Latest / Tech IPO Conversations with Fexingo: Public Software Companies and Capital Markets / The Hidden Cost of Software IPO Underpricing
Transcript
- Lucas: There is a specific kind of pain that happens when you watch a software company go public and see the stock jump twenty percent on day one. You look at the prospectus, you see the price they set, and you realize they could have priced it higher. But they didn't. And usually, the investment bank has a very good reason for not doing so. Luna: Right, but isn't that just part of the game? If you want the deal to succeed, you leave money on the table to ensure it doesn't flop. Lucas: It is part of the game, but the cost of that game is becoming harder to justify for founders who have been building for a decade. Let's look at the current environment here in November 2026. The S&P 500 is hovering around three thousand five hundred points, driven largely by mega-cap tech like Apple and Microsoft, which are trading with significant momentum. But the new blood coming into the public markets? They are being priced conservatively. Luna: So we're seeing a divergence where the incumbents are rich, but the newcomers are being discounted to attract buyers. Lucas: Exactly. And this brings me to something I want to talk about before we dive too deep into the mechanics. This show is built on the idea that operators and builders should have better access to these conversations. If these insights help you make smarter decisions about your own career or your own venture, consider supporting the network directly. It keeps us independent and ad-free. You can find us at buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo — that's F. E. X. I. N. G. O. Luna: Yeah, we really appreciate that support because it lets us dig into the stuff that actually matters to people building companies. Lucas: Back to the underpricing. The standard rule of thumb in investment banking has always been: secure the allocation, then worry about the price. If you price a software IPO too high, you risk the deal failing. A failed IPO is a reputational disaster for the bank. So they price it low enough that retail investors and mutual funds feel safe buying it. Luna: But that safety comes at the expense of the original shareholders, right? The ones who took the biggest risks? Lucas: That is the central tension. When a company prices at fifty dollars and opens at sixty-five, the initial buyers get an instant ten-dollar profit per share. The founder and the early venture capitalists? They sold their shares at fifty dollars, or they hold shares that are now worth more than they would have been if they had priced at sixty-five. That is a transfer of wealth from the private owners to the public buyers. Luna: It feels like a tax on success, especially when those early employees spent years grinding for equity that gets diluted by that gap. Lucas: It is effectively a tax on certainty. The bank wants certainty of execution. They would rather sell one hundred percent of the offering at fifty dollars than sell eighty percent at sixty-five and risk the remaining twenty percent crashing back down. In the software sector, where volatility is high, this behavior is even more pronounced. Luna: Does this change depending on the size of the IPO? Or is it the same playbook for a two-billion-dollar company as it is for a fifty-billion-dollar one? Lucas: It scales with the size, but the incentive is identical. Look at the recent headlines. We saw some major tech deals hit the wire this week, including some moves involving large-scale infrastructure and AI startups. Even when the demand is strong, the banks will anchor the price to create a floor. They need to build a 'book' of committed buyers. Luna: So they court the big institutional players first, making sure they have enough commitment to guarantee the sale, and that sets the ceiling for what they're willing to risk. Lucas: Precisely. And here is the concrete detail most people miss: the underpricing isn't random. It correlates with the size of the offering. Larger offerings tend to be underpriced more aggressively because the logistical complexity of distributing those shares is higher. The bank charges a premium for managing that risk, and the primary way they do that is by lowering the issue price. Luna: That sounds almost like a fee structure disguised as a pricing strategy. Are founders aware of this math, or are they just happy to be public? Lucas: Many founders are happy to be public. Going public solves liquidity problems. It validates the business model. It allows them to raise capital for growth without going back to private markets. But savvy founders negotiate hard on the number of shares, not just the price. If you can't move the price up, you increase the supply of shares. That dilutes existing holders, but it raises the total capital raised. Luna: So it's a trade-off between price per share and total ownership percentage. Most people don't think about that distinction until after the stock starts trading. Lucas: Right. And once the stock hits the tape, the 'pop' becomes a headline. 'Software Company Surges 20% on First Day.' It looks like a victory. But if you zoom out, that pop is often a signal of inefficiency. It means the market was willing to pay more, but the process didn't allow for that discovery to happen in the pricing phase. Luna: Is there any pushback against this model? Are newer banks or platforms trying to disrupt this traditional underpricing mechanic? Lucas: There has been talk of direct listings and book-building reforms for years. Direct listings, like Spotify did, bypass the bank entirely. You don't set a price; you let the market determine it based on the existing shares. But for most software companies, the cash raise is critical. They need the new capital. So they stick with the traditional IPO, which means they stick with the underpricing. Luna: Spotify worked because they didn't need the cash. But most growing software firms are still burning cash or reinvesting heavily. They can't afford to skip the bank. Lucas: Correct. And that reliance on bank financing perpetuates the cycle. The banks know that as long as founders need capital, they will accept the lower price in exchange for the guarantee of a successful launch. It is a rational choice for the individual player, but a suboptimal outcome for the ecosystem. Luna: So we end up with a market where the initial public buyers get a free lunch, and the long-term holders inherit a slightly inflated entry point once the pop fades. Lucas: Exactly. And the fade is real. Historical data shows that many IPOs underperform the broader market over the first three to five years. The initial excitement creates a peak, and then reality sets in. The company has to deliver on the promises made in the prospectus, which was priced conservatively to avoid scrutiny. Luna: It makes me wonder if the rise of private markets is actually protecting companies from this premature exposure. If you stay private longer, you control your own narrative. Lucas: That is a huge trend right now. Companies like Databricks and others have stayed private much longer than they would have in 2010. They use private debt and late-stage funding to delay the IPO. This gives them time to grow revenues, improve margins, and potentially command a higher price when they finally do go public. Less underpricing, more value retention. Luna: So staying private is a hedge against the public market's need for immediate certainty. You trade liquidity for valuation power. Lucas: That is the perfect summary. Liquidity vs. Valuation. The public market offers liquidity, but it demands a discount for the convenience of that exit. The private market offers valuation control, but it locks up your capital for years. Luna: For a founder listening to this, the question becomes: how long can I stay private before the pressure to go public outweighs the benefit of that higher price? Lucas: Usually, it's when the investor base gets restless. Venture capitalists and early employees want to cash out. If you can't provide liquidity through secondary sales in the private market, you eventually have to open the floodgates. And when you do, you're often at the mercy of the market cycle. Luna: Which brings us back to today. With rates stabilizing and tech stocks rallying, the window for IPOs is opening again. But are we seeing less underpricing now? Lucas: We are seeing slightly less underpricing in hot sectors like AI, because the demand is so intense. Banks are pushing for higher prices because they fear losing the deal to competitors. But in average sectors, the old rules still apply. If you're a generic SaaS company, you'll likely still see that ten to fifteen percent pop. Luna: So the differentiation is becoming key. If your story is unique, you can charge a premium. If you're commoditized, you have to discount to sell. Lucas: Spot on. The market is rewarding distinctiveness and punishing mediocrity. That's why the companies that stay private longest are often the ones with the most defensible moats. They don't need to rush to public markets to prove their worth. Luna: It suggests that for investors, the real alpha might be in spotting those private companies early, rather than chasing the IPO pop which is basically just a subsidy from the founders. Lucas: Or accepting that the IPO pop is the price of admission for a liquid asset. You get in, you ride the wave, and you hope the company grows fast enough to justify the initial discount. It's a different game than holding a private stake, but it's the game most people play. Luna: So the next time you see a software stock jump on its first day, remember: that green candle is partly a feature of the system, not just a sign of market enthusiasm. Lucas: It is. And understanding that mechanism helps you decide whether to buy the hype or wait for the correction. Because eventually, the price has to settle at what the company is actually worth, not what the bank was afraid it wasn't worth.