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Seven Pillars of Wisdom, a Triumph, 1926 (Extract) · Short Nonfiction Collection

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  Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph by T. E. Lawrence. These
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  synopsies are excerpted from the nineteen twenty six edition of Seven Pillars of Wisdom,
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  A Triumph by T. E. Lawrence, printed by M. Pike with
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  the assistance of H. J. Hodgson, London. This is a LibriVox
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  recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or
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  to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Introduction the Foundations of Arab Revolt.
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  Some Englishmen, of whom Kitchener was chief, believe that a rebellion of
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  Arabs against Turks would enable England, while fighting Germany simultaneously, to defeat her
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  ally Turkey. Their knowledge of the nature and power and country of the Arabic
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  speaking peoples made them think that the issue of such a rebellion would be happy
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  and indicated its character and method. So they allowed it to begin, having
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  obtained formal assurances of help for it from the British government. Yet, nonetheless,
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  the rebellion of the Sharif of Mecca came to most as a surprise and
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  found the Allies unready. It aroused mixed feelings and made strong friends and enemies
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  Amid, whose clashing jealousies its affairs began to miscarry. Book one, my
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  first visit to Arabia. I had believed these misfortunes of the revolt to be
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  due to faulty leadership, or rather to the lack of leadership Arab and English.
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  So I went down to Arabia to see and consider its great men.
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  The first the Sharif of Mecca, we knew to be aged. I found
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  Abdullah too clever, Ali too clean, Za'id to cool. Then I rode
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  up country to Faisal and found in him the leader with the necessary fire,
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  and yet with reason to give effect to our science. His tribesmen seemed sufficient
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  instrument, and his hills to provide natural advantage. So I returned confidently to
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  Egypt and told my chiefs how Mecca was defended not by Rabeg but by Faisal
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  in Jebel sub Book two, Faisal's first extension northward. My chiefs were astonished
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  at such favorable news, but promised help, and meanwhile sent me back,
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  much against my will, into Arabia. I reached Faisal's camp on the day
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  the Turks carried the defenses of Jebel sub by. There so doing. The
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  entire basis of my confidence in a tribal war was destroyed. We havevered for
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  a while by Yembo, hoping to retrieve the position, but the tribesmen proved
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  to be useless for assault, and we saw that if the revolt was to
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  endure, we must invent a new plan of campaign at once. This was
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  hazardous, as the promised British military experts had not yet arrived. However,
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  we decided that to regain the initiative we must ignore the main body of the
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  enemy and concentrate far off on his railway flank. The first step toward this
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  was to move our base Wej, which we proceeded to do in the grand
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  manner Book three, concentrating against the Medina railway. Our taking Weje had the
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  wish to effect upon the Turks, who abandoned their advance toward Mecca for a
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  passive defense of Medina and its railway. Our experts made plans for attacking them.
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  The Germans saw the danger of envelopement and persuaded Enver to order the instant
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  evacuation of Medina. Sir Archibald Murray begged us to put in such a sustained
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  attack as should destroy the retreating enemy. Faisal was soon ready in his part,
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  and I went off to Abdullah to get his cooperation. On the way,
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  I fell sick, and while lying alone with empty hands, was driven
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  to think about the campaign. Thinking convinced me that recent practice had been better
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  than our theory. So on recovery I did little to the railway, but
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  went back to Wej with novel ideas. I tried to make the others admit
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  them and adopt deployment as our ruling principle and to put preaching even before fighting.
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  They preferred the limited and direct military objective of Medina. So I decided
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  to slip off to Akaba by myself on test of my own theory. Book
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  four, The Expedition against Akaba. Sharif, Nasir Aouda and I set off
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  together for Akaba. Hitherto Faisal had been the public leader, but his remaining
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  in wedge through the ungrateful load of this northern expedition upon myself. I accepted
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  it and its dishonest implication, as are only means of victory. We tricked
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  the Turks and entered Akaba with good fortune. Book five. Exploiting the new
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  base, our capture of Akaba closed the Hejaz war and gave us the task
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  of helping the British invade Syria. The Arabs, working from Akaba became virtual
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  right wing of Alambi's army in Sinai. To mark the change relation, Faisal
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  was transferred with his army to Alambi's command. Alanby now became responsible for his
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  operations and equipment. Meanwhile, we organized the Akaba area as an unassailable base
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  from which to hinder the Hejaz Railway. Book six, The Failure of the
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  Bridges. By November nineteen seventeen, Allenby was ready to open a general attack
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  against the Turks along his whole front. The Arabs should have done the same
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  in their sector, but I was afraid to put everything on a throw,
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  and designed instead the specious operation of cutting the Yarmuck Valley railway to throw into
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  disorder the expected Turkish retreat. This half measure met with its due failure.
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  Book seven. A winter campaign after the capture of Jerusalem, Allenby, to
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  relieve his right, assigned us a limited objective. We began well, but
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  when we reached the Dead Sea, bad weather, bad temper, and division
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  of purpose blunted our offensive spirit and broke up our force. I had a
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  misunderstanding with Zaid, threw in my hand and returned to Palestine, reporting that
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  we had failed and asking the favor of other employment. Almby was in the
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  hopeful midst of a great scheme for the spring. He sent me back at
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  one Stafaisal with new powers. Book eight Orthodoxy arrives. In conjunction with Alamby,
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  we laid a triple plan to join hands across Jordan, to capture Man
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  and to cut off Medina in one operation. This was too proud, and
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  neither of us fulfilled his part, So the Arabs exchanged the care of the
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  Placid Medina railway for the greater burden of investing in Man, a Turk force
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  as big as their available regular army to help in this duty. Alamby increased
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  our transport that we might have longer range and more mobility. Man was impregnable
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  for us, so we concentrated on cutting its northern railway and diverting the Turkish
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  effort to relieve its garrison from the Amman side. Clearly no decision lay in
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  such tactics, but the German advanced in Flanders at this moment took from Allenby
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  his British units and consequently his advantage over the Turks. He notified us that
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  he was unable to attack. A stalemate as we were throughout nineteen eighteen was
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  an intolerable prospect. We schemed to strengthen the Arab army for autumn operations near
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  darra Ah and in the Benisachar country. If this drew off one division from
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  the enemy in Palestine, it would make possible a British ancillary attack, one
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  of whose ends would be our junction in the Lower Jordan Valley by Jericho.
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  After a month's preparation, this plan was dropped because of its risk and because
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  a better offered Book nine. Maneuvering for a final stroke, Allenby, in
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  rapid embodiment of reliefs from Mesopotamia and India, so surpassed, hoped that he
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  was able to plan an autumn offensive. The near balance of the forces on
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  each side meant that victory would depend on his subtlely deceiving the Turks that their
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  entire danger yet lay beyond the Jordan. We might help by lying quiet for
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  six weeks, feigning a feebleness, which should tempt the Turks to attack the
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  Arabs were then to lead off at the critical moment by cutting the railway communications
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  of Palestine. Such bluff within bluff called for most accurate timing, since the
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  balance would have been wrecked either by a premature or Turkish retreat in Palestine or
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  by their premature attack against the Arabs beyond Jordan. We borrowed from Allenby some
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  imperial camel corps to lend extra color to our supposed critical situation. Their success
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  glorified them and covered us While preparations were dara Ah went on with no more
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  check than an untimely show of peak from King houssain bok ten the liberation of
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  Damascus, our mobile column of airplanes, armored cars, Arab regulars and Bedouin
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  collected at Azrak to cut the three railways out of darrah Ah. The southern
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  line we cut near Mafrak, the northern at Arar, the western by Mezarib.
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  We circumnavigated darrah Ah and rallied despite air raids in the desert. Next
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  day Alanby attacked and in a few hours had scattered the Turkish armies beyond recovery.
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  I flew to Palestine for airplane help and got orders for a second phase
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  of the thrust northward. We moved behind darrah Ah to hasten its abandonment.
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  General Barrow joined us in his company. We advanced to Kiswei and there met
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  the Australian Mounted Corps. The United Forces entered Damascus unopposed. Some confusion manifested
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  itself in the city. We strove to allay it. Alanby arrived and smoothed
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  out all difficulties. Afterwards, let me go epilogue. Damascus had not seemed
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  a sheath for my sword when I landed in Arabia, but its capture disclosed
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  the exhaustion of my main springs of action. The strongest motive throughout had been
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  a personal one, not mentioned here but present to me. I think every
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  hour of these two years active pains and joys might fling up like towers among
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  my days, but Refluenta's air, this hidden urge reformed to be the persisting
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  element of life till near the end. It was dead before we reached Damascus.
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  Next in force had been a pugnacious wish to win the war, yoked
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  to the conviction that without Arab help, England could not pay the price of
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  winning its Turkish sector. When Damascus fell the Eastern War, probably the whole
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  war drew to an end. Then I was moved by curiosity. Superflumina babylonis
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  read as a boy had left me, longing to feel myself the node of
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  a national movement. We took Damascus, and I feared more than three arbitrary
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  days would have quickened in me a route of authority. There remained historical ambition,
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  and substantial as a motive by itself. I had dreamed at the City
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  School in Oxford of hustling in the form while I lived the new Asia which
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  time was inexorably bringing upon us. Mecca was to lead to Damascus, Damascus
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  to Anatolia, and afterwards to Baghdad. And then there was Yemen, Phantasias.
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  These will seem to such as are able to call my beginning an ordinary
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  effort. End of Seven Pillars of Wisdom A Triumph by T. E.
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  Lawrence, read by Atolsharma, Winnipeg, Canada. Excerpted from the nineteen twenty
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  six edition of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph by T. E.
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  Lawrence, printed by M. Pike with the assistance of H. J.
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  Hodgson, London, s