Latest / Healthcare Scandal Investigations / The notebook that recorded deaths and forced Bristol to change
Transcript
- 0:03Speaker 1: One infant. Twelve minutes. And the man with the power
- 0:08Speaker 1: to stop the operation chose not to. In January of 1995,
- 0:13Speaker 1: a baby named Joshua Loveday was wheeled into a cardiac
- 0:15Speaker 1: surgery unit at the Bristol Royal Infirmary. His parents waited outside,
- 0:19Speaker 1: in a corridor they had never had a reason to doubt.
- 0:21Speaker 1: The anesthetist already in that room had told the surgeon directly,
- 0:24Speaker 1: do not operate. His numbers were too grim. His concern
- 0:28Speaker 1: was specific, and it was not new. He had been
- 0:30Speaker 1: raising it, in one form or another, for four years.
- 0:34Speaker 1: The surgeon overruled him. The operation went ahead. Joshua did
- 0:39Speaker 1: not survive it. What came after was not a swift reckoning.
- 0:42Speaker 1: It was six more years of silence, denial, and institutional protection.
- 0:46Speaker 1: By the time the full scale of what had happened
- 0:48Speaker 1: in that unit became public, estimates would place the number
- 0:51Speaker 1: of children who died there between 1986 and 1995, children
- 0:54Speaker 1: who might have survived at another hospital, at 170. That
- 0:59Speaker 1: number comes from Lawrence Vick, a lawyer who worked closely
- 1:01Speaker 1: with the families. is an estimate not a case-by-case confirmed
- 1:05Speaker 1: finding but even as an estimate it reshaped british medicine
- 1:09Speaker 1: this is not simply a story about surgical mortality rates
- 1:12Speaker 1: it is about what happens when one doctor keeps raising
- 1:14Speaker 1: his hand keeps filing his numbers keeps pushing the data
- 1:18Speaker 1: in front of the people who are supposed to act
- 1:20Speaker 1: and is ignored year after year for nearly a decade
- 1:23Speaker 1: it is about what a hospital can hide when nobody
- 1:25Speaker 1: is required to make its outcomes public and it is
- 1:27Speaker 1: about what parents were never told and what it would
- 1:30Speaker 1: later emerge was taken from them without their knowledge or
- 1:33Speaker 1: their consent. Before this ends, it will reach a children's
- 1:36Speaker 1: hospital in Liverpool, a parliamentary inquiry described as the largest
- 1:40Speaker 1: ever conducted into the National Health Service, and a piece
- 1:43Speaker 1: of legislation that rewrote the rules of what can be
- 1:45Speaker 1: kept from a body after death. Stay with it. Stephen
- 1:50Speaker 1: Bolson arrived at the Bristol Royal Infirmary in 1988 as
- 1:53Speaker 1: an anaesthetist. He was careful, and he was data-driven. The
- 1:56Speaker 1: kind of clinician who kept records not because anyone required
- 1:59Speaker 1: it of him, but because the numbers were the only
- 2:01Speaker 1: honest language medicine had. In the operating theater, an anesthetist
- 2:04Speaker 1: sees things a surgeon does not always see. The small margins.
- 2:07Speaker 1: The moments where a heart takes too long to recover
- 2:09Speaker 1: its rhythm. The gap between what was promised to a
- 2:12Speaker 1: family in a consultation room and what actually happens once
- 2:14Speaker 1: the child is asleep. The pediatric cardiac surgery unit he
- 2:18Speaker 1: walked into would later be described by the formal inquiry
- 2:21Speaker 1: as operating with laxity. Simply not up to the task,
- 2:24Speaker 1: the inquiry would eventually conclude. Bolson did not know those
- 2:27Speaker 1: words yet. What he had was a notebook and a
- 2:30Speaker 1: habit of watching how long operations took and how often
- 2:32Speaker 1: children did not recover the way they were supposed to.
- 2:35Speaker 1: He began comparing Bristol's outcomes for complex infant heart surgery
- 2:39Speaker 1: against outcomes at other hospitals across the country. The gap
- 2:42Speaker 1: was not marginal. Set against comparable institutions, Bristol's children were
- 2:46Speaker 1: dying at rates that should have triggered an immediate review.
- 2:49Speaker 1: Picture him in 1991 sitting across a table from the
- 2:52Speaker 1: people who could have ordered that review, NHS management, the
- 2:55Speaker 1: Department of Health, the royal colleges, the professional bodies that
- 2:59Speaker 1: govern how medicine is practiced in Britain. He has a
- 3:01Speaker 1: folder of numbers in front of him, weeks of careful
- 3:03Speaker 1: comparison reduced to columns and percentages. He is a relatively
- 3:06Speaker 1: junior anesthetist, and the surgeons whose outcomes those numbers describe
- 3:09Speaker 1: are senior men with decades of standing, men whose names
- 3:12Speaker 1: sit on committees and whose judgment nobody in that room
- 3:14Speaker 1: has ever been asked to question out loud. He pushes
- 3:17Speaker 1: the folder forward. Nothing happens. Not a denial. Not an argument.
- 3:23Speaker 1: No one tells him he is wrong. Something quieter and
- 3:26Speaker 1: harder to fight. A silence that let the unit keep
- 3:28Speaker 1: operating exactly as it had before he walked in. The
- 3:31Speaker 1: same surgeons, the same schedule, the same theater. He goes
- 3:34Speaker 1: back to Bristol. The following week, another child is booked
- 3:37Speaker 1: in for the same procedures his numbers had just described.
- 3:40Speaker 1: He raises it again. The response does not change. The
- 3:44Speaker 1: inquiry would later have a name for the culture that
- 3:46Speaker 1: produced that silence. An old boy's culture among doctors. A
- 3:50Speaker 1: world where seniority bought insulation. where the idea that a
- 3:53Speaker 1: junior anesthetist might be right and the senior surgeons catastrophically
- 3:56Speaker 1: wrong was not a scenario the institution had built itself
- 3:59Speaker 1: to process. Three men sat at the center of what
- 4:02Speaker 1: that culture protected. James Wishart was a surgeon who also
- 4:05Speaker 1: held administrative authority inside the trust, a figure of real
- 4:08Speaker 1: institutional weight, someone whose word carried further than any junior
- 4:11Speaker 1: anesthetists ever could. Janardhan Dasmana was the other surgeon named
- 4:14Speaker 1: in what followed, junior to Wishart but carrying operational authority
- 4:17Speaker 1: over the cases that would come to define this story.
- 4:20Speaker 1: the surgeon whose hands were actually on the smallest and
- 4:22Speaker 1: most difficult operations. And John Roilands, chief executive of the
- 4:25Speaker 1: United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust, was a radiologist by training,
- 4:28Speaker 1: which meant he held medical knowledge and the administrative reach
- 4:31Speaker 1: to order a systemic response, and did neither. In 1994,
- 4:35Speaker 1: while Bolson's numbers sat inside the institution unread by anyone
- 4:38Speaker 1: outside it, Roilands received an OBE, an Honor for Service,
- 4:42Speaker 1: presented to the man who ran the building where the
- 4:44Speaker 1: dying was happening. None of this reached the parents. There
- 4:49Speaker 1: was no requirement, in British medicine at that time, for
- 4:51Speaker 1: a hospital to publish its outcomes broken down by procedure
- 4:54Speaker 1: or by surgeon. A family bringing their infant in for
- 4:57Speaker 1: open-heart surgery had no way to learn that Bristol's results
- 5:00Speaker 1: were worse than Great Ormond Street's, or any other specialist centers.
- 5:03Speaker 1: There was no chart to check, no published table, nothing
- 5:06Speaker 1: to compare against. They signed the consent form. They handed
- 5:09Speaker 1: their child to strangers in scrubs. They trusted the white coat,
- 5:12Speaker 1: the title, the calm and reassuring language of clinical confidence,
- 5:15Speaker 1: because that trust was the only tool they had been given.
- 5:19Speaker 1: If you had been that parent, standing in that corridor
- 5:21Speaker 1: with your child carried off in someone else's arms, you
- 5:23Speaker 1: would have trusted it too. You would have had no
- 5:26Speaker 1: reason not to. That trust was the architecture of the silence.
- 5:29Speaker 1: It was not stupidity. It was the only rational response
- 5:32Speaker 1: available to a family facing a system that told them nothing.
- 5:35Speaker 1: Then came a morning in January of 1995, when a
- 5:38Speaker 1: family carried their son through those same doors, believing, as
- 5:42Speaker 1: every family before them had believed, that the people waiting
- 5:45Speaker 1: inside were ready for him. Joshua Loveday was less than
- 5:48Speaker 1: one year old. Stephen Bolson, who had spent four years
- 5:51Speaker 1: compiling the numbers that said this unit was failing its
- 5:54Speaker 1: smallest patients, told the surgeon assigned to the case not
- 5:57Speaker 1: to proceed. Gennardin Dasmana overruled him. Joshua died on the table.
- 6:03Speaker 1: It reached the press within days. It reached the General
- 6:05Speaker 1: Medical Council. For Stephen Bolson, the man who had tried
- 6:08Speaker 1: to stop it, the aftermath was not vindication. Being right
- 6:11Speaker 1: did not make his position easier. Colleagues who had spent
- 6:14Speaker 1: four years dismissing his numbers did not suddenly welcome the
- 6:16Speaker 1: man who had been proven correct at the cost of
- 6:18Speaker 1: a child's life. His position at Bristol became impossible to hold.
- 6:21Speaker 1: He emigrated to Australia. The institution that had absorbed four
- 6:25Speaker 1: years of his warnings did not reform itself from the inside.
- 6:28Speaker 1: It was forced open from the outside, by a dead
- 6:30Speaker 1: child and a headline. There is a version of this
- 6:33Speaker 1: story that resolves clunely right here. A story about mortality statistics.
- 6:37Speaker 1: About a junior doctor ignored by a senior hierarchy. About
- 6:40Speaker 1: a system that protected its own until it no longer could.
- 6:43Speaker 1: That version is real. The inquiry confirmed almost every part
- 6:46Speaker 1: of it. But it is not the whole shape of
- 6:48Speaker 1: what happened at Bristol, and the rest of it does
- 6:50Speaker 1: not come from an operating theater at all. In 1996
- 6:54Speaker 1: or 97, the record is silent on the exact date.
- 6:57Speaker 1: A woman named Helen Rickard learned something. Her son had
- 7:00Speaker 1: died at Bristol in 1992, three years before Joshua. She
- 7:04Speaker 1: had grieved him. She had buried him, attended the small coffin, believed,
- 7:08Speaker 1: as anyone would, that the ceremony was complete. She had,
- 7:11Speaker 1: as much as anyone can, tried to move forward. Then
- 7:14Speaker 1: she found out that the hospital had kept her baby's
- 7:16Speaker 1: heart after the post-mortem. Without her knowledge. Without her consent.
- 7:21Speaker 1: Without a single word said to her at the time.
- 7:24Speaker 1: That is not a mortality statistic. That is a different
- 7:27Speaker 1: kind of wound entirely, the kind that does not close
- 7:29Speaker 1: the way ordinary grief eventually does, because it reopens the
- 7:32Speaker 1: burial itself, years after the fact. The child you thought
- 7:36Speaker 1: you laid to rest whole was not whole, and no
- 7:38Speaker 1: one had told you that before you walked away from
- 7:39Speaker 1: the grave. Helen Rickard did not stay quiet with it.
- 7:43Speaker 1: She started asking other Bristol families the same question, one
- 7:46Speaker 1: conversation at a time, and the answers came back the
- 7:48Speaker 1: same way, again and again. This was not one administrative mistake,
- 7:52Speaker 1: it was a practice. Children had died. Parents had been
- 7:55Speaker 1: told their sons and daughters were buried complete. Inside the hospital,
- 7:59Speaker 1: in storage, organs remained, catalogued and kept, while the families
- 8:02Speaker 1: who had lost them carried on believing there was nothing
- 8:05Speaker 1: left to know. Out of that discovery, something else happened,
- 8:08Speaker 1: something worth sitting with before the story gets darker again.
- 8:11Speaker 1: Mothers and fathers who had grieved alone for years, each
- 8:14Speaker 1: of them certain their loss was theirs alone to carry,
- 8:16Speaker 1: found each other. Helen founded a support group. They sat
- 8:19Speaker 1: in rooms together and said out loud what none of
- 8:21Speaker 1: them had been able to say to anyone who hadn't
- 8:22Speaker 1: lived it. Parents who had each believed their tragedy was
- 8:25Speaker 1: private discovered they were part of the same pattern, and
- 8:27Speaker 1: that discovery, terrible as its cause was, gave them something
- 8:30Speaker 1: the hospital had never offered them. Each other, and the
- 8:32Speaker 1: plain relief of not being the only one. That did
- 8:35Speaker 1: not stay contained to Bristol for long. When the Bristol
- 8:39Speaker 1: Royal Infirmary Inquiry opened in 1998 under Professor Ian Kennedy, QC,
- 8:44Speaker 1: it became the largest public inquiry ever undertaken into the
- 8:47Speaker 1: National Health Service. It had been convened to examine surgical mortality.
- 8:51Speaker 1: But the testimony it received kept expanding, past Bristol, past surgery,
- 8:55Speaker 1: past the very years it had been asked to look at.
- 8:58Speaker 1: In September of 1999, a heart specialist from Great Ormond
- 9:01Speaker 1: Street named Robert Anderson took the stand. He had been
- 9:04Speaker 1: called to speak about surgical outcomes. Instead, under questioning, he
- 9:08Speaker 1: testified that retaining organs after post-mortem without parental consent was
- 9:11Speaker 1: not something Bristol alone had done. It was common practice
- 9:14Speaker 1: across British hospitals, ordinary enough that no one inside those
- 9:17Speaker 1: institutions had thought to flag it as a scandal. And
- 9:20Speaker 1: then he named one specifically, Alder Hey Children's Hospital, in Liverpool.
- 9:25Speaker 1: That single sentence, spoken almost in passing inside a hearing
- 9:28Speaker 1: room built to examine one hospital, detonated a second inquiry.
- 9:32Speaker 1: For years, The tidy explanation for what happened at Bristol
- 9:35Speaker 1: was institutional negligence, a hierarchy so rigid it could not
- 9:38Speaker 1: process a warning that came from below it. That explanation
- 9:41Speaker 1: is well documented, and the inquiry backed most of it.
- 9:44Speaker 1: But it collapses the moment you look at what came
- 9:46Speaker 1: after the inquiry closed. In 2015, an NHS England report
- 9:49Speaker 1: went back to check what had actually changed since the
- 9:51Speaker 1: 2001 findings. It found no coordinated program of change. It
- 9:55Speaker 1: found that the same concerns had remained. 14 years after
- 9:59Speaker 1: the largest inquiry in the history of the National Health Service,
- 10:02Speaker 1: the system it examined still had not built what that
- 10:04Speaker 1: inquiry told it to build, which means the four years
- 10:06Speaker 1: Bolson spent being ignored, 1991 to 1995, were not a
- 10:10Speaker 1: failure of information. The information was there. It was read
- 10:14Speaker 1: and set aside over and over by people who had
- 10:16Speaker 1: the authority to act on it and chose the quieter
- 10:18Speaker 1: option instead. Dasmana said something to the GMC proceedings that
- 10:22Speaker 1: has survived in the record because of exactly how ordinary
- 10:25Speaker 1: it sounds, how easily it could be said in a
- 10:27Speaker 1: hallway without anyone flinching. Whenever you start any new operation,
- 10:30Speaker 1: he said, you are bound to have, unfortunately, high mortality.
- 10:34Speaker 1: It is the sentence of a man describing dead children
- 10:36Speaker 1: as tuition, a cost of the learning curve, without ever
- 10:39Speaker 1: asking whether the families paying that tuition had been told
- 10:41Speaker 1: class was still in session, or that their child was
- 10:44Speaker 1: part of the curriculum at all. No criminal charges were
- 10:47Speaker 1: brought against anyone at Bristol. the General Medical Council found
- 10:50Speaker 1: serious professional misconduct. Wishart was struck off. Roy Lance was
- 10:54Speaker 1: struck off, and the OBE he had received in 1994,
- 10:57Speaker 1: while the mortality data already existed inside his own trust,
- 11:00Speaker 1: was revoked in 2001. Dasmana was barred from operating on
- 11:04Speaker 1: children for three years and lost his position at Bristol.
- 11:07Speaker 1: Stephen Bolson's notebook, the one he started keeping in 1988,
- 11:10Speaker 1: became the foundation the whole inquiry was built on. In 2013,
- 11:14Speaker 1: the Royal Colleges of Anesthetists awarded him the Frederick Hewitt Medal,
- 11:18Speaker 1: In the 2025 birthday honours, his adopted country gave him
- 11:21Speaker 1: the Medal of the Order of Australia. Same data. Same
- 11:25Speaker 1: numbers he had once pushed across a table and watched
- 11:27Speaker 1: land in silence. 37 years between writing them down and
- 11:30Speaker 1: being thanked for it. At 2001, the Retained Organs Commission existed,
- 11:35Speaker 1: built for one purpose, returning stored organs to the families
- 11:37Speaker 1: they had been taken from. Helen Rickard's support group was
- 11:40Speaker 1: still standing by then, still growing. The Alder Hay Inquiry,
- 11:43Speaker 1: opened that December after Anderson's testimony, confirmed what Bristol had
- 11:47Speaker 1: already shown. that this was never one hospital's failure. In 2004,
- 11:51Speaker 1: the Human Tissue Act became law, requiring informed consent before
- 11:54Speaker 1: any organ or tissue could be kept, and it created
- 11:56Speaker 1: a new authority, the Human Tissue Authority, to enforce it.
- 12:00Speaker 1: The numbers moved too eventually. The 30-day mortality rate for
- 12:03Speaker 1: children undergoing cardiac surgery in Britain stood at 4.3% in
- 12:07Speaker 1: the year 2000. By 2009 it had fallen to 2.6%.
- 12:12Speaker 1: Broader surgical progress across the country accounts for some of
- 12:14Speaker 1: that fall, not all of it. But it moved in
- 12:16Speaker 1: the right direction. after a decade in which the numbers
- 12:19Speaker 1: pointing the other way had been kept inside one building.
- 12:22Speaker 1: Here is what the numbers can not hold. Bert Loveday,
- 12:25Speaker 1: Joshua's father, hanged himself at Winson Green prison in Birmingham.
- 12:29Speaker 1: The record notes depression and trouble with the law in
- 12:31Speaker 1: the years after his son's death. A man who did
- 12:33Speaker 1: not survive the aftermath of an operation he never consented
- 12:36Speaker 1: to in any real sense because no one had given
- 12:38Speaker 1: him the numbers that would have let him refuse it.
- 12:40Speaker 1: Four other parents of children who had gone through that
- 12:42Speaker 1: Bristol unit took their own lives too. These are documented facts,
- 12:46Speaker 1: not estimates. and they sit outside every statistic this story
- 12:49Speaker 1: has produced, because grief does not show up in a
- 12:51Speaker 1: mortality rate, and a support group cannot undo what a
- 12:53Speaker 1: hospital already did. Lawrence Vick's estimate holds one more figure
- 12:57Speaker 1: that does not disappear no matter which argument surrounds it.
- 13:00Speaker 1: Alongside the dead, he believed 25 to 30 children came
- 13:03Speaker 1: through that unit with permanent brain damage, injuries that do
- 13:06Speaker 1: not end a life, but reshape its entire length, and
- 13:09Speaker 1: never once appear in a mortality table. And between 1991
- 13:12Speaker 1: and 1995, The four years Bolson spent raising the alarm
- 13:16Speaker 1: and being waved off, an estimated 34 infants under the
- 13:20Speaker 1: age of one underwent cardiac surgery at Bristol and did
- 13:22Speaker 1: not survive, who, by that estimate, would have survived somewhere else.
- 13:26Speaker 1: 34 children who had not yet reached their first birthday.
- 13:31Speaker 1: Joshua Loveday had not reached his either. He died in
- 13:33Speaker 1: January of 1995, during an operation the anesthetist in the
- 13:37Speaker 1: room had already told the surgeon not to perform. One infant,
- 13:40Speaker 1: 12 minutes, or however long it took, is all it
- 13:43Speaker 1: took to turn a family's whole future into something else.
- 13:46Speaker 1: His father survived him by some years before Winson Green Prison.
- 13:49Speaker 1: His mother's grief was never written into a proceeding or
- 13:51Speaker 1: a report the way the rest of this story was.
- 13:53Speaker 1: Most of what these families carried never made it into
- 13:56Speaker 1: any record at all. What did make it into the
- 13:58Speaker 1: record is this. A unit that knew. Administrators who were told.
- 14:03Speaker 1: Numbers that existed for years before a single family was
- 14:05Speaker 1: shown them. And a system that described its own dead
- 14:07Speaker 1: children as the ordinary cost of learning, without once asking
- 14:10Speaker 1: whether the people paying that cost had agreed to. The
- 14:13Speaker 1: mortality rate is lower now. The Human Tissue Act exists now.
- 14:17Speaker 1: The anesthetist who left his career behind in Bristol holds
- 14:20Speaker 1: two medals now. Helen Rickard's support group gave grieving parents
- 14:23Speaker 1: each other, and it still does. None of it walks
- 14:26Speaker 1: Joshua Loveday back out of that theater, and none of
- 14:29Speaker 1: it returns him to the morning his parents carried him
- 14:31Speaker 1: through the doors of the Bristol Royal Infirmary, believing, the
- 14:34Speaker 1: way every parent before them had believed, that the people
- 14:36Speaker 1: waiting inside were ready for their son. This show is
- 14:40Speaker 1: made by Obomedia.