Latest / Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani / $435 Million a Day: The Math That Destroys The Iranian Regime | Miad Maleki

Transcript

$435 Million a Day: The Math That Destroys The Iranian Regime | Miad Maleki · Beyond the Summit with Amir Golshani

• Amir Golshani: Welcome back. Today we are standing at a historic crossroads. As we speak, a U.S. naval blockade is tightening around Iran's southern ports. A fragile ceasefire is hanging by a thread in Islamabad, and the global economy is holding its breath. Our guest today is the man who has spent his career designing the very financial and strategic tools currently being deployed. Miad Maliki is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. and a former associate director at the Treasury's Office for Global Targeting. Miad, it is a great pleasure to have you here. Miad Maleki: Thanks for having me, Amir. Amir Golshani: Fantastic. You have worked inside one of the most powerful financial systems in the world. But I want to start earlier. What shaped your lens on Iran in the first place? Miad Maleki: Well, I was born and raised in Iran and ⁓ moving my to the U.S. and ended up in Texas where, you know, we have both Jewish and Bahá'í background, two religious minority groups in Iran are subject to harsh persecution. And it's just... ⁓ not a friendly environment to be in. is very welcoming. You don't problem, to the most part, with day-to-day interactions with your Iranians. there's a systematic oppression against groups that is implemented by the regime and is ⁓ encouraged by the Republic. And that in addition to all the economic, you know, financial problem you're to have to deal with if you're not a part of, you know, you're not a regime supporter, you're not a part of that inner circle. And on top of that, you're member of the religious minority group. So putting all that together, you get pushed out. And a lot of people did a lot of people had to move because of the economic hardship. and the systematic social oppression in Iran. So we moved when I was 18, and went to Texas and I joined the US Air Force. Wasn't my plan to work on Iran or politics or national security at the beginning of my time in the Air Force. So I was interested in more of a... the technical aspects of logistics in global logistics of US Department of Defense. But then, know, Iranians are, I would say, we are all political scientists. We're so affected by the 1979 revolution. And it was such a complicated political development. It was a revolution that you can argue that it was popular. It's even hard to make a strong argument whether it was a popular revolution or not, you know, it is debatable, right? But then what happened, what came out of it is you had, you had the sitting government and monarchy that they had great passports. They were not as brutal as this regime is today. And at some point they just thought maybe it's not worth fighting and killing our fellow Iranians and Amir Golshani: It is debatable. 100%. Yes. Miad Maleki: They jumped on airplanes with great Iranian passport at the time and they got out and they handed governance to an Islamic theocracy that ended up giving Iranians what they weren't expecting to come out of 79 revolution. so I think Iranians became very involved in politics. know, like it was a debate in every family, every household. whether you thought that a revolution went wrong, whether you thought that revolution was needed, but it needed time, whether reforms were possible, whether reforms were impossible. I mean, it was just a debate because people were so affected by not just the political aspects of what was going on, but it ended up in a war in the 80s and the economy was horrible. Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: Um, you know, I, I remember, you know, I have kids and there are times that I look how comfortable kids are in the West and life is, it's, it's really good. And so many opportunities, you know, as, as a nine, 10, eight year old, seven, eight, I don't know, maybe younger five, six year old remembering having to wake up at 4 30 AM, 5 AM to go stand in. lines outside supermarkets to get a bottle of milk for my little sister, you know, because my mom had to go stand in a different line to get bread, you know, and so the people were so affected by it and they wanted to talk about it. ⁓ And so was a very political society. I ended up in the US Air Force, but I kept having an opinion about Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: politics in, not politics here in the U S but global international relations. And, that's ended up in the air force. I, I worked more on, on the lease issues, went to us central command in Tampa. and then ended up going to the treasury department, with the first Trump administration where I ended up working on, um, designing the maximum pressure campaign on Iran and its proxy groups as well. Allah Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad. And my first was to put together a plan to reimpose sanctions on the regime that would lift it as a part of the Iran nuclear deal. And then to increase on the regime to the point of either forcing it to change its behavior and coming to the table to negotiate a deal ⁓ that would have better than JCPOA. And happy to discuss. mechanics or details of that at some point, but also how to put pressure on the regime to the point that it can cause as much pain and misery people across the region through his proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, all these groups that were causing, that were destabilizing the region and also posing a threat to U.S. national security and assets in the region. Amir Golshani: I appreciate that. is fascinating to see how your political career has evolved over time. You also mentioned a great point. ⁓ You grew up with a deep understanding of Iranian culture. How has the cultural intuition helped you find the financial blind spots that Western-born analysts might miss? Miad Maleki: first thing that I always tell I told colleagues in the US government, you know what you hear coming from the Iranian regime, what you hearing about Iran really tried to take the layer of propaganda and inform it, you know, ⁓ narrative, put that aside, try to look at the numbers. look at the numbers that you get from the regime. Try to find, bits and pieces of information that you get from the country together and to have an understanding of what's actually happening on the ground. You know, we have this saying in Farsi, soorat ro ba sili sorkh negah dashtan you know, like to keep your face kind of like blush and nice with it slapping yourself, you know, you're hungry, you're Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: You're thirsty, you're under pressure, you're not feeling well, but you still want to put a good face on. You still want to look good, right? So it's not, I'm not saying it's a cultural thing, but it's a trend in Iranian messaging out of Iran that the regime, regardless of how bad the situation was in Iran, in all aspects of governance, all aspects of Iran's society, they were really good at managing. Right. Amir Golshani: Portraying a different picture, yeah. Miad Maleki: exactly and shaping perception. unfortunately, the problem that we've had since the JCPOA, and I think JCPOA is what really led to this issue, the Iran problem became a political topic, meaning a ⁓ domestic topic in the US instead of a strategic national topic. It became a policy that every administration would change or take a different approach to. you can deal with a dictatorship that has been pursuing the same policies and same ideas for years. You can counter that with policies that are shifting every four years. And fortunately, JCPOA, would say the end of the first Obama administration. Iran case became a domestic political topic presidents came in and couldn't implement policies that were good long enough to work or that policies that were poorly designed just to achieve some goals that you could achieve in a matter of three or four years ⁓ and they have caused or they they caused long term. ⁓ damage to U.S. national security interests. And JCPOA is a good example of it. Some of the policies of President Biden in regards to Iran were good examples we can talk about. And I'm not saying as a, this is not a political statement because I ⁓ keep at one political side here in the U.S., but not the other side. But the other side also, things could have been planned better. but they had to be planned just based on this reality of a four-term year for presidents, presidency in the US. anyway. Amir Golshani: Yeah, I love that. You mentioned President Biden, you know, and I remember his biggest threat was don't. And they did. It was really something. talking about numbers, Miad, you have estimated that this blockade costs the regime roughly $435 million a day. For the audience at home, ⁓ what does that pain hit first? You President Biden, and I remember his biggest threat was don't. And they did. It was really something. Is it the IRGC rockets or is it the wages of the rank and file soldier? Miad Maleki: Well, it's so let's let's break break it down. Let's just break down the numbers very quickly. You know, when we say four hundred thirty five million dollars a day, we're talking about two hundred seventy six million dollars a day in export. And that's crude oil, petrochemical products, non-oil exports, metals, you know, wide range of things that you run exports. We're looking about looking at about one hundred and fifty nine. Amir Golshani: Yeah. Miad Maleki: million dollars a day in imports. And that's a wide of things that Iran imports, including raw material and catalysts ⁓ other items that Iran to produce petrochemicals, metals, and other things that they need exports. We are looking at the overall of $435 million a day in imports and exports and trade. And about most majority, or you can argue almost. all of that now would go through the Persian Gulf straight up for most. And I say that because after the war during the strikes, Iran's production capacity on petrochemical and metals and other items dropped. And therefore their land exports or exports through land to Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq has declined significantly if not fully diminished. Because remember, they also have a domestic market that they need if they're not exporting through land, then they're going to have to really look at the export through Persian Gulf. Now, to answer your question, 40 % of Iran's, it's debatable. Some people say 25 % to 40 % of Iran's government budget depends on, or government revenue depends on oil. export. The numbers are not clear, Amir, and this is also a good point for your listeners. One thing that I know for a fact is no one in the Iranian government knows the ⁓ exact are. It's an economy that is mismanaged or managed. It's corrupt. It's opaque. Amir Golshani: Mm-hmm. Miad Maleki: and you just don't really know what the actual numbers are. You get numbers Amir Golshani: Maybe it is intentional because of the corruption. Miad Maleki: Right. And you know, I think there's some level of meaningful efforts in the Iranian government to have the actual numbers because they're folks who come in and they really want to know if they can get things under control or understand how to manage the country's economy. And they just can't find the numbers again, because, you have look at it this way. third of Iran's petroleum export is the oil that is allocated to Iran's armed forces. So every one barrel out of three barrels of oil that National Iranian Oil Company put on the terminal, oil terminal, to goes out. It's the oil that the ROGC armed forces general staff, you name it, these different elements of Iran's military, they pick it up and they sell it in the market. How they sell it, how do they bring the money back? If they bring any of it back? Who do they have to pay commission? Is it a Zanjani type guy? Is it a Shamkhani type person? Is it some Greek national? Whoever they're using to get the oil out. How much of that oil they give to Hezbollah? Because you the way that IRGC supports the Houthis and Hezbollah is that they give them Iranian oil to go sell. if the trade not going through, if Iran is not exporting is not importing. Who's going to be affected first? Well, obviously, Iranian regime always try, know, the corrupt actors in the regime, know how they can protect themselves economically. They're going to push that pain down to the ordinary Iranians. They've done that for 47 years. How much they can increase pressure on ordinary Iranians, that's another topic we can discuss because, you know, when when you were hearing this whole discussions about President Trump's threat to target Iranians, civilian infrastructure, power plants. You know, I remember someone from Iran messaged me, someone that I know, and said, hey, we haven't been getting power, internet, gas for years now. I mean, we don't even have water that we can rely on. Amir Golshani: Powerful energy. Miad Maleki: So, hey, is this that tweet is going to freak me out that US is going to now take the energy power plants away? They're having me giving us anything to begin with. so the whole argument that the regime is going to increase transit transfer that pressure to the ordinary Iranians. That's that's a valid point. But I don't know what is that additional pressure like they're already. Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: struggling. have a strong Iranians have already run. Ordinary Iranians have already struggled economically, under the poverty line in Iran for for years now. You know, one one last quick point. The salary for Iranian oil employees I've seen somewhere between five dollars to twenty dollars. ⁓ all the way up to $120, $150 a month. This is from a very low level labor worker all the way to some manager. You know, let's say $200. Let's say they're getting paid $200 a month. The poverty line in Iran is $270. So how's that going to change things for people? They've been already strangled. They've been already choked by this regime for so many years. Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: I don't know what else is left from these people to be squeezed out this regime. But happy to get more into numbers. I don't want to just give you rhetorics, but I think the pressure is going to be significant with Treasury Department's recent steps in the past few days to also target the banking channels for Iran. In addition to this blockade that is cutting the export, it's going to be very biting is going to be really put a significant pressure economically on the Iranian regime. Amir Golshani: You're absolutely right, but this Islamic regime, have proved over and over again that when you think, it cannot get worse than this, they have surprised people, it can get worse, you know, let's be hopeful, it's going to end soon. you also mentioned that ⁓ Iran's oil storage hits in about two weeks. We in that window right now. What happens to regimes? this Islamic regime, have proved over and over again that when you think, it cannot get worse than this, they have surprised people, it can get worse, stability on day, let's say day 16, when the pumps literally have to stop. Miad Maleki: That would be more of a longer term effects on the Iranian regime's ability to produce oil. But let's discuss that very quickly. So Iran has about 35 to 42 million barrels of storage capacity that is filling up very quickly as Iran is not being able to get its oil out. Now it's difficult to come up with exact numbers of how much of those tankers are filled how much of the onshore capacity is already taken. But looking at Iran's oil output, you know, somewhere between two to three million barrels a day and how much storage they have, you know, they can probably go for somewhere between three weeks to ⁓ months. My numbers, you know, I believe they're looking, they probably have around three weeks to six weeks left. And after that, they're gonna have to shut down oil extraction, and they're gonna have to start declining oil extraction. And that can be very damaging to their ability to bring extraction back up. In 2019, 2020, in 2020, when in Treasury Department, with that coordination with our colleagues over at the State Department, we brought in Iran's oil export down to 200, 100,000 barrels a day. from 1.9 to more million barrels a day during the JCPOA, what the regime has started doing was to filling up tankers. We didn't have a blockade at the time. So Iran could bring in tankers, fill them up, and go let them sit in international waters. Now, it's not really cheap and easy to keep oil on a tanker. You have to keep the tanker run, depending on what commodity we're talking about, crude or whatever we're talking about. It's not an easy storage. It's not cheap and easy to store in a tanker. But they basically filling up all their tankers, the entire national Iranian tanker company, a fleet of vessels were just used as floating oil storage. And then they started begging Emiratis and Chinese to start using their onshore oil storage capacity just so they don't have to drop their oil extraction. Now what happened? The Iranian regime, they're very smart. They see these things. They waited out President Trump and then President Trump, the moment left, the Biden administration came in and they wanted to negotiate. And as a part of that negotiation, if you look at Treasury Department sanctions that went out during the Biden administration, you see a decline in enforcement of sanctions. on Iran's oil. And when you don't enforce oil sanctions, then people want to buy it because there is less risk of being sanctioned. So Iran's export went up and Iran didn't really have to drop its oil extraction because they only had about one year, six months to a year of President Trump's last year to wait out. They did it and then they went back to shipping a lot of oil. Now, this time around, if we have another two years of President Trump left, if this pressure continues, whether through a blockade or a some maximum pressure campaign, then they're going to have to drop their oil extraction. That's going to really bite them economically. Amir Golshani: Right. So as the cash dries up and they cannot pay wages, we see desperation. In your experience, does a desperate regime lash out militarily or do they fold at the negotiating table first? as the cash dries up and they cannot pay wages, we see desperation. In your experience, does a desperate regime lash out militarily or do they fold at the negotiating table first? Miad Maleki: Well, You know, I've seen over and over that they're offered good deals and they walked away from it because they keep wanting more. That's why I keep saying the Iranian regime its worst enemy. mean, during the Biden administration, they had chances over and over to get some really good deals, but they wanted to keep asking for more. They ended up not getting a deal. And then October 7th happened ⁓ the US government at the time was just reluctant to continue the talks. So that policy went away and that Iranians didn't have a chance to get a deal. what's going to happen when they run out of cash and if there is no sanctions relief option, meaning they can't get a deal with the U.S., they can't settle on a negotiation terms, then the reality is domestically, think about what happened in January. And was the largest domestic ⁓ uprising against the Iranian regime. It had economic, right? Amir Golshani: Across the country, yeah. Miad Maleki: it had across the country, right? And to me, if is just getting worse and the regime is just more, it's weaker, then maybe this time around the regime is not gonna be able to ⁓ kill its way as ⁓ much as it in January. We just have to hope. And if there's their low on cash and they can't pay salaries of RGC thugs and their Basij supporters, I don't know. mean, at the end of the day, these RGC members and Basij members, I mean, you can leave Basij out because Basij members are really the core. they're not really getting paid a whole lot anyways. But the conscripts in the RGC or the personnel in the RGC, at the end of the day, they're Iranians. A lot of them really joined the RGC not because they really believed in the Islamic Republic, they had to make that choice in a market, an employment market with 40 % unemployment rate. And I would argue that there's a big part of the RGC and Iran's armed forces that if they're not getting paid, they're not going to go on the street and kill their fellow Iranians. You know, I've seen signs of even hardline regime supporters who you consider as being hardline regime insiders. They're not really, I mean, look, you've seen them leave Iran, go to Canada and it turned into completely different type of people, right? This guy, Khali Baath, he's a completely different person when he's not sitting in the parliament, saying that to America. The moment he can get out of Iran, someone gives him a visa to take his family, go live in Turkey, go live in Canada. They're going to show up in shorts and, you know, you know, on the beach. it's I think that's ⁓ the that they can't pay salaries. They're going to things going to really change. And I think the argument that I'm hearing is that they're going to starve their people before they cut salary of the RGC and armed forces. But that just doesn't that's not the way things work on the ground. economically, you can't just choose and pick, all right, well, I'm going to like, take everything off the shelves from the stores, put them in some kind of a warehouse only to feed my RGC personnel with RGC personnel. I mean, things just doesn't work like that on the ground. When you your point of doing that, things just going to break. So anyways, that's that's kind of a that's where my head is. But you just never never know how things could shift domestically. Amir Golshani: Right. Absolutely. Let's not forget about the Shia militias that coming from Afghanistan, Iraq, they need to be paid as well. So if there is no money for them, they're not willing to participate, I believe. I hope that's the case. ⁓ Miad Maleki: Yeah, I mean, at the end of the Trump administration, 2020, if you go back and look at local news coming out of actually New York Times, but at a really good report that Hezbollah was complaining about not getting paid by the regime. Iraqi Shiite militia groups were complaining that half of their paychecks were not showing up in their bank accounts. There was significant pressure on Iran's proxying and surrogates financially because the Iranian regime couldn't pay them. So they reached that point. mean, look, Houthis. I mean, have you seen them really getting involved these days? Maybe they get involved at some point, but they stayed pretty quiet. I'm not sure if they're doing that because they just they've the fact that this regime is not going to be a reliable source of funding for them. And maybe it's not worth their weapons. survival to be put at risk by getting pulled into this conflict. But these proxies and surrogates, they're not as reliable as the Iranian regime think they are. Arab nationals, they're Afghan nationals, they have their own countries, they have their own nations, and they have their own economic interests and financial interests. If that shifts, then they're going to shift their loyalty too. Amir Golshani: Yes, you're right. So, critics that we have many of them these days say the US cannot sustain a total blockade without spiked oil prices crashing the global economy. As a strategist, how do you counter that argument that this economic war hurts the West as much as it hurts Iran? Miad Maleki: Well, I think the numbers wouldn't support that argument. I mean, we just kind of went through some of these numbers. Strait of Hormuz is way more critical for Iran's economy than ⁓ any other around the globe. mean, closure of the Strait of Hormuz was Iran's nuclear option. And it went for it. Their economy is going to listen like don't look at the numbers now. The real numbers, the effect of Iran's closure of the straight up hormones on its own economy, those numbers going to show up depending on how the negotiations would go if there are some round of negotiations. But these numbers, the effects going to show up a little bit down the road. economically, Iran is way more vulnerable. to a closure of a straight up for most than any other economies around the globe. We're talking about two different things. You're talking about airline tickets going up and people having to cancel their summer trips if they really can't purchase their tickets. People are not gonna be able to travel to go watch some World Cup soccer games. You're gonna see some people having to cut back on some of like my parents, they try to cut back on their commute because of the gas price. Some people who have less of a purchasing power, might see the effect in that way. I'm not discounting the effect of it. It is real. But you can compare that to Iran losing $435 million a day. in commerce for the economy that already has 106 % of food inflation year on year or 30, 40 % unemployment rate. It's, you can't, that argument just doesn't make sense that. Amir Golshani: No, absolutely. I really like the way that you ⁓ clarified that, you know, we can put it this way. It's like discretionary expenses versus mortgage payment. If you do not pay your mortgage, you will be homeless. But, you know, you can avoid traveling, or ⁓ unnecessary if you don't have to. ⁓ Miad Maleki: Right. ⁓ macro level, there is a real concern with, let's say, airliners. You know, if they can't, if they're not selling tickets for six months for eight or they have to increase their prices and they're not, their sales drop, then those companies might have real problems. But again, you can compare that to to a country completely having a complete collapse of economy, economic collapse, as opposed to companies that are facing fiscal problems. So yeah, you explained it very well. You articulated the argument very well. Amir Golshani: Yeah. I appreciate that. we are in a fragile ceasefire and President Trump is pushing for a second round in Islamabad. Do you view these talks as a genuine off-ramp or just a tactical pause to let the blockade do its silent work? Miad Maleki: It'll be a guessing game because what's really, you know. On being unpredictable as a president, when you're facing a national security crisis or when you engage in foreign policy decision making or negotiation, especially with states like Iran with dictatorships and and thugs or non-state actors being unpredictable is a winning card. And President Trump is doing a great job staying unpredictable. However, a superpower with major economic global reach, being unpredictable is going to have major economic problems. So it's like a double-edged sword. So it's difficult to guess what really the thinking is. But at the end of the day, I think President Trump would like to see a resolution. He wants to see some kind of an agreement. He wants the agreement to be better than the JCPOA. And he also has a really good and sober understanding where Iran is economically, ⁓ and militarily. One, they've lost layers and layers ⁓ of senior leadership. They are, they've lost legitimacy because they've shown now domestically that they're not capable of resisting foreign invasion. politically, they've lost layers and layers ⁓ of their senior They are, they've lost legitimacy they've shown now that they're not capable of resisting foreign After 47 years of preparing for exactly this, you for 47 years, they said they're going to go and up Israel from the map. And after 47 years of doing this, Israeli ⁓ fighter jets are flying over Iran's airspace until they run out of fuel and then they have to go back. So they've lost the legitimacy politically. ⁓ a very weak position domestically. And also diplomatically, they don't have the support they used to have from the Gulf nations and their neighbors because of the way they attacked them. And also diplomatically, they don't have the support they used to have from the Gulf nations and their neighbors because of the way they attacked them. Economically, we'll just discuss that. Militarily, we'll just discuss that too. They've lost their Navy, they've lost their air defense system, lost their missiles and drones manufacturing capability. Amir Golshani: All Miad Maleki: Militarily, They've lost their Navy, they've lost their air defense system, they've lost their missiles and drones manufacturing capability. President Trump understands that he's really negotiating from the position of power. Unfortunately, there are congressional pressure that might interfere with President Trump's efforts to get a really good deal because he might feel pressure to just settle for something that would be less than a perfect deal from a U.S. national security perspective. But I see that his points about wanting to get a deal is real. Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: The points of 10 to 15 points that we've been hearing about, we've been reading about, those are pretty reasonable asks from the regime, from the government. Don't support non-state actors. Don't send your money to thugs across the region. You don't need an enrichment, uranium enrichment program. You really don't need it. We can have another chat about this, that economically, Iran's enrichment program never made sense. You can't justify it. The only way to justify it is from point of view, from some deterrence reasoning under 30 % is cheaper to go buy uranium and reach uranium in the market. You don't $1 trillion, $900 billion to create an infrastructure to enrich uranium when it makes sense to just buy it in the market and like everybody else. Amir Golshani: You're right, I see a genuine intention President Trump wants to get a good deal. Russia recently warned that President Trump likes surprises and might strike while negotiating. Given your time at OFAC, how much of this talk actually cover for repositioning assets for a final kinetic blow? Miad Maleki: you're raising a really good point and it's a really important question to ask. It's difficult to come up with an answer. But, but what I can tell you is looking at the numbers again, don't look at the propaganda. Don't look at, know, Iran won. Iran is the Iran has the upper hand. I mean, let's leave all of that nonsense out and just look at the reality that, you know, Or let me just tell you this. I don't know if you read about how the Iranian negotiation team in Pakistan had to change their flights, go to Mashhad. From Mashhad, they broke into smaller teams and into travel. Some of them went with bus, some of them went with train, some of them drove just so they can be all killed together. So ⁓ happened inside Iran. We're not talking about that's how to travel in Pakistan. That's how to travel inside Iran. So that's the reality on the ground that they, the regime officials, they can show their faces in the face of external threat. Same domestically. I mean, do you really think Ghalibov can now go and walk around the streets in Tehran with an ordinary Iranians? So the reality is very different than what you're hearing. I think my point is a kinetic part of this plan, you can argue that has already achieved its objectives. Now can argue that you can go back in and take more of the regime officials. You can go back in and take more of their missiles capability. You can go and take more of their drone capabilities. I don't know how from domestic political situation we're in today, getting close to a midterm election, the congressional scrutiny of the war. I don't know if what this president is going to get out of another round of strikes would outweigh the domestic reality here the U.S. So now There are other elements of U.S. power that can be deployed to create even more leverage for the U.S. And that would be a continuation of economic pressure campaign. You saw the Treasury Department coming in with these additional pressure on the financial systems ⁓ outside Iran outside the U.S., the foreign financial institutions in China, Hong Kong, UAE, potentially Turkey and other countries that are very important for Iran sanctions evasion. The blockade. We'll see how that works. You you can't maintain a blockade forever. But the reality, Amir, is with a very robust maximum pressure campaign in 2020, President Trump brought Iran's ⁓ oil export down to 100,000 barrels a day. So you can do that without a blockade. ⁓ It takes more time. It takes more whole of a government effort. President Trump was alone. He didn't have NATO support. We didn't have, you know, when the Biden administration came in, the goal was to create an international coalition to face the problem of Russia, to face the other issues. What I always thought about is the fact that U.S. government was able to bring the Iranian regime to its knees with one or two year, ⁓ one of maximum pressure campaign. And I can explain to you later why I'm just saying one year, not four year, but we've one year of maximum pressure campaign unilaterally without having any allies and partners who they were thinking that are still in the JCPOA at the time in 2020. We've already brought in the oil export down to 100,000, 200,000 barrels a day. So it's possible. maybe, President Trump is looking at how can we disengage and look at other means to continue to maintain pressure pressure on the Iranian regime. Amir Golshani: Yes, absolutely. And also, ⁓ Secretary of Scott Besson also warned Iran that what we are doing right now in terms of maximum pressure would be equivalent of kinetic actions. You know, it would be economic fury equivalent of epic fury, which is absolutely to your point. Yes. Another point I like to talk about and know your opinion ⁓ is China losing trade. Russia is losing an ally. they performing as financial lifelines for Iran right now or have they realized that betting on the Islamic Republic is losing investment in 2026? Miad Maleki: So let's start with China. Russia is a little bit different story. So China receives about 1.2 to all the way up to 1.8 on average oil, crude oil from Iran a day. That crude oil only goes to a small and medium sized teapot refineries. These are refineries that are small. The reason that it only goes to small refineries because the larger main refineries in China and major buyers in China, they don't want to get sanctioned. The small refineries, they can take that risk on they're already financially in trouble in China. They're not paying their taxes well. They're causing environmental issues because they're just not, they're older. They're maintained well. I've seen reports that the Chinese government wants to get rid of some of these smaller refineries. Those are the ones that they a state operational because they're receiving ⁓ discounted oil. So you look at the 1.5 on average ⁓ million of oil a day. with a lot of liability, sanctions liability. Put that next to Chinese trade with the US. It's like you can't compare. I mean, I don't know if it's somewhere below 1%. So China might, on an international, they might ⁓ at the UN and... give you some rhetorics about why US shouldn't unilaterally get involved in Iran, why it's unfair that US is doing this, why US is this and that, right? They can say that all day. But the reality is China is not going to put at risk its trade with the US over trade with Iran that is nothing compared to trade, again, with the US and the West. Amir Golshani: Right. Miad Maleki: the reality is Chinese government is not going to risk a trade with the U.S. or a trade with Iran. So Iranians, Zarif said this over and over. that they can't count on the Chinese as a superpower is going to come in the last minute and help Iran. Now, whether it's in the interest of China, that US stays bucked down in the Middle East in a straight up formals, that the US economy is taking a hit over the flow of oil out of the straight up formals. Yeah, I mean, I think they're they like to see that continue. But I think if US government is serious about getting the Chinese to be a helpful trade partner in the case of Iran, think US government can do that. Russia is already a failed economy. They're not doing great. They're subject to almost embargo level sanctions. Their trade with Iran is very limited. They get and missiles from Iran and they give them, ⁓ goods ⁓ in exchange, money if they have enough cash. that's insignificant. So I don't think Russia can play a role in the conflict today. They have a state out of it because they want their own deal with the U.S. They're stuck in a they're getting a pressure relief right now because everyone's focused on Iran. But but at the same time, I don't think Russia is a player here. Amir Golshani: I love that. For years, Iran bypassed sanctions using ghost tankers. Why is this blockade different? Miad Maleki: So the Fleet, the tankers that take Iranian oil out of the hands of known Iranian sellers of oil, because that's the way that Ghost Fleet helps Iran. It the Iranian side of the trade. They play as an intermediary to take the oil out and get it to the buyers. A blockade is blocking the flow of oil out of Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia, where you see the ship to ship transfer mostly happens. Some of it happens in the Persian Gulf, but Southeast Asia is where Malaysia, you know, the waters around Malaysia, that's where Iranian oil is picked up by the ghost fleet, for the most part. And then they start going through international water, looking for buyers in different ports in China, mostly in one main port, China. So now the oil is not coming out. You already have about 160 to 180 million barrels of oil sitting in these ghost fleet tankers. You saw US Navy Central Command, NAFSA, putting out a statement saying that the blockade includes boarding and seizing of ghost fleet tankers, meaning... You saw US Navy Central Command, NAFSA, putting out a statement saying that the blockade includes boarding and seizing of ghost fleet tankers, meaning... We're not just blocking Iranian oil coming out of this trade, but the oil that is sitting outside this trade, We're not just blocking Iranian oil coming out of this trade, but the oil that is sitting outside this trade, we're maintaining the power to go on board and seize those tankers as well. ⁓ the Ghost Fleet becomes irrelevant in the case of a blockade after while, meaning as soon as that oil is delivered and those tankers become empty, They can't go back and pick up Iranian oil in the Persian Gulf. they're becoming relevant. Amir Golshani: Miad, if there is a young Iranian watching this on YouTube right now, which I doubt because of the internet blackout, let's say they're using VPN or any means to be able to watch this video. Feeling the weight of triple digit inflation. ⁓ What your message to them about the darkness before the dawn? Miad Maleki: know, I didn't know economic when I lived in Iran. You know, when I was standing in the line to get milk or standing in long lines to get a loaf of bread, if I knew what economic potentials my country has, that would have really angered me. I know it's unhelpful to tell people in Iran that you have to be ⁓ more angry than you are already, but their anger is justified. their efforts to topple this regime is justified. And I admire them what done to bring about a political transition in Iran. They deserve it. Look at the numbers. Look at the potentials. You know, as much it's It's sad what the economic situation in Iran and what people are facing the children of Iran. What really makes me really sad and about the situation in Iran are the little kids, the children right now in Iran, ⁓ the main women children are main victims of this regime. They can be living in one of the most economic women and children are the main victims of this regime. They can be living in one of the most economic powerful nations globally. Their fossil fuel, their natural resources. How young, how talented this population is. Mark Dubowitz always says this thing that I really like. he never lived in Iran. He lived around Iranians. He really cares about Iran. he always says there's only one place that Iranians are not successful. And that's Iran right now. powerful nations globally. Their fossil fuel, their natural resources. How young, how talented this population is. know, Mark Dubowitz always says this thing that I really like. And, you know, he never lived in Iran. He lived around Iranians. He really cares about Iran. You know, he always says there's only one place that Iranians are not successful. And that's Iran right now. It's sad to see the talent, the skills, the of intelligence that you see in Iran within that population. It's unmatching. So I just, I can't wait for the day that this regime is gone and Iranians can really see the benefits of the potential that they have right now that is being oppressed and suppressed by this regime. Amir Golshani: Absolutely. Miad, after everything you've seen from your immigration to states, Air Force, to the Treasury, to this current crisis, what does freedom mean to you personally? Miad Maleki: You know what it means is that, you know, I came as, you know, as a young immigrant with little to no money, came with nothing. We started everything at zero and within a few years after moving to the US, 10 years, 15 years after moving to the US, I found myself in the White House. And... 10 years, 15 years moving to the US, I found myself in the White House. That is, that's what freedom means. That if you want to be effective, if you have goals and you work hard, you get there. that's what I always tell my friend and family that, you know, there's nothing most rewarding and there's nothing that I appreciate more about this country. And that's the fact that if you work hard, you stay on one thing, you get there. And... that's freedom means. That if you want to be effective, if you have goals and you work hard, ⁓ you get And that's what always tell my friend and family that, you know, there's nothing most rewarding and there's nothing that I appreciate more about this country. And that's the fact that if you work hard, you stay focused on one you get there. None of this was because of luck. just work hard and I stayed determined that I wanted something in the freedom of this country, that the freedom that this country offers helped me get there. Amir Golshani: was so powerful. Yeah, thank you for such surgical clarity to a very chaotic moment in history. Thank you. Miad Maleki: Thanks for having me, Amir.