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Sixteen Seconds to Nightfall: The Sosoliso Flight 1145 Tragedy · Aviation Survival Stories

• 0:03
  Speaker 1: The concrete culvert had been there for years. It sat
• 0:06
  Speaker 1: roughly 70 meters to the left of runway 21 at
• 0:09
  Speaker 1: Port Harcourt International Airport, documented on airport maps, visible to
• 0:14
  Speaker 1: anyone who looked. On the 10th of December, 2005, a
• 0:18
  Speaker 1: McDonnell Douglas DC-9 traveling at 160 knots found it. 108
• 0:23
  Speaker 1: of 110 people aboard did not survive. 59 of the
• 0:26
  Speaker 1: 60 students on that flight were going home for Christmas.
• 0:29
  Speaker 1: They never arrived. What makes this case so difficult to
• 0:33
  Speaker 1: set aside is not just the scale of the loss.
• 0:35
  Speaker 1: It is the accumulation of decisions, omissions and failures that
• 0:38
  Speaker 1: converged in 16 seconds, and the fact that almost every
• 0:42
  Speaker 1: contributing factor had been visible long before the aircraft left
• 0:45
  Speaker 1: the ground. There is a piece of information the first
• 0:48
  Speaker 1: officer carried onto that plane. He had doubts about the
• 0:50
  Speaker 1: airline's safety. He had already decided this would be his
• 0:53
  Speaker 1: last flight with the carrier he boarded anyway. That detail
• 0:56
  Speaker 1: will matter. Port Harcourt sits in the Niger Delta. the
• 1:00
  Speaker 1: commercial and industrial heart of Nigeria's oil-producing south. By December
• 1:05
  Speaker 1: of 2005, the city was the destination millions of Nigerians
• 1:08
  Speaker 1: associated with opportunity, family, and the particular weight of the
• 1:11
  Speaker 1: holiday return. Roads in Nigeria could be brutal, long-congested, and dangerous.
• 1:17
  Speaker 1: For families with means, an air ticket was not a luxury.
• 1:20
  Speaker 1: It was a calculation. The flight was the safe option.
• 1:24
  Speaker 1: Loyola Jesuit College stood in Abuja, the federal capital roughly
• 1:28
  Speaker 1: 500 kilometers north. It was one of Nigeria's most prestigious
• 1:32
  Speaker 1: secondary schools, run by the Society of Jesus, drawing students
• 1:36
  Speaker 1: from families across the country. By December, the campus was
• 1:39
  Speaker 1: wrapping up its term. Approximately 60 students, most of them
• 1:43
  Speaker 1: between 12 and 16 years old, were booked on Soseliso
• 1:46
  Speaker 1: Airlines Flight 1145 for the short hop south to Port Harcourt.
• 1:51
  Speaker 1: From there they would scatter to families, waiting with open
• 1:54
  Speaker 1: arms and prepared meals and the particular relief of a
• 1:57
  Speaker 1: child back in the house after months away. Their parents
• 2:00
  Speaker 1: had chosen the flight deliberately. The roads were not safe,
• 2:03
  Speaker 1: the plane was. The aircraft assigned to flight 1145 was
• 2:08
  Speaker 1: a McDonnell Douglas DC-930-2, built in 1972 and powered by
• 2:14
  Speaker 1: Pratt & Whitney JT-8D-9A engines. It had been registered in
• 2:18
  Speaker 1: Nigeria in June of 2003. and held a valid certificate
• 2:21
  Speaker 1: of airworthiness, issued in March of 2005. Its next scheduled
• 2:25
  Speaker 1: maintenance review was not until June of 2006. On paper,
• 2:29
  Speaker 1: the aircraft was fit to fly. No mechanical failure has
• 2:32
  Speaker 1: ever been identified as a cause of what followed. At
• 2:34
  Speaker 1: the controls sat Captain Benjamin Adebayo, 48 years old, a
• 2:38
  Speaker 1: Nigerian aviator with 10,050 total flight hours, including 1,900 hours
• 2:42
  Speaker 1: on the DC-9. He had completed his most recent simulator
• 2:47
  Speaker 1: training in Miami in July of 2005, five months before
• 2:51
  Speaker 1: this flight. Beside him sat First Officer Gerald Anden, 33
• 2:55
  Speaker 1: years old and Ghanaian, with 920 total hours and 670
• 3:00
  Speaker 1: on type. Anden had passed his last simulator evaluation in
• 3:03
  Speaker 1: August of 2005, rated satisfactory. Gerald Anden had a private
• 3:08
  Speaker 1: reason to be in that cockpit that day. He had
• 3:11
  Speaker 1: grown uneasy about flying for Sausaliso Airlines. He had concerns
• 3:15
  Speaker 1: about the carrier's safety standards, concerns serious enough that he
• 3:19
  Speaker 1: had decided this would be his final flight with the company.
• 3:22
  Speaker 1: He intended to leave after this trip. He never got
• 3:24
  Speaker 1: the chance. The flight departed Abuja at 12.25 in the afternoon.
• 3:29
  Speaker 1: The sky to the south was already shifting. A marine
• 3:32
  Speaker 1: airmass was pushing inland, and with it came the kind
• 3:35
  Speaker 1: of atmospheric instability that forms quickly and silently at the
• 3:38
  Speaker 1: boundary between two airmasses. The crew had no specific warning
• 3:42
  Speaker 1: about what was building ahead. The air traffic controller at
• 3:45
  Speaker 1: Port Harcourt, according to the investigation record, did not relay
• 3:49
  Speaker 1: wind speed information or alert the crew to the possibility
• 3:52
  Speaker 1: of a developing storm. The runway waiting for them at
• 3:54
  Speaker 1: Port Harcourt had another problem. Its approach lighting system depended
• 3:58
  Speaker 1: on the National Electrical Grid. That afternoon, the grid was down.
• 4:01
  Speaker 1: The lights were off. Seeing the runway on final approach,
• 4:05
  Speaker 1: in deteriorating visibility, would require the crew to acquire it
• 4:08
  Speaker 1: visually under conditions that were growing worse by the minute.
• 4:11
  Speaker 1: 60 students. Dozens of families at the arrivals gate. A
• 4:15
  Speaker 1: crew flying into a weather system no one had warned
• 4:18
  Speaker 1: them about, toward a runway they might not be able
• 4:20
  Speaker 1: to see. The DC-9 crossed into Port Harcourt airspace at
• 4:24
  Speaker 1: approximately 1 o'clock in the afternoon. From the cockpit, the
• 4:27
  Speaker 1: crew could already see what was building below them. The
• 4:30
  Speaker 1: marine air mass had arrived. It was pushing against the
• 4:32
  Speaker 1: warmer inland air, and where those two masses met, the
• 4:35
  Speaker 1: atmosphere was folding in on itself, rapidly, silently, in ways
• 4:39
  Speaker 1: that do not announce themselves on a standard weather report.
• 4:42
  Speaker 1: The approach to runway 21 required the crew to descend
• 4:45
  Speaker 1: to a decision altitude of 307 feet above the ground.
• 4:49
  Speaker 1: At that altitude the rule is simple and absolute. If
• 4:52
  Speaker 1: you can see the runway, you continue. If you cannot,
• 4:55
  Speaker 1: you go around. No exceptions, no judgment calls. The number
• 4:58
  Speaker 1: exists precisely because below it, there is not enough time
• 5:02
  Speaker 1: or altitude to recover from a mistake. Captain Benjamin Adebayo
• 5:05
  Speaker 1: descended through that altitude. The runway was not clearly visible.
• 5:09
  Speaker 1: He did not go around. He continued descending. There is
• 5:12
  Speaker 1: a word investigators use for what happened next to the
• 5:15
  Speaker 1: air surrounding that aircraft, microburst. A column of cold, dense
• 5:19
  Speaker 1: air dropped from the base of the storm system and
• 5:22
  Speaker 1: hit the ground, then spread outward in every direction at once.
• 5:26
  Speaker 1: An aircraft flying into a microburst first encounters a headwind
• 5:29
  Speaker 1: that artificially increases lift. The nose pitches up airspeed, rises,
• 5:34
  Speaker 1: everything feels briefly normal or even good. Then, within seconds,
• 5:38
  Speaker 1: the wind reverses. The headwind becomes a tailwind. Lift collapses.
• 5:42
  Speaker 1: The aircraft sinks at 160 knots, descending through conditions the
• 5:47
  Speaker 1: crew had not been warned about, toward a runway whose
• 5:49
  Speaker 1: lights were off because the national grid had failed that afternoon.
• 5:52
  Speaker 1: Flight 1145 entered the microburst, the flight data recorder captured
• 5:57
  Speaker 1: the moment, airspeed, altitude, vertical acceleration. The numbers told the
• 6:01
  Speaker 1: story of an aircraft fighting a force it could not
• 6:04
  Speaker 1: overcome at the altitude remaining. Captain Adebayo called for a go-around.
• 6:08
  Speaker 1: That call came at approximately 200 feet above the ground,
• 6:11
  Speaker 1: 107 feet below the decision altitude where the call should
• 6:15
  Speaker 1: have been made. The investigation record documents the gap precisely.
• 6:19
  Speaker 1: He gave the order 107 feet too late, 16 seconds.
• 6:23
  Speaker 1: That is how long elapsed between the go-around call and
• 6:26
  Speaker 1: impact with the ground. 16 seconds is not enough time
• 6:29
  Speaker 1: to arrest the descent of a DC-9 at 160 knots
• 6:32
  Speaker 1: when the ground is already filling the windscreen. The aircraft
• 6:35
  Speaker 1: struck terrain to the left of the runway threshold. It
• 6:38
  Speaker 1: did not hit the paved surface. It hit the earth
• 6:40
  Speaker 1: beside it, and then it hit something embedded in that earth.
• 6:43
  Speaker 1: A concrete drainage culvert, approximately 70 meters to the left
• 6:47
  Speaker 1: of runway 21. The culvert was not hidden. It was
• 6:50
  Speaker 1: not a surprise feature of the airport. It was documented.
• 6:53
  Speaker 1: It appeared on airport surveys. It had always been there.
• 6:56
  Speaker 1: The DC-9 broke apart. Seven people were pulled from the
• 6:59
  Speaker 1: wreckage alive. Seven out of 110. The airport's emergency response
• 7:04
  Speaker 1: amounted to one fire truck. There were no ambulances stationed
• 7:07
  Speaker 1: at Port Harcourt International Airport that afternoon. The fire that
• 7:11
  Speaker 1: began in the wreckage, fed by aviation fuel, by the
• 7:14
  Speaker 1: fractured fuselage, by everything that burns when a 33-year-old aircraft
• 7:18
  Speaker 1: disintegrates at speed, was not contained quickly enough. Riskiers pulled
• 7:22
  Speaker 1: people out. The fire reached others before anyone could. Of
• 7:26
  Speaker 1: those seven initial survivors, most did not survive the hours
• 7:29
  Speaker 1: that followed. Two did. Bania Musin suffered burns over 40%
• 7:32
  Speaker 1: of her body. She would spend months in medical care
• 7:36
  Speaker 1: before her condition stabilized. The second survivor was a 15-year-old
• 7:40
  Speaker 1: student from Loyola Jesuit College named Kechi Okwuchi. She had
• 7:44
  Speaker 1: boarded that flight in Abuja to go home for the
• 7:46
  Speaker 1: Christmas holidays. She was one of approximately 60 students on
• 7:50
  Speaker 1: flight 1145, making that same journey. 59 of those students
• 7:54
  Speaker 1: did not make it home. Ketchy was extracted from the
• 7:57
  Speaker 1: wreckage and eventually transferred to Mill Park Hospital in Johannesburg,
• 8:01
  Speaker 1: then to the Shriners Hospitals for Children in Galveston, Texas,
• 8:05
  Speaker 1: where she would undergo treatment for the next several years.
• 8:08
  Speaker 1: The burns she sustained were severe. The recovery was measured
• 8:11
  Speaker 1: not in weeks but in years and decades. There is
• 8:14
  Speaker 1: a particular kind of silence that descends on an arrivals
• 8:16
  Speaker 1: hall when the families waiting there begin to understand what
• 8:19
  Speaker 1: has happened. In Port Harcourt that afternoon, parents who had
• 8:22
  Speaker 1: chosen to fly their children home, who had made that
• 8:25
  Speaker 1: choice specifically because the roads were dangerous, because the highways
• 8:28
  Speaker 1: between cities carried their own risks, stood in that hall.
• 8:31
  Speaker 1: The choice that was supposed to be the safe one
• 8:33
  Speaker 1: had brought them to this moment. Among those who died
• 8:36
  Speaker 1: was Reverend Bimbo Otokoya, a pastor and televangelist known across Nigeria.
• 8:41
  Speaker 1: Also on board were Uche Marcus Okoro, the president of
• 8:44
  Speaker 1: a major oil workers' union and two volunteers with Médecine
• 8:47
  Speaker 1: Sans Frontières, one American, one French who had been working
• 8:50
  Speaker 1: in the country. 108 people, the investigation that followed sent
• 8:55
  Speaker 1: the damaged flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder to
• 8:58
  Speaker 1: the Air Accidents Investigation Branch in the United Kingdom for analysis.
• 9:02
  Speaker 1: The recorders had sustained damage in the impact and fire.
• 9:05
  Speaker 1: The data they produced was incomplete. It was however sufficient.
• 9:09
  Speaker 1: Sufficient to reconstruct the final minutes. Sufficient to identify the
• 9:13
  Speaker 1: decision point. Sufficient to name what went wrong. The Nigerian
• 9:17
  Speaker 1: Accident Investigation Bureau released its final report on July 26. 2006,
• 9:21
  Speaker 1: the official cause was the crew's decision to continue the
• 9:25
  Speaker 1: approach beyond the decision altitude without visual confirmation of the runway.
• 9:29
  Speaker 1: Contributing factors included the delayed go-around call, an incorrect go-around procedure,
• 9:34
  Speaker 1: wind shear caused by the microburst, and the absence of
• 9:37
  Speaker 1: runway lighting. Every one of those factors is real, every
• 9:40
  Speaker 1: one is documented, and yet the investigation record read carefully
• 9:44
  Speaker 1: reveals that this chain did not begin in the cockpit.
• 9:47
  Speaker 1: Consider what the crew was not given. The air traffic
• 9:49
  Speaker 1: controller at Port Harcourt did not report wind speed to
• 9:52
  Speaker 1: flight 1145. The controller did not alert the crew to
• 9:56
  Speaker 1: the possibility of a developing storm. The crew began their flight.
• 10:00
  Speaker 1: approach without the two pieces of information that might have
• 10:03
  Speaker 1: prompted them to hold to divert or to be far
• 10:05
  Speaker 1: more aggressive in calling a go-around the instant the decision
• 10:08
  Speaker 1: altitude passed without a runway in sight. Now consider the
• 10:11
  Speaker 1: runway itself. The approach lighting system at Port Harcourt International
• 10:16
  Speaker 1: Airport depended on the National Electrical Grid When the grid failed,
• 10:19
  Speaker 1: as it regularly did, the lights went dark. No backup
• 10:22
  Speaker 1: power source is documented in the investigation record as having
• 10:26
  Speaker 1: been operational that afternoon. The crew was attempting to visually
• 10:29
  Speaker 1: acquire a runway in deteriorating visibility in the final seconds
• 10:33
  Speaker 1: of an instrument approach. In the middle of a microburst,
• 10:36
  Speaker 1: with no lights to find. Picture the cockpit at 200
• 10:39
  Speaker 1: feet above the ground. The captain calls for the go-around.
• 10:43
  Speaker 1: He is 107 feet below where that call was supposed
• 10:45
  Speaker 1: to happen. The first officer advances the throttles. The engines
• 10:49
  Speaker 1: begin to spool. A DC-9's engines do not respond instantaneously.
• 10:54
  Speaker 1: There is a lag, a moment where the command has
• 10:56
  Speaker 1: been given but the power has not yet arrived. In
• 10:59
  Speaker 1: that lag, the aircraft is still descending, still moving at
• 11:03
  Speaker 1: 160 knots, still inside a windshear event no one warned
• 11:07
  Speaker 1: them was there. 16 seconds. The easiest conclusion and the
• 11:11
  Speaker 1: one that surfaces first in any reading of this accident,
• 11:14
  Speaker 1: is pilot error. The captain flew below the decision altitude,
• 11:17
  Speaker 1: the captain delayed the go-around, the captain was in command.
• 11:20
  Speaker 1: That conclusion is not wrong. The investigation does not dispute it,
• 11:24
  Speaker 1: but it is incomplete in a way that matters. Gerald
• 11:27
  Speaker 1: Anden had already decided he was leaving Sausaliso Airlines, because
• 11:30
  Speaker 1: he was not confident in the operation's safety standards. He
• 11:33
  Speaker 1: sat in that cockpit on what he had planned to
• 11:35
  Speaker 1: be his last flight with the carrier and the system
• 11:38
  Speaker 1: around him, the controller who said nothing about the wind,
• 11:41
  Speaker 1: the runway whose lights were off, the single fire truck
• 11:44
  Speaker 1: standing by on the ground, performed exactly as he had
• 11:47
  Speaker 1: feared it might. The accident did not begin at 200 feet.
• 11:50
  Speaker 1: It began much earlier, in the accumulation of decisions and
• 11:53
  Speaker 1: absences and failures that placed a crew inside that specific
• 11:57
  Speaker 1: set of conditions, with no way out. That is what
• 11:59
  Speaker 1: the record shows. And it is why, about seven and
• 12:02
  Speaker 1: a half months after the crash, Nigeria's aviation authorities issued
• 12:06
  Speaker 1: recommendations about windshear training that the broader industry had not
• 12:09
  Speaker 1: yet incorporated. And why? The following year, another aircraft went
• 12:13
  Speaker 1: down near Abuja in a windshear event. No criminal charges
• 12:17
  Speaker 1: were ever filed against any individual or organization. In connection
• 12:21
  Speaker 1: with Flight 1-145, the roughly $ 2. 3 million that Sosuliso Airlines
• 12:27
  Speaker 1: eventually deposited into a compensation trust was declared. In January
• 12:31
  Speaker 1: of 2009, a little over three years after 108 people
• 12:37
  Speaker 1: died on a runway approach that should never have reached
• 12:40
  Speaker 1: the point of no return, the official report from Nigeria's
• 12:43
  Speaker 1: Accident Investigation Bureau landed seven months after the crash. It
• 12:47
  Speaker 1: named the probable cause with clinical precision. The crew continued
• 12:50
  Speaker 1: below the decision altitude without visual contact with the runway,
• 12:54
  Speaker 1: delayed the go-around order, and executed that go-around incorrectly inside
• 12:58
  Speaker 1: a microburst. Every word of that finding is documented, and
• 13:01
  Speaker 1: none of it is disputed. But the report also listed
• 13:04
  Speaker 1: what it called contributing factors. Those words carry weight. A
• 13:07
  Speaker 1: runway without lights because the national power grid was down.
• 13:11
  Speaker 1: A controller who never mentioned wind speed or the developing storm.
• 13:14
  Speaker 1: a windshear event that had no warning attached to it
• 13:17
  Speaker 1: and that arrived faster than any crew could reasonably have anticipated,
• 13:20
  Speaker 1: without proper preparation. The investigation found that windshear training had
• 13:24
  Speaker 1: not been incorporated into industry practice in Nigeria at the
• 13:28
  Speaker 1: time of the accident. That finding produced a formal recommendation.
• 13:31
  Speaker 1: The recommendation came too late for the 108 people who
• 13:35
  Speaker 1: did not survive runway 21. And then, the following year,
• 13:39
  Speaker 1: another aircraft went down near Abuja. Windshear again. No criminal
• 13:43
  Speaker 1: charges were ever filed, not against any individual pilot, not
• 13:47
  Speaker 1: against any controller, not against any airline executive or aviation
• 13:51
  Speaker 1: authority official. The record is unambiguous on this point. The
• 13:54
  Speaker 1: causes of the accident were systemic, layered, and distributed across
• 13:58
  Speaker 1: multiple actors and institutions. The investigation identified them. The legal
• 14:03
  Speaker 1: system did not pursue them. So Seleso Airlines declared a
• 14:07
  Speaker 1: compensation fund in January of 2009 in January 2009. a
• 14:11
  Speaker 1: little over three years after the crash. The total amount
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: deposited was roughly $ 2. 3 million, placed into a trust to
• 14:19
  Speaker 1: be distributed among the families of 108 dead. That sum
• 14:22
  Speaker 1: translates to roughly $ 21, 300 per family. For the loss of
• 14:27
  Speaker 1: a child, a spouse, a parent. The accounting was done,
• 14:30
  Speaker 1: and the number was recorded, and it stands in the
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: public record, exactly as stated. The airline itself did not
• 14:37
  Speaker 1: survive long. Flight 1145 was Sausaliso's first and only fatal accident.
• 14:42
  Speaker 1: The operation ceased. The families who lost children from Loyola
• 14:46
  Speaker 1: Jesuit College built something from the ruins. Andi and Ifealaba
• 14:49
  Speaker 1: had sent three children onto that flight. Chuka, Enkem, and Buzonma.
• 14:53
  Speaker 1: None of them came home. The Ilibors founded an organization
• 14:56
  Speaker 1: called Ilibor Angels, a legacy of three names that should
• 14:59
  Speaker 1: have made it back to Port Harcourt for Christmas. Loyola
• 15:02
  Speaker 1: Jesuit College built a memorial hall, students formed the Concerned
• 15:06
  Speaker 1: Students Club to carry the memory forward. In 2013, a
• 15:10
  Speaker 1: new institution opened, Jesuit Memorial College. In 2014. Another. Loyola Academy.
• 15:18
  Speaker 1: The names are different. The reason behind them is not.
• 15:21
  Speaker 1: Two survivors remained after everything else was gone. Bunmi Amusan
• 15:25
  Speaker 1: survived with burns covering 40% of her body. Kechi Okuchi
• 15:29
  Speaker 1: was the only student from Loyola Jesuit College who lived.
• 15:32
  Speaker 1: She was pulled from the wreckage, transferred to Mill Park
• 15:35
  Speaker 1: Hospital in Johannesburg, then to the Shriners Hospital for Children
• 15:39
  Speaker 1: in Galveston, Texas, where she underwent treatment for burns covering
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: more than 65% of her body. She spent years in recovery,
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: years in surgery, years learning what it meant to carry
• 15:50
  Speaker 1: that weight. In 2017, she stood on a national television
• 15:54
  Speaker 1: stage in the United States and sang. She has spoken
• 15:57
  Speaker 1: publicly about the crash About the friend she lost, about
• 16:01
  Speaker 1: why she believes she was left behind when 59 classmates
• 16:04
  Speaker 1: were not, she has never pretended to have an answer
• 16:07
  Speaker 1: to that question. She simply keeps living with it. There
• 16:10
  Speaker 1: is a detail that surfaces in the record and does
• 16:12
  Speaker 1: not resolve cleanly. The concrete culvert that tore through the
• 16:15
  Speaker 1: fuselage of Flight 145 was not hidden. It was not
• 16:19
  Speaker 1: an unmapped obstacle, not a recent construction, not a surprise
• 16:23
  Speaker 1: to anyone who had studied the airport charts for Port Harcourt.
• 16:26
  Speaker 1: It had always been there, roughly 70 meters to the
• 16:29
  Speaker 1: left of runway 21, sitting in the drainage system as
• 16:32
  Speaker 1: it had for years. It was documented, it was visible
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: on the maps. That detail carries a particular kind of weight,
• 16:39
  Speaker 1: not the weight of a single catastrophic failure, but the
• 16:42
  Speaker 1: weight of something known and unchanged, and waiting. 108 people
• 16:47
  Speaker 1: died on December 10, 2005, on a flight that was
• 16:50
  Speaker 1: supposed to be the safe choice. 60 adolescents boarded in
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: Abuja because the road home was considered too dangerous. 59
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: of them did not arrive. A first officer climbed into
• 17:00
  Speaker 1: his seat that day, having already decided to leave the
• 17:03
  Speaker 1: airline because he did not trust its safety. A controller
• 17:06
  Speaker 1: managed an approach without sharing what the weather instruments were recording.
• 17:09
  Speaker 1: A runway sat dark because the power supply that was
• 17:12
  Speaker 1: supposed to light it was not available. An airport stood
• 17:15
  Speaker 1: by with one fire truck and no ambulances. None of
• 17:19
  Speaker 1: these things was invisible. None of them required discovery after
• 17:22
  Speaker 1: the fact. They were the ordinary conditions of that operation
• 17:25
  Speaker 1: on that afternoon and when they combined with a microburst
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: over Port Harcourt, 16 seconds was all the time that remained.
• 17:32
  Speaker 1: Kechi Okuchi is still alive. She carries the names of
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: her classmates with her in every interview in every performance.
• 17:38
  Speaker 1: In every room she walks into that 59 of them
• 17:41
  Speaker 1: never reached. That is not a detail from the accident report.
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: That is what happens after the report is filed and
• 17:47
  Speaker 1: the compensation is deposited and the recommendations are written and
• 17:50
  Speaker 1: another year passes and another aircraft falls. The question that
• 17:54
  Speaker 1: flight 1145 leaves open is not what caused the crash.
• 17:58
  Speaker 1: The investigation answered that. The question is what a known obstacle,
• 18:01
  Speaker 1: a dark runway, an unwarned storm, and a single fire
• 18:04
  Speaker 1: truck tell us about who gets protected and when and
• 18:07
  Speaker 1: whether the answer changes after the report is filed or
• 18:10
  Speaker 1: only after the next one is. This show is made
• 18:13
  Speaker 1: by Obermedia.