Latest / Saladin: The Muslim Leader Who Defeated Crusaders — Fexingo History / Saladin's Emirs: The Commanders Who Fought the Third Crusade
Transcript
- Lucas: So far in this series, we've spent a lot of time on Saladin himself — his diplomacy, his intelligence network, his siegecraft. But today I want to talk about the men who actually led his armies on the ground: his emirs, the commanders who had to execute his strategies in battle. Luna: Right, because in the Third Crusade, he didn't win every battle, and some of that falls on his commanders, doesn't it? Lucas: Exactly. And the picture is complicated. We have contemporary sources like Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad, Saladin's qadi and biographer, who gives us a lot of detail on these figures. One of the most important was Qaraqush — not the Fatimid eunuch from earlier episodes, but a different Qaraqush, a Kurdish emir who commanded Saladin's right wing at the Battle of Arsuf in 1191. Luna: Wait, there were two Qaraqushes? I've heard that name before. Lucas: Yes, it's a common name meaning 'black bird' in Turkish. So there's the famous Baha al-Din Qaraqush, the eunuch who built Cairo's walls for Saladin — we mentioned him in the Egypt episodes. But this one is a different man, Sharaf al-Din Qaraqush, a military commander. At Arsuf, he led the right wing of the Ayyubid army, but the battle was a disaster for Saladin. Richard the Lionheart's disciplined infantry and cavalry charges broke the Ayyubid lines. And after the battle, there was a lot of finger-pointing among the emirs. Luna: So who got the blame? Lucas: Saladin's own son, al-Afdal, later claimed that the rout started when the left wing collapsed, but other sources suggest that the emirs on the right, including Qaraqush, failed to maintain order. Baha ad-Din, always careful to protect Saladin's reputation, writes that the Sultan was betrayed by the flight of some troops. But the truth is, Richard's tactics were simply superior that day. The emirs were not used to facing such a coordinated charge from heavy cavalry combined with crossbowmen. Luna: So what happened to Qaraqush after that? Lucas: He survived, and he continued to serve. In fact, he was one of the commanders who held out during the long Siege of Acre before Saladin arrived. But the defeat at Arsuf damaged his standing. Another key figure was Taqi al-Din, Saladin's nephew — we've mentioned him before in the context of the Battle of Hattin. He was a brilliant commander, but he had ambitions of his own. He governed the Jazira region in northern Mesopotamia, and sometimes he acted independently, which frustrated Saladin. Luna: I remember that from the episode on the Ayyubid family. He was the one who was supposed to block Richard at Arsuf but didn't? Lucas: That's right. At Arsuf, Taqi al-Din commanded the left wing, and when Richard's knights charged, his division broke and fled. There are different accounts — some say he was overwhelmed by the force of the charge, others that he deliberately pulled back to preserve his own troops. But the result was the same: the entire line collapsed. After the battle, Saladin was furious, but he couldn't punish his own nephew too harshly. It shows the limits of his authority: he relied on these emirs, and they had their own power bases. Luna: So it wasn't just a unified army. It was a coalition of different lords, each with their own interests. Lucas: Exactly. The Ayyubid army was a feudal host. Each emir brought his own troops, and they were loyal to him first, to Saladin second. That's why Saladin spent so much time managing egos and distributing spoils. He had to constantly reward his commanders to keep them loyal. Baha ad-Din records that after Arsuf, Saladin distributed iqta' — land grants — to compensate his emirs for their losses and to prevent defections. Luna: Did any of them ever actually defect to the crusaders? Lucas: Not many, but there was one famous case: a Kurdish emir named Ibn al-Muqaddam, who had been a rival of Saladin's from the early days. He was a former ally of Nur ad-Din, and he joined Saladin reluctantly. During the Third Crusade, he was suspected of communicating with the Franj, though it was never proven. Saladin kept him close but never fully trusted him. It's a reminder that Saladin's coalition was fragile. He had to balance Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and even some Frankish mercenaries. Luna: What about al-Adil, Saladin's brother? Lucas: Ah, al-Adil was the most trusted. He was Saladin's right hand, the one he sent on the most delicate missions. During the Siege of Acre, it was al-Adil who negotiated with the crusaders, and he even developed a rapport with Richard the Lionheart. At one point, Richard proposed that al-Adil marry his sister Joan — a bizarre offer that went nowhere, but it shows how al-Adil was seen as a diplomat. He was also a capable field commander, though he wasn't at Arsuf because Saladin had sent him to secure Egypt. Luna: So al-Adil was almost like Saladin's second-in-command. Lucas: Yes, and after Saladin's death, al-Adil would eventually take over the empire. But during the Third Crusade, he was crucial for maintaining supply lines. For example, in 1192, when Saladin's army was exhausted and morale was low, al-Adil brought reinforcements from Egypt, which allowed Saladin to keep fighting. Without that, the war might have ended sooner. Baha ad-Din mentions that al-Adil also helped finance the war effort from his own treasury. Luna: Were there any emirs who were particularly loyal, maybe less famous but still important? Lucas: Yes, one I find interesting is Husam al-Din Bishara, a Kurdish emir who commanded the garrison at Acre during the early stages of the siege. He held out for two years against the crusader blockade, even when food ran out. Baha ad-Din praises his steadfastness. Another is Sayf al-Din Ali, who led a desperate sortie from Acre that almost broke the siege. These men are mostly footnotes in history, but they were the ones who actually fought and died. Luna: It's easy to focus on the big names like Saladin and Richard, but the war was won and lost by these lesser-known commanders. Lucas: Exactly. And their rivalries sometimes hurt the cause. For example, during the Siege of Acre, there was tension between the emirs inside the city and those outside with Saladin. The emirs inside, like Bishara, felt abandoned, while Saladin's field commanders were reluctant to risk a full assault. Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani, Saladin's secretary, wrote about how the emirs bickered over strategy. It's a human story: these were proud men with their own ambitions, and Saladin had to be both a leader and a diplomat. Luna: So in a way, Saladin's greatest challenge wasn't the crusaders — it was keeping his own army together. Lucas: That's a big part of it. The Third Crusade exposed the cracks in his coalition. After the loss of Acre in 1191, several emirs wanted to retreat to Egypt, but Saladin insisted on continuing the war. He had to use his personal authority and the rhetoric of jihad to keep them in the field. And he succeeded, just barely. The Treaty of Jaffa in 1192 was almost as much a victory of his diplomacy with his own emirs as it was with Richard. Luna: What happened to these emirs after the war? Lucas: Many of them survived and continued to serve under Saladin's successors. Taqi al-Din died in 1191, just before the end of the war, from illness. Qaraqush outlived Saladin and served under al-Adil. But the unity they had under Saladin didn't last. After his death, his sons and brothers fought for power, and the same emirs chose sides. The Ayyubid empire fragmented, and the crusaders were able to recapture some territory in the 13th century. So the story of these commanders is also the story of the empire's fragility. Luna: It's a reminder that Saladin's success was built on personal relationships as much as military might. Lucas: Absolutely. And when we read Baha ad-Din or Imad ad-Din, we see Saladin constantly meeting with his emirs, consulting them, rewarding them, sometimes scolding them. He knew that his power depended on their loyalty. The next time you think of the Third Crusade, remember that behind Saladin's victories and defeats were dozens of commanders with their own stories, their own pride, and their own sacrifices.