Latest / Defensive Line Shorts / The Defensive Line Shorts — Episode 1: The British Library ransomware
Transcript
- 0:00SPEAKER_00: Welcome to the very first episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 0:04SPEAKER_00: These are 10-minute episodes that each take one security control,
- 0:07SPEAKER_00: or one historic breach, and work out what defenders can take from it.
- 0:12SPEAKER_00: We're starting with a breach that a lot of people in UK security still talk about.
- 0:16SPEAKER_00: The ransomware attack on the British library.
- 0:19SPEAKER_00: My name is Carter, and I'm an intelligence analyst.
- 0:22SPEAKER_00: My job is the what, the why, and whether it's likely to happen again.
- 0:26SPEAKER_00: And, as ever, I'm joined by Lizzie.
- 0:28SPEAKER_01: Thanks, Carter.
- 0:30SPEAKER_01: My name is Lizzie and I'm a blue teamer.
- 0:32SPEAKER_01: I bring the practical angle,
- 0:34SPEAKER_01: the lessons for defenders and what it really takes to put them into practice.
- 0:38SPEAKER_00: One quick note before we start.
- 0:40SPEAKER_00: This briefing is drafted and read by AI, but reviewed and edited by humans.
- 0:45SPEAKER_00: So, some context.
- 0:47SPEAKER_00: The British Library isn't your local library.
- 0:50SPEAKER_00: It's the National Library of the UK.
- 0:52SPEAKER_00: It receives a copy of every new book published here and holds well over 100 million items.
- 0:58SPEAKER_00: On the 28th of October, 2023, staff arrived to find they couldn't log in.
- 1:04SPEAKER_00: Email was down, so the crisis team met on WhatsApp.
- 1:07SPEAKER_00: The attackers were Reseda, a ransomware-as-a-service group.
- 1:11SPEAKER_00: Criminal affiliates rent the ransomware and share the proceeds.
- 1:14SPEAKER_00: By then, Reseda had already hit hospitals, schools, and the Chilean army.
- 1:19SPEAKER_00: They demanded 20 Bitcoin, about 596,000 pounds.
- 1:24SPEAKER_00: The library refused to pay,
- 1:25SPEAKER_00: and around 600 gigabytes of stolen data was published on Reseda's leak site.
- 1:30SPEAKER_00: The library then did something rare.
- 1:32SPEAKER_00: In March 2024, it published a detailed review of what went wrong.
- 1:37SPEAKER_00: Most of the evidence was destroyed, so initial access isn't proven.
- 1:41SPEAKER_00: But the first unauthorized access was spotted on a terminal services server.
- 1:45SPEAKER_00: That server was installed in 2020 to give trusted external partners
- 1:49SPEAKER_00: and IT administrators remote access.
- 1:51SPEAKER_00: MFA covered cloud services, but not certain supplier connections into the library itself.
- 1:57SPEAKER_00: The review says that decision was taken for reasons of practicality,
- 2:00SPEAKER_00: cost, and impact on other programs.
- 2:03SPEAKER_00: The attackers were inside for around three days before the ransomware went off.
- 2:07SPEAKER_00: They copied whole shared drives from the finance,
- 2:10SPEAKER_00: technology,
- 2:10SPEAKER_00: and They searched staff folders for words like passport and confidential.
- 2:16SPEAKER_00: Staff were also allowed to use work equipment for personal use,
- 2:19SPEAKER_00: so personal files were likely caught up in that hall too.
- 2:22SPEAKER_00: And they used the library's own management tools to take copies of tweets.
- 2:25SPEAKER_00: There were warning signs, too.
- 2:40SPEAKER_00: If that sounds familiar, it should.
- 2:41SPEAKER_00: Ireland's health service executive,
- 2:42SPEAKER_00: hit by the Conti gang in 2021, had the same uncomfortable detail.
- 2:45SPEAKER_00: Early signs that were seen but not acted on in time.
- 3:05SPEAKER_00: That's not a criticism of the people involved.
- 3:08SPEAKER_00: It's what tends to happen when the people triaging
- 3:10SPEAKER_00: an alert aren't security specialists,
- 3:13SPEAKER_00: and nothing tells them what a suspicious alert should trigger.
- 3:16SPEAKER_00: Lizzie, where would you start?
- 3:17SPEAKER_01: With the door they walk through, because it's the most avoidable part of the story.
- 3:22SPEAKER_01: My first move would be to list every way a third party can get into your network.
- 3:26SPEAKER_01: That means remote desktop servers,
- 3:28SPEAKER_01: supplier VPNs, vendor support portals, and remote management tools.
- 3:33SPEAKER_01: Then I put MFA in front of every one of them.
- 3:37SPEAKER_01: Supplier access is often where MFA gets left out because it's awkward.
- 3:41SPEAKER_01: The supplier pushes back, the legacy system doesn't support it, and the project gets parked.
- 3:46SPEAKER_01: The library's own review now says MFA needs to be on every internet-facing endpoint,
- 3:51SPEAKER_01: whatever the technical difficulty.
- 3:54SPEAKER_01: If a vendor genuinely can't support MFA,
- 3:56SPEAKER_01: then consider only enabling that access when there's a ticket
- 4:00SPEAKER_01: and closing it again afterwards.
- 4:02SPEAKER_01: Beyond that, I'd look hard at the recovery path, because this is the real lesson here.
- 4:07SPEAKER_01: The library's digital collections were safe in backups.
- 4:10SPEAKER_01: What it couldn't do was rebuild the systems around them quickly,
- 4:13SPEAKER_01: because many were legacy,
- 4:15SPEAKER_01: unsupported, or simply wouldn't run on modern infrastructure.
- 4:18SPEAKER_01: So the question isn't, do we have backups?
- 4:21SPEAKER_01: It's, can we restore a working service, and how do we know?
- 4:25SPEAKER_01: I'd pick one critical system and restore it into an isolated environment this quarter.
- 4:30SPEAKER_01: Time how long it takes, and write down what breaks.
- 4:33SPEAKER_01: It's usually identity, certificates, or an old dependency nobody remembers.
- 4:37SPEAKER_01: And one targeted piece of segmentation.
- 4:40SPEAKER_01: It's hard to retrofit, but it's worth it here.
- 4:43SPEAKER_01: Stop workstations accepting inbound file sharing connections,
- 4:46SPEAKER_01: using the built-in host firewall where nothing depends on it.
- 4:49SPEAKER_01: That slows down the automated scraping of shared drives we just heard about.
- 4:53SPEAKER_01: Then, keep your management tooling and backup systems unreachable from ordinary user
- 4:58SPEAKER_01: and supplier networks.
- 4:59SPEAKER_01: Those tools are how the databases were copied, so treat them as tier zero.
- 5:04SPEAKER_01: Separate admin accounts, MFA, and a short list of who can use them.
- 5:08SPEAKER_01: And close the gap the ransomware found.
- 5:11SPEAKER_01: The desktops were protected.
- 5:12SPEAKER_01: The servers weren't.
- 5:14SPEAKER_01: If your endpoint protection stops at the workstation,
- 5:16SPEAKER_01: extend it to servers, with tamper protection switched on.
- 5:20SPEAKER_01: It won't stop everything on its own, but it's one more layer the attacker has to get through.
- 5:25SPEAKER_01: The other thing I'd take from this is the first few hours.
- 5:28SPEAKER_01: Their email was gone, so they used WhatsApp.
- 5:31SPEAKER_01: Consider setting up an out-of-band group now,
- 5:33SPEAKER_01: on Signal or WhatsApp, with the crisis team already in it.
- 5:37SPEAKER_01: And for that alert on the 26th, a one-page playbook helps.
- 5:41SPEAKER_01: Something like, if you see this, isolate the machine and call this person.
- 5:46SPEAKER_01: Not just reset the password and move on.
- 5:49SPEAKER_01: A password reset doesn't remove someone who's already inside.
- 5:52SPEAKER_00: And that recovery point is exactly where the story has gone since.
- 5:56SPEAKER_00: Because what makes this case so striking is how long recovery has taken.
- 6:01SPEAKER_00: The main catalog came back in read-only form in January 2024.
- 6:06SPEAKER_00: A proper new catalog with online ordering only launched in December 2025,
- 6:12SPEAKER_00: more than two years after the attack.
- 6:15SPEAKER_00: Electronic legal deposit material came back to the reading rooms in April 2026.
- 6:20SPEAKER_00: The Ethos service, which holds UK doctoral theses, only returned in July 2026.
- 6:26SPEAKER_00: The library's own site still says it's working to restore full functionality.
- 6:31SPEAKER_00: Reseda hasn't gone away either.
- 6:33SPEAKER_00: In September 2024,
- 6:35SPEAKER_00: the Port of Seattle,
- 6:36SPEAKER_00: which runs Seattle-Tacoma Airport,
- 6:38SPEAKER_00: confirmed Reseda was behind an August attack that disrupted it.
- 6:42SPEAKER_00: And here's a familiar detail.
- 6:44SPEAKER_00: The port said the attackers got into legacy systems.
- 6:47SPEAKER_00: My assessment is that the group is opportunistic,
- 6:50SPEAKER_00: rather than going after cultural institutions specifically.
- 6:53SPEAKER_00: Public bodies with legacy estates are attractive because the disruption is so public
- 6:58SPEAKER_00: and so painful.
- 7:00SPEAKER_00: On cost, the widely reported estimate was 6 to 7 million pounds.
- 7:04SPEAKER_00: That's roughly 40% of the library's reserves and more than 10 times the ransom demand.
- 7:10SPEAKER_00: We should be fair here.
- 7:11SPEAKER_00: The library faced problems most organizations will recognize.
- 7:15SPEAKER_00: Tight budgets, aging systems, and difficulty hiring and keeping IT talent.
- 7:20SPEAKER_00: Its own review says the wider cultural sector shares those same risks.
- 7:25SPEAKER_00: None of this was a silly mistake.
- 7:27SPEAKER_00: They were tradeoffs that looked reasonable until the day they didn't.
- 7:30SPEAKER_01: Which is why I'd end on the backups themselves.
- 7:33SPEAKER_01: The library's rebuild plan now includes immutable, air-gapped, and off-site copies.
- 7:38SPEAKER_01: That's a good benchmark.
- 7:40SPEAKER_01: Aim for a world where one compromised admin account can't encrypt
- 7:44SPEAKER_01: or delete every copy in a single session.
- 7:47SPEAKER_01: And if the restore only works because one key person knows how,
- 7:50SPEAKER_01: then you don't have a recovery plan yet.
- 7:53SPEAKER_01: And for legacy systems you can't replace this year,
- 7:56SPEAKER_01: put them on the risk register with a named owner.
- 7:59SPEAKER_01: Make sure the board understands they don't just add risk, they also slow down recovery.
- 8:04SPEAKER_00: So, three takeaways.
- 8:06SPEAKER_00: Supplier remote access needs MFA, even when it's awkward.
- 8:10SPEAKER_00: Backups aren't recovery, so test the restore.
- 8:13SPEAKER_00: And legacy systems don't just raise your risk, they slow down your recovery for years.
- 8:19SPEAKER_00: That's the first episode of The Defensive Line Shorts.
- 8:22SPEAKER_00: For more,
- 8:22SPEAKER_00: subscribe to The Defensive Line Weekly on Substack
- 8:25SPEAKER_00: and wherever you get your podcasts.
- 8:27SPEAKER_00: Until next time, stay defensive!