Latest / The President's Daily Brief / The PDB Situation Report | October 31st, 2026: Saudi-Houthi War Threatens to Spread & Xi Purges 33 Officials

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The PDB Situation Report | October 31st, 2026: Saudi-Houthi War Threatens to Spread & Xi Purges 33 Officials · The President's Daily Brief

• 0:07
  Welcome to the PDB Situation Report.
• 0:09
  I'm Mike Baker,
• 0:10
  your eyes and ears on the world stage.
• 0:13
  All right,
• 0:14
  let's get briefed.
• 0:15
  First up,
• 0:16
  the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis
• 0:20
  threatens to engulf more of the Middle East as Egypt,
• 0:24
  Turkey,
• 0:24
  and Pakistan
• 0:25
  become increasingly involved.
• 0:27
  We'll be joined by former UK ambassador to Yemen,
• 0:30
  Edmund Fitten Brown,
• 0:31
  for a look ahead.
• 0:33
  Later in the show,
• 0:34
  China's Communist Party,
• 0:35
  the CCP
• 0:36
  confirms the expulsion of 33 senior officials as Xi Jinping's sweeping purge
• 0:42
  raises new questions about his grip on power.
• 0:45
  Author Gordon G Chang,
• 0:46
  friend of the show,
• 0:47
  will stop by for more on that.
• 0:49
  But first,
• 0:50
  today's Situation Report Spotlight.
• 0:53
  The war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis
• 0:56
  is threatening to become a much larger regional conflict.
• 1:00
  Oh good,
• 1:00
  just what we needed in 2026.
• 1:02
  Houthi missiles and drones continue to
• 1:05
  target Saudi cities and oil infrastructure,
• 1:08
  prompting retaliatory strikes inside Yemen.
• 1:10
  And now other regional powers are getting involved.
• 1:14
  Egypt has authorized military support for Saudi Arabia,
• 1:17
  while Turkey and Pakistan
• 1:18
  are coordinating with Riyadh under a mutual defense pact
• 1:22
  even as diplomatic efforts with Iran reportedly continue.
• 1:27
  Could this conflict draw the Middle East into an even wider war?
• 1:30
  Well,
• 1:31
  here's a hint.
• 1:31
  Yes,
• 1:32
  it's very likely.
• 1:33
  Joining us to break it down is Edmund Fitten Brown.
• 1:35
  He's a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
• 1:38
  Middle East scholar,
• 1:39
  and former UK ambassador to Yemen.
• 1:41
  Well,
• 1:42
  Mister Ambassador,
• 1:43
  welcome back to The Situation Report.
• 1:44
  It's very good to see you.
• 1:46
  Thank you,
• 1:46
  it's good to be with you.
• 1:48
  Well,
• 1:49
  it,
• 1:49
  I guess,
• 1:49
  you know,
• 1:50
  uh,
• 1:51
  it's,
• 1:52
  you know,
• 1:52
  this is such a simple situation,
• 1:54
  uh,
• 1:55
  that,
• 1:55
  you know,
• 1:55
  we probably only need to take a minute or two to talk about it.
• 1:58
  But
• 1:58
  let's start from maybe the 30,000 ft view.
• 2:01
  Can you give us your assessment of the
• 2:04
  current state of the Saudi-Houthi conflict?
• 2:08
  Yeah,
• 2:09
  sure,
• 2:09
  so um.
• 2:11
  You know,
• 2:11
  the Saudis
• 2:12
  don't want this.
• 2:13
  They,
• 2:13
  they're not comfortable,
• 2:15
  you know,
• 2:15
  they're,
• 2:15
  they've got serious
• 2:17
  remorse for having got involved in Yemen back in 2015,
• 2:21
  and they've been
• 2:23
  like a bear with its foot in a trap really ever since then.
• 2:26
  And,
• 2:27
  you know,
• 2:27
  even as early as 2016,
• 2:29
  I can remember how anxious they were to sign a peace deal in Kuwait,
• 2:33
  uh,
• 2:34
  which would have given the Houthis most of what they claimed to want.
• 2:38
  The problem is,
• 2:39
  of course,
• 2:39
  what people have now realized is that the Houthis,
• 2:42
  uh,
• 2:42
  want a lot more than they sometimes say they do.
• 2:45
  And you know,
• 2:45
  they will say what suits them tactically,
• 2:48
  just as they said to US negotiators recently that
• 2:50
  they only have a quarrel with Saudi Arabia,
• 2:52
  they don't have a quarrel with America.
• 2:54
  And I think they even said they didn't have a quarrel with Israel,
• 2:57
  which was a really odd thing for them to say,
• 2:59
  given that 2/5 of their slogan is about uh death to Israel and a curse on the Jews.
• 3:05
  Anyway,
• 3:06
  Um,
• 3:07
  the Saudis are kind of stuck on at the moment,
• 3:09
  they,
• 3:10
  you know,
• 3:10
  they're trying desperately to break their own isolation,
• 3:12
  but the Saudis have are,
• 3:13
  are,
• 3:13
  are impaled on a hook of their own making here.
• 3:17
  Um,
• 3:17
  they,
• 3:18
  uh,
• 3:18
  had this,
• 3:19
  uh,
• 3:20
  long running truce with the Houthis,
• 3:22
  uh,
• 3:22
  for 4 years or so,
• 3:24
  uh,
• 3:24
  from,
• 3:25
  uh,
• 3:25
  from 22 onwards.
• 3:27
  And during that time,
• 3:29
  they weren't really paying attention to what was happening in Yemen.
• 3:32
  And we,
• 3:33
  we all witnessed uh a little bit of a blow up at the end of last year,
• 3:37
  when the,
• 3:37
  uh,
• 3:38
  when the southerners made their move and the Saudis blamed the Emirati for that.
• 3:43
  So that
• 3:44
  caused the Emiratis then to
• 3:47
  give up on Yemen and to leave.
• 3:49
  Well,
• 3:49
  now the Houthis and the Iranians uh will have noticed that and said,
• 3:53
  well,
• 3:53
  you know,
• 3:53
  the Saudis are now isolated.
• 3:56
  And of course they were looking then for an opportunity to raise the stakes,
• 3:59
  and the opportunity arose when
• 4:01
  uh the uh Houthi delegation went to the to Ayatollah Khamenei's uh funeral,
• 4:06
  um,
• 4:07
  in,
• 4:07
  uh,
• 4:08
  in the southern,
• 4:08
  and uh the Saudis who have a,
• 4:11
  a sort of aviation blockade
• 4:13
  on Sana'a at the behest of the internationally recognized government of Yemen,
• 4:18
  um,
• 4:18
  they challenged the right of the plane to land at Sana'a,
• 4:21
  and the plane ended up landing at Hodeidah instead.
• 4:24
  Um,
• 4:25
  and the Houthis said,
• 4:26
  OK,
• 4:26
  you're going to blockade us,
• 4:27
  we're gonna blockade you.
• 4:28
  So they started attacking,
• 4:30
  uh,
• 4:30
  Saudi,
• 4:30
  Saudi associated ships,
• 4:32
  uh,
• 4:32
  in the Red Sea,
• 4:33
  and they started attacking,
• 4:35
  uh,
• 4:35
  some Saudi infrastructure.
• 4:38
  Then we had the,
• 4:39
  uh,
• 4:39
  major escalation that happened more recently where the Houthis,
• 4:43
  uh,
• 4:44
  really went for it
• 4:45
  in the Yemeni civil war.
• 4:46
  They felt that their
• 4:47
  enemies,
• 4:48
  their Yemeni opponents,
• 4:50
  uh,
• 4:50
  were in,
• 4:51
  uh,
• 4:51
  an element of disarray.
• 4:53
  Uh,
• 4:53
  and they made,
• 4:54
  uh,
• 4:54
  rapid moves south of the Red Sea coast.
• 4:57
  They took Port of Mocca,
• 4:58
  they took,
• 4:59
  uh,
• 5:00
  the,
• 5:00
  uh,
• 5:01
  strategic islands and,
• 5:02
  uh,
• 5:03
  also the,
• 5:03
  uh,
• 5:03
  Yemeni coastline of the Babel Mandeb.
• 5:06
  And,
• 5:07
  um,
• 5:08
  that was when the Saudi suddenly thought,
• 5:09
  oh,
• 5:10
  OK,
• 5:10
  we've really screwed up here because the Houthis are in danger of actually
• 5:14
  Uh,
• 5:14
  both winning the civil war
• 5:17
  and also,
• 5:18
  um,
• 5:18
  of having an absolute chokehold on the Red Sea
• 5:20
  because of having the whole coast and also the,
• 5:23
  the Babel Mandep.
• 5:24
  So that
• 5:26
  the Saudis then sort of,
• 5:27
  you know,
• 5:27
  that was the end of the truce.
• 5:28
  The Saudis went all in on an air campaign to
• 5:31
  support the internationally recognized government and to weaken the Houthis.
• 5:34
  And of course the Houthis have escalated,
• 5:37
  uh,
• 5:37
  in response,
• 5:38
  and they,
• 5:38
  you know,
• 5:39
  now we have,
• 5:40
  uh,
• 5:40
  the kind of attacks on Saudi that we never saw before.
• 5:44
  Not even really during the period of the Iranian retaliation earlier this year.
• 5:49
  Um,
• 5:49
  this is the Houthis sort of saying,
• 5:51
  you know,
• 5:51
  we can
• 5:52
  essentially break any sort of sense of security or civil peace
• 5:57
  or economic stability in Saudi Arabia.
• 6:01
  And the most notable attack,
• 6:02
  I guess was the attack on Riyadh Airport on the 10th of October,
• 6:07
  which killed 13 people,
• 6:09
  including one US national.
• 6:11
  And you know,
• 6:11
  I,
• 6:12
  I watched the footage of that and it's an airport I've been through,
• 6:14
  I don't know,
• 6:15
  more than 100 times,
• 6:16
  I guess.
• 6:17
  Um,
• 6:18
  and I've,
• 6:18
  you know,
• 6:18
  I've been there when they,
• 6:19
  when the pilgrims have been there in their towels,
• 6:22
  and you know,
• 6:22
  you saw the video of the,
• 6:24
  the guys in their towels,
• 6:25
  and then you saw the explosion.
• 6:26
  It was absolutely harrowing to watch.
• 6:29
  Um,
• 6:29
  and,
• 6:30
  um,
• 6:30
  and a reminder,
• 6:31
  of course,
• 6:31
  that,
• 6:32
  you know,
• 6:32
  the Houthis are
• 6:33
  committing daily war crimes and yet oddly enough,
• 6:36
  um,
• 6:37
  you know,
• 6:37
  a lot of the people who
• 6:39
  claim to care a great deal about war crimes when they're committed by Israel.
• 6:43
  Um,
• 6:44
  give the Houthis a pass on this.
• 6:46
  So that's roughly where we are now.
• 6:47
  The problem,
• 6:48
  the problem Saudis's got is that,
• 6:49
  you know,
• 6:50
  they can
• 6:51
  sort of
• 6:53
  pretty much eliminate the Houthis comparative advantage
• 6:56
  against the internationally regist government of Yemen.
• 6:58
  Their air power is sufficient to do that.
• 7:01
  And that means that the,
• 7:02
  uh,
• 7:03
  Yemenis have pushed back a little bit on the Red Sea coast.
• 7:06
  They haven't recovered all the ground that the Houthis gained,
• 7:08
  but they have pushed back a little bit.
• 7:09
  The Houthis have also laid a very determined siege around the city of Taiz,
• 7:13
  uh,
• 7:14
  but they have not yet been able to take it.
• 7:16
  And again,
• 7:16
  because you have to mass,
• 7:17
  to take a city,
• 7:18
  you have to mass your,
• 7:19
  your forces and,
• 7:20
  and that makes them vulnerable to air power,
• 7:22
  which of course has always been the Saudi problem,
• 7:24
  that they've only got air power and when the Houthis are dispersed,
• 7:28
  they're very hard to attack,
• 7:29
  whereas,
• 7:30
  uh,
• 7:30
  they do make themselves vulnerable when they,
• 7:32
  when they appear in,
• 7:33
  in numbers.
• 7:34
  So,
• 7:34
  um,
• 7:35
  at the moment,
• 7:36
  I think,
• 7:36
  you know,
• 7:36
  the question is,
• 7:37
  can the siege of Taz be relieved,
• 7:40
  or will the Houthis actually take Taiz,
• 7:42
  which has been an objective for them
• 7:44
  for the last 12 years.
• 7:46
  Um,
• 7:46
  and,
• 7:46
  uh,
• 7:47
  it would represent a major sort of watershed moment
• 7:50
  in the civil war if they did take it.
• 7:52
  Um,
• 7:53
  the question,
• 7:53
  the other question that exists,
• 7:54
  of course,
• 7:55
  is,
• 7:56
  is any of the international support that the
• 7:58
  Saudis are getting gonna make a difference?
• 8:00
  They've got typhoons coming from the UK.
• 8:03
  They've got,
• 8:03
  uh,
• 8:04
  promise of Egyptian troops,
• 8:06
  uh,
• 8:06
  Turkish,
• 8:07
  Pakistani,
• 8:08
  um,
• 8:09
  you know,
• 8:09
  they apparently they've mended fences with the Emiratis,
• 8:13
  but I don't think that that has yet yielded any practical results.
• 8:17
  The big question is what is the US attitude to this?
• 8:19
  Will the US get involved in such a way as to make a meaningful difference,
• 8:23
  because it really it's the US that's capable of doing that,
• 8:26
  um,
• 8:27
  but we know that Donald Trump initially reacted
• 8:29
  skeptically when the Saudis asked for that help.
• 8:33
  And,
• 8:33
  you know,
• 8:34
  whilst I understand his skepticism,
• 8:36
  and I understand
• 8:37
  also his frustration with the Saudis for having fallen out with the Emiratis,
• 8:41
  because that was,
• 8:41
  you know,
• 8:42
  that was clearly
• 8:43
  a shot through the foot.
• 8:45
  Um,
• 8:46
  I,
• 8:46
  I can't help feeling that if the US wants to prevail
• 8:49
  in its war with Iran,
• 8:51
  it needs to recognize that the Yemeni front,
• 8:54
  very much like the Lebanese front,
• 8:56
  is inextricably linked with the Iranian front and the Strait of Hormuz.
• 9:00
  Yeah,
• 9:01
  that's uh that's
• 9:02
  where I wanted to go with this,
• 9:04
  um,
• 9:05
  is
• 9:06
  because it does seem
• 9:08
  Up to this point as if the White House is,
• 9:10
  is treating this as two
• 9:13
  separate and distinct conflicts,
• 9:15
  and possibly because they just don't want
• 9:18
  to deal
• 9:19
  with
• 9:19
  the Houthis,
• 9:20
  right?
• 9:21
  It's just,
• 9:21
  uh,
• 9:21
  there's,
• 9:21
  there's,
• 9:22
  there's too much going on elsewhere,
• 9:24
  and whether they can multitask or whether they're just not interested,
• 9:27
  uh,
• 9:28
  they seem like they're,
• 9:29
  they're trying to create a firewall,
• 9:31
  which
• 9:32
  To me it seems
• 9:34
  Either willfully naive,
• 9:36
  uh,
• 9:36
  or,
• 9:37
  or ignorant of the influence of the
• 9:40
  IRGC,
• 9:41
  the,
• 9:41
  uh,
• 9:42
  Revolutionary Guard Corps,
• 9:43
  on the Houthis,
• 9:45
  but you're the expert.
• 9:46
  What is
• 9:47
  Yeah,
• 9:47
  what is the influence
• 9:49
  at this stage of
• 9:51
  the regime?
• 9:52
  because you could argue,
• 9:53
  I suppose,
• 9:54
  and,
• 9:54
  and then I'll,
• 9:54
  then I'll stop talking and let my question hang out there.
• 9:57
  But you could argue that,
• 9:59
  that,
• 9:59
  look,
• 9:59
  what's happening with the Bab al-Meb and what's happening with,
• 10:02
  with the Saudis and the Houthis,
• 10:05
  that benefits,
• 10:06
  of course,
• 10:06
  the regime,
• 10:07
  right?
• 10:07
  It creates this other front
• 10:09
  and it creates this chaos
• 10:11
  and
• 10:13
  You could argue this,
• 10:14
  you know,
• 10:15
  this
• 10:16
  could have well been driven in
• 10:18
  large part
• 10:19
  or in part by
• 10:20
  the Iranian regime.
• 10:22
  Is that the wrong way to look at it?
• 10:25
  No,
• 10:25
  I think that's absolutely the right way to look at it.
• 10:27
  The IRGC has enormous influence over the Houthis.
• 10:30
  Um,
• 10:30
  you know,
• 10:31
  if you talk to different Yemen experts,
• 10:33
  you'll get
• 10:34
  differences of nuance here because some people will say,
• 10:37
  you know,
• 10:37
  that the Houthis are just a tool of the IRGC
• 10:40
  and other people will say that the Houthis have a Yemeni agenda,
• 10:44
  but it's closely aligned with Iran.
• 10:46
  And I take the,
• 10:47
  I take that line,
• 10:48
  the,
• 10:48
  the latter line.
• 10:49
  I,
• 10:49
  I believe that the Houthis have,
• 10:51
  um,
• 10:52
  they make their own decisions,
• 10:53
  but they make them in close consultation with the Iranians,
• 10:56
  and they are very dependent on the Iranians for finance,
• 11:00
  for,
• 11:00
  uh,
• 11:00
  resupply of weapons and other essential equipment,
• 11:04
  um,
• 11:05
  and for,
• 11:06
  uh,
• 11:06
  technical assistance and training.
• 11:08
  And you know,
• 11:08
  the IRGC have been present on the ground when the Houthis
• 11:11
  have been making these gains on the Red Sea coast.
• 11:14
  There's no doubt about that.
• 11:15
  Um,
• 11:16
  so,
• 11:17
  yes,
• 11:17
  I mean,
• 11:18
  you described it as sort of wishful thinking,
• 11:20
  um,
• 11:20
  perhaps to try to treat these as two different,
• 11:23
  um,
• 11:23
  fronts.
• 11:24
  Um,
• 11:25
  it's,
• 11:25
  it's,
• 11:25
  it's not just wishful thinking,
• 11:26
  it's,
• 11:27
  it's also self defeating because,
• 11:29
  um,
• 11:30
  yeah,
• 11:30
  you know,
• 11:31
  it is no coincidence
• 11:33
  that these things have happened at the time that they have.
• 11:36
  And let's not forget also that there was an
• 11:38
  attack on the east west pipeline in Saudi Arabia,
• 11:41
  which was launched from eastern Iraq,
• 11:43
  possibly by um Iraqi uh Shia proxies of the Iranians,
• 11:49
  but possibly with technical support also uh from
• 11:51
  the Iranians and possibly from the Yemeni Houthis because
• 11:54
  these guys have all got their implants with each other.
• 11:57
  And um so,
• 11:59
  uh,
• 12:00
  when you then consider what that represented with the
• 12:03
  Strait of Hormuz under pressure from the Iranians,
• 12:06
  the Babel Mandab uh in the
• 12:08
  uh in the hands of the Houthis,
• 12:09
  at least temporarily,
• 12:10
  um,
• 12:11
  and the east-west pipeline uh temporarily out of service.
• 12:16
  Uh,
• 12:16
  which meant that the,
• 12:17
  the Saudis lost their option of going north in the Red Sea and,
• 12:21
  uh,
• 12:21
  taking oil,
• 12:22
  uh,
• 12:23
  through the Suez Canal and using an
• 12:25
  Egyptian pipeline that facilitates that as well.
• 12:28
  Um,
• 12:28
  that,
• 12:29
  that is clearly a coordinated
• 12:31
  Iranian strategy using both the Iraqi proxies
• 12:35
  and the Yemeni proxies.
• 12:37
  And of course the effect,
• 12:39
  um,
• 12:39
  is,
• 12:40
  yes,
• 12:40
  of course,
• 12:40
  it's,
• 12:41
  it's aimed to knock the Saudis out of the war.
• 12:43
  The hope is that the Saudis will just capitulate and say this is too difficult,
• 12:46
  we'll pay you whatever we need to pay you,
• 12:48
  we'll,
• 12:49
  you know,
• 12:49
  we'll stop supporting the internationally recognized government of Yemen,
• 12:51
  etc.
• 12:52
  etc.
• 12:53
  Um,
• 12:54
  that would also be a massive strategic win for Iran.
• 12:57
  It would essentially be,
• 12:58
  uh,
• 12:58
  Saudi Arabia,
• 13:00
  uh,
• 13:00
  acknowledging that from now on,
• 13:02
  it's a sort of a vassal state that has to pay,
• 13:04
  uh,
• 13:05
  protection money to,
• 13:06
  uh,
• 13:06
  to its more aggressive neighbors.
• 13:09
  Um,
• 13:09
  and of course it's also,
• 13:11
  uh,
• 13:11
  an indirect assault on the United States or
• 13:14
  perhaps one could even call it a direct assault on the American economy.
• 13:18
  It's clearly intended and timed
• 13:21
  to try to cause uh the Republicans to lose the midterm elections.
• 13:25
  Yes,
• 13:25
  yeah,
• 13:25
  that's,
• 13:26
  I'm glad you brought that up because I wanna,
• 13:27
  I wanna touch on that,
• 13:29
  um,
• 13:30
  going into the next segment,
• 13:32
  which is my way of saying
• 13:33
  we have
• 13:34
  a break
• 13:34
  before our next segment.
• 13:36
  See,
• 13:36
  this,
• 13:36
  yeah,
• 13:37
  I know,
• 13:37
  Mr.
• 13:37
  Ambassador,
• 13:38
  I know you're,
• 13:38
  you're,
• 13:38
  you're very impressed with how smooth
• 13:40
  this,
• 13:40
  this whole project runs.
• 13:42
  Uh,
• 13:43
  if you'll stay right where you are,
• 13:44
  sir,
• 13:44
  we will be back with more
• 13:46
  from Edmund Fitten Brown,
• 13:48
  senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
• 13:50
  former UK ambassador to Yemen.
• 13:52
  We'll be back here on the Situation Report,
• 13:54
  so please stick around.
• 13:56
  Hey,
• 13:56
  Mike Baker here.
• 13:57
  Now,
• 13:57
  you may have heard about the upcoming US midterm elections,
• 14:00
  right?
• 14:01
  They are right around the corner and things are heating up.
• 14:04
  Congressional control,
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  possibly Senate control,
• 14:07
  and President Trump's agenda
• 14:08
  are all on the ballot and up for grabs.
• 14:11
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• 14:15
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• 14:17
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• 14:30
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• 14:32
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• 14:41
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• 14:42
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• 15:39
  Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report.
• 15:42
  Joining me once again is Edmund Fitten Brown.
• 15:44
  He's a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
• 15:48
  and former UK ambassador to Yemen.
• 15:50
  Sir,
• 15:50
  thank you very much for staying with us here.
• 15:54
  Great to be with you.
• 15:55
  Uh,
• 15:56
  now,
• 15:57
  we've been talking Yemen,
• 15:59
  um,
• 16:00
  and to some degree,
• 16:01
  we've been talking Iran's influence over the Houthis.
• 16:06
  Um,
• 16:07
  And you did mention the international support,
• 16:09
  whether it's from the UK,
• 16:11
  Egypt,
• 16:11
  Turkey,
• 16:11
  Pakistan.
• 16:12
  There was some talk even about Syria possibly
• 16:15
  providing some troops at one point,
• 16:17
  that seems to have,
• 16:18
  uh,
• 16:19
  died down a little bit,
• 16:20
  but
• 16:21
  to what degree
• 16:22
  do you envision this international support,
• 16:25
  uh,
• 16:25
  being meaningful,
• 16:26
  uh,
• 16:27
  whether it's in terms of troops or resources,
• 16:29
  or to what degree do you think it's
• 16:31
  essentially sort of public
• 16:33
  lip service?
• 16:35
  Yeah,
• 16:35
  it's a great question.
• 16:36
  And,
• 16:36
  and the answers may be slightly different with each country,
• 16:39
  but,
• 16:40
  um,
• 16:40
  but really I think that it's gonna be mainly cosmetic and moral support.
• 16:47
  Um,
• 16:47
  I think the people who can make a real difference are
• 16:49
  the Emiratis who have put troops on the ground in Yemen before
• 16:53
  and been highly effective in support
• 16:54
  of the internationally recognized government.
• 16:56
  And then the United States,
• 16:58
  obviously,
• 16:58
  if the United States decides to help the Saudis uh in a more
• 17:02
  proactive way,
• 17:03
  um,
• 17:04
  but going through the other potential sources of support one by one.
• 17:07
  Um,
• 17:08
  that's,
• 17:08
  uh,
• 17:08
  you mentioned the Syrians,
• 17:09
  and that is an interesting one.
• 17:11
  oddly enough,
• 17:12
  I suspect that if you,
• 17:13
  if you got Syrian troops,
• 17:14
  they probably would,
• 17:15
  uh,
• 17:16
  operate in a more uninhibited way.
• 17:18
  They probably,
• 17:19
  because they're battle hardened,
• 17:20
  you know,
• 17:20
  they've fought their own civil war
• 17:22
  so recently,
• 17:23
  it's quite possible that they could be quite useful to the,
• 17:26
  uh,
• 17:26
  Saudis and to the international,
• 17:28
  internationally recognized government.
• 17:30
  The problem is,
• 17:31
  of course,
• 17:31
  um,
• 17:32
  it's the Syrian home front,
• 17:34
  uh,
• 17:34
  Syria itself is still a mess,
• 17:36
  and there's a security vacuum in parts of Syria,
• 17:39
  and the Jordanians have just had to mount airstrikes inside Syria
• 17:43
  because of a Syrian,
• 17:45
  uh,
• 17:45
  uh,
• 17:45
  not,
• 17:46
  you know,
• 17:46
  not,
• 17:46
  not the government itself,
• 17:47
  not,
• 17:47
  not Shahra's,
• 17:48
  um,
• 17:49
  regime,
• 17:50
  but,
• 17:50
  uh,
• 17:50
  the fact that a plot,
• 17:52
  uh,
• 17:52
  which was incubated inside southern Syria,
• 17:55
  um,
• 17:56
  killed a large number of,
• 17:58
  uh,
• 17:58
  Jordanian Christians.
• 17:59
  Um,
• 18:00
  so you know,
• 18:01
  major terrorist attack were carried out effectively
• 18:04
  a cross border attack from southern Syria
• 18:06
  into Jordan.
• 18:07
  So this is why,
• 18:09
  uh,
• 18:09
  a lot of people who when they
• 18:11
  were asked about this,
• 18:12
  they said,
• 18:12
  no,
• 18:12
  this is not a good idea.
• 18:13
  The Syrians have got far too much
• 18:16
  that they're already struggling to deal with,
• 18:18
  you know,
• 18:18
  um,
• 18:19
  it's,
• 18:19
  it would be reckless to deploy significant numbers of capable troops,
• 18:24
  uh,
• 18:25
  elsewhere.
• 18:26
  So then,
• 18:26
  then you've got the Mecca Accords and you know,
• 18:29
  uh recently um
• 18:31
  slightly expanded to include um Indonesia and Qatar and sort of as as an emerging
• 18:37
  Sunni Islamist sort of front,
• 18:40
  um,
• 18:40
  which is led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
• 18:44
  Um,
• 18:45
  and,
• 18:45
  and,
• 18:46
  uh,
• 18:46
  you've got,
• 18:47
  uh,
• 18:47
  you've got,
• 18:48
  uh,
• 18:48
  Pakistan as an original member of it,
• 18:50
  then Indonesia,
• 18:51
  Qatar,
• 18:52
  um,
• 18:53
  and then this question about whether the,
• 18:55
  whether the Egyptians can to some degree be considered part of this as well.
• 18:58
  Although I noticed that the Egyptians have just taken
• 19:01
  pretty strong exception to Turkey's recent agreement
• 19:04
  with uh the eastern Libyan authorities,
• 19:07
  which is designed to enhance Turkey's.
• 19:10
  Uh,
• 19:10
  claims over the eastern Mediterranean in a way that is profoundly
• 19:14
  hostile to both Egyptian interests and of course Greek and Cypriot
• 19:18
  interests.
• 19:19
  So,
• 19:20
  um,
• 19:20
  I don't,
• 19:20
  you know,
• 19:21
  this is a really loose grouping.
• 19:23
  These are all,
• 19:24
  the best way of thinking of this is that these are all friends of Saudi Arabia.
• 19:27
  In one way or another,
• 19:28
  they're all friends of Saudi Arabia.
• 19:30
  They're not necessarily all friends of each other,
• 19:32
  at least not in a wholehearted way.
• 19:35
  And then how can they help?
• 19:36
  That's the question.
• 19:36
  Well,
• 19:37
  nobody's talking about Qatari troops,
• 19:38
  nobody's talking about,
• 19:40
  uh,
• 19:40
  Indonesian troops.
• 19:42
  Um,
• 19:43
  and Qatar was a member in the of the original,
• 19:46
  um,
• 19:46
  Saudi coalition in,
• 19:47
  in Yemen,
• 19:48
  but,
• 19:48
  but not,
• 19:49
  not a major,
• 19:49
  not an important member like the UAE.
• 19:52
  Um,
• 19:53
  so what would Turkey do?
• 19:54
  What would,
• 19:55
  um,
• 19:56
  Pakistan do?
• 19:57
  And what would Egypt do?
• 19:59
  In the case of Pakistan,
• 20:01
  they were asked by the Saudis to get involved in the civil war back in 2015.
• 20:06
  They were,
• 20:06
  the Saudis were desperate for help.
• 20:08
  They knew they didn't have enough uh people capable
• 20:10
  of putting troops on the ground in Yemen.
• 20:12
  They were worried about the resilience of the government,
• 20:15
  and they thought the Pakistanis might be,
• 20:17
  you know,
• 20:17
  had enough troops that they'd be willing effectively to,
• 20:20
  uh,
• 20:21
  expend some of them,
• 20:22
  uh,
• 20:22
  in exchange for,
• 20:23
  uh,
• 20:24
  you know,
• 20:24
  obviously generous Saudi,
• 20:26
  uh,
• 20:26
  subsidies.
• 20:27
  Um,
• 20:28
  and the Pakistanis.
• 20:29
  Disappointed them and said,
• 20:30
  no,
• 20:30
  you know,
• 20:31
  we don't want to
• 20:32
  get body bags coming back from Yemen,
• 20:34
  and that's not going to be good for our politics.
• 20:37
  So,
• 20:37
  I don't see any reason why that should have changed right now.
• 20:40
  The Pakistani government is,
• 20:41
  if anything,
• 20:41
  is more precarious now than it was then,
• 20:43
  you know,
• 20:44
  it's got all sorts of domestic opposition problems.
• 20:46
  It's trying to fight a rather difficult
• 20:49
  sort of,
• 20:50
  I don't know whether it's called it a war exactly.
• 20:52
  Uh,
• 20:52
  you know,
• 20:53
  sort of at the very least nutritional conflict
• 20:55
  with the Afghan Taliban,
• 20:57
  uh,
• 20:57
  just across the border,
• 20:59
  um,
• 20:59
  into Afghanistan.
• 21:01
  So,
• 21:02
  uh,
• 21:02
  I don't think that Pakistan is going to help very much,
• 21:04
  although they will definitely send,
• 21:06
  you know,
• 21:06
  more personnel to Saudi Arabia.
• 21:09
  They've already got a lot of personnel in Saudi Arabia in various,
• 21:12
  uh,
• 21:12
  support functions,
• 21:13
  training,
• 21:14
  uh,
• 21:14
  and that sort of thing.
• 21:16
  Um,
• 21:16
  and then,
• 21:17
  uh,
• 21:17
  the Turks,
• 21:18
  yeah,
• 21:18
  you know,
• 21:19
  they've got
• 21:20
  highly capable,
• 21:21
  uh,
• 21:21
  military.
• 21:22
  Um,
• 21:23
  but they,
• 21:23
  you know,
• 21:24
  again,
• 21:24
  are they willing to take casualties in Yemen?
• 21:26
  I don't think so.
• 21:27
  They're talking about defensive purposes only.
• 21:31
  And the same of course is true of the British typhoons,
• 21:33
  they're there for defensive purposes only.
• 21:35
  And the Egyptians appear also to be talking about,
• 21:38
  you know,
• 21:38
  if they do,
• 21:39
  if their troops are asked for by the Saudis,
• 21:42
  again,
• 21:42
  same thing.
• 21:43
  So what you could end up with is a,
• 21:45
  is a whole coalition.
• 21:46
  of friendly folks who love the Saudis,
• 21:48
  um,
• 21:49
  all turning up,
• 21:50
  but basically just manning positions in Saudi Arabia.
• 21:53
  Now,
• 21:53
  how useful is that against the Houthis?
• 21:55
  Probably the most useful thing they can do is
• 21:57
  to contribute to Saudi border security in the south.
• 22:00
  That would be something.
• 22:01
  And of course it's true that the Houthis might be a bit worried
• 22:04
  about killing those people because of course if you start killing Turks,
• 22:07
  or start killing Pakistanis or Egyptians,
• 22:10
  then maybe that changes their risk appetite for
• 22:13
  actually,
• 22:13
  uh,
• 22:14
  you know,
• 22:14
  sort of getting some kind of revenge on you.
• 22:17
  So it's not completely useless,
• 22:19
  but the bottom line is,
• 22:22
  whatever does not reinforce the ability of
• 22:25
  the internationally recognized government of Yemen.
• 22:28
  To steady themselves and ultimately to prevail in the Yemeni civil war,
• 22:33
  it won't ultimately help the Saudis very much.
• 22:37
  Uh,
• 22:39
  Uh,
• 22:39
  it's interesting the way that you,
• 22:40
  you,
• 22:41
  you.
• 22:42
  You frame it,
• 22:43
  um,
• 22:43
  as they're all friends of the Saudis,
• 22:45
  I assume mostly because
• 22:47
  for economic purposes,
• 22:49
  um,
• 22:50
  and there's some alignment obviously on religious grounds and,
• 22:54
  uh,
• 22:54
  but
• 22:56
  It does seem as if
• 22:58
  In a sense,
• 23:00
  the Saudis,
• 23:01
  uh,
• 23:01
  you know,
• 23:02
  if you look at Turkey,
• 23:03
  Pakistan,
• 23:03
  Egypt,
• 23:04
  you look at them and you think,
• 23:05
  OK,
• 23:05
  they're,
• 23:05
  they're sort of reluctantly.
• 23:08
  Getting in on this,
• 23:09
  right?
• 23:09
  And their support's only gonna go so far.
• 23:11
  Well,
• 23:11
  in part,
• 23:12
  it's because it seems like the Saudis,
• 23:14
  to your
• 23:15
  earlier point,
• 23:16
  are reluctant participants
• 23:19
  in this.
• 23:20
  You know,
• 23:20
  they've got themselves in a situation.
• 23:23
  Which again if we broaden the frame,
• 23:26
  widen the frame,
• 23:27
  you look and you think,
• 23:28
  OK,
• 23:28
  well this is exactly
• 23:30
  what the Iranian regime would want going back to
• 23:33
  sort of,
• 23:34
  OK,
• 23:34
  this is not happening in a bubble,
• 23:36
  this is just not something that's taking place in Yemen.
• 23:38
  If you look at what does the Iranian regime want from this.
• 23:42
  So,
• 23:43
  perhaps they're a little surprised at the international support that's coming in,
• 23:48
  um,
• 23:48
  and perhaps that will cause them to kind of rethink.
• 23:52
  But if they said
• 23:53
  to the Houthis,
• 23:54
  I guess to your point about the,
• 23:55
  the Houthis have,
• 23:56
  you know,
• 23:57
  influenced by the IRGC but make their own decisions,
• 24:01
  to what degree if the regime says,
• 24:03
  all right,
• 24:05
  let's pretend,
• 24:05
  let's pretend there's negotiations between Washington
• 24:07
  and Tehran that mean something.
• 24:09
  And,
• 24:11
  Could,
• 24:12
  I mean,
• 24:13
  I guess the US only has two envoys,
• 24:14
  right?
• 24:15
  Steve Woodkoff and Jared Kushner,
• 24:16
  they seem to be the envoys for everything.
• 24:18
  Um,
• 24:19
  but if they
• 24:20
  sit and say and insist on,
• 24:23
  The
• 24:24
  Kuthis stopping
• 24:25
  their,
• 24:26
  uh,
• 24:27
  actions
• 24:28
  and to
• 24:29
  continue or to stop,
• 24:31
  uh,
• 24:31
  disrupting the Babel Manabin.
• 24:34
  Could they put that on the table in negotiations with the Iranian regime?
• 24:40
  And get the Iranian regime to
• 24:42
  turn to the Houthis and say,
• 24:44
  stop it.
• 24:44
  I guess that was a long,
• 24:46
  long way to get to a relatively straightforward question.
• 24:49
  I think the answer is
• 24:51
  yes,
• 24:51
  up to a point,
• 24:53
  um,
• 24:54
  because both the Iranians and the Houthis
• 24:57
  are very tactically astute.
• 25:00
  They understand what it is to make a temporary gain,
• 25:04
  provided that you're not compromising your long term ambitions.
• 25:07
  So in other words,
• 25:08
  you might say,
• 25:09
  um,
• 25:10
  you know,
• 25:10
  I,
• 25:11
  I still want death to America.
• 25:13
  But just at the moment,
• 25:14
  if I can dupe the Americans into,
• 25:17
  uh,
• 25:17
  you know,
• 25:17
  coming up with some kind of agreement that leads to a tactical pause,
• 25:20
  that's going to be in my interests
• 25:22
  in the short term.
• 25:23
  That's the way the Iranians think it's also the way the Houthis think.
• 25:26
  And so I think in those,
• 25:28
  in the circumstance that you describe,
• 25:30
  uh,
• 25:30
  it's possible.
• 25:31
  I,
• 25:31
  what would happen in those circumstances,
• 25:33
  of course,
• 25:33
  is something else as well,
• 25:34
  and that is that just as happened with the MOU.
• 25:37
  Um,
• 25:38
  the Iranians would also say,
• 25:39
  well,
• 25:40
  you know,
• 25:40
  you want to include the Yemeni front in this.
• 25:42
  Well,
• 25:42
  obviously we insist on including the Lebanese front in this as well.
• 25:46
  And so then you bring in the question of,
• 25:49
  so you're,
• 25:49
  the Americans are effectively trying to negotiate
• 25:52
  on behalf of allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia,
• 25:56
  that actually have their own independent concerns.
• 25:59
  Now that might be less of a problem with the Saudis because the Saudis
• 26:02
  would probably just take the respite if they could get it.
• 26:05
  Um,
• 26:05
  the Israelis,
• 26:06
  of course,
• 26:06
  will not.
• 26:07
  The Israelis have learned their lesson since the 7th of October 23,
• 26:11
  and they're not going to give up on the Lebanese front
• 26:14
  until they're confident that that northern Israel is no longer threatened.
• 26:17
  So I think that would turn into a very difficult negotiation.
• 26:20
  I think the Iranians,
• 26:21
  you know,
• 26:21
  very tough negotiators,
• 26:23
  they
• 26:23
  will probably run rings around,
• 26:25
  uh,
• 26:25
  Mr.
• 26:25
  Witoff and Mr.
• 26:26
  Kushner as they have in the past.
• 26:28
  And so,
• 26:29
  you know,
• 26:29
  you,
• 26:29
  you might end up with something as unsatisfactory as the MOU itself,
• 26:33
  which thank goodness,
• 26:34
  uh,
• 26:35
  turned out to be a
• 26:36
  dead in the water,
• 26:37
  didn't it?
• 26:38
  Um,
• 26:38
  and I think this is,
• 26:40
  and this is perhaps the one thing that helps us
• 26:43
  is that for all their tactical
• 26:45
  skill,
• 26:46
  Both the Houthis and the Iranians also have a tendency to overreach.
• 26:50
  They have a tendency to push their luck just a bit too far,
• 26:53
  just as the Iranians did when they
• 26:55
  scorned the MOU and carried on,
• 26:57
  uh,
• 26:57
  attacking ships in the Strait of Hormuz,
• 26:59
  and therefore they lost all of the
• 27:00
  tactical advantage that the MOU could have given them if they had made just a few
• 27:04
  limited concessions.
• 27:06
  Likewise,
• 27:06
  the Houthis,
• 27:07
  uh,
• 27:08
  if they were,
• 27:08
  I think more tactically astute,
• 27:10
  they probably wouldn't be.
• 27:12
  Uh,
• 27:13
  killing American nationals at Riyadh airport,
• 27:15
  they probably wouldn't be,
• 27:17
  uh,
• 27:17
  rendering themselves vulnerable to accusations of attacking
• 27:21
  Mecca.
• 27:22
  And,
• 27:22
  uh,
• 27:23
  so
• 27:23
  what's happened,
• 27:24
  and I think it's good,
• 27:25
  you know,
• 27:25
  you mentioned the religious dimension to this because
• 27:27
  one of the
• 27:28
  things here that is
• 27:30
  perhaps interesting in the longer term,
• 27:32
  it's unlikely to kick in yet because
• 27:34
  the Houthis don't currently pose a threat to Mecca and Medina.
• 27:38
  But the Houthis claim Mecca and Medina.
• 27:41
  They say that the Al Saud are unfit guardians of the holy places.
• 27:45
  And they go,
• 27:46
  they hark back to the 1000 year Imamat and to the fact that
• 27:50
  in those days,
• 27:51
  the Yemenis had a role in Mecca and Medina.
• 27:54
  Um,
• 27:54
  and of course,
• 27:55
  as you know,
• 27:55
  the Turks did too because of the,
• 27:57
  uh,
• 27:57
  the Ottoman Empire.
• 27:58
  I mean,
• 27:58
  it was actually,
• 27:59
  it was actually part of the,
• 28:00
  uh,
• 28:01
  the Turkish Empire over many,
• 28:02
  many centuries.
• 28:03
  Um,
• 28:04
  and the fault line between those two,
• 28:06
  you know,
• 28:07
  because the imam was never part of the Ottoman Empire,
• 28:09
  that fault line is now where modern Saudi Arabia is,
• 28:12
  and northern Saudi Arabia is often dismissed
• 28:14
  by the older countries
• 28:16
  as being something of a sort of,
• 28:17
  you know,
• 28:17
  a modern contrivance,
• 28:19
  something that's not natural.
• 28:20
  And the Houthis keep saying,
• 28:22
  Mecca is not governorate of Saudi Arabia.
• 28:25
  It belongs to the Islamic Omama.
• 28:27
  And they sometimes,
• 28:28
  they sometimes also talk about their territorial claims
• 28:31
  to the whole of the southern peninsula,
• 28:34
  saying that they should govern the peninsula from Mecca to Mafra.
• 28:38
  In other words,
• 28:38
  from
• 28:39
  Mecca in the far northwest
• 28:41
  of that half of the peninsula,
• 28:43
  down to Mafra,
• 28:44
  which is the bordering governorate,
• 28:47
  uh,
• 28:47
  hard up against the Sultanate of Oman
• 28:49
  in the southeast.
• 28:51
  And so I think this talk
• 28:53
  and the fact that the Houthis appear to have a sort of a constantly
• 28:58
  uh evolving ambition,
• 29:00
  not just to win the Yemeni civil war,
• 29:02
  but then to impose themselves outside Yemen.
• 29:05
  I think it's starting to alarm some Sunni countries
• 29:09
  who are saying,
• 29:10
  well,
• 29:10
  hold on a sec,
• 29:11
  the Houthis are not going to be allowed to
• 29:14
  claim Mecca and Medina because they are not,
• 29:16
  they're not proper Sunnis.
• 29:21
  Well,
• 29:21
  I,
• 29:21
  I think that was a,
• 29:22
  uh,
• 29:23
  a,
• 29:24
  a very,
• 29:25
  uh,
• 29:25
  eloquent five-minute,
• 29:27
  uh,
• 29:27
  overview
• 29:29
  of the,
• 29:30
  the history
• 29:31
  of the region.
• 29:32
  Uh,
• 29:32
  I hope,
• 29:33
  I hope people were taking notes.
• 29:34
  Uh,
• 29:36
  look,
• 29:36
  if you had to,
• 29:38
  Uh,
• 29:39
  I hate to ask you a question that's,
• 29:41
  you know,
• 29:41
  just complete speculation,
• 29:42
  but I'm going to because
• 29:44
  that's actually,
• 29:44
  I don't hate doing it.
• 29:45
  I enjoy doing it.
• 29:47
  Uh,
• 29:47
  if you had to,
• 29:48
  uh,
• 29:48
  kind of look forward
• 29:50
  beyond the midterm elections,
• 29:52
  which is a whole
• 29:53
  another
• 29:54
  topic,
• 29:55
  you alluded to the fact that the
• 29:56
  Iranian regime is kind of
• 29:58
  blocking and delaying until the midterm elections,
• 30:01
  and
• 30:01
  that's
• 30:02
  not an
• 30:03
  unsophisticated strategy on their part,
• 30:05
  but,
• 30:06
  If you had to look
• 30:08
  just beyond the midterm elections,
• 30:10
  where do you think this is going?
• 30:12
  Do we see a renewed military campaign?
• 30:15
  Do we see an,
• 30:16
  uh,
• 30:16
  uh,
• 30:17
  an actual meaningful negotiation?
• 30:19
  Uh,
• 30:19
  do we see a change in the way that the
• 30:22
  Houthi-Saudi conflict is playing out?
• 30:24
  What,
• 30:24
  what would be your top line assessment?
• 30:28
  So I,
• 30:28
  I,
• 30:28
  I think we probably are looking at um
• 30:32
  renewed.
• 30:33
  Sort of military escalation after the midterms,
• 30:36
  that,
• 30:36
  you know,
• 30:37
  I keep hearing this from various people who
• 30:39
  say they've heard it from the administration in one way or another.
• 30:42
  Um,
• 30:43
  and,
• 30:43
  you know,
• 30:44
  clearly
• 30:45
  the administration is inhibited at the moment,
• 30:47
  they don't want to do anything that makes it likely
• 30:50
  that the midterms come out worse than they will.
• 30:53
  Um,
• 30:54
  but,
• 30:54
  uh,
• 30:55
  they also feel that,
• 30:56
  um,
• 30:57
  the Iranians are provoking,
• 30:58
  you know,
• 30:58
  the Iranians have hit,
• 30:59
  hit quite a few ships in the Strait of Hormuz,
• 31:02
  uh,
• 31:02
  over the last couple of weeks.
• 31:04
  Um,
• 31:04
  and they also,
• 31:05
  I think,
• 31:06
  are increasingly convinced that,
• 31:08
  uh,
• 31:09
  the Saudi Arabia has to be defended.
• 31:12
  Um,
• 31:12
  so I think that probably after midterms,
• 31:14
  we,
• 31:15
  we,
• 31:15
  we,
• 31:15
  we may well see an escalation.
• 31:17
  I'm not sure I would advise an escalation or at least
• 31:19
  I,
• 31:20
  I would,
• 31:20
  you know,
• 31:20
  my,
• 31:20
  my,
• 31:21
  my,
• 31:21
  if I were,
• 31:21
  you know,
• 31:22
  if I were advising the president,
• 31:24
  I would,
• 31:24
  I would say,
• 31:25
  you know,
• 31:26
  the strategy
• 31:28
  localized to Iran
• 31:29
  and the Strait of Hormuz
• 31:31
  is already working.
• 31:33
  The naval blockade,
• 31:35
  coupled with rigorous enforcement of secondary sanctions.
• 31:39
  And,
• 31:40
  uh,
• 31:40
  an increasing
• 31:41
  traffic through the Strait of Hormuz,
• 31:43
  uh,
• 31:44
  with,
• 31:44
  you know,
• 31:44
  whatever countermeasures are necessary as the Iranians try to uh find
• 31:48
  new ways of threatening ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
• 31:51
  Um,
• 31:51
  I think that's working.
• 31:52
  I think the Iranian economy is,
• 31:54
  is,
• 31:55
  uh,
• 31:55
  asphyxiating at the moment.
• 31:56
  They've got no exports,
• 31:58
  they've got no export earnings,
• 31:59
  and this is doing massive damage to the IRGC.
• 32:02
  The IRGC can't pay its people.
• 32:04
  The IRGC,
• 32:04
  of course,
• 32:04
  is not just some kind of,
• 32:06
  uh,
• 32:06
  it's not like the Houthis,
• 32:07
  you know,
• 32:07
  the Houthis can be said.
• 32:08
  In a way to be a sort of a,
• 32:10
  a band of merry warriors chewing their gut and
• 32:13
  loving the fight and not really caring if they,
• 32:16
  you know,
• 32:16
  if they sleep,
• 32:17
  you know,
• 32:17
  on in rocky caves or whatever.
• 32:19
  Um,
• 32:20
  the IRGC actually is a gigantic
• 32:23
  state enterprise that runs businesses.
• 32:26
  And so they cannot afford to let,
• 32:28
  you know,
• 32:29
  to just to let the Americans continue to strangle them to death.
• 32:32
  So it is possible that this blockade
• 32:34
  will actually force the Iranians ultimately into,
• 32:37
  uh,
• 32:38
  you know,
• 32:38
  making some concessions,
• 32:39
  perhaps on the nuclear file,
• 32:41
  which is the key one for the Americans.
• 32:42
  I think the US
• 32:43
  will not leave this conflict unless it
• 32:45
  has satisfactorily neutralized the Iranian nuclear program.
• 32:51
  So I think that's I,
• 32:52
  I think that,
• 32:53
  oh,
• 32:53
  I'm sorry,
• 32:53
  I'm sorry for interrupting.
• 32:54
  I just wanted to make the point that I think you're absolutely correct.
• 32:56
  I think they need,
• 32:58
  regardless of how
• 32:59
  meaningful those nuclear concessions are,
• 33:03
  they,
• 33:03
  the White House needs something
• 33:05
  on that front
• 33:06
  in order to
• 33:09
  Sell this in order to exit
• 33:11
  and,
• 33:11
  and say,
• 33:12
  look what we've done,
• 33:13
  uh,
• 33:13
  without that.
• 33:15
  Uh,
• 33:16
  it,
• 33:16
  it's
• 33:17
  going to be almost impossible for them to spin any sort of agreement
• 33:21
  with the
• 33:22
  Islamic Republic,
• 33:24
  you know,
• 33:24
  the regime is still in place,
• 33:26
  but it's gonna be very difficult to spin any sort of agreement,
• 33:29
  um,
• 33:30
  as a,
• 33:30
  as a win.
• 33:31
  But,
• 33:31
  uh,
• 33:32
  certainly,
• 33:32
  Ambassador,
• 33:33
  I,
• 33:33
  I'd want to be very meaningful of your time and,
• 33:35
  and,
• 33:36
  uh,
• 33:36
  I also want to ensure that,
• 33:38
  um,
• 33:39
  You come back.
• 33:40
  So,
• 33:42
  we,
• 33:42
  I've got,
• 33:42
  I've got 2 more pages of questions.
• 33:45
  Uh,
• 33:45
  what I don't have is time,
• 33:47
  uh,
• 33:47
  but I want to thank you.
• 33:48
  Uh,
• 33:49
  brilliant insight,
• 33:50
  really
• 33:51
  very much appreciate the analysis.
• 33:53
  Um,
• 33:54
  and
• 33:55
  I would love to have you back on shortly after the midterms
• 33:57
  so we can kind of assess where we are at that point.
• 34:00
  I think that would be fascinating.
• 34:02
  Let's do it.
• 34:03
  Excellent.
• 34:04
  Thank you again,
• 34:04
  sir.
• 34:05
  See you soon.
• 34:06
  That was Edmund Fitten Brown.
• 34:08
  Very much appreciate his insight.
• 34:10
  Hopefully get him back on the show shortly after the midterm elections.
• 34:14
  All right,
• 34:14
  coming up next,
• 34:15
  Xi Jinping's latest purge
• 34:17
  claims 33 senior officials.
• 34:20
  Who knew there were that many left after all his previous purges,
• 34:23
  and raises questions about uh Xi Jinping's kung fu-like grip on power
• 34:27
  and the growing turmoil that may exist within the Chinese Communist Party.
• 34:32
  Author Gordon G Chang will join us next
• 34:34
  to break it all down.
• 34:35
  Stay with us.
• 34:38
  Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report.
• 34:41
  China's Communist Party has wrapped up its 5th plenum in Beijing,
• 34:45
  and President Xi Jinping's
• 34:47
  sweeping purge of the country's political and military leadership
• 34:50
  is taking center stage.
• 34:52
  The party has confirmed the expulsion of 33 senior officials,
• 34:56
  including
• 34:57
  some of China's most powerful military commanders and longtime Xi allies.
• 35:02
  The gathering also saw a record number of absences,
• 35:05
  raising new questions
• 35:06
  about the scale of the political upheaval inside Beijing.
• 35:10
  So,
• 35:11
  is Xi Jinping consolidating his grip on power
• 35:14
  or do these purges suggest growing
• 35:16
  instability within the Chinese Communist Party?
• 35:19
  And what could it mean for China's military ambitions,
• 35:22
  including
• 35:22
  toward Taiwan,
• 35:23
  of course.
• 35:24
  Well,
• 35:24
  joining us now is Gordon G Chang.
• 35:26
  You know him,
• 35:26
  great.
• 35:27
  Friend of the show and the author of Plan Red,
• 35:30
  China's Project to destroy America.
• 35:31
  Get yourself a copy of that and
• 35:33
  read it.
• 35:34
  I guarantee you'll enjoy it.
• 35:35
  It's super interesting.
• 35:36
  I just said super.
• 35:38
  Look at me,
• 35:38
  I'm like a teenager.
• 35:40
  You can follow him on X and just go to at Gordon G Chang.
• 35:44
  All right,
• 35:45
  uh,
• 35:46
  Gordon,
• 35:46
  welcome back to the show.
• 35:47
  We got some things to talk about,
• 35:49
  um,
• 35:50
  and it does seem like every time we get together.
• 35:53
  Xi Jinping has
• 35:56
  gotten rid of a few more senior officials.
• 35:58
  This time he's done what,
• 35:59
  33 of them?
• 36:01
  Yes,
• 36:02
  um,
• 36:02
  there have been unprecedented purges.
• 36:05
  Um,
• 36:05
  we've had a meeting of the 5th plenum of the Communist Party.
• 36:09
  Plenums are
• 36:11
  plenary sessions of the Central Committee between national congresses.
• 36:16
  The Communist Party these days holds national congresses every 5 years.
• 36:20
  The next one is the 21st,
• 36:22
  which will be in the basically this time
• 36:26
  next year.
• 36:27
  And this plenum is important because Xi Jinping
• 36:31
  sought to consolidate his control over the party
• 36:34
  because at the 21st National Congress,
• 36:36
  he wants a 4th term as General Secretary
• 36:40
  and as chairman of the party's Central Military Commission.
• 36:44
  So we've seen these purges.
• 36:46
  It indicates that he has been able to at least get rid of people he doesn't like.
• 36:52
  The issue though,
• 36:53
  uh,
• 36:53
  and this is also true for the purges in the military,
• 36:57
  uh,
• 36:57
  yeah,
• 36:57
  he keeps on getting rid of people,
• 36:59
  but that doesn't mean he controls things,
• 37:01
  because if he controlled things,
• 37:02
  he wouldn't need to continually purge
• 37:05
  the party.
• 37:06
  So the continual purging of the party suggests that there is instability,
• 37:12
  um,
• 37:12
  and that's true of the military and true
• 37:14
  of the civilian sides of the Communist Party.
• 37:17
  Remember,
• 37:17
  the Chinese military is not a state army,
• 37:19
  it's a party army.
• 37:20
  And it's therefore extremely political.
• 37:24
  Yeah,
• 37:24
  that's a,
• 37:24
  that's a very important point.
• 37:25
  Uh,
• 37:26
  it is interesting that,
• 37:27
  what,
• 37:28
  14 years into his,
• 37:30
  whatever you wanna call it,
• 37:31
  his tenure,
• 37:31
  his reign,
• 37:33
  um,
• 37:34
  He's still,
• 37:36
  you know,
• 37:37
  cleaning house
• 37:38
  based on corruption charges,
• 37:40
  uh,
• 37:41
  party disloyalty,
• 37:42
  and he's cleaning a house
• 37:44
  over a period of 14 years that he's built,
• 37:48
  right?
• 37:48
  So,
• 37:49
  to your point about its stability,
• 37:51
  it does seem
• 37:52
  unusual,
• 37:53
  right?
• 37:53
  If,
• 37:53
  if,
• 37:54
  if he had created a stable foundation or infrastructure,
• 37:58
  He wouldn't be going through these purges,
• 38:00
  you wouldn't imagine because he would have accomplished the task.
• 38:03
  To what degree is,
• 38:05
  is the party at all looking at Xi Jinping and saying,
• 38:08
  you know,
• 38:08
  this is a,
• 38:09
  this is a problem of leadership.
• 38:11
  Well,
• 38:12
  they're looking at that,
• 38:13
  at least they're saying that quietly,
• 38:15
  um,
• 38:15
  but they're not willing to say it openly.
• 38:18
  And
• 38:19
  what's going on here is that
• 38:22
  Xi Jinping in 2012,
• 38:23
  when he became general secretary for the first time,
• 38:27
  uh,
• 38:27
  he inherited a relatively stable political system.
• 38:31
  There were rules,
• 38:32
  guidelines,
• 38:33
  norms,
• 38:34
  understandings about how the party would transfer power.
• 38:38
  Um,
• 38:38
  and so you had a very unusual period in the history of the party,
• 38:43
  um,
• 38:44
  where there was calm.
• 38:46
  But what Xi Jinping has done is he's jumped all of those guidelines and rules,
• 38:51
  and,
• 38:51
  and
• 38:52
  so
• 38:53
  right now you have a lot of grumbling.
• 38:55
  So for instance,
• 38:56
  when he took his 3rd term as general secretary
• 39:00
  4 years ago,
• 39:01
  what he did was he prevented a whole
• 39:04
  generation of Communist Party leaders from moving up.
• 39:07
  Because when the general secretary leaves,
• 39:09
  everybody gets a promotion,
• 39:11
  but by not leaving the last time,
• 39:13
  he has denied people promotions.
• 39:16
  They're not happy.
• 39:17
  But the point is that Xi Jinping has got a sort of reign of terror going,
• 39:22
  and that means they won't say anything,
• 39:25
  at least in the open.
• 39:27
  It all kind of comes down to the same.
• 39:29
  Question,
• 39:30
  which is,
• 39:31
  you know,
• 39:32
  how is his grip on power?
• 39:34
  We've talked about this before,
• 39:36
  but we always keep coming back around to it
• 39:38
  and it always,
• 39:40
  I,
• 39:40
  I,
• 39:40
  you know,
• 39:40
  I,
• 39:41
  I know it's very difficult to
• 39:43
  You know,
• 39:44
  to read the tea leaves there and,
• 39:45
  and understand what's actually happening,
• 39:48
  you know,
• 39:48
  in the inner circle that seems to always be shrinking around Xi.
• 39:52
  But,
• 39:53
  You know,
• 39:54
  that,
• 39:54
  let's,
• 39:54
  let's kind of
• 39:56
  throw that question at you.
• 39:57
  I mean,
• 39:57
  I,
• 39:58
  I know,
• 39:58
  realize it's a,
• 39:59
  that's a broad playing field,
• 40:00
  but,
• 40:01
  you know,
• 40:01
  how do you assess his grip on power at this point after these latest purges?
• 40:08
  He's stronger than I thought he would be,
• 40:10
  but,
• 40:10
  you know,
• 40:11
  let's go to the Central Military Commission again.
• 40:13
  There's now a question.
• 40:15
  Um,
• 40:16
  this Central Military Commission has been,
• 40:18
  um,
• 40:18
  you know,
• 40:19
  these vacancies have been there for most of this year.
• 40:22
  And the question is,
• 40:24
  is he not able to fill the 5,
• 40:27
  or does he not want to?
• 40:29
  In other words,
• 40:30
  does he want to completely control the military this way?
• 40:34
  I think that he can't,
• 40:36
  you know,
• 40:36
  he can't find 5 that he trusts,
• 40:39
  but
• 40:39
  I'm just guessing.
• 40:40
  I'm spitballing.
• 40:42
  I have no confidence in my answer.
• 40:44
  It's just instinct.
• 40:46
  And so,
• 40:47
  uh,
• 40:48
  you know,
• 40:48
  this is a,
• 40:49
  this is a regime that is normally opaque.
• 40:51
  It's a communist regime,
• 40:52
  but Xi Jinping has made it even less transparent than it was before.
• 40:57
  So
• 40:58
  we're all just speculating and,
• 40:59
  and as I say,
• 41:01
  um,
• 41:01
  I know less about China than I did 3 or 4 years ago,
• 41:04
  2 years ago,
• 41:05
  um,
• 41:06
  because he's
• 41:07
  explain that.
• 41:08
  That's a very interesting statement.
• 41:09
  What do you mean by that?
• 41:11
  I just,
• 41:13
  um,
• 41:13
  I'm speculating a lot more than I did before because I just don't know
• 41:18
  as much as I did before,
• 41:20
  and
• 41:21
  this is not for want of trying,
• 41:24
  this is just because the regime has now cut links with the outside,
• 41:29
  which means that it's much harder to sort
• 41:31
  of get information from which to base opinions.
• 41:35
  So,
• 41:36
  um,
• 41:37
  there are things that we know,
• 41:38
  and there are things that we speculate,
• 41:40
  and unfortunately,
• 41:42
  the room for the area of speculation is now a lot bigger than it used to be.
• 41:48
  Do you think that's
• 41:49
  also the case with the US government?
• 41:51
  I mean,
• 41:51
  do you think that
• 41:53
  they too are having to speculate more
• 41:56
  than they did in the past?
• 41:59
  Yeah,
• 41:59
  um,
• 42:00
  the CIA has had a terrible record in understanding China,
• 42:04
  so I think that that is very much,
• 42:07
  um,
• 42:08
  you know,
• 42:09
  I think it's
• 42:10
  their problem as well.
• 42:12
  Um,
• 42:12
  you know,
• 42:12
  I won't take that as a personal insult,
• 42:14
  Gordon.
• 42:15
  I'll just let it slide.
• 42:17
  Well,
• 42:17
  actually there are,
• 42:18
  there,
• 42:18
  there are,
• 42:19
  there are some very difficult lifts,
• 42:20
  uh,
• 42:21
  and there always have been.
• 42:23
  Uh,
• 42:23
  over the decades,
• 42:24
  and China has certainly been
• 42:27
  right there at the top in terms of a,
• 42:28
  a difficult lift in,
• 42:30
  in,
• 42:30
  in
• 42:30
  having quality,
• 42:32
  credible,
• 42:33
  corroborated intel
• 42:34
  on what's going on inside the party,
• 42:37
  inside the PLA,
• 42:39
  uh,
• 42:39
  plans and intentions.
• 42:41
  So,
• 42:41
  if you had to put,
• 42:42
  you know,
• 42:43
  uh,
• 42:43
  countries in the top three,
• 42:45
  it certainly put China right up there,
• 42:47
  Iran,
• 42:48
  North Korea.
• 42:49
  But,
• 42:49
  so I take your point.
• 42:50
  It,
• 42:50
  it's always been a difficult intel lift.
• 42:53
  You know,
• 42:53
  you should actually feel complimented because your generation in
• 42:56
  the CIA knew more about China than today's.
• 43:00
  Yeah,
• 43:01
  look at that.
• 43:02
  Although that's a bit of a slap at my age,
• 43:04
  but I'm OK with that.
• 43:05
  Uh,
• 43:06
  so,
• 43:07
  let's,
• 43:08
  you know what,
• 43:08
  Gordon,
• 43:08
  if we,
• 43:09
  if we could,
• 43:10
  we're gonna,
• 43:10
  we're gonna take that moment,
• 43:12
  um,
• 43:13
  and,
• 43:13
  uh,
• 43:14
  do a quick break
• 43:15
  and then we'll be back with more from
• 43:18
  Gordon G.
• 43:18
  Chang.
• 43:18
  Listen,
• 43:19
  if you're not following him on X,
• 43:20
  you should be.
• 43:22
  Just go to at Gordon G Chang.
• 43:24
  We'll be right back
• 43:25
  with more from Gordon here on The Situation Report.
• 43:28
  So stay with us.
• 43:30
  Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report.
• 43:33
  Joining us once again is Gordon Chang.
• 43:36
  You can follow Gordon on X and I suggest that you do
• 43:39
  just search up at Gordon G Chang.
• 43:42
  Gordon,
• 43:42
  thanks very much for staying with us here.
• 43:44
  Uh,
• 43:44
  we've been talking about Xi Jinping,
• 43:47
  we've been talking about the purges,
• 43:48
  uh,
• 43:49
  that he just,
• 43:50
  uh,
• 43:50
  affected in within the military
• 43:53
  and the government
• 43:54
  security services.
• 43:55
  Um,
• 43:56
  I want to switch now,
• 43:58
  uh,
• 43:59
  maybe take a left turn,
• 44:01
  still kind of focused on China in a way,
• 44:03
  but
• 44:03
  what have you heard about this story that's
• 44:06
  recently broke over the past couple of days
• 44:09
  involving the investigation into a Chinese intel asset,
• 44:13
  uh,
• 44:13
  developing a relationship with or just trying to develop a relationship
• 44:18
  with Nvidia's
• 44:20
  CEO,
• 44:20
  uh,
• 44:21
  Jensen Huang.
• 44:23
  Well,
• 44:24
  I mean,
• 44:25
  if the Chinese intelligence operations didn't try to target Chenson Wong,
• 44:30
  that would be news.
• 44:32
  That would be news.
• 44:33
  OK,
• 44:34
  but
• 44:34
  from this story,
• 44:35
  there are two things that are really disturbing.
• 44:39
  One of them is that President Trump was briefed on,
• 44:42
  um,
• 44:42
  Alice Wong,
• 44:43
  who was the
• 44:45
  Chinese asset in question.
• 44:47
  Um,
• 44:48
  and didn't say anything to Jensen Wong.
• 44:50
  Um,
• 44:51
  I think that that is a mistake.
• 44:53
  He should have,
• 44:54
  you know,
• 44:54
  the CEO of Nvidia should have been alerted.
• 44:57
  Um,
• 44:59
  the only justification for that is if,
• 45:02
  uh,
• 45:02
  Trump felt that Jensen Wong was himself compromised
• 45:05
  and they didn't want to let him know
• 45:07
  what,
• 45:08
  uh,
• 45:08
  the federal government knew.
• 45:09
  But apart from that,
• 45:10
  I think that they should have told him.
• 45:13
  The other thing I think it would have been a counterintelligence,
• 45:16
  uh,
• 45:17
  decision,
• 45:17
  that wouldn't have been
• 45:18
  Trump's decision.
• 45:19
  Uh,
• 45:19
  I mean,
• 45:20
  obviously,
• 45:20
  he's the president,
• 45:21
  you know,
• 45:21
  the president can weigh in,
• 45:22
  but
• 45:23
  in terms of if there was a,
• 45:25
  uh,
• 45:25
  counterintelligence investigation that was ongoing with Alice Huang,
• 45:29
  no,
• 45:29
  no relation apparently to Jensen Huang,
• 45:31
  but,
• 45:32
  um,
• 45:33
  then I think
• 45:34
  perhaps the decision not to give.
• 45:37
  The Nvidia CEO a
• 45:39
  defensive briefing
• 45:41
  or just at least provide him with some awareness.
• 45:44
  You know,
• 45:45
  the,
• 45:45
  the only real
• 45:46
  reason likely was that,
• 45:48
  you know,
• 45:48
  there was an ongoing investigation and they did not want to jeopardize
• 45:53
  whatever may have been happening,
• 45:54
  surveillance assets or whatever they were doing.
• 45:57
  Um,
• 45:58
  so,
• 45:58
  from an operational perspective,
• 45:59
  I could,
• 46:00
  I could get that.
• 46:01
  Now,
• 46:01
  you're right in the sense that
• 46:04
  if they had
• 46:05
  evaluated this thing
• 46:07
  fully and determined that the Nvidia CEO was not compromised in some fashion,
• 46:13
  then at some point,
• 46:14
  you have to,
• 46:16
  you have to get them on side.
• 46:17
  You have to advise them from a CIA perspective,
• 46:20
  what's happening.
• 46:22
  Yeah,
• 46:22
  because,
• 46:22
  uh,
• 46:23
  you want,
• 46:23
  you want Jensen Wong to be more careful in his relations with um Alice Wong,
• 46:28
  who actually was a customer,
• 46:30
  uh,
• 46:30
  Mega Speed.
• 46:31
  The second thing,
• 46:33
  uh,
• 46:33
  uh,
• 46:33
  and this is,
• 46:34
  um,
• 46:35
  extremely disturbing.
• 46:37
  We know that China has large quantities of Nvidia's Blackwell architecture chips.
• 46:43
  Those are the most sophisticated.
• 46:45
  Those are the ones that may not be exported to China.
• 46:49
  Now,
• 46:49
  the question is,
• 46:51
  Nvidia was selling these things around the world,
• 46:55
  I think,
• 46:56
  to customers that were
• 46:57
  dubious,
• 46:59
  um,
• 46:59
  and that were dirty,
• 47:01
  and the question is,
• 47:02
  why didn't
• 47:03
  Nvidia do more to stop this trade?
• 47:06
  And I think it's because my guess
• 47:09
  is that
• 47:10
  Nvidia knew that these chips were being diverted into China,
• 47:14
  but wanted to make the sales anyway.
• 47:16
  If that's the case,
• 47:18
  then,
• 47:18
  you know,
• 47:19
  we need a big,
• 47:20
  um,
• 47:21
  thorough FBI and maybe CIA investigation
• 47:25
  into
• 47:26
  Nvidia.
• 47:28
  We've had a lot of these issues where we've
• 47:30
  had American tech companies provide materials and services to
• 47:35
  prohibited Chinese parties,
• 47:37
  and
• 47:39
  basically they're only slap on the wrists.
• 47:42
  One example
• 47:44
  Lit Bhutan,
• 47:45
  who was,
• 47:46
  uh,
• 47:46
  who is now CEO of Intel.
• 47:48
  He was also CEO of Cadence,
• 47:50
  uh,
• 47:51
  Design Services.
• 47:53
  systems
• 47:55
  and Cadence,
• 47:56
  um,
• 47:57
  during the time he was CEO was providing services to a
• 48:01
  Chinese defense university which was on the Commerce Department's entity list.
• 48:04
  In other words,
• 48:05
  these services,
• 48:07
  because there was no license,
• 48:08
  were illegal,
• 48:09
  and Cadence actually pleaded guilty.
• 48:11
  But Lip Bhutan,
• 48:12
  he skated
• 48:14
  and he is now the head of Intel,
• 48:16
  which is getting a lot of federal money.
• 48:19
  So,
• 48:19
  you know,
• 48:20
  I think Jason Wong looks at that and said,
• 48:21
  well,
• 48:22
  there's no consequence for
• 48:24
  these illegal sales.
• 48:27
  My sense of it.
• 48:28
  I mean,
• 48:29
  uh,
• 48:29
  so
• 48:29
  that's a story that we need to investigate.
• 48:32
  We need to look at Jensen Wong.
• 48:33
  We need to look at Nvidia.
• 48:36
  Yeah,
• 48:36
  I,
• 48:37
  the,
• 48:38
  the story as it goes so far is that the Chinese intel asset,
• 48:42
  Alice Wong,
• 48:43
  uh,
• 48:43
  you're right,
• 48:44
  running a Singapore-based company called Megaspeed,
• 48:48
  and Megaspeed was apparently purchasing large numbers of chips from
• 48:53
  Nvidia
• 48:55
  through
• 48:56
  Other
• 48:57
  businesses,
• 48:58
  subsidiaries or ventures in some fashion with Megaspeed.
• 49:03
  Now,
• 49:04
  that's not atypical,
• 49:06
  right?
• 49:06
  If you're going to try to get around sanctions,
• 49:09
  you're going to use a variety of cutouts.
• 49:12
  So then the question to your point becomes,
• 49:14
  You know,
• 49:15
  did Nvidia do sufficient due diligence,
• 49:18
  uh,
• 49:19
  on these entities that were making these purchases?
• 49:23
  Uh,
• 49:23
  did they know and they just didn't care?
• 49:26
  Again,
• 49:27
  to your point.
• 49:28
  Um,
• 49:28
  so I,
• 49:29
  I think you're right.
• 49:30
  I do worry that
• 49:32
  Part of the problem
• 49:34
  is on the US government side,
• 49:36
  where
• 49:37
  if you don't connect all the dots,
• 49:39
  you can put sanctions in place,
• 49:41
  but as we've seen with Iran,
• 49:43
  You know,
• 49:43
  the regime has
• 49:45
  some 5000 entities,
• 49:48
  uh,
• 49:48
  associated with their Ministry of Defense.
• 49:51
  So,
• 49:51
  none of those have been sanctioned.
• 49:53
  You can put sanctions out there,
• 49:54
  but
• 49:55
  there are ways to get around it.
• 49:56
  And so then the US government needs to ensure that they're doing a thorough
• 50:01
  job,
• 50:02
  and that could be a heavy lift
• 50:03
  and it takes time and takes resources.
• 50:07
  Uh,
• 50:07
  and I get it.
• 50:08
  Sometimes,
• 50:08
  you know,
• 50:09
  businesses in the private sector aren't willing to,
• 50:11
  to put in that time because they want to make a deal.
• 50:14
  But
• 50:15
  I,
• 50:15
  I,
• 50:15
  I don't disagree with you.
• 50:16
  I think we need to understand fully,
• 50:19
  because now that we have this compromise in some fashion,
• 50:22
  I'm not saying that,
• 50:23
  you know,
• 50:24
  Jensen Kwang was compromised.
• 50:25
  I'm just saying that
• 50:26
  clearly he was targeted as you would fully expect.
• 50:30
  How Nvidia wouldn't have an internal
• 50:32
  corporate security program.
• 50:34
  That would be completely buttoned up given the
• 50:37
  national security implications of AI at this point
• 50:40
  is a whole another issue.
• 50:42
  Um,
• 50:43
  and now,
• 50:44
  Gordon,
• 50:44
  I'm
• 50:45
  just me climbing off of my soapbox
• 50:47
  to ask you another question.
• 50:49
  So,
• 50:50
  So what do you think,
• 50:52
  um,
• 50:53
  and what have you heard,
• 50:55
  uh,
• 50:55
  about
• 50:56
  the sort of the end result of this?
• 50:57
  Have you heard anything at all,
• 50:59
  uh,
• 51:00
  about what information they may have been going after,
• 51:03
  what information this Alice Wong may have collected,
• 51:07
  um,
• 51:07
  you know,
• 51:08
  any,
• 51:08
  any
• 51:09
  additional insight you can provide?
• 51:12
  Yeah,
• 51:12
  I,
• 51:12
  I'm sure Alice Wong wanted to know what Nvidia was doing,
• 51:15
  and,
• 51:15
  and of course,
• 51:16
  in Jenson Wong's relationship with President Trump,
• 51:19
  which was a close one,
• 51:21
  you know,
• 51:21
  the New York Times actually went through some of the
• 51:24
  things that they thought she would be looking for.
• 51:26
  I'm not sure that they know,
• 51:28
  um,
• 51:29
  and
• 51:29
  maybe nobody in the federal government knows,
• 51:31
  but the point is,
• 51:32
  she was in a position
• 51:34
  to get access to very important information.
• 51:38
  And so,
• 51:39
  Um,
• 51:40
  there's just,
• 51:41
  there's just so many questions that are open here,
• 51:44
  and it's not just the Chinese who are bad guys here.
• 51:47
  Um,
• 51:48
  yeah,
• 51:49
  I mean,
• 51:49
  the Chinese are bad guys,
• 51:50
  but we've let them be bad guys.
• 51:52
  We've opened the door,
• 51:53
  we opened the front door and say,
• 51:54
  why don't you,
• 51:55
  you know,
• 51:56
  help yourself.
• 51:57
  So
• 51:58
  this is an investigation that needs to have,
• 52:01
  this has broader implications,
• 52:03
  and it's not just Nvidia,
• 52:05
  it's others,
• 52:06
  but we need to have this because we cannot allow the Chinese to take our technology,
• 52:10
  which is really what the result is of all of this.
• 52:14
  No,
• 52:15
  it's it,
• 52:15
  and it's,
• 52:16
  you can't put a,
• 52:17
  a price tag on it.
• 52:18
  Over the years in particular,
• 52:20
  you can't put a price tag on what it's cost the US
• 52:22
  in terms of dollars,
• 52:23
  in terms of job opportunities,
• 52:25
  lost research and development,
• 52:27
  all those things.
• 52:28
  This has been going on for,
• 52:29
  for decades
• 52:30
  and you're right,
• 52:31
  we,
• 52:31
  in part because,
• 52:33
  uh,
• 52:33
  you know,
• 52:33
  we've always been chasing the,
• 52:35
  you know,
• 52:35
  China's market,
• 52:36
  right?
• 52:37
  Um,
• 52:38
  and in part because we mirror our values and imagine that.
• 52:42
  You know,
• 52:42
  we can all be uh
• 52:44
  on the same side in the community of nations.
• 52:46
  So for whatever reason,
• 52:48
  uh,
• 52:48
  we've allowed
• 52:50
  them to
• 52:52
  be incredibly aggressive and persistent,
• 52:55
  uh,
• 52:55
  in their
• 52:56
  theft of intellectual property,
• 52:57
  uh,
• 52:58
  research and development,
• 52:59
  economic information,
• 53:00
  whatever it may be,
• 53:01
  um,
• 53:02
  and.
• 53:04
  And,
• 53:04
  and again,
• 53:04
  you're right,
• 53:05
  you,
• 53:05
  you mentioned it earlier.
• 53:07
  There should be no surprise
• 53:08
  that
• 53:10
  Jensen Huang would be a target
• 53:12
  for an intel or for a,
• 53:14
  uh,
• 53:14
  espionage operation.
• 53:17
  Yes,
• 53:18
  yeah.
• 53:19
  So,
• 53:20
  well,
• 53:20
  Gordon,
• 53:22
  if I,
• 53:22
  if,
• 53:22
  if I may
• 53:23
  1 final question,
• 53:25
  and cause,
• 53:26
  you know,
• 53:26
  I love
• 53:27
  to ask you to speculate,
• 53:29
  but as we sort of approach the end of the year,
• 53:32
  Um,
• 53:34
  Taiwan
• 53:36
  He knew I was gonna ask about Taiwan.
• 53:38
  Uh,
• 53:38
  I just want to get your
• 53:40
  opinion on,
• 53:41
  uh,
• 53:43
  where,
• 53:43
  as we finish up the year,
• 53:44
  we go into the new year,
• 53:46
  um,
• 53:47
  do you see any
• 53:48
  significant developments around Taiwan or,
• 53:51
  or this time next year,
• 53:52
  or are we still
• 53:53
  talking about,
• 53:54
  uh,
• 53:55
  you know,
• 53:55
  increasing encroachment on their airspace,
• 53:57
  their water,
• 53:58
  but nothing fundamentally has changed?
• 54:01
  Yeah,
• 54:02
  I don't think anything is going to fundamentally change.
• 54:04
  Um,
• 54:05
  and I think the Chinese are waiting for the 2028
• 54:09
  presidential election in Taiwan,
• 54:11
  before they decide what they're going to do.
• 54:13
  But remember,
• 54:14
  you know,
• 54:14
  going back to this Communist Party Central Military Commission,
• 54:18
  I mean,
• 54:19
  there are no operational officers there,
• 54:20
  and you would think that for a combined air,
• 54:23
  land,
• 54:23
  sea operation,
• 54:24
  which is what an invasion of the main island of Taiwan would require,
• 54:28
  a very difficult military operation,
• 54:30
  even for us.
• 54:32
  Um,
• 54:32
  you would think that they would have better coordination,
• 54:35
  um,
• 54:36
  because they need that,
• 54:37
  and they apparently don't have it at the Central Military commission level.
• 54:41
  The question is whether they're able to replicate that at a lower level
• 54:45
  in the ranks of the People's Liberation Army.
• 54:47
  So,
• 54:48
  um,
• 54:48
  I,
• 54:49
  I just,
• 54:51
  there are a lot of things that can go wrong in East Asia.
• 54:54
  Um,
• 54:54
  among them,
• 54:55
  you know,
• 54:55
  some
• 54:56
  incident in the South China Sea or East China Sea that
• 55:00
  You know,
• 55:00
  can't be contained.
• 55:02
  Um,
• 55:03
  So I think the probability of war is actually pretty high,
• 55:06
  but I don't think the risk is that Xi Jinping decides to launch hostilities
• 55:12
  with an invasion of the main island of Taiwan.
• 55:15
  China's military,
• 55:16
  for all of its capabilities,
• 55:18
  is not able to do that,
• 55:19
  I think.
• 55:21
  And so
• 55:22
  I think we're going to be pretty much at the same with regard to Taiwan.
• 55:25
  We're going to be pretty much at the same place next year.
• 55:28
  Um,
• 55:29
  and it's going to be pretty much the same thing
• 55:31
  until at least after the 2028,
• 55:33
  uh,
• 55:34
  elections in Taiwan.
• 55:36
  OK.
• 55:37
  And then if he gets another,
• 55:38
  if,
• 55:39
  if Xi Jinping gets another term,
• 55:40
  which by all accounts,
• 55:42
  it seems like he certainly will
• 55:44
  get that additional term,
• 55:45
  then what's,
• 55:46
  um,
• 55:48
  What does that do to the timeline?
• 55:50
  Uh,
• 55:50
  we've talked about this before here on the show
• 55:52
  that perhaps he views Taiwan as his ultimate legacy,
• 55:57
  uh,
• 55:57
  but he gets another term.
• 55:58
  Does that stretch the timeline out for,
• 56:00
  for Taiwan,
• 56:01
  do you think?
• 56:03
  I don't,
• 56:04
  whether he gets a 4th term or not,
• 56:06
  um,
• 56:06
  a year from now,
• 56:07
  I don't,
• 56:08
  I don't see an invasion of
• 56:10
  the main island of Taiwan.
• 56:11
  I mean,
• 56:12
  he can grab some of the offshore islands,
• 56:14
  but I think that that would be,
• 56:16
  he realizes that's not in his interest,
• 56:18
  so I don't
• 56:19
  think that's going to happen.
• 56:21
  You know,
• 56:21
  some of those islands are like 2.5,
• 56:22
  3 miles
• 56:23
  off the Chinese coast.
• 56:25
  The Chinese military can grab those.
• 56:26
  That's not a difficult military operation,
• 56:29
  especially because Taiwan's not defending them.
• 56:31
  Um,
• 56:32
  but
• 56:33
  the main island,
• 56:34
  we're going to be basically at the same thing.
• 56:36
  If he gets his 4th term,
• 56:38
  um,
• 56:39
  I think that that keeps the invasion possibility high because
• 56:43
  he has based his personal legitimacy on annexing Taiwan.
• 56:47
  And I think that if you have another leader,
• 56:50
  um,
• 56:50
  they're not going to be focused on Taiwan.
• 56:52
  They're going to be focused on some really
• 56:54
  important structural problems in the Chinese economy,
• 56:57
  like the fact that it is
• 56:58
  zero growth,
• 56:59
  perhaps,
• 57:00
  um,
• 57:01
  not the 4.5% that they've reported for the third quarter of this year.
• 57:05
  So you're going to have a new Chinese leader,
• 57:07
  um,
• 57:07
  assuming that there will be one,
• 57:10
  and that's another.
• 57:11
  Conversation,
• 57:12
  but,
• 57:13
  um,
• 57:14
  you know,
• 57:14
  it's,
• 57:15
  they're going to be focused inward.
• 57:16
  They're not going to be focused about Taiwan or anything else outside of China.
• 57:21
  My guess,
• 57:23
  60 seconds.
• 57:24
  I lied.
• 57:24
  I,
• 57:24
  I,
• 57:24
  I said that was the last question,
• 57:26
  but here's the last question.
• 57:27
  You just said if,
• 57:28
  if he gets another term,
• 57:30
  do you think there's a chance that Xi Jinping does not get another term?
• 57:34
  There's always a chance he doesn't get another term.
• 57:36
  I mean,
• 57:36
  he could die,
• 57:37
  he could be too sick,
• 57:39
  um,
• 57:39
  you know,
• 57:40
  the military could just get sick and tired of him and decide to do something.
• 57:44
  Not likely,
• 57:45
  but,
• 57:45
  you know,
• 57:46
  nothing's inevitable,
• 57:46
  Mike.
• 57:47
  Um,
• 57:48
  and so I think that there's a chance,
• 57:51
  but
• 57:51
  I think,
• 57:52
  um,
• 57:53
  he probably gets his 4th term.
• 57:55
  I mean,
• 57:55
  nobody is,
• 57:56
  nobody
• 57:57
  in a mainstream
• 57:59
  position in this country or elsewhere is saying he won't,
• 58:02
  so
• 58:03
  I think that's the correct assessment.
• 58:05
  For once,
• 58:05
  the mainstream analysis is right.
• 58:09
  Well,
• 58:09
  Gordon,
• 58:10
  thank you as always,
• 58:11
  man.
• 58:11
  We love your insight
• 58:13
  and,
• 58:13
  uh,
• 58:14
  we really appreciate you,
• 58:15
  uh,
• 58:16
  as a,
• 58:16
  as a great friend of the show.
• 58:18
  Uh,
• 58:18
  so thank you very much.
• 58:19
  Look forward to seeing you the next time.
• 58:22
  Thanks,
• 58:22
  Mike and stay safe.
• 58:24
  You too,
• 58:24
  take care.
• 58:25
  That's Gordon Chang.
• 58:27
  Listen,
• 58:27
  I've mentioned it before,
• 58:28
  I'm gonna mention it again.
• 58:29
  You can follow him on X,
• 58:30
  just go to
• 58:31
  at Gordon G Chang.
• 58:34
  Well,
• 58:34
  that is all the time we have for this week's PDB situation report.
• 58:37
  Look,
• 58:37
  if you have any questions or comments,
• 58:39
  maybe a humorous anecdote,
• 58:40
  maybe a limerick,
• 58:41
  do people still do limericks?
• 58:43
  I have no idea.
• 58:44
  Please reach out to me at PDB@hefirstv.com,
• 58:48
  right?
• 58:49
  We've got another Ask Me Anything episode coming up soon,
• 58:52
  uh,
• 58:52
  so please keep your cards and letters coming with your questions,
• 58:55
  your comments,
• 58:56
  and,
• 58:57
  uh,
• 58:58
  You can,
• 58:59
  you can get the Ask Me Anything episodes,
• 59:00
  by the way.
• 59:01
  Let me just remind you of that by
• 59:03
  becoming a premium member
• 59:04
  of the
• 59:05
  President's Daily Brief,
• 59:07
  uh,
• 59:07
  just visiting PDBpremium.com.
• 59:10
  And of course,
• 59:10
  you can do the same if you do that,
• 59:11
  you can listen to the podcast of the show ad-free.
• 59:15
  It's another advantage.
• 59:16
  There you go.
• 59:17
  Look at that.
• 59:17
  I'm turning into a marketing whiz.
• 59:20
  All right,
• 59:20
  I'm Mike Baker and until next time,
• 59:22
  you know the drill.
• 59:23
  Stay informed,
• 59:24
  Stay safe.
• 59:25
  Stay cool.