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042 - Xlii That God Is One · Summa Contra Gentiles, First Book (On God)

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  Speaker 1: Chapter forty two of Suma Contragentilees, First Book on God
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  Speaker 1: by Saint Thomas aquinas translated by the Fathers of the
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  Speaker 1: English Dominican Province. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
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  Speaker 1: Chapter forty two. That God is one. Having proved the foregoing,
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  Speaker 1: it is manifest that there is only one God. For
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  Speaker 1: it is impossible that there be two sovereign goods, since
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  Speaker 1: that which is ascribed to a thing by way of
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  Speaker 1: superabundance is to be found in one alone. Now God
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  Speaker 1: is the sovereign good, as we have shown. Therefore God
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  Speaker 1: is one. Further, we have shown that God is absolutely perfect,
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  Speaker 1: and that he lacks no perfection. If then there be
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  Speaker 1: several gods, it follows that there are several such like
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  Speaker 1: perfect things. But that is impossis, for if none of
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  Speaker 1: them lacks any perfection, nor has any admixture of imperfection,
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  Speaker 1: which is required for anything to be simply perfect, there
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  Speaker 1: will be nothing by which they can be distinguished. Therefore
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  Speaker 1: it is impossible that there be several gods. Again, that
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  Speaker 1: which is sufficiently done, if it be supposed to be
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  Speaker 1: done by one, is better done by one than by many.
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  Speaker 1: Now the order of things is the best possible, since
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  Speaker 1: the potency of the first agent does not fail the
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  Speaker 1: potentiality of things for perfection, and all things are sufficiently
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  Speaker 1: perfected by referring them to one first principle. Therefore, a
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  Speaker 1: plurality of principles is inadmissible. Moreover, it is impossible for
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  Speaker 1: one continual and regular movement to proceed from several movers,
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  Speaker 1: for if they move together, none of them is a
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  Speaker 1: perfect mover, but altogether take the place of one perfect mover,
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  Speaker 1: which does not apply to the first mover, since the
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  Speaker 1: perfect precedes the imperfect. If, however, they move not together,
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  Speaker 1: each of them is at one time moving and at
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  Speaker 1: another time not. Whence, it follows that the movement is
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  Speaker 1: neither continuous nor regular, because movement that is continuous and
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  Speaker 1: one is from one mover. Moreover, a mover that is
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  Speaker 1: not always moving is found to move irregularly, as evidenced
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  Speaker 1: by movers of lower degree, wherein violent movement is intense
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  Speaker 1: at first and slackens at the end, while natural movement
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  Speaker 1: is the reverse. On the other hand, the first movement
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  Speaker 1: is one and continuous, as was proved by the philosophers. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: its first mover must needs be one Again, corporeal substance
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  Speaker 1: is directed to spiritual substance as its good, for there
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  Speaker 1: is in the latter a fuller goodness to which corporeal
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  Speaker 1: substance seeks to be likened, since whatever exists desires to
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  Speaker 1: attain the greatest good. As far as possible, Now, all
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  Speaker 1: movements of the corporeal creature are found to be reduced
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  Speaker 1: to one first movement, beside which there is no other
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  Speaker 1: first movement not reducible to it. Therefore, beside the spiritual substance,
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  Speaker 1: which is the end of the first movement, there is
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  Speaker 1: no other that cannot be reduced to it. Now under
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  Speaker 1: this name we understand God. Therefore there is only one God. Moreover,
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  Speaker 1: the mutual order of all divers things that are directed
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  Speaker 1: to each other is on account of their order towards
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  Speaker 1: some one thing, even as the mutual order of the
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  Speaker 1: parts of an army is on account of the order
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  Speaker 1: of the whole army to the commander in chief. For
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  Speaker 1: that certain diverse things be united together in some relationship
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  Speaker 1: cannot result from their own natures as distinct from one another,
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  Speaker 1: because from this they would rather result distinction among them.
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  Speaker 1: Nor can it result from different causes of order because
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  Speaker 1: these could not possibly of themselves, as differing from one another,
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  Speaker 1: have one order in view. Accordingly, either the mutual order
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  Speaker 1: of many is accidental, or it must be reduced to one,
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  Speaker 1: first cause of that order, who sets all in order
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  Speaker 1: towards the end which he intends. Now, all the parts
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  Speaker 1: of this world are observed to be ordered to one
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  Speaker 1: another in so far as certain things are aided by
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  Speaker 1: certain others. Thus the lower bodies are moved by the higher,
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  Speaker 1: and the latter by incorporeal substances, as shown above. Nor
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  Speaker 1: is this accidental, since it happens always or for the
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  Speaker 1: most part. Wherefore, this world has but one director and governor.
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  Speaker 1: But there is no other world besides this. Therefore there
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  Speaker 1: is but one governor of the universe, and in him
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  Speaker 1: we call God. Again, if there be two things, both
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  Speaker 1: of which are of necessity, they must needs agree in
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  Speaker 1: the intention of the necessity of being. It follows therefore
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  Speaker 1: that they must be differentiated by something added either to
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  Speaker 1: one or to the both of them, and consequently that
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  Speaker 1: either one is composite or both. Now, no composite thing
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  Speaker 1: exists necessarily per se, as we have proved above. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: there cannot possibly be several things, each of which exists necessarily,
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  Speaker 1: and consequently, neither can there be several gods. Moreover, that
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  Speaker 1: in which they differ on the supposition that they agree
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  Speaker 1: in the necessity of being is either required as a
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  Speaker 1: compliment in some way to this necessity of being, or
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  Speaker 1: is not required. If not, it follows that it is accidental,
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  Speaker 1: because whatever is added to a thing that has nothing
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  Speaker 1: to do with its being is an accident. Therefore, this
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  Speaker 1: accident has a cause, and this cause is either the
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  Speaker 1: essence of that which exists of necessity, or something else.
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  Speaker 1: If it is its essence, Since the very necessity of
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  Speaker 1: being is its essence as shown above, the necessity of
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  Speaker 1: being will be the cause of that accident. But necessity
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  Speaker 1: of being is found in both. Therefore both have that accident,
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  Speaker 1: and consequently are not differentiated. Thereby, if, however, the cause
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  Speaker 1: of this accident be something else, it follows that unless
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  Speaker 1: this something else exists, this accident would not exist, and
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  Speaker 1: without this accident there would not be the aforesaid distinction. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: without that something else, these two things that are supposed
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  Speaker 1: to exist of necessity would be not two but one. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: the proper being of both is dependent on a third,
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  Speaker 1: and consequently, neither of them exists necessarily per se. If,
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  Speaker 1: on the other hand, that in which they differ be
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  Speaker 1: necessary as a compliment to their necessity of being, this
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  Speaker 1: will be either because it is included in the notion
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  Speaker 1: of the necessity of being as animate is included in
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  Speaker 1: the definition of animal, or because necessity of being, as
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  Speaker 1: specified thereby as animal is completed by rational. In the
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  Speaker 1: first case, it follows that wherever there is no necessity
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  Speaker 1: of being, there is that which is included in its notion. Thus,
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  Speaker 1: to whatever we can apply animal, we can apply animate.
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  Speaker 1: And thus, since we ascribe necessity of being to both
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  Speaker 1: the aforesaid, they cannot be differentiated thereby. In the second case,
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  Speaker 1: this is again impossible, for the difference that specifies a
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  Speaker 1: genus does not complete the generic idea, but the genus
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  Speaker 1: acquires thereby being in act, because the notion of animal
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  Speaker 1: is complete before the addition of rational, although animal cannot
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  Speaker 1: be an act except be either rational or irrational. Now
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  Speaker 1: this is impossible for two reasons. First, because the quidity
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  Speaker 1: of that which has being of necessity is its being,
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  Speaker 1: as we have proved above. Secondly, because thus necessary being
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  Speaker 1: would acquire being from something else, which is impossible. Therefore
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  Speaker 1: it is impossible to have several things, each of which
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  Speaker 1: as necessary being per se. Further, if there be two gods,
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  Speaker 1: this word God is predicated of both, either unifically or equivocally.
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  Speaker 1: If equivocally, this is beside the present question, for nothing
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  Speaker 1: prevents anything receiving an equivocal name if the usual mode
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  Speaker 1: of speech allow. If however, it be predicated unifically, it
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  Speaker 1: must be said of both in the same sense. And
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  Speaker 1: thus it follows that in both there is the same
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  Speaker 1: nature in common. Either therefore this nature is in both
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  Speaker 1: according to the same being, or else it is in
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  Speaker 1: according to different beings. If according to one being, it
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  Speaker 1: follows that they are not two, but only one. For
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  Speaker 1: two things have not one being if they differ substantially. If, however,
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  Speaker 1: there is a different being in both, the quidity of
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  Speaker 1: neither will be its own being. But we must admit
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  Speaker 1: this to be the case of God, as we have proved. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: neither of them is what we understand by the name
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  Speaker 1: of God. And consequently it is impossible to admit the
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  Speaker 1: existence of two gods. Again, none of the things that
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  Speaker 1: belong to a particular signet thing as such can possibly
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  Speaker 1: belong to another, because the singularity of a particular thing
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  Speaker 1: belongs to no other but the singular thing itself. Now,
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  Speaker 1: its necessity of being belongs to that which is of necessity,
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  Speaker 1: inasmuch as it is the signet thing. Therefore it cannot
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  Speaker 1: possibly belong to any other thing. And thus it is
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  Speaker 1: impossible that there be several things, each of which exists
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  Speaker 1: of necessity. Therefore it is impossible that there be several
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  Speaker 1: gods Ods. Proof of the middle proposition. If that which
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  Speaker 1: is of necessity is not this signet thing as being
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  Speaker 1: of necessity, it follows that the designation of its being
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  Speaker 1: is not necessary in itself, but depends on something else. Now,
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  Speaker 1: a thing, according as it is in act, is distinct
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  Speaker 1: from all else, and this is to be this signet thing. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: that which is of necessity depends on something else for
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  Speaker 1: being an act, and this is contrary to the notion
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  Speaker 1: of that which is of necessity. Therefore, that which is
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  Speaker 1: of necessity must be of necessity according as it is
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  Speaker 1: this signet thing. Again, the nature signified by this word
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  Speaker 1: God is individualized either by itself in this God or
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  Speaker 1: by something else. If by something else, there must be
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  Speaker 1: composition Therein, if by itself, it follows that it cannot
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  Speaker 1: be applied to another, For that which is the principle
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  Speaker 1: of individualization cannot be common to several. Therefore, it is
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  Speaker 1: impossible that there be several gods. Moreover, if there be
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  Speaker 1: several gods, it follows that the divine nature is not
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  Speaker 1: identically the same in each. Therefore, there must be something
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  Speaker 1: to distinguish the divine nature in this one and that one.
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  Speaker 1: But this is impossible, since the divine nature receives no addition,
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  Speaker 1: whether of essential or of accidental differences, as proved above.
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  Speaker 1: Nor is the divine nature the form of any matter
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  Speaker 1: so as to be divided, as the matter is divided. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: there cannot possibly be several gods. Again, the being proper
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  Speaker 1: to each thing is but one. Now God is himself,
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  Speaker 1: his very being is shown above. Therefore there can be
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  Speaker 1: but one God. Further, a thing has being according as
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  Speaker 1: it has unity. Wherefore everything shuns division so far as
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  Speaker 1: it can lest. It thus tend to not being. But
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  Speaker 1: the divine nature surpasses all in having being. Therefore there
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  Speaker 1: is supreme unity. Therein, therefore it is no wise divided
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  Speaker 1: into several. Moreover, we observe that in every genus multitude
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  Speaker 1: proceeds from some kind of unity. Wherefore, in every genus
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  Speaker 1: we find one first thing, which is the measure of
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  Speaker 1: all things found in that genus. Hence, whatever things we
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  Speaker 1: find agreeing in one point must proceed from sis one principle.
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  Speaker 1: Now all things agree in the point of being. Therefore,
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  Speaker 1: that which is the principle of all things must needs
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  Speaker 1: be one only. And this is God. Again, in every government,
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  Speaker 1: he who presides desires unity. Wherefore the chief form of
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  Speaker 1: government is a monarchy or kingdom. And of our many
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  Speaker 1: members there is one head. And this is an evident
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  Speaker 1: sign that unity is due to whom headship is becoming.
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  Speaker 1: Wherefore we must confess that God, who is the cause
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  Speaker 1: of all, is simply one. We can moreover infer this
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  Speaker 1: confession of the divine unity from the sacred oracles. For
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  Speaker 1: it is said in Deuteronomy six four here o Israel,
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  Speaker 1: the Lord, thy God is one, and in Exodus twenty three,
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  Speaker 1: thou shalt not have strange gods before me, and in
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  Speaker 1: Ephesians four five, one Lord, one faith, et cetera. By
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  Speaker 1: this truth, the Heathens who believe in many gods are refuted,
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  Speaker 1: and yet several of them affirmed the existence of one
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  Speaker 1: supreme God, by whom they asserted that the others, whom
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  Speaker 1: they called gods, were caused, for they ascribed the Godhead
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  Speaker 1: to all eternal substances, especially by reason of wisdom, felicity,
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  Speaker 1: and governance of the universe. This mode of expression is
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  Speaker 1: found even in holy writ where holy angels or men
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  Speaker 1: or judges are called gods, as in the words of
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  Speaker 1: the Psalm there is none among the gods like unto
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  Speaker 1: thee O Lord. And again I have said you are gods.
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  Speaker 1: And many like passages are found throughout scripture. Wherefore the
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  Speaker 1: Manicheis would seem yet more opposed to this truth, since
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  Speaker 1: they assert two first principles, the one of which is
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  Speaker 1: not the cause of the other. The Aryans too impugned
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  Speaker 1: this truth by their errors, since they asserted that the
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  Speaker 1: Father and the Son are not one but distinct gods,
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  Speaker 1: and yet were compelled by the authority of scripture to
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  Speaker 1: confess that the Son is true God. End of Chapter
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  Speaker 1: forty two, read by Michael Shane, Craig, Lambert Elsie