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008 - Chapter 4 Part 1 - Majon-ni and Ambush Alley · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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  Speaker 1: Chapter four, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Majohn Nie and Ambush Alley.
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  Speaker 1: From a distance, the y shaped mountain valley, encircled by
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  Speaker 1: peaks and crossed by two swift, clear streams, might have
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  Speaker 1: been taken for a scene in the Alps. This impression
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  Speaker 1: was borne out by the village of majohan Nie, which
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  Speaker 1: nestled close to the earth, as seen from Afar, with
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  Speaker 1: the tranquil and untroubled air of a Swiss hamlet. On
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  Speaker 1: closer inspection, however, such first impressions could only prove to
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  Speaker 1: be i llussary. The most prominent building in the Korean
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  Speaker 1: village was a new schoolhouse with the onion shaped dome
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  Speaker 1: of Russian architecture, an incongruous and pretentious ructure for such
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  Speaker 1: a small peasant community. It had been erected not so
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  Speaker 1: much for the instruction of children as the indoctrination of
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  Speaker 1: adults and communist principles. Majan Ni, in short, had been
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  Speaker 1: for five years a hotbed of forced culture and the
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  Speaker 1: doctrines of the communist puppet states set up in northern
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  Speaker 1: Korea after World War II by the occupation forces of
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  Speaker 1: Soviet Russia, and it was here that the third Battalion
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  Speaker 1: of the First Marines arrived on twenty eight October nineteen fifty.
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  Speaker 1: Relief of elements of the twenty sixth Rock Regiment at
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  Speaker 1: sixteen hundred enabled those troops to return to Wansan and
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  Speaker 1: the vehicles which had brought three to one. The Marines
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  Speaker 1: had been assigned the mission of setting up a defensive
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  Speaker 1: position at Majan Ni, destroying enemy forces and denying them
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  Speaker 1: the use of this road net. In addition, the unit
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  Speaker 1: was to patrol roads to the north, south, and west
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  Speaker 1: and keep the road open between majan Nie and Wan San.
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  Speaker 1: This last directive was soon modified by oral instructions, relieving
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  Speaker 1: the battalion from the responsibility of keeping open the Wan
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  Speaker 1: San majan Nie road. The reason for the change was
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  Speaker 1: apparent when the troops of three one covered the twenty
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  Speaker 1: eight mile route by motor lift and two echelons on
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  Speaker 1: the afternoon of the twenty eighth. After leaving the seaport
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  Speaker 1: and alluvial plain, the shelf like road twists precariously through
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  Speaker 1: a three thousand foot pass. This stretch abounds in hairpin
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  Speaker 1: turns and deep gorges, which are ideal for setting a
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  Speaker 1: tactical trap, and the route was soon to be known
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  Speaker 1: to the troops as Ambush Alley. Although traversible by tanks,
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  Speaker 1: it offered too much danger from road blocks and landslides
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  Speaker 1: to permit the dispatch of the iron elephants. The strategic
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  Speaker 1: importance of the majan Nie area derived from its position
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  Speaker 1: at the head waters of the river Imjine and the
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  Speaker 1: junction of roads leading east to wan San, south to Seoul,
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  Speaker 1: and west of Pyeongyang. They were being traveled extensively at
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  Speaker 1: this time by NKPA troops escaping northward in civilian clothes.
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  Speaker 1: After the collapse of the Red Korean military effort. It
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  Speaker 1: was natural that the first marine division with a zone
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  Speaker 1: of more than fifteen thousand square miles to control should
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  Speaker 1: be ordered to occupy such an important road junction and
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  Speaker 1: potentially assembly area as majan Nie. Thus, the marines of
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge's Reinforced Battalion were sent as
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  Speaker 1: a blocking and screening force. Marine units tied in for defense.
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  Speaker 1: In addition to H and S Weapons and three rifle companies,
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  Speaker 1: the task organization consisted on twenty eight October of Battery
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  Speaker 1: D of the second Battalion, eleventh Marines, the third Platoon
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  Speaker 1: of Company C, first Engineer Battalion, and detachments from Anglico,
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  Speaker 1: First Signal Battalion, Company D, first Medical Battalion, and H
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  Speaker 1: and S Company, First Marines. The battalion commander and his
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  Speaker 1: s IIE, Major Joseph D. Trumpeter, decided, after a survey
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  Speaker 1: of the terrain that the commanding ground was too far
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  Speaker 1: from the village and too rugged for company outposts. The
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  Speaker 1: logical solution seemed to be a battalion perimeter combined with
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  Speaker 1: daytime company ops and vigorous patrolling of the three main roads.
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  Speaker 1: In order to tie in all units of a perimeter
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  Speaker 1: three thousand, seven hundred seventy yards in circumference, it was
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  Speaker 1: necessary to create provisional platoons of such H and S
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  Speaker 1: Artillery and Engineer troops as could be spared from their
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  Speaker 1: regular duties. Even so, the defense was spread thin in places.
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  Speaker 1: The schoolhouse was the obvious place for the battalion CP.
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  Speaker 1: Communication within the perimeter was by telephone, with wires laid
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  Speaker 1: from the CP to artillery and mortar positions, as well
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  Speaker 1: as company and platoon CPS. Radio communication yan was established
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  Speaker 1: with the regiment and the division, but due to the terrain,
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  Speaker 1: remained irregular at best. First Lieutenant Leroy M. Duffy and
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  Speaker 1: his engineers were assigned the task of constructing an oy
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  Speaker 1: strip on the east side of the perimeter, which was
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  Speaker 1: completed on two November. A parallel cliff made it necessary
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  Speaker 1: to land plains at a dangerous angle, but no better
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  Speaker 1: site could be had in this steep sided valley. Topography
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  Speaker 1: also limited Captain Andrew J. Stromaninger's cannoneers, who were almost
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  Speaker 1: literally firing out of a barrel. Close in support was
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  Speaker 1: out of the question in the bowl like valley ringed
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  Speaker 1: with peaks, but the six howitzers were emplaced so that
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  Speaker 1: they could be swung to fire on any avenue of approach,
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  Speaker 1: especially towards the three roads leading into majohn Nie. No
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  Speaker 1: difficulty was found in deciding on a water point for
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  Speaker 1: tests established the purity of the water from both branches
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  Speaker 1: of the imgine flowing through the perimeter. Lieutenant Duffy explained
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  Speaker 1: that he added chlorine only because the Marines were accustomed
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  Speaker 1: to the flavor political aspects of mission. The Marine mission
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  Speaker 1: had its political as well as military side. Major Edwin H.
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  Speaker 1: Simmons Coe of Weapons Company was given the responsibility for
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  Speaker 1: defending the three roadblocks of the perimeter with Weapons Company personnel.
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  Speaker 1: At each of them, he stationed a heavy machine gun
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  Speaker 1: section and a three point five inch rocket launcher section.
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  Speaker 1: These barriers were also ports of entry where all Korean
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  Speaker 1: transients were searched for weapons. When a group of twenty
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  Speaker 1: to thirty accumulated, they were escorted under guard to the
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  Speaker 1: prison Stockade, just across the road from the Battalion CP.
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  Speaker 1: There they were processed by the Civil Affairs Section, consisting
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  Speaker 1: of twelve Marine enlisted men under the command of First
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Donald M. Holmes and Master Sergeant Marion M. Stocks,
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  Speaker 1: known facetiously as the Mayor and Sheriff respectively of majohn Nie.
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  Speaker 1: Their decisions were based largely on the findings of the
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  Speaker 1: one hundred eighty first Counter Intelligence Corps CIC team and
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  Speaker 1: the Battalion S two Second Lieutenant Frederick W. Hopkins. The
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  Speaker 1: CIC specialists proved to be indispensable by contributing daily intelligence
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  Speaker 1: based on civilian as well as pow interrogations, as might
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  Speaker 1: be supposed. The question of whether a transient was an
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  Speaker 1: escaping NKPA soldier or a harmless peasant might have perplexed
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  Speaker 1: Solomon himself, but the Marines came up with a simple
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  Speaker 1: off the cuff solution. Time did not permit a lengthy screening,
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  Speaker 1: and each Korean was given a brief examination with the
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  Speaker 1: aid of interpreters. If his head was still close cropped
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  Speaker 1: in the NKPA manner, if his next showed a tan
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  Speaker 1: V line recently left by a uniform, if his feet
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  Speaker 1: bore the telltale callous as left by military footgear. If
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  Speaker 1: he could not pass these three tests, the transient was
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  Speaker 1: sent to the prison stockade as a fugitive Red Korean soldier.
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  Speaker 1: Now that Chinese communist troops had been encountered both on
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  Speaker 1: the ten Corps and Eighth Army fronts, it was all
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  Speaker 1: the more important that battle wise NKPA elements should be
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  Speaker 1: prevented from joining their new allies if Red China intervened.
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  Speaker 1: Some of the prisoners were admittedly NKPA veterans, wary of
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  Speaker 1: the war and ready to give up voluntarily. Manifestations of
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  Speaker 1: this spirit caused Lieutenant Colonel Ridge to send a radio
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  Speaker 1: request for an air drop of surrender leaflets. The first
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  Speaker 1: full day's operations on twenty nine October resulted in twenty
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  Speaker 1: four prisoners being taken, but this was a trickle as
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  Speaker 1: compared to the torrent which would follow until an average
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  Speaker 1: daily rate of eighty two was maintained during the seventeen
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  Speaker 1: days of the operations Rhodes Patrol rifle companies. Each of
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  Speaker 1: the rifle companies was given the mission of sending out
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  Speaker 1: daily motorized or foot patrols while manning as required company ops.
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  Speaker 1: The three roads were assigned as follows George Company Captain
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  Speaker 1: Carl L. Sitter the road to Wanson, Howe Company Captain
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  Speaker 1: Clarence E. Corley Junior, the Road to Seoul, Item Company
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  Speaker 1: First Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher the road to peong Yang.
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  Speaker 1: All patrols reported negative results throughout the first four days. Nevertheless,
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  Speaker 1: a system of artillery and eighty one millimeter mortar harassing
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  Speaker 1: and interdiction fires on suspected Red Korean assembly areas was
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  Speaker 1: put into effect. Major Simmons was designated the Supporting Arms
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  Speaker 1: Coordinator SAC and O Wise were used for artillery spotting
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  Speaker 1: and to call air strikes when planes were on station.
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  Speaker 1: The battalion commander emphasized to his officers the necessity for
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  Speaker 1: maintaining as good relations with the inhabitants as security would permit.
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  Speaker 1: Strict troop discipline was to be maintained at all times,
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  Speaker 1: and the villagers were allowed their own mayor and council,
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  Speaker 1: along with such laws or customs as did not conflict
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  Speaker 1: with the marine mission. A policy of justice and fairness
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  Speaker 1: had its reward when the inhabitants warned the CIC team
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  Speaker 1: of an impending attack by organized NKPA troops. POW interrogations
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  Speaker 1: and reports by civilians identified the enemy unit as the
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  Speaker 1: fifteenth NKPA Division, including the forty fifth, forty eighth, and
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  Speaker 1: fiftieth regiments, commanded by Major General Pak Sun Shoal. Following
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  Speaker 1: the NKPA collapse, the division had been able to maintain
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  Speaker 1: its organization while infiltrating northward from the Pusan perimeter and
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  Speaker 1: raiding the villages for food. The mission was reported to
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  Speaker 1: be the occupation and control of the upper Imjin Valley
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  Speaker 1: as a base for gerrilla operations, with the majohn Nie
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  Speaker 1: Road junction being designated one of the main objectives. Enemy
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  Speaker 1: numbers were said to reach a total of eleven thousand,
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  Speaker 1: but that figure, like most Oriental estimates of numbers, had
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  Speaker 1: to be taken with the traditional grain of salt. At
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  Speaker 1: any rate, the Marines had no further doubt on the
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  Speaker 1: morning of two November that they were opposed by a
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  Speaker 1: resolute enemy skilled at gorilla tactics. Second Lieutenant Harvey A.
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  Speaker 1: Gauss's platoon of how Company, reinforced with eighty one millimeter mortars,
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  Speaker 1: light machine guns and artillery. Forward Observer FO team and
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  Speaker 1: a fact was ambushed in a deep gorge five miles
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  Speaker 1: south of Majohn Nie. While conducting a motorized patrol. The
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  Speaker 1: Marines raked by rifle and automatic small arms fire from
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  Speaker 1: an unseen enemy hidden along the heights on both sides.
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  Speaker 1: Got off only the message we've been hit. Send help,
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  Speaker 1: Send Help before the radio was hit. Effective deployment in
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  Speaker 1: the narrow road was prevented by stalled vehicles. Casualties were
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  Speaker 1: mounting when Second Lieutenant Kenneth A. Bot and Pfc. Donald O.
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  Speaker 1: Hofstetter ran the gauntlet of fire in a jeep. They
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  Speaker 1: reached Majohn Knee unhurt, although one tire of the jeep
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  Speaker 1: had been shot. The three to one CP was delayed
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  Speaker 1: in summoning air because of the difficulties in radio transmission.
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  Speaker 1: This break in communications alarmed Major Simmons, Acting as Sack,
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  Speaker 1: he persuaded the pilot of an OI to fly him
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  Speaker 1: over the scene of the ambush. From his point of vantage,
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  Speaker 1: Simmons had a good view of the deployment of Captain
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  Speaker 1: Corley's remaining two rifle platoons, riding artillery trucks and reinforced
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  Speaker 1: with heavy machine guns and eighty one millimeter mortars, which
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  Speaker 1: had been sent out for majohn Nie to extricate the patrol.
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  Speaker 1: The eighty one millimeter mortars were set up just off
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  Speaker 1: the road and began pounding the North Korean cliff side positions. Pfc.
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  Speaker 1: Jack Golden, a one man task force, climbed with a
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  Speaker 1: ninety four pound heavy machine gun to a height where
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  Speaker 1: he could fire down on the communists. Marine corsairs came
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  Speaker 1: on station somewhat tardily because of the poor radio communication,
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  Speaker 1: and the remnants of the enemy disappeared into the hills.
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Robert J. Fleishaker, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy, the
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  Speaker 1: Battalion Medical officer and his assistants cared for the less
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  Speaker 1: critical marine casualties. One man died during the night, but
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  Speaker 1: most of the others were evacuated during the next day
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  Speaker 1: in three helicopter flights, much to the astonishment of the natives.
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  Speaker 1: Fly Shaker and his assistants also treated Korean civilians on occasion,
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  Speaker 1: and the saving of a village boy's life by an
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  Speaker 1: emergency ependectomy did much to gain the goodwill of the community.
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  Speaker 1: Airdrop of supplies requested. Radio communication between majohn Nie and
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  Speaker 1: Wanson was so uncertain because of the intervening hill mass
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  Speaker 1: that it was possible to get through for only a
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  Speaker 1: few hours at night. The surest means of communication was
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  Speaker 1: a written message carried by helicopter or oy pilots, who
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  Speaker 1: had to insure delivery to regiment after landing at the
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  Speaker 1: Wanson airfield. The supply problem had already begun to pinch
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  Speaker 1: before the first week ended. A convoy came through from
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  Speaker 1: Wanson without molestation on twenty nine October, but it was
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  Speaker 1: the last for a week. On one November, just a
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  Speaker 1: place safe, Lieutenant Colonel Ridge requested a practice air drop,
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  Speaker 1: which went off satisfactorily. His judgment was upheld on the
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  Speaker 1: morning of the How Company ambush when a three to
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  Speaker 1: one supply convoy was attacked seven miles west of Wanson
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  Speaker 1: and forced to turn back. First Lieutenant James D. Beeler
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  Speaker 1: commanded the George Company Rifle Platoon escorts the column of
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  Speaker 1: supply vehicles, which was under the charge of Second Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: James L. Crutchfield of H and S. Company. The third
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  Speaker 1: truck in line, loaded with diesel fuel and C three composition,
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  Speaker 1: burst into flames after running into a hail of enemy
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  Speaker 1: rifle and automatic weapons bullets. Meanwhile, the first two trucks
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  Speaker 1: continued until they came to a roadblock created by blowing
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  Speaker 1: a crater. Turning around under intense fire, they got back
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  Speaker 1: to the point of original ambush just as the other
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  Speaker 1: vehicles were trying to reverse direction, and in the confusion,
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  Speaker 1: two trucks went off the narrow road, making a total
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  Speaker 1: of three lost. A flight of three VMF three twelve corsairs,
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  Speaker 1: led by Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank Cole, dispersed an enemy
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  Speaker 1: force estimated at two hundred to three hundred men. The
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  Speaker 1: convoy was extricated and brought back to wants On after
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  Speaker 1: the first Marine sent out a task force consisting of
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  Speaker 1: four tanks, a tank dozer and six trucks filled with
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  Speaker 1: infantry personnel. Losses in the ambush were nine men killed
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  Speaker 1: and fifteen wounded. Ridge now had to call for an
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  Speaker 1: air drop in earnest. Gasoline, rations, grenades, and artillery, mortar
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  Speaker 1: and machine gun ammunition to a total of more than
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  Speaker 1: twenty one tons were packaged at the wants On Airfield
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  Speaker 1: on to November by Captain Hersel D. C. Blassongame's first
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  Speaker 1: Air Delivery Platoon. Four hours after the receipt of the message,
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  Speaker 1: the Air Force C forty sevens released one hundred fifty
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  Speaker 1: two parachutes over the majohn Nie perimeter. This was one
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  Speaker 1: of the one hundred forty one replenishment missions of the
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  Speaker 1: Air Delivery Platoon in November, amounting to eight hundred sixty
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  Speaker 1: four man hours of flying time and three hundred seventy
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  Speaker 1: seven tons of supplies dropped. Less than the usual amount
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  Speaker 1: of breakage resulted, but Colonel Poller considered it so necessary
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  Speaker 1: to push a truck convoy through to majohn Nie that
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  Speaker 1: he assigned a rifle company as guards. This mission fell
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  Speaker 1: the Captain Barrow's Able Company reinforced by one platoon of
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  Speaker 1: Captain Lester G. Harmon's Company C Engineers, Technical Sergeant Shelley
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  Speaker 1: Wiggins section of eighty one millimeter mortars, and Second Lieutenant
• 17:12
  Speaker 1: Harold L. Kaufman section of seventy five millimeters recoilist rifles.
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  Speaker 1: Thirty four supply vehicles were in the column which left
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  Speaker 1: Wantson at fourteen thirty on four November. The late hour
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  Speaker 1: of departure was a handicap, and though an OI flew reconnaissance,
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  Speaker 1: the convoy had no fact A TACP jeep well back
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  Speaker 1: in the column could communicate with the OI, which relayed
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  Speaker 1: the message to the two VMF three to twelve coursairs
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  Speaker 1: on station. Barrow reasoned that because so many of the
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  Speaker 1: enemy roadblocks required engineer equipment, it would be advisable for
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  Speaker 1: Harmon's vehicles to lead, followed by First Lieutenant William A.
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: McClellan's infantry platoon. This scheme promised well when four undefended
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  Speaker 1: crater roadblocks were encountered and speedily filled in by the engineers.
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  Speaker 1: The fifth, however, was the scene of an ambush by
• 18:06
  Speaker 1: Red Koreans occupying the steep heights on both sides of
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  Speaker 1: the narrow, winding road. The engineers soon had a hot
• 18:14
  Speaker 1: firefight on their hands. Taking cover behind the vehicles, they
• 18:18
  Speaker 1: gave a good account of themselves, but the stalled trucks
• 18:22
  Speaker 1: delayed the infantry platoon coming to their aid, and lack
• 18:25
  Speaker 1: of a fact resulted in less effective close air support
• 18:28
  Speaker 1: than the corsairs usually rendered. Thus, with the early November
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  Speaker 1: dusk approaching, Captain Barrow decided on a return to Wan San.
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  Speaker 1: By a near miracle, the trucks turned about safely on
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  Speaker 1: the narrow shelf that passed for a road. As the
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: enemy long range fire increased, Barrow ordered lights out. When
• 18:48
  Speaker 1: the column commenced its eight mile return trip in the darkness,
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: a truck loaded with twenty marines missed a hairpin turn
• 18:55
  Speaker 1: and plunged over the edge. Fortunately the accident happened and
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  Speaker 1: at one of the few spots where the vehicle could
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  Speaker 1: land on a wooded shoulder instead of hurtling through space
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  Speaker 1: to the rocky valley floor several hundred feet below. It
• 19:10
  Speaker 1: was found that nothing worse than broken bones and concussion
• 19:13
  Speaker 1: had resulted. After a human chain brought the injured men
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  Speaker 1: back up to the road, lights were turned on and
• 19:19
  Speaker 1: the convoy got back without further trouble. Barrow reported to
• 19:24
  Speaker 1: his regimental commander at Togwan that his loss as amounta
• 19:27
  Speaker 1: to eight men wounded and sixteen injured, in addition to
• 19:30
  Speaker 1: five vehicles destroyed. Colonel Poller assured him that his failure
• 19:35
  Speaker 1: had been due to an unavoidably late start and lack
• 19:38
  Speaker 1: of a fact rather than faulty judgment. The following morning,
• 19:43
  Speaker 1: after departing wants On at zero a thirty, the air
• 19:46
  Speaker 1: controller was not needed. Barrow had put into effect a
• 19:50
  Speaker 1: new tactical plan based on the premise that the guerrillas
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  Speaker 1: of Ambush Alley would be waiting, as usual for the
• 19:56
  Speaker 1: sound of approaching trucks. He prepared a surprise therefore by
• 20:01
  Speaker 1: directing his infantry platoons to take turns at leading the
• 20:04
  Speaker 1: column on foot, keeping a thousand yards or more in
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  Speaker 1: advance of the vehicles. The scheme worked to perfection. As
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  Speaker 1: Second Lieutenant Donald R. Jones's platoon rounded a bend near
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  Speaker 1: the scene of yesterday's ambush and surprised about seventy gorillas
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  Speaker 1: as they were eating. The ambussors had in effect been ambushed.
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  Speaker 1: The Marines opened up with everything they had and only
• 20:27
  Speaker 1: a few of the Reds escaped with their lives. There
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  Speaker 1: was no further trouble after the convoy got under way again,
• 20:34
  Speaker 1: arriving at Majohn Knee early in the afternoon of five
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  Speaker 1: November without a single casualty. Losses of fifty one killed
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  Speaker 1: and three prisoners were inflicted on the enemy. End of
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: Chapter four, Part one read by Aaron Bennett,