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Losing the Signal with Sean Silcoff · Oxide and Friends

• 0:00
  Speaker 1: Sean, are you there? Can you hear me?
• 0:02
  Speaker 2: I am here. Can you hear me?
• 0:03
  Speaker 1: Ho ho ho, man. We are running the table. This is great. Very exciting.
• 0:08
  Speaker 3: What a great day for Twitter spaces. And the recording is working.
• 0:13
  Speaker 1: Okay. I'm knocking on wood right now because we're we're obviously steering ourselves toward towards a later Twitter spaces catastrophe. So, Sean, thank you so much for joining us. Adam and I are so excited to to have you here. Adam, I know you you had not yet read this book when I was raving about it.
• 0:31
  I know you you've read it now.
• 0:34
  Speaker 3: Yeah. I I slammed through it. It's such a page turner. It is just fantastic. Like, both in terms of connecting to topics that we've discussed.
• 0:43
  It's an awesome story of technology and a lot of it felt pretty close to home. Like, having having lived through these periods and seen a lot of the things. So getting the inside baseball was awesome,
• 0:54
  Speaker 1: Sean. Absolutely awesome. Okay. Yes. Thank you very
• 0:57
  Speaker 2: much.
• 0:57
  Speaker 1: And so this is just losing the signal by by Jackie McNish and by you, Sean. And, just terrific, so well written, an incredible story. And I also gotta tell you the question that I'm that I'm dying to ask you because I went back Adam, have you seen The Spanish Prisoner, the David Mammon film?
• 1:17
  Speaker 3: Yes. Yes. Yes. One of my favorites.
• 1:19
  Speaker 1: Okay. So for those who have not seen The Spanish Prisoner, there is did we see it together? Maybe we saw it together.
• 1:25
  Speaker 3: That's not impossible in
• 1:27
  Speaker 1: Petrogue Hills. Yeah. The day. Yeah. Yeah.
• 1:29
  I got movie night circa, you know, like, 2000. I think that 2,001, I guess, 2,002. But there is a Sean, have you seen The Spanish Prisoner by David Mamet?
• 1:39
  Speaker 2: No. I haven't.
• 1:40
  Speaker 1: Okay. Good film. And there is a big twist at the end that makes you want to immediately rewatch the entire film. And the and I don't think it's giving away too much by saying that. And I kind of feel I went back and reread some of the rise of Rim, And I had that same feeling where I was all of a sudden having read your vivid portrayal of the fall of Rym, going back and rereading the rise, I was seeing all of this detail that I had missed.
• 2:17
  And I'm kinda dying to ask you now, did you see any of those parallels as you're writing it? Where and in because in particular, here's the parallel I'm dying to ask you about. It feels like Rim itself was playing the role of the iPhone, with BellSouth playing the role that AT and T would later play, where RIM does this thing that everyone else thinks is impossible, namely wireless email, and disrupts the entire industry. And I feel I see so many parallels with what the iPhone would do, you know, 8 years later.
• 2:54
  Speaker 2: I I think you can argue that
• 3:02
  Speaker 3: played, mate.
• 3:04
  Speaker 2: Thank you. It it it it it wrote the it wrote the script that I think Apple probably perfected with, you know, with lessons learned, both from the mistakes and blind spots RIM had, but also the failures that Silicon Valley had, had you know, the mistake Silicon Valley had made that Rim was able to capitalize on or sort of, geek around as it were. So I I I I think I and and it's actually interesting. I think I don't think Rim gets enough credit for a lot of the things it did. It's sort of a forgotten tech company for a lot of people, but, you know, I think about the way that a lot of, software is, sold nowadays.
• 3:44
  Slack's an example, and, you know, that was a playbook that was quite novel, that RIM sort of put into play in terms of, you know, infiltrating the, the enterprise, and not going through the CIOs?
• 3:56
  Speaker 1: They totally did. And I I mean and maybe you wanna actually expand a little bit on that because I know, Tom, you'd made that that comment earlier today about how a genius it was that they did infiltrate the c suite. Michael Dell's a customer. I mean, it was a great way of getting the product out there. Because it it feels like they they made the product essential at kind of the top levels of the company.
• 4:21
  And going into a very, a very viral path, but a very effective path as well, because they they were creating something. And actually, you know, on that note, you've got this great anecdote about a rim engineer being in San Francisco and wanting needing directions and being able to get it over email and having, like, the light bulb go off. How much do do you mind if I ask, like, how much you know, you got some, how how many kind of, narrative, license you were taking there versus, like because it sounds like that was an important moment. Well, that
• 5:02
  Speaker 2: you know, I I think what made this story really sing for us and and and what we really wanted to bring out, like, this is a book we wanted to resonate as much with, let's say, the, you know, typical listeners of, of of this group, as with, you know, our aunts or uncles or sisters or brothers around the Christmas table. You know? We thought there was a lot of little great little stories that, told the bigger story. You know, it's funny. Like, we were writing a book about tech, and we were trying to write as little about tech as possible while trying to be credible with techies, but not sort of lose the average reader.
• 5:37
  And so a lot of these little moments along the way really illustrated, I I think, a lot of the the the kind of human drama and and some of those moments. Like, one of my favorite passages in the book is, is about the is about the birth of BBM because nobody had ever told that story. And if you think about how much instant messengers, mobile instant messengers define our life, it it was amazing to me that these 3 guys were kind of unknowns. They'd not been heralded. They'd almost been punished.
• 6:09
  One of them, was was, you know, actually punished for creating BBM at the time. Probably a lot of skunks were skunk workers engineers have have experienced that kind of, you know, after the fact, can you believe that happened ism. But, you know, I love the anecdote about how, one of the, the cocreators of BBM was, you know, at Disneyland with his, I think his mother-in-law who, like, didn't even have a feature phone. And she was hooked on BBM, and, they were that's all the the only way they were communicating with each other to find out, like, you know, let's meet for ice cream or whatever. And he said, like, this is the moment where I realized that, you know, that mobile instant messaging would replace the phone call.
• 6:51
  And can you imagine like like, that that's like like, that's a chance to kinda, like, almost tell the story about the creation of a and no one had ever written about that. There was no record of it anywhere. We had to sort of root around and find it. And I you know, I think every day and every week, we were having, like, these conversations, like, isn't this amazing? Like like like, we had these stories we wanted to tell that, you know, kind of illustrated and and and brought the story to
• 7:22
  Speaker 3: life. I I loved that anecdote in particular. You know, sitting at Disney behind some other dad on the ride, hollering to be heard, you know, ruining it for everybody. And then being able to send this kind of covert text message, you know, via BBM, which was novel the first time. I I love that great pass.
• 7:40
  Speaker 1: Oh, and I and I love the mother-in-law at being, you know, kind of accidentally finding herself on the absolute leading edge of technology, not necessarily being aware that this thing is actually not broadly available, that you're one of the only people in the planet who has this kind of instant messaging capability, mobile instant messaging capability. It's it's just so great. That I yeah. I love
• 8:03
  Speaker 2: that. And, you know, the fact that the the first power user ever of BBM, was, you know, Mike Lazaridis' assistant. And if you wanted to get to Mike, you had to go through her. And so, you know, thus begins thus begins the the, the huge ride of mobile and send messaging. Yeah.
• 8:20
  Speaker 1: And the thing about the 3rd BBM is, like, it's it's much later though than RIM's initial rise. Right? I mean, because BBM is in is that in 2,007? Wait. Wait.
• 8:32
  What is BBM actually? Because I feel like it
• 8:35
  Speaker 2: you're testing my memory now. I think it's around 2,004 or 5.
• 8:38
  Speaker 1: 4 or 5. Okay.
• 8:39
  Speaker 2: But but I think but I think they're and and and this was you talked about the carriers. I mean, this was the state of of of carriers, you know, in mid mid 2000, you know, the first the odds, is that, you have to sort of sneak you you have to sneak BBM, and the first baby browsers that they had in with a, you know, with a with an update and stick it in through the help menu so that the carriers can catch it.
• 9:06
  Speaker 3: Yeah. I I loved the sneaky stuff that you described, rim doing of, to, to kind of circumvent the restrictions of the carriers installing the software and then asking forgiveness after the fact. Because that that seemed to be a pattern, a pattern sometimes to the delight of everybody and sometimes that really blew up in their face.
• 9:26
  Speaker 2: Yeah. Compare that to tech companies today. They they don't ask for forgiveness after they
• 9:32
  Speaker 3: That's right.
• 9:33
  Speaker 2: We we we want them to ask for forgiveness. We've, you know, lawmakers who are trying to enforce forgiveness on them. But, yeah, anyway, that's I digress.
• 9:42
  Speaker 1: Well, that actually so that that dovetails into kind of an interesting question because as you do kinda get to this unbelievable arc of this rise and and then fall, and I think there there's a lot to learn on kind of both halves of that. But one of the things that we saw on in the rise that I that I personally wondered if we didn't see an echo in the fall is the way that they interacted with partners. And, you know, sometimes it felt kind of, like, age appropriate, but, you know, kind of, like, startup y kind of things that you would go do. But other times, it clearly left some some some more than ruffle feathers. I mean, when they BellSouth thought they had an exclusive deal, and then they didn't.
• 10:25
  And that would that obviously rankled folks at BellSouth. They you know, there there was the Nokia deal, where they the Brim kinda slow rolled Nokia. Did you Sean, did those freight relationships cast a longer shadow, or were those kind of startup machinations that were kind of forgotten and didn't play a role in, in what later happened to Rem?
• 10:51
  Speaker 2: Yeah. I'm not you know, I don't think that, you know, a lot of a lot of people who interacted with with Jim didn't necessarily like it. You know, they didn't, they found him tough and and, you know, who is this who is this little guy with this little company? Oh, well, not little guy, you know, but this guy with a small company kind of acting like a big shot. But I don't think years later, when the wheels were falling off, people held that behavior against them.
• 11:15
  I think there's a lot of stories in the business world about people who are not all that pleasant, on the way up or at the top. And I I do kinda think in the business world, people like that sorta get a pass, as long as they're successful. You know? And and the reasons so so one of the things I think Blackberry put in place in the early days, was, you know, charging this, service access fee, which, you know, by their height was generating something like 2,000,000,000 in revenue. This is like, think think about a think think about it's like a software company today that's generating 2,000,000,000 in revenue with software margins.
• 11:54
  Like like, think about that. How many companies like that are there today? Not many even. And, and and but the problem was that nobody liked paying it. You know, if if you were to snap on the App Store, you know, you were, you know, you you got an enjoyable experience out of it.
• 12:09
  But if you had a Blackberry, you were, you know, it was like being forced to eat cod liver oil. And and so nobody liked that. But I I I don't think that, you know, I I don't think anyone had particularly long memories at that point or were looking to stick it to RIM. I think I think it was just a business decision at that point.
• 12:28
  Speaker 1: Interesting. Yeah. Okay. So they but it I mean, it is also true that I mean, Bosley did not, it didn't necessarily make friends. So, but That's putting it very mildly.
• 12:39
  It is putting it very mildly. And I and I should say, you know, full disclosure, I can make this last time that I have this crazy intersection with the company. I kind of, like, shoot through this story like a shooting star in that I'm that I the joint was briefly contemplated for an acquisition, strangely, and I ended up in being in a meeting with Bosley and Lazaridis. That was very close to the end. So, and as I think as mentioned last time, one of them would speak and the other would roll their eyes.
• 13:07
  So very clear that we were and, actually, Adam and I went through the mails that we exchanged after that and that they exchanged with us. And, Sean, you may be curious to know that Rim themselves likened the company to a house fire. And then they had this strange line that and we think the Joynt folks will understand. And I'm not like, is that because Joynt itself is a house fire or because we are Silicon Valley types who understand the metaphor? Actually, unanswered question.
• 13:35
  It could be either. But the so it definitely saw that that side, but, clearly, also, I mean, just that the the the the rise and some of the anecdotes you tell as part of that rise, again, I find just riveting. And some of these smaller details that you found, like the engineer in San Francisco that is emailing correspondence to get map directions in 1999, which is, like that's another one of your, I think, fire moments. Right? I mean,
• 14:08
  Speaker 2: Yeah. No. No. It's I I I I agree. And, you know, you talked about sort of Jim's sort of, disagreeableness, I guess, in in meetings and with partners.
• 14:18
  But, you know, I know an awful lot of people who used to work for him, both him and Mike, and they would still, you know, proverbially walk through fire for for a year of them. Yeah. I've been Yeah. There's a company actually up in Canada called Magnet Forensics. It's a very, very successful company.
• 14:33
  Jim is the, Jim is the chairman now, and, that organization is stuffed deep with, with Blackberry people. So and, you know, the CEO of Sonos was his, was his second in command, Patrick Spence. And so you've got a lot of these people who, who worked for both Jim and Mike, who I think are still, you know, speaking very fondly of their days and and of both of them as leaders and and and really recognize them for what they were, which were, you know, geniuses for a good part of their time at RIM. And, you know, the story turned, obviously, once Apple came along with the iPhone.
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: Yeah. The story did turn. And, you know, I I think one of the the the exercises that one does naturally when reading the book, Adam, it appears to be the same, where you're kind of wondering when is the time that you would course correct. Like, if you had a time machine, when is the kind of the latest you could arrive and course correct? Because they have a couple of big opportunities to course correct.
• 15:34
  Sean, what what were some of the big opportunities that that you've I mean, certainly, I got my own inference from reading the book. But what was your take on on some big opportunities to get to be able to course correct with respect to Apple?
• 15:45
  Speaker 2: Well, you know, it's interesting because first, you look at the I I think it's worth summarizing the opportunities that were lost along the way. I mean, you know, this was still very, very, very early days in the touch screen phone, and BlackBerry came up with a different idea than the touchscreen we all know today, which was a physical touch. You actually push the thing down, and the entire screen moved down like a giant button because they thought, well, that's the berry that's the black berry take on a on a smartphone. And I think one of the opportunities lost was after that project flopped and all of them were returned, they tried to perfect it. So they did a storm 2 and storm 3 instead of just junking the whole thing and going all in on a on a touch screen.
• 16:27
  And, so so that's one lost opportunity. I think I think they had an argument also later on about whether they should fork, Android or whether they should develop their own operating system. And, you know, that was a lost year, and sort of not realizing that the problem wasn't just a a a better browser. So I think you you sort of watch in slow motion these, like, the years peel by, and to the point where, you know, the BlackBerry 10 operating system comes out 6 years later. And, of course, nobody has 6 years to respond logically.
• 16:57
  But I don't know. I mean, like, I'm actually interested to hear your your take. So I'll give you my armchair quarterback sort of, like, what should Ryn do? If you can go back and Steve Jobs is on stage, it's January 2007, what what can you do to fix Rim? And I I've talked to people, people who are at the company and others who said, you know, the moment that happened, RIM was dead.
• 17:18
  Maybe. Maybe what you do instead though is you immediately cleave off a part of the company and true innovator still in the fashion. You take advantage of a high stock price and maybe you raise a 1,000,000,000 or 2 and buy a, you know, a a decent, so, you know, bring in a a full software company by a software company. Yeah. Give it to them and then say, come hell or high water, we need a, you know, we need a response to this within, you know, x period of time.
• 17:46
  Because you have to remember that Android I mean, Android's ascendance does more to sort of far from a sure thing at the time. I mean, all the telcos were a little freaked out about Google after a bid on Spectrum. Its first phone didn't work out that well. I mean, it's very possible if things have gone a little differently. And then, you know, they found a Hail Mary partner in Motorola, which was, you know, floundering at the time, and they come out with a droid.
• 18:18
  But, you know, if those things don't line up, then maybe we're all laughing at, you know, another failed Google product, but, you know, the naysayers like to pull out every so
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: often. Exactly. You know? And towards
• 18:29
  Speaker 2: the laugh at the second or third most valuable company in the world because, you know, they've had a handful of, you know, not so great successes. That could have been one of them. And then Yeah. You know, until Android and but the thing is, Android then very quickly cements its its stranglehold on the sort of non Apple, area of the market and just starts, you know, knocking off all the other, players like Palm and so on. So so who knows?
• 18:54
  I mean, REM maybe has, like, an 18 to 2 year window to get things right. And it took them 6 years, and by then, you know, the circumstances just were not there for for them to succeed.
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: You get
• 19:06
  Speaker 3: your analysis in the book describing how, you know, apple and Google had all these other ways of monetizing. And in particular, you know, you mentioned earlier where it was getting $2,000,000,000 a year, basically kind of cream off the top. Whereas Google was giving all the carriers the 30% from the App Store. Like, Rim didn't have these complimentary businesses.
• 19:28
  Speaker 2: Yeah. I mean, do you wanna pay $10 in protection money, or do you wanna pay $10 in and get a croissant of coffee? You know? It's like
• 19:36
  Speaker 1: Right. Well and it's it's so interesting you ask about the kind of you so from whatever it's worth from my perspective, I don't think Graham was dead when Steve Jobs announced the iPhone. I think that I I put that the time is being definitely after that. I do think that the storm is really critical. And, god, I I mean, you're telling of the storm I don't even remember the storm coming out, first of all.
• 19:58
  Like, I don't like, so I am not a I was not a Blackberry or a Rimp customer. I don't remember the storm at all, but you're telling of the storm is so vivid that Adam I'm not sure if I'm the only one. I I want one. I actually want
• 20:11
  Speaker 3: I wanna lay hands on it.
• 20:13
  Speaker 1: I wanna I wanna I wanna use it. I wanna, like, be just and I did end up, like, watching a bunch of online reviews of it and the, and then reading the, you know, the YouTube comments on it for even, you know, for for its time, we're we're lighting the thing up. The storm definitely was a a very important moment for them that they really needed to get right, and they definitely screwed it up. And I feel that though they so, Sean, what are the the ways that that I feel that they screwed up? And would would love to get your perspective on this.
• 20:44
  You know, this is a company that had really, pushed its engineering team hard a lot. And but they pushed that engineering team even harder for the storm. And inside a rim, there was a a lot of malcontent around how hard they were pushing folks and that they were rushing this thing to market when it was not up to RIM's quality standards. So the storm was not just kind of ill conceived. It was misimplemented in a way that that that I think conveys panic from RIM where they were kinda go I mean, because they was the you know, one of the stories you tell, Sean, is that their own testing lab found these really serious problems, but they shifted anyway.
• 21:27
  How did folks at RIM feel about that? I mean, did they am I right, first of all, to read in that much malcontent around how a storm was shipped inside of RIM?
• 21:37
  Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, first of all, I wanna give credit to my coauthor, Jackie, who who actually wrote that chapter, and I I thought that I mean, it's one of the pinpoint chapters of the, of of the book. But, you know, I think, you know, I think it was probably a general sense of unease. Like, this was a this was a company where things were always there's a great line, I think, you know, it was always, like, incoming. You know, the shells were always launched into RIM, And this was just another one of those, and, you know, there have been years years of, you know, you're right.
• 22:06
  You have to meet this deadline. You have to make this this trackball work. And and they've had one challenge after another, and I think this one just had sort of it was just one thing too many. But, you know, at least before they've been iterating with not that much competition. You know?
• 22:23
  They didn't have to worry about things like the operating system. Like like, is the operating system sufficient? Of course, it is. You know? Is the email sufficient?
• 22:30
  Of course, it is. Do we have to worry about a, do we have to worry about an app store? No. Because, you know, an app store in 2,006 is, you know, 3 ringtones and Mindbreaker, you know, or or Minesweeper Minesweeper. I I I spent a few hours on Minesweeper.
• 22:44
  I'll I'll confess. But, right, for those of us who actually remember the thing. And so I think, you know, it's just that perfect combination of of of it's too much change. It's too much of a jump. And and and they're also you know, I think the fatal flaw of of the storm is they're saying, well, we're just doing another BlackBerry.
• 23:05
  And so this is the again, this is the touchscreen version of a BlackBerry. People love using clickable phones. They love the sensation of clicking something down, so we're gonna give them that. And and what they weren't saying was, well, you know, we're gonna be reaching an audience 10 or a 100 times bigger than we've ever had before. Many of them probably don't use BlackBerry, so we have to give them something that they're going to love.
• 23:27
  They were trying to iterate from the existing platform to something where the market was going, whereas Apple had defined that market. You know, RIM was great RIM was a great innovator when it was innovating and it was a terrible follower. I wonder if someday we'll say that about Apple, that Apple is a great, was a great innovator but a terrible follower. I mean, that's a that's a, you know, that that's a hard turn for for anyone to make.
• 23:50
  Speaker 3: It's hard to maintain that for for certainly as long as Apple has, but, yeah, for even as long as BlackBerry had.
• 23:56
  Speaker 1: We we did say that about Apple. So Apple was dead on the operating table. Like, the the the Gil Nelio days, we did say that about Apple. And we you know, we've done the experiment of a Steve Jobs less Apple. Although, admittedly, like this I mean, Jobs that I think has been Jobs.
• 24:12
  It it's been gone for over a decade. And, you know, is it a fair criticism of that? I mean, I I think it's actually I don't know. Adam, are you lining up to get the iPhone 14? You're actually my litmus test for this.
• 24:23
  Alright.
• 24:24
  Speaker 3: No. I'm on the fence of iPhone 14. But but you're but you're right. But but some of it's just like, well, how many more cameras can you pack into a phone or whatever? And I'm not lining up for an for an Apple Watch too, but, you know, I'm I'm probably the wrong demographic for that.
• 24:41
  I don't know.
• 24:42
  Speaker 1: Yeah. I knew when I was saying that with my kids and they're making fun of the Apple ads, that the I mean, I think actually, honestly, the fact that Adam's on the with the iPhone 14, Sean, that is your strong sell signal with respect to to to Apple. Because I think I mean, Adam, I mean, you were I I mean, you came up, as a Mac aficionado. You were very early in on the kind of the resurrection of Apple. You were an early iPhone adopter.
• 25:06
  I mean, I think you're a fair
• 25:08
  Speaker 3: Oh, I mean, if you're saying I mean, for months, I know that you thought I was insufferable talking about this iPhone that was coming, and it was gonna be an iPad and a phone,
• 25:16
  Speaker 2: all these
• 25:16
  Speaker 1: things. More like you.
• 25:17
  Speaker 3: Enough already. That's right. But yeah. No. I was I was very into a big big booster.
• 25:23
  I'm still still using a Mac as my daily driver. But, I mean, you you gotta say, undeniably, Apple, independent of the phone or whatever, is doing interesting things and continues to find ways to to resonate with folks. It's really in their DNA. And one of the things, Sean, that occurred, you know, I I don't know if it's too far to say, but Michael Azaridis really felt like the product person, like the person who was who embodied Yeah. The the customer.
• 25:51
  And when it came to the original BlackBerry and and through its follow ons in this, you know, 5 or 10 year period, he just nailed it. Like, he knew exactly what the customer needed, you know, long battery life. These BlackBerrys lasted for, weeks on a single AA battery or whatever it was. It's lunacy. It it you know you you tell these anecdotes over and over again where he doesn't get it and I think you said his parting words you know, from the the BlackBerry board were pointing to a, keyboard, BlackBerry variant saying, this I get, and then pointing to the the, you know, the all glass touchscreen version saying, this I don't get.
• 26:38
  I I thought it was very poignant.
• 26:40
  Speaker 2: But, you know, how many trailblazers or innovators have there been like like, every innovator's dilemma is about, an established organization getting upended. But a lot of those established organizations were trailblazers in their day.
• 26:53
  Speaker 1: Absolutely. Totally.
• 26:54
  Speaker 2: Even even Amazon, You know, I, I talked to a couple of, you know, people who are very senior in the, in the Amazon organization, in the early 2 thousands. And, you know, right around 2003, 2004, I think when Amazon's growth rate was, you know, starting to dip below 30%, That's when, you know, that's when Jeff Bezos was getting nervous, you know, and and I think to start to realize that, you know, we need to find digital versions of know, you know, seller books and DVDs and so on to the all encompassing tech superpower that it is today. And, from my understanding, you know, know, this company, which was not even 10 years old at that time and still an innovator and still driven by the day 1 mentality, had trouble stocking the sort of new organization within the company that was meant to find the the video versions of what they were going to do, the digital versions of everything. So even even the innovator within 10 years, it's not like everyone was jump leaping to get out of the book selling business or whatever and and and take on this, take on this unknown new venture within Amazon.
• 28:14
  Think about that. So so, you know, I mean, Mike was you know, let's not forget and and this is part of the reason, by the way, that Mike and Jim agreed to participate, with the book to the extent that they did. They knew that the fall was not a pretty story they lived in. They'd seen that company's name become a laughingstock in the pages of the financial papers. But they felt like, you know, there was a great story on the way up that had been kind of forgotten, under told, and their sort of arrangement well, not arrangement.
• 28:46
  They're they're such as, well, you know, we'll talk with you and we'll participate in book, but we wanna know that you're telling the story on the way up as much as you are on the way down because it's an amazing story. And we agree. I mean, you know, think about the role that devices played in the average life of the average person, not a tech person necessarily, you know, in in 1995 or 1996.
• 29:05
  Speaker 1: Totally.
• 29:06
  Speaker 2: Yeah. Our average interactions with technology versus today, and how much we live on our phones, and that all happens because of Mike Lazaridis and Jim Balsillie. They this was the fire create, you know, to use that to to stamp that one to death a little bit. But but the the the fire creation of of our era, and it starts with BlackBerry. They were the ones who figured out a way to make handheld devices compelling, must need devices.
• 29:33
  And it wasn't just an moment. It was figuring it was a number of moments and and selling it and positioning it the right way and getting it in the right hands of the right people at the right time.
• 29:44
  Speaker 1: Totally. And and even,
• 29:47
  Speaker 3: instant messaging and, and even email. I mean, arguably, like the proliferation of email that in the integration of email for good or ill into our, you know, constant lives, you know, you a lot of credit to BlackBerry for sure. Well, totally. Yeah.
• 30:02
  Speaker 2: Think about what had happened if they'd gotten BBM right. Like, if they'd gotten BBM right, you know, would it be bigger than WhatsApp? Would it have would it have sort of
• 30:10
  Speaker 1: Yeah.
• 30:10
  Speaker 2: Fended off a lot of the the me twos that came up, everywhere? Think about that.
• 30:15
  Speaker 1: Yeah. I mean, it's definitely it's interesting to think about I don't know how much you have looked into the history of digital of deck, Sean, but I was struck by the parallels between the rise and fall of RIM and the rise and fall of deck, in that and with this case, Ken Olsen the kind of the two halves of Ken Olsen being played by the by Lazaridis and Paasile. But as with Deck, I do think that part of the in in amazing rides and for both of these companies, an amazing rise. For both companies, I think that part of the problem was that and this has definitely happened also in a deck where he spent a lot of time consolidating power in himself and, ultimately, could not get moved aside and was and stayed with Deck too long. And the the the the iPhone the role of the iPhone in the demise of Deck is very much played by the personal computer.
• 31:10
  Ken Olsen dismisses the personal computer. He doesn't believe that personal computing is important. He dismisses it as a toy. I mean, it's like even some of the rhetoric is some of the rhetoric that you hear out of Lazaridis and Bolstoi. And the the I I did so I was left wondering, to me, one of the major problems because I think you're right.
• 31:27
  It is very hard for single individuals to be able to kinda span multiple revolutions. And I view part of the problem at Rim is not really having a bench that was ready to take the reins of that company earlier. And to that, like, one question I definitely have for you is that the co CEO model is, I think, nuts. I mean, I don't think the co CEO model makes any sense at all, but it certainly I mean, I will go put it put it this way. It is unconventional, and it has not been mimicked.
• 32:00
  And I don't think anyone is gonna look at RIM as a case study for the reason to to to mimic it. Did do you think that the co CEO model was part of the problem, or is that just a a a kind of coincidental here?
• 32:15
  Speaker 2: I don't know. It worked really well until it didn't work really well. You know? And and and I think I think that's sort of, I think that's kind of the caveat for the for the co CEO model. I mean, you know, Jim couldn't have done it without Mike, and Mike couldn't have done it without Jim.
• 32:29
  And I don't know if Rim could have been as successful if Mike didn't have an equal voice and see that the table is Jim and and vice versa. And I think they Okay. You know? I mean, it was it was a great partnership, and they would not have gotten to where they were, I think, without it. But, you know, people change, companies change, and then, you know, all this incoming trauma, you know, it it affects them in different ways.
• 32:55
  I mean, Mike is a very you know, he's a religious person. He he has a lot of, he has a lot of faith, a lot of faith in himself, a lot of confidence in science. And, you know, Jim's great at, deking and bobbing and weaving and and walking into a situation and playing it as best you can, you know, taking the Sun Tzu, model with The Art of War. I I I'm old enough to remember having gone to business school when everyone had a copy of The Art of War tucked under their under their, you know, under their arm, but but Jim might be the only one who actually opened the thing and read it. There were a lot of things I saw people talking around in business school that I suspect that they didn't read.
• 33:38
  But, anyway Right. But, yeah. And, you know, I mean, that model works great until you walk into a situation and you have no answer. Like, how do you navigate a patent lawsuit where, you know, you've run you've run out of options and your whole service can be shut down. And Jim had never experienced anything like I mean, that was a, you know, that was a really damaging episode for the company because it really both of them got knocked for a loop by the the impact it had on them at different points in the, you know, in the process, which dragged on for years.
• 34:13
  Speaker 1: Dragged on for years. And it actually brings up another great question, which is the I mean, the entity lawsuit, obviously, horrifying to, I think, anyone in technology. I don't think that I I I can't imagine that Rim was anything other than sympathetic to anyone in technology. This is at a time before, honestly, the John Roberts court had, taken on a bunch of patent cases, and there's a whole bunch of reasons why the NTP case, couldn't happen some number of years later. But the NTP case does seem to have been a, I mean, certainly a distraction, but more than that.
• 34:48
  Do you think that the NTP case, played I mean, if you take away the NTP case, does Rim have a different outcome? Or, is it did that toll, that emotional toll that it take, was that so significant that you think it played an essential role in the challenge that we faced?
• 35:07
  Speaker 2: Well, it's sort of like it's like that when you're playing a video game and one of those sort of punch them up games and and, you know, you sustain a blow and and you can survive from it. But you start to get 3, 4, or 5 blows, and it's it's you know, you've lost your turn. I think I think that was the first of a series of blows. They probably could have recovered from it. I think the stock option scandal was was probably far more damaging because it got right to the core.
• 35:31
  And, you know, it it it it it that's what sort of severed the relationship more. I shouldn't say severed, but it sort of it struck a blow to the relationship at just the wrong time, and it and that was an enormous strain on the resources and the attention of the board of directors right when the iPhone is coming along. So I I think that has the has the probably lands the biggest blow on that company.
• 35:56
  Speaker 3: When you described, Jim and Mike really as 2 halves
• 36:00
  Speaker 1: of a whole, and it was
• 36:01
  Speaker 3: it was a really kind of touching portrayal of them, you know, certainly through the first half. And especially with the way you described, Jim Balsili, I was amazed with the patience and latitude and understanding that he extended to Mike Lazaridis, But it that NTP case must have been I mean, you talk about it as a blow for RIM to sustain, but for that relationship to sustain in terms of, you know, Jim, you know, continuing to extend that blind trust to Mike, did that was that the first kind of chipping away? Certainly, by the time they get to the the stock backdating, options scandal, that seemed to really undermine it. But did that erode that that kind of blind trust or that that two halves of a whole kind of dynamic that they had?
• 36:51
  Speaker 2: I think only in retrospect. I I think I think, you know, after the stock options you know, it's like it's like when you have a fight with your partner or something, and then, you know, you get over it. But then years later, you're you might fight about something else, and you say, well, remember the time you said this? And I think
• 37:07
  Speaker 1: That never happens. I don't know what you're talking about.
• 37:08
  Speaker 3: I don't know. Go ahead.
• 37:10
  Speaker 2: I I'm speaking hypothetically.
• 37:12
  Speaker 1: There you go. Exactly.
• 37:13
  Speaker 2: But no. But, I mean, you know, I think Jim felt like, when the auction scandal came along, I think Jim felt that, you know, he he you know, they they both made mistakes along the way, and Mike's side of the organization had made mistakes that Jim felt he'd he'd his side had built, the company up from. And that was one, but I think at the time it happened you know, RIM thought they would walk in and and win this. They'd hired what they thought was great legal, you know, a a great legal team. They had all this advice, and, you know, it was a very technical thing.
• 37:47
  They walk in, and they're supposed to recreate, the wireless system, I think, using prior art base going back, you know, a decade or 2. And, you know, one of the most interesting things about reading the 11 or 12 days of, of, of that case, so the original NTP case, is actually the jury selection. And I was no. I I'm I'm serious.
• 38:10
  Speaker 1: No. I know. It's the rocket docket. It's so bad.
• 38:13
  Speaker 2: It's the rocket docket. And and it's like, you know, you get the impression, reading it that if someone, you know, knows almost so much as how to turn on a you know, save a document in Microsoft Word that they're they're excluded from the jury. I mean, this was a lay jury of every people. They had to Yeah. Yeah.
• 38:28
  They had to litigate they had to make a decision on a very technical set of circumstances put before them. And so Jim Jim liked to refer to, and he still does. He's he's Jim will talk your ear off about intellectual property. It's a it's a big issue in Canada as well. He's been one of the foremost proponents of, you know, the tech industry up here kind of learning about it and understanding how important, IP is.
• 38:53
  He's helped shape, government policy up here federally. He's still very active on that front. But his view about going into these rocket dockets is it's all about who wears the white hat and who wears the black hat in that sort of, you know, kinda cowboy, cowboy scene. And, you know, know, especially with a a lay jury, who looks like the bad person and who looks like the good person? And here was Mike Lasria saying, you know, like, everyone in the jury knew that Blackberry was a hot thing and, you know, they were reading stories about how it was doing well and sales were going up.
• 39:26
  And and Mike was poor mouthing and and trying to make it seem like they were, you know, less successful, a little more vulnerable than they actually were. And and that right off the bat, the jury, you know, they, they had some doubts about that. But no. I mean, that said, the demonstration that they and this is maybe going a little into the weeds, but the demonstration of the tech was a complete disaster in the court. And that sort of you know, you can't really recover from that.
• 39:52
  No one can anticipate that. There's no real finger pointing from that. You just sort of pick up and try and try and navigate back to It it it it it
• 40:01
  Speaker 1: it it's higher Ronald, Would you mind recounting that demonstration a little bit? We talk just talk about it in the book, but people may be unaware that this actually did get to to a trial and that this demonstration did go sideways. You want to just describe that a little bit?
• 40:15
  Speaker 2: Yeah. It it's it you're testing my memory a little bit because it is a bit technical, but, basically, they had to they were up against this patent troll. It was actually this this this hard luck inventor who he was like a Michael Azeridis who didn't have a Jim Balsili. You know, and and he was he was obviously successful and inventive, in creating, a wireless, you know, in in trying to succeed his wireless email, but all he was left with was, you know, a destitute company, I think, and a and a couple of patents. And, so it was it essentially had been an operating company that was reduced to a nonpracticing entity.
• 40:50
  And Blackberry tried to show in court that, all the prior art existed prior to this patent, to deliver the things that NTP said it had a patent on. And they had this whole demonstration set up ready to go, and, I think they had a problem with the software. Anyway, there was, it's what happens when you Well, those the way
• 41:13
  Speaker 3: the way you describe it in the book, the, they they found some existing some system that claimed to be able to send these emails, and they do this demonstration. And then, I guess, in cross examination or something, Sean, the the attorneys see the time stamps on some of these files on the computer, and they're, like, 2 weeks ago.
• 41:39
  Speaker 2: Yeah. That's right. And and the and the person they brought in to demonstrate it had said, well, I couldn't get the earlier the earlier version of this to work. And the judge got really mad.
• 41:51
  Speaker 3: Well, Andy said, you know, that, not only could it not get it to work, but these helpful RIM engineers came in and helped me get it working.
• 41:59
  Speaker 2: And Yep. And so that whole administration, which was going to be the centerpiece of their case, was struck from the, struck from the record, basically.
• 42:07
  Speaker 1: And I think that it did show kind of a naivete about what the narrative as you say, it's the locket docket. This is in East Texas. Again, this is not possible today because of a bunch of of supreme court decisions and reforms that have taken place, but it used to be that you could kinda pick your venue. And in East Texas, they would you'd you'd pick this narrative of this big bad Neglocorp is stealing this American inventors, you know, this this farmer who in his shed has come up with this great invention, and it's being stolen by the by the large corporation. And, you know, that resonates, in East Texas.
• 42:43
  That resonates in a lot of places, but that really resonates. And they errantly tacked right into that narrative And may they they kind of made themselves out to be who the the kind of the cartoon that NTP was trying to portray them as, and it was just disastrous for
• 43:01
  Speaker 2: them. Yeah. And I and I don't think any of them knew what they were walking into. And, again, they had they had good legal advice. You know, they they hired well, I shouldn't say a good legal advice.
• 43:09
  I don't wanna be a judge of whether they had good or bad. They they hired but the they expensive. They hired a specific yeah. Yeah. I I mean, they did what you would expect, a company to do in that situation, which is to to bring in a big name and anyway.
• 43:24
  But And
• 43:25
  Speaker 1: I think for whatever it's worth, I mean, a lot of other folks learned from that. And, you know, Adam and I were kind of in the, in the extras of a cast of 1,000 in a very large patent suit between and between NetApp and Sun. And, NetApp tried to initiate this litigation in East Texas. And one of the absolutely glorious things that Sun's counsel did as part of this was a countersuit that had a bunch of patents that NetApp was violating, but then also a California statute, an anti competitive statute. And as a result, when and they sued them in San Jose and countersued in San Jose.
• 44:03
  And when the courts kinda looked at this, they're like, well, we got, you know, these federal statutes, but then we got this California statute that we gotta go deal with. So we're gonna toss this thing into San Jose, which is considered to be a total win because it's harder to find that jury in San Jose than it is to find it in East Texas. And, of course, the the but this whole and I think that, actually, honestly, the NTP suit and the damage that that did really cast a shadow and and and caused a bunch of really and all and and then the death of Rehnquist on bluntly because but Rehnquist never took a patent case. So for 30 years, patent law had effectively stopped. And when Roberts became the supreme court justice, he was taking a bunch of patent cases and a bunch of 9 o decisions.
• 44:43
  So that that totally and so I think that there's a bunch about that case that cast a long shadow. The so the the and then the options backdating, you said so that that's interesting that you feel that is, like, the options scandal is kind of the death blow of their relationship is what it sounds like. Is it Yeah.
• 45:03
  Speaker 2: Well, because both of them you know, I think Mike had and this probably gets to the heart of the dual CEO thing. You know? Because because Mike had always felt like Mike and Jim always felt like they could trust the other part the other side of the business to the other person wholly and completely. You know? I mean, Jim never set foot in the lab, and Mike trusted everyone to to be a shark and do his thing.
• 45:25
  And Mike, Mike felt that Jim had, you know, that the options back there, he didn't understand this stuff. He just said, okay. Let's do it. He he didn't know. He was even though he was co CEO, he wasn't sort of up to speed on this stuff.
• 45:38
  And I think he felt like Jim had put the company at risk. And when he had a chance and and Jim felt that he took, he he asked for leniency, which he felt was a betrayal of the partnership. So each of them felt betrayed by that, but they couldn't talk about it for months. So this sort of built up between them. And when they could when they finally did all the last matters were settled with the, you know, with the securities, commissions in the United States and Canada, Jim finally went in and and confronted Mike.
• 46:09
  And, they had a very emotional conversation. But from Jim's recollection, Mike's Mike had less of a recollection of it, but, you know, it it didn't lead to a really satisfying outcome. And and and people said afterward, you know, you know, they kinda kept their fights to themselves a bit.
• 46:25
  Speaker 1: But
• 46:26
  Speaker 2: but they but they would say, you know, it's like, you could tell mom and dad weren't getting along.
• 46:30
  Speaker 3: And that was Oh,
• 46:31
  Speaker 1: you could you could definitely tell that. Yeah. Yeah. So alright. So that's I mean, a bunch of things that are interesting there.
• 46:37
  1, first of all, and I think this is kind of a persistent theme, you have this outstanding reportage from these intense conversations that last reason falsely have with one another. And I've often found that one of them recalls it other than the other. The the the the the the aggrieved party always seems to have a vivid recollection of it, and then it flips. Like, they're not there's not one agreed party for the and the other one's like, yeah, not sure if they remember it or not. Which, of course, I mean, it's as it is in any long term relationship.
• 47:05
  But on the options back, let me ask you kind of a the more of a, kind of a moral framework question. Did they disagree, because honestly, it feels like they did, about whether what Rim did was right or wrong in a in a moral sense, not a legal sense?
• 47:23
  Speaker 2: I'm that's an interesting question. I I I always hate when people say that to me, so I'm sorry for saying that to you. You know, that's that's a really interesting question.
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: No. Actually, I actually like that. I'm not I don't get I get actually get offended when people say, actually, I agree with Brian. That's what drives me nuts.
• 47:43
  Speaker 2: You know, like, everyone was doing it. Everyone was doing it. So it's it's is it right or wrong if everyone's doing it? And, I mean, the thing is I think they were, you know, they they ended up sort of being kind of a the, you know, the the
• 47:57
  Speaker 3: The kind of sacrificial lamb on the side.
• 47:59
  Speaker 2: Yeah. The the head on the pole at the at the entrance to the medieval city, you know, kinda warning warning all visitors. And and I think part of the problem was because this was an email company. You know? The the this
• 48:11
  Speaker 3: Yeah. So they they all the receipts were right there.
• 48:13
  Speaker 1: The the receipt we we we are a receipt gathering company. We have the receipts.
• 48:17
  Speaker 2: Yeah. They they left they left a they left an extensive, as it were, a digital paper trail that made it relatively easy for patient regulators to to sift through, and and make their case. And, you know, I guess, one could cynically say claim their victim, You know? Hold up their hold up their their their prey as a word for them. Well, yeah.
• 48:37
  I mean, the
• 48:39
  Speaker 1: I mean, the victim is a bit strong. Right? Because, I mean, they so my read is that that Lazaridis knew at some level that, like, yes, everyone was doing it. But everyone I mean, everyone was wrong. Everyone was actually doing something that was actually wrong.
• 48:53
  And the and Bosoli believed that, like, actually, everyone was doing it, and we are being selected as a victim. And because everyone was doing it, that, like, that kind of takes morality out of it. That was my read. Is that not is that not a am I overreading there, do you think?
• 49:11
  Speaker 2: Yeah. You know, I I I think that's a fair I mean, you have to remember also what the what the early 2000s were like, 99, 2000. I mean Oh, I remember. Market was too long. Like, how the hell do you price options when your stock is going from, you know, 60 to 20 to a 120 to 7 to 18 to a 1000?
• 49:27
  You know? Like, how on earth do you price do you price options? And I think that was a I I think a lot of companies struggled with it. Obviously, the solution they came up with was not a great solution.
• 49:37
  Speaker 3: But you're right. The the temptation must have been so high when you say, hey, if I had joined 2 weeks later or 2 weeks earlier, you know, I'd be talking about, you know, 5 x multiple on on, you know, the the the difference here. So could we just move this around?
• 49:51
  Speaker 2: It it was a big struggle. I think a lot of companies, and I think a lot of companies had that. I mean, I was actually covering this stuff, 20 20 some years ago, and and it was it was everywhere, everywhere in the tech industry. And and I think it was just one player.
• 50:07
  Speaker 1: It yeah. Actually, for whatever it's worth, Sun, I'm not no. I do not know for a fact that there wasn't, but I do not think that Sun actually got caught up in it. It was it was in a lot of places, but I think
• 50:16
  Speaker 2: A lot of places. It got everywhere, but a lot of places.
• 50:18
  Speaker 1: Well, but I think because people say, like, oh, everyone's doing it. It's like, well, not actually everyone is doing it. And the and those folks that aren't doing it are actually trying to abide by the law. And there's a little bit where I or by by by regulation, anyway. And, I mean, it was it I think people felt like they were in a gray area.
• 50:40
  Enforcement. But, so Tom is so Tom Line's got his hand up. Tom, Sean, just to introduce Tom to you. Tom was one of the early employees, at Sun Microsystems and is a radio around here. So, Tom, welcome.
• 50:53
  Any thoughts for Sean? Thanks to be down good to be on. I was gonna comment that the the ironic nuance of the backdating thing is that it the backdating wasn't illegal. It was the failure to report it. Right.
• 51:05
  Right. Yeah. That's a good point. Yeah. And and so everyone was doing this.
• 51:09
  It's like, okay. I was doing it. But the subtlety was you gotta report it, which nobody nobody did to
• 51:15
  Speaker 2: my knowledge.
• 51:17
  Speaker 1: And the the the sacrificial victim out here was Burkhade. We went after them. Yeah. Interesting. And and that you know, honestly, like, good on the regulators.
• 51:28
  I mean, the way they kind of they they know what is gonna get everyone else's attention is which is I take one of your peers, and if I actually enforce this to the full letter of the law, full letter of the regulation with one of your peers, it's gonna wake everybody up. And it did. Like, I don't think options backdating was not something that is, I think, as commonly engaged in.
• 51:47
  Speaker 2: Yeah. And the thing is, you know, the other thing is I think Jim kind of understood a little bit more, you know, again, the Art of War thing sort of navigating. You know? And and you look at any Securities Exchange Commission action, and there's often a big dance and and the purp walk and all that sort of thing. But at the end of the day, you know, everyone's looking at a settlement probably.
• 52:11
  I I'm thinking is is is is is the strategic thinking there. You know? You know, at the end of the day, everyone gets to walk away. Well, I I can't you can't really say that actually with the SEC stuff because there are there have been directors and and, executives who've been banned from, from running companies. So that that's not always true.
• 52:28
  But
• 52:28
  Speaker 1: Yeah. I and, also, Adam and I dealt with an IBM exec who was doing due diligence on an acquisition of Sun and feeding that due diligence to his, girlfriend who was then feeding it to her boyfriend who was then trading on it. And he went to jail. Yeah.
• 52:42
  Speaker 2: No. It's okay. Yeah. Of course.
• 52:45
  Speaker 1: Of course. So there are there are definitely limits, but, so you you know, one question I wanna ask you about a figure that that features pretty prominently in the book to the point that I think that, you you know, you've even called him the the the third leg of the rim stool in early days is Larry Conley. So Larry Conley comes from Motorola, and, interestingly, like, you I mean, you view him as a a a new kind of engineering discipline arriving at Rim. I wonder if you could speak to to that arrival, what it meant for Rim, and then what his subsequent departure and actually re arrival, meant for Rim some years later.
• 53:27
  Speaker 2: Yeah. Well, he's he's he's old school fire and brimstone. I mean, he's from he's from vintage Motorola, good old fashioned Motorola, where they made tough managers who, you know, there was a performance culture. And, you know, he joins this sort of unruly startup that's, that's figured out how to make people, you know, how to make wireless email popular, but is you know, it doesn't have 1 year targets. You know, if you ask someone when's this product due, someone will say 6 months, another person will say 2 years.
• 54:00
  And, you know, he brings in an operating discipline that is, that is probably essential and needed at the time and is, you know, I think is an engine for the company's growth, but it comes at the cost of, you know, a lot of the the early culture. Right? You know, the the the early engineers. And I'm sure that happens in a lot of companies, that grow up from a scrappy, young, place to. And then I I lost into a into something much bigger.
• 54:30
  And, the thing that that Larry had was, a pocket veto. He was the only other person in the company who could walk into a meeting and say this is the way it is, and everyone would know that he was representing Jim and Mike. The problem was that, you know, he wanted more of that. You know, he wanted to have the role of of president. He wanted to be formalized as the one person, underneath them, but they each had their own COO.
• 54:56
  Speaker 1: Which is I mean, that is a I mean, the co CEO model okay. Co COO model as well. It seems like, wow. Okay. That's,
• 55:05
  Speaker 2: Yeah. And and he and Don Morrison, Jim's CEO, could not have been more different. I mean, it's Jim was, you know, or, Don was a lovely guy, and, you know, everyone would come to his onto his couch to sort of sit down and talk about the world and and and lay out their problems. He was he was a gentle father figure for a lot of people and and and much admired. Larry was tough and respected.
• 55:32
  Good. Probably not loved, but definitely respected. Wildly respected. A lot of people yeah. I'd never heard of him actually, before we started doing, before we started working on the book.
• 55:42
  But everyone said, oh, if you could get Larry to talk, he would be, he he would be great. And, and and, you know, because he couldn't get that one position, which he thought the company really needed, I think he got a little bit frustrated over time. He was getting into his sixties. He had his knees replaced and and decided it was time to to leave. And this was right at the time when things are the wheels are starting to get ready to fall off on RIM, and and they they needed Larry Conley more than ever.
• 56:10
  Not that it necessarily would have fixed everything, but I think it would have I think things really spiraled out, quite badly after he left. And I think he would've he would've I mean, maybe the playbook never would've seen the light of day, or been as much of a disaster Yeah. If he'd been around at that time.
• 56:28
  Speaker 1: Yeah. Interesting. Well and so you as you kinda get to that, like, departure and them, you know, with the storm first and then, you know, the Playbook later trying to respond to to Apple and the iPhone. I do feel that that and I would love your take on this. You know, Andy Grove is famous for saying that only the paranoid survive.
• 56:46
  It you definitely see it in the way that Intel conducted itself under Grove for sure. In that, Intel would have this huge road map lead over AMD when AMD was dead. And they would present you their ongoing road map, and it was like, god. Nobody tell them they have no competition because this road map is so aggressive even though it actually doesn't need to be. Like, they could be relaxing, and they worked.
• 57:08
  This is back before Intel. It had its own, its own decline. But it doesn't feel like RIM had that same sense of paranoia. They certainly and I I I don't wanna I know it's hard to take Apple seriously. A lot of people didn't think Apple was a serious contender, but they certainly did not take Apple seriously.
• 57:31
  Is that a fair read? I mean, do you think that they do they have a culture of arrogance with respect to to Apple? And did that did that impede their ability to really respond to Apple?
• 57:43
  Speaker 2: I I think probably one of the one of the big mistakes they made was was misreading or or or not taking into account how much the carriers would bend, And that changed the game probably more than anything. Because, again, you have to think like like, the carriers were carriers were always terrified of becoming dumb pipes. So they're like, what's wrong with being a dumb pipe when you can, you know, you can pay 5% dividends a year? But but the carriers are always worried about becoming dumb pipes, and so they never really allowed any of the, you know, the the early 2000 vintage smartphone providers, RIM included, to to to have much of an app store, you know, like, who would ever think that the mighty carriers would ever bend the way they did? And so RIM never needed to develop an App Store.
• 58:32
  It never needed to develop a sophisticated operating system beyond the, let's face it, glorified digital radio that was the Ring operating system. Because they'd beaten more complex operating systems that the best of Silicon Valley threw at them in the late nineties and early 2000. And the impression Mike had at the time was that eats up a lot of battery, and it's gonna eat up a lot of, a lot of, the network space. And he was right about both of those things. But but the fact that the carriers then you know, the carriers who are scared of Apple, because Apple has partnered with Sprint, right, on the iPad, and I think that sort of set the game going.
• 59:12
  So, AT and T kinda gives them carte blanche and lets them do an app store. And then Verizon, by the time, by the time they do the droid, says to, you know, you do an app store as well. That would have been unthinkable for, you know, for RIM just a few years earlier. And, and so they'd never had to worry much about because the carriers never wanted them to have much in the way that's in suddenly. It's like suddenly the the the ground gives way underneath you in a way you never would have expected.
• 59:42
  Speaker 1: And that's and that's
• 59:43
  Speaker 2: and that's the carriers teetering. And so, you know, if they had thought you know, if you go back to 2,001, 2,000 and and you tell Jim and Mike, you know, in 7 years, the way the carriers are gonna be is going to change. And, they're gonna let Silicon Valley in the front door, and Silicon Valley is gonna start to call the shots. I think RIM does things a lot differently. But I think I think they believed, you know, and we're used now to for 15 years of disruption of Silicon Valley coming in, and, you know, taking over the car business and taking over the health care business or or trying to.
• 1:00:17
  You know, all these areas where Silicon Valley is disrupting everything at every turn. And it wasn't like that. You know? And and and you wouldn't necessarily have thought that the carriers would have been so vulnerable to and and and would have been kinda handed the keys to to Google and Apple to change to the kinda change the rules.
• 1:00:37
  Speaker 1: So I'm really curious about that because I feel in 2001, if you had said that Apple was gonna be the tip of that spear. I don't know if they would have taken it seriously. It reminds you that scene in Back to the Future when he talks about the Ronald Reagan being president in 1955. It's like, Ronald Reagan the actor? He's like, you're clearly not from the future.
• 1:00:53
  And I I, you know, I kind of wonder the same thing because, you know, something that I had mentioned that was that was very striking to me when I was talking to, you know, this this very weird day at Rim that ended in this meeting with Bosile and Lazaridis where people kept talking about the toy company and of this like menace of a toy company and I could not figure out I mean it was embarrassing. I literally it took me like 3 meetings to figure out who the toy company was and what I was like, Toys R Us declared war on Canada.
• 1:01:21
  Speaker 2: That's some
• 1:01:22
  Speaker 1: ways that I'm that I'm unaware of. And, you you know, is is Toys R Us trying to fish out the cod stocks on the great banks? Because if anything is gonna get under a Canadian fingernails, I know that's gonna do it. But the as it turns out, the toy company was with they mentioned, oh, the Cupertino toy company. And I was like, wait a minute.
• 1:01:40
  Sorry. Is the toy company Apple? It's 2,011. This company is devouring you right now. They are not a toy company.
• 1:01:49
  They are an Apex predator, and you are their prey. And I I just I just wonder if you would have been able to communicate the urgency in 2001. But you think that you you might have been able to?
• 1:02:02
  Speaker 2: It's hard, but remember, there was a lot of innovation that happened that enabled the iPhone to come out. And it wasn't it wasn't a great iPhone either in 2,000 No. Like right?
• 1:02:12
  Speaker 1: No. It's like I get to rehash all these arguments I had with Adam Tell him why his device was terrible.
• 1:02:16
  Speaker 3: It's true.
• 1:02:17
  Speaker 2: But but I but I think that's, you know, that's one of the timeless lessons I think, that that everyone should take from the innovator's dilemma and always think about, like, if you're an incumbent and someone comes along, you know, and they're and they're you know, let's say you're an enterprise and they're they're going after SME or or someone's coming in with, like, bargain basement product and you say, well, they'll never compete with us. Well, no. They're they're claiming a piece of the market that you're not interested in. That's gonna fuel their revenue and growth, and and and who knows what that company can become. And I I don't think anyone should ever, and it's, you know, it's a combination of only the paranoid, survive and the innovator's dilemma.
• 1:02:53
  Like, you always have to be watching and never dismiss anyone coming in with this toy or the 1.0 version because that's gonna get better or the tech might change, you know, the algorithms might improve, the chips might get faster, and and things that you rule out. Well, I I don't need to tell you guys this. This is this is your life.
• 1:03:16
  Speaker 1: You know? This is You know? Yeah. You've lived it, but you've had We've lived this. Yeah.
• 1:03:17
  Speaker 2: We I
• 1:03:17
  Speaker 1: mean Right. I mean, Adam and I literally lived it because we were at Sun at the height, and and we're at the, like, boy, this x eighty's why would one buy an $800,000 Sun server when you could buy a an x86 for a lot less money? And as it turns out
• 1:03:32
  Speaker 2: I feel I feel like I'm innovation explaining here. Sorry, guys.
• 1:03:34
  Speaker 1: Oh, no. No. No. No. Spot on.
• 1:03:37
  It is it is spot on, and I think that you're right that that is I feel that is actually the you know, there are a bunch of, like, lessons in here, but the big lesson from this, I think, is Sean, I think you exactly nailed it. The big lesson is you really do not dismiss that technology on the horizon. You do so at your own peril. And by the time you're actually estimating it properly, it may be too late to really, to truly and meaningfully you
• 1:04:07
  Speaker 2: know, you know, good products help you do something you were doing before more effectively and efficiently, but great products can, you know, significantly transform how a task is performed reshapes human behaviors and economic activity, you know, you get to set the ground rules and standards and establish leadership in the global race, but the race doesn't end. And on comes the next incumbent and, you know, rinse and repeat, and so on.
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 1: Absolutely. And it this was indeed it was a great product. It was a revolutionary product. The book is superlative. I just cannot recommend this book strongly enough.
• 1:04:50
  Adam, hopefully, you didn't think that I I, I I know you might actually agree with Brian on this one that this book is actually it. Folks, you heard it here.
• 1:04:59
  Speaker 3: I actually agree agree with Brian.
• 1:05:03
  Speaker 2: And
• 1:05:03
  Speaker 1: and and we we we would be remiss if we did not mention that this is going to be a feature film. This is Sounds good. Which is extremely exciting. It must be just I mean, that must be very exhilarating for you, Sean, to have a book that is being used as the basis for the big screen. Must be a lot of fun.
• 1:05:21
  Speaker 2: Yeah. It's it's kinda like a a pinch me moment. I mean, obviously, we've we've known about this for some time and, you know, it's it hasn't been our news to share, but, you know, I did get to visit the film set in Hamilton, which is about 45, 50 minutes, or longer with bad traffic, outside of Toronto. And I got to meet the, you know, it's amazing to walk around and and see this, see the set and, like, they you could tell they put a a ton of effort into recreating the look and feel of RIM at Blackberry at various stages. And I got to meet, Glenn Howerton, the, It's Always Sunny in Philadelphia star in character in between takes as Jim Balsillie, you know, with the, Oh, wow.
• 1:06:01
  Batman, and and, you know, it's, 2 minutes. I don't know if you know many actors, but you catch an actor between 2 takes, and, you know, they are in the zone. They are they are in character. And I walked in and, you know, it took my breath away because it it felt like meeting Jim Balsili 15 or 20 years ago. Wow.
• 1:06:20
  Speaker 1: So he really nailed it.
• 1:06:23
  Speaker 2: Yeah. That was neat. I mean, and, you know, it's great to think, you know, we wrote this story, we put a lot of effort into it, and it's nice to know that, you know, it still resonates 7 years later, and it will reach a new audience, and they'll tell their story their way. And, you know, hopefully the film will be a success and bring more readers to the story and just more interest in this improbable great little Canadian company that started, you know, above a bagel store, the old the old cliche, and and changed the world until it was disrupted itself. It's, you know, it was an honor and a privilege to be able to write the story.
• 1:06:59
  And and, you know, I I take some, some great satisfaction knowing that that the story will get to be told, in a new medium for for more.
• 1:07:07
  Speaker 1: Well, the the story will endure. I will tell you that most people would not know who Data General was were not for Tracy Ketterstall of the new machine. So reportage endures, and I think the lessons from this one are are timeless. Cannot recommend this book strongly enough. Adam actually agrees with me.
• 1:07:24
  And so, definitely worth checking out. We're all gonna check out. Wait. We're gonna have to do a a group watching of this thing when it becomes available. But, Sean, I cannot thank you enough for both for the book.
• 1:07:35
  You and Jackie just did such a terrific job and for being willing to to join us here on this circus. Really, really appreciate it, and thank you for all of your the thoughtful insight about the the company and the book and people behind it. Just can't thank you enough.
• 1:07:54
  Speaker 2: No. Thank you for the opportunity, and and thanks for the interest. I really appreciate it.
• 1:07:58
  Speaker 1: You bet. Alright. Thanks, everyone. We will, we we will see you next time when just to tease out a little bit. I think, Adam, we might switch it up and do a, at least a one off for our European friends.
• 1:08:10
  Put up the time a little bit. Oh. Yeah. For your if you're a European catching this, on a recording, I think we might try to do it not at 2 AM your time. So, stay tuned for that.
• 1:08:20
  We'll get to get that out there in the next couple of weeks. Alright. Thanks, everyone. Take care. Thanks again.
• 1:08:26
  Bye
• 1:08:27
  Speaker 2: bye.