Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: The DOJ Makes It's Case To The Court In Opposition To Maxwell's Appeal (Part 5-6) (7/31/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:03Speaker 1: In this episode, we're getting right back to the United
- 0:06Speaker 1: States Government's brief in response to Glenn Maxwell's attempt to
- 0:10Speaker 1: appeal her sentence. B applying Section thirty two eighty three
- 0:15Speaker 1: to Maxwell complies with Landgraph. Furthermore, under the land Graph framework,
- 0:20Speaker 1: the two thousand and three amendment to Section thirty two
- 0:23Speaker 1: eighty three properly applies to pre enactment conduct for which
- 0:27Speaker 1: the statute of limitations had not expired at the time
- 0:30Speaker 1: the amendment was passed. Because the statute of limitations had
- 0:34Speaker 1: not expired when Congress amended section thirty two eighty three
- 0:37Speaker 1: in two thousand and three, that amendment extended the limitations
- 0:41Speaker 1: period for prosecuting Maxwell, rendering the charges timely. I land
- 0:46Speaker 1: Graft step one. At step one of the Landgraph analysis,
- 0:50Speaker 1: the question is whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's
- 0:54Speaker 1: proper reach land Graph five eleven us A two eighty.
- 0:58Speaker 1: When evaluating congress Is intent at step one, this Court
- 1:02Speaker 1: has considered both statutory text and legislative history. In re
- 1:08Speaker 1: enter mort Acceptance Company Secretary Litigation Enterprise three ninety one FT.
- 1:14Speaker 1: Three D four oh one, four oh six, and four
- 1:16Speaker 1: oh eight second Circuit two thousand four. Here, the text
- 1:19Speaker 1: and history of Section thirty two eighty three established that
- 1:23Speaker 1: Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of
- 1:26Speaker 1: child sexual abuse in cases where the limitation periods had
- 1:30Speaker 1: not yet expired. Prior to two thousand and three, any
- 1:34Speaker 1: child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the victim
- 1:37Speaker 1: reached the age of twenty five years, at which point
- 1:40Speaker 1: the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution.
- 1:44Speaker 1: In two thousand three's amendment, which was titled No Statute
- 1:48Speaker 1: of Limitations for Child Abductions and Sex Crimes pub L.
- 1:52Speaker 1: Number one O eight through twenty one, Section two two
- 1:56Speaker 1: one seventeen Statute six sixty, Congress explicitly provided that no
- 2:01Speaker 1: statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for such
- 2:05Speaker 1: an offense shall preclude such prosecution during the life of
- 2:09Speaker 1: a child. US Code eighteen, Section thirty two eighty three,
- 2:12Speaker 1: two thousand and three. The amendment draws no distinction between
- 2:17Speaker 1: pre enactment and post enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan explained,
- 2:21Speaker 1: by stating that no statute of limitations that would otherwise
- 2:25Speaker 1: preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply the amendments. Planned
- 2:29Speaker 1: language unambiguously requires that it applied to prosecutions for offenses
- 2:34Speaker 1: committed before the date of enactment. Thus, the breadth of
- 2:38Speaker 1: the text shows that Congress intended to extend the Statute
- 2:41Speaker 1: of limitations even for a pre enactment conduct. United States
- 2:45Speaker 1: Verus Jeffreyes four h five ft. Three d. Six eighty two,
- 2:49Speaker 1: six eighty four, Eighth Circuit two thousand and five, reaching
- 2:53Speaker 1: same conclusions as Section thirty two eighty three's predecessor, based
- 2:57Speaker 1: on similar title end wording of state cf. Enterprise three
- 3:02Speaker 1: ninety one ft three d at four oh seven, describing
- 3:05Speaker 1: provision that no limitation shall terminate the period within which
- 3:09Speaker 1: suit may be filed, as example of statute reflecting clear
- 3:13Speaker 1: Congressional intent to apply to pre enactment conduct. Legislative history
- 3:18Speaker 1: confirms this conclusion. In initially enacting a special statute of
- 3:23Speaker 1: limitations for child sex abuse offenses, Congress sought to make
- 3:27Speaker 1: it easier to prosecute offenders who commit sex crimes that
- 3:30Speaker 1: may be difficult to detect quickly. Wingarten eight sixty five
- 3:34Speaker 1: ft three d. At fifty four, but that limitation period
- 3:38Speaker 1: proved to be inadequate in many cases. HR Conference number
- 3:43Speaker 1: one oh eight through sixty six at fifty four. Telling
- 3:47Speaker 1: lye the Conference report offered the example of a child
- 3:50Speaker 1: rapist who cannot be prosecuted because he was identified as
- 3:53Speaker 1: the perpetrator one day after the victim turned twenty five.
- 3:58Speaker 1: Given that Congress bemoan those offenders who escape prosecution because
- 4:02Speaker 1: a limitation period had expired, there is every reason to
- 4:05Speaker 1: believe that it intended to preserve the ability to prosecute
- 4:09Speaker 1: pre enactment offenders whose limitation periods had not yet expired.
- 4:13Speaker 1: See the United States versus shir Chief, four thirty eight
- 4:17Speaker 1: f Dot three d nine nine twenty four, Ninth Circuit
- 4:20Speaker 1: two thousand and six, concluding that in enacting the two
- 4:24Speaker 1: thousand and three Amendment, Congress evinced a clear intend to
- 4:28Speaker 1: extend the limitations period. Maxwell notes that Congress considered and
- 4:33Speaker 1: rejected a retroactivity clause before enacting the two thousand and
- 4:36Speaker 1: three Amendment, but as Judge Nathan recognized, the legislative history
- 4:41Speaker 1: makes clear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity provision because it
- 4:45Speaker 1: would have produced unconstitutional results. A one point fifty two
- 4:50Speaker 1: discussing co sponsor remarks expressing concern that the proposed retroactivity
- 4:55Speaker 1: provision was a doubtful constitutionality because it would have revived
- 4:59Speaker 1: the government its authority to prosecute crimes that were previously
- 5:02Speaker 1: time barred. Thus, the rejection of the retroactivity clause shows
- 5:07Speaker 1: only that Congress intended to limit the protect Act to
- 5:10Speaker 1: its constitutional applications, including past conduct like Maxwell's, on which
- 5:15Speaker 1: the Statute of Limitations had not yet expired. The reach
- 5:19Speaker 1: of the two thousand and three Amendment to Section thirty
- 5:22Speaker 1: two eighty three is clear because Congress has expressly extended
- 5:26Speaker 1: the Statute of limitations to pre enactment conduct. Judge Nathan
- 5:29Speaker 1: correctly resolved this analysis at land Graph step one. In
- 5:34Speaker 1: the alternative, however, the statute is at worst ambiguous. If
- 5:38Speaker 1: the Court takes that view, it should proceed to land
- 5:40Speaker 1: Graph step two, which examines the retroactive effects of the
- 5:44Speaker 1: statute two land Graph step two. As the Supreme Court
- 5:48Speaker 1: explained in land Graph, even absence specific legislative authorization, applying
- 5:53Speaker 1: a statute to pre enactment conduct is unquestionably proper in
- 5:57Speaker 1: many situations. Five eleven year US at two seventy three.
- 6:02Speaker 1: A statute does not operate retrospectively merely because it is
- 6:06Speaker 1: applied in a case arising from conduct and to dating
- 6:09Speaker 1: the statute's enactment, or of sets expectations based on prior
- 6:13Speaker 1: law Idea two sixty nine. Instead, the question is whether
- 6:17Speaker 1: the statute would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
- 6:21Speaker 1: increase the party's liability for past conduct, or impose new
- 6:25Speaker 1: duties with respect to transactions already completed Idea two eighty Importantly,
- 6:31Speaker 1: the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after
- 6:34Speaker 1: the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make
- 6:37Speaker 1: the application of the rule at trial retroactive, because parties
- 6:42Speaker 1: have diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure, and because
- 6:46Speaker 1: rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct Idea
- 6:51Speaker 1: two seventy five. In Vernon versus Casodaga Valley Central School District,
- 6:56Speaker 1: forty nine f. Dot three D eight eighty six, Second Circuit,
- 7:00Speaker 1: nineteen ninety five, this Court considered a new statute of
- 7:04Speaker 1: limitations that shortened the time to file certain discrimination claims,
- 7:08Speaker 1: and held that applying the new statute in a case
- 7:11Speaker 1: filed after its enactment, but a rising out of events
- 7:15Speaker 1: that predate, its enactment is not inpermissively retroactive under landgrafh
- 7:20Speaker 1: Ida eight eighty nine to ninety. As the Court explained,
- 7:23Speaker 1: the conduct to which the statute of limitations applies is
- 7:27Speaker 1: not the primary conduct of the defendants the alleged discrimination,
- 7:31Speaker 1: but is instead the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs the
- 7:34Speaker 1: filing of their suit id at. Eight ninety. The two
- 7:38Speaker 1: thousand and three amendment to section thirty two eighty three
- 7:42Speaker 1: likewise applies only to the secondary conduct of filing a
- 7:45Speaker 1: criminal case. It does not apply to the primary conduct
- 7:49Speaker 1: of Maxwell's child sexual abuse by, for example, modifying the
- 7:53Speaker 1: elements of an offense to criminalize conduct that previously had
- 7:57Speaker 1: not constituted a crime ida at. Eight ninety one. Land
- 8:01Speaker 1: Graft in other cases continents treating statutes of limitations differently
- 8:05Speaker 1: from statutory provisions that affects substantiative rights. Thus, like the
- 8:10Speaker 1: new statute in Vernon, the two thousand and three amendment
- 8:13Speaker 1: impaired no rights possessed by either party, increased neither party's liability,
- 8:18Speaker 1: nor imposed any new duties with respect to pass transactions
- 8:22Speaker 1: id At eight ninety. Enterprise does not alter this conclusion. Therefore,
- 8:27Speaker 1: this Court considered whether an amended statute of limitations operated
- 8:32Speaker 1: to revive already expired securities fraud claims Enterprise three ninety
- 8:37Speaker 1: one Ft. Three d at four five. While acknowledging that
- 8:40Speaker 1: under Vernon retroactive application of a revised statute of limitations
- 8:45Speaker 1: generally does not have an impermissible retroactive effect, the Court
- 8:49Speaker 1: concluded that the resurrection of previously time barred claims has
- 8:53Speaker 1: an impermissible retroactive effect id at four O nine and
- 8:56Speaker 1: four to ten. Emphasis removed. Enterprise has no application here,
- 9:01Speaker 1: as the limitations period for the charges against Maxwell did
- 9:05Speaker 1: not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus,
- 9:09Speaker 1: unlike enterprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have stripped
- 9:13Speaker 1: defendants of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed IDEA
- 9:18Speaker 1: four ten, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge
- 9:23Speaker 1: Nathan correctly concluded that the two thousand and three amendment
- 9:27Speaker 1: accordingly did not deprive Maxwell of any vested rights. To
- 9:31Speaker 1: be sure, this Court has observed that there may be
- 9:35Speaker 1: colorable arguments that the logic of enterprise extends to criminal
- 9:38Speaker 1: cases where the defendant statute of limitations defense had not
- 9:43Speaker 1: vested when the limitations period was extended, because the extension
- 9:47Speaker 1: increases the period of time during which a defendant can
- 9:50Speaker 1: be sued, thereby increasing a defendant's liability four pass conduct Winingarten,
- 9:55Speaker 1: eight sixty five ft three d at fifty seven, oh
- 10:00Speaker 1: United States versus Miller, nine to eleven f dot three
- 10:03Speaker 1: d six thirty eight, six forty four through six forty six,
- 10:06Speaker 1: First Circuit twenty eighteen, discussing potential defense arguments. But such
- 10:12Speaker 1: a claim runs headlong into the vast weight of retroactivity decisions,
- 10:17Speaker 1: which recognize that revoking a vested statute of limitations defense
- 10:22Speaker 1: is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a
- 10:26Speaker 1: still viable claim Winingarten, eight sixty five f dot three
- 10:30Speaker 1: d at fifty seven. For example, in the criminal context,
- 10:34Speaker 1: there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before
- 10:38Speaker 1: prosecution is time barred does not run a foul of
- 10:41Speaker 1: the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. Cruz versus Maipa,
- 10:46Speaker 1: seven seventy three F dot three, D one thirty eight
- 10:49Speaker 1: one forty five, Fourth Circuit twenty fourteen. See also Stagner
- 10:54Speaker 1: five point thirty nine US at six thirty two. Holding
- 10:57Speaker 1: that X post facto clause does not prevent the state
- 11:00Speaker 1: from extending time limits for prosecutions not yet time barred,
- 11:05Speaker 1: as this Court explained long ago, while it is unfair
- 11:08Speaker 1: and dishonest for the government to assure a man that
- 11:10Speaker 1: he has become safe from the pursuit but then withdraw
- 11:14Speaker 1: its assurance, it is permissible to extend a statute of
- 11:17Speaker 1: limitations while the chase is on Falter versus the United
- 11:21Speaker 1: States twenty three F. Dot two D four twenty four
- 11:25Speaker 1: to twenty six, Second Circuit nineteen twenty eight l. Hand j.
- 11:29Speaker 1: These X post facto cases are particularly instructive here because
- 11:33Speaker 1: Landgraph and the ex post facto clause are informed by
- 11:37Speaker 1: the same retroactivity concerns. Cruse seven seventy three F. Dot
- 11:41Speaker 1: three D at one forty five. See also land Graph
- 11:44Speaker 1: five eleven US at two sixty six, citing the X
- 11:48Speaker 1: post facto clause as an expression as the entire retroactivity
- 11:52Speaker 1: principle it was applying. Thus, applying Section thirty two eighty
- 11:56Speaker 1: three's two thousand and three amendment to Maxwell's unexpired charges
- 12:00Speaker 1: is permissible under LANDGRAF, as the Tenth Circuit recently explained
- 12:05Speaker 1: with respect to the very same statute of limitations that
- 12:08Speaker 1: issue here. By extending the unexpired statute of limitations, Congress
- 12:12Speaker 1: did not increase defendant's exposure to prosecution retroactively. It did
- 12:17Speaker 1: not raise the penalty for the charge defense. It did
- 12:20Speaker 1: not redefine the offense to make it easier to establish.
- 12:23Speaker 1: It did not expose defendant to criminal prosecution anew. It
- 12:26Speaker 1: merely altered the ongoing charging period for the conduct that
- 12:30Speaker 1: had already exposed him to criminal prosecution. Defendant was subject
- 12:34Speaker 1: to indictment in two thousand and two before the statutes
- 12:38Speaker 1: of limitations were extended, and he remained the subject to
- 12:41Speaker 1: indictment in two thousand and seven once the changes were made.
- 12:45Speaker 1: A dead charge was not resurrected, and the underlying nature
- 12:48Speaker 1: of defendant's potential criminal liability remained the same. United States
- 12:53Speaker 1: versus Piat forty five f. Fourth Circuit eleven forty two,
- 12:57Speaker 1: eleven sixty one and sixty two ten Circuit twenty twenty two.
- 13:02Speaker 1: The decisions of other courts of appeals are in accord
- 13:05Speaker 1: sure Chief four thirty eight F. Dot three d At
- 13:08Speaker 1: nine twenty two through twenty five. Jeffreys four oh five F.
- 13:12Speaker 1: Dot three D at six eighty five. Maxwell sites United
- 13:16Speaker 1: States versus Richardson five twelve f Dot two D one
- 13:19Speaker 1: oh five Third Circuit nineteen seventy five, and two District
- 13:23Speaker 1: court decisions that are bound to follow it BR fifty
- 13:26Speaker 1: eight and fifty nine. But Richardson, which was decided before Landgraph,
- 13:31Speaker 1: is inconsistent with Landgraf United States versus Nator four twenty
- 13:36Speaker 1: five F Dot supp three D six one nine six
- 13:39Speaker 1: thirty Eastern District, Virginia, twenty nineteen. Specifically, Richardson focused on weather.
- 13:45Speaker 1: Congress expressed a clear intention to overcome the presumption against
- 13:49Speaker 1: retroactivity five twelve f Dot two d at one o
- 13:53Speaker 1: six without engaging in Landgraf second step I e. Considering
- 13:57Speaker 1: whether the statute would have retroactive effect land Graph five
- 14:01Speaker 1: eleven US at two eighty. Moreover, unlike the two thousand
- 14:05Speaker 1: and three amendment, the statute at issue in Richardson did
- 14:09Speaker 1: not expressly provide that no statute of limitations that would
- 14:12Speaker 1: otherwise preclude prosecution of the relevant offense shall preclude prosecution
- 14:18Speaker 1: under terms of the amended statute. In some the statute
- 14:22Speaker 1: of limitations for the charges in the indictment had not
- 14:25Speaker 1: yet expired when the two thousand and three Amendment to
- 14:28Speaker 1: section thirty two eighty three extended the limitations period. And
- 14:32Speaker 1: Judge Nathan correctly determined that applying the two thousand and
- 14:35Speaker 1: three Amendment in this case does not create impermissible retroactive effects.
- 14:40Speaker 1: Therefore step two of land graph is satisfied and Section
- 14:44Speaker 1: thirty two eighty three applies retroactively. See Winegarden, eight sixty
- 14:49Speaker 1: five ft. Three d At fifty five. If a statute
- 14:52Speaker 1: would not create impermissible retroactive effects, then the court shall
- 14:56Speaker 1: apply the statute to antecedent conduct according to the charges
- 15:00Speaker 1: were timely. All right, folks, we're gonna wrap up this
- 15:03Speaker 1: episode right here, and in the next episode, we're gonna
- 15:06Speaker 1: pick up where we left off with Section thirty two
- 15:09Speaker 1: eighty three reaches count three and count four. All of
- 15:13Speaker 1: the information that goes with this episode can be found
- 15:16Speaker 1: in the description box. What's up, everyone, and welcome back
- 15:19Speaker 1: to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're gonna pick
- 15:23Speaker 1: up where we left off with the United States response
- 15:27Speaker 1: in brief to Glad Maxwell's attempt to get an appeal two.
- 15:32Speaker 1: Section thirty two eighty three reaches counts three, and four.
- 15:37Speaker 1: Maxwell separately argues that Section thirty two eighty three does
- 15:40Speaker 1: not apply it to counts three and four because neither
- 15:43Speaker 1: is an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse of
- 15:46Speaker 1: a child. Maxwell contends that these counts, which charged her
- 15:50Speaker 1: with transporting a minor with intent that the minor engage
- 15:53Speaker 1: in illegal sexual activity and conspiracy to do the same,
- 15:57Speaker 1: are not offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child
- 16:00Speaker 1: because a completed sex acts is not an essential element
- 16:04Speaker 1: of either charge. But Maxwell does not dispute that the
- 16:07Speaker 1: evidence at trial established that her commission of counts three
- 16:10Speaker 1: and four involved completed sex acts abusing one or more
- 16:14Speaker 1: minor victims, nor could she, as Jane testified that she
- 16:19Speaker 1: was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines,
- 16:23Speaker 1: including to New York, as a minor. Instead, Maxwell insists
- 16:26Speaker 1: that counts three and four do not involve sexual abuse
- 16:29Speaker 1: of a child because a completed sex act is not
- 16:32Speaker 1: an element of those crimes. This argument misreads the relevant
- 16:35Speaker 1: statutes and legislative history and runs contrary to the decision
- 16:40Speaker 1: of this Court and other courts of appeals. A Counts
- 16:44Speaker 1: three and four are offenses involving the sexual abuse of
- 16:47Speaker 1: a child. Maxwell's entire argument is based on a mistaken
- 16:51Speaker 1: premise that the phrase offense involving the sexual abuse of
- 16:55Speaker 1: a child US Code eighteen, section thirty two eighty three
- 16:59Speaker 1: only in compass crime in which unlawful sexual activity actually
- 17:03Speaker 1: took place. This flawed proposition ignores relevant statutory definitions, which
- 17:08Speaker 1: make clear that section thirty two eighty three reaches more
- 17:12Speaker 1: broadly to include offenses in which there were no completed
- 17:15Speaker 1: illegal sex act as described above. Section thirty two eighty
- 17:20Speaker 1: three was originally codified at US Code eighteen, section thirty
- 17:24Speaker 1: five oh nine K. The definition of the term sexual
- 17:27Speaker 1: abuse is located within the same section. For purposes of
- 17:32Speaker 1: this section, the term sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement,
- 17:39Speaker 1: or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
- 17:42Speaker 1: another person to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or the rape, molestation, prostitution,
- 17:49Speaker 1: or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or incest
- 17:52Speaker 1: with children US Code eighteen, section thirty five nine A eight.
- 17:58Speaker 1: The term sexually explicit con conduct is in turn defined
- 18:01Speaker 1: to mean, among other things, sexual intercourse including sexual conduct,
- 18:05Speaker 1: and the term sexual contact means the intentional touching, either
- 18:09Speaker 1: directly or through clothing of the genitilia anous grind, breast,
- 18:14Speaker 1: inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with the intent
- 18:17Speaker 1: to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse a gratifying sexual
- 18:22Speaker 1: desire of any person ID Section thirty five oh nine
- 18:26Speaker 1: A nine to A. Courts have looked into the definition
- 18:30Speaker 1: of sexual abuse set fourth in Section thirty five oh
- 18:33Speaker 1: nine A to determine whether the statute of limitations of
- 18:36Speaker 1: Section thirty two eighty three applies to an offense. United
- 18:40Speaker 1: States versus Carpenter six point eighty f dot three D.
- 18:43Speaker 1: Eleven oh one, eleven oh three to four Ninth Circuit
- 18:46Speaker 1: twenty twelve. We join our sister circuits in looking at
- 18:50Speaker 1: subsection thirty five oh nine A for a definition of
- 18:54Speaker 1: sexual abuse under federal law and find it the appropriate
- 18:58Speaker 1: definition to use in applying Section thirty two eighty three
- 19:01Speaker 1: is extended statute of limitations. The definition of sexual abuse
- 19:06Speaker 1: includes not only actual sexual contact, but also the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement,
- 19:14Speaker 1: or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
- 19:17Speaker 1: another person to engage in sexual contact. US Code eighteen,
- 19:21Speaker 1: Section thirty five oh nine A. The breadth of the
- 19:24Speaker 1: definition is underscored by Congress's use of the word includes
- 19:28Speaker 1: in section thirty five oh nine a's text, which is
- 19:31Speaker 1: significant because it makes clear that the examples enumerated in
- 19:35Speaker 1: the text are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Christopher
- 19:40Speaker 1: versus Smith, Klein Beachamcorp. Five sixty seven US one forty two,
- 19:45Speaker 1: one sixty two, twenty twelve, citing Burges First, United States
- 19:49Speaker 1: five point fifty two US one twenty four one thirty
- 19:53Speaker 1: one and three, two thousand and eight, and the text
- 19:55Speaker 1: of Section thirty two eighty three goes even further beyond
- 19:59Speaker 1: the definition provided in section thirty five oh nine by
- 20:02Speaker 1: covering any crime involving the sexual abuse of a child.
- 20:06Speaker 1: Congress therefore did not require that a particular statute have
- 20:10Speaker 1: actual sexual contact with a minor as an element of
- 20:13Speaker 1: its offense, but rather swept broadly to cover any crime
- 20:17Speaker 1: that in any way involves sexual abuse. As broadly defined.
- 20:22Speaker 1: Given this expanse of language, sexual abuse has defined here
- 20:25Speaker 1: encompasses a wider set of behavior than just rape or
- 20:28Speaker 1: other unwanted sexual touching. United States Verse Schneider eight oh
- 20:32Speaker 1: one ft three d one eighty six one ninety seven
- 20:36Speaker 1: Third Circuit twenty fifteen. Thus, courts throughout the country have
- 20:40Speaker 1: concluded that Section thirty two eighty three applies to a
- 20:43Speaker 1: variety of offenses that do not require a sexual act
- 20:47Speaker 1: between a defendant and a specific child United States Versus.
- 20:51Speaker 1: Vickers Number thirteen R one twenty eight RJA twenty fourteen,
- 20:56Speaker 1: w L one eighty three eighty two fifty five at
- 20:59Speaker 1: A eleven WD and y May eight, twenty fourteen, or
- 21:04Speaker 1: a physical contact with the victim Carpenter six point eighty
- 21:07Speaker 1: ft three d at eleven O three according to the
- 21:10Speaker 1: United States Versus Deal seven seventy five seven fourteen seven
- 21:15Speaker 1: twenty fifth Circuit twenty fifteen. Section thirty two eighty three's
- 21:20Speaker 1: definition thus captures crimes of intent where a perpetrator seeks
- 21:24Speaker 1: to have a minor engage in sexual contact even if
- 21:27Speaker 1: such sexual contact does not occur. Transportation of a minor
- 21:31Speaker 1: with intent to engage in a legal sex act, as
- 21:34Speaker 1: charged in Count four and conspiracy to commit the same
- 21:37Speaker 1: as charged in Count three, fall comfortably within that definition,
- 21:42Speaker 1: even though a completed sex act is not required to
- 21:44Speaker 1: commit those two crimes. Count four has sexual abuse as
- 21:48Speaker 1: an element because it requires the defendant to induce a
- 21:51Speaker 1: child to engage in illegal sexual activity by transporting the
- 21:55Speaker 1: minor across state lines with an intent that the child
- 21:59Speaker 1: engage in and illegal sex Act. US Code eighteen, section
- 22:03Speaker 1: thirty five oh nine A eight and count three as
- 22:07Speaker 1: a conspiracy to commit Count four is an offense involving
- 22:10Speaker 1: such sexual abuse id At thirty two eighty three CE,
- 22:14Speaker 1: United States versus Sense number zero eight CR two fifty
- 22:18Speaker 1: three WWE twenty ten w L two three five one
- 22:22Speaker 1: four eight four at two and three, Connecticut, June seven,
- 22:27Speaker 1: twenty ten, collecting cases interpreting the term sexual abuse to
- 22:32Speaker 1: encompass all crimes that would logically relate to the common
- 22:35Speaker 1: understanding of sexual abuse, even when found in chapters one
- 22:39Speaker 1: ten sexual Exploitation and other Abuse of Children and one
- 22:43Speaker 1: seventeen Transportation of illegal sexual activity and related crimes of
- 22:48Speaker 1: Title eighteen. Schneider eight oh one FT three d at
- 22:52Speaker 1: one ninety six to ninety seven, holding that Section thirty
- 22:55Speaker 1: two eighty three applied to defendant convicted of traveling with
- 22:58Speaker 1: the purpose of engaging in sex with a minor victim
- 23:02Speaker 1: in violation of US Code eighteen, Section twenty four to
- 23:05Speaker 1: twenty three B. Accordingly, even considering only the elements of
- 23:09Speaker 1: the offenses, Counts three to four falls squarely within Section
- 23:13Speaker 1: thirty two eighty three's definition of an offense involving sexual
- 23:17Speaker 1: abuse of a child B. Maxwell's argument for use of
- 23:21Speaker 1: a categorical approach lacks merit because counts three and four
- 23:25Speaker 1: qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child
- 23:29Speaker 1: US Code eighteen, Section thirty two eighty three, even without
- 23:33Speaker 1: resort to the facts of the case. The Court need
- 23:36Speaker 1: not to address Maxwell's claim that the categorical approach applies
- 23:40Speaker 1: in this context, but the arguments Maxwell advances in support
- 23:44Speaker 1: of her claims are meritless. In any event, Maxwell first
- 23:47Speaker 1: relies on Section thirty two eighty three's use of the
- 23:50Speaker 1: phrase offense involving the sexual abuse of a child, which
- 23:54Speaker 1: he contends dictates looking only to the elements of the offense. But,
- 23:59Speaker 1: as this Court has all ready recognized, Section thirty two
- 24:02Speaker 1: eighty three's texts reaches beyond the offense and its legal
- 24:05Speaker 1: elements to the conduct involved in the offense, a linguistic
- 24:09Speaker 1: expansion that shows Congress's intent for courts to look beyond
- 24:13Speaker 1: the bare legal charges in deciding whether section thirty two
- 24:16Speaker 1: eighty three applied Winngarten eight sixty five ft three d
- 24:20Speaker 1: at fifty nine and sixty See also Nize Win versus
- 24:24Speaker 1: Holder five point fifty seven US twenty nine thirty two
- 24:27Speaker 1: thirty eight two thousand and nine, holding that a statute
- 24:30Speaker 1: that includes an offense involves phrase is consistent with the
- 24:34Speaker 1: circumstance specific approach. Indeed, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected
- 24:40Speaker 1: an essential ingredient test comparable to the categorical approach and
- 24:44Speaker 1: instead applied case specific analysis to determine that section thirty
- 24:48Speaker 1: two eighty three applied to travel with intent to commit
- 24:51Speaker 1: an illegal sex act with a minor in violation of
- 24:54Speaker 1: US Code Section twenty four to twenty three b. Schneider
- 24:58Speaker 1: eight oh one f dot three d at one ninety
- 25:01Speaker 1: six and one ninety seven. Maxwell also argues that the
- 25:04Speaker 1: clearer weight of authority holds that statutes employing similar language
- 25:08Speaker 1: should be read through a categorical rather than case specific lens,
- 25:12Speaker 1: but the decision she cites involved statutes with other features
- 25:16Speaker 1: favoring the categorical approach, which are notably absent here. Some
- 25:20Speaker 1: cases involve statutes that define the crime of violence. As
- 25:24Speaker 1: an offense that either has an element the use of
- 25:27Speaker 1: physical force, or by its nature involves a substantial risk
- 25:31Speaker 1: of force language that invokes an elements based approach. United
- 25:36Speaker 1: States versus Davis, one thirty nine. Supreme Court two three
- 25:39Speaker 1: one nine, two three, two eight and twenty nine, twenty nineteen.
- 25:43Speaker 1: Leakel versus Ashcroft, five forty three US one in seven,
- 25:47Speaker 1: two thousand and four. Some cases concerned the definition of
- 25:51Speaker 1: an aggravated felony under federal immigration law Kaweshima versus Holder,
- 25:56Speaker 1: five sixty five US four seventy eight Leakel. Five for
- 26:00Speaker 1: three US at seven, a context in which the categorical
- 26:04Speaker 1: approach traditionally applies because the inquiry is whether the alien's
- 26:08Speaker 1: prior conviction meets the definition. Winegarten eight sixty five f
- 26:13Speaker 1: Dot three, d at fifty nine, and United States versus
- 26:16Speaker 1: Morgan three ninety three FT three D one ninety two
- 26:20Speaker 1: d C. Circuit two thousand and four is likewise distinguishable,
- 26:24Speaker 1: as it involved a venue statute presenting significantly different concerns
- 26:29Speaker 1: than those presented here. Maxwell also relies on a trio
- 26:33Speaker 1: of cases, chief among them Bridges versus United States three
- 26:37Speaker 1: forty six US two nine, nineteen fifty three. In Bridges,
- 26:41Speaker 1: the Supreme Court applied an essential ingredient test to determine
- 26:44Speaker 1: whether an offense qualified for a provision that extended the
- 26:48Speaker 1: criminal limitations period for certain fraud offenses Winegarten, eight sixty
- 26:52Speaker 1: five ft. Three d At fifty nine ten. But, as
- 26:56Speaker 1: this Court has explained, Bridges is distinguishable because the Supreme
- 27:00Speaker 1: Court they are believed, applying the restrictive essential ingredient test
- 27:04Speaker 1: to determine if an offense involve the defrauding of the
- 27:08Speaker 1: United States effectuated Congress's specific intent to limit the extended
- 27:12Speaker 1: limitations period to only a few offenses, while Congress have
- 27:16Speaker 1: the opposite intention for Section thirty two eighty three ID.
- 27:21Speaker 1: The other two cases, United States versus Sharton two eighty
- 27:24Speaker 1: five US five eighteen, nineteen thirty two and United States
- 27:28Speaker 1: versus Novek two seventy one US two oh one, nineteen
- 27:31Speaker 1: twenty six, are distinguishable on similar grounds. In any event,
- 27:35Speaker 1: the essential ingredient test does not help maxwell As discussed above,
- 27:40Speaker 1: an offense involving the sexual abuse of a child US
- 27:43Speaker 1: Code eighteen, Section thirty two eighty three must be read
- 27:46Speaker 1: in light of the definition of sexual abuse set forth
- 27:49Speaker 1: in section thirty five h nine A, which encompasses a
- 27:53Speaker 1: wide range of conduct that is not limited to actual
- 27:56Speaker 1: sexual contact with the child. Counts three to four each
- 27:59Speaker 1: have an essential ingredient that fits with the broad definition.
- 28:03Speaker 1: See super a point two B two A. Finally, neither
- 28:07Speaker 1: Deal nor United States Versus Contentos six fifty one FT
- 28:11Speaker 1: three d eighth nine eight Circuit twenty eleven supports the
- 28:15Speaker 1: use of a categorical approach. In each decision, the Court
- 28:19Speaker 1: concluded that Section thirty two eighty three applied to the
- 28:22Speaker 1: subject defenses without considering the specific facts of the crime.
- 28:26Speaker 1: But in neither case did the court consider whether a
- 28:28Speaker 1: categorical approach was required, let alone hold that it was.
- 28:32Speaker 1: As noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence that
- 28:36Speaker 1: trial established that Maxwell's commission of counts three and four
- 28:40Speaker 1: involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims.
- 28:44Speaker 1: Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when
- 28:47Speaker 1: transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Accordingly,
- 28:52Speaker 1: Counts three to four qualify as offenses involving the sexual
- 28:56Speaker 1: abuse of a child, both by their statutory terms and
- 28:59Speaker 1: based on the pacific facts of this case. All right, folks,
- 29:03Speaker 1: we're going to wrap up right here, and in the
- 29:04Speaker 1: next episode we're going to pick up with zero point three.
- 29:07Speaker 1: The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
- 29:11Speaker 1: that jur of fifty could be fair and impartial, notwithstanding
- 29:14Speaker 1: his inadvertent mistakes on his jury questionnaire. All of the
- 29:18Speaker 1: information that goes with this episode can be found in
- 29:21Speaker 1: the description box.