Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2003] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:062003 was $13.6 billion, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value off both our Class A and Class B stock by 21%.
- 0:15Over the last 39 years, that is since present management took
- 0:20over, per share book value has grown from $19.00 to $50,498, a
- 0:26rate of 22.2% compounded annually.
- 0:29It's per share intrinsic value that counts, however, not book
- 0:33value. Here the news is good.
- 0:36Between 1964 and 2003, Berkshire morphed from a struggling
- 0:40northern textile business who's intrinsic value was less than
- 0:44book into a widely diversified enterprise worth far more than
- 0:48book. Our 39 year gain and intrinsic
- 0:51value has therefore somewhat exceeded our 22.2% gain in book.
- 0:56For a better understanding of intrinsic value and the economic
- 0:59principles that guide Charlie Munger, my partner in
- 1:02Berkshire's Vice Chairman and me and running Berkshire, please
- 1:06read our owner's manual beginning on page 69.
- 1:10Despite their shortcomings, book value calculations are useful at
- 1:14Berkshire as a slightly understated gauge for measuring
- 1:17the long term rate of increase in our intrinsic value.
- 1:21The calculation is less relevant, however, than it once
- 1:25was in rating any single year's performance versus the S&P 500
- 1:29index, a comparison we display on the facing page.
- 1:33Our equity holdings, including convertible preferreds, have
- 1:37fallen considerably as a percentage of our net worth,
- 1:40from an average of 114% in the 1980s, for example, to an
- 1:46average of 50% in 2000 to 2003. Therefore, yearly movements in
- 1:51the stock market now it affect a much smaller portion of our net
- 1:55worth than was once the case. Nonetheless, Berkshire's long
- 1:58term performance versus the S&P remains all important.
- 2:02Our shareholders can buy the S&P through an index fund at very
- 2:07low cost unless we achieve gains in per share intrinsic value in
- 2:11the future that outdo the S and PS performance.
- 2:15Charlie and I will be adding nothing to what you can
- 2:18accomplish on your own. If we fail, we will have no
- 2:21excuses. Charlie and I operate in an
- 2:23ideal environment. To begin with, we are supported
- 2:27by an incredible group of men and women who run our operating
- 2:31units. If there were a corporate
- 2:33Cooperstown, it's roster would surely include many of our CE
- 2:37OS. Any shortfall in Berkshires
- 2:39results will not be caused by our managers.
- 2:42Additionally, we enjoy a rare sort of managerial freedom.
- 2:45Most companies are saddled with institutional constraints.
- 2:49A company's history, for example, it may commit it to an
- 2:52industry that now offers limited opportunity.
- 2:56A more common problem is a shareholder constituency that
- 2:59pressures its manager to dance to Wall Street's tune.
- 3:02Many CEOs resist, but others give in and adopt operating and
- 3:06capital allocation policies far different from those they would
- 3:10choose if left to themselves. At Berkshire, neither history
- 3:14nor the demands of owners impede intelligent decision making.
- 3:18When Charlie and I make mistakes, they are in tennis
- 3:21parlance, on forced errors. All figures used in this report
- 3:24apply to Berkshires. A shares, the successor to the
- 3:27only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996.
- 3:32The B shares have an economic interest equal to 130th that of
- 3:37BA3 operating earnings When valuations are similar.
- 3:41We strongly prefer owning businesses to owning stocks.
- 3:45During most of our years of operation, however, stocks were
- 3:49much the cheaper choice. We therefore sharply tilted our
- 3:53asset allocation in those years toward equities, as illustrated
- 3:57by the percentages cited earlier.
- 3:59In recent years, however, we found it hard to find
- 4:03significantly undervalued stocks, a difficulty greatly
- 4:06accentuated by the mushrooming of the funds we must deploy
- 4:10today. The number of stocks that it can
- 4:12be purchased in large enough quantities to move the
- 4:15performance needle at Berkshire is a small fraction of the
- 4:18number that existed A decade ago.
- 4:21Investment managers often profit far more from piling up assets
- 4:25than from handling those assets well.
- 4:27So when one tells you that increased funds won't hurt his
- 4:30investment performance, step back.
- 4:33His nose is about to grow. The shortage of attractively
- 4:36priced stocks in which we can put large sums doesn't bother
- 4:39us, providing we can find companies to purchase that one
- 4:42have favorable and enduring economic.
- 4:44Carrick Touristics 2 are run by talented and honest managers,
- 4:49and three are available at a sensible price.
- 4:52We have purchased a number of such businesses in recent years,
- 4:56though not enough to fully employ the gusher off cash that
- 4:59has come our way. In buying businesses, I've made
- 5:02some terrible mistakes, both of Commission and omission.
- 5:05Overall, however, our acquisitions have led to decent
- 5:09gains in per share earnings. Below is a table that quantifies
- 5:13that point. But first we need to warn you
- 5:15that growth rate presentations can be significantly distorted
- 5:19by a calculated selection of either initial or terminal
- 5:22dates. For example, if earnings are
- 5:25tiny in a beginning year, a long term performance that was only
- 5:28mediocre can be made to appear sensational.
- 5:32That kind of distortion can come about because the company at
- 5:35issue was minuscule in the base year, which means that only a
- 5:38handful of insiders actually benefited from the touted
- 5:42performance, or because a larger company was then operating at
- 5:45just above break even. Picking a terminal year that is
- 5:48particularly buoyant will also favorably bias a calculation of
- 5:52growth. The Berkshire Hathaway that
- 5:54present management assumed control of a 1965 had long been
- 5:59sizable. But in 1964, it earned only
- 6:03$175,586, or $0.15 per share, so close to break even that any
- 6:10calculation of earnings growth from that base would be
- 6:13meaningless. At the time, however, even those
- 6:17meager earnings looked good. Over the decade following the
- 6:201955 merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway
- 6:24Manufacturing, the combined operation had lost $10.1
- 6:28million, and many thousands of employees had been let go.
- 6:32It was not a marriage made in heaven.
- 6:34Against this background, we give you a picture of Berkshire's
- 6:37earnings growth that begins in 1968 but also includes
- 6:41subsequent base years spaced five years.
- 6:45A series of calculations is presented so that you can decide
- 6:48for yourself which period is most meaningful.
- 6:51I've started with 1968 because it was the first full year we
- 6:55operated National Indemnity, the initial acquisition we made as
- 6:59we began to expand Berkshires business.
- 7:02I don't believe that using 2003 as the terminal year distorts
- 7:06our calculations. It was a terrific year for our
- 7:10insurance business, but the big boost that gave to earnings was
- 7:13largely offset by the pathetically low interest rates
- 7:16we earned on our large holdings of cash equivalents, a condition
- 7:20that will not last. All figures shown below, it
- 7:23should be noted, exclude capital gains, operating earnings,
- 7:27operating earnings subsequent compounded year in dollars
- 7:31millions per share in dollars growth rate of per share
- 7:34earnings. 1964 point 2.15 not meaningful 1964 to 2319 Sixty
- 7:4282.72.6922.8 percent 1968 to 2003.
- 7:49Nineteen 7311.912.1820.8 percent 1973 to 2319.
- 7:57Seventy 830 point zero. 29.1521 Point one percent 1978 to 2003
- 8:053198348.645.6024.3 percent 1983 to 2003 nineteen 88313 Point
- 8:16four 273.3718 Point 6 percent 1988 to 2003 nineteen 93477.8
- 8:27four. 113.1923 Point 9 percent 1993 to 2003 Nineteen 98.1
- 8:351277.01000 and 20.4928 point 2 percent 1998 to 2003 2003 5422
- 8:46point zero 3531.324 We will continue the capital allocation
- 8:53practices we have used in the past.
- 8:56If stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses,
- 8:59we will buy them aggressively. If selected bonds become
- 9:03attractive, as they did in 2002, we will again load up on these
- 9:07securities. Under any market or economic
- 9:11conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our
- 9:14standards and for those that do, the bigger the better.
- 9:18Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen
- 9:21periodically. It's a painful condition to be
- 9:24and but not as painful as doing something stupid.
- 9:27I speak from experience. Overall, we are certain
- 9:30Berkshire's performance in the future will fall far short of
- 9:33what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I
- 9:37remain hopeful that we can deliver results that are
- 9:39modestly above average. That's what we're being paid for
- 9:43acquisitions. As regular readers know, our
- 9:46acquisitions have often come about in strange ways.
- 9:50None, however, had a more unusual genesis than our
- 9:53purchase last year of Clayton Homes.
- 9:55The unlikely source was a group of finance students from the
- 9:59University of Tennessee and their teacher, Doctor Al Aksir.
- 10:03For the past five years, Al has brought his class to Omaha,
- 10:07where the group tours Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheims,
- 10:11eats at Goritz, and then comes to Kiewit Plaza for a session
- 10:14with me. Usually about 40 students
- 10:17participate. After two hours of give and
- 10:20take, the group traditionally presents me with a thank you
- 10:23gift. The doors stay locked until they
- 10:25do. In past years, it's been items
- 10:27such as a football sign by Phil Fulmer and a basketball from
- 10:31Tennessee's famous women's team. This past February, the group
- 10:35opted for a book, which, luckily for me, was the recently
- 10:39published autobiography of Jim Clayton, founder of Clayton
- 10:42Homes. I already knew the company to be
- 10:45the class act of the manufactured housing industry,
- 10:48knowledge I acquired after earlier making the mistake of
- 10:51buying some distressed junk debt of Oakwood Homes, one of the
- 10:55industry's largest companies. At the time of that purchase, I
- 10:59did not understand how atrocious consumer financing practices had
- 11:03become throughout most of the manufactured housing industry,
- 11:07but I learned Oakwood rather promptly went bankrupt.
- 11:10Manufactured housing, it should be emphasized, can deliver very
- 11:14good value to home purchasers. Indeed, for decades, the
- 11:18industry has accounted for more than 15% of the homes built in
- 11:22the US. During those years, moreover,
- 11:25both the quality and variety of manufactured houses consistently
- 11:29improved. Progress in design and
- 11:31construction was not matched, however, by progress in
- 11:35distribution and financing. Instead, as the years went by,
- 11:39the industry's business model increasingly centered on the
- 11:42ability of both the retailer and manufacturer to unload terrible
- 11:47loans on naive lenders. When securitization then became
- 11:51popular in the 1990s, further distancing the supplier of funds
- 11:55from the lending transaction, the industry's conduct went from
- 11:59bad to worse. Much of its volume a few years
- 12:02back came from buyers who shouldn't have bought, financed
- 12:05by lenders who shouldn't have lent.
- 12:07The consequence has been huge numbers of repossessions and
- 12:11pitifully low recoveries on the units repossessed.
- 12:14Oakwood participated fully in the insanity, but Clayton,
- 12:18though it could not isolate itself from industry practices,
- 12:21behave considerably better than its major competitors.
- 12:25Upon receiving Jim Clayton's book, I told the students how
- 12:28much I admired his record, and they took that message back to
- 12:31Knoxville, home of both the University of Tennessee and
- 12:35Clayton Homes. Ow then suggested that I call
- 12:38Kevin Clayton, Jim's son and the CEO, to express my views
- 12:42directly. As I talked with Kevin, it
- 12:45became clear that he was both able and a straight shooter.
- 12:48Soon thereafter, I made an offer for the business based solely on
- 12:52Jim's book, my evaluation of Kevin, the public financials of
- 12:56Clayton, and what I had learned from the Oakwood experience.
- 12:59Clayton's The board was receptive since it understood
- 13:03that the large scale financing Clayton would need in the future
- 13:06might be hard to get. Lenders have fled the industry,
- 13:10and securitizations, when possible at all, carried far
- 13:14five more expensive and restrictive terms than was
- 13:17previously the case. This tightening was particularly
- 13:20serious for Clayton, whose earnings significantly depended
- 13:24on securitizations. Today, the manufactured housing
- 13:28industry remains awash in problems.
- 13:30Delinquencies continue, high repossessed units still abound,
- 13:34and the number of retailers has been halved.
- 13:37A different business model is required, one that eliminates
- 13:40the ability of the retailer and salesman to pocket substantial
- 13:44money upfront by making sales financed by loans that are
- 13:47destined to default. Such transactions cause hardship
- 13:51to both buyer and lender and lead to a flood of repossessions
- 13:55that then undercut the sale of new units.
- 13:58Under a proper Model 1, requiring significant down
- 14:01payments and shorter term loans, the industry will likely remain
- 14:05much smaller than it was in the 90s.
- 14:07But it will deliver to home buyers an asset in which they
- 14:10will have equity rather than disappointment upon resale.
- 14:14In the full circle department, Clayton has agreed to buy the
- 14:17assets of Oakwood. When the transaction closes,
- 14:21Clayton's manufacturing capacity, geographical reach and
- 14:24sales outlets will be substantially increased as a by
- 14:28product. The debt of Oakwood that we own,
- 14:31which we bought at a deep discount, will probably return a
- 14:34small profit to us and the students.
- 14:37In October we had a surprise graduation ceremony in Knoxville
- 14:40for the 40 who sparked my interest in Clayton.
- 14:43I donned A mortar board and presented each student with both
- 14:46a PHD4. Phenomenal hard working deal
- 14:50maker from Berkshire and AB Cher.
- 14:52I'll gotten a Cher. If you meet some of the new
- 14:55Tennessee shareholders at our annual meeting, give them your
- 14:58thanks and ask them if they've read any good books lately.
- 15:02In early spring, Byron Trott, A managing director of Goldman
- 15:05Sachs, told me that Walmart wish to sell its McClain subsidiary.
- 15:10McClain distributes groceries and non food items to
- 15:13convenience stores, drug stores, wholesale clubs, mass
- 15:17merchandisers, quick service restaurants, theaters and
- 15:21others. It's a good business, but one
- 15:24not in the mainstream of Walmart's future.
- 15:26It's made to order, however, for us.
- 15:29McClain has sales of about $23 billion but operates on paper
- 15:33thin margins, about 1% pre tax, and will swell Berkshire's sales
- 15:38figures far more than our income.
- 15:40In the past, some retailers had shunned McClain because it was
- 15:43owned by their major competitor. Grady Rosier, Mcclain's superb
- 15:47CEO, has already landed some of these accounts.
- 15:50He was in full stride the day the deal closed and more will
- 15:53come. For several years I have given
- 15:56my vote to Walmart in the balloting for Fortune Magazines
- 15:59Most Admired list. Our McClain transaction
- 16:02reinforced my opinion. To make the McClain deal, I had
- 16:06a single meeting of about two hours with Tom Show, Walmart
- 16:10CFO, and we then shook hands. He did, however, first call
- 16:15Bentonville. 29 days later. Walmart had its money.
- 16:18We did no due diligence. We knew everything would be
- 16:21exactly as Walmart said it would be and it was.
- 16:25I should add that Byron has now been instrumental in three
- 16:28Berkshire acquisitions. He understands Berkshire far
- 16:32better than any investment banker with whom we have talked,
- 16:34and it hurts me to say this earns his fee.
- 16:37I'm looking forward to deal #4 as I am sure is he taxes.
- 16:42On May 20th, 2003, the Washington Post ran an op-ed
- 16:46piece by me that was critical of the Bush tax proposals. 13 days
- 16:51later, Pamela Olson, assistant secretary for tax policy at the
- 16:55US Treasury, delivered a speech about the new tax legislation,
- 16:59saying that means a certain Midwestern Oracle, who, it must
- 17:03be noted, has played the tax code like a fiddle, is still
- 17:07safe retaining all his earnings. I think she was talking about
- 17:11me. Alas, my fiddle playing will not
- 17:13get me to Carnegie Hall or even to a high school recital.
- 17:16Berkshire, on your behalf and mine, will send the Treasury
- 17:20$3.3 billion for tax on its 2003 income, a sum equaling 2% of the
- 17:26total income tax paid by all US corporations in fiscal 2003.
- 17:32In contrast, Berkshire's market valuation is about 1% of the
- 17:36value of all American corporations.
- 17:39Our payment will almost 6 certainly place us among our
- 17:43country's top 10 taxpayers. Indeed, if only 540 taxpayers
- 17:48paid the amount Berkshire will pay, no other individual or
- 17:52corporation would have to pay anything to Uncle Sam.
- 17:56That's right, 290 million Americans and all other
- 18:00businesses would not have to pay a dime in income, Social
- 18:03Security, excise or estate taxes to the federal government.
- 18:08Pay raised the math. Federal tax receipts, including
- 18:11Social Security receipts in fiscal 2003 totaled $1.782
- 18:17trillion and 540 Berkshires, each paying 3.3 dollars billion,
- 18:23would deliver the same $1.782 trillion.
- 18:27Our federal tax return for 2002, 2003 is not finalized.
- 18:32When we paid $1.75 billion covered a mirror 8905 pages.
- 18:39As is required, we dutifully filed 2 copies of this return,
- 18:43creating a pile of paper 7 feet tall at world headquarters.
- 18:48Our small band of 15.8, though exhausted, momentarily flushed
- 18:52with pride. Berkshire, we felt, was surely
- 18:56pulling its share of our country's fiscal load, but Miss
- 18:59Olsen sees things otherwise, and if that means Charlie and I need
- 19:02to try harder, we are ready to do so.
- 19:05I do wish, however, that Miss Olsen would give me some credit
- 19:09for the progress I've already made.
- 19:11In 1944 I filed my first 1040 reporting my income as a 13 year
- 19:16old newspaper carrier. The return covered 3 pages after
- 19:21I claimed the appropriate business deductions, such as $35
- 19:24for a bicycle. My tax bill was $7.00.
- 19:28I sent my check to the Treasury and it, without comment,
- 19:31promptly cashed it. We lived in peace.
- 19:34I can understand why the Treasury is now frustrated with
- 19:37corporate America and prone to outbursts, but it should look to
- 19:41Congress and the administration for redress, not to Berkshire.
- 19:45Corporate income taxes in fiscal 2003 accounted for 7.4% of all
- 19:50federal tax receipts, down from a post war peak of 32% in 1952.
- 19:57With 1 exception 1983, last year's percentage is the lowest
- 20:01recorded since data was first published in 1934.
- 20:05Even so, tax breaks for corporations and their
- 20:08investors, particularly large ones, were a major part of the
- 20:11administration's 2002 and 2003 initiatives.
- 20:15If class warfare is being waged in America, my class is.
- 20:19Today, many large corporations run by CEOs whose fiddle playing
- 20:23talents make your chairman look like he is all thumbs, pay
- 20:27nothing close to the stated federal tax rate of 35%.
- 20:30In 1985, Berkshire paid $132 million in federal income taxes
- 20:36and all corporations paid $61.00 billion.
- 20:40The comparable amounts in 1995 were $286 million and $157
- 20:46billion respectively. And as mentioned, we will pay
- 20:50about $3.3 billion for 2003, a year when all corporations paid
- 20:56$132 billion. We hope our taxes continue to
- 21:00rise in the future. It will mean we are prospering.
- 21:03But we also hope that the rest of corporate America on tests up
- 21:07along with us. This might be a project for Miss
- 21:09Olsen to work on corporate governance in judging whether
- 21:13corporate America is serious about reforming itself.
- 21:15CEO pay remains the acid test. To date, the results aren't
- 21:20encouraging. A few CE OS, such as Jeff Immelt
- 21:24of General Electric, have led the way in initiating programs
- 21:27that are fair to managers and shareholders alike.
- 21:30Generally, however, his example has been more admired than
- 21:34followed. It's understandable how pay got
- 21:36out of hand. When management hires employees
- 21:39or when companies bargain with a vendor, the intensity of
- 21:43interest is equal on both sides of the table.
- 21:46One parties gain is the other party's loss, and the money
- 21:50involved has real meaning to both.
- 21:52The result isn't honest to God negotiation, but when CEOs or
- 21:56their representatives have met with compensation committees,
- 21:59too often one side the CEOs has cared far more than the other
- 22:03about what bargain is struck. ACEO, for example, will always
- 22:07regard the difference between receiving options for 100,000
- 22:11shares or for 500,000 as monumental.
- 22:14To a comp committee, however, the difference may seem
- 22:18unimportant, particularly if, as 7 has been the case at most
- 22:22companies, neither grant will have any effect on reported
- 22:26earnings. Under these conditions, the
- 22:28negotiation often has a play. Money quality overreaching by
- 22:32CEOs greatly accelerated in the 1990s as compensation packages
- 22:37gained by the most avaricious, a title for which there was
- 22:40vigorous competition, were promptly replicated elsewhere.
- 22:44The couriers for this epidemic of greed were usually
- 22:47consultants and human relations departments, which had no
- 22:51trouble perceiving who buttered their bread.
- 22:53As one compensation consultant commented, there are two classes
- 22:57of clients you don't want to offend.
- 22:59Actual and potential in proposals for reforming this
- 23:02malfunctioning system. The cry has been for independent
- 23:06directors, but the question of what truly motivates
- 23:09independence has largely been neglected.
- 23:11In last year's report, I took a look at how independent
- 23:14directors, as defined by statute, had performed in the
- 23:18mutual fund field. The Investment Company Act of
- 23:201940 mandated such directors, and that means we've had an
- 23:24extended test of what statutory standards produce.
- 23:28In our examination last year, we looked at the record of fund
- 23:31directors in respect to the two key tasks board members should
- 23:35perform, whether at a mutual fund business or any other.
- 23:39These two all important functions are 1st to obtain or
- 23:43retain an able and honest manager and then to compensate
- 23:47that manager fairly. Our survey was not encouraging.
- 23:50Year after year, at literally thousands of funds, directors
- 23:54had routinely rehired the incumbent management company,
- 23:57however pathetic its performance had been.
- 24:00Just as routinely, the directors had mindlessly approved fees
- 24:04that in many cases far exceeded those that could have been
- 24:07negotiated. Then, when a management company
- 24:10was sold, invariably at a huge price relative to tangible
- 24:14assets, the directors experienced a counter revelation
- 24:17and immediately signed on with the new manager and accepted its
- 24:21fee schedule. In effect, the directors decided
- 24:24that whoever would pay the most for the old management company
- 24:28was the party that should manage the shareholders money in the
- 24:31future. Despite the lapdog behavior of
- 24:33independent fund directors, we did not conclude that they are
- 24:37bad people. They're not.
- 24:39But sadly, boardroom atmosphere almost invariably sedates their
- 24:43fiduciary genes. On May 22nd, 2003, not long
- 24:48after Berkshire's report appeared, the chairman of the
- 24:50Investment Company Institute addressed its membership about
- 24:54the state of our industry. Responding to those who have
- 24:57weighed in about our perceived failings, he mused.
- 25:00It makes me wonder what life would be like if what actually
- 25:04done something wrong. Be careful what you wish for.
- 25:06Within a few months, the world began to learn that many fund
- 25:10management companies had followed policies that hurt the
- 25:13owners of the funds they managed while simultaneously boosting
- 25:17the fees of the managers prior to their transgressions.
- 25:21It should be noted these management companies were
- 25:23earning profit margins and returns on tangible equity that
- 25:27were the envy of corporate America.
- 25:29Yet to swell profits further, they trampled on the interests
- 25:33of fund shareholders in an appalling manner.
- 25:35So what are the directors of these looted funds doing?
- 25:38As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the
- 25:41contract of the offending management company, though
- 25:44naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees.
- 25:49Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded
- 25:51taking such a boy's will be boy's attitude?
- 25:54To top it all off, at least one miscreant management company has
- 25:58put itself up for sale, undoubtedly hoping to receive a
- 26:01huge sum for delivering the mutual funds it has managed to
- 26:05the highest bitter among other managers.
- 26:08This is a travesty. Why in the world don't the
- 26:10directors of those funds simply select whomever they think is
- 26:14best among the bidding organizations and sign up with
- 26:17that party directly? The winner would consequently be
- 26:20spared a huge payoff to the former manager who, having
- 26:24flouted the principles of stewardship, deserves not a dime
- 26:28not having to bear that acquisition cost.
- 26:30The winner could surely manage the funds in question for a far
- 26:33lower ongoing fee than would otherwise have been the case.
- 26:37Any truly independent director should insist on this approach
- 26:41to obtaining a new manager. 8 The reality is that neither the
- 26:45decades old rules regulating investment company directors nor
- 26:49the new rules bearing down on corporate America foster the
- 26:53election of truly independent directors.
- 26:55In both instances, an individual who is receiving 100% of his
- 27:00income from director fees and who may wish to enhance his
- 27:04income through election to other boards is deemed independent.
- 27:07That is nonsense. The same rules say that
- 27:10Berkshire director and lawyer Ron Olson, who receives from us
- 27:14perhaps 3% of his very large income, does not qualify as
- 27:18independent because that 3% comes from legal fees Berkshire
- 27:22pays his firm rather than from fees he earns as a Berkshire
- 27:26director. Rest assured, 3% from any source
- 27:29would not torpedo Ron's independence.
- 27:32But getting 20 percent, 30%, or 50% of their income from
- 27:36director fees might well temper the independence of many
- 27:40individuals, particularly if their overall income is not
- 27:43large. Indeed, I think it's clear that
- 27:46at mutual funds it has. Let me make a small suggestion
- 27:49to independent mutual fund directors.
- 27:52Why not simply affirm in each annual report that one, we have
- 27:55looked at other management companies and believe the one
- 27:58way have retained for the upcoming year is among the
- 28:01better operations in the field. And two, we have negotiated a
- 28:05fee with our managers comparable to what other clients with
- 28:08equivalent funds would negotiate.
- 28:10It does not seem unreasonable for shareholders to expect fund
- 28:14directors, who are often receiving fees that exceed
- 28:17$100,000 annually, to declare themselves on these points.
- 28:21Certainly these directors would satisfy themselves on both
- 28:25matters were they handing over a large chunk of their own money
- 28:28to the manager. If directors are unwilling to
- 28:31make these two declarations, shareholders should heed the
- 28:34maxim if you don't know whose side someone is on, he's
- 28:38probably not on yours. Finally, a disclaimer.
- 28:41A great many funds have been run well and conscientiously despite
- 28:45the opportunities for malfeasance that exist.
- 28:48The shareholders of these funds have benefited and their
- 28:51managers have earned their pay. Indeed, if I were a director of
- 28:55certain funds, including some that charge above average fees,
- 28:59I would enthusiastically make the two declarations I have
- 29:02suggested. Additionally, those index funds
- 29:05that are very low cost, such as Vanguards, are investor friendly
- 29:08by definition and are the best selection for most of those who
- 29:12wish to own equities. I am on my soapbox now only
- 29:15because the blatant wrongdoing that has occurred has betrayed
- 29:18the trust of so many millions of shareholders.
- 29:21Hundreds of industry insiders had to know what was going on,
- 29:25yet none publicly said a word. It took Eliot Spitzer and the
- 29:28whistleblowers who aided him to initiate a house cleaning.
- 29:32We urge fund directors to continue the job.
- 29:35Like directors throughout corporate America, these
- 29:38fiduciaries must now decide whether their job is to work for
- 29:41owners or for managers. Berkshire governance True
- 29:45independence, meaning the willingness to challenge a
- 29:47forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish, is an
- 29:51enormously valuable trait in a director.
- 29:54It is also rare. The place to look for it is
- 29:57among high grade people whose interests are in line with those
- 30:00of rank and file shareholders and are in line in a very big
- 30:04way. We've made that search at
- 30:06Berkshire. We now have 11 directors in each
- 30:08of them, combined with members of their families, owns more
- 30:12than $4 million of Berkshire stock.
- 30:15Moreover, all have held major stakes in Berkshire for many
- 30:18years. In the case of six of the 11
- 30:21family ownership amounts to add least hundreds of millions and
- 30:25dates back at least three decades.
- 30:27All 11 directors purchased their holdings in the market just as
- 30:31you did. We've never passed out options
- 30:33or restricted shares. Charlie and I love such honest
- 30:37to God ownership. After all, whoever washes a
- 30:40rental car. In addition, director fees at
- 30:42Berkshire are nominal, as my son Howard periodically reminds me.
- 30:47Thus, the upside from Berkshire for all 11 is proportionately
- 30:51the same as the upside for any Berkshire shareholder.
- 30:55And it always will be. 9 The downside for Berkshire directors
- 30:58is actually worse than yours because we carry no directors
- 31:02and officers liability insurance.
- 31:04Therefore, if something really catastrophic happens on our
- 31:07directors watch, they are exposed to losses that will far
- 31:11exceed yours. The bottom line for our
- 31:13directors? You win, they win big, you lose,
- 31:17they lose big. Our approach might be called
- 31:20owner capitalism. We know of no better way to
- 31:23engender true independence. This structure does not
- 31:26guarantee perfect behavior, however.
- 31:29I've sat on boards of companies in which Berkshire had huge
- 31:32stakes and remained silent as questionable proposals were
- 31:36rubber stamped. In addition to being
- 31:38independent, directors should have business savvy, A
- 31:41shareholder orientation and a genuine interest in the company.
- 31:45The rarest of these qualities is business savvy, and if it is
- 31:48lacking, the other two are of little help.
- 31:51Many people who are smart, articulate and admired have no
- 31:55real understanding of business. That's no sin.
- 31:58They may shine elsewhere, but they don't belong on corporate
- 32:01boards. Similarly, I would be useless on
- 32:04a medical or scientific board, though I would likely be
- 32:07welcomed by a chairman who wanted to run things his way.
- 32:10My name would dress up the list of directors, but I wouldn't
- 32:14know enough to critically evaluate proposals.
- 32:16Moreover, to cloak my ignorance, I would keep my mouth shut if
- 32:20you can imagine that in effect I could be replaced without loss
- 32:25by a potted plant. Last year, as we moved to change
- 32:28our board, I asked for self nominations from shareholders
- 32:31who believed they had the requisite qualities to be a
- 32:34Berkshire director. Despite the lack of either
- 32:37liability insurance or meaningful compensation, we
- 32:41received more than 20 applications.
- 32:43Most were good coming from owner oriented individuals having
- 32:47family holdings of Berkshire worth well over $1 million.
- 32:51After considering them, Charlie and I, with the concurrence of
- 32:54our incumbent directors, asked for shareholders who did not
- 32:58nominate themselves to join the board.
- 33:00David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keogh and Tom
- 33:04Murphy. These four people are all
- 33:06friends of mine and I know their strengths well.
- 33:08They bring an extraordinary amount of business talent to
- 33:11Berkshire's board. The primary job of our directors
- 33:14is to select my successor either upon my death or disability, or
- 33:19when I begin to lose my marbles. David Ogilvy had it right when
- 33:23he said develop your eccentricities when young.
- 33:27That way when you get older, people won't think you're going
- 33:30Gaga. Charlie's family and mine feel
- 33:33that we overreacted to David's advice.
- 33:35At our directors meetings, we cover the usual run of
- 33:38housekeeping matters, but the real discussion, both with me in
- 33:42the room and absent, centers on the strengths and weaknesses of
- 33:45the four internal candidates to replace me.
- 33:48Our board knows that the ultimate scorecard on its
- 33:51performance will be determined by the record of my successor.
- 33:55He or she will need to maintain Berkshires culture, allocate
- 33:58capital and keep a group of America's best managers happy in
- 34:02their jobs. This isn't the toughest task in
- 34:05the world. The train is already moving at a
- 34:08good clip down the track and I'm totally comfortable about it
- 34:11being done well by any of the for candidates we have
- 34:14identified. I have more than 99% of my net
- 34:17worth in Berkshire and will be happy to have my wife or
- 34:20foundation, depending on the order in which she and I die.
- 34:24Continue this concentration sector results As managers,
- 34:28Charlie and I want to give our owners the financial information
- 34:31and commentary we would wish to receive if our roles were
- 34:34reversed. To do this with both clarity and
- 34:37reasonable brevity becomes more difficult as Berkshires scope
- 34:41widens. Some of our businesses have
- 34:43vastly different economic characteristics from others,
- 34:46which means that our consolidated statements, with
- 34:49their jumble off figures make useful analysis almost
- 34:53impossible. On the following pages,
- 34:55therefore, we will present some balance sheet and earnings
- 34:58figures from our four major categories of businesses, along
- 35:02with commentary about each. We particularly want you to
- 35:06understand the limited circumstances under which we
- 35:08will use debt, since typically we shun it.
- 35:11We will not, however, inundate you with data that has no real
- 35:15value in calculating Berkshire's intrinsic value.
- 35:19Doing so would likely obfuscate the most important facts.
- 35:22One warning when analyzing Berkshire B10, sure to remember
- 35:27that the company should be viewed as an unfolding movie,
- 35:30not as a still photograph. Those who focused in the past on
- 35:34only the snapshot of the day sometimes reached erroneous
- 35:37conclusions. Insurance.
- 35:39Let's start with insurance, since that's where the money is.
- 35:42The fountain of funds we enjoy in our insurance operations
- 35:45comes from float, which is money that doesn't belong to us but
- 35:49that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because
- 35:52one, premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide.
- 35:56Insurance protection is delivered over a period that
- 35:58usually covers a year. And two, loss events that occur
- 36:02today do not always result in our immediately paying claims,
- 36:06since it sometimes takes years for losses to be reported.
- 36:09Think asbestos negotiated and settled.
- 36:13Float is wonderful if it doesn't come at a high price.
- 36:15The cost of float is determined by underwriting results, meaning
- 36:19how losses and expenses paid compare with premiums received.
- 36:23The property casualty industry as a whole regularly operates at
- 36:27a substantial underwriting loss and therefore often has a cost
- 36:31of float that is unattractive. Overall, our results have been
- 36:35good. True, we've had five terrible
- 36:37years in which float cost us more than 10%.
- 36:41But in 18 of the 37 years Berkshire has been in the
- 36:44insurance business, we have operated at an underwriting
- 36:47profit, meaning we were actually paid for holding money.
- 36:50And the quantity of this cheap money has grown far beyond what
- 36:54I dreamed it could when we entered the business in 1967.
- 36:58Year end Float in dollars millions Other other year GEICO
- 37:02General Re Reinsurance Primary Total 19672020197740 million
- 37:10131,171 One Nine 877-0180 715-0819 972-917-4014 455-7386
- 37:261998 Three 1100 Twenty 514-9094 305-400-1522 754-1990 Nine 3440
- 37:31Four 151666285400 Three 25298 2003 Thousand 900-4315
- 37:50525-780-5500 Ninety 827871 2001 4251 One 9310112626 Hundred
- 38:048535508 2002 4678 Twenty 2207 Thirteen 1390 Six 943 Four 1224
- 38:182003 5287 Twenty 3650 Four 13948 133144220 Last year was a
- 38:31standout float reached record levels and it came without cost
- 38:36as all major segments contributed to Berkshire's $1.7
- 38:40billion pre tax underwriting profit.
- 38:43Our results have been exceptional for one reason.
- 38:45We have truly exceptional managers.
- 38:48Insurers sell a non proprietary piece of paper containing a non
- 38:52proprietary promise. Anyone can copy anyone else's
- 38:56product. No installed base key patents.
- 39:00Critical real estate or natural resource position protects and
- 39:03insures competitive position. Typically brands do not mean
- 39:07much either. The critical variables.
- 39:09Therefore, our managerial brains, discipline and
- 39:12integrity. Our managers have all of these
- 39:15attributes and spades. Let's take a look at these All
- 39:18Stars and their operations. General Rhee had been
- 39:21Berkshire's problem child in the years following our acquisition
- 39:24of it in 1998. Unfortunately, it was a £400
- 39:29child and its negative impact on our overall performance was
- 39:32large. That's behind us.
- 39:34Jen Rhee is fixed. Thank Joe Brandon, its CEO, and
- 39:38his partner Tad Montrose for that.
- 39:41When I wrote you last year, I thought that discipline had been
- 39:44restored to both underwriting and reserving, and events during
- 39:482003 solidified my view. 11 That does not mean we will never have
- 39:53setbacks. Reinsurance is a business that
- 39:56is certain to deliver blows from time to time but under Joe and
- 40:00Tad this operation will be a powerful engine driving
- 40:04Berkshires future profitability Gen. residential financial
- 40:08strength. Unmatched among reinsurers, even
- 40:11as we started 2003, further improved during the year.
- 40:15Many of the company's competitors suffered credit
- 40:18downgrades last year, leaving Gen.
- 40:20Ree and its sister operation at National Indemnity as the only
- 40:25AAA rated companies among the world's major reinsurers.
- 40:29When insurers purchase reinsurance, they buy only a
- 40:31promise, one whose validity may not be tested for decades.
- 40:36And there are no promises in the reinsurance world equaling those
- 40:40offered by Gen. Ree and National Indemnity.
- 40:43Furthermore, unlike most reinsurers, we retain virtually
- 40:47all of the risks we assume. Therefore, our ability to pay is
- 40:51not dependent on the ability or willingness of others to
- 40:54reimburse us. This independent financial
- 40:57strength could be enormously important when the industry
- 41:01experiences the mega catastrophe it surely will.
- 41:04Regular readers of our annual reports know of AG Giant's
- 41:08incredible contributions to Berkshire's prosperity over the
- 41:11past 18 years. He continued to pour it on in
- 41:142003. With a staff of only 23.
- 41:18Ajit runs one of the world's largest reinsurance operations,
- 41:22specializing in mammoth and unusual risks.
- 41:26Often these involve assuming catastrophe risks, say the
- 41:30threat of a large California earthquake of a size far greater
- 41:34than any other reinsurer will accept.
- 41:36This means Ajits results in Berkshires will be lumpy.
- 41:40You should therefore expect his operation to have an occasional
- 41:44horrible year over time. However, you can be confident of
- 41:48a terrific result from this one-of-a-kind manager Aji writes
- 41:52some very unusual policies. Last year, for example, PepsiCo
- 41:57promoted a drawing that offered participants a chance to win a
- 42:00$1 billion prize. Understandably, Pepsi wished to
- 42:04lay off this risk, and we were the logical party to assume it.
- 42:08So we wrote a $1 billion policy retaining the risk entirely for
- 42:12our own account. Because the prize, if one, was
- 42:16payable over time. Our exposure in present value
- 42:19terms was $250 million. I helpfully suggested that any
- 42:24winner be paid $1.00 a year for a billion years, but that
- 42:27proposal didn't fly. The drawing was held on
- 42:30September 14th. Ajit and I held our breath, as
- 42:34did the finalist in the contest, and we left happier than he.
- 42:38PepsiCo has renewed for a repeat contest in 2004.
- 42:42GEICO was a fine insurance company when Tony Nicely took
- 42:45over as CEO in 1992. Now it is a great one.
- 42:50During his tenure, premium volume has increased from $2.2
- 42:53billion to 8.1 dollars billion and our share of the personal
- 42:58auto market has grown from 2.1% to 5%.
- 43:02More important, GEICO has paired these gains with outstanding
- 43:06underwriting performance. We now pause for a commercial.
- 43:10It's been 60-7 years since Leo Goodwin created a great business
- 43:14idea at GEICO, one designed to save policy holders significant
- 43:18money. Go to geico.com or call 1800
- 43:22847-7536 to see what we can do for you.
- 43:27End of commercial in 2003 both the number of inquiries coming
- 43:31into GEICO and its closure rate on these increased
- 43:35significantly. As a result, our preferred
- 43:37policy holder count grew 8.2% an hour standard and non standard
- 43:42policies grew 21.4%. Geico's business growth creates
- 43:47a never ending need for more employees and facilities.
- 43:51Our most recent expansion, announced in December, is a
- 43:54customer service center in M. Delighted to say Buffalo Stan
- 43:58Lipsey, the publisher of Our Buffalo News, was instrumental
- 44:02in bringing the city and GEICO together. 12th.
- 44:05The key figure in this matter, however, was Governor George
- 44:08Pataki. His leadership and tenacity are
- 44:12why Buffalo will have 2500 new jobs when our expansion is fully
- 44:17rolled out. Stan, Tony and I, along with
- 44:20Buffalo, thank him for his help. Berkshire's smaller insurers had
- 44:23another terrific year. This group, run by Rod Eldred,
- 44:27John Kaiser, Tom Nernie, Don Tall and Don Wurster, increased
- 44:32its float by 41% while delivering an excellent
- 44:36underwriting profit. These men, though operating in
- 44:39unexciting ways, produce truly exciting results.
- 44:43We should point out again that in any given year, a company
- 44:46riding long tail insurance coverages, giving rise to claims
- 44:49that are often settled many years after the loss causing
- 44:52event takes place, can report almost any earnings that the CEO
- 44:56desires. Too often the industry has
- 44:59reported wildly inaccurate figures by misstating
- 45:02liabilities. Most of the mistakes have been
- 45:05innocent. Sometimes, however, they have
- 45:07been intentional, their object being to fool investors and
- 45:11regulators. Auditors and actuaries have
- 45:14usually failed to prevent both varieties of misstatement.
- 45:18I have failed on occasion too, particularly in not spotting gin
- 45:22residential unwitting under reserving a few years back.
- 45:26Not only did that mean we reported inaccurate figures to
- 45:29you, but the error also resulted in our paying very substantial
- 45:33taxes earlier than was necessary.
- 45:35Eric, I told you last year, however, that I thought our
- 45:39current reserving was at appropriate levels.
- 45:41So far that judgement is holding up.
- 45:44Here are Berkshires pre tax underwriting results by segment.
- 45:48These contracts were explained on page 10 of the 2002 Annual
- 45:52Report, available on the Internet at
- 45:55www.berkshirehathaway.com. In brief, this segment consists
- 46:00of a few jumbo policies that are likely to produce underwriting
- 46:03losses which are capped but also provide unusually large amounts
- 46:07of float regulated utility businesses.
- 46:10Through Mid American Energy Holdings.
- 46:12We own an 80.5% fully diluted interest in a wide variety of
- 46:18utility operations. The largest are One Yorkshire
- 46:21Electricity and Northern Electric, who's 3.7 million
- 46:25electric customers make it the third largest distributor of
- 46:28electricity in the UK, to Mid American Energy, which serves
- 46:32689,000 electric customers in Iowa and three Kern River and
- 46:38Northern Natural pipelines which carry 7.8% of the natural gas
- 46:43transported in the United States.
- 46:45Berkshire has three partners who own the remaining 19.5%, Dave
- 46:50Sokel and Greg Abel, the brilliant managers of the
- 46:53business and Walter Scott, a long time friend of mine who
- 46:57introduced me to the company. Because Mid American is subject
- 47:01to the Public Utility Holding Company Act, Puka, Berkshires
- 47:04voting interest is limited to 9.9%.
- 47:08Walter has the controlling vote. Our limited voting interest
- 47:11forces us to account for Mid American in our financial
- 47:15statements in an abbreviated manner instead of our fully
- 47:18including its assets, liabilities, revenues and
- 47:22expenses an hour statements, we record only a one line entry in
- 47:26both our balance sheet and income account.
- 47:29It's likely that 13 Someday, perhaps soon, either puka will
- 47:34be repealed or accounting rules will change.
- 47:37Berkshires consolidated figures would then take an all of mid
- 47:40American, including the substantial debt it utilizes.
- 47:44The size of this debt, which is not now nor will it be an
- 47:48obligation of Berkshire, is entirely appropriate.
- 47:51Mid Americans diverse and stable utility operations assure that
- 47:56even under harsh economic conditions, aggregate earnings
- 47:59will be ample to very comfortably service all debt.
- 48:03At year end, $1.578 billion of Mid Americans most junior debt
- 48:08was payable to Berkshire. This debt has allowed
- 48:11acquisitions to be financed without our three partners
- 48:14needing to increase their already substantial investments
- 48:18in Mid American. By charging 11% interest,
- 48:21Berkshire is compensated fairly for putting up the funds needed
- 48:25for purchases, while our partners are spared dilution of
- 48:28their equity interests. Mid American also owns a
- 48:31significant non utility business, Home Services of
- 48:34America, the second largest real estate broker in the country.
- 48:38Unlike our utility operations, this business is highly
- 48:42cyclical, but nevertheless one we view enthusiastically.
- 48:46We have an exceptional manager. Ron Peltier, who threw both his
- 48:51acquisition and operational skills, is building a brokerage
- 48:54powerhouse. Last year, Home Services
- 48:57participated in $48.6 billion of transactions, a gain of $11.7
- 49:03billion from 2002. About 23% of the increase came
- 49:08from 4 acquisitions made during the year.
- 49:10Through our 16 brokerage firms, all of which retain their local
- 49:15identities. We employ 16,343 brokers in 16
- 49:19states. Home services is almost certain
- 49:23to grow substantially in the next decade as we continue to
- 49:26acquire leading localized operations.
- 49:29Hey race, a tidbit for fans of free enterprise.
- 49:32On March 31st, 1990, the day electric utilities in the UK
- 49:37were denationalized, Northern and Yorkshire had 6800 employees
- 49:42and functions. These companies continue today
- 49:45to perform. Now they employ 2539, yet the
- 49:48companies are serving about the same number of customers as when
- 49:52they were government owned and are distributing more
- 49:54electricity. This is not, it should be noted,
- 49:58a triumph of deregulation. Prices and earnings continue to
- 50:01be regulated in a fair manner by the government, just as they
- 50:05should be. It is a victory, however, for
- 50:08those who believe that profit motivated managers, even though
- 50:12they recognize that the benefits will largely flow too.
- 50:15Customers will find efficiencies that government never will.
- 50:19Here are some key figures on mid Americans operations earnings in
- 50:23dollars millions, finance and financial products.
- 50:26This sector includes a wide-ranging group of
- 50:29activities. Pay raise.
- 50:30Some commentary on the most important.
- 50:33I manage a few opportunistic strategies in AAA fixed income
- 50:37securities that have been quite profitable in the last few
- 50:40years. These opportunities come and go,
- 50:43and at present they are going. We speed their departure
- 50:46somewhat last year, thereby realizing 24% of the capital
- 50:51gains we show in the table that follows.
- 50:53Though far from foolproof, these transactions involve no credit
- 50:57risk and are conducted in exceptionally liquid securities.
- 51:01We therefore finance the positions almost entirely with
- 51:05borrowed money. As the assets are reduced, so
- 51:07also are the borrowings. The smaller portfolio we now
- 51:11have means that in the near future, our earnings in this
- 51:14category will decline significantly.
- 51:17It was fun while it lasted, and at some point, we'll get another
- 51:20turn at bat. A far less pleasant unwinding
- 51:23operation is taking place at Gen.
- 51:24Re Securities, the trading and derivatives operation we
- 51:28inherited when we purchased General Re Insurance.
- 51:31When we began to liquidate Gen. Re Securities in early 2002, it
- 51:36had 23,218 outstanding tickets with 884 counterparty, some
- 51:42having names I couldn't pronounce, much less
- 51:45creditworthiness I could evaluate.
- 51:47Since then, the unit's managers have been skillful and diligent
- 51:51in unwinding positions. Yet at year end, nearly two
- 51:55years later, we still had 7580 tickets outstanding with 453
- 52:01counterparties. As the country song laments, How
- 52:04can I miss you if you want, go away.
- 52:07The shrinking of this business has been costly.
- 52:09We've had pre tax losses of $173 million in 2002 and $99 million
- 52:17in 2003. These losses it should be noted
- 52:20came from a portfolio of contracts that in full
- 52:23compliance with Gap had been regularly marked to market with
- 52:27standard allowances for future credit loss and administrative
- 52:30costs. Moreover, our liquidation has
- 52:33taken place both in a benign market, we've had no credit
- 52:37losses of significance and in an orderly manner.
- 52:40This is just the opposite of what might be expected if a
- 52:43financial crisis force the number of derivatives dealers to
- 52:47cease operations simultaneously. If our derivatives experience
- 52:51and the Freddie Mac shenanigans of mind blowing size and
- 52:54audacity that were revealed last year makes you suspicious of
- 52:58accounting in this arena, consider yourself wised up.
- 53:02No matter how financially sophisticated you are, you can't
- 53:05possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of a
- 53:08derivatives intensive company what risks lurk in its
- 53:11positions. Indeed, the more you know about
- 53:14derivatives, the less you will feel you can learn from the
- 53:17disclosures normally proffered you.
- 53:19In Darwin's words, ignorance more frequently begets
- 53:22confidence than does knowledge. And now it's confession time.
- 53:26I'm sure I could have saved you $100 million or so pre tax if I
- 53:31had acted more promptly to shut down Gen.
- 53:33Re Securities. Both Charlie and I knew at the
- 53:36time of the general reinsurance merger that its derivatives
- 53:39business was unattractive. Reported profits struck us as
- 53:43illusory, and we felt that the business carried sizable risks
- 53:46that could not effectively be measured or limited.
- 53:50Moreover, we knew that any major problems the operation might
- 53:54experience would likely correlate with troubles in the
- 53:56financial or insurance world that would affect Berkshire
- 54:00elsewhere. In other words, if the
- 54:02derivatives business were ever to need shoring up, it would
- 54:05commandeer the capital and credit of Berkshire at just the
- 54:09time we could otherwise deploy those resources to huge
- 54:12advantage. A historical note, we had just
- 54:16such an experience in 1974 when we were the victim of a major
- 54:20insurance fraud. We could not determine for some
- 54:23time how much the fraud would ultimately cost us and therefore
- 54:26kept more funds and cash equivalents than we normally
- 54:29would have. 15 Absent this precaution, we would have made
- 54:33larger purchases of stocks that were then extraordinarily cheap.
- 54:37Charlie would have moved swiftly to close down Gin Re Securities,
- 54:41no question about that. I however dithered.
- 54:44As a consequence, our shareholders are paying a far
- 54:47higher price then was necessary to exit this business.
- 54:50Though we include Gin residential sizable life and
- 54:53health reinsurance business in the insurance sector.
- 54:57We show the results for Ajit Jain's life and annuity business
- 55:01in this section. That's because this business in
- 55:04large part involves arbitraging money.
- 55:07Our annuities range from a retail products sold directly on
- 55:11the Internet to structured settlements that require us to
- 55:13make payments for 70 years or more to people severely injured
- 55:18in accidents. We've realized some extra income
- 55:20in this business because of accelerated principal payments
- 55:24we received from certain fixed income securities we had
- 55:27purchased at discounts. This phenomenon has ended and
- 55:31earnings are therefore likely to be lower in this segment during
- 55:34the next few years. We have a $604 million
- 55:38investment in Value Capital, a partnership run by Mark Byrne, a
- 55:43member of a family that has helped Berkshire over the years
- 55:46in many ways. Berkshire is a limited partner
- 55:49in and has no say in the management of Marx Enterprise,
- 55:53which specializes in highly hedged fixed income
- 55:56opportunities. Mark is smart and honest and
- 55:59along with his family, has a significant investment in value.
- 56:03Because of accounting abuses at Enron and elsewhere, rules will
- 56:07soon be instituted that are likely to require that values
- 56:11assets and liabilities be consolidated on Berkshire's
- 56:14balance sheet. We regard this requirement as
- 56:17inappropriate given that values liabilities, which usually are
- 56:22above $20 billion, are in no way ours.
- 56:25Over time, other investors will join us as partners in value.
- 56:29When enough do, the need for us to consolidate value will
- 56:32disappear. We have told you in the past
- 56:35about Brocadia, the partnership we formed three years ago with
- 56:38Leucadia to finance and manage the wind down of Finova, A
- 56:42bankrupt lending operation. The plan was that we would
- 56:46supply most of the capital and Leucadia would supply most of
- 56:49the brains. And that's the way it has
- 56:52worked. Indeed, Joe Steinberg and Ian
- 56:55coming, who together run Leucadia, have done such a fine
- 56:58job in liquidating Finova's portfolio that the 5.6 dollars
- 57:03billion guarantee we took on in connection with the transaction
- 57:06has been extinguished. The unfortunate byproduct of
- 57:10this fast payoff is that our future income will be much
- 57:13reduced. Overall, Arcadia has made
- 57:16excellent money for us and Joe and Ian have been terrific
- 57:19partners. Our leasing businesses are XDRA
- 57:22transportation equipment and Court office furniture.
- 57:26Both operations have had poor earnings during the past two
- 57:29years as the recession cost demand to drop considerably more
- 57:33than was anticipated. They remain leaders in their
- 57:35fields and I expect at least a modest improvement in their
- 57:39earnings this year. Through our Clayton purchase, we
- 57:41acquired a significant manufactured housing finance
- 57:45operation. Clayton, like others in this
- 57:47business, had traditionally securitized the loans it
- 57:51originated. The practice relieved stress on
- 57:53Clayton's balance sheet, but a byproduct was the front ending
- 57:57of income, a result dictated by GAP.
- 58:00We are in no hurry to record income, have enormous balance
- 58:03sheet strength and believe that over the long term the economics
- 58:07of holding our consumer paper are superior to what we can now
- 58:11realize through securitization. So Clayton has begun to retain
- 58:15its loans. We believe it's appropriate to
- 58:17finance a soundly selected book of interest bearing receivables
- 58:21almost entirely with debt, just as a bank would.
- 58:24Therefore, Berkshire will borrow money too, finance Clayton's
- 58:28portfolio and re lend these funds to Clayton at our cost
- 58:31plus one percentage 16 point. This markup fairly compensates
- 58:37Berkshire for putting its exceptional creditworthiness to
- 58:40work, but it still delivers money to Clayton at an
- 58:43attractive price. In 2003, Berkshire did $2
- 58:46billion of such borrowing and re lending with Clayton using much
- 58:51of this money to fund several large purchases of portfolios
- 58:55from lenders exiting the business.
- 58:57A portion of our loans to Clayton also provided catch up
- 59:00funding for paper it had generated earlier in the year
- 59:03from its own operation and had found difficult to securitize.
- 59:07You may wonder why we borrow money while sitting on a
- 59:09mountain of cash. It's because of our Every Tub on
- 59:13its Own bottom philosophy. We believe that any subsidiary
- 59:16lending money should pay an appropriate rate for the funds
- 59:19needed to carry its receivables and should not be subsidized by
- 59:24its parent. Otherwise, having a rich daddy
- 59:26can lead to sloppy decisions. Meanwhile, the cash we
- 59:30accumulate at Berkshire is destined for business
- 59:32acquisitions or 4 the purchase of securities that offer
- 59:36opportunities for significant profit.
- 59:38Clayton's loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5
- 59:42billion in not too many years and with sensible credit
- 59:46standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.
- 59:49For simplicity's sake, we include all of Clayton's
- 59:52earnings in this sector, though a sizable portion is derived
- 59:56from areas other than consumer finance.
- 59:59From date of acquisition, May 23rd, 2003, three of our
- 1:00:03building materials businesses, Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore and
- 1:00:07Mytek had record operating earnings last year and earnings
- 1:00:11at Johns Manville the 4th. We're trending upward at your
- 1:00:14end. Collectively, these companies
- 1:00:17earned 21% on tangible net worth.
- 1:00:20Shaw Industries, the world's largest manufacturer of
- 1:00:23broadloom carpet, also had a record year.
- 1:00:26Led by Bob Shaw, who built this huge enterprise from a standing
- 1:00:30start, The company will likely set another earnings record in
- 1:00:332004. In November, Shaw acquired
- 1:00:36various carpet operations from Dixie Group, which should add
- 1:00:39about $240 million to sales this year, boosting Shaw's volume to
- 1:00:44nearly $5 billion. Within the apparel group, Fruit
- 1:00:48of the Loom is our largest operation.
- 1:00:50Fruit has three major assets, a 148 year old universally
- 1:00:56recognized brand, a low cost manufacturing operation and John
- 1:01:00Holland, CEO. In 2003, Fruit accounted for
- 1:01:0442.3% of the men's and boys underwear that was sold by Mass
- 1:01:09marketers Walmart, Target, Kmart, etcetera and increased
- 1:01:13its share of the women's and girls business in that Channel
- 1:01:17to 13.9%, up from 11.3% in 2002. In retailing, our furniture
- 1:01:24group earned $106 million pre tax, our Jewelers $59,000,000 In
- 1:01:30CS, which is both a manufacturer and retailer, $59 million.
- 1:01:35Both RC Wiley and Nebraska Furniture Mart NFM opened hugely
- 1:01:40successful stores last year, Wiley in Las Vegas and NFM in
- 1:01:44Kansas City, KS. Indeed, we believe the Kansas
- 1:01:48City store is the country's largest volume home furnishing
- 1:01:51store. Our Omaha operation, while
- 1:01:54located on a single plot of land, consists of three units.
- 1:01:5818. NFM was founded by Rose Blunk
- 1:02:01and Mrs. B in 1937 with $500. She worked until she was 103.
- 1:02:08Not a bad idea. One piece of wisdom she imparted
- 1:02:11to the generations following her was if you have the lowest
- 1:02:15price, customers will find you at the bottom of a river.
- 1:02:18Our store serving Greater Kansas City, which is located in one of
- 1:02:22the area's more sparsely populated parts, has proved
- 1:02:25misses BS point. Though we have more than 25
- 1:02:28acres of parking, the lot has at times overflowed.
- 1:02:32Victory, President Kennedy told us after the Bay of Pigs
- 1:02:35disaster, has 1000 fathers, but Defeat is an orphan at NFM.
- 1:02:41We knew we had a winner a month after the boffo opening in
- 1:02:43Kansas City when our new store attracted an unexpected
- 1:02:47paternity claim. A speaker there referring to the
- 1:02:50Blumpkin family, asserted they had enough confidence in the
- 1:02:54policies of the administration were working such that they were
- 1:02:57able to provide work for 1000 of our fellow citizens.
- 1:03:01The proud Papa at the podium, President George W Bush in
- 1:03:05flight Services, Flight Safety, Our training operation
- 1:03:09experienced a drop in normal operating earnings from
- 1:03:12$183,000,000 to $150 million. The abnormals In 2002, we had a
- 1:03:19$60 million pre tax gain from the sale of a partnership
- 1:03:24interest to Boeing, and in 2003 we recognized a $37 million loss
- 1:03:30stemming from the premature obsolescence of simulators.
- 1:03:33The corporate aviation business has slowed significantly in the
- 1:03:37past few years, and this fact has hurt Flight Safety's
- 1:03:40results. The company continues, however,
- 1:03:43to be far, in a way, the leader in its field.
- 1:03:46Its simulators have an original cost of $1.2 billion, which is
- 1:03:51more than triple the cost of those operated by our closest
- 1:03:54competitor, Net Jets. Our fractional ownership
- 1:03:57operation lost $41 million pre tax in 2003.
- 1:04:02The company had a modest operating profit in the US, but
- 1:04:06this was more than offset by a $32 million loss on aircraft
- 1:04:10inventory and by continued losses in Europe.
- 1:04:13Net Jets continues to dominate the fractional ownership field
- 1:04:17and its lead is increasing. Prospects overwhelmingly turn to
- 1:04:21us rather than to our three major competitors.
- 1:04:24Last year, among the four of us, we accounted for 70% of net
- 1:04:28sales measured by value. An example of what sets Net Jets
- 1:04:32apart from competitors is our Mayo Clinic Executive Travel
- 1:04:36Response Program, a free benefit enjoyed by all of our owners on
- 1:04:40land or in the air, anywhere in the world and at any hour of any
- 1:04:44day. Our owners and their families
- 1:04:46have an immediate link to Mayo. Should an emergency occur while
- 1:04:50they are traveling here or abroad, Mayo will instantly
- 1:04:53direct them to an appropriate doctor or hospital.
- 1:04:57Any baseline data about the patient that Mayo possesses is
- 1:05:00simultaneously made available to the treating physician.
- 1:05:04Many owners have already found this service invaluable,
- 1:05:07including one who needed emergency brain surgery in
- 1:05:11Eastern Europe. The $32 million inventory write
- 1:05:14down we took in 2003 occurred because of falling prices for
- 1:05:18used aircraft early in the year. Specifically, we bought back
- 1:05:22fractions from withdrawing owners at prevailing prices, and
- 1:05:26these fell in value before we were able to remarket them.
- 1:05:29Prices are now stable. The European loss is painful,
- 1:05:32but any company that forsakes Europe, as all of our
- 1:05:35competitors have Dunn is destined for second tier status.
- 1:05:39Many of our US owners fly extensively in Europe and want
- 1:05:43the safety and security assured by a net jets, plane and pilots
- 1:05:47despite a slow start. Furthermore, we are now adding
- 1:05:51European customers at a good pace.
- 1:05:53During the years 2001 through 2003, we had gains of 88
- 1:05:58percent, 61% and 77% in European management and flying revenues.
- 1:06:04We have not, however, yet succeeded in stemming the flow
- 1:06:08of red ink. Rich Santouli, Net Jet's
- 1:06:11extraordinary CEO and I expect our European loss to diminish in
- 1:06:152004 and also anticipate that it will be more than offset by US
- 1:06:20profits. Overwhelmingly, our owners love
- 1:06:23the Net Jets experience. Once a customer has tried us,
- 1:06:27going back to commercial aviation is like going back to
- 1:06:30holding hands. Net jets will become a very big
- 1:06:33business over time and will be one in which we are pre eminent
- 1:06:37in both customer satisfaction and profits.
- 1:06:40Rich will see to that 19 investments.
- 1:06:43The table that follows shows our common stock investments.
- 1:06:46Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the
- 1:06:50end of 2003 are itemized. We bought some Wells Fargo
- 1:06:54shares last year. Otherwise, among our six largest
- 1:06:57holdings, we last changed our position in Coca-Cola in 1994,
- 1:07:02American Express in 1998, Gillette in 1989, Washington
- 1:07:07Post in 1973 and Moody's in 2000.
- 1:07:11Brokers don't love us. We are neither enthusiastic nor
- 1:07:15negative about the portfolio we hold.
- 1:07:17We own pieces of excellent businesses, all of which had
- 1:07:20good gains and intrinsic value last year, but their current
- 1:07:23prices reflect their excellence. The unpleasant corollary to this
- 1:07:27conclusion is that I made a big mistake in not selling several
- 1:07:31off our larger holdings during the Great Bubble.
- 1:07:34If these stocks are fully priced now, you may wonder what I was
- 1:07:38thinking four years ago when their intrinsic value was lower
- 1:07:41and their price is far higher. So do I.
- 1:07:43In 2002, junk bonds became very cheap, and we purchased about $8
- 1:07:48billion of these. The pendulum swung quickly
- 1:07:52though, and this sector now looks decidedly unattractive to
- 1:07:55us. Yesterday's weeds are today
- 1:07:57being priced as flowers. We've repeatedly emphasized that
- 1:08:01realized gains at Berkshire are meaningless for analytical
- 1:08:04purposes. We have a huge amount of
- 1:08:06unrealized gains on our books and are thinking about when and
- 1:08:10if to cash them. Depends not at all on a desire
- 1:08:13to report earnings at one specific time or another.
- 1:08:17Nevertheless, to see the diversity of our investment
- 1:08:20activities, you may be interested in the following
- 1:08:23table categorizing liquidation of long term strips, the most
- 1:08:27volatile of government securities and from certain
- 1:08:29strategies I follow. Within our finance and financial
- 1:08:33products division, we retain most of our junk portfolio
- 1:08:36selling only a few issues, calls and maturing bonds accounted for
- 1:08:40the rest of the gains in the junk category.
- 1:08:43During 2002 we entered the foreign currency market for the
- 1:08:46first time in my life and in 2003 we enlarged our position as
- 1:08:51I became increasingly bearish on the dollar.
- 1:08:54I should note that the cemetery for Sears has a huge section set
- 1:08:58aside for macro forecasters. We have in fact made few macro
- 1:09:02forecasts at Berkshire and we have seldom seen others make
- 1:09:05them with sustained success. We have and will continue to
- 1:09:09have the bulk of Berkshires net worth in US assets, but in
- 1:09:13recent years our country's trade deficit has been force feeding
- 1:09:16huge amounts of claims on and ownership in America to the rest
- 1:09:20of the world. For a time, foreign appetite for
- 1:09:23these assets readily absorb the supply.
- 1:09:26Late in 2002, however, the world started choking on this diet and
- 1:09:31the dollar's value began to slide against major currencies.
- 1:09:35Even so, prevailing exchange rates will not lead to a
- 1:09:38material let up in our trade deficit, so whether foreign
- 1:09:42investors like it or not, they will continue to be flooded with
- 1:09:45dollars. The consequences of this are
- 1:09:48anybody's guess. They could, however, be
- 1:09:51troublesome and reach, in fact, well beyond currency markets.
- 1:09:56As an American, I hope there is a benign ending to this problem.
- 1:10:00I myself suggested one possible solution, which incidentally
- 1:10:04leaves Charlie cold in a November 10th, 2003 article in
- 1:10:08Fortune Magazine. Then again, perhaps the alarms I
- 1:10:11have raised will prove needless. Our country's dynamism and
- 1:10:15resiliency have repeatedly made fools of naysayers.
- 1:10:19But Berkshire holds many billions of cash equivalents
- 1:10:22denominated in dollars, so I feel more comfortable owning
- 1:10:26foreign exchange contracts that are at least a partial offset to
- 1:10:29that position. These contracts are subject to
- 1:10:32accounting rules that require changes in their value to be
- 1:10:35contemporaneously included in capital gains or losses.
- 1:10:39Even though the contracts have not been closed.
- 1:10:42We show these changes each quarter in the Finance and
- 1:10:45Financial Products segment of our earnings statement.
- 1:10:48At year end, our open foreign exchange contracts totaled about
- 1:10:52$12 billion at market values and were spread among five
- 1:10:56currencies. Also, when we were purchasing
- 1:10:59junk bonds in 2002, we tried when possible to buy issues
- 1:11:03denominated in euros. Today, we own about $1 billion
- 1:11:07of these. When we can't find anything
- 1:11:09exciting in which to invest, our default position is U.S.
- 1:11:13Treasuries, both bills and repos.
- 1:11:16No matter how low the yields on these instruments go, we never
- 1:11:19reach for a little more income by dropping our credit standards
- 1:11:23or by extending maturities. Charlie and I detest taking even
- 1:11:27small risks unless we feel we are being adequately compensated
- 1:11:31for doing so. About as far as we will go down
- 1:11:34that path is to occasionally eat cottage cheese a day after the
- 1:11:38expiration date on the carton. A 2003 book that investors can
- 1:11:42learn much from, His Bull by Maggie Mahar.
- 1:11:45Two other books ID recommend are The Smartest Guys in the Room by
- 1:11:48Bethany McLean and Peter L Kind and In an Uncertain World by Bob
- 1:11:53Rubin. All three are well reported and
- 1:11:55well written. Additionally, Jason Zweig last
- 1:11:58year did a first class job in revising The Intelligent
- 1:12:01Investor, my favorite book on investing.
- 1:12:04Designated Gifts program. From 1981 through 2002,
- 1:12:08Berkshire administered a program whereby shareholders could
- 1:12:11direct Berkshire to make gifts to their favorite charitable
- 1:12:15organizations. Over the years, we dispersed
- 1:12:17$197 million pursuant to this program.
- 1:12:22Churches were the most frequently named designees, and
- 1:12:25many thousands of other organizations benefited as well.
- 1:12:29We were the only major public company that offered such a
- 1:12:31program to shareholders, and Charlie and I were proud of it.
- 1:12:35We reluctantly terminated the program in 2003 because of
- 1:12:39controversy over the abortion issue.
- 1:12:42Over the years, numerous organizations on both sides of
- 1:12:45this issue had been designated by our shareholders to receive
- 1:12:49contributions. As a result, we regularly
- 1:12:52received some objections to the gifts designated for pro-choice
- 1:12:55operations. A few of these came from people
- 1:12:58and organizations that proceeded to boycott products. 21 of our
- 1:13:02subsidiaries that did not concern us.
- 1:13:05We refused all requests to limit the right of our owners to make
- 1:13:10whatever gifts they chose, as long as the recipients had five
- 1:13:13O 1C free status. In 2003, however, many
- 1:13:17independent associates of the Pampered Chef began to feel the
- 1:13:21boycotts. This development meant that
- 1:13:23people who trusted us, but who were neither employees of ours
- 1:13:26nor had a voice in Berkshire decision making, suffered
- 1:13:29serious losses of income for our shareholders.
- 1:13:32There was some modest tax efficiency in Berkshire doing
- 1:13:35the giving rather than they're making their gifts directly.
- 1:13:38Additionally, the program was consistent with our partnership
- 1:13:42approach, the first principle set forth in our owners manual.
- 1:13:46But these advantages paled when they were measured against
- 1:13:49damage done loyal associates who had with great personal effort
- 1:13:53built businesses of their own. Indeed, Charlie and I see
- 1:13:57nothing charitable and harming decent hard working people just
- 1:14:01so we and other shareholders can gain some minor tax
- 1:14:04efficiencies. Berkshire now makes no
- 1:14:07contributions at the parent company level.
- 1:14:09Our various subsidiaries follow philanthropic policies
- 1:14:13consistent with their practices prior to their acquisition by
- 1:14:16Berkshire, except that any personal contributions that
- 1:14:19former owners had earlier made from their corporate pocketbook
- 1:14:22are now funded by them personally.
- 1:14:25The annual meeting. Last year I asked you to vote as
- 1:14:28to whether you wished our annual meeting to be held on Saturday
- 1:14:32or Monday. I was hoping for Monday,
- 1:14:34Saturday, one by two to one. It will be a while before
- 1:14:37shareholder democracy resurfaces at Berkshire.
- 1:14:41But you have spoken and we will hold this year's Annual meeting
- 1:14:44on Saturday, May 1st at the new Quest Center in downtown Omaha.
- 1:14:48The Quest offers US 194,000 square feet for exhibition by
- 1:14:53hour subsidiaries, up from 65,000 square feet last year,
- 1:14:57and much more seating capacity as well.
- 1:15:00The Quests doors will open at 7:00 AM, the movie will begin at
- 1:15:058:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30.
- 1:15:08There will be a short break at noon for food.
- 1:15:11Sandwiches will be available at the Quest concession stands.
- 1:15:15That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions
- 1:15:18until 3:30. We will tell you everything we
- 1:15:21know and, at least in my case, more.
- 1:15:24An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:15:27this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:15:30need for admission to the meeting and other events.
- 1:15:33As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again
- 1:15:37signed up American Express, 800-799-6634, to give you
- 1:15:43special help. They do a terrific job for us
- 1:15:46each year and I thank them for it.
- 1:15:48In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels
- 1:15:52to the meeting. Afterwards the vans we'll make
- 1:15:55trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart,
- 1:15:58Borsheims and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find
- 1:16:02a car useful. Our exhibition of Berkshire
- 1:16:05goods and services will blow you away this year.
- 1:16:08On the floor, for example, will be a 1600 square foot Clayton
- 1:16:12home featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns, Manville
- 1:16:16insulation, My Tech fasteners, carefree awnings and outfitted
- 1:16:20with NFM furniture. You'll find it a far cry from
- 1:16:24the mobile home stereotype of a few decades ago.
- 1:16:27GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top
- 1:16:30counselors from around the country, all of them ready to
- 1:16:33supply with auto insurance quotes.
- 1:16:35In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special
- 1:16:39shareholder discount, usually 8%.
- 1:16:41This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in
- 1:16:46which we operate. Bring the details of your
- 1:16:48existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.
- 1:16:52On Saturday at the Omaha Airport, we will have the usual
- 1:16:56array of aircraft from Net Jets available for your inspection.
- 1:17:00Stop by the Net Jets booth at the Quest to learn about viewing
- 1:17:03these planes. If you buy what we consider an
- 1:17:05appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well
- 1:17:08need your own plane to take them home. 22 at Nebraska Furniture
- 1:17:13Mart, located on a 77 acre site on 72nd St. between Dodge and
- 1:17:17Pacific. We will again be having
- 1:17:20Berkshire weekend pricing, which means we will be offering our
- 1:17:22shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to
- 1:17:26employees. We initiated this special
- 1:17:29pricing at NFM 7 years ago and sales during the weekend grew
- 1:17:34from $5.3 million in 1997 to $17.3 million in 2003.
- 1:17:41Every year has set a new record. To get the discount, you must
- 1:17:45make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday,
- 1:17:49May 3rd, inclusive, and also present your meeting credential.
- 1:17:52The period special pricing will even apply to the products of
- 1:17:56several prestigious manufacturers that normally have
- 1:17:59ironclad rules against discounting, but that in the
- 1:18:03spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception
- 1:18:06for you. We appreciate their cooperation.
- 1:18:09NFM is open from 10:00 AM to 9:00 PM, Monday through Saturday
- 1:18:13and 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on Sunday.
- 1:18:16On Saturday this year from 5:30 PM to 8:00 PM, we are having a
- 1:18:21special affair for shareholders only.
- 1:18:24They'll be there eating barbecue and drinking coke.
- 1:18:27Borsheim's, the largest jewelry store in the country except for
- 1:18:30Tiffanus Manhattan store, well have two shareholder only
- 1:18:34events. The first will be a cocktail
- 1:18:36reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00 PM on Friday, April 30th.
- 1:18:40The second, the main gala, will be from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM on
- 1:18:44Sunday, May 2nd. Ask Charlie to autograph your
- 1:18:48sales ticket. Shareholder prices will be
- 1:18:50available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid
- 1:18:54the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and
- 1:18:57Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a
- 1:19:01shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open
- 1:19:04until 6:00 PM. Borsheims operates on a gross
- 1:19:06margin that is fully 20 percentage points below that of
- 1:19:10its major rivals. So the more you buy, the more
- 1:19:13you save. At least that's what my wife and
- 1:19:15daughter tell me. Both were impressed early in
- 1:19:17life by the story of the boy who, after missing A streetcar,
- 1:19:21walked home and proudly announced that he had saved 5 by
- 1:19:24doing so. His father was irate.
- 1:19:27Why didn't you miss a cab and save 85 in the mall outside of
- 1:19:31Borsheims? We will have Bob Hammond and
- 1:19:34Sharon Osberg, 2 of the world's top bridge experts, available to
- 1:19:38play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
- 1:19:41Additionally, Patrick Wolf, twice US chess champion, will be
- 1:19:45in the mall taking on all comers blindfolded.
- 1:19:48I've watched and he doesn't peek.
- 1:19:51Gore, it's my favorite steakhouse, will again be open
- 1:19:53exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd,
- 1:19:58and we'll be serving from 4:00 PM until 10:00 PM.
- 1:20:01Please remember that to come to Gourds on Sunday, you must have
- 1:20:05a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733
- 1:20:11on April 1st, but not before. If Sunday is sold out, try
- 1:20:16Gourds on one of the other evenings you will be in town.
- 1:20:19Flaunt your mastery of fine dining by ordering, as I do, a
- 1:20:23rare T-bone with a double order of hash Browns.
- 1:20:26We will have a special reception on Saturday afternoon from 4:00
- 1:20:29to 5:00 for shareholders who come from outside of North
- 1:20:33America. Every year our meeting draws
- 1:20:35many people from around the globe and Charlie and I want to
- 1:20:38be sure we personally meet those who have come so far.
- 1:20:42Any shareholder who comes from other than the US or Canada will
- 1:20:46be given special credentials and instructions for attending this
- 1:20:49function. Charlie and I have a great time
- 1:20:52at the annual meeting and you will too.
- 1:20:54So join us at the quest for our annual Woodstock for
- 1:20:58Capitalists. Warren E Buffett, February 27th,
- 1:21:022004, Chairman of the Board.