Latest / The Team House / Inside Iran's Covert Operations | Jon Hackett | Ep. 368
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: The team House with your hopes, Jack Murphy and David Bark.
- 0:12Speaker 2: Hey, everybody, welcome to episode three hundred and sixty eight.
- 0:15Speaker 2: I am Dave. Here with me tonight is d Our Fearless,
- 0:19Speaker 2: producer and sometimes hosts and the host of Ayzon. Our
- 0:23Speaker 2: guest tonight again is Jonathan Hackett. If you didn't see
- 0:26Speaker 2: his first episode, it was three point fifty one. Tonight,
- 0:30Speaker 2: we're going to talk a little bit more about his
- 0:32Speaker 2: Marine Corps background, and we're also going to talk about
- 0:35Speaker 2: his book, which I oh have right here. Phenomenal book,
- 0:40Speaker 2: Iran's Shadow Weapons. I'm used to being able to just
- 0:44Speaker 2: hold it up in the cameras here Iran Shadow. So
- 0:47Speaker 2: welcome back, Jonathan. We really appreciate it.
- 0:49Speaker 3: Yeah, thanks for having me. It's great to see you guys.
- 0:51Speaker 3: Not in the studio this time, but still good see it.
- 0:54Speaker 2: Yeah, we're having some technical issues at the studio, so
- 0:56Speaker 2: we're doing this old school.
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- 3:01Speaker 2: So, Jonathan, can you give us kind of a brief
- 3:04Speaker 2: summary of your Marine Corps history? And then there are
- 3:08Speaker 2: a couple of things that we'd like to talk about
- 3:10Speaker 2: that we didn't get an opportunity to last time before
- 3:12Speaker 2: we get into the book.
- 3:13Speaker 3: Sure, I'll just give you guys wavetops. So I was
- 3:16Speaker 3: in the Marine Corps for twenty years. I started out
- 3:18Speaker 3: doing signals intelligence, which is collecting on foreign signals, you know,
- 3:23Speaker 3: communications and things like that, went into cryptography, which is
- 3:27Speaker 3: a little bit a more niche area of SIGAN, moved
- 3:29Speaker 3: over to the National Security Agency headquarters in Fort Meade.
- 3:32Speaker 3: I worked there for a couple of years on some
- 3:34Speaker 3: special projects, kind of like tailored access operations and things
- 3:38Speaker 3: for very specific outcomes. After that, I realized I was
- 3:41Speaker 3: kind of getting too deep into the skiff sometimes a
- 3:43Speaker 3: skiff within a skiff, and I needed to get outside,
- 3:47Speaker 3: and so I moved into the kind of intelligence human
- 3:49Speaker 3: intelligence world and went to training for that in Damn Neck, Virginia,
- 3:54Speaker 3: and went over immediately to Afghanistan after that for over
- 3:59Speaker 3: a year doing human first, and then as the mission change,
- 4:02Speaker 3: we moved into CI a lot more and then came
- 4:05Speaker 3: back and I went right over to Marsac twenty thirteen
- 4:08Speaker 3: and I was there for five years because we were
- 4:10Speaker 3: only allowed to stay for five years, so I stayed
- 4:13Speaker 3: for it was four months or four years, eleven months,
- 4:16Speaker 3: and I think it was like twenty nine days that
- 4:18Speaker 3: I was there, And then had to go, so I
- 4:20Speaker 3: went over to Dia and I did three years there
- 4:23Speaker 3: at the US Embassy in Jordan. I'm on Jordan, where
- 4:27Speaker 3: I worked on not only Jordan issues in the overt capacity,
- 4:30Speaker 3: but we also worked on a lot of other clandestine
- 4:32Speaker 3: things going on around the region, most importantly was Syria,
- 4:36Speaker 3: because Syria doesn't have a US embassy in it, so
- 4:38Speaker 3: there were a lot of the Syria activities we had
- 4:40Speaker 3: to handle from Jordan and from Turkey also in some
- 4:42Speaker 3: other places, so I had some things to do with that.
- 4:46Speaker 3: And then after that ended, I went to go be
- 4:48Speaker 3: an instructor in dan Nek, teaching the Marine Corps how
- 4:50Speaker 3: to do special activities on the counterintelligence human intelligence side,
- 4:54Speaker 3: all the way up from starting from like very basic,
- 4:57Speaker 3: you know, debriefing things, through interrogations, through handling, through surveils,
- 5:01Speaker 3: detection routes, all the way up to principal Asian operations
- 5:04Speaker 3: where the students do run full phase tonight area activities
- 5:08Speaker 3: and get certified on that and become kind of children's
- 5:10Speaker 3: human intelligence specialists for the Marine Corps. And then I
- 5:13Speaker 3: retired and just started up as an unemployed student at
- 5:17Speaker 3: Yale Law School now where I'm just getting inundated with
- 5:20Speaker 3: stuff to read, so I took a little break to
- 5:22Speaker 3: come talk to you guys.
- 5:24Speaker 2: Well, I mean I can tell you read a lot,
- 5:26Speaker 2: because about a fifth of your book is references. It's amazing.
- 5:32Speaker 3: Yeah, that's something left behind from like the human side,
- 5:35Speaker 3: where you have to source everything. You should never claim
- 5:38Speaker 3: anything without something backing it up, because your opinion is
- 5:41Speaker 3: kind of worthless without something backing it up. And as
- 5:43Speaker 3: you saw probably there's like multiple citations on each piece,
- 5:46Speaker 3: you know, kind of converging to show like, hey, this
- 5:48Speaker 3: isn't my opinion, this is what's actually happening, right right, So.
- 5:53Speaker 2: Can you tell us some of the things that we
- 5:55Speaker 2: didn't get a chance to get to about your career
- 5:59Speaker 2: while you're in there was a strike, there were a
- 6:01Speaker 2: couple of things that you know, we didn't have an opportunity.
- 6:05Speaker 3: Yeah, we talked a lot about my kind of SIG
- 6:07Speaker 3: background and just a little bit about MARSOK. But there
- 6:10Speaker 3: were some parts we didn't get to, especially the Iraq
- 6:12Speaker 3: deployment twenty sixteen, when ISIS was really entrenched and the
- 6:16Speaker 3: US and coalition partners are about to retake Western Iraq
- 6:19Speaker 3: from ISIS. This is after all the masacers going on
- 6:21Speaker 3: all that stuff, and I was on a Special Operations
- 6:24Speaker 3: Task Force eighty one out there, and our job was
- 6:27Speaker 3: to do in part work with the tribes in Syria
- 6:31Speaker 3: Eastern Syria and the Kurds in Northeastyria and other groups
- 6:34Speaker 3: in Western Iraq to start building this kind of ring
- 6:38Speaker 3: around Mosul, which was the heart of ISIS or dish
- 6:41Speaker 3: in Western Iraq and actually Iraq generally. And we were
- 6:44Speaker 3: doing that because the plan was for the counter terrorism forces,
- 6:47Speaker 3: which was the Kurdish and Iraqi forces, they would come
- 6:50Speaker 3: in later and actually retake Moscil with conventional strike gigantic operation.
- 6:54Speaker 3: He was the eighty second airborne came in there. He
- 6:56Speaker 3: was a huge thing. That was after we left. So
- 6:59Speaker 3: my mission there was to prepare the environment by doing
- 7:02Speaker 3: air strikes or controlling air strikes, running really intense human
- 7:06Speaker 3: source network. I had, For example, I had one principal agent.
- 7:09Speaker 3: A principle agient is basically a source that works for you,
- 7:11Speaker 3: that has a subsource network under him doing things for you.
- 7:15Speaker 3: So basically there's a level of separation between you and
- 7:17Speaker 3: the actual people doing the thing, and that's for safety reasons.
- 7:21Speaker 3: That's also to protect the operational security of the mission
- 7:23Speaker 3: and things. And we had a very intense network like
- 7:26Speaker 3: that throughout Western Iraq, and one of my principal agents
- 7:29Speaker 3: had fifty two sub sources working for me, which is
- 7:32Speaker 3: a lot to keep track of, especially during combat operations.
- 7:36Speaker 3: A lot of validation going on to make sure that
- 7:38Speaker 3: what those people were saying was true and all that.
- 7:41Speaker 3: And at the same time, that particular task force that
- 7:43Speaker 3: I was on hadn't done any human triggered strikes yet.
- 7:46Speaker 3: And the human triggered strike is when basically you have
- 7:49Speaker 3: a human being sitting across the street is typically how
- 7:52Speaker 3: it works watching a building saying, hey, that building has
- 7:55Speaker 3: got one bad guy in it or eighty bad guys
- 7:57Speaker 3: in it. These are their names. We go and monitor
- 8:00Speaker 3: that facility for up to eight hours, because that's the
- 8:02Speaker 3: requirement at the time that we had to have eight
- 8:04Speaker 3: hours of what do you call soak on the target
- 8:06Speaker 3: before we could strike it, to make sure women and
- 8:08Speaker 3: children don't come in are out, so that we understand
- 8:10Speaker 3: the risk profile of the strike. And I'd have one
- 8:13Speaker 3: of my subsources sitting across the street and he'd be
- 8:16Speaker 3: giving me information. I'd be passing information along. I would
- 8:19Speaker 3: get B fifty two s or F eighteen's up in
- 8:22Speaker 3: the sky, and whenever the moment was right, I'd be
- 8:25Speaker 3: the one coordinating that bomb hitting that building, and I
- 8:27Speaker 3: would hear it right through the phone because my source
- 8:29Speaker 3: would be watching it happen. And the interesting thing is
- 8:33Speaker 3: to make sure the asset validation was going correctly. We
- 8:35Speaker 3: would never tell them that we were planning to strike.
- 8:37Speaker 3: We always had to kind of string them along, so
- 8:39Speaker 3: they weren't quite sure what was about to happen or
- 8:41Speaker 3: when was it going to happen. You've got kind of
- 8:43Speaker 3: an idea, especially after they see their first one, they
- 8:45Speaker 3: know this will probably happen, but they're always shocked in
- 8:48Speaker 3: surprise the moment that bombs drop on the building. And
- 8:52Speaker 3: one that stands out to me was Abu Omar al Shashani,
- 8:55Speaker 3: who was the equivalent of like the Minister of Defense
- 8:57Speaker 3: for ISIS. All of ISIS, and we have been tracking
- 9:02Speaker 3: some lower level guys, especially my source network, have been
- 9:04Speaker 3: monitoring some like finance guys and some other things. And
- 9:07Speaker 3: we're doing some smaller strikes, you know, killing twenty people
- 9:09Speaker 3: thirty people at a time. And we got this new
- 9:13Speaker 3: piece of technology called Gorgon Stare. Gorgon Stare is like
- 9:17Speaker 3: it's a series of pieces of equipment that are able
- 9:19Speaker 3: to monitor almost everything happening based on a single target.
- 9:23Speaker 3: And what I mean by that is, let's say you
- 9:24Speaker 3: have a funeral for one of the bad guys we killed. Well,
- 9:27Speaker 3: isis the way they do their funerals, especially during Ramadan.
- 9:30Speaker 3: They don't bring the women and children. It's only the fighters,
- 9:33Speaker 3: you know, like the guys that were there that knew him.
- 9:36Speaker 3: So what you can do is start tracking all those
- 9:38Speaker 3: individuals at that funeral, and when they go home, you
- 9:40Speaker 3: can turn Gorgon Stare on and it will monitor each
- 9:43Speaker 3: of those individuals where they go and on a heat
- 9:44Speaker 3: map and you can basically see these like little legs
- 9:47Speaker 3: coming out and it will continue monitoring all of them,
- 9:49Speaker 3: building this gigantic pattern of life. Well, that's a new
- 9:52Speaker 3: stack of targets to start looking at, and we really
- 9:56Speaker 3: started maximizing the use of that, and as we did that,
- 9:59Speaker 3: we started getting way more careful about which targets we picked.
- 10:02Speaker 3: There were a lot of targets at the time. There
- 10:03Speaker 3: was something like thirty thousand isis spiders active like with
- 10:06Speaker 3: weapons strapped to their bodies at any time at that time,
- 10:08Speaker 3: so we really could have hit you know, you could
- 10:10Speaker 3: have throw a rock and hit an Isis guy across
- 10:12Speaker 3: the four line of troops. They were everywhere. But we
- 10:15Speaker 3: don't want to waste time and resources and mission momentum
- 10:19Speaker 3: by just striking whoever, So what I started to do
- 10:22Speaker 3: was trace particular activities. One in particular was when we
- 10:26Speaker 3: hit a certain building. The way that people reacted to
- 10:28Speaker 3: that strike started telling me something. And there was one
- 10:31Speaker 3: strike in particular. We blew the building up, killed like
- 10:33Speaker 3: forty guys, and instead of coming to recover bodies, we
- 10:37Speaker 3: saw them clear everybody out from the street away from
- 10:40Speaker 3: the building, and they started sending guys in with plastic
- 10:42Speaker 3: garbage bags, black garbage bags and coming out with them
- 10:45Speaker 3: over their shoulder like Santa Claus carrying out whatever. It
- 10:48Speaker 3: was very heavy, and we figured out that that was
- 10:50Speaker 3: actually gold because we had struck the bank. And then
- 10:55Speaker 3: they took a lot of that gold to another place
- 10:57Speaker 3: that was very important to them, and we began tracking
- 11:00Speaker 3: that place. It was a lot of these like thing
- 11:01Speaker 3: after thing, with the domino effect of them kind of
- 11:03Speaker 3: revealing to us. Based on a very early instigation toward them.
- 11:08Speaker 3: That sets off all these patterns that we can follow.
- 11:10Speaker 3: And I'm leaving out a lot of details obviously to
- 11:12Speaker 3: protect operational security, but this is kind of the gist
- 11:15Speaker 3: of it. And it turns out that one night in Ramadan,
- 11:18Speaker 3: one of my subsources told me that, hey, there's an
- 11:20Speaker 3: ID factory in this place. And you know, back during
- 11:23Speaker 3: the Iraq War, like the early years, you think ID factory,
- 11:26Speaker 3: it's a couple of guys with some cans and you know,
- 11:28Speaker 3: some explosives. This was like an industrial factory. I mean
- 11:31Speaker 3: it was actually a factory converted, like it had conveyor
- 11:34Speaker 3: belts and everything converted to produce IDs on an industrial scale.
- 11:37Speaker 3: It was insane and I was able to figure out
- 11:40Speaker 3: who ran that facility, and there's some other buildings around there,
- 11:43Speaker 3: and the way that they had set up the security
- 11:46Speaker 3: around this place, only there was only one way out.
- 11:49Speaker 3: I was actually able to get a B fifty two
- 11:50Speaker 3: from Syria to fly into Iraq and blow this place up.
- 11:53Speaker 3: And there was something like three thousand rocket tails that
- 11:55Speaker 3: we were able to count from the footage afterwards. I mean,
- 11:57Speaker 3: this thing was insane, and the way it blew up,
- 11:59Speaker 3: I mean you could for miles around. People thought that
- 12:02Speaker 3: it was our strike that made the explosion.
- 12:04Speaker 2: It was just it was not.
- 12:04Speaker 3: It was the explosives in the building that cooked off
- 12:07Speaker 3: after the smaller, relatively smaller bombs. But then the guys
- 12:11Speaker 3: exited that one way out and we followed that and
- 12:13Speaker 3: come to find out, they went over to go notify
- 12:17Speaker 3: Abu Omar al Shashani's deputy that we had been kind
- 12:20Speaker 3: of moving up the food chain because he doesn't use
- 12:22Speaker 3: a cell phone. That's very important. The smart guys don't
- 12:24Speaker 3: use his cell phone. But we still could get him anyway.
- 12:27Speaker 3: And there was another night during Ramadan, like three days later,
- 12:31Speaker 3: we've been watching this location that we thought it was
- 12:33Speaker 3: actually Abu Bakrel Baghdadi's summer house, which was where this
- 12:37Speaker 3: other gentleman was at Abu Omar, who's chechen by the way,
- 12:40Speaker 3: al Shashani, and we were able to start monitoring the
- 12:44Speaker 3: location and we counted eighty six guys going in there
- 12:47Speaker 3: throughout the evening and none of them coming out. And
- 12:50Speaker 3: one of my subsources contacts me through my principal Asian
- 12:53Speaker 3: and lets me know that this is in fact one
- 12:55Speaker 3: of those meetings, and it wasn't in just one building.
- 12:58Speaker 3: It was like multiple compounds around and as we're going
- 13:00Speaker 3: through the eight hours required soak of the target, the
- 13:04Speaker 3: sub sources reporting to me on who's in which building,
- 13:07Speaker 3: So I've got multiple high level names of who's in
- 13:09Speaker 3: what building, and then eventually we're able to get aircraft
- 13:14Speaker 3: up there. And then the one star general in charge
- 13:16Speaker 3: of authorizing these strikes had to wake up a bunch
- 13:19Speaker 3: of other generals that sit around a table basically and
- 13:21Speaker 3: make decisions. Because the building that Shani was in was
- 13:24Speaker 3: a religious building. In order to strike one of these buildings,
- 13:28Speaker 3: we have to get certain level of concurrence that's different
- 13:30Speaker 3: than even striking a house, which also requires its own concurrence.
- 13:34Speaker 3: It's called a Category one removal, which means there's this
- 13:36Speaker 3: list called Category one targets that we're not allowed to
- 13:38Speaker 3: touch and we have to get the target removed off
- 13:41Speaker 3: category one to be able to strike it. And so
- 13:44Speaker 3: it was something like four o'clock or three o'clock in
- 13:46Speaker 3: the morning we were able to finally get approval from
- 13:48Speaker 3: four or five generals that had to all give their
- 13:50Speaker 3: cut on it. And there were other wrinkles in this.
- 13:55Speaker 3: For example, there was a US person in one of
- 13:57Speaker 3: these buildings who was a legal permanent resident States, but
- 14:00Speaker 3: he was a naturalized US person, which required even higher
- 14:03Speaker 3: level approval to continue moving forward to strike. So there's
- 14:06Speaker 3: a lot of risk analysis going on, but also the
- 14:08Speaker 3: optics were being analyzed throughout this strike process. And I
- 14:13Speaker 3: was under a lot of pressure because we knew that
- 14:14Speaker 3: those guys would vacate around six am as soon as
- 14:17Speaker 3: the sun came up, because they were there for Sohor dinner,
- 14:19Speaker 3: which is the meal you eat during Ramadan to break
- 14:22Speaker 3: right before you break your fast in the morning. It's
- 14:24Speaker 3: that smaller meal right before if Tar, and minutes were
- 14:28Speaker 3: taken away. It was almost it was almost sunrise, and
- 14:30Speaker 3: I'm getting worried, you know, And finally we get to
- 14:32Speaker 3: go ahead and we blew it up and turned out
- 14:35Speaker 3: it was eighty seven guys in they're dead, and one
- 14:38Speaker 3: of them was Shashani.
- 14:42Speaker 2: It's amazing, And how did you guys verify that? I mean,
- 14:45Speaker 2: so you can't send a team to do bda?
- 14:47Speaker 3: Right? Yeah, So at the time, there were actually civilian
- 14:51Speaker 3: hospitals and there were ISIS hospitals. These ISIS hospitals were
- 14:54Speaker 3: for IIS fighters only they had like their own separation
- 14:56Speaker 3: between you know, they don't want their fighters being exposed
- 14:59Speaker 3: to the regular people. And we had sources inside of
- 15:02Speaker 3: all these hospitals, and I had two particular sources that
- 15:04Speaker 3: were very good that were in one of the hospitals
- 15:06Speaker 3: that they usually took the higher level guys to. And
- 15:08Speaker 3: every time a bodybag went in, that person was there
- 15:11Speaker 3: verifying with everybody and letting me know. And the thing is,
- 15:14Speaker 3: they don't know who I'm looking for. I'm only asking
- 15:17Speaker 3: them for the names of every single person that comes
- 15:19Speaker 3: in there. And nobody on the ground knew what targets
- 15:22Speaker 3: we were after at any time. And we never gave
- 15:25Speaker 3: him feedback like, oh, yeah, we did kill that guy,
- 15:27Speaker 3: you know, Jim Bob, we don't do that because we
- 15:29Speaker 3: don't want it to muddy up the process, right, And
- 15:32Speaker 3: so sure enough, next morning we got confirmation from that
- 15:35Speaker 3: person that it in fact was him.
- 15:39Speaker 2: It's amazing any other like kind of big stories from
- 15:44Speaker 2: that part of your career that you want to talk
- 15:46Speaker 2: about that we didn't get a chance to touch.
- 15:48Speaker 3: On, nothing like that. That's that's such a longer thing.
- 15:53Speaker 2: Really, Yeah, what what was it like going from you know,
- 15:59Speaker 2: singing into human For you?
- 16:02Speaker 3: It was an interesting transition because working at the National
- 16:05Speaker 3: Security Agency, we are told that we have you know,
- 16:08Speaker 3: the highest clearances and the most access and all this,
- 16:10Speaker 3: and you know, to some measure that's true. But going
- 16:15Speaker 3: into the human intelligence world, I didn't. I didn't know
- 16:17Speaker 3: that there were a completely separate connection of control systems
- 16:21Speaker 3: and ways of handling information. And that was a big
- 16:24Speaker 3: learning curve for me because of the way intelligence information
- 16:26Speaker 3: is handled from san derived information is very different than
- 16:29Speaker 3: how it's from human controlled systems and from from source
- 16:33Speaker 3: handling of human beings very different, and the trade craft
- 16:35Speaker 3: is obviously completely different. With sigent you're kind of protecting
- 16:39Speaker 3: the instruments and the methods of using those instruments, whereas
- 16:43Speaker 3: with human beings you're trying to protect them and the mission.
- 16:46Speaker 3: It's more it's obviously more human like, which requires a
- 16:50Speaker 3: lot more security considerations. It's much more difficult, it's much
- 16:54Speaker 3: more in some cases more expensive, especially if you're working
- 16:57Speaker 3: with cover. If you've got you know, cover Marcial cover,
- 17:00Speaker 3: for example, it's extremely expensive and it may never get
- 17:05Speaker 3: you anything depending on how you set it up. And
- 17:08Speaker 3: that's part of the game, is that some of this
- 17:10Speaker 3: never produces anything. Some of it produces gold mines, whereas
- 17:13Speaker 3: with set you kind of know, like that's that guy's phone,
- 17:16Speaker 3: that's what he said the end. You know, where a
- 17:19Speaker 3: human you've got to because the human elements there. These
- 17:22Speaker 3: guys might not be telling the truth, they might not
- 17:24Speaker 3: know that what they said was wrong. Want money, ideology
- 17:28Speaker 3: they might have, they might be under coercion, they might
- 17:30Speaker 3: be doing it for excitement. You know, there's a lot
- 17:32Speaker 3: of things you have to control. Sometimes you're like a
- 17:34Speaker 3: therapist with them and you have to learn a lot
- 17:36Speaker 3: of this stuff that might be frustrating to some people
- 17:38Speaker 3: at times, like well why do I have to listen
- 17:39Speaker 3: to this how this guy feels about his spouse. It's like, well,
- 17:42Speaker 3: that's really important because you're going to use those things
- 17:44Speaker 3: as buttons to push in the future when you really
- 17:47Speaker 3: need them. And that's kind of simplifying it. But that
- 17:50Speaker 3: is a little bit difficult, especially from a singant background,
- 17:52Speaker 3: but it's true from any background that doesn't deal with people.
- 17:55Speaker 3: You know, you could be an infantry guy and still
- 17:56Speaker 3: have and have to learn those same things in the
- 17:58Speaker 3: same difficult way because that doesn't makes sense for where
- 18:00Speaker 3: you came from.
- 18:01Speaker 2: You know, Yeah, it's interesting. Well, you know, with your
- 18:05Speaker 2: background and you know your operational experience, your experience both
- 18:09Speaker 2: in you know, SIG and cyber and in human that
- 18:12Speaker 2: you seem like the perfect person to write this book
- 18:17Speaker 2: because you you already had your experience in different fields
- 18:22Speaker 2: that you covered. So I think I imagine it probably
- 18:25Speaker 2: gave you a better depth of understanding when you were
- 18:28Speaker 2: you know, reading the reports and and and all the
- 18:32Speaker 2: various sources and stuff.
- 18:34Speaker 3: It is.
- 18:35Speaker 2: It's an incredible book. It I mean, I'm surprised how
- 18:39Speaker 2: much information is in this book, especially considering, uh, you know,
- 18:45Speaker 2: how closed off Iran is, you know, and and I
- 18:50Speaker 2: imagine that it's a very hard country to penetrate and
- 18:53Speaker 2: get information on.
- 18:55Speaker 3: Well, it's interesting because all that that is true, but
- 18:59Speaker 3: there is so much resistance to the regime, which you
- 19:01Speaker 3: see in the book. M h. Just like those those
- 19:04Speaker 3: buttons we were talking about earlier with human sources, there
- 19:07Speaker 3: are plenty of buttons on Iranian targets to push to
- 19:11Speaker 3: get information about what's going on behind that walled garden,
- 19:14Speaker 3: you know. Yeah, And it's because of what the regime
- 19:17Speaker 3: does to its people. It's not because of what Israel
- 19:18Speaker 3: does to Iran. It's not because of what the US does.
- 19:20Speaker 3: It's because the regime oppressing their own people so extremely
- 19:25Speaker 3: that suddenly there are a lot of people that are
- 19:27Speaker 3: willing to do things they never would do before because
- 19:30Speaker 3: of this pressure.
- 19:31Speaker 2: And that's one of the things that I found interesting
- 19:33Speaker 2: is you mentioned that the populace is act. The Iranian
- 19:39Speaker 2: populace is actually the number one target of Iranian intelligence and.
- 19:44Speaker 3: It has been since nineteen eighty. Yeah. Yeah, there's never changed,
- 19:48Speaker 3: It's never been a moment.
- 19:50Speaker 2: How did you get interested in Iran?
- 19:53Speaker 3: Well, my very first interaction with Iran in intelligence context
- 19:58Speaker 3: was in Afghanistan and I was doing some counterintelligence activities
- 20:02Speaker 3: there to protect some of our aircraft that we had.
- 20:05Speaker 3: And I didn't really know much about Iran and a
- 20:08Speaker 3: tactical level at that time, or like they're what they
- 20:10Speaker 3: were doing. I knew a lot of the higher level
- 20:12Speaker 3: things because when I was work at the National Security Agency,
- 20:15Speaker 3: I worked on strategic issues like Russia nuclear stuff, the
- 20:19Speaker 3: North Korea stuff, China stuff, all in the nuclear level,
- 20:23Speaker 3: and then with Iran and on some other things related
- 20:25Speaker 3: to that, so I knew that big picture, you know,
- 20:27Speaker 3: this was a threat, but I'd never seen them in action.
- 20:30Speaker 3: And I don't think most people actually have. And I
- 20:33Speaker 3: was there in the desert at a very remote base
- 20:36Speaker 3: down by the Iran Pakistan Afghanistan Triborder area which is
- 20:40Speaker 3: called Baluchistan, and suddenly I look up and there's this
- 20:45Speaker 3: thing that looks like a skateboard flying around in the
- 20:47Speaker 3: sky and kind of up ahead of us. And actually
- 20:50Speaker 3: a pilot came running over to me and he pointed
- 20:51Speaker 3: out to me too. He's liked, you see that thing.
- 20:53Speaker 3: I'm like, yeah, what is that? And we started taking
- 20:55Speaker 3: photos of it and sent it over to some of
- 20:58Speaker 3: the CIA guys that we were connected to, and there said,
- 21:01Speaker 3: you know, that's a that's an Iranian mohadre for UAV.
- 21:07Speaker 3: But what was happening It was going in like a
- 21:09Speaker 3: square holding pattern because whoever was controlling it it had
- 21:12Speaker 3: gotten too far outside of their control because at the
- 21:14Speaker 3: time they didn't have one way attack and all this stuff.
- 21:16Speaker 3: It was very much more rudimentary, and it had lost
- 21:19Speaker 3: control and went to a holding pattern over the GPS
- 21:22Speaker 3: grid of where it was supposed to be monitoring. So
- 21:24Speaker 3: we're just watching it go in a square over the
- 21:26Speaker 3: base and somebody knocked it down and we took it,
- 21:28Speaker 3: But that was my first introduction to like an actual
- 21:31Speaker 3: Iranian threat happening in front of me, which, as I said,
- 21:35Speaker 3: it's kind of unusual to see because usually people think
- 21:37Speaker 3: of it like behind the scenes and the shadows and
- 21:39Speaker 3: all that. Maybe not so much today now, but for
- 21:42Speaker 3: much of the time, that's how it was viewed. And
- 21:44Speaker 3: that kind of like piqued my interest a little bit.
- 21:46Speaker 3: And then when I went to places like Senegal, for example,
- 21:51Speaker 3: I found out that two streets over from our diplomatic
- 21:53Speaker 3: facility or our team house in Dakar was a Hesbala
- 21:57Speaker 3: teamhouse in Dakar that was working with cocaine shipments from
- 22:02Speaker 3: South America into Dakar, which is the largest The port
- 22:05Speaker 3: of Dakar is the largest import point for cocaine in
- 22:07Speaker 3: all of Africa. It's fifty four countries in Africa and
- 22:09Speaker 3: that's the biggest important location. Wow. And it was just
- 22:13Speaker 3: kind of interesting because like, we weren't fighting with each other.
- 22:15Speaker 3: We were both there for different things, which is kind
- 22:17Speaker 3: of interesting, like, well, why are we here like this,
- 22:19Speaker 3: Why aren't we fighting each other? You know, So there's
- 22:20Speaker 3: there's a lot more going too, So I was trying
- 22:22Speaker 3: to like figure out what's going on here, like higher
- 22:24Speaker 3: level it's not just it's not just war, you know,
- 22:27Speaker 3: there's more to it. It's politics involved. Are those politics?
- 22:30Speaker 3: And those are the kind of questions I started asking
- 22:32Speaker 3: That kind of got me down that pathway, you know.
- 22:34Speaker 2: And so going starting into the book, because you talk
- 22:40Speaker 2: about the politics, you talk about the three talentisms, you know,
- 22:48Speaker 2: and a lot of misconceptions people have about Iran's motives
- 22:54Speaker 2: and how that colors the intelligence that they collect and
- 23:00Speaker 2: how they perceive that intelligence. Can you kind of go
- 23:02Speaker 2: into those ideas.
- 23:04Speaker 3: Yeah, And actually I call them sacred talismans because that's
- 23:07Speaker 3: actually borrowed from Klauswitz, who was kind of talking down
- 23:11Speaker 3: on other military theorists like Jominy at the time, which
- 23:14Speaker 3: was a French Napoleonic theorist who had these like grand
- 23:16Speaker 3: ideas about the world that were all based on what
- 23:18Speaker 3: they thought the world was and it was like a
- 23:20Speaker 3: thing that could never be questioned and it can only
- 23:21Speaker 3: be this way. And he was saying, like, that's not true.
- 23:24Speaker 3: I mean, you go to war over here, it's different
- 23:26Speaker 3: than going to war over here. You can't just say
- 23:28Speaker 3: that the same thing. And so he called those ways
- 23:31Speaker 3: of thinking sacred talismans. And that's why I call these
- 23:34Speaker 3: things sacred talismans, because in my opinion, they're flawed at best,
- 23:39Speaker 3: perhaps mistaken, it's better way to describe it. The first
- 23:43Speaker 3: one is Israel versus Iran, and I mean, even looking today,
- 23:45Speaker 3: like everyone's like, oh, yeah, obviously that's what's going on.
- 23:48Speaker 3: But if you start peeling it back in which I
- 23:50Speaker 3: do in the book, it's not so clear cut that
- 23:53Speaker 3: it's Israel versus Iran. I mean, who's the one doing
- 23:55Speaker 3: the bombings, who's the one killing people? Who's like I mean,
- 23:58Speaker 3: I could just go on and on about the facts
- 24:00Speaker 3: and how lopsided one side is versus the other, and
- 24:03Speaker 3: also about the reaction to those things. It's not what
- 24:07Speaker 3: you would expect if it was actually a conflict between
- 24:09Speaker 3: two states as it's described. And a lot of times
- 24:12Speaker 3: that particular talisman's described as an ideology against ideology, which
- 24:16Speaker 3: again I think is naive. It's political, especially if you
- 24:19Speaker 3: look at political realism. You know, states are black boxes
- 24:22Speaker 3: operating to survive against other states and to keep their
- 24:27Speaker 3: interests alive. And the regime doesn't care about the state
- 24:30Speaker 3: of Iran. The regime cares about the regime. So that's
- 24:33Speaker 3: like a black box within a black box making decisions
- 24:35Speaker 3: about securing itself, and then an Israel same thing. I mean,
- 24:38Speaker 3: you have the Likud party keeping itself alive as strongly
- 24:43Speaker 3: as we can, as long as it can, you know.
- 24:45Speaker 3: So there's these political decisions that look like ideology, but
- 24:49Speaker 3: to someone who's actually if you removed the names off
- 24:52Speaker 3: of the parties, it would be hard to actually make
- 24:54Speaker 3: the same judgments we might make if the names are
- 24:56Speaker 3: on the parties. That's the what I call the blue talisman.
- 25:01Speaker 3: Then there's the red talisman, which is exporting the revolution.
- 25:04Speaker 3: That idea came up and you hear it in discourse
- 25:07Speaker 3: A lot people say, like, oh, Iran's exporting the revolution.
- 25:09Speaker 3: There's this crime terror nexus in Bolivia, or like whatever.
- 25:14Speaker 3: But really, I mean those are those are drug trafficking
- 25:16Speaker 3: operations that generate income the end. I mean, they're not
- 25:19Speaker 3: over there with guns shooting people. They're over there with
- 25:22Speaker 3: dollar counters and bubble wrap wrapping up bales of cocaine
- 25:26Speaker 3: to ship it to Africa to make money so they
- 25:28Speaker 3: can survive because they're heavily sanctioned and they can't access
- 25:31Speaker 3: the banking system and they're cut off from the swift system,
- 25:33Speaker 3: so how else are they kind to move their money
- 25:36Speaker 3: around and make more money? Yeah, it's illegal, but I
- 25:38Speaker 3: mean that is that a terror nexus? I don't know.
- 25:42Speaker 3: Maybe if they're actually doing terror, what does that mean?
- 25:45Speaker 3: And these might be like off putting questions to people,
- 25:48Speaker 3: But you have to be able to question anything because
- 25:51Speaker 3: if you cannot question an idea, this is no longer
- 25:55Speaker 3: a fact based idea now it's an emotion based idea.
- 25:58Speaker 3: We have to be factual about how we appro stuff,
- 26:00Speaker 3: especially things that bring up as many emotions as Iran
- 26:03Speaker 3: and Israel as we just talked about. Then I get
- 26:07Speaker 3: down to something called the Black Talisman, which is realism,
- 26:10Speaker 3: which I kind of alluded to, where these actors are
- 26:14Speaker 3: generally rational and when I say rational, actually Mahre de Gan,
- 26:17Speaker 3: who is one of the Masad directors, said Iran is rational.
- 26:21Speaker 3: They may not be our rational, but they are rational,
- 26:23Speaker 3: which I think is a great way to describe it,
- 26:25Speaker 3: because it doesn't matter how we see the world. It
- 26:27Speaker 3: matters how the actor sees the world. And if it's
- 26:29Speaker 3: in their interest to do what they think is right,
- 26:31Speaker 3: they're going to do it, even if it's crazy. And
- 26:33Speaker 3: hurts people, They're still going to do it because that's
- 26:35Speaker 3: what they think they need to do to survive, especially
- 26:37Speaker 3: when they feel like they've been backed up against the wall.
- 26:40Speaker 3: So that's my perspective. When I look at this book,
- 26:43Speaker 3: I look at it from a realist perspective, asking, you know,
- 26:46Speaker 3: there's this thing. John Rawls is a philosopher that wrote
- 26:49Speaker 3: a lot in the seventies and eighties, and he said
- 26:50Speaker 3: that there's this thing called the veil of ignorance where
- 26:52Speaker 3: if someone dropped you down in the society and didn't
- 26:54Speaker 3: tell you where in that society you fell high class,
- 26:57Speaker 3: middle class, low class, labor, or rich person. If you
- 27:00Speaker 3: didn't know which of those things you fell into, how
- 27:02Speaker 3: would you make the laws. You'd make them much differently
- 27:05Speaker 3: than you would if you knew where you were, you know.
- 27:08Speaker 3: And that's kind of the approach that I take with
- 27:10Speaker 3: this is instead of like labeling everything, let me just
- 27:12Speaker 3: look at the facts and see what the facts say.
- 27:15Speaker 3: And when I talk about facts, I don't just mean
- 27:17Speaker 3: like looking at the news and things like that. As
- 27:19Speaker 3: you said in the back of the book, there are
- 27:21Speaker 3: hundreds of declassified American intelligence documents that were top secret,
- 27:25Speaker 3: secret noebeign and a whole trove of Iraqi documents that
- 27:29Speaker 3: were top secret and secret that had never been seen before.
- 27:33Speaker 3: These things are not for the public. These are internal
- 27:36Speaker 3: political documents, basically our intelligence process feeding political decisions of
- 27:42Speaker 3: facts that were collect on the ground through human intelligence
- 27:44Speaker 3: SIGAN and other collection methodologies, with some other information to
- 27:49Speaker 3: help back it up to put into context for people
- 27:50Speaker 3: to understand. So that's kind of a long way of
- 27:53Speaker 3: saying what these talismans are. But it's important to question
- 27:56Speaker 3: all of them, including my own assertions. People should question
- 27:59Speaker 3: what I say to and not in a combative way,
- 28:02Speaker 3: but instead questioning, well, where did you get that, What
- 28:04Speaker 3: does that mean? What does that mean to me? Because
- 28:06Speaker 3: I think people don't ask those kind of questions, and
- 28:08Speaker 3: that's how we end up twenty years in Afghanistan, fighting
- 28:10Speaker 3: the same war, one year at a time for twenty years.
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- 30:44Speaker 2: So, uh, can you tell us a little a little
- 30:47Speaker 2: bit about them the about the intelligence apparatus of Iran,
- 30:53Speaker 2: we have the vaja uh theurgy see codes and then
- 31:00Speaker 2: well you go ahead and tell us please.
- 31:02Speaker 3: Yeah. So a lot of people, even in the intelligence
- 31:04Speaker 3: community in the United States, and I've seen this, they
- 31:06Speaker 3: don't know what vaja is. This is a new term
- 31:09Speaker 3: for a lot of Westerners. This is what Iran calls
- 31:13Speaker 3: their intelligence service, the equivalent of the CIA, their human
- 31:17Speaker 3: intelligence service. In the West, we call it the Ministry
- 31:20Speaker 3: of Intelligence. It's not called the Ministry of Intelligence. Why
- 31:23Speaker 3: are we calling it that? So that's something I start
- 31:25Speaker 3: out with, like, why are we using these things that
- 31:26Speaker 3: we think are true that are not true? So let's
- 31:28Speaker 3: start with what they call themselves va ja vaja, and
- 31:33Speaker 3: that is their actual human element that started out as
- 31:36Speaker 3: their strongest component or their entity. In two thousand and nine,
- 31:40Speaker 3: there was something called the Green Revolution in Iran when
- 31:43Speaker 3: the country was almost overthrown. It was the most serious
- 31:45Speaker 3: moment of overthrow since nineteen seventy nine in the country,
- 31:49Speaker 3: and the way the regime saw this was as a
- 31:52Speaker 3: failure of VAJA to suppress the people enough to force
- 31:57Speaker 3: them not to rebel. This is how it was viewed.
- 32:00Speaker 3: What they did was they basically reduced the power of VOJA,
- 32:03Speaker 3: subordinated it to the IERGC. And this is where the
- 32:05Speaker 3: IRGC Intelligence Organization came out to become a thing. Before that,
- 32:09Speaker 3: it was a department. An agency is a smaller thing
- 32:11Speaker 3: with less remit. It was not meant to be inside
- 32:14Speaker 3: the country doing things. But from that moment forward until today,
- 32:17Speaker 3: it became this massive intelligence apparatus that now is the
- 32:21Speaker 3: premier intelligence apparatus in Iran and outside of Iran. And
- 32:25Speaker 3: VAJA has been relegated to kind of this political intelligence
- 32:29Speaker 3: gatherer for looking at whatever, what are foreign diplomats doing?
- 32:32Speaker 3: You know, like nothing that you would expect today's CIA,
- 32:35Speaker 3: for example, to be doing. All the cover activity is IERGC.
- 32:38Speaker 3: Now there's very small components that VAJA still does, but
- 32:41Speaker 3: it's minuscule. It's mostly the IERGC and underneath that, and
- 32:46Speaker 3: in the book I have a pretty good diagram of
- 32:48Speaker 3: that there are many different things underneath that. There's like
- 32:50Speaker 3: forty different departments underneath that. It's it's extremely complex and
- 32:54Speaker 3: part of what the regime And when I say the regime,
- 32:56Speaker 3: I don't mean the entire Irunnan government, although they're all complicit.
- 33:00Speaker 3: I mean that small kernel of decision makers who have
- 33:03Speaker 3: absolute control over what happens, which is a very tiny
- 33:06Speaker 3: number of people. The rest of the people in the government,
- 33:08Speaker 3: which is about one percent of the ninety two million
- 33:10Speaker 3: people in the country, are just following along because it's
- 33:12Speaker 3: in their interest to follow along, you know. But there's
- 33:15Speaker 3: maybe between one hundred to one thousand named individuals that
- 33:17Speaker 3: are that are the regime that's actually doing this stuff.
- 33:21Speaker 3: And the IRGC is not designed to protect i running
- 33:23Speaker 3: of people. It's designed to protect that small group of people,
- 33:26Speaker 3: that small kernel of people. And you can see it
- 33:29Speaker 3: because the Iotola's son, for example, can go freely outside
- 33:34Speaker 3: the country. He can go to Washington, d C. If
- 33:37Speaker 3: he wants to. Why because he has a black diplomatic passport.
- 33:41Speaker 3: Why does he have that? Why does he need that?
- 33:43Speaker 3: And if you look at who in the regime are
- 33:45Speaker 3: these named individuals that are the powerholders, they all have
- 33:47Speaker 3: black diplomatic passports. Cost some sole money had two diplomatic passports. Smelgani,
- 33:52Speaker 3: the current Good Sports Commander, has four black passports. I mean,
- 33:55Speaker 3: these guys are able to come and go as they please.
- 33:58Speaker 3: The Iran Central Bank Director, who's the sanctioned bank, you know,
- 34:02Speaker 3: that is the bank target of the West, has a
- 34:05Speaker 3: black passport and he's come and gone to Washington, DC
- 34:07Speaker 3: to World Bank meetings. I mean, these people are heavily protected,
- 34:12Speaker 3: and they know how to use the system. They know
- 34:13Speaker 3: how to use the Vienna Convention, which is the thing
- 34:15Speaker 3: that grants diplomatic community. And they initially relied on VAJA
- 34:19Speaker 3: to ensure that. And now it's the IERGC that is
- 34:22Speaker 3: providing that, and it's providing it so that the Iranian
- 34:26Speaker 3: people remain shut down while these small elites are able
- 34:28Speaker 3: to have the maximum freedom. They're basically monopolizing freedom at
- 34:32Speaker 3: the cost of everybody else.
- 34:34Speaker 2: Right, And I mean there's there's a lot of wealth
- 34:38Speaker 2: at the top there too, isn't.
- 34:39Speaker 3: There There is? Actually, when the Shaw fled Iran in
- 34:43Speaker 3: nineteen seventy nine, he had something like six billion dollars
- 34:47Speaker 3: in today's dollars, not in nineteen seventy nine dollars, a
- 34:50Speaker 3: very small amount of money. It's about the same as
- 34:52Speaker 3: Donald Trump claims to have. And he had that much money.
- 34:56Speaker 3: That was the Shaw that was run out of the
- 34:57Speaker 3: country for having too much wealth, for being too opulent. Right, well,
- 35:00Speaker 3: now the Iatola, today's Iotola, how many he has as
- 35:05Speaker 3: much money as Jeff Bezos, but his assets are liquid.
- 35:09Speaker 3: Jeff bezos assets are not liquid. They're tied up in
- 35:11Speaker 3: equity in his businesses. Elon Musk's something like ninety percent
- 35:15Speaker 3: of his money is tied up in equity in his businesses.
- 35:16Speaker 3: If he pulled it out, his businesses would collapse. Not
- 35:19Speaker 3: so for the Iatola. And actually that wealth grew dramatically
- 35:23Speaker 3: after two thousand and seven, which is when the IRGC
- 35:26Speaker 3: was first sanctioned by the United States, and there were
- 35:28Speaker 3: these series of sanctions that grew from that period forward.
- 35:31Speaker 3: And that if you took a graph and showed the
- 35:32Speaker 3: sanctions increasing and put it right next to wealth of
- 35:35Speaker 3: these top elites increasing, they're positively correlated, which means they
- 35:38Speaker 3: grow together. And especially after twenty seventeen twenty eighteen, when
- 35:42Speaker 3: we put the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, there's a
- 35:45Speaker 3: dramatic spike and growth of wealth in these top leaders
- 35:48Speaker 3: in Iran, and a dramatic decrease in general wealth for
- 35:51Speaker 3: the population of the people in Iran. In fact, that
- 35:53Speaker 3: same year that the Iatola's money exponentially grew is the
- 35:56Speaker 3: same year that there were lines outside of grocery stores
- 35:59Speaker 3: because there were chicken rations in Iran because there was
- 36:03Speaker 3: not enough chicken to feed people. There were gas rations
- 36:05Speaker 3: in a country that's petroleum rich at the same time
- 36:08Speaker 3: that the Ayatola was one of the richest human beings
- 36:11Speaker 3: on earth. And that just kind of illustrates to you
- 36:13Speaker 3: that this is not a democracy. It's not a country.
- 36:15Speaker 3: It's not a capitalist country that reacts to capitalist measures
- 36:18Speaker 3: like sanctions, right ins said, it's just it's enriching elites
- 36:22Speaker 3: handover fist.
- 36:25Speaker 2: It's amazing. And you know later in the book you
- 36:29Speaker 2: go into like the sanctions and the effects, and we'll
- 36:31Speaker 2: get into that. So with the IURGC, we have the
- 36:36Speaker 2: IGCCI their cyber space, their EW and cyber defense. And then,
- 36:41Speaker 2: like you said, underneath that, there's just tons and tons
- 36:44Speaker 2: of like different departments. Is there a lot of competition
- 36:48Speaker 2: between IRGC and VAJA, and then within the IRGC itself.
- 36:52Speaker 3: There was between VUDGE and IRGC before two thousand and nine.
- 36:55Speaker 3: After that no more. But when IRGC grew, the regime
- 36:59Speaker 3: actually forced it to get so large that it would
- 37:02Speaker 3: be too large to be controlled by a single individual
- 37:04Speaker 3: besides the Iatola kind of like a check and balance
- 37:07Speaker 3: in an authoritarian way, because the IOGC is extremely powerful.
- 37:11Speaker 3: I mean, even if you took the Iotola out, the
- 37:13Speaker 3: IRGC could run the country. Right now, they control something
- 37:15Speaker 3: like forty percent of the entire black market or the
- 37:17Speaker 3: entire economy, which is mostly a black market thing. Like
- 37:20Speaker 3: if you want an iPhone in Iran, it has to
- 37:22Speaker 3: be purchased from an IRGC supplier, and there are many
- 37:25Speaker 3: iPhones in Iran. There are many Western products in Iran
- 37:27Speaker 3: that you would think like, oh, there's sanctioned. They can't
- 37:29Speaker 3: get that. Now you can get it. It's just four
- 37:31Speaker 3: thousand dollars, you know. And the IRGC was designed that
- 37:34Speaker 3: way where there isn't one person cost some soul money.
- 37:37Speaker 3: For example, even when he was, you know, the big guy,
- 37:40Speaker 3: he couldn't run all of the IRGC. He was in
- 37:42Speaker 3: the Kods force. He was a lower relatively lower in
- 37:45Speaker 3: stature compared to the others. Even though he had some
- 37:47Speaker 3: direct line to the Iotola and was able to get
- 37:49Speaker 3: tasking from him directly, and a lot he'd get away
- 37:51Speaker 3: with a lot more than the other two star generals.
- 37:54Speaker 3: There's only like fifteen two star generals in the entire
- 37:56Speaker 3: country of Iran, very few, and they're designed that way.
- 38:00Speaker 3: And actually the Ministry of Defense is actually it's separated
- 38:03Speaker 3: from the IRGC and it's subordinate to the IRGC. So
- 38:05Speaker 3: the IRGC has a two star general commander. The Ministry
- 38:08Speaker 3: of Defense is led by a one star So if
- 38:10Speaker 3: the Ministry Defense, which you would think would be able
- 38:12Speaker 3: to upset defense policy, sets a policy, the urgency can
- 38:15Speaker 3: ignore it, and they do ignore it. They have ignored it,
- 38:17Speaker 3: which is kind of an interesting tension that it was
- 38:19Speaker 3: designed that way. And there's a lot of these designs
- 38:21Speaker 3: where there's these tensions built throughout this system, which is
- 38:25Speaker 3: again not a democracy, but was created from an authoritarian
- 38:28Speaker 3: mind of how do how do we keep that authoritarian
- 38:31Speaker 3: in power? And they're doing a pretty good job of it,
- 38:34Speaker 3: yeah for sure.
- 38:36Speaker 2: So you know, in about keeping them in power. Who
- 38:42Speaker 2: are the top targets for Iranian intelligence operations?
- 38:47Speaker 3: The number one target is the Mujahadi and ihalk m
- 38:50Speaker 3: Ek or the People's Mujahideen, which has been a thorn
- 38:53Speaker 3: in their side since nineteen seventy nine. That Mujahidin has
- 38:55Speaker 3: existed for a long time before nineteen sixties. It's some
- 39:00Speaker 3: would argue that it's a Marxist organization. Some would vehemently
- 39:03Speaker 3: argue against that. There was a divide between them in
- 39:05Speaker 3: the eighties, but in any case, they were the main
- 39:08Speaker 3: target and they remained the main target. In fact, when
- 39:10Speaker 3: in June when Israel's war on Iran started, most if
- 39:15Speaker 3: not all of the action at the actual action, people
- 39:18Speaker 3: in Iran doing the stuff that we were seeing like
- 39:20Speaker 3: lasing targets and doing target reconnaissance and actually setting off
- 39:24Speaker 3: devices were not Israeli operatives. Those were Iranians that most
- 39:29Speaker 3: of them worked for Mujahadini Cup, the NEK. If you
- 39:32Speaker 3: remember back in the early two thousands when it was
- 39:35Speaker 3: released that Iran had a nuclear weapons program that was
- 39:38Speaker 3: released through the Mujahidini Cup. And there's another set of
- 39:42Speaker 3: targets which is the Aziris, not Azerbaijan in the country,
- 39:46Speaker 3: but Azerbaijan province in section of your on northwest iron
- 39:51Speaker 3: those nuclear documents that were taken a few years ago
- 39:53Speaker 3: that Benjaminuttyaw who held up and said, look, we have
- 39:55Speaker 3: all the proof. Now we stole it was something like
- 39:57Speaker 3: I think it was a ton of paper from this
- 39:59Speaker 3: bunker that was a ZII assisted theft out of the country,
- 40:05Speaker 3: and actually they gave Israel overflight out of Azerbaijan the
- 40:08Speaker 3: country to take those documents to Israel. And there's a
- 40:11Speaker 3: lot of these groups that they've been against the government,
- 40:14Speaker 3: any Iranian government for a very long time. So before
- 40:17Speaker 3: there was the regime, there was the Shah, and before
- 40:20Speaker 3: the Shah there was his father, and before that there
- 40:22Speaker 3: was the Kajars, so it is a long history. But
- 40:25Speaker 3: the Kurds, for example, the Aziris, the Baluchis, the Ahvazis,
- 40:28Speaker 3: which are an Arab arab iised group of Iranians in
- 40:30Speaker 3: the southwest of the country and the border of Iraq.
- 40:32Speaker 3: These are all separatists aligned people, not all of them are,
- 40:37Speaker 3: but they're typically an area you can go to if
- 40:40Speaker 3: you want to do something in Iran. These are the
- 40:42Speaker 3: people you work with as an outsider to do things
- 40:44Speaker 3: against the regime, which means these are the people the
- 40:47Speaker 3: regime wants to get rid of for control, severely controlled,
- 40:51Speaker 3: and in some cases that's what they do. They just
- 40:53Speaker 3: go and you know, reduce the amount of resources they have,
- 40:55Speaker 3: they reduce the freedom of action. In other cases they
- 40:58Speaker 3: go round them up and kill them, like they did
- 40:59Speaker 3: the Mujahideen in nineteen eighty eight. If you remember President Rayisi,
- 41:03Speaker 3: who died mysteriously in a helicopter last year, he was
- 41:07Speaker 3: considered the hanging judge. He signed off on something like
- 41:10Speaker 3: three thousand execution orders that Mujahdini Kak were most of
- 41:14Speaker 3: the people that were executed under his basically by decree
- 41:17Speaker 3: saying like, yeah, that guy's guilty, no trial, needed to
- 41:19Speaker 3: go kill him. And he did that in nineteen eighty eight,
- 41:22Speaker 3: three thousand people again, Mujahidin people. And so there's this
- 41:26Speaker 3: tension between these groups that don't feel like they are.
- 41:30Speaker 3: They don't feel Persian, they don't feel Iranian. Sometimes they do,
- 41:33Speaker 3: sometimes they don't, but they certainly feel I'm Asiri, I
- 41:37Speaker 3: am Ahbasi, I am Baluchi, I am Kurdish, you know,
- 41:41Speaker 3: and especially when you look at the Curds. There's thirty
- 41:43Speaker 3: five million Kurds. That's the largest stateless group, stateless ethnic
- 41:47Speaker 3: group in the world period, and they're split up between Turkey, Syria, Iraq,
- 41:52Speaker 3: and Iran. And Iran has one called the p Jack Pjak,
- 41:55Speaker 3: which is a Kurdish separatist group in Iran that has
- 41:58Speaker 3: been a constant thorn in their side that they've been
- 42:01Speaker 3: blowing up, you know, routinely, sometimes the Turkey's help. And
- 42:05Speaker 3: these are just a summary of some of them, but
- 42:06Speaker 3: there are smaller groups too, and the thing they all
- 42:09Speaker 3: have in common is that they disagree with the regime,
- 42:12Speaker 3: but there's no democratic mechanism for them to change anything
- 42:15Speaker 3: with the regime, so instead of having that democratic mechanism,
- 42:18Speaker 3: they have to resort to violence.
- 42:21Speaker 2: The other target you mentioned that we've seen is the
- 42:26Speaker 2: Salafi the Salafis, the you know, Salafi Jihadis. And what
- 42:31Speaker 2: I thought was interesting as you mentioned that in the
- 42:33Speaker 2: nineties that Iran actually notified Western intelligence about the cooperation
- 42:39Speaker 2: between the Taliban and AH.
- 42:42Speaker 3: Yes, they were actually helping us quite a bit. And
- 42:44Speaker 3: that relationship was built in Bosnia because during the wars
- 42:48Speaker 3: in Bosnia and Albania and Kosovo, the Coastal Liberation Army
- 42:53Speaker 3: and some of the Bosniac groups which are Muslim Bosnians,
- 42:57Speaker 3: we're working with the IRGC and actually that was the
- 42:59Speaker 3: QUDS force first overseas deployment to do un conventional warfare
- 43:02Speaker 3: was in Bosnia and we were there also the I
- 43:06Speaker 3: four and later on the KFO were there. Then Operation
- 43:09Speaker 3: Allied Force was there continuously. There was US Western presence
- 43:13Speaker 3: there with Yukon, and we built relationships with them at
- 43:16Speaker 3: the time. And actually you can read some of the
- 43:17Speaker 3: stuff in the book about Clinton. Clinton did a green
- 43:20Speaker 3: light and actually allowed Iran to ship weapons in there
- 43:22Speaker 3: to arm the KLA through Croatia. And that was a
- 43:26Speaker 3: very interesting revelation that most people probably don't know, is
- 43:29Speaker 3: that the US was not necessarily working hand in hand,
- 43:31Speaker 3: but we weren't holding the back. And because we were
- 43:34Speaker 3: diging that relationship, they took it upon themselves to share
- 43:37Speaker 3: with us something they knew about what was going on
- 43:38Speaker 3: in Afghanistan, and that was the Taliban housing al Qaida.
- 43:42Speaker 3: And if you look at some of those targets that
- 43:44Speaker 3: we struck when Bill Clinton authorized strikes in the late nineties,
- 43:48Speaker 3: some of those targets were alerted to us by Iran.
- 43:52Speaker 2: So, you know, you break the book down into the
- 43:56Speaker 2: official well, I mean into the three different sections, but
- 43:59Speaker 2: under this talk about like the official cover, the non
- 44:01Speaker 2: official cover, and then the UW aspects. Can we talk
- 44:07Speaker 2: about the official cover because you've already mentioned the Black
- 44:09Speaker 2: passports and the diplomatic community. How effective is that and
- 44:13Speaker 2: what are some of their greatest abuses of that system.
- 44:18Speaker 3: Yeah, official cover is very interesting because it's something that
- 44:21Speaker 3: every country does and no one likes to talk about.
- 44:25Speaker 3: And there are some obviously good uses of it, and
- 44:29Speaker 3: then there are some abuses of the diplomatic passport. Is
- 44:32Speaker 3: what I mean, diplomatic community. This stuff all comes from
- 44:35Speaker 3: the Vienna Convention of nineteen sixty one that basically says
- 44:38Speaker 3: that you're allowed to do things in a country as
- 44:40Speaker 3: an agent of that sovereign power, and that means you're immune,
- 44:43Speaker 3: you're inviolable, which means you cannot be searched. If you
- 44:46Speaker 3: have a pouch which could be a backpack, a box,
- 44:49Speaker 3: a cargo container with a sticker on it that says
- 44:52Speaker 3: this is a diplomatic pouch that is unvilable. It cannot
- 44:55Speaker 3: be searched. And as I said, every country does this.
- 44:58Speaker 3: So when we are wagging our finger at Iran, we
- 45:00Speaker 3: should remember all the times that we've done the exact
- 45:02Speaker 3: same thing and every other country does. I mean, this
- 45:05Speaker 3: is part of what diplomatic status is for. Without getting
- 45:10Speaker 3: into all the details of what the West does with it.
- 45:12Speaker 3: Iran has stations overseas, and that doesn't necessarily mean VAJA stations.
- 45:17Speaker 3: They have VAJA stations and they have IERGC stations, and
- 45:20Speaker 3: sometimes those IRGC stations are huge. And actually one of
- 45:24Speaker 3: the very first IRGC stations that we have evidence of
- 45:26Speaker 3: on the intel side was in Vienna before the Soviet
- 45:30Speaker 3: Union collapsed, and they had a small little Kods Force
- 45:33Speaker 3: element and there it wasn't called Kuods Force yet, it
- 45:35Speaker 3: was called the Office of Liberation Movements. They had a
- 45:38Speaker 3: little typist in there that was sending codes out, you know.
- 45:41Speaker 3: But they were there on diplomatic cover. They were there
- 45:44Speaker 3: as a foreign ministry representative, not as an intelligence officer. Again,
- 45:49Speaker 3: this is what many countries do, but Iran has certainly
- 45:51Speaker 3: abused it. At Dubai is a common location where they
- 45:54Speaker 3: do abuse this, where they'll move cargo containers, gigantic containers
- 45:58Speaker 3: like off of a ship with a little stick on
- 46:00Speaker 3: it that says this is a diplomatic pouch. You can't
- 46:01Speaker 3: touch it, and inside of that our weapons and money
- 46:04Speaker 3: and whatever you need to put in there to escape scrutiny. Right. Actually,
- 46:08Speaker 3: just side note, we had a Saudi prince in Lebanon
- 46:10Speaker 3: when I was deployed there that tried to do the
- 46:12Speaker 3: diplomatic pouch thing with his jet. He actually pouched his
- 46:15Speaker 3: jet and it was full of ecstasy. It had like
- 46:17Speaker 3: two million ecstasy pills in it. But when he landed,
- 46:19Speaker 3: the door open and they kind of all came out
- 46:20Speaker 3: and it became like a now we see it thing.
- 46:23Speaker 3: So he kind of messed that up. But that was
- 46:24Speaker 3: a little side note. But of it, for sure, Yeah,
- 46:30Speaker 3: for sure. But they use it for other reasons too.
- 46:33Speaker 3: So in New York, for example, there's something like twenty
- 46:36Speaker 3: five accredited Iranian diplomats living there right now that are
- 46:39Speaker 3: allowed to live there, and they're on a range restriction.
- 46:42Speaker 3: They're not allowed to leave a certain area of the city.
- 46:44Speaker 3: But the area that they're in, it's a good part
- 46:46Speaker 3: of the city. You can do a lot of things there,
- 46:48Speaker 3: which means you can meet with other people, perhaps sources
- 46:50Speaker 3: or perhaps handlers if you're being handled. You know, that's
- 46:54Speaker 3: a place where everybody gets to go together. So it
- 46:56Speaker 3: could be Israel. He's talking to Iranians, it could be
- 46:58Speaker 3: Iranians talking to who knows what it is. It's happening
- 47:02Speaker 3: all the time. They also had an office in Washington,
- 47:05Speaker 3: d C outside run out of the Pakistani embassy. So
- 47:09Speaker 3: that let's say you're an Iranian citizen studying in the
- 47:11Speaker 3: United States and you lose your passport, Well you need
- 47:14Speaker 3: to get a new one. But how are you need
- 47:15Speaker 3: to get that if you don't have an Iranian embassy
- 47:17Speaker 3: in the United States. Well there's a guy in the
- 47:19Speaker 3: Pakistani embassy whose job it is and he is he
- 47:22Speaker 3: is an Iranian diplomat in the Washington d C. That
- 47:27Speaker 3: will get you a new passport. This is this is
- 47:29Speaker 3: the way, you know, this is the good way that
- 47:31Speaker 3: this works. This is how it's helpful. Right, And that's
- 47:33Speaker 3: not cover, that's that's declared on the cover side. Especially
- 47:37Speaker 3: with commercial cover, it's a whole other animal because think
- 47:40Speaker 3: about all their shipping lines are sanctioned, all the port
- 47:43Speaker 3: entries are sanctioned, all their goods are sanctioned. Like I
- 47:46Speaker 3: just said, the iPhone. How do you get that into
- 47:47Speaker 3: the country on industrial scale, Well you have to have
- 47:50Speaker 3: commercial cover, and you have to have companies all over
- 47:53Speaker 3: the world that look like one thing, but there's something else.
- 47:56Speaker 3: And that is what they mostly make their money off
- 47:59Speaker 3: of of how they they enrich the regime and how
- 48:01Speaker 3: they move people and goods and equipment around the world
- 48:05Speaker 3: very easily and with very little notice.
- 48:08Speaker 2: Yeah, you went into that quite a bit in your book,
- 48:10Speaker 2: The The Banyan Banyans Banyard's Bonyards. Yeah. So you know,
- 48:21Speaker 2: when we talk about things that Iran is doing under
- 48:24Speaker 2: you know, diplomatic cover, we're talking about a lot of
- 48:27Speaker 2: known bad actors. Like we know that these people are
- 48:30Speaker 2: bad actors, how can they just don't get P and
- 48:32Speaker 2: GT from everyone?
- 48:34Speaker 3: So that's something called reciprocity. If you start kicking out
- 48:38Speaker 3: person from country X, person from country X will start
- 48:41Speaker 3: kicking you out. And we saw this a lot during
- 48:42Speaker 3: the Obama administration when we were having some escalatory actions
- 48:45Speaker 3: with Russia where we kicked some Russian diplomats out of
- 48:48Speaker 3: the United States. Well, the next day Russia kicked the
- 48:50Speaker 3: exact same number of diplomats out of Russia. And you know,
- 48:53Speaker 3: we close a Chinese diplomatic facility in Texas. Well, the
- 48:55Speaker 3: next week there's a US diplomatic facility closed in China.
- 48:58Speaker 3: So there's a huge risk of if we interrupt this
- 49:01Speaker 3: process that we all know is going on, the costs
- 49:04Speaker 3: are higher than the benefits. So sometimes it might be
- 49:08Speaker 3: better to actually, rather than neutralize, it might be better
- 49:10Speaker 3: to exploit that thing, Which is exactly the confluence of
- 49:14Speaker 3: human intelligence and counterintelligence where you get to make the choice,
- 49:17Speaker 3: do I want to just cut this thing off and
- 49:18Speaker 3: stop it. You know, if there's a drug vessel full
- 49:21Speaker 3: of drugs and we see it off the coast of Venezuela,
- 49:23Speaker 3: do we want to blow it up? Or do we
- 49:25Speaker 3: want to capture the guys and interrogate them and find
- 49:27Speaker 3: out where they came from, where they're going and all
- 49:28Speaker 3: this other stuff. Well, that's a choice between exploiting and neutralizing.
- 49:32Speaker 3: And neutralizing has a lot of immediate shock value that
- 49:35Speaker 3: looks good politically and in the news. But exploiting typically
- 49:39Speaker 3: doesn't get known to anybody. It's a secret, and it
- 49:42Speaker 3: goes on for a long long time, and it can
- 49:44Speaker 3: have a huge payoff if you're smart about it. And
- 49:47Speaker 3: of course that's my bias because I did those things
- 49:50Speaker 3: and I know how they work, But I will advocate
- 49:53Speaker 3: for the high value and high impact that they have
- 49:54Speaker 3: over a very long time that if rather than just
- 49:56Speaker 3: shutting these things down or kicking these diplomats out, wouldn't
- 49:59Speaker 3: it be a better to recruit that diplomat as a
- 50:02Speaker 3: double agent, and then have him work for you for
- 50:04Speaker 3: thirty years and then recruit his own assets for you
- 50:07Speaker 3: as a principal agent that you could then further gather
- 50:09Speaker 3: defectors to keep them defectors in place. I mean, the
- 50:12Speaker 3: possibilities are endless, the value is endless. Rather than just
- 50:15Speaker 3: kicking that one guy out and making the country kick
- 50:17Speaker 3: one of your people out, you know, to me, it's
- 50:19Speaker 3: a no brainer.
- 50:21Speaker 2: When we talk about some of the things that you know,
- 50:25Speaker 2: Iran does in foreign countries and in particularly the United States,
- 50:28Speaker 2: and they do a lot of this stuff everywhere. Can
- 50:31Speaker 2: we talk about ms see Elena Jodd.
- 50:35Speaker 3: Yeah, Masulia Nojod is actually very interesting person. She wrote
- 50:38Speaker 3: her own book called The Wind in My Hair, which
- 50:40Speaker 3: I recommend if anyone's interested in Iran, Like what it's
- 50:42Speaker 3: like to be a person in jail in Iran, political jail,
- 50:45Speaker 3: Evan prison, getting tortured. She wrote a book about it.
- 50:49Speaker 3: The regime has been trying to kill her for a
- 50:51Speaker 3: very long time. They've tried multiple times the first time.
- 50:54Speaker 3: She lives in New York actually, and she's under FBI
- 50:58Speaker 3: protection now. But when she came to the US, she
- 51:01Speaker 3: started talking way more than she used to talk when
- 51:03Speaker 3: she was in Iran, because now she had some distance.
- 51:04Speaker 3: But the regime caught up to her. They tried to
- 51:07Speaker 3: assassinate her once by recruiting some Chechen guys who were
- 51:11Speaker 3: kind of this high jinks group of guys that were
- 51:13Speaker 3: pretty sloppy. They did a lot of physical surveillance on
- 51:16Speaker 3: her home. They were looking at the way that she
- 51:19Speaker 3: was walking to understand her behavior, and so they're doing
- 51:21Speaker 3: a lot of early collection activity to see how this
- 51:24Speaker 3: target looked. And they were interdicted. One of them had
- 51:28Speaker 3: an AK forty seven in his car. They were using
- 51:30Speaker 3: their phones way too much. In fact, most of the
- 51:33Speaker 3: reason we able to catch them is because of what
- 51:34Speaker 3: they said on their phones. It was very obvious what
- 51:37Speaker 3: they were doing. So we neutralized them. And a few
- 51:42Speaker 3: years later the regime still wanted to kill her, but
- 51:44Speaker 3: they had a more elaborate plan this time. This time
- 51:46Speaker 3: they wanted to kidnap her in New York, bring her
- 51:49Speaker 3: to a port in New York, put her on a speedboat,
- 51:52Speaker 3: take the speedboat to Venezuela, and then take her to
- 51:55Speaker 3: Iran so they could do a show trial and execute
- 51:57Speaker 3: her or torture her so that she would recamp and
- 52:01Speaker 3: make this negative message about what she was saying on
- 52:03Speaker 3: the media. We were able to catch that as well.
- 52:07Speaker 3: But there have been some others as well. R. Bob
- 52:10Speaker 3: cr who's Iranian living in Texas, who is a used
- 52:13Speaker 3: car salesman. He was recruited by the IRGC to assassinate
- 52:17Speaker 3: the Saudi ambassador who was in DC at the time,
- 52:20Speaker 3: eating at a very nice restaurant, and he got very
- 52:23Speaker 3: close to actually doing it. But there was a confidential
- 52:25Speaker 3: informant that we had in the drug cartels because he
- 52:27Speaker 3: was actually buying his weapons from the Zeta's cartel. And
- 52:30Speaker 3: we actually had a recruited guy in the Zetas cartel
- 52:32Speaker 3: recruited for something else obviously, who was like, hey, there's
- 52:35Speaker 3: this Iranian stuff going on. You guys should look into this,
- 52:37Speaker 3: and so DEA and FBI looked into it. Sure enough, yes,
- 52:40Speaker 3: he had done quite a few things. He was ready
- 52:42Speaker 3: to go, and we were able to capture him too.
- 52:45Speaker 3: But a lot of these are very interesting when you
- 52:47Speaker 3: look at them, because it's not an Iranian case officer
- 52:51Speaker 3: or IERGC guy doing this, it's whoever they can get
- 52:55Speaker 3: their hands on to do it. Because they have such
- 52:57Speaker 3: few resources available to do these things in States and
- 53:00Speaker 3: in other countries that they're just kind of grasping at
- 53:03Speaker 3: straws to see what sticks. They've recruited Hell's Angels guys
- 53:06Speaker 3: before to organize some assassination attempts more recently. You know,
- 53:10Speaker 3: they're a very interesting thing to look at about how
- 53:12Speaker 3: they recruit these guys in Canada and then they have
- 53:14Speaker 3: illegally entered the United States and then go do their
- 53:17Speaker 3: target reconstants that they're going to do and then go
- 53:20Speaker 3: figure out when the time is right. But again, confidential
- 53:23Speaker 3: informant helps with that and we're able to capture those
- 53:25Speaker 3: people too. So it's very interesting to see how they're
- 53:28Speaker 3: doing things in the United States because they're very different
- 53:29Speaker 3: than how they do them in other countries where they
- 53:31Speaker 3: have more ability to move. And that goes back to
- 53:34Speaker 3: the diplomatic thing. So if you look at Iran, which
- 53:37Speaker 3: countries can Iran go to Iranians without a visa? This
- 53:41Speaker 3: is an important question to ask. You should away if
- 53:43Speaker 3: you're an intelligence analysts should always ask, you know, my
- 53:44Speaker 3: target country, what countries can they go to without a visa?
- 53:47Speaker 3: Because that means those are countries they can go to
- 53:49Speaker 3: into a source meeting without being easily noticed. Countries might
- 53:54Speaker 3: surprise you. For example, Ecuador and say Sheelles and Singapore,
- 53:59Speaker 3: they can go there without a VA Thailand, Georgia, Armenia.
- 54:03Speaker 3: So there's a lot of countries that are not Muslim
- 54:05Speaker 3: countries that they can go to and do the activities
- 54:08Speaker 3: need to do their third country meetings so that way
- 54:10Speaker 3: they're not meeting the source and the sources home country
- 54:12Speaker 3: or in Ron, they're doing it in a kind of
- 54:14Speaker 3: safer area. This is how they kind of do things
- 54:16Speaker 3: outside of the United States. In the United States, they're
- 54:19Speaker 3: using a lot of cyber activity where they're and also
- 54:21Speaker 3: in Israel where they're recruiting their assets through Facebook, sometimes
- 54:25Speaker 3: posing as lovers and other kind of things. And when
- 54:29Speaker 3: we see these things exposed, we kind of chuckle at it,
- 54:30Speaker 3: but I also have to ask, like, why aren't they
- 54:32Speaker 3: throwing more resources at this stuff? You know, But it's
- 54:35Speaker 3: because they're more concerned about their survival at home than
- 54:38Speaker 3: they are about anything else outside the country.
- 54:41Speaker 2: Something you mentioned like that was surprising to me because
- 54:46Speaker 2: most people I think of an age are aware of
- 54:49Speaker 2: Solomon Rushdi and the fetway against him. I did not
- 54:53Speaker 2: know you mentioned that that over three dozen people have
- 54:56Speaker 2: been killed trying to kill him and it's still going on. Yeah, yeah,
- 55:00Speaker 2: just got and there's basically there's basically a fund for
- 55:05Speaker 2: his death. There was just an increase.
- 55:08Speaker 3: Yep, it was adjusted for inflation, you know, because it's
- 55:10Speaker 3: been around for.
- 55:11Speaker 2: A while, so right right, three point three million. And
- 55:15Speaker 2: it's crazy to me that that there's just basically like this, Hey,
- 55:19Speaker 2: if you if you get himmering these people like you
- 55:21Speaker 2: get a piece of this.
- 55:23Speaker 3: Yeah, it's basically a beef that the original Ayatola had
- 55:26Speaker 3: and he is now dead and a beef has survived him.
- 55:31Speaker 2: Can we also talk a little bit about Merchant, because
- 55:33Speaker 2: that's pretty recent that it was an assef Merchant.
- 55:40Speaker 4: Who was that Uh the wasn't he?
- 55:43Speaker 2: The Pakistani? The gentleman who was uh gonna who is
- 55:49Speaker 2: gonna try and the Pakistani who's gonna try and kill Trump?
- 55:52Speaker 3: Oh oh yeah, yeah, there's been a few of those.
- 55:55Speaker 3: I don't know how much stock I put into that.
- 55:57Speaker 3: I have an I have a theory that these are
- 55:59Speaker 3: not like coming from high level ERGYC people. Even the
- 56:02Speaker 3: r BOBSI are one that I mentioned, the Saudi into
- 56:04Speaker 3: twenty thirteen assassination project. I think these are lower level
- 56:09Speaker 3: ergyc This is my theory is I'd had no fact
- 56:11Speaker 3: to back this up, but I think these are lower
- 56:13Speaker 3: level ways of trying to do what they can with
- 56:17Speaker 3: what they can. If the same thing with John Bolton
- 56:19Speaker 3: and Pompeo and Trump, these are like really low level,
- 56:23Speaker 3: amateur hour type things that have almost no resources attached
- 56:27Speaker 3: to them, something like that coming from If it was
- 56:29Speaker 3: coming from the top levels of the government, I feel
- 56:31Speaker 3: like there would be more risk analysis in there, some
- 56:34Speaker 3: more thought about how it looks and how to do it.
- 56:37Speaker 3: You know, these things and if you compare them to
- 56:39Speaker 3: other assassination operations that the regime has done, especially against Iranians,
- 56:44Speaker 3: those are far more advanced methodical. They put a lot
- 56:46Speaker 3: more thought into it. They still failed a lot, but
- 56:49Speaker 3: they succeeded a lot. And it wasn't this kind of
- 56:51Speaker 3: like pie in the sky, like oh, let's just go
- 56:54Speaker 3: after that guy and go kill them. You know, they
- 56:56Speaker 3: really thought through how do they do it, where's the
- 56:58Speaker 3: right place to do it, what resources do we need,
- 56:59Speaker 3: what country should it be, and who should we recruit.
- 57:01Speaker 3: In Denmark there were a few of these where they
- 57:03Speaker 3: killed some MUJA hitting guys and some as MLA guys
- 57:06Speaker 3: with very methodical ways of doing it even recently. So
- 57:10Speaker 3: I question, you know, where are these orders coming from?
- 57:13Speaker 3: And I don't know if those are officially sanctioned things
- 57:17Speaker 3: like even again back to the r Bob Ziar case,
- 57:21Speaker 3: when you look at the Treasury sanctions that detail, you
- 57:25Speaker 3: know what was going on with that case. They implicate
- 57:27Speaker 3: cost some solo money and two high level IRGC guys
- 57:30Speaker 3: in addition to the one guy that was on the
- 57:31Speaker 3: phone with ar BOBZR. But there's no there's no link
- 57:34Speaker 3: between that low level basically a lieutenant colonel and the
- 57:37Speaker 3: IRGC and cost some solo money like that doesn't really
- 57:40Speaker 3: make sense to me, you know. I again, theorizing that
- 57:44Speaker 3: it's probably someone lowered down the ranks who's like, I'm
- 57:46Speaker 3: going to make a name for myself and get this
- 57:48Speaker 3: big hit and then I'm going to be important, that's
- 57:51Speaker 3: probably more likely.
- 57:54Speaker 2: Makes sense. So you know, then you go into COVID action.
- 57:58Speaker 2: Can we talk about the Iran Experts Initiative.
- 58:02Speaker 3: Yeah, it's very interesting, more recent actually since the Biden administration.
- 58:07Speaker 3: This is kind of a classic example of and many
- 58:09Speaker 3: countries do this Russia does this, China does this with
- 58:13Speaker 3: their Confucius institutes, where countries will use their academic credentials
- 58:19Speaker 3: to do intelligence things. And again this is not a
- 58:22Speaker 3: new surprising thing. This is very common in countries, but
- 58:27Speaker 3: it was kind of surprising because of how close these
- 58:30Speaker 3: individuals were to the Biden administration, specifically to the Iran
- 58:34Speaker 3: team working for President Biden and the Syria team working
- 58:37Speaker 3: for President Biden. And there was in fact one individual
- 58:39Speaker 3: on the Iran team, the envoys team, that was telling
- 58:43Speaker 3: the envoy advice. That advice was coming directly from Sarif
- 58:47Speaker 3: through emails to that person, which is kind of interesting
- 58:50Speaker 3: that emails are now in the public domain, so if
- 58:53Speaker 3: people want to go research them, they can. And all
- 58:56Speaker 3: the people that were involved in this Iran Experts initiative
- 58:58Speaker 3: claimed to be the one that we're providing. They said
- 59:01Speaker 3: that the access they had to the regime was only
- 59:03Speaker 3: for academic purposes, so that they could help inform the
- 59:05Speaker 3: US government on the JCPOA. My thought, as an intelligence
- 59:10Speaker 3: collector and a handler, well that's probably how it started
- 59:13Speaker 3: out for you, and that the regime kept pushing down
- 59:16Speaker 3: that button and kept you on and now you're working
- 59:18Speaker 3: for them, even if you don't know that you are.
- 59:21Speaker 3: So sometimes you know, ignorance is not an excuse for
- 59:23Speaker 3: intelligence collection, and we've seen that many times with how
- 59:25Speaker 3: people believe they're providing something to one country and it's
- 59:28Speaker 3: a false flag and they're providing it to somebody else,
- 59:30Speaker 3: or they think is something completely separate, And if you
- 59:33Speaker 3: look at what they collected and what they did and
- 59:34Speaker 3: what they said, this is a very clear cut influence
- 59:37Speaker 3: operation that actually affected how are Iran envoy operated in
- 59:41Speaker 3: the world. And when you're doing negotiations with a country,
- 59:44Speaker 3: let's say you're on you have a limited information so
- 59:47Speaker 3: the information you do have is extremely valuable and you're
- 59:49Speaker 3: using it to reduce uncertainty and increase your decision advantage. Well,
- 59:53Speaker 3: the other side wants to take control of that process
- 59:56Speaker 3: to their own advantage, and we would be ignorant to
- 59:59Speaker 3: think that they were not, And unfortunately at the time,
- 1:00:02Speaker 3: we were ignorant to think that they were not, and
- 1:00:04Speaker 3: they did do it. So again, I go in a
- 1:00:06Speaker 3: lot of detail on it. I have the actual names
- 1:00:08Speaker 3: of the people in there and everything, but it is
- 1:00:10Speaker 3: kind of interesting to think about how many other times
- 1:00:11Speaker 3: does this happen? You know, that's a question mark this
- 1:00:13Speaker 3: should come up that people for future research should be
- 1:00:15Speaker 3: looking into, and in the intelligence community should be looking
- 1:00:17Speaker 3: at what other things that look benign are not benign
- 1:00:21Speaker 3: because that's a that's a great intelligence operation when it
- 1:00:23Speaker 3: looks benign. That's what Clandesta's activity is. The activity looks
- 1:00:26Speaker 3: like it's something else, you know, right.
- 1:00:30Speaker 2: And then you know there's So we're briefly going over
- 1:00:35Speaker 2: all this stuff. There are so many great examples in
- 1:00:37Speaker 2: this book. I highly highly recommend everybody read this. It's
- 1:00:40Speaker 2: Iran's shadow weapons. But let's move into cyber because cyber
- 1:00:45Speaker 2: has been Oh the link is going to be in
- 1:00:48Speaker 2: the description. Let's move into cyber because cyber has been
- 1:00:53Speaker 2: something that you know, Iran was nothing and then we
- 1:00:59Speaker 2: hit him or they were hit with stucksnet stucknet, and
- 1:01:02Speaker 2: then they became something. And it's been a real evolution
- 1:01:07Speaker 2: for them, hasn't it.
- 1:01:08Speaker 3: It's really fascinating. Actually, I'm not aware of another country
- 1:01:11Speaker 3: having this similar evolution. As you said, they were nothing
- 1:01:15Speaker 3: before like two thousand and seven, at a maximum, they
- 1:01:18Speaker 3: were defacing websites. Fast forward ten years and they are
- 1:01:22Speaker 3: overturning billions of dollars of ransomware and banks and destroying
- 1:01:27Speaker 3: giant pieces of infrastructure and SCATA systems, which are industrial
- 1:01:31Speaker 3: control systems, like they just they accelerate. Well, how do
- 1:01:34Speaker 3: they do that where they get information? Well, as you mentioned,
- 1:01:38Speaker 3: stucksnet happened, and they ran immediately reverse engineered stucksnet and
- 1:01:43Speaker 3: saw how it was made, and they made their own
- 1:01:46Speaker 3: piece of malware that they used that now they knew
- 1:01:49Speaker 3: this new information. Well, then they said, well, what if
- 1:01:51Speaker 3: we're under threat by other things, let's start investing a
- 1:01:53Speaker 3: ton of money in this. And they started recruiting these
- 1:01:55Speaker 3: civilian entities, which is actually not unlike the US. The US,
- 1:01:59Speaker 3: a lot of our cyber expertise is not uniform service
- 1:02:03Speaker 3: members or gs civilians at cybercom. It's contractors, companies that
- 1:02:08Speaker 3: have experts in them that the government hires to produce
- 1:02:11Speaker 3: tailored items Collard malware. This is the way it actually works.
- 1:02:15Speaker 3: There's a couple of really interesting books on it, like
- 1:02:17Speaker 3: Countdown to Zero Day, which I recommend by Kim Zetter,
- 1:02:20Speaker 3: which goes into how stocks and that was actually made.
- 1:02:22Speaker 3: It was not made by the government, It was made
- 1:02:24Speaker 3: by other companies that were sold to the government and
- 1:02:27Speaker 3: same thing with Israel, Like they have Pegasus that's made
- 1:02:29Speaker 3: by a civilian company that's not made by Unit eighty
- 1:02:33Speaker 3: two hundred, their second organization. Right.
- 1:02:36Speaker 2: Wait, are you saying that the government is not on
- 1:02:38Speaker 2: the leading edge of development and conception of of skin,
- 1:02:44Speaker 2: they're on.
- 1:02:45Speaker 3: The leading edge of anything money to give to those people, Yeah, right,
- 1:02:49Speaker 3: because they'll pay a lot of money, a lot of money,
- 1:02:52Speaker 3: you know. And the regime does the same thing. And
- 1:02:54Speaker 3: they did the same thing. And actually, when Israel wiped
- 1:02:57Speaker 3: a bunch of servers in Iran using a white or malware,
- 1:03:01Speaker 3: Iran reverse engineered that and turned it into something called Shammoun,
- 1:03:04Speaker 3: which they then put on Saudi Aramco and erased all
- 1:03:07Speaker 3: of Saudi Aramco's data, which is incredible because, as I said,
- 1:03:10Speaker 3: even two years before that, the regime could only deface
- 1:03:13Speaker 3: a website. And now they're wiping out the entire oil
- 1:03:15Speaker 3: infrastructure of Saudi Arabia, not all of it, but almost
- 1:03:18Speaker 3: all of the huge, huge amount. And it wasn't just
- 1:03:21Speaker 3: a one hit thing. They had carefully planned it. They
- 1:03:23Speaker 3: chose a day during Ramadan when they knew no on
- 1:03:25Speaker 3: would be at the place, like everything was carefully thought through.
- 1:03:28Speaker 3: It was very deliberate, which is a huge change before
- 1:03:31Speaker 3: when they looked like this ragtag group of little hackers
- 1:03:33Speaker 3: which they call Sabiri's that were just hired off the
- 1:03:36Speaker 3: street to go do forum blasts and you know, take
- 1:03:39Speaker 3: websites down with didas attacks. So you see this evolution
- 1:03:42Speaker 3: not as their innovation at the beginning, more their reaction,
- 1:03:45Speaker 3: but as they reacted to it. They just took everything
- 1:03:48Speaker 3: that hit them and then they turned it into their
- 1:03:49Speaker 3: own weapon and they use it against us, which is
- 1:03:52Speaker 3: the West, Israel, European countries especially like Denmark, Netherlands, other
- 1:03:57Speaker 3: countries as well to their advantage. And for that first
- 1:04:00Speaker 3: few years, then they rapidly accelerated producing their own things
- 1:04:04Speaker 3: that are now novel that would never have existed if
- 1:04:08Speaker 3: things hadn't happened before to them that pushed them in
- 1:04:11Speaker 3: that direction, which is kind of fascinating, you know, revisionist
- 1:04:13Speaker 3: history of like what would have happened if we didn't
- 1:04:15Speaker 3: do stuck net or if they didn't discover stuck net.
- 1:04:18Speaker 2: Right, And you also mentioned that when Israel used Wiper
- 1:04:22Speaker 2: that they uncovered a much more valuable and essay loitering
- 1:04:26Speaker 2: tool that.
- 1:04:28Speaker 3: Yeah, that wasn't like for the NSAY. Yeah, so the
- 1:04:31Speaker 3: NSA tool was hidden and had been hidden and was
- 1:04:34Speaker 3: totally unknown, and that tool was extremely advanced and was
- 1:04:38Speaker 3: capable of pretty much destroying the entire nuclear program and
- 1:04:40Speaker 3: a lot of other infrastructure, including much of their non
- 1:04:44Speaker 3: nuclear defense infrastructure. And when Israel did that wiper activity,
- 1:04:49Speaker 3: it did it in the same kind of area of
- 1:04:51Speaker 3: the memory of system that this other malware was. And
- 1:04:55Speaker 3: when the regime went to go look, they found both
- 1:04:58Speaker 3: and the US unfortunately lost this extremely advanced tool that
- 1:05:02Speaker 3: now is no longer functional.
- 1:05:05Speaker 2: Yeah, I have a question.
- 1:05:07Speaker 4: Can I ask a question see their cyber operations, what
- 1:05:11Speaker 4: is like the percentage between like them going out there
- 1:05:14Speaker 4: trying to make money for the regime to like offensive
- 1:05:17Speaker 4: operations against state actors and stuff like that, whether it's Israel,
- 1:05:22Speaker 4: the US, or any Denmark.
- 1:05:24Speaker 3: The money part was earlier and it has really dramatically decreased.
- 1:05:28Speaker 3: And in fact, the last time they did a major
- 1:05:30Speaker 3: financial operation, they did two that were like really huge.
- 1:05:34Speaker 3: One was against a Las Vegas company because the owner
- 1:05:37Speaker 3: of the company was Jewish and made a statement about Iran,
- 1:05:41Speaker 3: and to retaliate they caused him several one hundreds of
- 1:05:43Speaker 3: millions of dollars of damage to his infrastructure. They didn't
- 1:05:47Speaker 3: get any money from that though. Then in Georgia, the
- 1:05:50Speaker 3: state in the United States or Georgia, they attacked a
- 1:05:52Speaker 3: municipal infrastructure and were able to do some ransomware attack
- 1:05:55Speaker 3: there After that, which is like more than ten years ago.
- 1:05:59Speaker 3: They have drifted away from that and they're mostly focusing
- 1:06:01Speaker 3: on offensive cyberactivity.
- 1:06:03Speaker 2: Yeah, it's wild that they now have like five advanced
- 1:06:06Speaker 2: persistent threats, at least five that are associated with them.
- 1:06:10Speaker 2: Can you talk a little bit about the twenty twenty
- 1:06:12Speaker 2: three attacks on US ships?
- 1:06:15Speaker 3: Do you recall that which ones are you talking about?
- 1:06:18Speaker 2: The ballast they are relutely yes.
- 1:06:23Speaker 3: This is from a group called Shahid Kave, which is
- 1:06:25Speaker 3: a very elite cyber unit inside of one of their
- 1:06:30Speaker 3: elite cyber units. So you can think of it as
- 1:06:32Speaker 3: you know, inside a cybercom there is an elite national
- 1:06:36Speaker 3: mission Force, the Cyber Mission Force. You can think of
- 1:06:38Speaker 3: Shahid Kaves as a team inside of that cyber mission Force.
- 1:06:42Speaker 3: It's kind of analogous. And what Shahid Kave did was
- 1:06:44Speaker 3: they were able to actually steal through malware activity. They
- 1:06:49Speaker 3: use these things called remote access trojans or rats to
- 1:06:51Speaker 3: get this stuff. So they create a rat inside of
- 1:06:53Speaker 3: a computer system, trafted the designs for these ballasts, and
- 1:06:58Speaker 3: if they wanted to, they could have basic hit a
- 1:07:00Speaker 3: button and turn these ballasts off, which would have caused
- 1:07:03Speaker 3: these cargo vessels to eventually sink after their machinery broke
- 1:07:06Speaker 3: down and things. But the interesting part about that is
- 1:07:10Speaker 3: that these were not operations they were going to do. Instead,
- 1:07:12Speaker 3: this was a menu of options that they presented to
- 1:07:14Speaker 3: the IATOLA, and this was their job, was to basically
- 1:07:18Speaker 3: come up with all kinds of ways that if the
- 1:07:20Speaker 3: IATOLA wanted to, they could attack the US with cyber tools. Interestingly,
- 1:07:25Speaker 3: they haven't used them to our knowledge, not just this tool,
- 1:07:29Speaker 3: but other tools. And that kind of goes along with
- 1:07:32Speaker 3: what they do, not just in cyber but in intelligence generally,
- 1:07:36Speaker 3: where they take a lot of things and put them
- 1:07:38Speaker 3: on the shelf and they wait till there's a time
- 1:07:41Speaker 3: when they really want to use the thing. That's kind
- 1:07:44Speaker 3: of interesting because there's been a lot of opportunities that
- 1:07:46Speaker 3: you might think would be a good reason for them
- 1:07:48Speaker 3: to use those things. You could think of like June
- 1:07:51Speaker 3: for example, as one of those times and they didn't
- 1:07:53Speaker 3: do it, And that's kind of an interesting question of
- 1:07:56Speaker 3: like why didn't they destroy the ballasts on all of
- 1:07:58Speaker 3: the ships in the golf in June? You know, but
- 1:08:02Speaker 3: it probably goes toward the more political question of well,
- 1:08:04Speaker 3: if they did that, what would happen next? And what
- 1:08:06Speaker 3: would that mean for me? You know. So they're probably
- 1:08:08Speaker 3: they probably have a lot of things on the shelf
- 1:08:11Speaker 3: that they'll never ever use that are probably very powerful.
- 1:08:14Speaker 3: But it would mean that their own destruction may be
- 1:08:16Speaker 3: invited from using these things.
- 1:08:17Speaker 2: Right, Yeah, where where it turns into basically an act
- 1:08:23Speaker 2: of war. Yes, and let's talk about you know, we
- 1:08:28Speaker 2: talk about these capabilities, but let's talk about like they're internal,
- 1:08:32Speaker 2: like they have they're pretty devious with their own population,
- 1:08:36Speaker 2: you know, in terms of like the the apps that
- 1:08:39Speaker 2: they create, the software you know that they create where well,
- 1:08:44Speaker 2: they they'll put out, hey, here's a censorship. Here's a
- 1:08:48Speaker 2: way to circumvent censorship. But it's actually put out by
- 1:08:51Speaker 2: the government.
- 1:08:52Speaker 3: Yeah, and actually this is all because their internet. It's
- 1:08:56Speaker 3: not like our internet. You know, we think like, oh
- 1:08:58Speaker 3: I can put a VPN on and I can I
- 1:09:00Speaker 3: can use proton whatever. Well, the problem in Iran is
- 1:09:04Speaker 3: that they don't have an open Internet. They have something
- 1:09:06Speaker 3: called the National Information Network, which is given to them
- 1:09:09Speaker 3: by China. This is a Chinese technology about how to
- 1:09:12Speaker 3: create a you know, China's Great Firewall, which is pretty successful.
- 1:09:16Speaker 3: They gave that to Iran and Iran implemented it, which
- 1:09:18Speaker 3: means that people in Iran cannot access the Internet like
- 1:09:21Speaker 3: we do. There are entire sections of the Internet that
- 1:09:24Speaker 3: they can never reach. There are some VPNs that do
- 1:09:27Speaker 3: work there, but they're not always working, and they kind
- 1:09:30Speaker 3: of come up and down, and there's a lot of
- 1:09:31Speaker 3: volatility there. But within that special ecosystem that they've created,
- 1:09:35Speaker 3: as you said, they've got all kinds of little things
- 1:09:37Speaker 3: in there that are ready to hook you. And especially
- 1:09:39Speaker 3: during times of protest or unrest, there's a lot of
- 1:09:43Speaker 3: things that are designed to trick you, track you, or
- 1:09:47Speaker 3: catch you or figure out where you are, you know,
- 1:09:50Speaker 3: because what their goal is to stop protests that they
- 1:09:53Speaker 3: don't want them happening, and they'll go to any length
- 1:09:55Speaker 3: to do it. They were at the time during the
- 1:09:56Speaker 3: masa Amini protests few years ago, they were throwing girls
- 1:09:59Speaker 3: off for roofs because the girls were posting on Instagram
- 1:10:02Speaker 3: and were at the actual protests. They were shooting girls
- 1:10:04Speaker 3: walking home from school that had no part in the
- 1:10:06Speaker 3: protest just because they were there. Lots and lots of
- 1:10:09Speaker 3: people were killed during this protest with live rounds. And
- 1:10:12Speaker 3: at the heart of it was the Internet, because how
- 1:10:15Speaker 3: else can you in a country so oppressed and so controlled,
- 1:10:19Speaker 3: how else can you communicate that this protest is going
- 1:10:21Speaker 3: down right now at this location. And they have to
- 1:10:24Speaker 3: use the Internet. And the problem is they can't access Instagram,
- 1:10:27Speaker 3: They can't access a lot of social media that we
- 1:10:29Speaker 3: can unless you're a regime person. They have special access
- 1:10:33Speaker 3: in the network to be able to go onto Instagram
- 1:10:35Speaker 3: and post their pictures and things. But that means that
- 1:10:38Speaker 3: people have to use all these little tools and software.
- 1:10:40Speaker 3: And if you remember, like back in the nineties when
- 1:10:41Speaker 3: you were trying to download music, I wasn't doing it
- 1:10:43Speaker 3: because it was illegal, of course, but for those who
- 1:10:45Speaker 3: were doing it, you sometimes would download a movie or
- 1:10:48Speaker 3: a song and it was actually full of viruses, right
- 1:10:50Speaker 3: because they have no way of like verifying like what
- 1:10:53Speaker 3: am I downloading? Because it's all nothing's official, and in
- 1:10:56Speaker 3: Iran it's like that, and the regime puts a lot
- 1:10:58Speaker 3: of stuff out there, like, oh, this is the VPN
- 1:11:00Speaker 3: that you can use to get outside the country, But
- 1:11:02Speaker 3: it turns out it's actually a government controlled BPM that's
- 1:11:04Speaker 3: accessing your entire phone. And that's one small example, but
- 1:11:08Speaker 3: that's how the entire system is designed, is to have
- 1:11:11Speaker 3: total knowledge of what is every person this country doing
- 1:11:13Speaker 3: so we can stop them from rebelling against us.
- 1:11:17Speaker 2: It's insane.
- 1:11:18Speaker 3: And actually, during during the June War, they shut the
- 1:11:21Speaker 3: entire Internet off for two days, not because it wasn't
- 1:11:24Speaker 3: Israel that did that, it was the Iranian government because
- 1:11:27Speaker 3: they recognize how weak they were during that conflict, like
- 1:11:30Speaker 3: that was a great moment if the people wanted to
- 1:11:32Speaker 3: stand up and take the country over, that was if
- 1:11:34Speaker 3: ever it was then. And so the regime noticed that
- 1:11:36Speaker 3: and they turned the entire Internet off. Zero Internet that
- 1:11:40Speaker 3: you couldn't make, you couldn't call on WhatsApp, you couldn't
- 1:11:42Speaker 3: do anything. And that was a very scary time because
- 1:11:44Speaker 3: imagine there's bombs falling all around in big cut cities,
- 1:11:48Speaker 3: Israeli bombs and US bombs, and you don't know what
- 1:11:51Speaker 3: they're going to hit next, because you don't even know.
- 1:11:52Speaker 3: They can't even see the news. You don't know if
- 1:11:54Speaker 3: this is the start of an invasion, right, I mean,
- 1:11:56Speaker 3: you have no idea. So these people are like living
- 1:11:58Speaker 3: in complete fear and darkness, and that's what the regime
- 1:12:01Speaker 3: wanted them to feel, which is crazy because their own
- 1:12:04Speaker 3: country was under attack and they were trying to increase
- 1:12:07Speaker 3: the fear of their own people during that time.
- 1:12:09Speaker 2: We talked a little bit about sanctions earlier and how
- 1:12:13Speaker 2: their wealth continues to shoot up even with the sanctions.
- 1:12:18Speaker 2: Can and you know, and and you know, you have
- 1:12:23Speaker 2: some great graphs in there detailing like the vineyards and
- 1:12:27Speaker 2: the shipping lanes or you know, all the interest, but
- 1:12:30Speaker 2: can you kind of talk about how they circumvent these
- 1:12:34Speaker 2: sanctions and why they continue gaining more and more wealth.
- 1:12:38Speaker 3: There's a couple of different ways. One of the most
- 1:12:40Speaker 3: tried and true methods is something called the huala, which
- 1:12:43Speaker 3: is an unofficial mechanism for moving money that doesn't actually
- 1:12:46Speaker 3: physically move. So basically, I have a ledger and you
- 1:12:49Speaker 3: have a ledger, and on my ledger I say minus
- 1:12:51Speaker 3: one hundred dollars, and I sent a note to you
- 1:12:54Speaker 3: that says hey, on your ledger, right, plus one hundred dollars.
- 1:12:57Speaker 3: One hundred dollars never existed. This money is moving theoretically,
- 1:13:01Speaker 3: but this is a very common it's illegal system. It's
- 1:13:04Speaker 3: not illegal, it's legal in many countries in the world
- 1:13:07Speaker 3: because this is how they've traditionally used done bankings for
- 1:13:10Speaker 3: several thousand years. The regime relies quite a bit on jualas,
- 1:13:13Speaker 3: especially for some of the earlier steps in their money
- 1:13:15Speaker 3: movement process. So that because there's no trace from my
- 1:13:19Speaker 3: book to your book except from the person who said
- 1:13:21Speaker 3: that that money moved. So let's say I want to
- 1:13:23Speaker 3: move some money to Dubai, Well, I can do the
- 1:13:25Speaker 3: juala to Dubai. Then in Dubai there is money. Well,
- 1:13:29Speaker 3: there's a lot of banks in Dubai, and in fact,
- 1:13:30Speaker 3: something like a third of the Dubai permanent population are
- 1:13:34Speaker 3: actually Iranians. And that's because of the banking system in Dubai,
- 1:13:37Speaker 3: which is hugely designed to facilitate money movement, not just
- 1:13:41Speaker 3: for Iran but for many countries. That's one of the
- 1:13:43Speaker 3: things that Dubai kind of uses a selling point is
- 1:13:45Speaker 3: that hey, you can do banking here and we don't
- 1:13:47Speaker 3: care what you do. And a lot of the banking
- 1:13:49Speaker 3: is based out of those banks there's also a lot
- 1:13:51Speaker 3: of banks in Switzerland and banks in South America, and
- 1:13:55Speaker 3: in China. There's also a lot of goods for cash
- 1:13:59Speaker 3: or good for services activity where for example, if Iran
- 1:14:03Speaker 3: brings a cargo boat with millions of barrels of oil
- 1:14:08Speaker 3: on it, they can do a ship to ship transfer
- 1:14:10Speaker 3: to China, and China does something very similar to the
- 1:14:13Speaker 3: whola system where they give them goods in kind for
- 1:14:16Speaker 3: that oil, and there's a lot of other ways they
- 1:14:18Speaker 3: can do it too.
- 1:14:21Speaker 2: Yeah, it was, like I said, you go into great depth.
- 1:14:26Speaker 2: So let's talk about you know, and you mentioned Solomoni.
- 1:14:29Speaker 2: Let's talk about what Iran got up to after the
- 1:14:33Speaker 2: invasion of Iraq. You mentioned that there were thirty one
- 1:14:38Speaker 2: transactions between two thousand and four and two thousand and eight,
- 1:14:42Speaker 2: and those were large transactions for weapons systems or ied systems.
- 1:14:47Speaker 3: You know.
- 1:14:48Speaker 2: You know, we saw the the EFPs out there that
- 1:14:51Speaker 2: were Iranian generated. Can you go into that a little bit.
- 1:14:56Speaker 3: Yeah. So, the kind of the shocking part of that
- 1:14:58Speaker 3: is many of those actuators hearts were either made in
- 1:15:01Speaker 3: the United States or made in the United Kingdom. So
- 1:15:03Speaker 3: like the radios, the Harris radios made in the United Kingdom.
- 1:15:06Speaker 3: The actuators were made in the United States, those companies
- 1:15:08Speaker 3: had no clue that that's what was happening. But the
- 1:15:11Speaker 3: way that the regime does its movement of money and material,
- 1:15:14Speaker 3: you're not going to know that you're selling your actuators
- 1:15:16Speaker 3: to an Iranian agent, you know. And so what they
- 1:15:18Speaker 3: would do is they'd have a guy in the United
- 1:15:20Speaker 3: States that would purchase it as a legitimate company, usually
- 1:15:22Speaker 3: a cover organization commercial cover, shift that stuff to Dubai
- 1:15:26Speaker 3: or to another country. There's a couple of countries that
- 1:15:28Speaker 3: I've listed in there, like Malaysia as another example. Then
- 1:15:31Speaker 3: move it to another location in that same country, and
- 1:15:33Speaker 3: then mark the goods as something else, which is kind
- 1:15:35Speaker 3: of tried and true method to do it. Just slap
- 1:15:37Speaker 3: a new paper on there that says grain and then
- 1:15:40Speaker 3: ship it over to the Straits of Horror Moves or
- 1:15:42Speaker 3: to wherever you want to bring it, and then take
- 1:15:45Speaker 3: it out of the packages and start making IDs with it.
- 1:15:47Speaker 3: It sounds crazy and like super easy, but you have
- 1:15:49Speaker 3: to think about these shipping lanes we're talking about are
- 1:15:52Speaker 3: some of the busiest places on the planet, especially the
- 1:15:54Speaker 3: bab Al mundav Straight, the Persian Gulf, and if you
- 1:15:58Speaker 3: go further east in Indonesia the Straights at Malacca. Something
- 1:16:01Speaker 3: like sixty percent of the world's goods pass through the
- 1:16:03Speaker 3: Straits of Malacca on ships. So there's no way that
- 1:16:06Speaker 3: you could stop every ship and look in every cargo container,
- 1:16:09Speaker 3: especially if you're paying off people at the ports in
- 1:16:12Speaker 3: name your country in Singapore for example, to just not
- 1:16:15Speaker 3: even look at what the document says, like they're not
- 1:16:17Speaker 3: they don't know what's in the thing. They don't care
- 1:16:18Speaker 3: what's in the thing. It's kind of like you know
- 1:16:20Speaker 3: the New York Port Authority in the nineteen seventies, right,
- 1:16:22Speaker 3: like they don't care what's going over there. They they
- 1:16:24Speaker 3: just want the cargo to move and put the money
- 1:16:26Speaker 3: in their pocket. Right, It's business, and that's what was
- 1:16:30Speaker 3: happening where the regime was clandesseminly moving these Western produced
- 1:16:32Speaker 3: pieces of equipment over to the Middle East and then
- 1:16:35Speaker 3: killing our own soldiers with these US produced pieces of equipment.
- 1:16:40Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's you know, I regards to what people's
- 1:16:47Speaker 2: political opinions about Solomony or the effectiveness of the strike,
- 1:16:51Speaker 2: I know a lot of veterans saw it as as
- 1:16:54Speaker 2: you know, come up and you know, so let's talk
- 1:16:59Speaker 2: a little bit about their unconventioned warfare capabilities. You have
- 1:17:02Speaker 2: the is it the sabourine, the patient ones.
- 1:17:05Speaker 3: Yep, that's kind of the white soft unit. And then
- 1:17:09Speaker 3: there's the more black soft type units as well that
- 1:17:11Speaker 3: they have.
- 1:17:13Speaker 2: And so what are some of the white soft and
- 1:17:15Speaker 2: then some of the BLACKSAFT up to these days or
- 1:17:18Speaker 2: you know, in the last say fifteen to twenty years.
- 1:17:21Speaker 3: It's a really important distinction with Iran's military is that
- 1:17:24Speaker 3: they don't have one military they have two. They have
- 1:17:26Speaker 3: the Arteesh, which is the like our DoD. Then they
- 1:17:30Speaker 3: have the IRGC, which is a completely separate military organization,
- 1:17:34Speaker 3: which is larger than the ARTEESH. They're about similar in size,
- 1:17:37Speaker 3: but the IRGC is roughly larger. The IRGC's mission is
- 1:17:40Speaker 3: to protect the Ayatola and the regime around him. The
- 1:17:44Speaker 3: rteche mission is to protect the sovereignty of Iran like
- 1:17:46Speaker 3: any other army would be. And a lot of outsiders
- 1:17:50Speaker 3: don't understand that distinction. There's a lot of Arteesh people
- 1:17:52Speaker 3: that if there was a rebellion right now, they would
- 1:17:56Speaker 3: turn their weapons on the regime. They don't want to
- 1:17:58Speaker 3: be in this situation. They're just kind of regular people.
- 1:18:00Speaker 3: I largely see people are different, right, and that's a
- 1:18:03Speaker 3: huge distinction that needs to be made. The Sabaregn you
- 1:18:05Speaker 3: mentioned are on the Artes side, and there's a lot
- 1:18:08Speaker 3: of Artes whitesft that do the traditional like visit board
- 1:18:11Speaker 3: search and seizure of a vessel for example. They'll you know,
- 1:18:15Speaker 3: train foreign partners across a border another example. The biggest
- 1:18:19Speaker 3: deployment of the Artes though, was in the nineteen eighty
- 1:18:22Speaker 3: nineteen eighty eight Iran Iraq War. Since eighty eight, the
- 1:18:25Speaker 3: Artes never deployed more than a company size element outside
- 1:18:28Speaker 3: of Iraq, which is crazy because you think like those
- 1:18:32Speaker 3: units need real experience at least not just with the combat,
- 1:18:34Speaker 3: but with like perception staging armored movement integration, like moving
- 1:18:37Speaker 3: to another country physically. It takes a lot of practice
- 1:18:40Speaker 3: and training. They didn't have that from nineteen eighty eight
- 1:18:42Speaker 3: until twenty sixteen. The reason they got that in twenty
- 1:18:45Speaker 3: sixteen is because of ISIS in Syria. That was the
- 1:18:48Speaker 3: first time the regime deployed Artesh as a military force
- 1:18:51Speaker 3: outside of Iran since the Iran Iraq War, which is
- 1:18:54Speaker 3: kind of interesting because we had the whole conflict in Iraq.
- 1:18:56Speaker 3: The US did. There was many other conflicts between nineteen
- 1:18:59Speaker 3: eighty eight in twenty sixteen that could have invited the army.
- 1:19:02Speaker 3: They didn't send them, which is just to me, it's
- 1:19:04Speaker 3: kind of interesting, like why wouldn't you send your army
- 1:19:06Speaker 3: to go do something, but didn't until twenty sixteen, and
- 1:19:09Speaker 3: they actually had brigades, entire brigades deployed to Syria. Then
- 1:19:13Speaker 3: the iurgyc what they're up to. They focus a lot
- 1:19:16Speaker 3: on unconventional warfare. Are in the ring of countries around Iran.
- 1:19:21Speaker 3: But the way that they do unconventional warfare rit large.
- 1:19:23Speaker 3: They separate it by portfolio or file. So there's like
- 1:19:26Speaker 3: an Africa file, there's a South America file, there's a
- 1:19:30Speaker 3: Middle East file specifically focused on Afghanistan. There's another file
- 1:19:33Speaker 3: spoke specifically on Iraq. There's one for Turkey, there's one
- 1:19:36Speaker 3: for the Balkans. Like the Bosnia deployment I mentioned, it
- 1:19:39Speaker 3: is part of one element of the KODS force going there.
- 1:19:42Speaker 3: It's not the whole CUDS force going, it's a group
- 1:19:44Speaker 3: that specializes it, kind of like in the US we
- 1:19:46Speaker 3: have Fifth Group of Special Forces. They focus on the
- 1:19:48Speaker 3: Middle East. They're not deployed to South America, right, And
- 1:19:52Speaker 3: that's the IERGC and CUDS Force has a very similar
- 1:19:55Speaker 3: mindset and actually cost some solo Moni was the architect
- 1:19:57Speaker 3: of that because before he took over in the late nineties,
- 1:20:00Speaker 3: there was only one file and that was the Balkans
- 1:20:03Speaker 3: because that was their only deployment. But as the US
- 1:20:05Speaker 3: started moving and saber rattling about the Middle East and
- 1:20:08Speaker 3: then we invaded nine to eleven, happened like, hey, we
- 1:20:10Speaker 3: need to do something around this country and separate it
- 1:20:13Speaker 3: by task, organization of specialty. The Afghanistan guys, you guys
- 1:20:17Speaker 3: are only going to be Afghanistan. And actually smel Gani,
- 1:20:20Speaker 3: the current Coulds Force commander, was an Afghanistan file guy,
- 1:20:24Speaker 3: Like he only did Afghanistan his entire career, and then
- 1:20:27Speaker 3: when Solimani was killed, Ghani was elevated to that position.
- 1:20:31Speaker 3: So he's kind of an interesting example of that that
- 1:20:33Speaker 3: file mentality.
- 1:20:36Speaker 2: Something that you mentioned in the book that did I
- 1:20:42Speaker 2: forgot to mention earlier. I didn't know that Iran almost
- 1:20:46Speaker 2: invaded Afghanistan.
- 1:20:48Speaker 3: Yeah, forgotten moment of history. Yeah, yeah, that was actually
- 1:20:52Speaker 3: Masari Sharif. There were some Iranian diplomats there and a
- 1:20:55Speaker 3: journalist and then some other Iranians that weren't affiliated with
- 1:20:57Speaker 3: the government, and the Taliban killed them. And this was
- 1:21:01Speaker 3: a huge problem inside of Iran because they had just
- 1:21:03Speaker 3: come out of the Aaron Iraq War. They were bloodied
- 1:21:06Speaker 3: and beaten. Their only deployment overseas in the last decade
- 1:21:09Speaker 3: before this happened, which I think was ninety seven, was
- 1:21:12Speaker 3: to Bosnia. Like I mentioned, that was a very tiny thing.
- 1:21:14Speaker 3: They didn't want to be involved with anything outside of
- 1:21:16Speaker 3: the country at the time. They were licking their wounds
- 1:21:18Speaker 3: and trying to focus and clamp down the country and
- 1:21:20Speaker 3: just like get back to normal. And then this thing
- 1:21:23Speaker 3: happens with these diplomats in Masuri Sharif, and there's an
- 1:21:27Speaker 3: element of the IRGC that wants to invade Afghanistan. Immediately
- 1:21:31Speaker 3: they had a whole brigade ready to go and they
- 1:21:33Speaker 3: headed division also getting spun up. They went all the
- 1:21:35Speaker 3: way up to the border, and there's this National Security
- 1:21:38Speaker 3: Council like element in the Iranian government that includes Ayatola,
- 1:21:41Speaker 3: and they kind of were sitting around thinking like, well,
- 1:21:43Speaker 3: what happens if we do this, what's next? And the
- 1:21:45Speaker 3: reason they did not invade Afghanistan is interesting. It's because
- 1:21:50Speaker 3: Ahmed Shah Masud, who was part of the Northern Alliance
- 1:21:53Speaker 3: that we were allied with, would be in danger if
- 1:21:56Speaker 3: Iran invaded Afghanistan. Well why is that important? Well, because
- 1:22:00Speaker 3: Ron was also helping the Northern Alliance because inside the
- 1:22:02Speaker 3: Northern Alliance were a lot of Hazara Shia folks who
- 1:22:05Speaker 3: were threatened by Taliban and still are threatened by the
- 1:22:07Speaker 3: Taliban now, and Iran didn't want to damage that those
- 1:22:12Speaker 3: people that they saw as people they wanted to protect,
- 1:22:15Speaker 3: and that went into their calculus of why they didn't invade. Again,
- 1:22:18Speaker 3: another revisionist history question, like what would have happened if
- 1:22:20Speaker 3: they had invaded because this was again like nineteen ninety
- 1:22:23Speaker 3: seven ish, we hadn't bombed Camp Feruk yet, which was
- 1:22:25Speaker 3: the assamb Bin Laden, one of the training camps, Like
- 1:22:28Speaker 3: we hadn't done any of that stuff yet. How different
- 1:22:30Speaker 3: would things be if if they had invaded? Wow? What
- 1:22:33Speaker 3: a different world?
- 1:22:34Speaker 2: Yeah, Yeah, it's fascinating and it's interesting to you where
- 1:22:38Speaker 2: you know, you talked about the intelligence quartet, you know,
- 1:22:42Speaker 2: sharing intelligence with other countries about Daish, you know, isis
- 1:22:48Speaker 2: Daish and and I'm curious. You know, Isis was a
- 1:22:55Speaker 2: you know, they were the enemy of everybody, but the
- 1:22:59Speaker 2: teams still formed to fight them, you know, separate teams
- 1:23:03Speaker 2: still formed. Like this wasn't this global war on Isis.
- 1:23:07Speaker 2: You know, it was you know, individual efforts, I take it,
- 1:23:10Speaker 2: or not individual, but kind of group efforts. But we
- 1:23:14Speaker 2: didn't want to get too chumming with Iran or Russia
- 1:23:16Speaker 2: or anybody else. During the year.
- 1:23:18Speaker 3: I'll tell you, we were actually doing a strike in
- 1:23:20Speaker 3: Iraq and we had the target was soaked for a
- 1:23:24Speaker 3: few hours. We had aircraft getting ready to go, like
- 1:23:26Speaker 3: we were going to blow this target up. And as
- 1:23:29Speaker 3: we're watching it through ISR this team that looks highly
- 1:23:32Speaker 3: trained and like clearly a special forces team, not our team.
- 1:23:36Speaker 3: And we have the test force, like we know who's here,
- 1:23:38Speaker 3: and we see this team coming up out in the
- 1:23:41Speaker 3: infrared and we're like, who is that? And we were
- 1:23:43Speaker 3: making calls, making calls, trying to figure this out. It
- 1:23:45Speaker 3: turns out it was the Germans. Because the Germans didn't
- 1:23:49Speaker 3: want to say they were deployed there and they didn't
- 1:23:50Speaker 3: want to be part of our coalition, and they were
- 1:23:53Speaker 3: doing a raid on a compound and didn't tell anyone,
- 1:23:55Speaker 3: or at least didn't tell us, and we were about
- 1:23:57Speaker 3: to blow that compound up like minutes, like as they
- 1:23:59Speaker 3: were going in there, we would have killed them. And
- 1:24:01Speaker 3: it was crazy to me, like how how even on
- 1:24:03Speaker 3: the western side we were not fully integrated like you
- 1:24:06Speaker 3: were saying like it was, it wasn't a coalition by
- 1:24:09Speaker 3: any means.
- 1:24:09Speaker 2: Yeah, that's crazy. So, you know, there's so much to
- 1:24:15Speaker 2: the book, and I hope I haven't left out any
- 1:24:17Speaker 2: Have I left out anything major in our discussion?
- 1:24:23Speaker 3: I mean, there's so much stuff about the different countries
- 1:24:25Speaker 3: that the IRGC works in, but I don't want to
- 1:24:27Speaker 3: spoil it because it's that was one of my favorite
- 1:24:29Speaker 3: parts to research because it's so interesting to see, like
- 1:24:31Speaker 3: in Yemen for example, like how did they get to
- 1:24:33Speaker 3: where they are today? And do the who thies even
- 1:24:35Speaker 3: care about Iran which is a big question because I don't.
- 1:24:38Speaker 3: I would argue that they don't care as much as
- 1:24:41Speaker 3: we think they do. Yeah, same with Hesbola, which I
- 1:24:43Speaker 3: also go into a lot of detail about where Hasbola
- 1:24:46Speaker 3: came from and how it formed and Iran came in later.
- 1:24:49Speaker 3: It wasn't you know, like it's a very interesting kind
- 1:24:51Speaker 3: of thing that we just take for granted. And as
- 1:24:53Speaker 3: we talked about the beginning of the show, there's a
- 1:24:55Speaker 3: lot of these things that we just say, like, oh,
- 1:24:56Speaker 3: that's the way it is. We should ask is that
- 1:24:59Speaker 3: really how it is? Is that? How would have got
- 1:25:00Speaker 3: that way? Because if we're using the wrong information and
- 1:25:03Speaker 3: we're making decisions with the wrong information, we're gonna end
- 1:25:05Speaker 3: up with really bad results that keep ending with failures
- 1:25:08Speaker 3: over and over again because we keep using these biases
- 1:25:10Speaker 3: every time we try to make a decision.
- 1:25:13Speaker 2: Yeah, no, it's it is. I don't want to say
- 1:25:15Speaker 2: it's a dense book because that, you know, makes it
- 1:25:18Speaker 2: sound dry. It's not dry. It's just packed with information.
- 1:25:23Speaker 2: I mean packed with information. And I said earlier about
- 1:25:27Speaker 2: a fifth of this book is references and sources. It
- 1:25:31Speaker 2: is exceptionally well I'll show I'll show everybody. So the
- 1:25:38Speaker 2: sources start here. If you guys can the sources, can
- 1:25:43Speaker 2: you guys see this all right? Start here?
- 1:25:45Speaker 3: Like it's massive.
- 1:25:46Speaker 2: It's uh. I was shocked by the amount of information
- 1:25:50Speaker 2: you had.
- 1:25:50Speaker 4: In this book.
- 1:25:51Speaker 3: I wanted to write it like an Intel report, where
- 1:25:54Speaker 3: if you want to get more info on that thing,
- 1:25:56Speaker 3: you can get it instead of like, well how did
- 1:25:58Speaker 3: he come to that conclusion? You know, which is on
- 1:26:00Speaker 3: Intel report. You don't do that, and Intel report reports
- 1:26:03Speaker 3: are facts, they're not opinions.
- 1:26:06Speaker 2: Yeah, no, that's fantastic. Well if that's if that's it,
- 1:26:10Speaker 2: as long as we haven't left anything out DP.
- 1:26:13Speaker 4: So when Israel hit Iran with the that wipe program
- 1:26:20Speaker 4: and Iran came across the NSA program that we had there,
- 1:26:25Speaker 4: I mean, what's it like when we find out that
- 1:26:29Speaker 4: a big important program that we have had there for
- 1:26:33Speaker 4: a long time gets exposed.
- 1:26:36Speaker 3: I'll tell you what. The guys in the watch floor
- 1:26:38Speaker 3: were pissed. So this program is called Flame and it
- 1:26:42Speaker 3: was like a multi tool you could call it, where
- 1:26:44Speaker 3: it doesn't just do one thing. It's like a launch
- 1:26:47Speaker 3: pad two that's clandestimly there that you can put a
- 1:26:50Speaker 3: bunch of things inside of and then we'll do a
- 1:26:52Speaker 3: ton of different functions. Right, And these different functions can
- 1:26:55Speaker 3: do pretty much anything to a system. Offensively, defensively. They
- 1:26:59Speaker 3: can manipulate to make things look real that aren't real. Like,
- 1:27:01Speaker 3: it's incredible what I could do. If you're talking about
- 1:27:04Speaker 3: the bureaucrats, they cared about the dollars because the programs
- 1:27:08Speaker 3: like Flame are worth millions of dollars. Like I said,
- 1:27:10Speaker 3: they weren't developed by people in the Remote Operation Center,
- 1:27:13Speaker 3: which is where this came out of at NSA. These
- 1:27:15Speaker 3: were developed by civilian companies that are hired for the
- 1:27:19Speaker 3: specific purpose, like I need you to make me this
- 1:27:21Speaker 3: thing that can do these things. And then you'll get
- 1:27:24Speaker 3: multiple companies that are like, oh, I can do that
- 1:27:25Speaker 3: and this other companies like I can do that too.
- 1:27:27Speaker 3: Here's better, but I'll charge you three million dollars for that,
- 1:27:30Speaker 3: you know, And this is how this game works, right, Well,
- 1:27:33Speaker 3: we just dumped a bunch of money in this program,
- 1:27:36Speaker 3: and this program is extremely expensive, and now it's gone.
- 1:27:39Speaker 3: And the problem is if you take Flame apart and
- 1:27:42Speaker 3: see how it's made, you can figure out how we
- 1:27:45Speaker 3: might access other things with similar analogous methods, which means
- 1:27:49Speaker 3: if we had other stuff like in Russia, for example,
- 1:27:51Speaker 3: or in China or North Korea, all those are done too.
- 1:27:54Speaker 3: So you're talking about like worldwide ramifications. And this was
- 1:27:58Speaker 3: because Israel went in there and wanted to delete data. Again,
- 1:28:01Speaker 3: this is this is the conflict between exploit versus neutralized.
- 1:28:04Speaker 3: When wanted to exploit. Israel wanted to neutralize, which they
- 1:28:08Speaker 3: frequently do. That's their frequent approach is to just destroy
- 1:28:10Speaker 3: the thing. How much more value can you get if
- 1:28:13Speaker 3: you exploit instead? I mean it's immeasurable.
- 1:28:18Speaker 2: Yeah, And it's not as if, you know, the different signals,
- 1:28:25Speaker 2: intelligence apparati apparatus are checking in with each other to say, hey,
- 1:28:30Speaker 2: we're getting ready to attack these guys. You got anything
- 1:28:33Speaker 2: hanging out there that you don't want exposed?
- 1:28:36Speaker 3: Yeah, And actually with stucks net, it's unique because there
- 1:28:38Speaker 3: were five different countries involved with stucks net that were
- 1:28:41Speaker 3: coordinating with each other about it, and they weren't the
- 1:28:43Speaker 3: five BY partners, you know, it was it was the
- 1:28:45Speaker 3: US was the five I partner in that partnership. And
- 1:28:49Speaker 3: it was kind of like an interesting collection of people
- 1:28:51Speaker 3: working together on this singular purpose, which was timed to
- 1:28:55Speaker 3: happen right before the twenty fifteen nuclear agreement, so that way,
- 1:28:59Speaker 3: if the nuclear agreement didn't work out, we had this
- 1:29:01Speaker 3: covert operation that would destroy the nuclear program anyway. But
- 1:29:04Speaker 3: it was discovered right Typically it doesn't happen like that,
- 1:29:08Speaker 3: typic were the other countries, so it was Denmark, Netherlands, Israel,
- 1:29:14Speaker 3: United States and Germany, which is interesting because the US
- 1:29:18Speaker 3: and Germany were two of the countries that were part
- 1:29:20Speaker 3: of the original P five countries that were negotiating with
- 1:29:22Speaker 3: Israel on Earth with Iran on the twenty fifteen JCPOA, and.
- 1:29:28Speaker 2: Germany has a history of helping Iran at times, training
- 1:29:32Speaker 2: them in you know, in different things.
- 1:29:35Speaker 3: Yeah, in the early nineties too. Yeah. Actually, all the
- 1:29:39Speaker 3: the things that were destroyed, the parts of the centrifuges
- 1:29:43Speaker 3: that were exploited by stuck Stent were Semens produced components.
- 1:29:49Speaker 3: And how did we know how those Semens components work. Well,
- 1:29:52Speaker 3: they're made in Germany, and the German government was able
- 1:29:54Speaker 3: to obtain access to all that material, you know. But
- 1:29:57Speaker 3: in the nineties they were training them on regular espionage,
- 1:29:59Speaker 3: like human espionage, teach them how to use cameras, take
- 1:30:02Speaker 3: clandestine photography, do surroualitsy detection routes. Russia was also training
- 1:30:06Speaker 3: them too, but Germany actually gifted them a bunch of
- 1:30:09Speaker 3: computers and cameras to do espionage and with the knowledge.
- 1:30:13Speaker 3: And it's interesting because France also with Germany in this
- 1:30:15Speaker 3: time period the early nineties, they knew that Iran was
- 1:30:18Speaker 3: going to use this stuff to assassinate Iranians in Europe, right,
- 1:30:22Speaker 3: Like Bond Station was being used as a platform for
- 1:30:26Speaker 3: assassinations and Paris Station was being used for the same thing.
- 1:30:29Speaker 3: But the agreement was as long as you don't kill Frenchmen,
- 1:30:31Speaker 3: as long as you don't kill Germans, you can use
- 1:30:34Speaker 3: those locations to do that stuff. And here's some cameras
- 1:30:36Speaker 3: and computers to help you do it.
- 1:30:37Speaker 2: Wow, Wow, Jesus, it's crazy.
- 1:30:43Speaker 3: And again that's all in the intel reports, that's not
- 1:30:45Speaker 3: in the media. So like that goes to the sourcing
- 1:30:48Speaker 3: of like this is stuff people have never seen or
- 1:30:50Speaker 3: heard of before probably or like that's not possible. They're
- 1:30:53Speaker 3: not friends. Well guess what in the intelligence community, there's
- 1:30:56Speaker 3: no friends. There's only interests, right right, Well, Jonathan, is
- 1:31:02Speaker 3: a great book.
- 1:31:02Speaker 2: We really appreciate you. Thanks for coming back.
- 1:31:04Speaker 4: Got to questions actually on questions, Yeah from JJ Can
- 1:31:10Speaker 4: mister Hackett share anything about the US funneling arms through
- 1:31:12Speaker 4: the Iranians during the Civil war in Bosnia?
- 1:31:15Speaker 3: That's super interesting. Actually, there's a whole section in the
- 1:31:17Speaker 3: book about that, and some of it is public and
- 1:31:20Speaker 3: some of it I have in there from intelligence reports
- 1:31:23Speaker 3: and what the Iranians were doing. They were supporting the Bosniacs,
- 1:31:27Speaker 3: which Bosniact with a K is the Muslim group that
- 1:31:31Speaker 3: was being targeted by still bit On Melosovich and other
- 1:31:34Speaker 3: genocidal leaders there and the regime at the time. Remember
- 1:31:38Speaker 3: this was like late eighties, early nineties, when the regime
- 1:31:40Speaker 3: was trying to help Muslims worldwide, like that was kind
- 1:31:42Speaker 3: of their banner, like, let's help these oppressed, that was
- 1:31:45Speaker 3: what they were doing. And they saw the Bosniacs as
- 1:31:47Speaker 3: oppressed because they were They're being massacred, I mean like it.
- 1:31:50Speaker 3: It was horrific, and so the regime went there and
- 1:31:54Speaker 3: brought weapons there, trained them. They also taught the intelligence
- 1:31:57Speaker 3: service of the Bosniaks how to do intelligence collection. And
- 1:32:00Speaker 3: this is where the clash came between US helping Bosnias
- 1:32:04Speaker 3: and Iran helping Bosniaks, because there was a group of
- 1:32:06Speaker 3: them that we both were helping, and there was a
- 1:32:09Speaker 3: group of them that Iran was helping that was harming us.
- 1:32:11Speaker 3: And there was actually an ID factory that was discovered
- 1:32:14Speaker 3: later on in the war that IF discovered, which is
- 1:32:17Speaker 3: the international force there that was IDs to attack IF.
- 1:32:22Speaker 3: Which is interesting because at the exact same time we
- 1:32:24Speaker 3: were allowing the regime to provide weapons to people in
- 1:32:28Speaker 3: Bosnia that were fighting against the Serbs. So there was
- 1:32:31Speaker 3: this like overlaying of friend and enemy in the same space.
- 1:32:35Speaker 3: Because similar to Isis, where everybody was against the serves
- 1:32:39Speaker 3: what they were doing at the time, and some of
- 1:32:41Speaker 3: them were against them in different ways, some of those
- 1:32:43Speaker 3: ways overlapped. It wasn't clear cut like oh that's my enemy,
- 1:32:46Speaker 3: that's my friend. Sometimes it doesn't work like that. Even
- 1:32:49Speaker 3: in Iraq, Like again back when I was talking about ISIS.
- 1:32:51Speaker 3: When I was there, we actually were careful not to
- 1:32:54Speaker 3: strike targets where we knew IRGC people were meeting in
- 1:32:58Speaker 3: Iraq because we knew that the sources they were working
- 1:33:01Speaker 3: with were fighting against ISIS. So those are kind of
- 1:33:04Speaker 3: like off limits places. We never sent them letters or
- 1:33:06Speaker 3: anything and told them like, hey, guys, we're not going
- 1:33:08Speaker 3: to touch you, but it was like an understood thing,
- 1:33:09Speaker 3: like we're going to leave these people alone over here,
- 1:33:11Speaker 3: because the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and
- 1:33:13Speaker 3: we care more about ISIS right now than we do
- 1:33:16Speaker 3: about killing a couple of RGC guys that who knows
- 1:33:18Speaker 3: what they're doing.
- 1:33:19Speaker 4: We got a couple more from Dunk and Idaho. As
- 1:33:24Speaker 4: far as I know, there have been ops on US
- 1:33:26Speaker 4: soil sponsored directly by Iran, and there have been proxy
- 1:33:29Speaker 4: group ops in a few other Western countries, but there
- 1:33:33Speaker 4: haven't been proxy group ops on US soil. Is that correct?
- 1:33:36Speaker 4: If so?
- 1:33:37Speaker 3: Why so? This is an intelligence thing where we don't
- 1:33:41Speaker 3: know the answer completely. And actually the FBI has come
- 1:33:44Speaker 3: out with competing reports from their own organization at some
- 1:33:47Speaker 3: times saying there's like two thousand Hesibla fighters in America
- 1:33:51Speaker 3: ready to go at any time. Other reports coming out
- 1:33:53Speaker 3: and saying no, the greatest threat in the United States
- 1:33:55Speaker 3: is you know, other groups. I won't get into that.
- 1:33:58Speaker 3: But then they say, but the hesible threats not that big,
- 1:34:00Speaker 3: or they'll say, well, the connections here are tenuous. They're
- 1:34:03Speaker 3: actually like relatives of hesbal of people that Hesbola could
- 1:34:06Speaker 3: push a button to, like push on them emotionally and
- 1:34:08Speaker 3: force them to do something. There's not a lot of
- 1:34:10Speaker 3: consensus about exactly what is going on here. And actually
- 1:34:13Speaker 3: I was reading a report recently about in the United
- 1:34:16Speaker 3: States Iran and Hesbela, how many of them actually came
- 1:34:20Speaker 3: across the border during the Biden administration, which is an
- 1:34:24Speaker 3: interesting question. I saw one report that said it was like,
- 1:34:26Speaker 3: I don't know, six hundred guys or something. That's a tiny,
- 1:34:30Speaker 3: tiny percentage of the total people that came across. How
- 1:34:32Speaker 3: do we even know it was six hundred? What were
- 1:34:34Speaker 3: they doing? Are they doing money laundering? Are they doing
- 1:34:36Speaker 3: drug stuff? Are they actually doing plots? Because a lot
- 1:34:38Speaker 3: of times when you look at pre attack planning, it
- 1:34:41Speaker 3: looks a lot like other types of attack or other
- 1:34:43Speaker 3: types of planning. Surveillance, for example, if you don't know
- 1:34:47Speaker 3: why they're doing the surveillance, it could look like pre
- 1:34:49Speaker 3: attack surveillance. It could also look like surveillance, so you
- 1:34:52Speaker 3: could go do an intelligence activity like a source meeting.
- 1:34:55Speaker 3: It could also look like a drug deal, like surveillance
- 1:34:57Speaker 3: for to find a location that's good for a drug deal.
- 1:35:00Speaker 3: You don't really know until the thing actually happens, unless
- 1:35:02Speaker 3: you've got recruitment of someone involved in that network, or
- 1:35:05Speaker 3: you've got sigan or something else like that. So that's
- 1:35:08Speaker 3: kind of a challenge where like with the FBI, for example,
- 1:35:11Speaker 3: how are they without doing source operations or having it's
- 1:35:15Speaker 3: very tough to know exactly what is the threat. Like
- 1:35:18Speaker 3: we might be able to say, like hey, that guy
- 1:35:20Speaker 3: I know he is a member of HESBLA. Okay, what
- 1:35:23Speaker 3: else do you know? Well, it's hard to know, you know,
- 1:35:25Speaker 3: So it's kind of an ambiguous answer to that. But
- 1:35:27Speaker 3: it's important to kind of take it with a measured
- 1:35:29Speaker 3: approach of like what exactly is this guy doing? That
- 1:35:32Speaker 3: way you can ask the right questions and do the
- 1:35:33Speaker 3: right intelligence collection to actually figure it out instead of
- 1:35:36Speaker 3: just assuming like, oh, he's a drug dealer. Well, if
- 1:35:39Speaker 3: we make the assumption that he's a drug dealer but
- 1:35:40Speaker 3: he's actually a bad guy terrorist, we've made a bad assumption.
- 1:35:44Speaker 3: Same vice versa. If we say like, oh, he's here
- 1:35:45Speaker 3: to do terror attacks and we're ignoring all the drug
- 1:35:47Speaker 3: dealing he's doing, that's another problem. Right, So we need
- 1:35:50Speaker 3: to come at this question objectively, which I trust that
- 1:35:53Speaker 3: counter intelligence FBI kind of intelligence is probably doing it
- 1:35:56Speaker 3: really well. It has been doing it really well. But
- 1:35:58Speaker 3: it's tough. It's really tough, not just in the United
- 1:36:00Speaker 3: States but any country. Even when you have a lot
- 1:36:02Speaker 3: more ability to do stuff, it's really hard to figure
- 1:36:04Speaker 3: out what is that guy doing because you can't see
- 1:36:06Speaker 3: inside their brain.
- 1:36:07Speaker 4: One more from v how much or any of the
- 1:36:11Speaker 4: operations that they have overseas have been self funded, and
- 1:36:14Speaker 4: he wrote IRGC sexy car Watch fundraiser.
- 1:36:19Speaker 3: Well, the thing is they have a lot of money.
- 1:36:21Speaker 3: They can put a lot of money at it. But
- 1:36:23Speaker 3: what they typically do to fund the overseas stuff is
- 1:36:26Speaker 3: use money that's not from Iran, so that means drug money,
- 1:36:30Speaker 3: black market stuff, other criminal activity financing that generates income
- 1:36:35Speaker 3: from those activities. Especially in Europe for example, a lot
- 1:36:38Speaker 3: of illegal immigration fund things that they'll help do human
- 1:36:42Speaker 3: trafficking and move people and get money from that, or
- 1:36:44Speaker 3: they'll move drugs like Captagon out of Syria into the
- 1:36:46Speaker 3: Gulf Arab countries and make a ton of money off that.
- 1:36:49Speaker 3: A lot of that money is used to finance these
- 1:36:51Speaker 3: activities because again it's really tough to move the money
- 1:36:53Speaker 3: out of Iran physically, like take dollars out of Iran
- 1:36:57Speaker 3: and bring them outside the country. You can do it,
- 1:36:59Speaker 3: but you want to do it for what matters, And
- 1:37:01Speaker 3: if an attack has a risk of being discovered, you
- 1:37:04Speaker 3: don't want to use your dollars for that. You want
- 1:37:06Speaker 3: to use your drug money for that, because that's something
- 1:37:08Speaker 3: that you can stand to lose. You know.
- 1:37:12Speaker 4: I have one more question about something you mentioned before,
- 1:37:15Speaker 4: about your career specifically, when you mentioned you were in
- 1:37:18Speaker 4: damn neck training, most people think of damn Neck as
- 1:37:21Speaker 4: like we're sealed Team six is. Want to just clarify
- 1:37:25Speaker 4: a little bit of what that, you know, I don't
- 1:37:27Speaker 4: want people to be as so as your shield Team
- 1:37:28Speaker 4: six in the comments and stuff.
- 1:37:30Speaker 3: It's funny because people are upset that that you're calling
- 1:37:32Speaker 3: me an operator the other day, even though that's the
- 1:37:35Speaker 3: of my job. But yeah, it was. It was the
- 1:37:38Speaker 3: counter intelligence human intelligence course, which is the Marine Corps
- 1:37:42Speaker 3: Intelligence Plandestine Intelligence Activity Training pipeline. So we are a
- 1:37:47Speaker 3: validated CIA training organization that CIA comes down there every
- 1:37:51Speaker 3: six months to valuate our training, and we also issue
- 1:37:53Speaker 3: a counter intelligence credential. So it's the only the Marine
- 1:37:56Speaker 3: Corps is the only one that does this. The other
- 1:37:58Speaker 3: DTY branches do not combine intelligence human intelligence, and they
- 1:38:01Speaker 3: also don't train up to Category one intelligence collection, which
- 1:38:05Speaker 3: is the highest level of intelligence collection that clandestine intelligence
- 1:38:09Speaker 3: collection that exists. So it's kind of we chose that
- 1:38:11Speaker 3: place because it's a good place to do it, obviously
- 1:38:13Speaker 3: because the base has a lot of you know, got
- 1:38:16Speaker 3: a good fence, and we also transform the area around it.
- 1:38:20Speaker 3: The Damn Neck area, the Norfolk and Virginia Beach area
- 1:38:23Speaker 3: into a training zone where it's it's a foreign country essentially,
- 1:38:26Speaker 3: very similar to how the farm does it, and the
- 1:38:28Speaker 3: guys have to go out there and operate as if
- 1:38:30Speaker 3: they're in a foreign country and do other ops out
- 1:38:32Speaker 3: in downtown Norfolk, you know, in the middle of the night,
- 1:38:35Speaker 3: which is sometimes more dangerous than doing it in a
- 1:38:36Speaker 3: foreign country.
- 1:38:41Speaker 4: No more questions from Patreon, All set, All.
- 1:38:45Speaker 2: Right, Hey Jonathan, thank you once again. Thanks for you know,
- 1:38:49Speaker 2: thanks for the book, thanks for you know, taking the
- 1:38:52Speaker 2: time to write that, and thanks for joining us tonight.
- 1:38:55Speaker 3: Yeah, thanks for having me. I'm glad to talk about it.
- 1:38:56Speaker 3: I think it's super important.
- 1:38:58Speaker 2: Topic and ever thank you for joining us and we
- 1:39:01Speaker 2: will see you soon.
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