier Strike Group is the centerpiece of
- 11:44American power projection globally.
- 11:47Each carrier is a moving air base capable of striking targets
- 11:51across a wide region. But carriers are large,
- 11:54relatively slow targets by military standards, and their
- 11:57position can be tracked with increasing precision by modern
- 12:00intelligence and satellite systems.
- 12:02A hypersonic glide vehicle carrying a conventional warhead
- 12:06and targeted at a carrier would not need to be nuclear to be
- 12:09strategically decisive. A single accurate hit could
- 12:12mission kill a vessel that costs billions of dollars to build,
- 12:16years to crew, and months to replace.
- 12:18The threat is not theoretical. It is the explicit rationale
- 12:22behind China's carrier killer missile program, of which the DF
- 12:2617 is the most discussed element.
- 12:28American carrier operations in the Western Pacific are already
- 12:32being reconsidered in light of this threat, with strike groups
- 12:35operating at greater distances from Chinese territory than they
- 12:38would have 10 years ago. Air bases are similarly
- 12:41vulnerable. A regional air base, whether in
- 12:44Qatar, Japan, Diego Garcia or Guam, is a fixed target.
- 12:49Its coordinates are known. Its facilities, fuel storage,
- 12:53runway infrastructure, and parked aircraft represent a
- 12:56concentration of military power that cannot easily be dispersed.
- 13:00Hypersonic weapons designed to penetrate air base defenses and
- 13:04crater runways or destroy aircraft on the ground represent
- 13:07a first strike capability that could substantially degrade
- 13:10airpower before it can be brought to bear.
- 13:13This concern has driven significant investment in air
- 13:15base hardening, aircraft dispersal planning, and mobile
- 13:18basing concepts across NATO and Pacific Command.
- 13:22Command and control centers and missile defense batteries are
- 13:25also primary targets. Destroying the nerve centers of
- 13:28an enemy's military decision making or eliminating the
- 13:31systems that would otherwise intercept follow on strikes has
- 13:35been a feature of military planning since the Cold War.
- 13:38Hypersonic weapons with the speed and unpredictability to
- 13:41penetrate layer defenses make those targets more vulnerable
- 13:44than at any previous point in the precision strike era.
- 13:48Underpinning all of this is a challenge that has received less
- 13:51public attention than the missiles themselves.
- 13:53The challenge of tracking and attribution.
- 13:56Identifying, tracking and characterizing A hypersonic
- 13:59glide vehicle in flight requires sensors that are positioned to
- 14:02observe the relevant flight regime.
- 14:04Ground based radars have physical horizons.
- 14:07A glide vehicle flying at lower altitudes.
- 14:10The standard ICBM warhead may not present itself to ground
- 14:13based sensors until relatively late in its flight path,
- 14:17reducing warning time further. The problem is compounded by the
- 14:20plasma sheath that forms around a vehicle flying at extreme
- 14:23hypersonic speeds, an Ionis layer of super heated air that
- 14:27can interfere with radar returns and degrade the quality of
- 14:30tracking data available to defense systems.
- 14:33The response to this challenge has been a shift towards space
- 14:36based sensing constellations of satellites positioned to track
- 14:39missile launches from above and maintain continuous coverage of
- 14:42vehicles across their full flight path. the United States
- 14:46Space Development Agency and the Missile Defense Agency have both
- 14:49prioritized space based infrared and tracking satellites as part
- 14:53of a broader sensor architecture designed to address the
- 14:56hypersonic threat. But building and sustaining
- 14:59those constellations takes time, and the satellite architecture
- 15:02required to cover global hypersonic threats
- 15:05comprehensively is still being assembled.
- 15:07Adversaries are aware of this gap and have structured their
- 15:10programs accordingly. The nuclear dimension adds a
- 15:13layer of risk that deserves careful consideration.
- 15:17Most hypersonic glide vehicles under development or in service
- 15:20are capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear
- 15:23warheads. That dual capability creates a
- 15:26particular problem for crisis stability.
- 15:29If a hypersonic missile is detected in flight, the
- 15:32defending nation faces a decision under extreme time
- 15:35pressure. What is this carrying and where
- 15:37is it going? The combination of compressed
- 15:40warning time, uncertain trajectory, and ambiguous
- 15:43payload means that miscalculation during a crisis
- 15:46becomes more likely. A conventional strike using a
- 15:49hypersonic vehicle might be interpreted as a nuclear attack.
- 15:53A decision that in a slower moving crisis, might allow for
- 15:56verification and communication instead demands a response
- 16:00within minutes. Cold War nuclear doctrine was
- 16:03built around the assumption that both sides would have time to
- 16:05assess a situation before making irreversible decisions.
- 16:09Hypersonic weapons erode that assumption in ways that arms
- 16:12control frameworks have not yet addressed.
- 16:15The broader strategic implication is this Hypersonic
- 16:19weapons do not make war inevitable.
- 16:22They do not make defense impossible.
- 16:24The engineering challenges involved in building reliable,
- 16:27accurate hypersonic systems at scale are substantial.
- 16:31Heat management during sustained hypersonic flight remains
- 16:35difficult. Guidance systems must function
- 16:37in an environment of extreme thermal stress, vibration, and
- 16:41plasma interference. Maneuverability during the glide
- 16:44phase requires continuous aerodynamic control at
- 16:47conditions where small errors in surface deflection produce large
- 16:51trajectory deviations. The gap between a successful
- 16:54test flight and reliable operational deployment in volume
- 16:57is significant, and some of the capability claims made by states
- 17:00that have tested these systems appear calibrated more for
- 17:03deterrence messaging than for a sober technical assessment of
- 17:06what they can currently field. But the trajectory is clear.
- 17:10The engineering problems are being solved.
- 17:13The systems being deployed today will be refined and succeeded by
- 17:16more capable versions. Missile defense systems are
- 17:19adapting through space based sensing, directed energy
- 17:22research, and interceptor development.
- 17:25But adaptation takes time and the offensive programs have
- 17:28moved faster than the defensive ones.
- 17:30The central challenge hypersonic weapons pose is not about
- 17:34physical speed. It is about cognitive speed,
- 17:37about how quickly commanders, analysts, and decision makers
- 17:40can process information, evaluate threats, identify
- 17:43targets, and reach defensible conclusions under conditions of
- 17:47extreme time pressure and incomplete information.
- 17:50The side that can compress that cognitive cycle, that can
- 17:53detect, track, decide and act faster than its adversary, will
- 17:57hold a structural advantage in any future high intensity
- 18:00conflict. The era of warfare in which
- 18:03commanders had hours or days to deliberate over a developing
- 18:06crisis has not ended, but it is shrinking, and the weapon
- 18:10systems being built today by multiple states with competing
- 18:14interests and growing arsenals are designed to shrink it
- 18:17further. That is not a reason for panic.
- 18:21It is a reason for precision in deterrence, in diplomacy and in
- 18:24the design of the decision making architectures that will
- 18:27be under the greatest strain if these weapons are ever used.