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- 0:00Chapter one. Every art and every method, and in like manner, every
- 0:07action and deliberate choice, appear to aspire after a certain good. Hence,
- 0:12it is well said that the good is that which all things desire of ends.
- 0:18However, there appears to be a certain difference, For some of them
- 0:22are energies, but others of them. Besides these are certain works. But
- 0:28in those things in which there are certain ends, besides the actions in these,
- 0:33the works are naturally adapted to be better than the energies. Since,
- 0:38however there are many actions and arts and sciences, there will also be many
- 0:44ends. For the end of medicine is health, of the shipbuilding art a
- 0:49ship, of the military art victory, and of the economic art wealth.
- 0:57But such arts as are of this kind are arranged under one certain power,
- 1:03just as the bridle making art is arranged under the equestrian art, and such
- 1:08other arts as pertain to equestrian instruments. Both this art, however, and
- 1:14every warlike action are arranged under the military art, and after the same manner,
- 1:21other arts are arranged under other powers. But in all these the ends
- 1:26of those arts which are architectonic or master arts are more eligible than all the
- 1:32ends of the arts which are subordinate to the master arts, for the latter
- 1:37are pursued for the sake of the former. It makes, however, no
- 1:41difference whether the energies themselves are the ends of actions or something else besides these,
- 1:48in the same manner as in the above mentioned Sciences, Chapter two.
- 1:55If therefore, there is a certain end of actions which we wish to obtain
- 2:00for its own sake, but we desire other things on account of this,
- 2:04and our choice is not directed to all things for the sake of something else
- 2:08bracket, For thus there would be a progression to infinity, so that appetite
- 2:13would be empty in vain close bracket. If this be the case, it
- 2:17is evident that this end will be the good, and to that which is
- 2:22the most excellent will not. Therefore, the knowledge of this end be of
- 2:27great importance with respect to life, for by having, like archers a mark
- 2:32at which we may aim, we shall obtain what is fit in a greater
- 2:37degree. If this, however, be the case, we must endeavor to
- 2:42adumbrate what it is and show to what science or power it belongs. But
- 2:47it would seem that it belongs to that power which is the most principal end
- 2:53is especially architectonic, and the political power or science appears to be a thing
- 3:00of this kind. For this ordains what sciences ought to be instituted in cities,
- 3:05and which of them ought to be learnt by the several individuals, and
- 3:08to what extent we likewise see that the most honorable of the powers or faculties
- 3:15are arranged under this power, as for instance, the military, the economical,
- 3:22and the rhetorical powers. Since, however, the remaining practical sciences use
- 3:28this political science, and since it also legally establishes what ought to be done
- 3:32and from what it is required to abstain, the end of this science will
- 3:37comprehend in itself the ends of the other sciences, so that this will be
- 3:42human good itself. For though the good of an individual and a city is
- 3:46the same, yet to obtain and preserve the good of a city appears to
- 3:51be something greater and more perfect pra We must be satisfied, indeed, if
- 3:55we can affect the good of an individual alone, But it is more beautiful
- 4:00and divine to affect the good of a nation and cities. These are the
- 4:04things therefore which the method being political requires. Chapter three. It will,
- 4:14however, be discussed sufficiently if it is rendered perspicuous according to its subject matter.
- 4:20For accuracy must not be similarly investigated in all discussions, as neither in
- 4:26all the works of art. Things beautiful, however, and just, with
- 4:30which the political science is conversant, possess so great a difference, and are
- 4:35involved in so much ambiguity that to some persons their subsistence appears to be from
- 4:41law only and not from nature. What is good, likewise possesses a certain
- 4:46ambiguity of this kind, because it happens that many persons are injured by it,
- 4:51for some have perished through wealth, but others through fortitude. We must
- 4:57be satisfied therefore, and speak thing about and from such things, if we
- 5:01can indicate the truth by a rude adumbration, and if our conclusions in discussing
- 5:09things which have a frequency of subsistence are similar in accuracy to the things themselves
- 5:15after the same manner, likewise, it is requisite to admit everything that has
- 5:19been said, for it is the province of an erudite man so far to
- 5:24investigate the accurate in each genus of things, as the nature of the thing
- 5:29will admit. Since it appears to be a similar thing to assent to a
- 5:32mathematician when speaking, probably, and to require demonstrations from a rhetorician. Everyone,
- 5:40however, judges well of those things which he knows, and of these
- 5:44is a good judge. Hence, the man who is learned in anything judges
- 5:48well of that thing. But he in short forms a proper judgment about everything
- 5:55who is learned in everything. Hence a youth is not a proper auditor of
- 6:00the political science, for he is unskilled in the actions pertaining to life.
- 6:04But reasonings are from and about these, And besides this, if he yields
- 6:11to his passions, he will, in vain and without any advantage, be
- 6:15an auditor of ethical doctrines. Since the end here is not knowledge but action.
- 6:21It makes, however, no difference whether person is a youth as to
- 6:26his age, or has juvenile manners, for the defect is not from time,
- 6:31but from living and engaging in every pursuit from passion. Since the knowledge
- 6:38of such persons in the same manner as that of intemperate is useless. But
- 6:44a knowledge of these things will be very advantageous to those whose appetites and actions
- 6:48are conformable to reason, And thus much by way of preface concerning the Auditor
- 6:55of Ethics, how he ought to admit discussions of this kind, and what
- 6:59we pose to consider in this treatise, Chapter four, repeating therefore what we
- 7:08have said. Since all knowledge and deliberate choice aspires after a certain good,
- 7:13let us show what that is, which we say the political science desires,
- 7:17and what the supreme good is of all actions by name. Therefore, it
- 7:23is nearly acknowledged by most men, for both the vulgar and the learned call
- 7:27it felicity. But they conceive that to live well and to act well are
- 7:31the same thing as to be happy. Concerning felicity, however, what it
- 7:36is, they are dubious, and the multitude did not form the same opinion
- 7:42of it as the wise. For some of them indeed conceive it to rank
- 7:46among the number of things which are clear and evident, such as pleasure,
- 7:50or wealth or honor, but others assert it to be something else. Frequently,
- 7:57likewise, the same person forms a different opinion of it, For when
- 8:01diseased, he conceives it to be health. But when poor riches and those
- 8:05who are conscious of their ignorance admire those who assert something grand and above their
- 8:11comprehension. Some too. Besides these, many goods are of opinion that there
- 8:16is another good, subsisting by itself, which is the cause to all these
- 8:20of their being good. To examine therefore all the opinions would perhaps be a
- 8:26vain undertaking, But it will be sufficient to consider those that are most eminent,
- 8:33or which appear to be in some respect reasonable. We must not,
- 8:37however, be ignorant that arguments from principles and two principles differ from each other.
- 8:43For Plato well doubts about and investigates this, whether the way is from
- 8:48principles or two principles, as in a race from the president of the games
- 8:52to the goal, or the contrary. For we must begin from things that
- 8:56are known, but these subsist in a two full respect. For some things
- 9:01are known to us, but others are simply known. Perhaps therefore we should
- 9:07begin from things known to us. Hence, it is necessary that the auditor
- 9:11of discussions about things beautiful and just, and in short, about political concerns,
- 9:18if he is to be benefited, should be adorned with worthy manners.
- 9:22For the principle is this that the thing is so viz. That certain actions
- 9:28are worthy and others are unworthy. And if this is sufficiently apparent, it
- 9:33is not at all requisite to know why it is so. But such a
- 9:37one either possesses or will easily acquire ethical principles. Let him, however,
- 9:43who has neither of these, hear what Hesiod says. He the first rank
- 9:48of excellence maintains, who from himself in everything is wise, and what,
- 9:54even to the end is best, foresees he too is good who yield to
- 10:00wise advice. But he who neither firm himself is wise, nor to assent
- 10:05to others can endure, is but a useless, despicable man. Chapter five.
- 10:13Let us, however, return from whence we have digressed, For it
- 10:18seems that men do not unreasonably form an opinion of good and felicity from the
- 10:22different kinds of lives. The vulgar, indeed, and the most worthless part
- 10:28of mankind place felicity in pleasure, And on this account they embrace the life
- 10:33which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure. For there are three kinds of lives
- 10:39which especially take the lead. The one we have just mentioned the political life,
- 10:43and the third is the contemplative life. The multitude therefore appear to be
- 10:48perfectly servile, deliberately choosing the life of cattle. And they support their opinion
- 10:54by the example of many persons in power who have referred a voluptuous life and
- 10:58have lived like Sardinopolis. But men of elegant minds and those who are addicted
- 11:05to practical concerns place felicity in honor, for this is nearly the end of
- 11:09the political life. This, however, appears to be more superficial than the
- 11:15good, which is the object of our investigation. For honor seems to be
- 11:20rather in the persons that honor than in him who is honored. But we
- 11:24prophesy that good is something appropriate and of which it is difficult to deprive its
- 11:28possessor. Farther still, it seems that men pursue honor in order that they
- 11:33may believe themselves to be worthy persons. They seek, therefore, to be
- 11:39honored by wise men and by those to whom they are known, and with
- 11:43a view to virtue. It is evident therefore that according to these men,
- 11:48virtue is more excellent than honor. Perhaps, however, some one may apprehend
- 11:54that this virtue is rather the end of the political life. But even this
- 11:58appears to be more imperfect than the chief good ought to be. For it
- 12:03appears to be possible that he who possesses virtue may sleep or be unemployed through
- 12:09the whole of his life, and besides this may be afflicted with evils and
- 12:13experienced the greatest misfortunes. But no one would proclaim a man thus living to
- 12:18be happy, unless for the purpose of defending his position in concerning these things.
- 12:24Indeed, enough, for we have spoken sufficiently about them in our miscellaneous
- 12:28writings. But the third life is the contemplative, which we shall make the
- 12:33object of our consideration hereafter. The life, however, which is engaged in
- 12:39the acquisition of riches, is a certain violent life. And it is evident
- 12:43that wealth is not the good which we investigate, for wealth is useful and
- 12:48for the sake of something else. Hence, the things which have been before
- 12:52mentioned may be considered as ends rather than wealth, for they are loved on
- 12:56their own account. It appears, how however, that neither does felicity consist
- 13:01in these though many arguments are reduced to prove that it does these things.
- 13:07Therefore we shall dismiss Chapter six. Perhaps, however, it is better to
- 13:15consider universal good and inquire how it is said to subsist. Though such an
- 13:20inquiry as this will be arduous, because the men who have introduced ideas are
- 13:24our friends. But it may perhaps seem to be better, and indeed necessary
- 13:31to the salvation of truth, to subvert the opinions even of our friends,
- 13:35For both being our friends i e. Plato and truth, it is wholly
- 13:41to give the preference to truth. Those, however, who have introduced this
- 13:46opinion, do not make ideas of things in which they admit there are the
- 13:50prior and the posterior. Hence, neither do they establish an idea of numbers.
- 13:56But good is predicated of essence, of quality, and of relation.
- 14:01That, however, which has a subsistence per se and essence are naturally prior
- 14:07to that which subsists as a relative. For this i e. A relative
- 14:13resembles the branch of a tree, and an accident of being, so that
- 14:20there will not be a common idea in these. Again, good is predicated
- 14:24in as many ways as being, for it is predicated in essence as God
- 14:30and intellect, which are essences and are said to be good, and in
- 14:35quality as the virtues, in quantity, as the moderate, in relation,
- 14:39as utility, in time as occasion, and in place as a habitation,
- 14:46and after the same manner in the other predicaments. It is evident therefore,
- 14:52that there will not be a certain, common, universal and one good,
- 14:56for it would not be predicated in all the categories, but in one alone.
- 15:01Farther still, since of all things which subsist according to one idea,
- 15:07there is also one science. Of all goods, there would be one certain
- 15:11science. But now there are many sciences of things which are under one category.
- 15:16Thus, for instance, with occasion, the art of commanding an army
- 15:22is conversant in war, but the medical art in disease, and with the
- 15:28moderate. Indeed, the medical art is conversant in food, but the gymnastic
- 15:33art in labor. It may, however, be doubted, what their intention
- 15:39is in denominating every idea itself, since in man itself and in man there
- 15:45is one and the same definition of man. For so far as man there
- 15:48is no difference between them. But if this be the case, neither so
- 15:54far as good will be good itself and goods differ, Nor will it be
- 15:58in a greater degree good from being eternal, Since neither is that which is
- 16:03white for a long time more white than that which is white only for one
- 16:07day. The Pythagoreans, however, appear to speak more probably concerning the good,
- 16:14for they place the one in the coordination of things good, whom Speusippus
- 16:18also seems to have followed. But the discussion of these things pertains to another
- 16:23treatise. A certain doubt, however, presents itself concerning the particulars we have
- 16:30just mentioned. Because reasons are not assigned concerning every good, but things which
- 16:34are of themselves the objects of pursuit and love are predicated according to one species.
- 16:41And those things which are effective of these, or in a certain respect
- 16:45preserve them or impede their contraries, are predicated on account of these, and
- 16:52after another manner. It is evident therefore that goods may be predicated in two
- 16:57ways, and that some things indeed are good per se, but others are
- 17:02good on account of these, separating therefore goods per se from things useful.
- 17:07Let us consider whether they are predicated according to one idea. But what kind
- 17:14of goods can be said to be good per se? Are they such as
- 17:17are pursued alone apart from other things, such as to be wise to see
- 17:23in some pleasures and honors. For these, though we pursue them on account
- 17:29of something else, Yet at the same time may be ranked by some one
- 17:33among goods which are good per se? Or is the good per se nothing
- 17:38else except idea? Form therefore or idea will be vain. But if these
- 17:47also rank among goods which are good per se, it will be requisite that
- 17:51the same definition of the good should be conspicuous in all of them, just
- 17:56as there is the same definition of whiteness in snow and cebrus, But of
- 18:00honor and prudence and pleasure there will be other and different definitions, so far
- 18:07as they are goods. The good therefore, is not something common according to
- 18:12one idea. In what manner, however, is it said that there is
- 18:18one idea of the good? For it does not resemble things which are fortuitously
- 18:22homonymous. Is it because all goods are from one and are referred to one
- 18:29good? Or is it rather according to analogy? For as sight is in
- 18:33the body, so is intellect in the soul, and another thing in another.
- 18:40Perhaps, however, these things must be omitted at present, for the
- 18:44accurate discussion of them will be better adapted to another philosophy, and in a
- 18:49similar manner concerning idea. For even if there is some one good which is
- 18:56predicated in common, or which is something itself said by itself, it is
- 19:00evident that it can neither be practicable nor acquired by man. But now that
- 19:07which is practicable by man, and which he may obtain, is the object
- 19:11of investigation. Perhaps, however, the knowledge of this separate good may to
- 19:17some one appear to be better with respect to those goods which may be acquired
- 19:22and which are practicable. For having this as an exemplar, we may in
- 19:27a greater degree know those things which are good for us, and by knowing
- 19:33and more easily obtain them. This assertion therefore has indeed a certain probability,
- 19:40But it seems to be dissonant to the sciences, For all the sciences aspire
- 19:45after a certain good and investigate that which is wanting, omitting the knowledge of
- 19:49it. Though it is not reasonable to suppose that all artists are ignorant of
- 19:56and do not search for, an aid of such great importance, It is
- 20:00likewise dubious what advantage a weaver or a carpenter would derive to their arts from
- 20:04the knowledge of the good itself, or how he who surveys the idea of
- 20:10the good will become more skilled in medicine or in commanding an army. For
- 20:15it appears that the physician does not in this way consider health, but that
- 20:21he considers the health of man, and perhaps rather the health of this particular
- 20:26man, for he restores to health an individual, and thus much concerning these
- 20:30things. Chapter seven. Now, however, let us return to the investigated
- 20:40good and show what it is. For it appears that there is a different
- 20:45good in a different action and art. Since there is one good in the
- 20:49medical art, another in the art of commanding an army, and in a
- 20:53similar manner in the remaining arts. What therefore is the good of each?
- 21:00Is it not that for the sake of which other things are affected by that
- 21:03art. But this, in the medical art, indeed, is health.
- 21:07In the art of commanding an army is victory. In the art of building
- 21:11a house is a house, and something else in another art. And in
- 21:17every action and deliberate choice, it is the end, since all of them
- 21:22perform other things for the sake of this. Hence, if there is one
- 21:26certain end of all actions, this will be the practical good. But if
- 21:32there are many ends these will be practical goods. The reasoning, however,
- 21:37in its transition, arrives at the same thing as was asserted by us in
- 21:42the beginning. But we must endeavor to render this still more clear, because
- 21:48therefore it appears that there are many ends, and of these which use sum
- 21:52on account of others, such as wealth, flutes, and in short,
- 21:56instruments. It is evident that all ends are not perfect. That, however,
- 22:02which is most excellent appears to be something perfect, so that if there
- 22:07is only one certain perfect end, this will be what we investigate. But
- 22:11if there are many, it will be the most perfect of these. We
- 22:15denominate, however, that which is pursuable for its own sake, more perfect
- 22:22than that which is pursuable for the sake of something else, and that which
- 22:25is never eligible on account of another thing, than things which are eligible both
- 22:30on their own account and for the sake of something else. In short,
- 22:34the completely perfect is that which is always eligible on its own account, and
- 22:40never on account of something else. Felicity, however, especially appears to be
- 22:45a thing of this kind, for we always choose this on its own account,
- 22:49and never on account of anything else. But we choose honor and pleasure,
- 22:55intellect, and every virtue on their own account, indeed bracket. For
- 23:00though we should derive no farther advantage than what the possession of them affords,
- 23:04yet each of them would be the object of our choice. Close bracket.
- 23:10Yet we also choose them for the sake of felicity. No one, however,
- 23:15chooses felicity for the sake of these, nor in short, for the
- 23:18sake of anything else. The same thing also appears to happen from that which
- 23:25enables a man to be sufficient to himself. For perfect good appears to be
- 23:29self sufficient. But we call the self sufficient that which is not only sufficient
- 23:34to him who lives a solitary life, but which is also sufficient to parents
- 23:38and children, to a wife, and in short, to friends and fellow
- 23:44citizens. Since man is naturally a political animal, a certain boundary, however,
- 23:49must be assumed of these things. For if good is to be extended
- 23:53to parents and their offspring, and to the friends of friends, there will
- 23:59be a procession to infinity. But this indeed, we shall consider hereafter.
- 24:04We call, however, the self sufficient, that which, subsisting by itself
- 24:10alone, makes life eligible and in want of nothing. But we think that
- 24:15felicity is a thing of this kind. And besides this, we think that
- 24:18it is the most eligible of all things, and is not enumerated with any
- 24:23other good. For if it were enumerated with even the smallest good, it
- 24:29is evident that it would be more eligible, since that which is added would
- 24:33become an excess of good. But a greater good is always more eligible.
- 24:38Felicity therefore appears to be something perfect and sufficient, to itself, being the
- 24:45end of actions. Perhaps, however, to say that felicity is the best
- 24:51of things is to assert that which is acknowledged by all men. But it
- 24:56is requisite that we should yet more clearly say what it is. Perhaps,
- 25:00therefore this will be affected if the work of man is assumed. For as
- 25:04to the player on the flute, to the statuary, and to every artist,
- 25:10and in short, to those who have a certain work and action,
- 25:14the good and the excellent appear to be in the work. This also may
- 25:18appear to be the case with man, if he has a certain work.
- 25:22Whether therefore are there certain works and actions Indeed, of a carpenter and a
- 25:26shoemaker, But of man is there no work? And is he naturally indolent?
- 25:33Or shall we say that as of the eye, the hand, and
- 25:37the foot, and in short of each of the parts of the body,
- 25:40there appears to be a certain work. So likewise of man, shall we
- 25:44admit that besides all these there is a certain work. What then will this
- 25:48work be? For to live appears to be common also to plants as well
- 25:53as to men. But the peculiar work of man is now investigated. The
- 26:00nutritive and augmentative life therefore must be rejected, and a certain sensitive life will
- 26:07be consequent to this. It appears, however, that this also is common
- 26:11to a horse and an ox into every animal. A certain practic life,
- 26:18therefore, accompanied with reason, remains. But of this one kind is obedient
- 26:22to reason, but the other possesses reason and energizes discursively. Since this life,
- 26:30however, is predicated in a twofold respect, i e. According to
- 26:36energy and according to habit, it must be admitted to subsist according to energy,
- 26:42For this appears to be predicated according to a more principal mode of subsistence.
- 26:48But if the work of man is the energy of soul according to reason
- 26:52or not without reason, and we say that the same thing is the work
- 26:56of the human species, and of a wordy man, just as the same
- 27:00thing is the work of a harper, and of a good harper. And
- 27:04in short, this is the case in all things, excellence, according to
- 27:08virtue being added to the work. For the work of a harper is to
- 27:12play on the harp, and of a good harper to play well on it.
- 27:17If this be the case, and we admit the work of man to
- 27:21be a certain life, and this to be the energy of the soul and
- 27:25actions in conjunction with reason, but by a worthy man, these things are
- 27:30well and beautifully performed, and everything is well accomplished according to its proper virtue.
- 27:36If this be the case, human good will be the energy of soul
- 27:40according to virtue. But if there are many virtues, it will be the
- 27:45energy of soul according to the best and most perfect virtue. And besides this
- 27:51in a perfect life. For as one swallow does not make spring nor one
- 27:56day, so neither does one day nor a little time make a man blessed
- 28:00and happy. Let this therefore be a description of the good, for it
- 28:06is necessary, perhaps as in a picture, first to delineate and afterwards add
- 28:11the colors. But it would seem that any one may be able to adduce
- 28:15and distinctly arrange things which are well delineated, And the time is the inventor
- 28:22of or a good co operator with things of this kind. Whence also accessions
- 28:29are made to the arts, for any one may add what is wanting.
- 28:33It is also requisite to call to mind what has been before said, and
- 28:37not to search for accuracy similarly in all things, but investigate it in each
- 28:42according to the subject matter, and so far as is appropriate to the method
- 28:48pertaining to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometrician investigate a right angle
- 28:53differently. The farmer, indeed, so far as is useful to his work,
- 28:59But the latter explores what it is, or what the quality is which
- 29:03it possesses, for he is a contemplator of truth after the same manner.
- 29:08Therefore, we must proceed in other things, lest what is superfluous should become
- 29:14more abundant than the works themselves. Neither must the cause be required similarly in
- 29:19all things, but in some as for instance, concerning principles, it is
- 29:25sufficient to have shown properly that they are. But the subsistence of a thing
- 29:30is the first thing, and the principle of principles. However, some are
- 29:37surveyed by induction, others by sense, others from a certain custom, and
- 29:41others in a different way. But we should endeavor to discuss everything so far
- 29:47as its nature permits, and should earnestly apply ourselves to define well. For
- 29:52this is of great importance with respect to what is consequent. The principle therefore
- 29:57appears to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things
- 30:02which our objects of inquiry become manifest through it. Chapter eight. Felicity therefore
- 30:11must be considered by us not only from the conclusion and the particulars from which
- 30:15its definition consists, but also from the assertions of others concerning it. For
- 30:22everything which is inherent in a thing accords with the truth, but what is
- 30:26true is rapidly dissonant with what is false. Since goods therefore have a twofold
- 30:33distribution, and some of them are said to be external, but others pertain
- 30:37to the soul and the body, we call those pertaining to the soul the
- 30:41most proper and principal goods, but we place the physical actions and energies about
- 30:47the soul. Hence, it is well said, according to this opinion which
- 30:51is ancient and assented to by those who philosophize that felicity is the energy of
- 30:56the soul according to virtue. It is also rightly said that certain actions and
- 31:03energies constitute the end i e. Felicity. For thus felicity will consist in
- 31:10the goods pertaining to the soul, and not in external goods. With this
- 31:14reasoning, likewise, the assertions accord that the happy man lives well and acts
- 31:19well, for nearly felicity will be a certain living well and acting well.
- 31:26It appears, moreover, that everything which is sought for in felicity is inherent
- 31:30in the definition we have given it. For to some, indeed, felicity
- 31:36appears to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a certain wisdom.
- 31:41But to others it appears to be these things, or some one of
- 31:44them, companied with pleasure, or not without pleasure. Others also comprehend in
- 31:51the definition of felicity external affluence. But of these opinions, some are supported
- 31:57by the authority of many and ann and others by a few and renowned men.
- 32:04It is, not, however, reasonable to suppose that either of these
- 32:07have wholly erred, but that they have erred in some one particular, and
- 32:12are right in most things. With those therefore, who say that felicity is
- 32:16every virtue or a certain virtue, our assertion accords, for it is the
- 32:22energy of the soul according to virtue. Perhaps, however, it differs in
- 32:27no small degree to conceive that what is most excellent consists in possession, or
- 32:32to conceive that it consists in use, and that it consists in habit or
- 32:38in energy. For it is possible that habit, when inherent, may be
- 32:44effective of no good, as in him who is asleep, or who in
- 32:47some other way is inactive. But this cannot be the case with energy.
- 32:53For he who possesses virtue and energy necessarily acts and acts well. But as
- 33:00in the Olympic Games, not the most beautiful and the strongest are crowned,
- 33:04but those who contend for some of these are victorious. So those who act
- 33:08rightly obtain those things in life which are beautiful and good. The life,
- 33:14also of these, is in itself delectable, independent of external pleasure. For
- 33:20to be delighted is among the number of things pertaining to the soul. But
- 33:23to every one that is delightful, of which he is said to be a
- 33:28lover as a horse to a lover of horses, and a spectacle to a
- 33:31lover of spectacles, after the same manner. Also, just things are delightful
- 33:37to a lover of justice, and in short, what pertains to virtue to
- 33:42a lover of virtue. Things therefore, delectable to the multitude, are hostile
- 33:46to each other because they are not naturally delightful. But to the lovers of
- 33:52what is beautiful in conduct, those things are delectable, which are delectable by
- 33:57nature, and such are the action according to virtue, so that they are
- 34:01delectable to these, and are so per se. The life, also of
- 34:06these, is not at all in want of pleasure as a certain appendage,
- 34:10but contains pleasure in itself. For in addition to what has been said,
- 34:15he is not a good man who does not rejoice in beautiful actions, For
- 34:20neither would anyone call him just who does not rejoice in acting justly, nor
- 34:24him liberal who does not rejoice in liberal actions, and in a similar manner,
- 34:30in the other virtues. If this, however, be the case,
- 34:34actions according to virtue will be of themselves delectable, but they are also good
- 34:39and beautiful, And especially each of these if the worthy man judges well concerning
- 34:45them. But he judges in the way we have said. Felicity therefore is
- 34:51a thing most excellent, most beautiful, and most delectable. Nor are these
- 34:55to be separated from each other. According to the Delian inscription quote that which
- 35:01is most just is most beautiful. But to be well is the best of
- 35:07things, And for a man to obtain the object of his love is the
- 35:12most delectable of things. Close quote. For all these are inherent in the
- 35:16best energies. But we say that felicity is all these or one of them,
- 35:22and that the most excellent. At the same time, however, it
- 35:28appears, as we have said, that external goods are requisite to felicity,
- 35:32For it is impossible or not easy, to perform beautiful actions without the assistance
- 35:37of externals. Since many things are indeed performed, as it were, through
- 35:43instruments, by means of friends and wealth and political power. The privation also
- 35:49of some things, such as nobility, a good offspring and beauty, defile
- 35:53a blessed condition of being, For he cannot be entirely happy who is very
- 35:59deformed in his body, or of ignoble birth, or who leads a solitary
- 36:05life and is deprived of children, and perhaps he can, in a still
- 36:08less degree be entirely happy if his children are very vicious or being good die.
- 36:16As we have said, Therefore, a completely happy life requires such a
- 36:21prosperity as this. Whence, also some arrange prosperity, but others virtue in
- 36:27the same place with felicity. Chapter nine. Hence, also it is doubted
- 36:35whether felicity is a thing which may be acquired by discipline or custom, or
- 36:39in some other way by exercise, or whether it accedes by a certain divine
- 36:45allotment or from fortune. If therefore, any other thing is the gift of
- 36:52the gods to men, it is reasonable to suppose that felicity also is the
- 36:57gift of divinity, and especially because it is the best of human concerns.
- 37:01This, however, will perhaps be more adapted to another discussion. But it
- 37:07appears that though it should not be sent by divinity to men, but is
- 37:12procured through virtue and a certain discipline or exercise, it belongs to the most
- 37:17divine of things. For the reward and end of virtue appears to be most
- 37:22excellent, and something divine and blessed Felicity also will be a thing very common,
- 37:30for it is able to be present through a certain discipline and attention to
- 37:35all men who are not mutilated with respect to virtue. But if it is
- 37:38better that felicity should be acquired after this manner, rather than from fortune,
- 37:44it is reasonable that it should be so acquired, since natural productions subsist in
- 37:50such a way as it is most beautiful for them to subsist, and in
- 37:53a similar manner things which are produced by art or by any other cause,
- 38:00and especially such as are produced by the most excellent cause. To commit,
- 38:04however, the greatest and most beautiful of things to fortune would be very lawless
- 38:08and reprehensible. The object of investigation, likewise is apparent from the definition of
- 38:15felicity, For we have said that it is a certain energy of the soul
- 38:21according to virtue. But of the remaining goods, some indeed are present from
- 38:25necessity, but others co operate and are naturally adapted to be useful organically.
- 38:32These things also will accord with what we have said in the beginning, For
- 38:37we established the end of the political science as the best end. But this
- 38:43pays the greatest attention to the citizens in order to render them characters of a
- 38:47certain description, and that they may be good men and practicers of beautiful actions.
- 38:54Reasonably, Therefore, do we neither call an ox, nor a horse,
- 38:59nor any any other irrational animal happy, for it is not possible that
- 39:04any one of them can partake of such energy as this. Through this cause,
- 39:08likewise, neither is a child happy, for he is not, yet,
- 39:13on account of his age, a practicer of things of this kind.
- 39:16But those children who are said to be happy are proclaimed to be blessed through
- 39:22hope that when they become men, they will obtain the rational energy in perfection.
- 39:27For felicity, as we have said, requires perfect virtue and a perfect
- 39:32life. For many mutations and all various fortunes happen in life. And it
- 39:37is possible that he whose affairs are in the most prosperous condition may, in
- 39:44old age fall into the greatest calamities. As in heroic poems. It is
- 39:49fabled concerning prime. But no one would call him happy who experiences such misfortunes,
- 39:54and who dies miserably. Chapter ten. Shall we say, therefore,
- 40:02that no other man is to be proclaimed happy as long as he lives,
- 40:07but that according to Solon, it is requisite to look at the end of
- 40:10life. If, however, we admit this is a man therefore then happy
- 40:16when he dies. Or is this perfectly absurd, especially to those who say,
- 40:22as we do, that felicity is a certain energy. But if neither
- 40:28we call him who is dead happy, Nor was this the intention of Solon?
- 40:31But his meaning is that a man may be securely proclaimed blessed, as
- 40:37being now out of the reach of evils and misfortunes. Even this also is
- 40:43attended with a certain doubt, for there appears to be a certain good and
- 40:46evil to him who is dead, if there is also to him who is
- 40:51alive, but without sensation such as honor and ignominy, and in short,
- 40:57the prosperity and adversity of his death. This, however, also presents us
- 41:02with a difficulty, for it is possible that to the offspring of him who
- 41:07has lived to old age blessedly and has died rationally, many mutations may happen,
- 41:13and that some of them may be good and may obtain a life according
- 41:16to their desserts, but that the contrary may take place with others. It
- 41:21is likewise evident that there may be an all various apostasy in them from the
- 41:25manners of their parents. It would therefore be absurd if he who is dead
- 41:30should also be changed together with them, and should at one time become happy
- 41:36and again miserable. It is likewise absurd that the affairs of descendants should not,
- 41:42for a certain time be of any consequence whatever to parents. Let us,
- 41:47however, return to the former subject of doubt, for perhaps that which
- 41:52is now investigated may be surveyed from it. If therefore it is necessary to
- 41:58look to the end of life and meant to proclaim each man blessed, not
- 42:01as being now blessed, but because he was so before. Is it not
- 42:07absurd when he is happy i e. While he is living, that what
- 42:12is present with him i e. Felicity should not be asserted of him with
- 42:15truth, because we are unwilling to proclaim the living happy on account of the
- 42:21mutations of life, and because we apprehend felicity to be something stable and by
- 42:25no means easily to be changed. But fortunes frequently circulate about the same persons.
- 42:32For it is evident, if we should follow fortune, we must frequently
- 42:37call the same man happy and again miserable. Thus evincing the happy man to
- 42:42be like the chameleon and possessing an infirm stability. Or shall we say that
- 42:47it is indeed by no means right to follow fortune, for living well or
- 42:52ill is not among the gifts of fortune. But human life, as we
- 42:58have said, requires the goods of forty. The energies, however, according
- 43:02to virtue, are the mistresses of felicity. But the contrary energies are the
- 43:08mistresses of the contrary. That also, which is now the subject of doubt,
- 43:14bears testimony to our assertion. For in no human affair is there so
- 43:20much stability as in the energies according to virtue, since they appear to be
- 43:24more stable than even the sciences themselves. And of these very energies, those
- 43:30that are most honorable are also most stable, because blessed men principally and most
- 43:37assiduously live in these, For this appears to be the cause that oblivion does
- 43:42not happen concerning them. The object of investigation, therefore is present with the
- 43:47happy man, and he will be such through life for always, or the
- 43:52most of all men, he will perform and contemplate things pertaining to virtue,
- 43:59will bear the changes of fortune most beautifully and in the most perfectly elegant manner,
- 44:05as being truly good and a square without blame. Since, however,
- 44:10many things happen from fortune, and which differ in magnitude and parvitude, it
- 44:16is evident that prosperous, and in a similar manner, adverse circumstances, when
- 44:22they are small, are of no consequence to the life of man, but
- 44:27that such as are great and numerous, if they are indeed prosperous, render
- 44:31life more blest, for they are also naturally adapted to adorn life, and
- 44:36the use of them is beautiful and good. And that, on the contrary,
- 44:40if they are adverse, they oppress and injure beatitude, for they bring
- 44:45with them molestation and are an impediment to many energies. At the same time,
- 44:52however, even in these the beauty of good conduct shines forth when a
- 44:57man bears many and great misfortunes easily, not through an insensibility of pain,
- 45:02but in consequence of being generous and magnanimous. But if energies are the mistresses
- 45:08of life, as we have said, nor one who is blessed will become
- 45:13miserable, since he will never do anything that is odious and base. For
- 45:19we are of opinion that the man who is truly good and wise will bear
- 45:23all fortunes in a becoming manner, and from existing circumstances will always perform the
- 45:30most beautiful deeds, just as a good general will use the army under his
- 45:35command in the most warlike manner, and a shoemaker from the leather with which
- 45:39he is supplied will make the most beautiful shoes, And the same thing will
- 45:45take place with all other artists. If this, however, be the case,
- 45:50the happy man will never become miserable. Nor yet, if he should
- 45:53fall into the calamities of prim will he be blessed. Nor again is he
- 46:00us and easily changed. For he is not easily moved from felicity, nor
- 46:05by any casual misfortunes, but by such as are great and numerous. And
- 46:09after such calamities as these, he will not again become happy in a short
- 46:15time. But if he does recover his felicity, it will be in a
- 46:19certain, long and perfect time, in which he will become a partaker of
- 46:22things of a great and beautiful nature. What then, prevents us from calling
- 46:28the man happy who energizes according to perfect virtue, and who is sufficiently supplied
- 46:34with external goods, not for any casual time, but through a perfect life
- 46:39or ought. We to add that he must also thus live and die conformably
- 46:45to nature, since the future is unapparent to us, and we admit that
- 46:50felicity is an end, and entirely end in every respect perfect. But if
- 46:54this be the case, we must call those among the living blessed, to
- 46:59whom the particulars we have mentioned are and have been present. But we must
- 47:04denominate them blessed as men. And thus much concerning these things. Chapter eleven,
- 47:12that the good or bad fortune, however of descendants and of all friends,
- 47:16should contribute nothing to the happy man, appears to be a thing very
- 47:21unfriendly and contrary to the opinions of mankind. But since many things happen,
- 47:27and which possess an all various difference, and some of them pertain to us
- 47:30in a greater but others in a less degree, to discuss them severally appears
- 47:36to be a long and an infinite undertaking. It will therefore perhaps be sufficient
- 47:40to speak of them universally, and to a dumbrate what they are. As
- 47:45of the calamitous circumstances, then, which happen to the happy man, some
- 47:51have a certain weight and are of importance in life. This is likewise the
- 47:55case with respect to all his friends. It makes a difference, however,
- 48:00whether each of the calamities happens to the living or the dead, And the
- 48:05difference is much greater than whether the illegal and dreadful deeds which are the subject
- 48:09of tragedy have been formally perpetrated or are perpetrated. Now in this way,
- 48:16therefore the difference may also be collected. Perhaps, however, it ought rather
- 48:22to be doubted concerning the dead, whether they partake of any good or ill.
- 48:27For it appears from these things that though something should arrive to them,
- 48:31whatever it may be, whether good or the contrary, it is something devile
- 48:37and small, either in its own nature or to them. But if it
- 48:43should possess a certain power, yet it cannot be so great or of such
- 48:47a kind as to make those happy or not so, or to deprive those
- 48:52of blessedness. You are the prosperity. Therefore, and in a similar manner,
- 48:58the adversity of friends appears to contribute something to the dead. Yet with
- 49:02respect to them, they are of so little consequence, as neither to make
- 49:07those that are happy unhappy, nor affect anything else of the like kind.
- 49:15Chapter twelve. These things being discussed, let us consider with respect to felicity,
- 49:22whether it is among the number of things laudable, or rather of things
- 49:27honorable, For it is evident that it does not consist in power. It
- 49:31seems, therefore, that everything which is laudable is praised because it possesses a
- 49:37certain quality and is in a certain respect referred to something. For we praise
- 49:44the just and the brave man, and in short, the good man,
- 49:47and also virtue on account of works and actions. We likewise praise the strong
- 49:53man and the racer, because they are naturally adapted to possess certain quality and
- 50:00have reference in a certain respect to something good and worthy. But this also
- 50:06is evident from the praises which pertain to the gods, for they appear to
- 50:09be ridiculous when referred to us. This, however, happens, as we
- 50:15have said, because praise subsists from relation. But if praise is given to
- 50:20things of this kind, it is evident that no praise can be given to
- 50:23the most excellent things. But something greater and better pertains to them, as
- 50:30also appears to be the case. For we proclaim the gods to be blessed
- 50:35and happy, and we also proclaim the most divine of men to be blessed.
- 50:39And in a similar manner, we celebrate what is good. For no
- 50:43one praises felicity in the same way as he does justice, but he proclaims
- 50:49it to be blessed as something more divine and excellent than justice. Eudoxus,
- 50:54likewise, in his defense of pleasure, appears to have given it the palm
- 50:59of victory in a proper manner, for in consequence of its not being praised
- 51:05as being among the number of good things, he considers this an indication that
- 51:09it was more excellent than things that are laudable. But God and the good
- 51:14are things of this kind, For other things also are referred to these.
- 51:19For praise, indeed, is given to virtue, since from this we are
- 51:23enabled to perform beautiful deeds. Encomiums, however, pertain to deeds, and
- 51:30in a similar manner to bodies and souls. The accurate discussion, however,
- 51:35of these things, is perhaps more adapted to a treatise on encomiums. But
- 51:40to us it is evident from what has been said that felicity is among the
- 51:45number of things honorable and perfect. It seems likewise that it is so because
- 51:52it is a principle. For we all of us do everything else for the
- 51:57sake of this. But we admit that the prince and the cause of what
- 52:00is good is something honorable and divine Chapter thirteen. Since, however, felicity
- 52:09is a certain energy of the soul according to perfect virtue, we must direct
- 52:15our attentions to virtue. For perhaps we shall thus also speculate better concerning felicity.
- 52:21But it seems that he who is skilled in the administration of public affairs
- 52:25labors especially about this, for he wishes to make the citizens worthy persons and
- 52:30obedient to the laws. And as an example of these we have the legislators
- 52:36of the Quitans, and the Lacedaemonians, and any others there may have been
- 52:42of this kind. If, however, the speculation itself is of the political
- 52:46science, it is evident that the inquiry will be conformable to our intention from
- 52:52the beginning. But our discussion must be concerning virtue, viz. Human virtue.
- 52:59For investigate human good and human felicity. And we call human virtue not
- 53:05the virtue of the body, but of the soul. And we say that
- 53:08felicity is the energy of the soul. If, however, this be the
- 53:14case, it is evident that he who is skilled in the administration of public
- 53:19affairs ought to know whatever pertains to the soul, just as he who intends
- 53:23to cure the eyes ought to have a knowledge of the whole body. And
- 53:27this in a greater degree. By how much more honorable and excellent the political
- 53:32is than the medical science of physicians. Likewise, the more elegant are busily
- 53:38employed about their knowledge of the body. He, therefore, who is skilled
- 53:43in the administration of public affairs, must direct his attention to the soul.
- 53:47But he must direct his attention to it for the sake of these things,
- 53:52and so far as is sufficient to the objects of inquiry. For to consider
- 53:57the soul still more accurately is perhaps phaps more laborious and difficult than the present
- 54:01discussion requires. We have also said some thing sufficiently concerning it in our popular
- 54:07writings, and those who must be consulted, such as that one part of
- 54:12the soul is irrational, but another rational. But whether these parts are separated
- 54:16in the same manner as the parts of the body and everything which is partable,
- 54:22or they are two parts in definition alone, and are naturally inseparable,
- 54:27as in the periphery of a circle, the convex and the concave is of
- 54:31no consequence in the present discussion of the irrational part, however, one part
- 54:37resembles the common and vegetative power, I mean, the power which is the
- 54:42cause of nutrition and increase. For such a power as this may be admitted
- 54:46to exist in everything that is nourished, in embryos, and also in perfect
- 54:52animals, since it is more reasonable that this power should exist in them than
- 54:57any other. The virtue therefore, or of this power appears to be common
- 55:01and not human. For this part seems especially to energize in sleep. But
- 55:07a good man and a bad man can, in the smallest degree be distinguished
- 55:10in sleep. Whence it is said that the happy differ in no respect from
- 55:15the miserable during the half of life. But this happens reasonably, for sleep
- 55:20is an inactivity both of the worthy and the depraved soul, except so far
- 55:25as certain motions gradually arrive at the soul. And on this account, the
- 55:30phantasms of worthy are better than those of worthless men. But of these things
- 55:36enough, the nutritive part therefore must be omitted, since it is naturally a
- 55:39destitute of human virtue. There appears, however, to be another certain irrational
- 55:45nature of the soul, which nevertheless participates in a certain respect of reason.
- 55:52For we praise the reason of the continent and also of the incontinent man,
- 55:55and that part of the soul which possesses reason, for it rightly excites to
- 56:00the most excellent deeds. There appears, however, to be in them,
- 56:05i e. Both in the continent and incontinent, something else naturally contrary to
- 56:10reason, which wars against and resist reason. For indeed, as the paralyzed
- 56:16parts of the body, if we wish to move them to the right hand,
- 56:20are on the contrary, moved to the left, thus also it is
- 56:23in the soul, for the impulses of the incontinent are in a direction contrary
- 56:30to the dictates of reason. In bodies, however, we see that which
- 56:34is moved contrary to the intention of the will. But in the soul we
- 56:37did not see that which is moved contrary to reason. Though perhaps we ought,
- 56:42nevertheless to think that in the soul also there is something opposite to reason,
- 56:46which is adverse and proceeds in a direction contrary to it, But it
- 56:52is of no consequence in what manner it is different from reason. This part,
- 56:55however, appears, as we have said, to participate of reason.
- 57:00It is obedient therefore to the reason of the continent man, and perhaps it
- 57:06is still more obedient the reason of the temperate and brave man, for all
- 57:09things are in concord with his reason. It appears therefore that the irrational part
- 57:15is twofold, For the vegetable part, in no respect participates of reason,
- 57:21but the part which desires, and in short, the erectic part, participates
- 57:27in a certain respect of reason, so far as they are attentive and obedient
- 57:31to it. In this way, therefore we say that a man has a
- 57:36regard for, or pays attention to his father and his friends, and not
- 57:40after the same manner as he has a regard for the mathematical sciences, but
- 57:45that the irrational part is in a certain respect obedient to reason. Admonition and
- 57:51all reproof and exhortation indicate, if, however, it be requisite to say
- 57:55that this part also possesses reason that which possess us his reason will be twofold,
- 58:01the one indeed properly and in itself, but the other resembling a child
- 58:07attentive to his father. Virtue likewise is distributed according to this difference. For
- 58:13we say that of the virtues, some are dionoetic, or belong to the
- 58:17power which reasons scientifically, but others ethical. And we denominate indeed wisdom,
- 58:24intelligence, and prudence dionoetic virtues, but liberality and temperance ethical virtues. For
- 58:32when we speak concerning the manners of man, we do not say that he
- 58:37is wise or intelligent, but that he is mild or temperate. We likewise
- 58:42praise a wise man according to habit, but we call the laudable habits virtues.
- 58:47End of Book one, Book two, Chapter one. Since, however,
- 58:55virtue is twofold, one kind being die noetic, but the other ethic.
- 59:01The dionoetic indeed, for the most part, receives both its generation and
- 59:07increase from doctrine, on which account it requires experience and time. But the
- 59:14ethic is produced from custom, from whence also it derives the name, which
- 59:21declines but a little from ethos, custom, from which likewise it is evident
- 59:29that no one of the ethical virtues is ingenerated in us by nature. For
- 59:34nothing that has a natural subsistence can by custom be brought to act differently from
- 59:38its natural tendency. Thus, a stone which naturally tends downward cannot be accustomed
- 59:45to tend upward, though someone should hurl it upward ten thousand times. Nor
- 59:51can fire be accustomed to tend downward. Nor can anything else among the things
- 59:55which have natural tendencies different from these, be acc wisdom to any other tendency
- 1:00:01than that which it has from nature. The virtues, therefore, are neither
- 1:00:06from nature nor are in generated in us preternaturally, but they are produced in
- 1:00:13us in consequence of our being naturally adapted to receive them, and becoming perfect
- 1:00:19through habit. Again, with respect to such things as are ingenerated in us
- 1:00:23by nature, of these, we first receive the powers, but afterwards employ
- 1:00:29the energies of those powers, which is evident in the senses. For it
- 1:00:34is not from frequently seeing or frequently hearing that we receive these senses, but
- 1:00:39on the contrary, having these senses, we use them, and we do
- 1:00:45not have them by using them. With respect to the virtues, however,
- 1:00:50we receive them by first energizing according to them, in the same manner as
- 1:00:53in the other arts. For those things which it is necessary to do,
- 1:00:59in consequence of having learnt how to do them, these by doing we learn
- 1:01:02how to do. Thus, by building, we become builders, and by
- 1:01:07playing on the harp we become harpers. Thus, too, by acting justly,
- 1:01:12we become just prudent by acting prudently, and brave by acting bravely.
- 1:01:19But what happens in cities bears testimony to the truth of this. For the
- 1:01:22legislators, by accustoming the citizens to virtue, render them worthy characters. And
- 1:01:29this, indeed is the intention of every legislator. But such as do not
- 1:01:34affect this well err And in this one polity differs from another, the good
- 1:01:40from the bad. Farther still, from the same things, and through the
- 1:01:45same things, every virtue is generated and corrupted, and in a similar manner
- 1:01:51every art. For from playing on the harp, both good and bad harpers
- 1:01:55are produced, and analogously builders of houses and all other artists. For from
- 1:02:02building well, they will be good builders, but bad from building ill,
- 1:02:07since if it were not so, there would be no occasion for a preceptor.
- 1:02:12But all men would be naturally good or bad artists. The like also
- 1:02:15takes place in the virtues. For by acting in our compacts with men,
- 1:02:21we become some of us indeed just, but others unjust. And by acting
- 1:02:25in things of a dreadful nature, and by being accustomed either to be terrified
- 1:02:30or to be confident in danger, some of us become brave, but others
- 1:02:36timid. The reasoning likewise is similar with respect to desire and anger, For
- 1:02:40some men indeed become temperate and mild, but others intemperate and irrascuable. These
- 1:02:46from being in this way conversant with these things, but those from being conversant
- 1:02:52with them in that way. And in one word, habits are produced from
- 1:02:55similar energies. Hence it is necessary to render energies endued with a certain quality,
- 1:03:01for habits follow from the differences of these. It is of no small
- 1:03:06consequence therefore, to be thus or thus accustomed immediately from our youth. But
- 1:03:12it is of very great consequence, or rather it is everything Chapter two.
- 1:03:17Since therefore the present treaties is not for the sake of theory, like other
- 1:03:22discussions, For our attention is not directed to this business that we may know
- 1:03:28what virtue is, but that we may become good men, since otherwise no
- 1:03:32advantage would be derived from it. This being the case, it is necessary
- 1:03:37to consider with respect to actions how they are to be performed, For as
- 1:03:42we have said, they are the mistresses of the qualities which habits possess to
- 1:03:47act. Therefore, according to right reason is common, and is now assumed
- 1:03:52to be so. We shall, however, hereafter, speak concerning this and
- 1:03:57show what right reason is and how it subsists with reference to the other virtues.
- 1:04:02But this must be previously granted that every treatise of practical affairs ought only
- 1:04:08to be an adumbration and not an accurate discussion, as also we observed in
- 1:04:13the beginning, because reasonings are required conformable to the subject matter, and in
- 1:04:18practical affairs and things contributing to them, there is nothing stable, as neither
- 1:04:24is there in things which are salubrious, such therefore being the universal reason.
- 1:04:30In a still greater degree will the discussion of particulars be deficient in accuracy,
- 1:04:35for it neither falls under art nor under any precept. It is, however,
- 1:04:41necessary that those who are engaged in practical affairs should always direct their attention
- 1:04:45to an opportune time, in the same manner as in medicine and in the
- 1:04:50pilot's art. But though the present discussion is of this nature, we must
- 1:04:56endeavor to give it assistance in the first place. Therefore, or this must
- 1:05:00be observed, that things of this kind viz. Actions which produce in us
- 1:05:04the habits of the virtues, are naturally adapted to be corrupted by excess and
- 1:05:10defect, as we see in strength and health, which are the virtues of
- 1:05:15the body bracket. For it is necessary to use things apparent as testimonies in
- 1:05:19things which are unapparent close bracket. Since exercises which are excessive, and also
- 1:05:26those which are deficient, corrupt the strength of the body. In like manner,
- 1:05:30meat and drink, when taken in too great or too small a quantity,
- 1:05:34corrupt the health. But these, when commensurate, produce, increase and
- 1:05:39preserve it. This therefore is also the case in temperance and fortitude and the
- 1:05:45other virtues. For he who flies from and is afraid of all things and
- 1:05:49endures nothing becomes timid, and he who, in short, is afraid of
- 1:05:54nothing but marches up to all things, becomes audacious. In a similar manner.
- 1:05:59He, indeed, who gives himself up to the enjoyment of every pleasure
- 1:06:02and abstains from none, is intemperate. But he who flies from all pleasures,
- 1:06:08like rustic men, is an insensate person. For temperance and fortitude are
- 1:06:14corrupted by excess and defect, but are preserved by mediocrity. Not only,
- 1:06:20however, generations, increments, and corruptions are produced from and by the same
- 1:06:28things, but the energies also of the virtues will subsist after the same manner,
- 1:06:31Since this likewise is the case in other things which are more apparent,
- 1:06:36as for instance, in strength, for strength is produced by taking much food
- 1:06:42and enduring many labors, and the strong man is especially able to do both
- 1:06:46these. Thus, too it is in the virtues, for by abstaining from
- 1:06:50pleasures we become temperate, and having become temperate, we are especially able to
- 1:06:57abstain from them. The like also takes place in fortitude, for by being
- 1:07:00accustomed to despise things of a terrible nature, and to endure them, we
- 1:07:04become brave, And having become brave, we are specially able to endure terrible
- 1:07:10things. Chapter three. It is necessary, however, to consider as an
- 1:07:16indication of habits, the pleasure or pain which is attendant on actions. For
- 1:07:23he who abstains from corporeal pleasure and is delighted in doing so is a temperate
- 1:07:28man. But he who is grieved when he abstains from them is intemperate.
- 1:07:32And he, indeed, who endures dreadful things and is delighted with his endurance,
- 1:07:38or feels no pain from it, is a brave man. But he
- 1:07:42who feels pain from the endurance of them is a timid man. For ethical
- 1:07:46virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains. For we act basely through the influence
- 1:07:53of pleasure, but we abstain from beautiful conduct through the influence of pain.
- 1:07:58Hence, it is necessary, as Plato says, to be so educated in
- 1:08:01a certain respect immediately after our youth, that we may be delighted and pained
- 1:08:06with things from which it is requisite to feel pleasure or pain, For this
- 1:08:11is right education. Farther still, if the virtues are conversant with actions and
- 1:08:16passions, but pleasure and pain are consequent to every passion and action. On
- 1:08:21this account, also virtue will be conversant with pleasures and pains. The punishments
- 1:08:28likewise, which are inflicted through these indicate the truth of this, for they
- 1:08:32are certain remedies. But remedies are naturally adapted to operate through contraries. Again,
- 1:08:40as we have also before observed, the nature of every habit of the
- 1:08:43soul is referred to and conversant with those things by which it is adapted to
- 1:08:47become better and worse. But habits become depraved through pleasures and pains by pursuing
- 1:08:55or avoiding these, either such as ought not to be pursued or avoided,
- 1:08:59or when it is not proper, or in such a way as is not
- 1:09:02proper, or in as many other modes, as such things are distinguished by
- 1:09:08reason. Hence, some persons divine the virtues to be certain apathies and tranquilities,
- 1:09:14but they do not define them well, because they speak simply, and
- 1:09:16do not add in such a way as is proper, and when it is
- 1:09:20proper, and such other additions as are usually made. It is admitted therefore
- 1:09:27that virtue is a thing of this kind, which is conversant with pleasures and
- 1:09:30pains, and practices things of the most excellent nature. But vice is the
- 1:09:35contrary from what has been said. Likewise, we may obtain still greater evidence
- 1:09:40about these things. For as there are three things which pertain to choice,
- 1:09:45and also three which pertain to aversion, viz. The beautiful in conduct,
- 1:09:49the advantageous, and the delightful, and three the contraries to these, the
- 1:09:55base, the disadvantageous, and the painful. The good man indeed acts rightly
- 1:10:00in all these, but the bad man erroneously, and especially in what pertains
- 1:10:05to pleasure. For pleasure is common to all animals, and is consequent to
- 1:10:11everything which is the object of choice. For the beautiful and the advantageous appear
- 1:10:16to be delightful. Again, pleasure is co nourished with all of us from
- 1:10:21our infancy, on which account also it is difficult to wipe away this passion
- 1:10:28with which our life is imbued. We likewise direct our actions by pleasure and
- 1:10:32pain, as by our rule, some of us in a greater and others
- 1:10:36in a less degree. On this account, therefore, it is necessary that
- 1:10:41the whole of this discussion should be conversant with these things. For to rejoice
- 1:10:45or be pained properly or improperly, is of no small consequence in actions.
- 1:10:50Farther still, it is more difficult to fight with pleasure than with anger,
- 1:10:56as heraclitis is. But both art and virtue are always conversant with that which
- 1:11:01is more difficult, for that which is well done is better when it is
- 1:11:05affected with greater difficulty. Hence, on this account also the whole business,
- 1:11:11both of ethics and politics, is conversant with pleasures and pains, For he
- 1:11:15who employs these well will be a good man, and he will be a
- 1:11:19bad man who employs them badly. We have shown, therefore, that virtue
- 1:11:25is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and corrupted by
- 1:11:29the same things by which it is produced when they did not exist after the
- 1:11:32same manner, and that it likewise energizes about the things from which it originated.
- 1:11:40Chapter four. It may, however, be doubted, what our meaning
- 1:11:44is in asserting that men, by acting justly, become just and temperate by
- 1:11:48acting temperately. For if they act justly and temperately, they are already just
- 1:11:54and temperate, just as those who perform things pertaining to grammar and music are
- 1:11:59grammary and musicians. Or shall we say that this is not the case in
- 1:12:03the arts, For it is possible that a man may do something grammatical,
- 1:12:08both from chance and the suggestion of another person. He will therefore then be
- 1:12:14a grammarian if he both does something grammatical and grammatically, that is, according
- 1:12:18to the grammatical art which he possesses. Again, neither is the thing similar
- 1:12:25in the arts and the virtues, For things produced by the arts contain in
- 1:12:29themselves efficient excellence. It is sufficient, therefore, to these to be affected
- 1:12:33with a certain mode of subsistence. But things which are performed according to the
- 1:12:38virtues are not done justly or temperately if they subsist in a certain way,
- 1:12:43But if he who does them does them in consequence of being disposed in a
- 1:12:47certain way, and in the first place, indeed, if he does them
- 1:12:51knowingly, in the next place, if with deliberate choice, and also deliberately
- 1:12:57choosing to do them on their own account, and in the third place,
- 1:13:00if he does them with a firm and immutable disposition of mind. These things,
- 1:13:05however, are not co enumerated as requisites to the possession of the other
- 1:13:10arts, except the knowledge of them alone. But to the acquisition of the
- 1:13:15virtues, the knowledge of them is of little or no efficacy, While the
- 1:13:19other particulars pertaining to them are capable of affecting no small thing, but are
- 1:13:25all powerful. And these are obtained from frequently acting justly and temperately. Things
- 1:13:31therefore are said to be just and temperate when they are just as a just
- 1:13:36or temperate man would perform. But he is a just and temperate man,
- 1:13:42not who merely does these things, but who does them so as just and
- 1:13:46temperaate men do them. It is well said, therefore, that a man
- 1:13:50becomes just from acting justly and temperate from acting temperately, but that from not
- 1:13:56doing these things, no one will ever become a good man. The multitude,
- 1:14:00however, do not thus act, but flying towards they fancy they shall
- 1:14:04philosophize and thus become worthy characters, acting similarly to sick persons who attentively indeed
- 1:14:12hear what the physicians say, but do nothing which they order them to do.
- 1:14:16As therefore, these by such a method of cure never have their body
- 1:14:20in a healthy condition. So neither is the soul of those, ever well,
- 1:14:25who thus philosophize Chapter five. In the next place, we must consider
- 1:14:31what virtue is, since therefore three things are produced in the soul viz.
- 1:14:36Passions, powers, and habits. Virtue will be some one of these.
- 1:14:42But I call passions indeed desire, anger, audacity, envy, joy,
- 1:14:48love, hatred, cupidity, emulation, pity, and in short, those
- 1:14:55things to which pleasure or pain are consequent. And I denomin powers those things
- 1:15:00according to which we are said to be susceptible of the passions, viz.
- 1:15:05According to which we are able to be angry or pained, or are inclined
- 1:15:10to pity. But I call habits those things according to which we are well
- 1:15:15or ill disposed towards the passions. Thus, for instance, with respect to
- 1:15:19being angry, if we are vehemently or were missly disposed towards it, we
- 1:15:25are badly affected. But if moderately we are well affected. And in a
- 1:15:30similar manner with respect to the other passions. Neither the virtues, therefore,
- 1:15:35nor devices are passions. Because we are not said to be worthy or depraved
- 1:15:41according to the passions, but we are said to be so according to the
- 1:15:44virtues or vices. And because according to the passions we are neither praised nor
- 1:15:49blamed. For neither he who is afraid, nor he who is angry,
- 1:15:54is praised, nor is he who is simply angry blamed. But he who
- 1:15:59is angry after a certain manner, but we are praised or blamed according to
- 1:16:03the virtues and vices. Further still, we may be angry and afraid without
- 1:16:09any deliberate intention of being so, but the virtues are certain deliberate elections,
- 1:16:14or are not without deliberate choice. In addition to this, also we are
- 1:16:18said to be moved according to the passions, but we are not said to
- 1:16:21be moved according to the virtues and vices, but to be disposed in a
- 1:16:26certain way. In this account, neither are the virtues powers. For we
- 1:16:30are neither said to be good nor bad, from being able simply to suffer.
- 1:16:34Nor are we, through this either praised or blamed. And again we
- 1:16:39possess powers indeed from nature, but from nature we do not become either good
- 1:16:44or bad. We have, however, spoken concerning this before. If therefore
- 1:16:49the virtues are neither passions nor powers, it remains that they are habits.
- 1:16:54And thus we have shown what virtue is. Generically Chapter six. It is
- 1:17:00necessary, however, not only to show that virtue is a habit, but
- 1:17:03likewise to show what kind of a habit it is. We must say,
- 1:17:08therefore, that every virtue renders that of which it is the virtue well disposed,
- 1:17:13and causes its work to be well accomplished. Thus, for instance,
- 1:17:16the virtue of the eye causes both the eye and the work of it to
- 1:17:19be good. For by the virtue of the eye we see well in a
- 1:17:24similar manner, the virtue of a horse causes the horse to be good for
- 1:17:28the race, for carrying his rider, end sustaining the enemy in battle.
- 1:17:32But if this be the case in all things, the virtue of man will
- 1:17:35also be a habit from which man becomes good and from which he accomplishes his
- 1:17:41own work. And how this indeed will be affected, we have already shown,
- 1:17:45but it will again be now manifest if we consider what the quality is
- 1:17:50of the nature of virtue in everything therefore, which is continued and divisible.
- 1:17:57It is possible, indeed, to assume the more, the less, and
- 1:18:01the equal, and this either with respect to the thing itself or with reference
- 1:18:05to us. But the equal is a certain middle between excess and defect.
- 1:18:12I call, however, the middle of a thing, that which is equally
- 1:18:15distant from each of the extremes, and which is one and the same in
- 1:18:18all things. But with reference to us the middle is that which neither exceeds
- 1:18:24nor falls short of the becoming. This, however, is neither one nor
- 1:18:29the same in all things. Thus, for instance, if ten things are
- 1:18:33many but two a few, six are assumed as a medium with reference to
- 1:18:39the thing. For six equally surpasses and is surpassed. But this is a
- 1:18:43middle according to arithmatical proportion. The middle or medium, however, with reference
- 1:18:48to us, is not thus to be assumed. For if to eat ten
- 1:18:53pounds is to eat much, but two pounds a little, it does not
- 1:18:57follow that the master of the gymnastic exercises will order six pounds to be eaten,
- 1:19:01for this perhaps will be too much or too little for him who is
- 1:19:05to take food for milo. Indeed, it would be too little, but
- 1:19:10for him who is beginning the exercises it would be too much. And the
- 1:19:14like must be understood of the coarse and brestling. Thus, therefore every scientific
- 1:19:19man will avoid excess and defect, but will search for the medium, and
- 1:19:25make this the object of his choice. He will, however, explore that
- 1:19:29medium which is not the middle of the thing, but is a middle with
- 1:19:32reference to us. If therefore, every science thus well accomplishes its work when
- 1:19:38it looks to the middle and refers its work to this. Whence, it
- 1:19:42is usual to say of works that are well finished, that nothing can be
- 1:19:45added to or taken away from them, acknowledging by this that excess and defect
- 1:19:50corrupt that which is excellent in them, but that mediocrity preserves this. And
- 1:19:57if good artists, as we say, operate looking to this, but virtue
- 1:20:01in the same manner as nature is more accurate and better than all art.
- 1:20:06If this be the case, it will tend to the medium as a boundary.
- 1:20:11I speak, however, of ethical virtue, for this is conversant with
- 1:20:15passions and actions. But in these there is excess and defect in the middle.
- 1:20:20Thus, for instance, it is possible to be afraid, to be
- 1:20:25confident, to desire and abhor, to be angry and to pity, and
- 1:20:29in short, to be pleased and pained in a greater and less degree,
- 1:20:33and to be both these improperly. But to have these passions when it is
- 1:20:40proper, and in such things towards such persons, and for the sake of
- 1:20:44that which, and as it is proper, this is the middle and the
- 1:20:47best, and pertains to virtue in a similar manner. Also, in actions
- 1:20:53there is excess and defect and the middle. But virtue is conversant with passions
- 1:20:59and actions in which the excess indeed is erroneous and the defect is blamed.
- 1:21:04But the medium is praised and possesses rectitude, And both these pertain to virtue.
- 1:21:11Hence, virtue is a certain medium and tends to the middle as a
- 1:21:15boundary. Again, to air is manifold for evil, as the Pythagorean's conjecture,
- 1:21:20belongs to the infinite, and good to the finite. But it is
- 1:21:25only possible to act rightly in one way. Hence the one is easy,
- 1:21:30but the other difficult. It is easy, indeed, to deviate from the
- 1:21:34mark, but difficult to hit it. And on this account excess and defect
- 1:21:40belong to vice, but the medium to virtue. For simple the good,
- 1:21:45all various are the bad. Virtue therefore, is a pre elective habit,
- 1:21:53or a habit accompanied with deliberate choice, existing in a medium with reference to
- 1:21:58us, and which is defined by reason and in such a way as a
- 1:22:02prudent man would define it. It is also the medium between two vices,
- 1:22:06the one being characterized by excess but the other by defect, and farther still.
- 1:22:13It is defined by this that some of the vices fall short of but
- 1:22:16others surpass the becoming both in passions and actions. But virtue both discovers and
- 1:22:23chooses the medium. Hence, according to the essence and the definition which explains
- 1:22:28the very nature of a thing, virtue is a medium. But according to
- 1:22:32that which is best and subsists well, it is a summit. Not every
- 1:22:38action, however, nor every passion, receives a medium. For some passions,
- 1:22:44as soon as they are named, are complicated with depravity, such as
- 1:22:47malevolent rejoicing in the evils of others, impudence, envy, and in actions
- 1:22:54adultery, theft, and murder. For all these and others of the like
- 1:22:58kind are thus denomined dominated because they are themselves bad, and not the excesses
- 1:23:03nor the defects of them. Hence, it is not possible at any time
- 1:23:08to act rightly in these, but they are always attended with error. Nor
- 1:23:13it is acting well or not acting well in things of this kind consist in
- 1:23:16committing adultery when and as it is proper. But simply to do any of
- 1:23:23these things is to act wrong. To require therefore a medium in these is
- 1:23:28just as if some one should think it proper that there should be a medium
- 1:23:31excess and defect in doing an injury and in acting timidly and intemperately. For
- 1:23:38thus there would be a middle of excess and defect, and an excess of
- 1:23:42excess and a deficiency of defect. As however, there is no excess and
- 1:23:47defect of temperance and fortitude, because the middle is in a certain respect to
- 1:23:51the summit. So neither is there a middle excess and defect in those passions
- 1:23:58and actions. But in whatever if manner they are exerted, they are attended
- 1:24:01with air. For in short, neither is there a middle of excess or
- 1:24:06defect, nor are there excess and defect of the middle. Chapter seven.
- 1:24:13It is necessary, however, not only to assert this universally, but also
- 1:24:17to adapt it to particulars. For in what is said concerning actions, universal
- 1:24:23assertions indeed are more common, but those that are particular are more true,
- 1:24:28since actions are conversant with particulars with which assertions ought to accord. These therefore
- 1:24:34are to be assumed from description of fear and confidence. Therefore, fortitude is
- 1:24:41the medium of the characters, however, which exceed The one indeed, which
- 1:24:45exceeds by a privation of fear is anonymous. But that which exceeds in confidence
- 1:24:50is audacious. And he who exceeds in being afraid, but is deficient in
- 1:24:56confidence, is timid. In pleasures and pain, however, though not in
- 1:25:00all pleasures, but in such as are corporeal, and in those especially which
- 1:25:05pertain to the touch, and in a less degree in pains. The medium,
- 1:25:11indeed is temperance, but the excess in temperance. But those who are
- 1:25:15deficient in the pursuit of pleasures do not very frequently occur, on which account,
- 1:25:20neither have they obtained a name. They may, however, be called
- 1:25:25insensate. In giving and receiving money, the medium, indeed is liberality,
- 1:25:30but the excess and defect are prodigality and illiberality, in which men exceed and
- 1:25:36are deficient in a contrary way. For the prodigal indeed exceeds in spending money,
- 1:25:43but is deficient in receiving it, and the illiberal man exceeds in receiving
- 1:25:47but is deficient in spending money. At present, therefore we think it sufficient
- 1:25:53summarily to adumbrate these things. But afterwards we shall discuss them more accurately.
- 1:26:00With respect to wealth. However, there are other dispositions of the mind,
- 1:26:03and the medium indeed is magnificence. For the magnificence differs from the liberal man
- 1:26:10in this that the former is conversant with greater but the latter with small things.
- 1:26:15The excess, however, is an ignorance of elegance and decorum and illiberal
- 1:26:20profusion. But the defect is an indecorous parsimony in spending money. And these
- 1:26:27vices differ from those which surround liberality. But in what they differ we shall
- 1:26:32afterwards show with respect to honor and ignominy. The medium, indeed is magnanimity,
- 1:26:39but the excess is called a certain inflation of the mind, and the
- 1:26:43defect pusillanimity. As we have said, however, that liberality corresponds to magnificence,
- 1:26:50but differs from it in this that it is conversant with small things.
- 1:26:55So too magnanimity, which is conversant with great honor. Another certain virtue corresponds,
- 1:27:00and which also is itself conversant with what is small. For it is
- 1:27:05possible to aspire after honor in such manner as is proper and more and less
- 1:27:12than is proper. But he who exceedes in his desires of honor is said
- 1:27:15to be ambitious, but he who is deficient is unambitious, and the middle
- 1:27:21character between both is anonymous. The dispositions also are anonymous, except the disposition
- 1:27:28of the ambitious man, which is denominated ambition. Hence, the extremes contend
- 1:27:34for the middle place. And we indeed sometimes call the middle character ambitious and
- 1:27:40sometimes unambitious. And sometimes we praise the ambitious and sometimes the unambitious man.
- 1:27:45But from what cause we do this will be shown hereafter. Now, however,
- 1:27:51conformably to the manner in which we begun, let us speak about the
- 1:27:56rest. With respect to anger. Therefore there is like vi excess, defect
- 1:28:00and a medium. But since these are nearly anonymous, we call the middle
- 1:28:05character a mild man, and the medium mildness. But of the extremes,
- 1:28:11let him who exceeds be wrathful, and the vice be wrathfulness, and let
- 1:28:15him who is deficient be a man void of anger, and the defect a
- 1:28:18privation of anger. There are likewise three other media, which have indeed a
- 1:28:24certain similitude to each other, but differ from each other. For all of
- 1:28:29them are conversant with the communion of words and actions. But they differ because
- 1:28:33one of them is conversant with the truth which is in them, but the
- 1:28:38others are conversant with the delectable. And of this, viz. The delectable
- 1:28:44one kind consists in jest, but another in all the concerns of life.
- 1:28:48We must therefore also speak concerning these, in order that we may in a
- 1:28:53greater degree perceive that in everything the medium is laudable, but the extremes are
- 1:28:58neither right nor laudable, but reprehensible. Of these, therefore, the greater
- 1:29:03part also are anonymous. But we must endeavor, in the same manner as
- 1:29:08in the rest, to give names to them, for the sake of perspicuity
- 1:29:12and the facility of understanding what follows. With respect to truth, therefore,
- 1:29:16the middle character may be called voracious, and the medium truth. But of
- 1:29:21dissimulation. That kind which exaggerates may be called arrogance, and he who possesses
- 1:29:27it an arrogant man. And that which extenuates may be called irony, and
- 1:29:31he who employs it may be denominated ironical or a dissembler. With respect however,
- 1:29:36to the delectable, and that kind which consists in jest. The middle
- 1:29:42character indeed may be called facetious, and the disposition itself facetiousness. But the
- 1:29:47excess may be denominated scurrility, and he who possesses it a scurrilous man,
- 1:29:55And he who is deficient may be called a rustic man, and the habit
- 1:29:59itself gosticity. In the other species of the delectable, which pertains to the
- 1:30:03concerns of life, he who delights in such a way as is proper is
- 1:30:09a friend, and the medium is friendship. But he who exceedes, if
- 1:30:13it is not with a view to any advantage, is studious of pleasing,
- 1:30:17but if for the sake of advantage, is a flatterer. And he who
- 1:30:20is deficient and in all things unpleasant, is contentious and difficult to be pleased.
- 1:30:27There are likewise media in the passions and in things pertaining to the passions.
- 1:30:32For bashfulness is not a virtue, And yet the modest man is praised
- 1:30:36for in these things, one indeed is called the middle character. Another is
- 1:30:42said to exceed, and another to be deficient. And he indeed who exceedes
- 1:30:45and is bashful in all things, is as it were, astounded. But
- 1:30:50he who is deficient and is not ashamed of anything is impudent, And the
- 1:30:56middle character is the modest man. Indignation is a medium between envy and joy
- 1:31:01for the calamities of others. But these habits are conversant with the pain and
- 1:31:05pleasure arising from what happens to others. For he who is propense to indignation
- 1:31:12is indeed pained from those that do well undeservedly. But he who is envious,
- 1:31:17surpassing the indignant man, is pained from all that do well. And
- 1:31:21he who rejoices in the calamities of others is so much deficient in feeling pain
- 1:31:27from the prosperity of bad men that he is delighted with it. These things,
- 1:31:30however, are discussed by us elsewhere, i e. In the second
- 1:31:34book of the Rhetoric with respect to justice. However, since it is not
- 1:31:40predicated simply, we shall make it the subject of discussion hereafter viz. The
- 1:31:45Fifth Book, and show how each of its parts is a medium. In
- 1:31:49a similar manner, Also, we shall speak concerning the rational or intellectual virtues
- 1:31:55in the sixth book, Chapter eight, Since however, there are three dispositions
- 1:32:01of the soul two indeed a vices, of which the one subsists according to
- 1:32:06excess, but the other according to defect. And since virtue is one of
- 1:32:11these dispositions, and is a medium, all these three dispositions are in a
- 1:32:15certain respect opposed to all. For the extremes are contrary to the middle and
- 1:32:20to each other. But the middle is contrary to the extremes. For as
- 1:32:25the equal is with reference to the less greater, but with reference to the
- 1:32:30greater less, Thus the middle habits exceed with reference to the deficiencies, but
- 1:32:34are defective with reference to the excesses, both in passions and actions. For
- 1:32:40the brave, with reference to the timid man, appears to be audacious,
- 1:32:44but with reference to the audacious man timid. In a similar manner, also
- 1:32:48the temperate man, with reference to him who is insensate, appears to be
- 1:32:53intemperate, but with reference to the intemperate man insensate. But the liberal,
- 1:32:59when contrasted with the illiberal man, appears to be a prodigal, but when
- 1:33:03compared with the prodigal illiberal. Hence, the extremes propel the medium, each
- 1:33:09to the other, and the timid calls indeed, the brave man audacious,
- 1:33:13but the audacious man calls him timid, and analogously in the other extremes,
- 1:33:18these, however, being thus opposed to each other, there is a greater
- 1:33:21contrariety in the extremes to each other than to the medium, for these are
- 1:33:27more remote from each other than from the medium, just as the great is
- 1:33:30more remote from the small, and the small from the great, than both
- 1:33:33of them from the equal. Farther still, in some extremes there appears to
- 1:33:39be a certain similitude to the medium, as in audacity to fortitude, and
- 1:33:44in prodigality to liberality. But in the extremes there is the greatest dissimilitude to
- 1:33:48each other. Things, however, which are very distant from each other are
- 1:33:54defined to be contraries, so that those things which are more distant are more
- 1:33:58contrary to each other, but to the medium. In some things, indeed,
- 1:34:02the deficiency is more opposed, and in others the excess. Thus to
- 1:34:06fortitude audacity, indeed, which is an excess, is not opposed, but
- 1:34:12timidity, which is a defect. And to temperance, the want of sensibility,
- 1:34:17which is an indigence, is not opposed, but intemperate, which is
- 1:34:21an excess. This, however, happens from two causes, one indeed from
- 1:34:27the thing itself, for one of the extremes being near to and more similar
- 1:34:31to the medium than the other. Hence not this, but the contrary is
- 1:34:35more opposed to it. Thus, for instance, since audacity appears to be
- 1:34:40more similar and nearer to fortitude, but timidity appears to be more dissimilar,
- 1:34:45on this account we oppose the latter two fortitude rather than the former, For
- 1:34:49things which are more distant from the medium appear to be more contrary. This
- 1:34:55therefore is one cause from the thing itself. But another cause is from our
- 1:35:00for those vices to which we are naturally more adapted appear to be more contrary
- 1:35:04to the medium. Thus, because we are naturally more adapted to pleasures,
- 1:35:09we are more easily impelled to intemperance than to moderation in the pursuit of pleasure.
- 1:35:15Those things therefore are said to be in a greater degree contraries to which
- 1:35:18a greater accession is made. And on this account, in temperance, which
- 1:35:24is an excess, is more contrary to temperance than the other extreme. Chapter
- 1:35:30nine, that ethical virtue therefore is a medium, and how it is so,
- 1:35:35and that it is a medium between two vices, the one existing according
- 1:35:40to excess, but the other according to defect, And that it is such
- 1:35:44in consequence of looking to the medium in passions and actions as to a mark
- 1:35:48has been sufficiently shown. Hence also it is laborious to be worthy, for
- 1:35:55in everything it is laborious to obtain the middle. Thus the middle of a
- 1:35:59circle cannot be discovered by everyone, but by him who is skilled in geometry
- 1:36:04in lank manner. To be angry and to give and spend money is in
- 1:36:09the power of everyone, and is easy. But to be angry and to
- 1:36:12give and spend money to whom, and as much and when and on what
- 1:36:17account, and as it is proper, cannot be accomplished by everyone, nor
- 1:36:23is it easy. For this is to act rightly, and is rare and
- 1:36:28laudable and beautiful. Hence, it is necessary that he whose attention is directed
- 1:36:33to the medium as to a mark, should first recede from that which is
- 1:36:38more contrary. As Calypso also admonishes far from the smoke and waves direct the
- 1:36:44helm. For of the extremes, the one, indeed is more erroneous,
- 1:36:48but the other less, since therefore it is difficult to obtain the medium accurately
- 1:36:55by making a second navigation. As they say, the least of the evils
- 1:36:59must be assumed, but this will especially be affected in the way we have
- 1:37:02mentioned. It is likewise requisite to consider what devices are to which we are
- 1:37:08most propense, For different men are naturally prone to different vices. But this
- 1:37:13will be known from the pleasure and pain with which we are affected. We
- 1:37:16ought, however, to draw ourselves to the contrary part, for by removing
- 1:37:20ourselves very far from air, we shall arrive at the medium, which those
- 1:37:26do who straighten distorted pieces of wood. But in everything we should especially avoid
- 1:37:30the delectable and pleasure, for we are not uncorrupted judges of it. In
- 1:37:35the same manner. Therefore, as the Trojan nobles were affected towards helen,
- 1:37:41we ought to be affected towards pleasure, and in everything where pleasure is concerned,
- 1:37:46to employ their decision. For thus by dismissing it we shall err in
- 1:37:50a less degree. By thus acting. Therefore, in short, we shall
- 1:37:55be especially able to obtain the medium. Perhaps, However, this difficult,
- 1:38:00and principally in particulars, for it is not easy to determine how and with
- 1:38:05whom, and on what account, and for how long a time it is
- 1:38:10requisite to be angry. For we indeed sometimes praise those who are defective in
- 1:38:14anger and call them mild, but at other times we praise those who are
- 1:38:18exasperated and call them virile. He, however, who deviates but a little
- 1:38:24from rectitude, whether he inclines in the more or the less, is not
- 1:38:28blamed. But he who deviates much from it, For the air of such
- 1:38:32a one is not latent. It cannot, however, be easily determined to
- 1:38:36what extent and how much he is blameable, as neither is this easy in
- 1:38:42any other sensible thing. But things of this kind rank among particulars, and
- 1:38:47the judgment of them pertains the sense. Thus much therefore is indeed manifest that
- 1:38:54the middle habit is in all things laudable, and that it is necessary at
- 1:38:58one time to incline to act excess, and at another two deficiency. For
- 1:39:02thus we shall easily obtain the medium and rectitude of conduct. End of Book
- 1:39:10two, Book three, Chapter one. Since therefore virtue is conversant with passions
- 1:39:19and actions, and praise and blame accompany things of a voluntary nature, but
- 1:39:25pardon and sometimes pity such as are involuntary. It is perhaps necessary that those
- 1:39:30who speculate concerning virtue should define the voluntary and involuntary. This will also be
- 1:39:38useful to legislators in conferring rewards and inflicting punishments. But those actions appear to
- 1:39:45be involuntary which are done by force or through ignorance. And the violent is
- 1:39:49that the principle of which is external, being of such a nature that it
- 1:39:55contributes nothing to the advantage of him who acts, or of him who suffers,
- 1:40:00as if, for instance, the wind or men who are the masters
- 1:40:04of some one should bring him to a certain place. With respect to such
- 1:40:10things, however, as are performed through the fear of greater evils, or
- 1:40:14for the sake of something beautiful in conduct, as if a tyrant who is
- 1:40:18the lord of parents and children should command one to do a certain base action,
- 1:40:24and on these conditions, that if he did it, his parents and
- 1:40:27children should be saved, but if he did not, they should die.
- 1:40:30With respect to such things as these, it is dubious whether they are voluntary
- 1:40:35or involuntary. Something of the like kind also happens in losses at sea,
- 1:40:41when in a tempest the goods of the ship are thrown overboard. For simply
- 1:40:45considered, no one throws them into the sea willingly, but every one who
- 1:40:48is endued with intellect does so for his own safety and that of the rest
- 1:40:53of the crew. Such like actions therefore are mixed. But they are more
- 1:40:58similar to voluntary acts, for they are then eligible when they are performed,
- 1:41:02but the end of the action is according to opportunity. A thing therefore must
- 1:41:09be said to be done voluntarily or involuntarily, then when it is done.
- 1:41:15But he threw his goods into the sea voluntarily, for the principle of moving
- 1:41:19the organic parts in such like actions is in the man himself. But those
- 1:41:25things of which the principle is in himself, he has the power to reform
- 1:41:29or not. Such things, therefore are voluntary, simply considered. However,
- 1:41:34they are perhaps involuntary, for no one would choose any one of these on
- 1:41:39its own account. But in such like actions. Men are sometimes praised when
- 1:41:44they endure something disgraceful or painful for the sake of great and beautiful circumstances,
- 1:41:49And if they do otherwise, they are blamed. For to endure the most
- 1:41:54disgraceful things with a view to nothing beautiful or moderate is the part of a
- 1:41:59bad man. To other things, however, no praise is given, but
- 1:42:02pardon is granted to them when a man does what he ought not to do
- 1:42:06in consequence of being compelled by such things as surpass human nature and which no
- 1:42:13one can endure. And perhaps there are some things which we ought never to
- 1:42:16do by any compulsion, but we ought to suffer the most dreadful evils and
- 1:42:21die rather than do them, for those circumstances appear to be ridiculous, which
- 1:42:27compelled the Elkmaeon of Euripides to kill his mother. It is, however,
- 1:42:31sometimes difficult to judge what is to be chosen in preference to something else,
- 1:42:36and whether this is to be endured instead of that. And it is still
- 1:42:41more difficult to persevere in our decisions, since, for the most part,
- 1:42:45things which are expected are attended with molestation, in things which we are compelled
- 1:42:49to do are base. Hence, both praise and blame are given to those
- 1:42:54that act from compulsion, and to those who do not. What kind of
- 1:42:59things therefore or are to be called violent? Shall we say that they are
- 1:43:02then simply to be called so when the cause is in things external, and
- 1:43:06the agent contributes nothing to the action, but things which are of themselves involuntary
- 1:43:13indeed, but are now eligible, and are eligible instead of certain other things,
- 1:43:17and the principle of which is in the agent. These are, of
- 1:43:21themselves indeed involuntary, but now and instead of certain other things, are voluntary.
- 1:43:28They are, however, more similar to voluntary actions, for actions are
- 1:43:32conversant with particulars than these are voluntarily performed. It is not, however,
- 1:43:38easy to show what things are to be chosen in preference to others, for
- 1:43:42there are many differences in particulars. But if it should be said that things
- 1:43:47delectable and beautiful are violent, for they compel us to act, being external.
- 1:43:53If this should be said, all things will thus be violent. For
- 1:43:57all men do everything for the sake of these, and those indeed who act
- 1:44:01from violence and unwillingly act painfully. But those who are influenced by the delectable
- 1:44:06act with pleasure. It is therefore ridiculous for a man to accuse external things
- 1:44:13and not himself, when he is easily captivated by things of this kind,
- 1:44:16and to consider himself as the cause of beautiful actions. But delectable things as
- 1:44:23the causes of his base actions. Hence, the violent appears to be that
- 1:44:28the principle of which is external, and to which the thing compelled contributes nothing.
- 1:44:33Everything, however, which is done from ignorance, is not voluntary,
- 1:44:38but that is involuntary, which is attended with pain and repentance. For he
- 1:44:43who does anything from ignorance and is not at all indignant with the action,
- 1:44:47does not indeed perform it willingly, because he acts from ignorance. Nor yet
- 1:44:53again, does he perform it unwillingly in consequence of feeling no pain from the
- 1:44:57action of those therefore who act from ignorance. He who repents of what he
- 1:45:01has done appears to have acted unwillingly. But he who does not repent,
- 1:45:05since he is a different character from the other, may be said to have
- 1:45:09acted not willingly. For since he is a different character, it is better
- 1:45:14that he should have a proper name. To act from ignorance likewise appears to
- 1:45:18be a different thing from acting ignorantly, For he who is intoxicated or enraged
- 1:45:24does not appear to act from ignorance, but from some one of the above
- 1:45:29mentioned circumstances, yet not knowingly, but ignorantly. Every depraved man therefore is
- 1:45:35ignorant what ought to be done and from what actions he should abstain, And
- 1:45:41from error of this kind may become unjust and in short bad. But an
- 1:45:46action ought to be called involuntary, not if he who does it is ignorant
- 1:45:50of what is advantageous. For ignorance in the deliberate choice of a thing is
- 1:45:56not the cause of involuntary conduct, but of depravity. Nor is the ignorance
- 1:46:00of universal the cause of it, for men are blamed on this account.
- 1:46:04But it arises from the ignorance of particulars in which and about which every action
- 1:46:11is conversant. For in these there is pity and pardon. Since he who
- 1:46:15is ignorant of any one of these acts involuntarily. Perhaps, however, it
- 1:46:20will not be amiss to define what and how many the particular circumstances are which
- 1:46:26render an action involuntary. They are, therefore the circumstance of the principal agent,
- 1:46:30the circumstance of the instrumental agent, the circumstance of the end, and
- 1:46:35the circumstances of the action itself. No one therefore, will be ignorant of
- 1:46:42all these unless he is insane. But it is evident that neither will he
- 1:46:45who acts be ignorant of them, or how can he be ignorant of himself.
- 1:46:50A man, however, may be ignorant of what he does, as
- 1:46:55is the case with those who say that they have spoken unawares, or that
- 1:46:59they did not know what they said was arkane, as Eschylus with respect to
- 1:47:03the mysteries, or as when someone throws a catapulta not knowing what he throws.
- 1:47:09A person also may fancy, like Meropi, that a son is an
- 1:47:14enemy, and that a spear which has a sharp point is blunt like a
- 1:47:16ball, or that a stone is upon us. A man likewise, striking
- 1:47:21another with a view to his safety, may kill him, and wishing to
- 1:47:26show the mode of exercise and wrestling, he may strike him whom he wished
- 1:47:30to instruct. As there is ignorance. Therefore, in all these particulars in
- 1:47:34which there is action, he who is ignorant of some one of them appears
- 1:47:39to have acted involuntarily, and especially in those things which are of principal importance.
- 1:47:45But those appear to be of principal importance in which there is action,
- 1:47:47and that for the sake of which action is undertaken. Since the involuntary therefore
- 1:47:54is denominated from an ignorance of this kind, it is besides this necessary that
- 1:47:59the action be painful and attended with repentance. But as the involuntary is that
- 1:48:04which is done from violence and through ignorance, the voluntary will appear to be
- 1:48:10that of which the principle is in the agent who knows the particulars in which
- 1:48:15the action consists. For perhaps it is not well said that actions which are
- 1:48:19produced through anger or desire are involuntary. For in the first place, indeed,
- 1:48:25if this were admitted, no other animal would act voluntarily, nor would
- 1:48:30children. And in the next place, whether are any of the actions which
- 1:48:33we perform through the influence of desire or anger done by us voluntarily? Or
- 1:48:39shall we say that worthy actions are performed by us voluntarily, but base actions
- 1:48:44involuntarily? Or would not this be ridiculous, since there is one cause of
- 1:48:48both of these? Perhaps, too, it is absurd to call those things
- 1:48:54involuntary after which it is requisite to aspire. But it is necessary to be
- 1:48:59angry with certain things and to desire others, such as health and discipline.
- 1:49:03It appears, however, that things involuntary are painful, but that those which
- 1:49:09are the objects of desire are delectable. Again, what difference is there between
- 1:49:14the errors which are caused by reason or by anger with respect to their being
- 1:49:17involuntary? For both are to be avoided. The irrational passions also do not
- 1:49:24appear to be less human. But the actions of man proceed both from anger
- 1:49:29and desire. It would be absurd, therefore, to consider these as involuntary.
- 1:49:34Chapter two. Having therefore defined the voluntary and involuntary, it follows that
- 1:49:42we should discuss pre election or deliberate choice. For deliberate choice appears to be
- 1:49:47most aligned to virtue, and by this, as a rule, a judgment
- 1:49:51may be formed of manners more than by actions. Deliberate choice therefore appears indeed
- 1:49:57to be a voluntary thing. Yet it is not the same with what is
- 1:50:00voluntary, But the voluntary is more extended. For of the voluntary children and
- 1:50:06other animals partake, but they do not partake of deliberate choice. And we
- 1:50:12say, indeed, the things which we do suddenly are done voluntarily, but
- 1:50:16not according to deliberate choice. But those who call it desire or anger,
- 1:50:21or will or a certain opinion do not appear to speak rightly. For deliberate
- 1:50:27choice is not common to us and irrational animals, but desire and anger are.
- 1:50:32And the incontinent man indeed acts from the influence of desire, but not
- 1:50:38from deliberate choice. On the contrary, the continent man acts from deliberate choice
- 1:50:44and not from the impulse of desire. And desire indeed is contrary to deliberate
- 1:50:49choice, But desire is not contrary to desire. Desire, likewise, is
- 1:50:55conversant both with that which is delectable and that which is painful. But deliberate
- 1:51:00choice is neither conversant with the painful nor the delectable. Much less is deliberate
- 1:51:05choice anger. For in the smallest degree do things which are affected through anger
- 1:51:11appear to be affected by deliberate choice. Nor yet is it will. The
- 1:51:15will appears to be near to it, For deliberate choice, indeed is not
- 1:51:19among the number of things impossible, And if any one should say that he
- 1:51:24deliberately chooses impossibilities, he would appear to be stupid. The will, however,
- 1:51:29is directed to things which are impossible, as for instance, to immortality,
- 1:51:33and the will indeed is also conversant with things which can, by no
- 1:51:38means be accomplished by him who wills, as that a certain player or person
- 1:51:43engaged in athletic contests may be victorious. No one, however, deliberately chooses
- 1:51:47things of this kind, but only such as he things can be affected through
- 1:51:51himself. Farther still, the will, indeed is more directed to the end,
- 1:51:57but deliberate choice to things pertaining to the end. And thus we wish
- 1:52:00to be well, But we deliberately choose those things through which we become well.
- 1:52:06And we wish indeed to be happy. And we say that this is
- 1:52:11our wish. But it is not fit to say that we deliberately choose to
- 1:52:15be happy. For in short, deliberate choice appears to be conversant with the
- 1:52:20things that are in our power. Neither therefore, will deliberate choice be opinion.
- 1:52:26For opinion indeed appears to be conversant with all things, and no less
- 1:52:30with things eternal and impossible than with things in our power. Opinion likewise is
- 1:52:36divided into the false and the true, and not into good and evil.
- 1:52:41But deliberate choice is rather divided into the latter than into the former. In
- 1:52:45short, therefore, perhaps no one will say that deliberate choice is either the
- 1:52:49same with opinion in general or with some particular opinion. For by deliberately choosing
- 1:52:56good or evil, we become affected with a certain quality. But this does
- 1:53:00not happen to us through forming an opinion. And we deliberately choose, indeed
- 1:53:04to obtain or avoid or to do something of the like kind. But we
- 1:53:10form an opinion of what it is, or to what it is advantageous,
- 1:53:14or in what manner, and we do not very much appine to obtain or
- 1:53:17avoid it. And deliberate choice, indeed is praised because it pertains to that
- 1:53:23of which it is necessary to partake more abundantly or with rectitude. But opinion
- 1:53:29is praised for its truth. We likewise deliberately choose those things which we especially
- 1:53:33know to be good, but we form an opinion of things which are not
- 1:53:38very much known to us. And the same persons do not appear to deliberately
- 1:53:42choose and opine the most excellent things, but some indeed opine that which is
- 1:53:46better, but from vice choose those things which ought not to be the objects
- 1:53:51of choice. It is, however, of no consequence, whether opinion precedes
- 1:53:57or follows deliberate choice. For our attention is not directed to this, but
- 1:54:01to the consideration whether deliberate choice is the same with a certain opinion, what
- 1:54:08men, or what kind of a thing is deliberate choice? Since it is
- 1:54:13no one of the above mentioned particulars, it appears therefore to be a voluntary
- 1:54:17thing. Not everything, however, which is voluntary, is the object of
- 1:54:21deliberate choice, but that which has been the subject of previous deliberation. For
- 1:54:27deliberate choice is accompanied with reason and the discourse of energy of reason, And
- 1:54:32this the name appears to signify, the object of deliberate choice, being that
- 1:54:38which is eligible in preference to other things. Chapter three. But whether do
- 1:54:44men consult about all things? And is everything a subject of consultation? Or
- 1:54:49about certain things? Is there no consultation? Perhaps, however, that must
- 1:54:55be called a subject of consultation, not about which some stupid or insane sane
- 1:55:00person consults, but which is an object of consultation to a man endued with
- 1:55:04intellect. Concerning eternal things, however, no one consults, such as concerning
- 1:55:10the world or the diagonal inside of a square, because they are incommensurable.
- 1:55:15Nor does any one consult about things which are in motion, but which are
- 1:55:19always passing into existence after the same manner, whether from necessity or naturally,
- 1:55:27or from some other cause, such as conversions and risings. Nor does any
- 1:55:31one consult about things which subsist differently at different times, such as about drought
- 1:55:36and rain, nor about fortuitous events, such is the discovery of a treasure,
- 1:55:43nor yet about all human concerns. For no Lacedaemonian consults. How the
- 1:55:47polity of the Scythians may be governed in the best manner, since none of
- 1:55:51these things can be affected by us. But we consult about things which can
- 1:55:58be performed by us. And these are the rest of things which we have
- 1:56:01not mentioned. For nature, necessity, and fortune appear to be causes,
- 1:56:08and besides these intellect and everything which energizes through man. The individuals, however,
- 1:56:15of the human species, consult about things which may be performed by them.
- 1:56:18And indeed, in those sciences which are accurate and sufficient to themselves,
- 1:56:23there is no consultation, as for instance, there is no consultation about letters,
- 1:56:29for there is no contention how we should write. But such things as
- 1:56:32are affected by us, yet not always after the same manner. About these
- 1:56:38we consult as about things pertaining to medicine and the art of procuring money,
- 1:56:43and about the art of the pilot, more than about the gymnastic art,
- 1:56:46because the former is much less accurate than the latter. In a similar manner,
- 1:56:51also we consult about the rest. But we consult more in the arts
- 1:56:56than in the sciences, for we dissent more about them. Consultation, however,
- 1:57:01takes place in things which have a frequency of subsistence, but of which
- 1:57:05the event is in manifest, and in things in which there is the indefinite.
- 1:57:11In things also which are of great importance, we employ counselors, distrusting
- 1:57:15our own judgment as not sufficient. We consult, however, not about ends,
- 1:57:20but about things pertaining to ends. For neither does a physician consult whether
- 1:57:25he shall heal a sick nor a rhetorician whether he shall persuade, nor the
- 1:57:30politician whether he shall establish equitable legislation. Nor does any one of the remaining
- 1:57:34characters consult about the end. But proposing a certain end, they consider how
- 1:57:41and by what means it may be obtained. If also it appears that this
- 1:57:45end is to be obtained through many media, they consider through which of them
- 1:57:48it may be obtained in the easiest and best manner. But if through one
- 1:57:53medium, they consider how it may be accomplished through this, and through what
- 1:57:58likewise this may be of, until they arrive at the first cause, which
- 1:58:02is discovered in the last place. For he who consults appears to investigate and
- 1:58:08analyze in the above mentioned manner, as if he were investigating and analyzing a
- 1:58:13diagram. It appears, however, that not every investigation is a consultation.
- 1:58:17For mathematical inquiries are not consultations. But every consultation is an investigation. And
- 1:58:25that which is last in analysis is first in generation. And if, indeed,
- 1:58:30in consulting we meet with an impossibility, we desist from consultation, as
- 1:58:35if there should be occasion for money, and this cannot be procured. But
- 1:58:41if that about which we consult appears to be possible, then we endeavor to
- 1:58:45obtain it. Those things, however, are possible, which may be accomplished
- 1:58:49through ourselves. For things which are accomplished through our friends are in a certain
- 1:58:55respect affected through ourselves. Since the principle is in us. But at one
- 1:59:00time instruments are explored, and at another time the use of them, And
- 1:59:05in a similar manner, in other things, at one time indeed, that
- 1:59:10being investigated through which the end may be obtained, and at another time the
- 1:59:14manner man. Therefore, as we have said, appears to be the principle
- 1:59:18of actions. But consultation is about things which may be performed by man,
- 1:59:24and actions are for the sake of other things. Hence, the end will
- 1:59:28not be the object of consultation, but things which pertain two ends. Neither
- 1:59:32therefore will particulars be the objects of consultation, as whether this thing is bred
- 1:59:39or as well baked, or is made as it ought to be. For
- 1:59:42these things pertain to sense. But if a man always consults, there will
- 1:59:46be a procession to infinity. The object of consultation, however, and the
- 1:59:51pre eligible or object of deliberate choice, are the same, except that the
- 1:59:58object of pre election or deliberate choice is something which is now definite. For
- 2:00:02the pre eligible is that which is preferred from consultation. For everyone ceases to
- 2:00:08investigate how he shall act when he has reduced the principle to himself and to
- 2:00:13that part of himself which ranks as the leader, since this part is that
- 2:00:16which he deliberately chooses. But this also is evident from the ancient polities which
- 2:00:21Homer has imitated, for the kings of these polities announced to the people what
- 2:00:27they had deliberately chosen to do. Since, however, that which is pre
- 2:00:30eligible is an object of consultation appetible of things which are in our power,
- 2:00:35pre election, also, or deliberate choice, will be an appetite of,
- 2:00:41or tendency to things in our power, accompanied with consultation for forming a judgment.
- 2:00:48In consequence of having consulted, we desire conformably to consultation. We have
- 2:00:55therefore adumbrated what pre election is and what the things are with them which it
- 2:01:00is conversant, and have shown that it belongs to things which have reference to
- 2:01:04ends. Chapter four. That will, however, pertains to the end we
- 2:01:11have shown. But this end, to some persons appears to be the good,
- 2:01:15and to others apparent good. But it happens to those who say that
- 2:01:19the object of the will is the good, that what he wills who does
- 2:01:24not choose rightly is not an object of will, For if it were an
- 2:01:28object of will, it would also be good. It may, however,
- 2:01:31happen to be bad. And it happens to those who say that the object
- 2:01:35of the will is apparent good. That the object of the will has not
- 2:01:40a natural subsistence, but is what appears to anyone to be eligible. A
- 2:01:45different thing, however, appears to be eligible to a different person, And
- 2:01:50if it should so happen, contraries appear to be eligible. If therefore these
- 2:01:56things are not approved, we must say that simply and an in reality,
- 2:02:00the good is indeed the object of the will, but that apparent good is
- 2:02:03the object of the will to everyone. To the worthy man, therefore,
- 2:02:09real good is the object of the will, but to the bad man casual
- 2:02:14good. Just as in bodies, to such as are well disposed, those
- 2:02:17things are salubrious, which are in reality so, but other things, to
- 2:02:23such as are diseased. And the light takes place in things that are bitter,
- 2:02:28sweet, hot, heavy, and each of the rest. For the
- 2:02:31worthy man judges of everything rightly, and in everything the truth presents itself to
- 2:02:38his view. For according to every habit, there are things beautiful and delectable
- 2:02:43which are peculiar to that habit. And perhaps the worthy man very much excels
- 2:02:48others in this, that he sees the truth in everything, being as it
- 2:02:53were, the rule and measure of things. But with the multitude deception is
- 2:02:58present on account of pleasure. For pleasure, though not good, appears to
- 2:03:01be so. The multitude therefore choose the delectable as good, but fly from
- 2:03:08pain as an evil. Chapter five. Since the end therefore is the object
- 2:03:15of the will, But things pertaining to the end are the objects of consultation
- 2:03:19and deliberate choice. The actions which are conversant with these will be actions of
- 2:03:26deliberate choice and voluntary. But with these the energies of the virtues are conversant.
- 2:03:32Virtue therefore also is in our power, and in a similar manner vice.
- 2:03:39For in those things in which to act is in our power, not
- 2:03:43to act is also in our power. And in those things in which we
- 2:03:46have the power not to act, we have likewise the power to act.
- 2:03:51Hence, if to act worthily is in our power, not to act basely
- 2:03:57will likewise be in our power. And if if we have the power of
- 2:04:00not acting worthily, we have also the power of acting basely. But if
- 2:04:06to act, and in a similar manner, not to act worthily and basely
- 2:04:12are in our power, and this is to be good or bad, it
- 2:04:15will be in our power to be worthy or depraved characters. And to say,
- 2:04:21with a certain tragic poet that quote no one is willingly depraved nor unwillingly
- 2:04:28blessed close quote seems to be partly false and partly true. For no one
- 2:04:33is unwillingly blessed. But depravity is voluntary. Or unless this is admitted,
- 2:04:41what we have just now asserted must be controverted. And it must not be
- 2:04:45said that man is the principle and generator of actions in the same manner as
- 2:04:50he is of children. But if these things are admitted, and we cannot
- 2:04:57refer them to any other principles than those which are in in our power,
- 2:05:00it follows that those things are in our power and are voluntary, of which
- 2:05:05also the principles are in our power. The truth of this appears to be
- 2:05:10tested both privately by individuals and publicly by legislators themselves. For they castigate and
- 2:05:17punish those who act depravely if they do not act from compulsion or from ignorance,
- 2:05:23of which they were not the causes. But they honor those who act
- 2:05:27well in order that they may excite these and impede those. No one,
- 2:05:31however, exhorts others to the performance of such actions as are neither in our
- 2:05:36power nor a voluntary because no advantage can be derived from persuading us not to
- 2:05:43be hot, or be in pain, or be hungry, or anything else
- 2:05:47of the like kind. For notwithstanding the persuasion, we shall no less suffer
- 2:05:53these things. For legislators also punish a man for his ignorance if he appears
- 2:05:59to be the cause of his ignorance. Thus, double punishments are ordained for
- 2:06:02those that are intoxicated, for the principle is in themselves, because they have
- 2:06:09the power of not becoming intoxicated, and this i e. Intoxication is the
- 2:06:15cause of their ignorance. They likewise punish those who are ignorant of anything which
- 2:06:19is legally established, which ought to be known, and which it is not
- 2:06:24difficult to know. And in a similar manner in other things which men appear
- 2:06:29to be ignorant of from negligence, and of which it is in their power
- 2:06:33not to be ignorant, for it is in our power to pay attention to
- 2:06:38it ought to be known. Perhaps, however, it may be said that
- 2:06:43a man is a person of such a character that he cannot pay attention.
- 2:06:46But such persons are themselves the causes of their characteristic qualities in consequence of living
- 2:06:54negligently. The causes, likewise, of men being unjust or intemperate, are
- 2:07:00in themselves in consequence of the former acting wickedly, and of the latter spending
- 2:07:04their time in drinking and things of the like kind. For energies in everything
- 2:07:10render those who employ them similar to such energies. This, however, is
- 2:07:15evident from those who exercise themselves in any contest or action, for they persevere
- 2:07:20in energizing to be ignorant. Therefore, that in everything from energizing about the
- 2:07:27thing habits are produced is the province of a very insensate man. Again,
- 2:07:31it is absurd to suppose that he who acts unjustly is unwilling to be unjust,
- 2:07:38or that he who acts intemperately is unwilling to be intemperate. But if
- 2:07:43any one does those things from which he will be unjust, not ignorantly,
- 2:07:46he will be unjust willingly. Nevertheless, though he should wish, he will
- 2:07:53not cease to be unjust and become just. For neither does he who is
- 2:07:57diseased become well by wishing to be so, even though it should happen that
- 2:08:01he is voluntarily diseased by living intemperately and disobeying his physicians. Prior therefore,
- 2:08:07to his living intemperately, it was in his power not to be diseased.
- 2:08:11But after having abandoned himself to intemperance, it was no longer possible, as
- 2:08:16neither is it possible for him who has thrown a stone to resume it.
- 2:08:20At the same time, it was in his power to emit from his hand
- 2:08:24and hurl the stone, for he contained the principle of action in himself.
- 2:08:28Thus, also to the unjust and intemperate man, it was possible from the
- 2:08:33beginning not to be unjust and intemperate, on which account they are voluntarily so.
- 2:08:39But when they are become such characters, it is no longer possible for
- 2:08:43them not to be so. Not only, however, the vices of the
- 2:08:48soul are voluntary, but in some persons also the vices of the body,
- 2:08:52which likewise we reprehended. For no one reprehends those who are naturally deformed,
- 2:08:58but we blame those who are so through the want of exercise and from negligence.
- 2:09:03The like also takes place in imbecility and mutilation. For no one would
- 2:09:09reproach a man who is blind from nature, or disease, or a blow,
- 2:09:13but would rather pity him. But everyone would reprove him who is blind
- 2:09:16from drinking wine, to excess, or from any other species of intemperance.
- 2:09:22Of the vices therefore pertaining to the body, those indeed that are in our
- 2:09:26power are blamed, but those which are not are not reprehended. But if
- 2:09:31this be the case in other things, also the vices which are reprehended will
- 2:09:35be in our power. If, however, some one should say that all
- 2:09:39men aspire after a parent could, but that we have no authority over the
- 2:09:45phantasy, and that such as everyone is such, also does the end appear
- 2:09:48to him to be. If indeed every one is to himself in a certain
- 2:09:54respect the cause of habit, he will also be in a certain respect the
- 2:09:58cause to himself of the fantasy, i e. Of the conception which he
- 2:10:03forms of a thing in his imagination. But if no one is the cause
- 2:10:07to himself of bad conduct, but he acts evinly from an ignorance of the
- 2:10:13end, fancying that by so acting he shall obtain the greatest good. And
- 2:10:18if the desire of the end is not spontaneous, but it is requisite that
- 2:10:22everyone should be born endued, as it were, with sight, by which
- 2:10:26he may judge rightly and may choose real good. And if also he is
- 2:10:31naturally of a good disposition, in whom this is well implanted by nature,
- 2:10:35For that which is greatest and most beautiful, and which can neither be obtained
- 2:10:39nor learned from another person, but which such as a man is naturally such
- 2:10:45he possesses, and to be naturally inclined to this well and beautifully will be
- 2:10:50a perfect and true natural goodness of disposition. If these things are true,
- 2:10:56why will virtue more than vice be voluntary? For the end appears and is
- 2:11:00similarly posited both to the good and the bad man, either by nature or
- 2:11:05in some other way. But referring other things to this, they act in
- 2:11:09any man or whatever. Whether therefore the end, whatever it may be,
- 2:11:16is not apparent to every one from nature, but there is also something with
- 2:11:20him who acts, or whether the end is natural. Yet, because a
- 2:11:24worthy man performs other things voluntarily, and therefore virtue is voluntary, vice also
- 2:11:30will be no less voluntary. For in a bad as well as in a
- 2:11:33good man, there is similarly a power of acting from himself in what he
- 2:11:39does, though the intention of the end is not in our power. If
- 2:11:43therefore, as we have said, the virtues are voluntary, for we ourselves,
- 2:11:48in a certain respect are the concuses of habits, and in consequence of
- 2:11:52being disposed in a certain way, we propose to ourselves a certain end.
- 2:11:58If this be the case, the vice this also will be voluntary. For
- 2:12:01a similar reason. We have therefore spoken in common concerning the virtues, have
- 2:12:07adumbraided the genus of them, and have shown that they are media and habits.
- 2:12:13We have likewise unfolded what the things are from which they are produced,
- 2:12:18and have shown that they are caused by energies, and are the principles of
- 2:12:22energies similar to those by which they are generated. That they are likewise in
- 2:12:28our power, and are voluntary things. And this in such a way as
- 2:12:31right reason shall ordain. Actions, However, and habits are not similarly voluntary.
- 2:12:39For of actions we are the lords from the beginning to the end.
- 2:12:43Since we have a knowledge of particulars, but of habits we are only lords
- 2:12:48of the principle. The accession, however, of particulars is not known,
- 2:12:52as it is in diseases, but because it is in our power. Thus
- 2:12:56to use or not to use particulars. On this account, our habits a
- 2:13:00voluntary Resuming therefore the discussion of each of the virtues, let us show what
- 2:13:05they are, what the quality of the things is with which they are conversant,
- 2:13:09and how they subsist. But at the same time it will be manifest
- 2:13:15how many there are. And in the first place, let us consider fortitude
- 2:13:22Chapter six. That fortitude therefore is indeed a medium which is conversant with fear
- 2:13:28and audacity has been already observed by us. But we evidently fear things of
- 2:13:35a terrible nature, and these are in short evils. Hence, also fear
- 2:13:41is defined to be the expectation of evil. We fear therefore all things that
- 2:13:46are evil, such as infamy, poverty, disease, the want of friends,
- 2:13:50and death. The brave man, however, does not appear to be
- 2:13:54conversant with all evils. For it is necessary and beautiful to be afraid of
- 2:14:00some things, and not to be afraid of them is base, as for
- 2:14:03instance, not to be afraid of infamy. For he who is afraid of
- 2:14:07this is a worthy and modest man. But he who is not afraid of
- 2:14:11it is impudent. He is, however, metaphorically called by some a brave
- 2:14:16man, for he has something similar to the brave man, since the brave
- 2:14:22man also is fearless. But perhaps it is not proper to fear poverty or
- 2:14:26disease, or in short, such things as neither proceed from vice nor from
- 2:14:31ourselves. Yet neither is he who is fearless with respect to these a brave
- 2:14:37man. We denominate him, however, brave from similitude. For some men
- 2:14:41who, in the dangers of war are timid, are liberal and possess a
- 2:14:46proper confidence in the loss of money. Neither therefore is he timid who dreads
- 2:14:50insolent conduct towards his children and wife, or envy, or anything of the
- 2:14:56like kind. Nor is he a brave man if he is cond confident when
- 2:15:00he is about to be whipped with what kind of dreadful things? Therefore is
- 2:15:05the brave man conversant? Shall we say, with such as are the greatest?
- 2:15:09For no one endures dreadful things better. But death is the most dreadful
- 2:15:13of things, for it is the end of life, and nothing farther appears
- 2:15:18to remain. For him who is dead, either good or bad, But
- 2:15:22neither does the brave man appear to be conversant with every kind of death,
- 2:15:26as, for instance, death in the sea or from disease. With what
- 2:15:31kinds of death, therefore, is he conversant, shall we not say,
- 2:15:35with those that are most beautiful? But these are the deaths which happen in
- 2:15:39war, For such a death is attended with the greatest and most beautiful danger.
- 2:15:46And the truth of this is confirmed by the honors which cities and monarchs
- 2:15:50confer on those who conduct themselves bravely. In more, he therefore may properly
- 2:15:56be called a brave man who is intrepid with respect to a beautiful death in
- 2:16:00such things as are the causes of death when they are near. But things
- 2:16:03of this kind are especially such as happen in war. Nevertheless, in the
- 2:16:07sea and in diseases, the brave man is intrepid, yet not in the
- 2:16:13same manner as sailors are. For brave men, when they despair of their
- 2:16:18safety, indignantly beare death of this kind. But sailors have good hope of
- 2:16:22escaping from their experience. At the same time, brave men act with fortitude
- 2:16:28in those things in which strength of mind is requisite, or it is beautiful
- 2:16:33to die. But neither of these exists in such like destructions. As we
- 2:16:37have mentioned Chapter seven. The same thing, however, is not terrible to
- 2:16:43all men. But we say that there is also something which is above man.
- 2:16:48This therefore is indeed terrible to everyone endued with intellect. But the terrible
- 2:16:54things which do not exceed the endurance of human nature differ in magnitude, and
- 2:17:00in the more and the less, and the like takes place in things pertaining
- 2:17:03to confidence. The brave man, however, is unterrified as a man.
- 2:17:09He will therefore indeed dread things of this kind, yet in such a manner
- 2:17:13as is proper, and as reason prescribes, for the sake of the beautiful
- 2:17:18in conduct, for this is the end of virtue. But it is possible
- 2:17:22to be terrified at these in a greater and less degree. And it is
- 2:17:26also possible to dread things which are not dreadful, as if they were so.
- 2:17:31Of the errors, however, in the endurance of things terrible, one
- 2:17:35consists in dreading what it is not proper to dread, another in dreading not
- 2:17:39as is proper, but another in not dreading when it is proper, or
- 2:17:45something of this kind, and in a similar manner in what pertains to confidence.
- 2:17:50He therefore, who endures and fears things which it is requisite to endure
- 2:17:54in fear, and for the sake of that for which it is requisite,
- 2:17:58and in such a way as and when it is requisite, and in a
- 2:18:01similar manner, He who thus confides is a brave man. For the brave
- 2:18:05man suffers and acts according to the importance of the thing, and conformably to
- 2:18:11reason. But the end of every energy is the end, according to habit
- 2:18:16i e. The beautiful in conduct, and to the brave man fortitude is
- 2:18:20beautiful. The end also is a thing of this kind, for everything is
- 2:18:26defined by the end for the sake of the beautiful in conduct. Therefore,
- 2:18:30the brave man endures and performs all that pertains to fortitude. Of the characters,
- 2:18:35however, which exceed he indeed, who exceeds in fearlessness is anonymous.
- 2:18:41But it has been before observed by us that many things are anonymous. He,
- 2:18:46however, who fears nothing, neither earthquakes nor inundations, as it is
- 2:18:50said of the Celtae, will be an insane person, or one who has
- 2:18:54no sense of pain. But he who exceeds in confidence respecting things of a
- 2:19:00terrible nature will be audacious. The audacious man also appears to be arrogant and
- 2:19:05a pretender to fortitude. Such therefore, as the brave man is with respect
- 2:19:09to things of a terrible nature, such does the audacious man wish to appear.
- 2:19:15And hence in those things in which he is able, he imitates him.
- 2:19:18On this account, also, many audacious persons have timidity united with audacity,
- 2:19:24for in consequence of their audacity, when danger is not imminent, they
- 2:19:28do not endure things of a dreadful nature when they occur. But he who
- 2:19:33exceedes in fearing is timid, for he fears what he ought not, and
- 2:19:37in such a manner as he ought not to fear, And all such things
- 2:19:41are consequent to him. But he is deficient in confiding, as he exceeds.
- 2:19:46However, in pains he is more apparent. The timid man therefore is
- 2:19:52hopeless, for he fears all things, but the brave man is the contrary,
- 2:19:56for confidence is the province of the man who who hopes for the best.
- 2:20:01The timid, the audacious, and the brave man therefore are conversant with
- 2:20:05the same things, but they are differently affected towards them. For the timid
- 2:20:11and the audacious man exceed and are deficient. But the brave man is disposed
- 2:20:16towards things dreadful in the middle way, and in such a manner as is
- 2:20:20proper. And audacious men, indeed, are precipitate and wish to encounter dangers
- 2:20:26before they arrive, but when they arrive they are deficient in fortitude. Brave
- 2:20:31men, however, are ardent in encountering danger, and before it arrives they
- 2:20:35are quiet. As we have said, therefore, fortitude is a medium conversant
- 2:20:39with those things of a dreadful nature, and such as pertain to confidence,
- 2:20:45which we have mentioned, and it chooses and endures them because it is beautiful.
- 2:20:48To do so, or not to do so is base. But to
- 2:20:52die in order to avoid poverty or on account of love or something painful,
- 2:20:58is not the province of a brave but rather of a timid man. For
- 2:21:03it is effeminate to fly from things laborious. And such do not endure death
- 2:21:07because it is beautiful to endure it, but in order to fly from evil.
- 2:21:11Fortitude, therefore, is a certain thing of this kind. Chapter eight.
- 2:21:18Other kinds of fortitude also are denominated according to four modes, and in
- 2:21:24the first place indeed political fortitude, since this most resembles fortitude truly so called,
- 2:21:31for citizens appear to endure dangers on account of the punishments and disgrace inflicted
- 2:21:37by the laws, and also on account of the honours they confer. Hence,
- 2:21:41the most brave men appear to be found among those with whom the timid
- 2:21:45are disgraced and the brave are honoured. Homer likewise introduces such persons, as,
- 2:21:52for instance, Diomede and Hector shall proud Polydaemus before the gate proclaim his
- 2:22:00counsels are obeyed too late, which timely followed. But the former night what
- 2:22:05numbers had been saved by Hector's flight close quote and Diomede quote, but ah,
- 2:22:15what grief should haughty Hector boast I have fled inglorious to the guarded coast
- 2:22:20close quote. This species of fortitude, however, is especially similar to the
- 2:22:24before mentioned, because it is produced from virtue, for it is generated through
- 2:22:30shame and a desire of the beautiful in conduct, for it is through a
- 2:22:33desire of honor and a flight from disgrace, which is dishonorable. Those also
- 2:22:39may be ranked among brave men who are compelled to be brave by their rulers.
- 2:22:45But they are inferior to the former, i e. The politically brave,
- 2:22:48because their conduct is not produced through shame but through fear, and is
- 2:22:54not the consequence of flying from what is base, but from what is painful,
- 2:22:58For they are compelled by their masters. Thus Hector quote on rushed bold,
- 2:23:05Hector gloomy, as the knight forbids to plunder, animates the fight points
- 2:23:11to the fleet. For by the gods, who flies, who dares but
- 2:23:16linger by this hand he dies no weeping sister. His cold eye shall close,
- 2:23:22no friendly hand, his funeral pile compose. Who stops to plunder at
- 2:23:28this signal hour, the birds shall tear him, and the dog's devour close
- 2:23:35quote. And the generals scourge the soldiers if they desert their ranks. The
- 2:23:39same thing also has done by those who dispose their troops before Foss's and adopt
- 2:23:45other methods of the like kind. For all these employ force. It is
- 2:23:50necessary, however, not to be brave from necessity, but because it is
- 2:23:54beautiful to be so. But experience, but particulars, appears to be a
- 2:23:58certain for the decay. Whence also Socrates thought that fortitude was a science.
- 2:24:03And indeed there are other such persons in other things. But soldiers are such
- 2:24:09in warlike affairs, for it seems that there are many vain terrors in war
- 2:24:13of which soldiers are especially aware. Soldiers therefore appear to be brave because other
- 2:24:20persons do not understand the nature of these alarms. In the next place,
- 2:24:24they are especially able from their experience to attack their enemies without receiving any injury
- 2:24:31themselves. They also know how to guard against and strike their enemies in consequence
- 2:24:35of being able to use their arms and having armor of such a kind as
- 2:24:41is most excellent for the purpose of attacking without being injured by their adversaries.
- 2:24:46They fight therefore, like armed with unarmed men, and like athletes with those
- 2:24:52that are unskilled in athletic exercises. For in such like contests, not the
- 2:24:58most brave are the most adaptive to fight, but those who are most strong
- 2:25:01and those whose bodies are in the most excellent condition. But soldiers become timid
- 2:25:07when the danger is excessive and they are deficient in numbers and warlike apparatus.
- 2:25:13For the merely skillful are the first that fly, but those who act bravely
- 2:25:18according to political circumstances, die, remaining at their post, as it happened
- 2:25:22at the Hermaeus, since citizens flight is base and death is more eligible than
- 2:25:28such a preservation. But the soldiers in this battle at Hermaus encountered the danger
- 2:25:35at first as thinking themselves superior to their enemies. But when they saw the
- 2:25:39full extent of the danger, they fled, dreading death more than disgrace.
- 2:25:45The brave man, however, is not a person of this description. Anger
- 2:25:50also is referred to fortitude, for men likewise appear to be brave on account
- 2:25:54of anger, just as wild beasts rush on those that moon them, because
- 2:25:58brave men also are irascable. Whence, Homer says, quote strength be to
- 2:26:07anger added, and his ardor and his wrath he roused, and pungent fury
- 2:26:16from his nostrils flowed, and his blood boiled close quote, For everything of
- 2:26:28this kind appears to signify the energy and impulse of anger. Brave men therefore
- 2:26:33act on account of the beautiful in conduct, but anger cooperates with them,
- 2:26:39and savage animals act through the influence of pain, for they act because they
- 2:26:43are wounded or terrified, since if they are in a wood or in a
- 2:26:48marsh, they do not attack anyone. Hence, those persons are not brave
- 2:26:52who are impelled to danger by pain and anger, for seeing nothing that is
- 2:26:56dreadful. Since thus, asses also would be brave when they are hungry,
- 2:27:01for they cannot, even by blows, be driven from their pasture. Adulterers,
- 2:27:07likewise, perform many audacious deeds through their lustful desire. Those therefore are
- 2:27:13not brave or impelled to danger through pain or anger. The fortitude, however,
- 2:27:18appears to be most natural, which subsists on account of anger, and
- 2:27:22which assumes deliberate choice, and that for the sake of which a thing is
- 2:27:26done, or the final cause. Men also, when they are angry,
- 2:27:31are pained, but are delighted when they take vengeance on the authors of their
- 2:27:35anger. Those, however, who act under the influence of these causes,
- 2:27:39are indeed pugnacious, but not brave, for they do not act with a
- 2:27:45view to the beautiful in conduct, nor from the dictates of reason, but
- 2:27:50from the influence of passion, but may possess something similar to fortitude. Nor
- 2:27:56yet, are those who are full of good hope brave, for in consequence
- 2:28:00of having frequently conquered and conquered many. They are confident in dangers. But
- 2:28:07they are similar to brave men, because both these characters are confident. Brave
- 2:28:11men, however, are indeed confident for the reasons we have already assigned,
- 2:28:16but these because they fancy they are superior to others, and that they shall
- 2:28:20suffer no evil from their opponents. Those also, that are intoxicated, act
- 2:28:26after this manner, for they become full of good hope. But when they
- 2:28:31are frustrated of their expectations, they fly from danger. It is, however,
- 2:28:37the province of a brave man to endure things which are and appear to
- 2:28:41be dreadful to men, because it is beautiful to do so, and base
- 2:28:45not to endure them. Hence, also it appears to be the part of
- 2:28:48a more brave man to be fearless and without perturbation in sudden terrors, rather
- 2:28:54than in such as wherefore seen. For this rather proceeds from habit, and
- 2:28:58in a less degree from preparation. For things indeed, which were foreseen may
- 2:29:03be chosen from deliberation and reason. But in things which suddenly happen, a
- 2:29:09man can only conduct himself fearlessly from the habit of fortitude. Those persons likewise
- 2:29:16appear to be brave who are ignorant of danger, and they are not fair
- 2:29:20remote from those who are full of good hope. They are, however,
- 2:29:24inferior to them, because they have no preconceived opinion of vanquishing the evil,
- 2:29:28but the former have. Hence, the fortitude of those who are full of
- 2:29:33good hope continues for a certain time, but the fortitude of those who are
- 2:29:37ignorant of danger ceases as soon as the deception is apparent, as was the
- 2:29:43case with the Archives when they met with the Lacedaemonians and thought them to be
- 2:29:48Sisionians. And thus we have shown what kind of men the brave are and
- 2:29:52those who appear to be brave. Chapter nine. Since, however, fortitude
- 2:30:01is conversant with confidence and fear, yet it is not similarly conversant with both,
- 2:30:07but in a greater degree with things of a terrible nature. For he
- 2:30:11who is without perturbation in these, and who conducts himself in them as he
- 2:30:16ought, is more brave than he who does so in things pertaining to confidence.
- 2:30:20Brave men, therefore, as we have before observed, are called brave
- 2:30:24from enduring things of a painful nature. Hence, also fortitude is unaccompanied with
- 2:30:31pain, and is justly praised, for it is more difficult to endure pain
- 2:30:37than to abstain from pleasure. Nevertheless, the end, according to fortitude may
- 2:30:43appear to be pleasant, but to be obscured and obliterated by surrounding circumstances,
- 2:30:48just as it happens in gymnastic contests. For to pugilists, indeed, the
- 2:30:54end for the sake of which they contend is pleasing viz. A crown and
- 2:30:58honors, but to be beat, since this pertains to the flesh, is
- 2:31:03painful, as is likewise every labor. Because however, the circumstances which produce
- 2:31:09pain are many, and that for the sake of which they content is small,
- 2:31:13it appears to possess nothing delectable. If therefore a thing of this kind
- 2:31:18also pertains to fortitude. Death, indeed, and wounds will be painful to
- 2:31:22a brave man and to one who is unwilling to endure them. The brave
- 2:31:28man, however, endures them because it is beautiful so to do, or
- 2:31:31because it is base not to endure them, and by how much the more
- 2:31:37he possesses every virtue, and is more happy by so much. The more
- 2:31:41will he be pained by death, where such a man most eminently deserves to
- 2:31:46live, and he is knowingly deprived by death of the greatest goods. But
- 2:31:50this is painful. He is, however, no less brave, and perhaps
- 2:31:56he is more brave because he chooses that conduct in battle, which is beautiful,
- 2:32:00in preference to these goods to energize. Therefore, delectably does not pertain
- 2:32:05to all the virtues, except so far as they come into contact with the
- 2:32:09end. But perhaps nothing prevents not only those from being most excellent soldiers,
- 2:32:16who are most brave, but also those who are less brave and possess no
- 2:32:20other good, For these are prepared for danger and to lose their life for
- 2:32:24a small gain. And thus much concerning fortitude, and it is not difficult
- 2:32:30from what has been said to adumbrate what it is Chapter ten. In the
- 2:32:37next place, let us speak concerning temperance, For these i e. Fortitude
- 2:32:41and temperance appear to be the virtues of the irrational parts. The temperance,
- 2:32:46therefore, is a medium conversant with pleasures. Has been already observed by us,
- 2:32:52for it is conversant in a less degree, and not similarly with pains.
- 2:32:58But about pleasures and pain in temperance also is employed. What the pleasures,
- 2:33:03therefore, are with which temperance is conversant, We must now explain.
- 2:33:09Let pleasures, however, be divided into those pertaining to the soul and those
- 2:33:13pertaining to the body. Thus, for instance, the pleasures pertaining to the
- 2:33:18soul are ambition and the love of learning, For each of these is delighted
- 2:33:22with that which is the object of its desire, the body not being at
- 2:33:26all affected, but rather the rational part. And those who are conversant with
- 2:33:31such like pleasures are neither denominated temperate nor intemperate. Thus two with respect to
- 2:33:39such other pleasures as are not corporeal. For we call those who are lovers
- 2:33:43of fables and narrations, and who consume the day in such casual circumstances as
- 2:33:48present themselves triflers, but not intemperate. Nor do we call those intemperate who
- 2:33:54are pained by the loss of riches or friends. Temperance, however, will
- 2:33:58be conversant with corporeal pleasures. Yet neither will it be conversant with all such
- 2:34:03pleasures, For those persons are not called either temperate or intemperate, who are
- 2:34:09delighted with objects of sight, such as colors and figures and pictures, though
- 2:34:13it would seem that there is also a proper manner of being delighted with these,
- 2:34:18and that it is possible to be pleased with them according to excess and
- 2:34:22defect. Thus two in things pertaining to the hearing, for no one calls
- 2:34:26those intemperate who are excessively delighted with melodies or players, nor those temperate who
- 2:34:33are delighted with them in a proper manner. Nor are those denominated temperate or
- 2:34:37intemperate who are delighted with odors, except from accident. For we do not
- 2:34:43call those persons intemperate who are delighted with the smell of apples or roses,
- 2:34:48or odoriferous fumigations, But we rather denominate those persons so more are delighted with
- 2:34:54the smell of ointments and food. For intemperate persons are pleas with these,
- 2:35:01because through these the recollection of the objects of their desires is produced. Others
- 2:35:05also may be seen, who, when they are hungry, are delighted with
- 2:35:09the smell of food, But to be delighted with things of this kind is
- 2:35:13the province of an intemperate man. For to such a one these things are
- 2:35:18objects of desire. Nor do other animals receive pleasure from these senses except by
- 2:35:24accidents. For neither are dogs delighted with the smell, but with the eating
- 2:35:28of hairs, the smell producing the sense i e. Causing them to perceive
- 2:35:33food present. Nor is the lion delighted with the voice of the ox,
- 2:35:37but with eating him. But he perceives through the voice of the ox that
- 2:35:41he is near, and is seen to be delighted with this perception. In
- 2:35:46link manner, neither is the lion delighted with seeing or finding a stag or
- 2:35:50a wild goat, but he is pleased on seeing that from which he shall
- 2:35:54obtain food. Temperance and intemperance, therefore, are conversant with pleasures of this
- 2:36:01kind, of which also irrational animals partake. Hence, these pleasures appear to
- 2:36:05be servile and savage, and they are the pleasures pertaining to the touch and
- 2:36:11the taste. Temperance and intemperance, however, appear to use the taste,
- 2:36:16but in a small degree or not at all. For the judgment of sapers
- 2:36:20is the province of the taste which those persons employ who make trial of wines
- 2:36:26and season food. The intemperate, however, are not very much delighted with
- 2:36:31these sapers, but with the enjoyment of the food, the whole of which
- 2:36:35is affected through the touch, in meats and drinks, and in what are
- 2:36:39called venereal concerns. Hence, a certain person named Philoxenus, the son of
- 2:36:46Erics, who was most voracious needing, wished that he had a neck longer
- 2:36:50than that of a crane, as being one who is delighted with the touch.
- 2:36:54The touch, therefore, with which intemperance is conversant, is the most
- 2:36:58common of all the senses, and will appear to be justly disgraceful, because
- 2:37:03it exists in us, not so far as we are men, but so
- 2:37:07far as we are animals. To be delighted. Therefore with and especially enamored
- 2:37:11of such pleasures is beastly, for the most liberal of the pleasures which are
- 2:37:16perceived through the touch are not to be numerated with these, such, for
- 2:37:20instance, as the pleasures in gymnastic exercises produce through friction and heat. Since
- 2:37:26the touch of the intemperate man does not pertain to the whole body, but
- 2:37:31to certain parts of it. Chapter eleven. Of desires. However, some
- 2:37:37appear to be common, but others peculiar and advantageous. Thus, for instance,
- 2:37:43the desire of food is indeed natural. For everyone when in want,
- 2:37:48desires either dry or moist nutriment, and sometimes both. And as Homer says,
- 2:37:54both the young man and he is in the vigor of his age desire
- 2:37:58the joys of love. But everyone does not desire this or that food,
- 2:38:01nor the same food. Hence this desire appears to be properly ours, and
- 2:38:07it possesses also something natural, For different things are pleasing to different persons,
- 2:38:13and the same thing is more agreeable to some persons than to others. Few
- 2:38:18therefore err in natural desires, and they err in these in one way,
- 2:38:24viz. In excess. For to eat or drink what casually presents itself till
- 2:38:30an excessive fullness is produced is to surpass in multitude what is conformable to nature.
- 2:38:35Since natural desire is the replenishing of indigence, Hence such persons are called
- 2:38:41gluttons, as replenishing the indigence of nature beyond what is becoming. And those
- 2:38:46who are very servile become men of this description. But in those pleasures which
- 2:38:52are peculiar or proper, many persons air and in many ways, for they
- 2:38:56are denominated lovers of things of this kind, either from being delighted with things
- 2:39:01which are not proper, or being pleased with them more than is proper,
- 2:39:05as is the case with the multitude, or not in such a way as
- 2:39:09is proper, or not in that respect in which it is proper. The
- 2:39:15intemperate, however, exceed in all things, for they are delighted with some
- 2:39:18things with which it is not proper to be delighted, since they are odious,
- 2:39:22And if it is requisite to be delighted with some of such things,
- 2:39:26they are delighted with them more than is proper, and after the manner of
- 2:39:31the multitude. That excess therefore in pleasures is intemperate, and that it is
- 2:39:37blameable is evident. In pains. However, a man is not said to
- 2:39:41be temperate by enduring them as in fortitude, nor intemperate by not enduring them.
- 2:39:46But he indeed is intemperate who is pained more than is requisite, because
- 2:39:50he does not partake of pleasures so that the pleasure gives him pain in consequence
- 2:39:56of being desired by him above measure, and he is said to be a
- 2:40:00temperate man who is not pained by the absence of pleasure and by abstaining from
- 2:40:05it. The intemperate man therefore desires all pleasant things, or those which are
- 2:40:09most eminently pleasant, and is led by desire so as to choose what is
- 2:40:15most pleasant in preference to other things. Hence, also he is pained both
- 2:40:18when he is frustrated of pleasure and when he desires it, for desire is
- 2:40:24accompanied with pain, though it seems to be absurd that a man should be
- 2:40:28pained on account of pleasure. Those however, who are deficient in pleasures and
- 2:40:33are delighted with them less than is proper, are not very frequent. For
- 2:40:37an insensibility of this kind is not human, since other animals also distinguish food
- 2:40:43and are delighted with some kinds of it and not with others. But he
- 2:40:48to whom nothing is delectable, and with whom one thing does not differ from
- 2:40:52another, is very remote from human nature. Such a one also is without
- 2:40:58a name, because he does not very frequently exist. The temperate man,
- 2:41:01however, with respect to these things, subsists in a middle condition. For
- 2:41:07neither is he delighted with those things with which the intemperate man is especially delighted,
- 2:41:13but he is rather indignant with them. Nor, in short, does
- 2:41:16he rejoice in things in which he ought not, Nor is he very much
- 2:41:20delighted with anything of this kind, nor is he pained if it is absent,
- 2:41:24Nor does he desire it except moderately, nor more than is proper,
- 2:41:30nor at a time when he ought not, nor in short, anything of
- 2:41:33this kind. But such things, as being delectable, contribute to health or
- 2:41:39to a good habit of body, These he desires moderately, and in such
- 2:41:43a way as is proper. He also desires other delectable things, which are
- 2:41:48not an impediment to these, or which are not adverse to the beautiful in
- 2:41:54conduct or above his income. For he who is thus affected loves such pleasures
- 2:41:58beyond their dessert. The temperate man, however, is not a person of
- 2:42:03this description, but is one who acts conformably to right reason Chapter twelve.
- 2:42:11In temperance, however, appears to be more similar to the voluntary than timidity,
- 2:42:16for the former subsists on account of pleasure, but the latter on account
- 2:42:20of pain, of which the one indeed is eligible, but the other is
- 2:42:24to be avoided. And pain indeed astounds and disturbs the nature of its possessor,
- 2:42:31But pleasure produces nothing of this kind. It is therefore more voluntary,
- 2:42:35and on this account also it is more disgraceful. For it is more easy
- 2:42:39to be accustomed to these things, since there are many such in life,
- 2:42:43and the being accustomed to them is unattended with danger. But the contrary takes
- 2:42:50place in things of a dreadful nature. Timidity, likewise, may appear not
- 2:42:54to be similarly voluntary with particulars, for timidity indeed is with us pain,
- 2:43:00but particular so astounded men through pain that they throw away their arms and act
- 2:43:05in other things indecorously, And on this account they appear to be violent.
- 2:43:11The contrary, however, takes place with the intemperate man, for particulars with
- 2:43:16him are voluntary, since he desires them and his appetite is directed to them.
- 2:43:22But the whole of an intemperate life is less voluntary, for no one
- 2:43:26desires to be intemperate. We transfer also the name of intemperance to puerile errors,
- 2:43:31for they possess a certain similitude. But which of these is denominated from
- 2:43:35the other is of no consequence to the present discussion. It is, however,
- 2:43:41evident that the latter is denominated from the former. Nor does the transition
- 2:43:46appear to be badly made. For that which desires what is base is to
- 2:43:50be punished, and which has an abundant increase. But desires in a child
- 2:43:54are especially a thing of this kind. Where children live according to desire,
- 2:43:58and in these the appetite of the delectable especially flourishes. If therefore this appetite
- 2:44:05is not obedient in subject to the governor reason, it increases abundantly, For
- 2:44:11the appetite of the delectable is insatiable, and in the stupid man is every
- 2:44:16way diffused. And the energy of desire increases that which is allied to it,
- 2:44:20so that if the desires are great and vehement, they expel the reasoning
- 2:44:26power. Hence it is necessary that they should be moderate and few, and
- 2:44:30in no respect adverse to reason. But we call a thing of this kind
- 2:44:33obedient and reformed by correction. For as it is necessary that a child should
- 2:44:39live conformably to the mandate of his preceptor, thus also it is requisite that
- 2:44:46the part of the soul which energizes according to desire should live conformably to reason.
- 2:44:52Hence, it is necessary that this part of the soul in the temperate
- 2:44:56man should accord with reason, for the end proposed by both i e.
- 2:45:01By reason and desire in the temperate man is the beautiful in conduct. And
- 2:45:05the temperate man desires those things which it is proper to desire, and as
- 2:45:09and when it is proper. But reason likewise thus ordains, and thus much
- 2:45:15concerning temperance. End of Book three, Book four, Chapter one. In
- 2:45:26the next place, let us speak concerning liberality. But it appears to be
- 2:45:31a medium about riches. For the liberal man is praised not in warlike concerns,
- 2:45:37nor in those things in which the temperate man is praised, nor again
- 2:45:41in judicial affairs, but in the giving and receiving of riches, and more
- 2:45:46in the giving than in the receiving. We call, however, riches everything
- 2:45:52the worth of which is measured by money. But prodigality and illiberality are excesses
- 2:46:00and defects about riches, And we always indeed ascribe illiberality to those who pay
- 2:46:07more attention to riches than is proper. But combining. We sometimes attribute prodigality
- 2:46:13to the intemperate, for we call both the incontinent and those who consume their
- 2:46:20property in intemperance prodigals. Hence, men of this description appear to be most
- 2:46:26deprived, for at one and the same time they have many vices. They
- 2:46:30are, not, however, appropriately denominated, For he is a prodigal who
- 2:46:35has one certain vice, viz. The consumption of his property. For he
- 2:46:41is a prodigal who is destroyed through himself, since the consumption of his property
- 2:46:46appears to be a certain destruction of himself, as through this the means of
- 2:46:52living are obtained. In this way. Therefore, we consider prodigality with respect
- 2:46:58to those, however, of which there is a certain use. It is
- 2:47:03possible to use them well or ill. But wealth is among the number of
- 2:47:07things useful, and he uses everything in the best manner, who possesses the
- 2:47:13virtue pertaining to each thing. He therefore will use wealth in the best manner,
- 2:47:18who has the virtue pertaining to riches, and he is the liberal man.
- 2:47:24The use, however, of riches appears to be expense and donation,
- 2:47:28but the accepting and preservation of riches is rather possession, Hence it is more
- 2:47:35the province of a liberal man to give to those to whom it is proper,
- 2:47:39than to receive, whence it is proper, and not to receive whence
- 2:47:43it is not proper. For it is more the province of virtue to benefit
- 2:47:48than to be benefited, and to perform things which are beautiful, than not
- 2:47:52to perform things which are base It is not, however, a manifest that
- 2:47:58to giving, to benefit, to act beautifully are consequent, but to receiving,
- 2:48:03to be benefited or not to act basely. Thanks also are presented to
- 2:48:09the giver, but not to the receiver, and praise is rather bestowed on
- 2:48:13the former than the latter. It is likewise more easy not to receive than
- 2:48:18to give, for men are less willing to bestow what is their own than
- 2:48:24not to receive what belongs to another. Those also, who bestow are called
- 2:48:28liberal. But those who do not receive are not praised for liberality, but
- 2:48:33are no less praised for justice. Those, however, who receive, are
- 2:48:37not very much praised. But of all those who are loved on account of
- 2:48:43virtue, the liberal are nearly beloved the most, for they benefit others.
- 2:48:48And this consists in giving the actions, however, according to virtue, are
- 2:48:52beautiful and are for the sake of the beautiful. The liberal man therefore gives
- 2:48:58for the sake of the beuty beautiful, and gives rightly. For he gives
- 2:49:03to those to whom it is proper, and such things as are proper,
- 2:49:07and when it is proper, and whatever other particulars are consequent to giving rightly.
- 2:49:13And this he does either delectably or without pain. For that which is
- 2:49:18conformable to virtue is delectable or without pain, but is in the smallest degree
- 2:49:24painful. But he who gives to those to whom it is not proper,
- 2:49:30or not for the sake of the beautiful, but from some other cause,
- 2:49:33is not liberal, but must be called by some other name. Nor is
- 2:49:39he liberal who gives with pain, for such a one would prefer riches to
- 2:49:43a beautiful action. But this is not the province of a liberal man.
- 2:49:48Nor does the liberal man receive from whence it is not proper to receive.
- 2:49:52For neither is such a kind of receiving the province of one who does not
- 2:49:56honor riches. Neither will the liberal man be right readily disposed to ask a
- 2:50:01favor for It is not the province of him who benefits to be benefited easily.
- 2:50:07But he will take whence it is proper, as for instance, from
- 2:50:11his own possessions, not as a thing beautiful, but as necessary, in
- 2:50:16order that he may have the means of giving. Nor will he neglect his
- 2:50:20own affairs, because he wishes through these to supply the wants of certain persons.
- 2:50:26Nor will he give to any casual persons in order that he may have
- 2:50:30to give to those to whom it is proper, and when it is proper,
- 2:50:33and where it is beautiful to give. It is likewise very much the
- 2:50:37province of a liberal man, so to accede in giving, as to leave
- 2:50:41but little for himself. For it is the property of a liberal man not
- 2:50:46to consider himself. But liberality is denominated according to the property which is possessed.
- 2:50:54For the liberal does not consist in the multitude of gifts, but in
- 2:50:58the habit of the giver. And this habit gives according to the means of
- 2:51:01giving. Nothing, however, hinders but that he may be a more liberal
- 2:51:07man who gives fewer things if he gives them from less means. But those
- 2:51:13persons appear to be more liberal who have not acquired property themselves, but have
- 2:51:18received it from others, for they have had no experience of want, and
- 2:51:22all men are more attached to their own works, as is evident in parents
- 2:51:26and poets. It is, not, however, easy for the liberal man
- 2:51:31to be rich, since he is neither anxious to receive nor preserve wealth,
- 2:51:35but is more disposed to give, and does not honor riches on their own
- 2:51:39account but for the sake of giving. Hence, also fortune is accused because
- 2:51:46those who most deserve to be are in the smallest degree wealthy. This,
- 2:51:50however, does not happen unreasonably, for it is not possible that he should
- 2:51:56be rich who pays no attention to the means of obtaining wealth. Is also
- 2:52:00the case in other things. Nevertheless, the liberal man will not give to
- 2:52:05those to whom he ought not, nor when he ought not, and other
- 2:52:09things of the like kind, for if he did, he would no longer
- 2:52:13act conformably to liberality, and by thus consuming his wealth improperly, he would
- 2:52:18not have the means of giving to those to whom he ought to give.
- 2:52:22For as we have said, he is a liberal man who spends according to
- 2:52:26his property and on things, on which he ought to spend. But he
- 2:52:30who exceeds his means in spending is a prodigal. Hence we do not call
- 2:52:35Tyrant's prodigals, for it does not seem to be easy by gifts and expenses
- 2:52:39to exceed the abundance of their possessions. Since therefore, liberality is a medium
- 2:52:46which is conversant about giving and receiving riches, the liberal man will give and
- 2:52:50spend on things on which he ought, and as much as he ought,
- 2:52:54as well in small things as in great and he will thus act willingly and
- 2:53:00pleasure he will likewise receive whence it is proper, and such things as he
- 2:53:05ought to receive. For since this virtue is a medium about giving and receiving,
- 2:53:11he will do both these in such a way as is proper. Since
- 2:53:15a receiving of this kind is consequent to giving equitably, but a receiving which
- 2:53:20is not of this kind is the contrary. Things therefore, which are consequent
- 2:53:24may subsist together in the same thing, but it is evident that contraries cannot.
- 2:53:31But if it should happen to the liberal man that he should spend beyond
- 2:53:35what he ought and beyond what is becoming he will be pained, yet moderately,
- 2:53:41and in such a manner as is proper. For it is the province
- 2:53:45of virtue to be pleased and pained with those things with which it is proper
- 2:53:48to be so, and in such a way as is proper. The liberal
- 2:53:52man also is very pliable in pecuniary contracts, for he may be injured,
- 2:53:58since he does not honor riches. And he is more indignant if he has
- 2:54:03not spent what he ought, than pained if he has spent what he ought
- 2:54:07not, for he does not assent to symonides. But the prodigal heirs also
- 2:54:13in these things, for he is neither pleased nor pained with things with which
- 2:54:16he ought, nor as he ought. But this will be more evident as
- 2:54:22we proceed. It has, however, been observed by us that prodigality and
- 2:54:28illiberality are excesses and defects, and in two things, viz. In giving
- 2:54:33and receiving, For we place expense in the same class with giving. Prodigality
- 2:54:39therefore exceeds in giving and not receiving, but it fails in receiving, and
- 2:54:46illiberality fails indeed in giving, but exceeds in receiving. Except in small things.
- 2:54:52The peculiarities therefore of prodigality cannot be very much conjoined, for it is
- 2:54:58not easy for him who receives nothing to give to every one, since the
- 2:55:03property of those private individuals rapidly fails, who also appear to be prodigals.
- 2:55:09For a man of this description does seem to be better, though not much
- 2:55:13than the illiberal man, for he is easily cured by age and by want,
- 2:55:18and may arrive at the medium. For he has the properties of the
- 2:55:22liberal man, since he gives and does not receive, yet neither as he
- 2:55:26ought, nor in a becoming manner. If therefore he should happen to be
- 2:55:31accustomed to this, or in some other way should be changed, he would
- 2:55:35become liberal, for he would give to those to whom it is proper,
- 2:55:39and would not receive whence it is not proper. Hence, the prodigal does
- 2:55:43not appear to be depraved in his manners, for it is not the property
- 2:55:46of a bad or ignoble, but of a stupid man to exceed in giving
- 2:55:52and not receiving. But he who is prodigal after this manner appears to be
- 2:55:56much better than the illiberal man. For the above mentioned reasons, and also
- 2:56:01because the one benefits many, but the other no one, and not even
- 2:56:05himself. The multitude of prodigals, however, as we have said, receive
- 2:56:09whence they ought not, and according to this are illiberal. But they become
- 2:56:15prompt to receive because through being willing to spend, they are unable to do
- 2:56:20this with facility, for the means of spending rapidly fail them. Hence they
- 2:56:24are compelled to procure money elsewhere. But at the same time, because they
- 2:56:28pay no attention to the beautiful inconduct, they receive negligently and from every one
- 2:56:33indiscriminately, For they desire to give, but it is of no consequence to
- 2:56:39them how or whence they give. On this account, neither are their gifts
- 2:56:43liberal, for they are not beautiful, nor for the sake of this very
- 2:56:46thing the beautiful in conduct. Nor are they bestowed as they ought to be.
- 2:56:52But sometimes they cause those to be rich who ought to be poor,
- 2:56:54and give nothing to men whose manners are moderate, but bestow on flatterers or
- 2:57:01those who are the means of procuring them any other pleasures. Hence, also
- 2:57:05most of them are intemperate, for they spend their money easily and likewise spend
- 2:57:11profusely on things of an intemperate nature. And because they do not live with
- 2:57:16a view to the beautiful in conduct, then incline to pleasures. The prodigal,
- 2:57:20therefore, unless he is corrected, falls into these vices. But by
- 2:57:26care and diligence, he may arrive at the medium and to what is becoming
- 2:57:30in conduct. Illiberality, however, is incurable for old age, and every
- 2:57:37infirmity appear to render men illiberal, and it is more congenial to them than
- 2:57:41prodigality, for the multitude are more desirous of gain, then disposed to give.
- 2:57:48Illiberality, likewise extends widely and is multiform, since there appears to be
- 2:57:54many modes of it, for consisting in two things, a deficiency in giving
- 2:57:58and excess in receiving. It is not wholly and entirely present with all illiberal
- 2:58:03men, but sometimes it is divided, and some indeed exceed in receiving,
- 2:58:09but others are deficient in giving. For all those to whom such appellations apply
- 2:58:15as niggardly, tenacious, and sordid, are deficient in giving. But they
- 2:58:20do not desire the property of others, nor do they wish to receive some
- 2:58:24indeed through a certain probity and an avoidance of base conduct. For some of
- 2:58:31them seem to take care of their own property, or at least say that
- 2:58:35they do so, in order that they may not at any time be compelled
- 2:58:39to do anything base of these characters, however, the skin flint, and
- 2:58:43every one of the like kind, is so denominated from giving to no one
- 2:58:48in excess. But others of these abstain from property which is not their own
- 2:58:52through fear, because it is not easy for him who takes what belongs to
- 2:58:56others to preserve his own property unviole. Hence they are disposed neither to receive
- 2:59:03nor give. Others again exceed in receiving in consequence of receiving on all sides
- 2:59:09and everything, such as those who perform illiberal works together with panders, usurers,
- 2:59:15gamesters, sharpers, and other depredators, and those who, for the
- 2:59:20sake of a little subject themselves to great infamy. For all these receive whence
- 2:59:24they ought not, and what they ought not. The acquisition, however,
- 2:59:30of base gain, appears to be common to these, for all of them
- 2:59:33endure disgrace for the sake of gain, and this small for we do not
- 2:59:37call those illiberal who receive great things whence they ought not, and such as
- 2:59:43they ought not, as for instance, tyrants, the subverters of cities,
- 2:59:48and the plunderers of temples, But we rather call them depraved and impious and
- 2:59:54unjust. The gamester. Indeed, the highwaymen and the sharper are among the
- 3:00:00number of illiberal characters, for they are addicted to base gain, since for
- 3:00:05the sake of gain they devote themselves to these employments and endure disgraces, and
- 3:00:09some indeed expose themselves to the greatest dangers for the sake of what they may
- 3:00:15get. But others gain something from their friends to whom they ought to give.
- 3:00:18Both these therefore, since they wish to enrich themselves whence they ought not,
- 3:00:24are addicted to base gain, and all such receivings are illiberal. Reasonably,
- 3:00:28also, is illiberality said to be contrary to liberality, for it is
- 3:00:33a greater evil than prodigality, and men err more in this than in prodigality,
- 3:00:39of which we have spoken above. And thus much concerning liberality and the
- 3:00:43opposite advices Chapter two, it would seem to follow that we should, in
- 3:00:50the next place discuss magnificence, for it also appears to be a certain virtue
- 3:00:56which is conversant with riches. It does not, however, in the same
- 3:01:01manner as liberality, extend to all pecuniary actions, but only to those that
- 3:01:05are sumptuous, For in these it surpasses liberality in magnitude, for as its
- 3:01:11name signifies, it is a becoming costliness in great things. Magnitude, however,
- 3:01:18is a relative, for the same expense, does not become the commander
- 3:01:22of a three ranked galley and the president of a public spectacle. The becoming,
- 3:01:26therefore subsists with reference to him who spends, and to the things on
- 3:01:31which he spends his money and the money which is spent. He, however,
- 3:01:37who spends with decorum in small or in moderate things, is not called
- 3:01:41magnificent, such as quote to vagrant mendicants, I oft have given close quote.
- 3:01:50But he who spends appropriately in great things, for the magnificent is a
- 3:01:54liberal man. But the liberal man is not because liberal magnificent of the habit,
- 3:02:01however, of this kind, the deficiency, indeed is called parsimony.
- 3:02:05But the excess, vulgar, ostentation and ignorance of what is elegant and such
- 3:02:11other appellations as belong to habits which do not exceed in magnitude about things in
- 3:02:18which great expense is becoming, but exhibit a splendid profusion in things in which
- 3:02:24such profusion is not proper. Concerning these, however, we shall speak hereafter.
- 3:02:30But the magnificent resembles the scientific man, for he is able to survey
- 3:02:35what is the chorus, and can spend largely with elegance. For as we
- 3:02:39said in the beginning, habit is defined by energies and by those things of
- 3:02:45which it is the habit. But the expenses of the magnificent man are great
- 3:02:50and becoming, and such also are his deeds. For thus the expenses will
- 3:02:54be great and adapted to the deed. Hence it is necessary that the deed
- 3:02:58should be worth the expense, and the expense worthy the deed, or even
- 3:03:03surpassing it. The magnificent man therefore spends after this manner for the sake of
- 3:03:09the beautiful in conduct, for this is common to the virtues, and he
- 3:03:13also spends with pleasure, and largely because an accurate attention to expense is the
- 3:03:20province of a parsimonious man. The magnificent man likewise, will rather consider how
- 3:03:26he may accomplish the most beautiful and becoming work than the money it will cost,
- 3:03:31and how it may be accomplished with the least expense. It is necessary,
- 3:03:35therefore, that the magnificent should also be a liberal man. For the
- 3:03:39liberal man spends what he ought and as he ought. But in these things
- 3:03:43whatever his great pertains to the magnificent man, magnificence being, as it were,
- 3:03:48a certain magnitude of liberality. Since, however, liberality is conversant with
- 3:03:54the same things as magnificence, the magnificent man will produce a more magnificent from
- 3:04:01an equal expense. For there is not the same virtue of possession and a
- 3:04:05work, Since the virtue of a possession is to be of great worth and
- 3:04:09most precious as gold, But the virtue of a work is to be great
- 3:04:15and beautiful. For the survey of a thing of this kind is admirable,
- 3:04:18but the magnificent is admirable, and the virtue of a work is magnificence in
- 3:04:24magnitude. Among expenses, however, which we call honorable, are such as
- 3:04:30pertained to the worship of the gods, gifts dedicated to divinity, the building
- 3:04:35of temples and sacrifices, and in a similar manner, such things as pertain
- 3:04:39to every demoniacal nature, and such as are bestowed on the community at large
- 3:04:46from a laudable ambition. Thus the expenses of the magnificent man will be of
- 3:04:50this kind, if he should think it requisite to furnish public spectacles splendidly,
- 3:04:56or three rank galleys, or to feast the city. But in all things,
- 3:05:01as we have said, it must be considered who the agent is and
- 3:05:05what the means are which he possesses. For the expense ought to be such
- 3:05:09as is worthy of the means, and not only adapted to the work,
- 3:05:13but also to him by whom it is affected. Hence, a poor cannot
- 3:05:16be a magnificent man, for he has not the means of spending much in
- 3:05:22a becoming manner. The poor man, therefore, who endeavors to do so,
- 3:05:26is stupid, for such an endeavor is repugnant to his means and to
- 3:05:30the becoming. But that which is done rightly is done according to virtue.
- 3:05:35Such expense, however, becomes those who possess hereditary wealth, or have procured
- 3:05:39it themselves, or have derived it from their ancestors. Or by legacy,
- 3:05:46and it likewise becomes those who are noble and renowned, and other persons of
- 3:05:50the like kind, For all these have magnitude and dignity. The magnificent man,
- 3:05:56therefore is especially a person of this description. And magnificence, as we
- 3:06:01have said, consists in such like expenses, for they are the greatest and
- 3:06:07the most honorable. With respect to private expenses, however, those pertain to
- 3:06:11the magnificent man which are incurred but once, such as marriage and whatever.
- 3:06:18Also there may be of the like kind, and that about which the whole
- 3:06:22city is earnestly occupied, or those who are in the dignified situation. Also
- 3:06:28such expenses as pertain to the receiving and dismissing of strangers, together with gifts
- 3:06:33and remunerations, for the magnificent man does not spend sumptuously on himself, but
- 3:06:39on the public. But gifts have something similar to things consecrated to the gods.
- 3:06:46It is also the province of a magnificent man to build a house in
- 3:06:48a manner adapted to wealth, for this also is a certain ornament, and
- 3:06:54to bestow more upon those works which are more lasting, for these are most
- 3:06:58beautiful. It is likewise his province in each of these to observe the becoming,
- 3:07:05For the same things are not adapted to gods and men, either in
- 3:07:07building a temple or a sepulcher. And every essence, indeed is great in
- 3:07:13its own kind, and that is most magnificent, which is great in a
- 3:07:18great thing, But that is so in the second place, which is great
- 3:07:22in these things. For there is a difference between magnitude in a work and
- 3:07:26magnitude in expense. Since a ball, indeed, or a most beautiful jug
- 3:07:33possesses the magnificence of a childish gift, but the price of these is small
- 3:07:37and illiberal. On this account, it is the province of a magnificent man
- 3:07:41to do magnificently whatever he may do in every genus of things, For a
- 3:07:48thing of this kind cannot easily be transcended, and the magnitude of the expense
- 3:07:52is appropriate. Such therefore is the magnificent man. But he who exceedes and
- 3:07:58is vulgarly ostentatious, exceeds by spending, as we have before observed, beyond
- 3:08:05what is becoming. For in small things and which require but small expense,
- 3:08:09he consumes much money and is discordantly splendid. Thus, for instance, he
- 3:08:16will prepare a wedding dinner through ostentation, and give money to players who are
- 3:08:20present at the entertainment, as if it were for the public advantage. And
- 3:08:24in plays he will introduce a purple curtain before the scenes, as is done
- 3:08:30by the Megarinsians. He will likewise do everything of this kind not for the
- 3:08:35sake of the beautiful in conduct, but that he may display his wealth,
- 3:08:39and fancies that on account of these things he shall be admired in things.
- 3:08:43Likewise, where much expense is required, he spends but little, but where
- 3:08:48little expense is required, he spends largely. The parsimonious man, however,
- 3:08:52is deficient in everything, and when he has incurred a great expense, then,
- 3:08:58looking to the completion of the work by a too accurate investigation, he
- 3:09:03leaves it imperfect through too little expense. Everything, also, which he does
- 3:09:07is accompanied with delay and consideration, and on this account he laments and fancies
- 3:09:13that he does everything on a larger scale than he ought. These habits,
- 3:09:16therefore, are vices, Yet they do not bring with them disgrace, because
- 3:09:22they are neither injurious to others, nor base in the extreme Chapter three.
- 3:09:28But magnanimity is conversant with great things, as is evident from the very name.
- 3:09:33What the quality of the things is, however, with which it is
- 3:09:37conversant, we must in the first place consider. But it makes no difference
- 3:09:41whether we survey the habit or him who subsists according to the habit. He,
- 3:09:46however, appears to be magnanimous. Who deserving great things thinks that he
- 3:09:50deserves them. For he who thinks thus of himself undeservedly is stupid. But
- 3:09:56no one who is endued with virtue is either stupid or a fool. The
- 3:10:01above mentioned character, therefore is magnanimous. For he who deserves small things and
- 3:10:07thinks that he deserves them is a modest but not a magnanimous man, since
- 3:10:11magnanimity consists in magnitude, just as beauty consists in a large body. For
- 3:10:18small men are elegant and have symmetry a form, but are not beautiful.
- 3:10:24He, however, who thinks that he deserves great things but thus thinks undeservedly,
- 3:10:28is proud, though not everyone is proud. Who deserving many things thinks
- 3:10:33he deserves more. But he who estimates himself less than he deserves is pusillanimous.
- 3:10:39If deserving things of a moderate or small nature, he thinks himself to
- 3:10:43deserve still less than these, And he will especially appear to be a character
- 3:10:48of this kind, who, deserving great things, has this humiliating opinion of
- 3:10:54himself, for what would he do if he were not deserving of such things.
- 3:10:58Magnanimous man therefore is in magnitude the summit, but in that which is
- 3:11:03requisite the middle. For he thinks himself deserving of that which he does deserve,
- 3:11:09but the other characters exceed and are deficient. Hence, if deserving great
- 3:11:13things, he thinks that he deserves them, and especially if he deserves the
- 3:11:18greatest things, he will principally be conversant with one thing. What this is
- 3:11:22therefore must be assumed from dessert, and dessert is denominated with reference to external
- 3:11:28goods. We must, however, consider that as the greatest of external goods,
- 3:11:33which we attribute to the gods, after which those who are in a
- 3:11:37dignified situation especially aspire, and which is the reward of the most beautiful deeds.
- 3:11:43But honor is a thing of this kind, For this is the greatest
- 3:11:48of external goods. The magnanimous man therefore is conversant with honor and dishonor,
- 3:11:54in such a manner as is proper, and indeed, without any reasoning process,
- 3:11:58the magnetic appears to be conversant with honor. For great men especially think
- 3:12:03themselves deserving of honor, but they think so deservedly. The pusillanimous man,
- 3:12:09however, is deficient both with respect to himself and the desert of the magnanimous
- 3:12:15man. But the proud man exceedes, indeed with respect to himself, yet
- 3:12:20not with respect to the magnanimous man. The magnanimous man, however, if
- 3:12:24he is deserving of the greatest things, will be the best of men.
- 3:12:28For a better character always deserves something greater, and the best of characters deserves
- 3:12:33the greatest of things. Hence, it is necessary that the truly magnanimous man
- 3:12:39should be a good man, and that which is great in every virtue will
- 3:12:43appear to belong to the magnanimous man. Nor does it by any means accord
- 3:12:48with the character of the magnanimous man to fly agitated with fear or to injure
- 3:12:54anyone, for on what account will he act basely to whom nothing is great?
- 3:13:00But from a survey of particulars. The magnanimous man will appear to be
- 3:13:03ridiculous if he is not a good man, nor indeed will he be worthy
- 3:13:09of honor if he is a bad man. For honor is the reward of
- 3:13:13virtue, and is conferred on good men. Magnanimity therefore appears to be,
- 3:13:18as it were, a certain ornament of the virtues, for it causes them
- 3:13:22to be greater, and does not exist without them. On this account,
- 3:13:26it is truly difficult to be magnanimous, for it is not possible to be
- 3:13:31so without integrity and worth. The magnanimous man, therefore, is especially conversant
- 3:13:37with honor and dishonor, and with great honors. Indeed, and those which
- 3:13:41are conferred by worthy men, he is moderately pleased as being things familiar and
- 3:13:46adapted to him, or rather less than he deserves, for there can be
- 3:13:52no honor equal to the desert of all perfect virtue. Nevertheless, he will
- 3:13:56admit these honors, because they have not anything greater to confer upon him.
- 3:14:01But he will entirely despise the honor which is paid him by casual persons and
- 3:14:07for things of a trifling nature, for these do not accord with his dessert,
- 3:14:11and in a similar manner he will despise dishonor, for it will not
- 3:14:16justly befall him. The magnanimous man, therefore, as we have said,
- 3:14:20is especially conversant with honor. Nevertheless, with respect to wealth also, and
- 3:14:26power, and all prosperous and adverse fortune, he will conduct himself in these
- 3:14:33moderately, in whatever manner they may take place. And neither in prosperity will
- 3:14:39he be very much elated, nor an adversity very much dejected. For neither
- 3:14:43is he affected with respect to honor, as if it were the greatest of
- 3:14:46things. Since dominion and wealth are eligible on account of honor. Those therefore
- 3:14:52who possess these wish through them to be honored to him. However, to
- 3:14:58whom honor is a small thing, other things also will be small. Hence,
- 3:15:01likewise, magnanimous men appear to be supercilious. Prosperity, however, seems
- 3:15:07to contribute to magnanimity, for those that are nobly born are thought worthy of
- 3:15:13honor, and also men in authority, and those that are rich, for
- 3:15:16they surpass others. But everything which excels in good is more honorable. Hence,
- 3:15:22also things of this kind cause men to be more magnanimous, for they
- 3:15:26are honored by certain persons on account of them. In reality, however,
- 3:15:31the good man alone is to be honored. But he who possesses both these
- 3:15:35i e. Good fortune and virtue is reckoned more deserving of honor. Those,
- 3:15:41however, who possess such like goods without virtue, neither justly think themselves
- 3:15:46worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous men. For magnanimity cannot
- 3:15:50exist without all perfect virtue. But those who possess things of this kind become
- 3:15:56supercilious and insolent and bad men. For without virtue it is not easy to
- 3:16:01bear prosperity elegantly. But not being able to bear prosperity and fancying that they
- 3:16:07surpass other men, they despise them and act in a casual manner. For
- 3:16:11they imitate the magnanimous man without resembling him, and they do this in those
- 3:16:16things in which they are able. They do not therefore act conformably to virtue,
- 3:16:22but they despise other men. The magnanimous man, however, justly despises
- 3:16:26others, for he forms a true opinion of men and things. But the
- 3:16:31opinion of the multitude is casually formed. The magnanimous man also neither exposes himself
- 3:16:37to small dangers, nor is a lover of danger, because there are but
- 3:16:41few things which he considers to be of great importance. But he exposes himself
- 3:16:46to great dangers, and when he is in danger, is not sparing of
- 3:16:50his life, because he does not consider life as a thing of great importance.
- 3:16:56He is likewise disposed to benefit others, but is a shame to be
- 3:17:00benefited, for the former is the province of one who surpasses, but the
- 3:17:05latter of one who is surpassed. And the benefit which he returns exceeds what
- 3:17:09he received. For thus it will come to pass that he who first bestowed
- 3:17:13the benefit will be his debtor, and t will be benefited by him.
- 3:17:18Magnanimous men also appear to remember those whom they have benefited, but not those
- 3:17:24from whom they have derived any advantage, for he who receives is inferior to
- 3:17:28him who confers the benefit. But the magnanimous man wishes to excel. Hence,
- 3:17:35neither does Thetis mention the benefits she had conferred on Jupiter, nor the
- 3:17:39Lacedaemonians those which they had conferred on the Athenians, but those which they had
- 3:17:45received from them. It is likewise the property of a magnanimous man to ask
- 3:17:50nothing of anyone, or scarcely to do so, but to administer readily to
- 3:17:54the wants of others, and towards those, indeed, who are in a
- 3:17:58dignified situation and in prosperous circumstances, to be great in his behavior, but
- 3:18:05moderate towards those who are in a middle condition. For to surpass the former
- 3:18:09is difficult and venerable, but it is easy to excel the latter, and
- 3:18:15to conduct himself with dignity. Among the former is not ignoble, but among
- 3:18:20the lower class of men it is arrogant, in the same manner as it
- 3:18:22would be for man to display his strength among the infirm. It is also
- 3:18:28the property of the magnanimous man not to betake himself to things which are held
- 3:18:31in honorable estimation, or where others possess the principal place. Likewise to be
- 3:18:37at leisure and given to delay, except where great honor is to be obtained,
- 3:18:43or some great work is to be accomplished, And to perform a few
- 3:18:46things, indeed, but these great and celebrated. It is also necessary that
- 3:18:52he should openly hate and openly love, for to conceal love or hatred is
- 3:18:58the province of one who is afraid. It is likewise the property of the
- 3:19:01magnanimous man to regard truth more than opinion, and also to speak and act
- 3:19:05openly, for this is the province of the man who despises others. Hence
- 3:19:11he uses the greatest freedom of speech, for this pertains to him who speaks
- 3:19:15freely. Hence, too, he is a despiser of others and a lover
- 3:19:20of truth, unless when he speaks ironically, but his language is ironical to
- 3:19:24the vulgar. The magnanimous man likewise is unable to live with any other person
- 3:19:30than a friend, for it is servile. Hence all flatterers are mercenary,
- 3:19:35and all humble men are flatterers. Nor is he given to admiration, for
- 3:19:41to him nothing is great in human affairs. Nor is he mindful of injuries,
- 3:19:46for it is not the province of a magnanimous man to be mindful,
- 3:19:50and especially of evils, but rather to overlook them. Nor does he speak
- 3:19:54about men, for neither does he speak about himself nor about another person,
- 3:20:00for he is not concerned either that he himself may be praised, or that
- 3:20:03others may be blamed. Nor again, is he addicted to praise. Hence,
- 3:20:09neither does he defame any one, not even his enemies, unless in
- 3:20:13order to remove contumily from himself, and in necessary or small affairs. He
- 3:20:18is by no means quarrelous and suppliant. For to be so is the province
- 3:20:24of a man who considers such affairs as of great consequence. He is likewise
- 3:20:28so disposed as to prefer the possession of things beautiful and unattended, with advantage
- 3:20:35to such as are advantageous and useful. For this is more the province of
- 3:20:39one who is sufficient to himself. The motion also of the magnanimous man is
- 3:20:45slow, his voice is grave, and his diction stable. For he who
- 3:20:50is earnestly attentive to but few things is not prone to be hasty, nor
- 3:20:54is he vehemently stenuous, who considers nothing in human affairs as great. But
- 3:21:00acuteness of voice and rapidity of motion are produced from vehemence and considering human affairs
- 3:21:07as important. Such therefore is the magnanimous man. He, however, who
- 3:21:11is deficient in magnanimity, is pusillanimous. But he who exceedes is proud and
- 3:21:18arrogant. Neither, however, do these characters appear to be bad, for
- 3:21:22they are not malevolent, but wander from the medium. For the pusillanimous man,
- 3:21:28indeed, deserving good things, deprives himself of what he deserves and appears
- 3:21:33to have something depraved. In consequence of not thinking himself to deserve what is
- 3:21:37good, he also is ignorant of himself, for if he were not,
- 3:21:41he would aspire after things of which he is worthy, such things being good.
- 3:21:46Such men, however, do not appear to be stupid, but rather
- 3:21:50to be sluggish. But an opinion of this kind seems to render them worse.
- 3:21:54For everyone desires what is adapted to his desert. They likewise with themselves
- 3:22:00from beautiful actions and pursuits as if they were unworthy of them, and in
- 3:22:05a similar manner, from external goods. But the proud and arrogant are stupid
- 3:22:11and ignorant of themselves in this obviously, for they endeavor to obtain honorable things
- 3:22:16as if they deserved them, and afterwards are reprobated by others for doing so.
- 3:22:22They also study the ornaments of dress and graceful deportment and the like,
- 3:22:26and they wish that their prosperity may be apparent, and they speak of themselves
- 3:22:31as if they were to be honored on account of these things. Peaceillanimity,
- 3:22:35however, is more opposed to magnanimity than pride and arrogance, for it more
- 3:22:41frequently occurs, and is a worse evil. Magnanimity, therefore, is,
- 3:22:46as we have said, conversant with great honor. Chapter four. It seems,
- 3:22:52however, that a certain virtue is conversant with honor, as we have
- 3:22:56before observed, which would appear to have a similar relation too magnanimity, that
- 3:23:01liberality has to magnificence. For both these virtues are remote from magnitude, but
- 3:23:07dispose us in such a way as is proper with respect to things moderate and
- 3:23:11small. But as in the receiving and giving of money, there are a
- 3:23:16medium excess and defect. Thus also in the appetition of honor there are the
- 3:23:22more and the less than is proper, and whence it is proper, and
- 3:23:26as it is proper, for we blame the ambitious man as aspiring after honor
- 3:23:31more than is proper, and whence it is not proper to obtain it.
- 3:23:35And we blame the unambitious man as not deliberately choosing to be honored even for
- 3:23:39actions that are beautiful. Sometimes, however, we praise the ambitious man as
- 3:23:46virile and a lover of beautiful conduct, but the unambitious man as modest and
- 3:23:50temperate, as we have before observed. But it is evident that since the
- 3:23:56lover of a certain thing is said to be so multifariously, we do not
- 3:24:00always refer the lover of honor to the same thing. But when we praise
- 3:24:05him, it is because he desires honor more than the vulgar desire it.
- 3:24:09And when we blame him, it is because he desires it more than is
- 3:24:11proper. Since, however, the medium is anonymous, the extremes appear to
- 3:24:16contend for it as for a solitary place. But in those things in which
- 3:24:22there are excess and defect, there is also a medium. Men also aspire
- 3:24:26after honor more or less than is proper, and therefore they also aspire after
- 3:24:33it in such a way as is proper. Hence this habit is praised,
- 3:24:37which is an anonymous medium about honor. It appears, however, with reference
- 3:24:41to ambition, to be a privation of ambition and to be ambition with reference
- 3:24:48to a privation of ambition, and to be in a certain respect both with
- 3:24:52reference to both. This also appears to be the case in the other virtues.
- 3:24:58Here, however, the extremes are seen to be opposed to each other,
- 3:25:01because the middle is without a name. Chapter five. But mildness is
- 3:25:07indeed a medium conversant with anger, since, however, the virtue which conducts
- 3:25:13itself moderately with respect to anger is anonymous, and this is also nearly the
- 3:25:20case with the extremes. We refer mildness to the medium, though it appears
- 3:25:24to incline rather to the deficiency in anger, which deficiency is anonymous. But
- 3:25:31the excess may be called a certain angriness, For the passion is anger,
- 3:25:37but the causes of it are many and various. He therefore, who is
- 3:25:41angry from causes and with persons with which it is proper to be angry,
- 3:25:46and farther still, in such a manner as is proper, and when and
- 3:25:50as long as it is proper, is praised. Hence he will be a
- 3:25:56mild man. Since mildness is praised, for the mild man wishes to be
- 3:26:01without perturbation, and not to be led by passions, but to be angry,
- 3:26:07as reason may ordain in these things, and for as long a time
- 3:26:11as it prescribes. He appears, however, rather to err in the deficiency
- 3:26:16with respect to anger, for the mild man is not given to revenge,
- 3:26:20but is rather inclined to pardon. But the deficiency, whether it be a
- 3:26:26certain lenity or whatever it may be, is blamed. For those who are
- 3:26:31not angry from causes for which it is proper to be angry, appear to
- 3:26:35be stupid. And this is also the case with those who are not angry
- 3:26:39as it is proper, nor when it is proper, nor with those persons
- 3:26:43with whom it is proper, since they appear to be without sensation and to
- 3:26:48be void of pain. And also since they are not angry, they are
- 3:26:52not inclined to revenge, for it is servile for a man to endure the
- 3:26:56insolent behavior of others towards him and his own relations. Excess, however,
- 3:27:03in anger, has a manifold subsistence, for it is possible to be angry
- 3:27:07with persons and from causes with which it is not proper, and also more
- 3:27:13and less, and for a longer time than is proper. All these excesses,
- 3:27:18however, are not inherent in the same person, for it is not
- 3:27:22possible that they should be, for evil destroys itself, and if it is
- 3:27:26perfect and attire is intolerable. Those therefore, who are irascable, rapidly become
- 3:27:33angry and with things and from causes with which they ought not to be angry,
- 3:27:37and also more than is proper. But they quickly cease to be angry,
- 3:27:41which is a most excellent thing. But this happens to them because they
- 3:27:46do not restrain their anger, but return an injury as soon as they have
- 3:27:50received it. Hence, their anger, on account of its celerity, is
- 3:27:54manifest. But afterwards they cease to be angry. The extremely irascible, however,
- 3:28:01are excessively rapid in their anger, and are angry with everything and on
- 3:28:05every occasion, whence also they derive their appellation. But the bitterly angry are
- 3:28:11with difficulty liberated from anger, and are angry for a long time, for
- 3:28:18they detain their anger from bursting forth. They cease, however, to be
- 3:28:22angry, when they have taken vengeance on those that angered them, for vengeance
- 3:28:26appeases anger, producing pleasure instead of pain. But if vengeance does not take
- 3:28:31place, they are oppressed with a heavy burden. For because the manner in
- 3:28:37which they are affected is not apparent, neither does anyone persuade them to be
- 3:28:41appeased. Time, however, is requisite for them to concoct their anger.
- 3:28:46But men of this description are most troublesome to themselves and to those who are
- 3:28:50especially their friends. We likewise call those men severe in their anger, who
- 3:28:56are angry from causes for which they ought not, and in a greater deay,
- 3:29:00and for a longer time than is proper, and who cannot be appeased
- 3:29:03without revenge or punishment, to mildness. However, we rather oppose the excess
- 3:29:09than the defect, for it is more frequent, since it is more human
- 3:29:13to revenge an injury. Severe men also are worse for the purpose of association.
- 3:29:18But that which we before observed is also manifest from what we now say,
- 3:29:24For it is not easy to define how and with what persons, and
- 3:29:28from what causes, and for how long a time a man should be angry,
- 3:29:31and also to what extent he may be so rightly or erroneously. For
- 3:29:37he who transgresses in a small degree is not blamed, whether he inclines to
- 3:29:41the more or to the less. Since we sometimes praise those that are deficient
- 3:29:46and call them mild, and sometimes we call those who are severely angry virile,
- 3:29:52as being men who are able to govern others. It is not therefore
- 3:29:56easy to explain in words the quantity and mo of transgression which is blameable,
- 3:30:01for the judgment of this is situated in particulars and incense. Thus much,
- 3:30:07however, is evident that the middle habit indeed is laudable, according to which
- 3:30:11we are angry with those persons, and from those causes that it is proper
- 3:30:16to be so, and in such a manner as is proper, and everything
- 3:30:20else of the like kind. But the excesses and defects are blameable. And
- 3:30:26these, indeed, if they deviate but a little from the medium, are
- 3:30:30blameable in a small degree, if more in a greater degree, and if
- 3:30:35much they are very blameable. It is evident therefore that the middle habit must
- 3:30:39be retained. And thus we have discussed the habits pertaining to anger Chapter six.
- 3:30:46In the associations, however, of men with each other, and in
- 3:30:50the communication of words and deeds, some persons appear to be placid and obsequious,
- 3:30:56who praise everything with a view to pleasure of those with whom they associate,
- 3:31:01and are not their opponents in anything, in consequence of fancying that they
- 3:31:05ought not by any means to offend them. Others, on the contrary,
- 3:31:09are adverse to their associates in everything, and are not at all concerned about
- 3:31:13whom they may offend. And these are cold, morose, and litigious.
- 3:31:18That the above mentioned habits therefore are blameable is not a manifest and also that
- 3:31:24the medium between these is laudable, according to which a man admits what he
- 3:31:28ought and as he ought, and is in a similar manner indignant. No
- 3:31:33name, however, is given to this medium, but it seems especially to
- 3:31:37resemble friendship, for he who subsists according to the middle habit is such a
- 3:31:41one as we wish a worthy friend to be, if he also assumes,
- 3:31:46in conjunction with it, a love resembling Felia love. But it differs from
- 3:31:50friendship because it is without passion, and a love resembling Pelia love towards those
- 3:31:56upon whom it is exercised, For it does not everything in such a manner
- 3:32:01as is fit in consequence of loving or hating, but from a habit of
- 3:32:05approving or reprehending properly. For he who possesses this habit will be similarly affable
- 3:32:13to those whom he does not, and to those whom he does know,
- 3:32:16to his associates, and to those with whom he does not associate, except
- 3:32:20that to each of these his affability will be appropriate. For it is not
- 3:32:26fit similarly to pay attention or give pain to familiars and strangers. We have
- 3:32:31therefore universally shown that he will conduct himself in his associations in such a manner
- 3:32:37as is proper, but referring his actions to the beautiful in conduct and the
- 3:32:41useful. His aim will be neither to give pain to nor delight others by
- 3:32:46obsequiousness. For this virtue appears to be conversant with the pains and pleasures which
- 3:32:52take place in associations. But when the possessor of this virtue cannot delight his
- 3:32:58associates worthily or without injuring them, he is indignant, and deliberately chooses to
- 3:33:05give them pain rather than to injure them by obsequiousness. He also will not
- 3:33:09permit another person to be obsequious to him in those things which are attended with
- 3:33:15no small disgrace or injury, and the contrary to which produces but little pain,
- 3:33:20But he will rather be indignant. He will likewise associate differently with those
- 3:33:26who are in a dignified situation and any casual persons, and with those who
- 3:33:31are more or less known to him, in a similar manner. Also in
- 3:33:35other differences, he will attribute to everyone what it is fit for each person
- 3:33:39to receive. And he will indeed choose to give delight to others as a
- 3:33:43thing of itself eligible, but will cautiously avoid giving them pain. And with
- 3:33:50respect to events, if they are greater, he will follow them. I
- 3:33:52mean, he will follow the beautiful in conduct and the advantageous, and for
- 3:33:58the sake of great pleasure afterwards he will give pain in a small degree.
- 3:34:03Such therefore is the middle character. But he is without a name. With
- 3:34:07respect, however, to those who delight others, he who aims at pleasing
- 3:34:11and nothing else may be called accommodating. But he who does this in order
- 3:34:16that he may derive some pecuniary advantage, or such things as are procured through
- 3:34:20money, is a flatterer and he who is indignant with everything we have already
- 3:34:26said, is morose and litigious. The extremes, however, appear to be
- 3:34:31opposed to each other, because the medium is anonymous. Chapter seven. The
- 3:34:37medium of arrogance also is nearly conversant with the same things. But this medium,
- 3:34:43likewise is anonymous. It will not, however, be foreign from the
- 3:34:48purpose to discuss such like habits, for by discussing each particular we shall know
- 3:34:54more of what pertains to manners, and shall be persuaded that the virtues are
- 3:34:58media when we understand what takes place in all of them. With respect therefore,
- 3:35:03to the associations of men with each other, we have already spoken concerning
- 3:35:07those who associate with a view to pleasure and pain. But let us now
- 3:35:11consider those who are men of veracity or falsehood, alike in words and deeds
- 3:35:16and dissimulation. The arrogant man, therefore appears to be one who pretends to
- 3:35:22things of a splendid nature which he does not possess, or to such as
- 3:35:26are more splendid than he possesses. The dissembler, on the contrary, denies
- 3:35:31what he possesses, or makes it to be less than it is. But
- 3:35:35the middle character, forming a just opinion of himself, is a man of
- 3:35:39veracity in his life and in his words, acknowledging that he possesses what he
- 3:35:43does possess, and neither more nor less. Each of these, however,
- 3:35:48may be done for the sake of something or for the sake of nothing.
- 3:35:52But such as a man is, such also will be his words and actions,
- 3:35:56and such also will be his life, unless he acts for the sake
- 3:36:01of something of itself. However, falsehood is bad and blameable, but truth
- 3:36:05is beautiful and laudable. Hence the man of veracity, indeed, being a
- 3:36:11middle character, is laudable. But of the two characters who want veracity,
- 3:36:16both indeed are blameable, but the arrogant man more than the other. We
- 3:36:22shall, however, speak concerning each of these, and in the first place,
- 3:36:26concerning the man of veracity. For we do not speak of the man
- 3:36:30who has veracity in compacts and in things which pertain to injustice or justice,
- 3:36:35for this will belong to another virtue. But we speak of him who,
- 3:36:39though nothing of this kind should occur, is a man of veracity, both
- 3:36:43in words and in his life, because he is such from habit But such
- 3:36:48a one will appear to be a worthy man. For he who is a
- 3:36:50lover of truth, and who speaks the truth in things in which it is
- 3:36:54of no consequence, whether he does or not, will in a still greater
- 3:36:58degree speak the truth of things in which it is of consequence. For he
- 3:37:03will avoid what is false as base, and which also he will, of
- 3:37:07itself avoid. But such a man is worthy of praise. He will,
- 3:37:11however, if it should be requisite, to deviate from the medium, rather
- 3:37:16inclined to what is less than the truth. For this appears to be more
- 3:37:20elegant, because excesses are troublesome and invidious. But he who pretends that he
- 3:37:26possesses things of greater consequence than he really does, and this for the sake
- 3:37:31of nothing else, resembles indeed the depraved man, for otherwise he would not
- 3:37:35be delighted with falsehood. Yet he seems to be rather a vain than a
- 3:37:39bad man. If, however, he does this for the sake of something
- 3:37:43such as glory or honor, he is not very blameable, as the arrogant
- 3:37:48man is. But if he does it for the sake of money, or
- 3:37:50for things which pertain to money, he is more base. But the arrogant
- 3:37:56man is not characterized by capacity or power, but by deliberate choice, for
- 3:38:01he is arrogant according to habit, and because he is such a character.
- 3:38:05Thus, also with respect to the man who is without veracity, when delights
- 3:38:11in falsehood itself, but another delights in it in consequence of aspiring after glory
- 3:38:16or game. Those therefore, who are arrogant for the sake of glory pretend
- 3:38:20the possession of those things for which men are praised or proclaimed to be happy.
- 3:38:24But those who are arrogant for the sake of gain pretend to be those
- 3:38:28characters with which others are delighted, and of which the non possession may be
- 3:38:33latent, such as to be a physician, or a prophet, or a
- 3:38:37wise man. On this account, most men pretend and arrogate to themselves things
- 3:38:43of this kind, for they possess the above mentioned qualities. The semblers or
- 3:38:48the ironical, however, who speak less than the truth, appear indeed to
- 3:38:52be more elegant in their manners, for they do not seem to speak for
- 3:38:56the sake of gain, but in consequence of avoiding fastidiousness. But these persons
- 3:39:01especially deny that they possess things of an illustrious nature, as also Socrates did.
- 3:39:07Those, however, who pretend that they do not possess small things and
- 3:39:11which are obvious, are called crafty or delicate deceivers, and are very contemptible
- 3:39:16men. Sometimes also this species of dissimulation appears to be arrogance, such for
- 3:39:22instance, as the garments of the Lacedaemonians, for excess and very great deficiency
- 3:39:28alike pertain to arrogance. But those who moderately use irony and are ironical in
- 3:39:33things which are not very much known and obvious, appear to be elegant men.
- 3:39:39The arrogant man, however, seems to be opposed to the man of
- 3:39:41veracity, for he is a worse character. Chapter eight. Since however,
- 3:39:48there is a certain relaxation in life and rest from labor, and since this
- 3:39:52remission is accompanied with jesting, it appears that here also there is a certain
- 3:39:58elegant method of conversation, in which such things are said as are proper,
- 3:40:03and are delivered in a proper manner. And similarly with respect to hearing what
- 3:40:09it is proper to hear, and hearing it in such a way as is
- 3:40:11fit. But there is a difference in speaking to some persons rather than to
- 3:40:16others, and in hearing some things rather than others. It is evident,
- 3:40:20however, that in these things also there is an excess and deficiency with respect
- 3:40:26to the medium. Those therefore, who exceed in the ridiculous appear to be
- 3:40:31scurllless and troublesome, for they entirely affect the ridiculous, and a more at
- 3:40:37exciting laughter than at speaking in a becoming manner, and not giving pain to
- 3:40:41the object of their ridicule. But those who do not say themselves anything ridiculous,
- 3:40:46and are indignant with those who do, appear to be rustic and rigorous.
- 3:40:52Those, however, who just elegantly are called facetious and versatile, as
- 3:40:56being of a flexible genius. For of manners their appear to be such like
- 3:41:01motions, but as a judgment is formed of bodies from motions, so likewise
- 3:41:05of manners, Since however, there is a redundancy of the ridiculous, and
- 3:41:09most men delight in jests and caveling more than is proper. The scurrilous also
- 3:41:15are called versatile, as being polite and pleasant. But that they differ,
- 3:41:20and in no small degree is evident from what has been said to the middle
- 3:41:24habit. Also, dexterity is appropriate, but it is the province of a
- 3:41:28dexterous man to say. And here such things as are adapted to a worthy
- 3:41:33and liberal man. For there are certain things which it becomes such a one
- 3:41:37to say, and here in jest. And the jesting of a liberal differs
- 3:41:41from that of a servile man. And again the jesting of an erudite differs
- 3:41:46from that of an inerudite man. But the truth of this may be seen
- 3:41:50both from ancient and modern comedies. For in the former the ridiculous consisted in
- 3:41:56obscenity, but in the latter the suspicion of obscenity, or rather excited laughter.
- 3:42:01These things, however, differ in no small degree with respect to the
- 3:42:05decorous and elegant. Whether therefore, is he who ridicules well to be defined
- 3:42:11by this that he says what it becomes a liberal man to say, or
- 3:42:15by this that he does not pain, or that he delights the hearer?
- 3:42:20Or shall we say that a thing of this kind is indefinite, for a
- 3:42:24different thing is odious and pleasing to a different person. He will also hear
- 3:42:30things of this kind viz. Things that are adapted to a worthy and liberal
- 3:42:33man. For such things as a man endures to hear, such also he
- 3:42:37appears to do. He will not therefore do or say everything. For tavilling
- 3:42:43is a certain invective. Legislators, however, forbid certain invectives, and perhaps
- 3:42:48it would be proper that they should also forbid caveling. The elegant and liberal
- 3:42:54man therefore will so conduct himself as if he were a law to himself.
- 3:43:00Hence, the middle character is a man of this description, whether he is
- 3:43:03to be denominated dexterous or versatile. But the scurrilous man is vanquished by the
- 3:43:09ridiculous, and neither spares himself nor others. If he can excite laughter,
- 3:43:15He likewise says such things as the elegant man would never say. In some
- 3:43:18things that he says, the elegant man would not even endure to hear.
- 3:43:22The rustic man, however, is useless with respect to such conversations, for
- 3:43:28contributing nothing. He is indignant with all of them. But relaxation and jesting
- 3:43:33appear to be necessary to the life of man. There are therefore the above
- 3:43:39mentioned three media in life, but all of them are conversant with the communion
- 3:43:43of certain words and actions. They differ, however, because one of them
- 3:43:46is conversant with truth, but the others are conversant with the delectable, but
- 3:43:52of the media which pertained a pleasure. One indeed is conversant with jests,
- 3:43:56but the other with the associations which belong to the rest of life. Chapter
- 3:44:03nine. With respect to shame, it is not fit to speak of it
- 3:44:07as of a certain virtue, for it resembles passion more than habit. It
- 3:44:11is defined, therefore, to be a certain dread of infamy, and similar
- 3:44:16to fear, it is exercised about dreadful things. For those who are under
- 3:44:20the influence of shame become red or blush, but those who have the fear
- 3:44:24of death upon them are pale. Hence, both these appear to be,
- 3:44:28in a certain respect corporeal, which seems rather to belong to passion than to
- 3:44:33habit. This passion, however, is not adapted to every age, but
- 3:44:37to youth. For we think it requisite that young persons should be bashful,
- 3:44:43because they commit many errors in consequence of living from passion, but are restrained
- 3:44:48from the commission of them by shame. And we praise indeed bashful young men,
- 3:44:54But no one praises a bashful old man, for we think that he
- 3:44:56ought not to do anything for which he should be as share shamed. For
- 3:45:00neither does shame pertain to a worthy man, since it is produced by bad
- 3:45:05conduct. For the things which cause shame are not to be done. But
- 3:45:09it makes no difference whether some things are in reality base, but others only
- 3:45:13base according to opinion, for neither of these are to be done, so
- 3:45:18that shame is not to be admitted. The thing of this kind, also
- 3:45:20viz. To do something base is the province of a bad man. But
- 3:45:26for a man to be so disposed as to be ashamed, if he should
- 3:45:30do anything that is base, and to fancy himself on this account to be
- 3:45:33a worthy character, he is absurd. For shame pertains to voluntary actions,
- 3:45:39but a worthy man never voluntarily acts basely. Shame, however, from hypothesis,
- 3:45:45may seem to be good, for if a worthy man should act basely,
- 3:45:48he would be ashamed. But this does not pertain to the virtues.
- 3:45:52Nor if impudence is a bad thing, and not to be ashamed when acting
- 3:45:56basely, will it be at all a more worthy earthly thing to be ashamed
- 3:46:01when performing base deeds. Neither is continents of virtue, but a certain mixed
- 3:46:07thing. This, however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let us now
- 3:46:11speak concerning justice. End of Book four, Book five. Now, therefore,
- 3:46:22let us direct our attention to justice and injustice, and consider with what
- 3:46:26kind of actions they are conversant, what kind of medium justice is, and
- 3:46:31of what things the just is the medium. But let our survey be made
- 3:46:37according to the same method as the preceding discussions. We see therefore that all
- 3:46:43men are willing to call that kind of habit justice, through which we practice
- 3:46:46just things, or are inclined to the works of justice, and through which
- 3:46:52we act justly and wish what is just. And after the same manner injustice
- 3:46:58is that bad habit through which men act unjustly and wish what is unjust.
- 3:47:05Hence, these things must first be adumbraided by us, since there is not
- 3:47:09the same mode of subsistence in the sciences, in powers and in habits.
- 3:47:15For there is the same power, indeed, and the same science of contraries,
- 3:47:20but there is not the same habit of contraries. Thus, for instance,
- 3:47:24contrary operations are not performed by health, but those only which are salubrious.
- 3:47:30For we say that a man walks in a healthy manner when he walks
- 3:47:33in such a way as a healthy man walks frequently. Therefore, a contrary
- 3:47:39habit is known from a contrary habit. But frequently habits are known from their
- 3:47:43subjects. For if a good habit of body is apparent, a bad habit
- 3:47:48of body will also be apparent. And from things which produce a good habit
- 3:47:52of body, this good habit will be known, and from this good habit
- 3:47:56its producing causes will be known. For if a good habit of body is
- 3:48:01a density of the flesh, a bad habit of body will necessarily be a
- 3:48:05rarity of the flesh, and that which produces a good habit of body will
- 3:48:09be productive of density in the flesh. It follows, however, for the
- 3:48:15most part, that if one contrary is predicated multifariously, the other also will
- 3:48:20be multifariously predicated, as if the just, so likewise the unjust. But
- 3:48:26justice and injustice are predicated multifariously, though through the proximity of their homonymy this
- 3:48:35is latent, nor is it more apparent, as is the case in those
- 3:48:39things which are remote, for the difference according to idea or form is great.
- 3:48:45Thus, for instance, clavis is predicated homonymously, for it signifies both
- 3:48:50that part which is under the neck of animals and that by which gaits are
- 3:48:54shut viz. A key. We must consider therefore, in how many ways
- 3:49:00an unjust man is denominated. But it appears that he is an unjust man
- 3:49:05who acts illegally, and he who takes to himself more of external goods than
- 3:49:09he ought, or who is avaricious, and also he who is unequal i
- 3:49:16e. Who takes to himself less of evils than is equitable, So that
- 3:49:20it is evident that he will be a just man who acts legally, and
- 3:49:24he who is equal or equitable. The just therefore will be both the legal
- 3:49:30and the equal, but the unjust will be the illegal and the unequal.
- 3:49:35Since, however the unjust man is avaricious, he will be conversant with good,
- 3:49:39yet not with every kind of good, but with that in which there
- 3:49:43is prosperous and adverse fortune, and which is indeed simply always good, but
- 3:49:50to a certain person not always. But men pray for and pursue this good,
- 3:49:56though they ought not for they should pray indeed, that things which are
- 3:50:00simply good, such as riches, may also be good to them, But
- 3:50:05they should choose such things as are good to their possessor, such as virtue
- 3:50:09and wisdom. The unjust man, however, does not always choose that which
- 3:50:13is more. But in things which are simply evil, he chooses the less.
- 3:50:18But because the less evil appears in a certain respect to be good,
- 3:50:22and of what is good, there is a desire of possessing more of it
- 3:50:26than is equitable. On this account, the unjust man appears to be avaricious.
- 3:50:33He is also unequal, and acts illegally. For this very thing,
- 3:50:37the acting illegally or in equality comprehends all injustice, and is common to all
- 3:50:43injustice. Since, however, he who acts illegally is unjust, but he
- 3:50:48who acts legally is just. It is evident that everything which is legal is
- 3:50:52in a certain respect just. For the things which are defined by the legislative
- 3:50:58science are legal, and we say that each of these is just. But
- 3:51:01the laws speak about everything, looking either to that which is advantageous in common
- 3:51:07to all men, or to the best of men, or to those in
- 3:51:11authority. And this either according to virtue or some other mode. Hence,
- 3:51:16after one manner, we call those things just which are capable of producing and
- 3:51:20preserving felicity, and the parts of it by political communion. The law,
- 3:51:26however, ordains that the works of the brave man should be done, such
- 3:51:30as that a soldier shall not leave his rank, nor fly from the enemy,
- 3:51:33nor throw away his arms. And likewise that the works of the tempered
- 3:51:39man shall be done, such as not to commit adultery, nor behave with
- 3:51:43insolent wantonness, and also those of the mild man, such as not to
- 3:51:46strike another person, nor to fame anyone. And the law or deigns similarly
- 3:51:52with respect to the other virtues and vices, partly commanding and partly forbidding,
- 3:51:58the law indeed doing this which is rightly framed, but that which is rashly
- 3:52:03framed erroneously. This justice, therefore, i e. Legal justice, is
- 3:52:09indeed a perfect virtue, yet not simply but with reference to another thing.
- 3:52:13And on this account justice frequently appears to be the best of the virtues.
- 3:52:18Nor is either the evening or the morning star so admirable. We likewise say
- 3:52:24proverbially, every virtue is comprehended in justice and legal justice is especially a perfect
- 3:52:31virtue because it is the use of perfect virtue. But it is perfect because
- 3:52:37he who possesses it is also able to employ virtue towards another person, and
- 3:52:41not only towards himself. For many persons are indeed able to employ virtue in
- 3:52:46their own affairs, but not in the affairs of others. And on this
- 3:52:50account it appears to have been well said by Bias that dominion shows the man,
- 3:52:56for he who governs has relation to another per and is now conversant with
- 3:53:01the communion of life. For the very same reason, also, justice alone,
- 3:53:07of all the virtues, appears to be a foreign good because it has
- 3:53:11reference to another person, since it performs what is advantageous to another, viz.
- 3:53:16Either to a ruler or to the community at large. He therefore is
- 3:53:22the worst of characters, who acts deprivdly both towards himself and towards his friends.
- 3:53:28But he is the best of men, not who acts virtuously towards himself
- 3:53:33but towards another person, for this is a difficult work. This justice,
- 3:53:37therefore, is not a part of virtue, but is universal virtue. Nor
- 3:53:43is the injustice which is contrary to it. A part of vice, but
- 3:53:46universal vice. What the difference, however, is, between virtue and this
- 3:53:52justice is evident from what has already been said. For it is indeed the
- 3:53:56same with it, but not essentially. For so far in d as it
- 3:54:00has reference to another person, it is justice, But so far as it
- 3:54:03is habit of a certain description, it is simply virtue. Chapter two.
- 3:54:11We investigate, however, that justice which is a part of virtue, For
- 3:54:16there is, as we say, such a justice, And in a similar
- 3:54:20manner we investigate the injustice, which is a part of face. But that
- 3:54:24there is such a justice is indicated by this that he who energizes, according
- 3:54:30to other depravities, acts unjustly, indeed, but does not assume to himself
- 3:54:35more of external good than he ought, such for instance as the man who
- 3:54:39throws away his shield through timidity, or he who speaks ill of another from
- 3:54:43asperity, or who does not give pecuniary assistance to another through illiberality. But
- 3:54:52when he assumes to himself more than he ought, he frequently is not vicious
- 3:54:56according to any one of such faces, nor yet according to all devices,
- 3:55:01but according to a certain depravity. For we blame him, and for injustice
- 3:55:07There is therefore a certain other injustice, as being a certain part of universal
- 3:55:13injustice, and a certain something unjust, which is a part of the whole
- 3:55:18of the unjust, that is contrary to law. Farther still, if one
- 3:55:22person indeed should commit adultery for the sake of gain, and should receive money
- 3:55:28for so doing, but another should give money and sustain an injury in his
- 3:55:31property by doing it in consequence of being under the influence of strong desire,
- 3:55:37the latter indeed will rather appear to be intemperate than one who assumes to himself
- 3:55:43more than he ought. But the former will be unjust but not intemperate,
- 3:55:46and it is evident that he will not because he acts with a view to
- 3:55:50gain. Again, in all other unjust deeds, there is always a reference
- 3:55:56to a certain depravity. Thus, if a man commits adult, the reference
- 3:56:01is to intemperance. If he abandons his post in battle, the reference is
- 3:56:05to timidity. But if he strikes another person to anger, if however,
- 3:56:11he obtains money by it, the reference is to no other depravity than to
- 3:56:16injustice. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain other injustice which
- 3:56:22ranks as a part besides universal injustice, and which is synonymous with it,
- 3:56:28because the definition of each is in the same genus, or both possess their
- 3:56:31power in a reference to another person. But the injustice, which ranks as
- 3:56:37a part, is conversant with honor, or riches, or safety, or
- 3:56:41if all these could be comprehended in one name, it is conversant with them.
- 3:56:46And this on account of the pleasure which results from gain. Universal injustice,
- 3:56:52however, is conversant with all such things as a worthy man is conversant
- 3:56:56with in the exercise of justice. That there are many kinds of justice,
- 3:57:01therefore, and that there is a certain justice which is different from universal virtue
- 3:57:05is evident. What it is, however, and what kind of thing it
- 3:57:09is must be explained. The unjust, therefore, has been distinguished by us
- 3:57:15into the illegal and the unequal, and the just into the legal and the
- 3:57:18equal. But the prior injustice of which we have spoken subsists according to the
- 3:57:24illegal, Since, however, the illegal and the unequal are not the same,
- 3:57:28but different as a part with reference to a whole. For everything unequal
- 3:57:33is illegal, but not everything which is illegal is unequal. Hence, the
- 3:57:37unjust and injustice are not the same with these, but different from them in
- 3:57:43the same manner as parts and wholes. For this injustice is a part of
- 3:57:48the whole of injustice, and in a similar manner this justice is a part
- 3:57:52of the whole of justice. We must therefore speak concerning the justice and injustice
- 3:57:58which ranks as parts, and after the same manner, concerning the partially just
- 3:58:01and unjust. The justice therefore and injustice, which are arranged according to universal
- 3:58:07virtue, and of which the former is the use of the whole of virtue,
- 3:58:11and the latter of the whole of vice. With reference to another person,
- 3:58:16we shall admit it is likewise evident how the just and the unjust,
- 3:58:20which are arranged conformably to these are to be distinguished. For nearly most of
- 3:58:24those things which are legal are ordained from universal virtue, for the law orders
- 3:58:30men to live conformably to every virtue, and forbids them from acting conformably to
- 3:58:35any one of the vices. But the efficient causes of the whole of virtue
- 3:58:39are those legal actions which are established by the laws for the purposes of public
- 3:58:45discipline. Concerning the discipline, however, of an individual, according to which
- 3:58:50he is simply a good man. Whether it pertains to the political or another
- 3:58:54science, will be determined hereafter. For perhaps it is not the same thing
- 3:58:58to be a good man and a good citizen. But there is one species
- 3:59:03of the justice which subsists according to a part and of the just pertaining to
- 3:59:07it, and which consists in the distributions either of honor, or riches,
- 3:59:13or such other things as may be divided among those who partake of the same
- 3:59:16polity. For in these it is possible that one person may share unequally and
- 3:59:22equally with another. But another species of justice is that which possesses a corrective
- 3:59:26power in contracts. Of this however, there are two parts. For of
- 3:59:31contracts, some are voluntary, but others are involuntary. The voluntary, indeed,
- 3:59:37are buying, selling, putting out money at interest, serteeship, lending
- 3:59:43anything on hire, pledging, and hiring a slave or an artificer. But
- 3:59:48these contracts are said to be voluntary because the principle of them is voluntary.
- 3:59:52And of involuntary contracts some are clandestine, such as theft, adultery, prostitution,
- 4:00:01deceiving the slave of another person, insidious murder, and bearing false witness.
- 4:00:07But the violent are such as blows, bonds, death, plunder,
- 4:00:11mutilation, slander, and contumily. Chapter three. Since however the unjust man
- 4:00:18is unequal, and also the unjust belongs to the unequal, it is evident
- 4:00:24that there is a certain medium of the unequal. But this is the equal.
- 4:00:30For in whatever action there is the more and the less, there is
- 4:00:33also the equal. If therefore the unjust is unequal, the just will be
- 4:00:39equal, which, indeed, without any reasoning process, is manifest to all
- 4:00:45men. But since the equal is a medium, the just will be a
- 4:00:48certain medium. The equal, however, is in two things at least.
- 4:00:52It is necessary therefore that the just, which is a medium and equal,
- 4:00:58should be referred to a certain thing, and to certain things. And so
- 4:01:01far indeed, as it is a medium, it is referred to certain things.
- 4:01:07But these are the more and the less. And so far as it
- 4:01:09is equal, it is referred to two things. But so far as it
- 4:01:13is the just, it is referred to certain things. Hence, it is
- 4:01:16necessary that the just should be in four things, at least, for the
- 4:01:20persons to whom the just pertains are too and the things in which it consists
- 4:01:24are two, and there will be the same equality between the persons to whom
- 4:01:28justice pertains, and the things in which it consists. For as is the
- 4:01:33relation of the former to each other, such also is that of the latter.
- 4:01:39For if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal things.
- 4:01:43Battles, however, and accusations hence originate when either equal persons do not
- 4:01:48obtain equal things, or those that are not equal have an equal distribution of
- 4:01:54things. This also is evident from distribution according to dessert. For all mena
- 4:02:00acknowledge that the just in distribution should be made according to a certain dessert.
- 4:02:05All men, however, do not say that there is the same dessert.
- 4:02:07But democratic men indeed say that dessert is liberty. And of the oligarchists,
- 4:02:15some say that it is wealth, but others that it is nobility. But
- 4:02:20the aristocrats say that it is virtue. The just, therefore is something analogous.
- 4:02:26For the analogous is not only the peculiarity of monatic number or number consisting
- 4:02:31of units, but of number universally. For analogy or proportion is equality of
- 4:02:37ratio, and consists in four things. At least that disjunct proportion therefore consists
- 4:02:43in four terms is evident. And this is also the case with continued proportion,
- 4:02:50for this uses one thing as two things, as for instance, as
- 4:02:54A is to B, so is B to C. Hence B is twice
- 4:03:00assumed, so that if B is placed twice, the analogous things will be
- 4:03:05four. But the just also consists in four things at least, and the
- 4:03:09reason is the same for the persons to whom justice is distributed, and the
- 4:03:15things which are distributed are similarly divided. As the term A therefore is to
- 4:03:20B, so will C b to D. And therefore, alternately, as
- 4:03:26A is to C, so is B to D. Hence the whole will
- 4:03:30be compared with the whole which the distribution conjoins, and if they are thus
- 4:03:35compounded, they will be justly conjoined. The conjunction therefore, of the term
- 4:03:41A with C and of B with D forms the justice which is in distribution,
- 4:03:46and the just is the medium of that which is foreign from the analogous,
- 4:03:50for the analogous is a medium, and the just is analogous. Mathematicians,
- 4:03:56however, call such an analogy or proportion as the U s geometrical,
- 4:04:01For in geometrical proportion, it happens that the whole is to the whole as
- 4:04:05all the parts to all. But this proportion is not continued, for the
- 4:04:11same thing is not assumed as the person to whom a distribution is made,
- 4:04:15and as the thing distributed. This justice therefore consists in proportion. But the
- 4:04:20unjust is foreign from proportion. And hence one person has more, but another
- 4:04:26less than he ought, which also happens to be the case in actions.
- 4:04:31For he indeed who does an injury has more, but he who is injured
- 4:04:35has less of good than he ought. The contrary, however, takes place
- 4:04:39in evil, for a less evil has the relation of good with respect to
- 4:04:43a greater evil, for a less is more eligible than a greater evil.
- 4:04:48But the eligible is good, and that which is more eligible is a greater
- 4:04:54good. This, therefore is one species of the just. Chapter four.
- 4:05:01The other remaining species of justice is corrective, which is conversant both with voluntary
- 4:05:05and involuntary contracts. But the form of this justice is different from the former.
- 4:05:11For the justice which is distributive of common things or things of a public
- 4:05:18nature, always subsists according to the above mentioned proportion. For if the distribution
- 4:05:24is made from common property, it will be according to the same ratio as
- 4:05:28the things introduced have to each other, and the unjust, which is opposed
- 4:05:33to this justice, is foreign from proportion. The just, however, which
- 4:05:37is in contracts, is indeed a certain equality, and the unjust is inequality,
- 4:05:45yet not according to geometrical but arithmetical proportion. For it makes no difference
- 4:05:52whether a worthy deprives a bad man of his property or a bad a worthy
- 4:05:56man, nor whether a worthy or a bad man commits adultery. But the
- 4:06:01law only looks to the difference of the injury, and uses the persons as
- 4:06:05if they were equal. Though the one indeed should injure, but the other
- 4:06:09should be injured, and though the one should do but the other should suffer
- 4:06:13harm. Hence this injustice, since it is unequal, the judge endeavors to
- 4:06:20equalize. For when one man indeed inflicts a blow but another is struck,
- 4:06:26or one man kills but another is killed, the suffering and the action are
- 4:06:30divided into unequal parts. But the judge, by the punishment which inflicts,
- 4:06:35endeavors to produce any equality by detracting from the game. For in things of
- 4:06:41this kind, in short, though to some things name will not be appropriate,
- 4:06:45the injury is denominated gain, and the endurance of the injury loss.
- 4:06:50But when the suffering is measured, the one is called loss, but the
- 4:06:54other gain. Hence, of the more and the less, the equal is
- 4:06:58the medium. With respect to loss and gain, however, the one is
- 4:07:03more, but the other less. Contrarily, for the more of good,
- 4:07:07but the less of evil, is gain, and the contrary is loss,
- 4:07:11of which the equal is the medium, which we say is the just.
- 4:07:16Hence, the justice, which is corrective, will be the medium of loss
- 4:07:20and gain. Hence, too, when men contend with each other about legal
- 4:07:24affairs, they fly to the judge. But to go to a judge is
- 4:07:28to go to justice. For a judge is nothing else than, as it
- 4:07:33were, animated justice. They also search for judge who is a medium,
- 4:07:37and some persons call judges mediators, as if they should obtain justice if they
- 4:07:41obtain to the medium. The just, therefore is a certain medium, since
- 4:07:46the judge is also. But the judge equalizes, and, as if a
- 4:07:50line were cut into unequal parts, he takes away from the greater section that
- 4:07:56by which it exceeds the half, and adds it to the less section.
- 4:08:00When however, the whole is divided into two equal parts. Then men say
- 4:08:05they have what is their own when they obtain the equal. But the equal
- 4:08:09is the middle of the greater and the less, according to arithmetical proportion.
- 4:08:13Hence, also the just bracket decan close bracket is denominated because it is divided
- 4:08:22into two equal parts bracket o d ditcha eston close bracket, just as if
- 4:08:28it should be said to be di chayan, and the judge is called diecastes,
- 4:08:33as if he were die Chastes, or one who divides a thing into
- 4:08:39two equal parts. For if when two things are equal, that which is
- 4:08:45taken from the one is added to the other, the latter will exceed what
- 4:08:48the former then becomes by two such parts. For if what is taken away
- 4:08:54from one of the equal things were not added to the other, the one
- 4:08:56would exceed the other by one such part. Only the thing therefore, to
- 4:09:01which something is added exceeds the medium by one part. And the medium also
- 4:09:05exceeds by one part that from which something is taken away. By this,
- 4:09:11therefore we may know what ought to be taken away from him who has more,
- 4:09:16and what ought to be added to him who has less. For it
- 4:09:20is necessary to add to him who has less that by which the medium exceeds,
- 4:09:24but to take away from the greatest that by which the medium is exceeded.
- 4:09:30Let there be three lines A A, B, B C C equal
- 4:09:35to each other. From A A, let a E be taken and added
- 4:09:39to C C, and let that part be c D. Hence the whole
- 4:09:45line D C C will exceed the line A E by the line c D
- 4:09:52and the line f C, and therefore it will exceed the line b B
- 4:09:56by the line c D. This also takes place in other arts, for
- 4:10:03they would be subverted unless that which suffers suffers the same in quantity and quality
- 4:10:09as that which acts. But these appellations loss and gain are derived from voluntary
- 4:10:15contracts. For when a man obtains more than his own, he is said
- 4:10:18to gain, but when he has less than what he had at first,
- 4:10:22he is said to have lost, as in buying and selling, and such
- 4:10:26other things as the law permits. When however, men have neither more nor
- 4:10:30less, but give as much as they receive, they are said to have
- 4:10:33their own, and neither to lose nor gain. Hence, the just is
- 4:10:37the medium of a certain gain and loss in things which are not voluntary,
- 4:10:43so that each of those who form a contract may have as much afterwards as
- 4:10:46before. Chapter five. To some persons, however, retaliation appears to be
- 4:10:54simply just, and this also was the opinion of the Pythagoreans poorly define the
- 4:11:01just to be simply retaliation. But retaliation is neither adapted to distributive nor to
- 4:11:07corrective justice. Though rhadamanthus in Eschylus, appears to assert that justice is this
- 4:11:13quote, and that the punishment will be equitable when a man suffers the same
- 4:11:20thing as he has done. Close quote for retaliation is frequently discordant. Thus,
- 4:11:26for instance, if a magistrate should strike a man, it is not
- 4:11:28proper that the man should strike him in return. And if anyone strikes a
- 4:11:33magistrate, he ought not only to be struck, but to be punished more
- 4:11:37severely. Again, there is a great difference between the voluntary and the involuntary.
- 4:11:43But commercial intercourse is preserved by a justice of this kind if the retaliation
- 4:11:48is made according to proportion and not according to equality. For by analogous retaliation,
- 4:11:54the union of a city becomes permanent. For men either endeavor to return
- 4:12:00evil for evil, for it appears to be slavery if they cannot retaliate,
- 4:12:03or they wish, when they benefit others, to be themselves benefited in return.
- 4:12:07Since if this does not take place, there is no compensation by which
- 4:12:11the permanent union of society is affected. Hence, the Temple of the Graces
- 4:12:16is built in a conspicuous part of the city for the purpose of producing remuneration.
- 4:12:20For this is the peculiarity of grace or favor. For it is requisite
- 4:12:26to return a favor to him who has conferred one, and he again should
- 4:12:30begin to confer a favor. But a conjunction according to a diameter produces the
- 4:12:35retribution which is according to analogy. Thus, for instance, let the builder
- 4:12:39of a house be a a shoemaker b, the house c and the shoe
- 4:12:45d. It is necessary, therefore that the builder of the house should receive
- 4:12:48from the shoemaker his work and give his work to him in return. Hence,
- 4:12:54if the first equality is that which is according to analogy, and afterwards
- 4:12:58a retaliation is made, it will be that which we have mentioned. But
- 4:13:01if not, there will neither be equality, nor will the bond of society
- 4:13:05remain. For nothing hinders but that the work of the one may be more
- 4:13:09excellent than the work of the other. It is necessary therefore that these should
- 4:13:15be equalized. But this also takes place in the other arts, for they
- 4:13:20would be subverted unless that which is passive suffered the same in quantity and quality
- 4:13:26as the agent effects. For the communion of society is not produced from two
- 4:13:30physicians, but from a physician and a husbandman, and in short, from
- 4:13:35different and not from equal characters. But it is necessary that these should be
- 4:13:39equalized. Hence, it is requisite that all things should be capable of being
- 4:13:43compared with each other, of which there is an exchange. And for this
- 4:13:48purpose money was adopted and becomes in a certain respect a measure, for it
- 4:13:54measures all things, so that it likewise measures excess and defect, and therefore
- 4:13:58deters means how many shoes are equal to a house or to nutriment. It
- 4:14:03is necessary therefore that such as the ratio is of the builder of a house
- 4:14:07to a shoemaker, such should be the ratio of the number of shoes to
- 4:14:11a house or to nutriment. For if this does not take place, there
- 4:14:16will neither be exchange nor communion, and it will not take place unless the
- 4:14:20things compared are in a certain respect equal Hence it is necessary, as has
- 4:14:26been before observed, that all things should be measured by one certain thing,
- 4:14:30and this is in reality indigence, which connects all things. For if mankind
- 4:14:35were not in want of anything, or if they were not similarly in want,
- 4:14:39either there would be no exchange or not the same. But money was
- 4:14:43adopted by compact as a subsidiary exchange for indigence. And on this account money
- 4:14:50was called bracket no misma close bracket because it is not established by nature but
- 4:14:56by law, and it is in our power to change and render it useless.
- 4:15:01Retaliation therefore, will then take place when there is an equalization. Hence,
- 4:15:07as the husbandman is to the shoemaker, so is the work of the
- 4:15:11shoemaker to the work of the husbandman. But it is necessary to bring them
- 4:15:16to the form of proportion when an exchange takes place, for without this,
- 4:15:20one of the extremes will have both the excesses. When, however, each
- 4:15:24person has his own. They will thus be equal and communicate with each other.
- 4:15:28Because this equality can be produced among them. Let the husbandman be a
- 4:15:33the nutriment c. And the work of the shoemaker equal to the nutriment B.
- 4:15:39D. But without this retaliation there would be no communion of society.
- 4:15:45That indigence, however, connects as being one certain thing is evident because when
- 4:15:50men are not in want of each other, either both or one of them,
- 4:15:54no exchange takes place, as it does when one is in want of
- 4:15:56what the other possesses, as for instance, for which an exportation of corn
- 4:16:02is granted. It is necessary therefore that this should be equalized in order to
- 4:16:07future exchange. However, if nothing should at present be wanted, that it
- 4:16:11may be obtained when it is wanted, money becomes as it were asserted to
- 4:16:17us. For it is requisite that he who brings money should take what he
- 4:16:22wants in exchange for it. Money therefore also suffers this very same thing,
- 4:16:26for it does not always possess an equal power, but at the same time
- 4:16:30it is more permanent. Hence, it is necessary that all things should be
- 4:16:34estimated, for thus there will always be in exchange, and if there is
- 4:16:38an exchange, there will be a communion. Money therefore, as a measure,
- 4:16:44having made things commensurate, equalizes them, for there would be no communion
- 4:16:48without exchange, nor exchange without equality, nor equality without commensuration. In reality,
- 4:16:55Therefore, it is impossible that things which so much differ should become commenced.
- 4:17:00But for the purposes of indigence, this is sufficiently possible. Hence it
- 4:17:04is necessary there should be one certain thing as a measure, and this from
- 4:17:10assumption. Hence it is called money, for this causes all things to be
- 4:17:14commensurate, since all things are measured by money. Let a house be a
- 4:17:19ten mina B and a bed c. A therefore will be the half of
- 4:17:25B. If the house is worth five mina or is equal to the value
- 4:17:29of five mina. But let the bed c be the tenth part of B.
- 4:17:33It is evident therefore how many beds are equal in value to the house
- 4:17:37viz. Five. That such, however, was the exchange before there was
- 4:17:42money is manifest, for it makes no difference whether five beds or as much
- 4:17:48as the worth of five beds are given for the house. Thus, therefore
- 4:17:52we have shown what the unjust, and also what the just is. But
- 4:17:56these things being determined, it is evident that it just. Action is a
- 4:18:00medium between doing and receiving an injury, for the former is to have more,
- 4:18:04but the latter less than is just. Justice, however, is a
- 4:18:08medium not after the same manner with the former virtues, but because it pertains
- 4:18:12to a medium between the more and the less. But injustice pertains to extremes.
- 4:18:18And justice, indeed, is that according to which a just man is
- 4:18:21said to act justly from deliberate choice, and to distribute justice, both to
- 4:18:26himself in making a compact with another person, and to another who makes a
- 4:18:30compact with another, Yet not so as to attribute more of what is eligible
- 4:18:33to himself and less to his neighbor, and the contrary of that which is
- 4:18:38hurtful, but so as to distribute that equal to himself and others according to
- 4:18:42analogy, and he adopts the same mode of conduct towards another person who forms
- 4:18:48a compact with another. Injustice, on the contrary, is not according to
- 4:18:52which an unjust man is said to act unjustly from deliberate choice, and to
- 4:18:57distribute injustice both to him and others. But this is the excess and deficiency
- 4:19:03of that which is beneficial or hurtful, contrary to the analogous. Hence,
- 4:19:08injustice is excess and deficiency, because it pertains to excess and deficiency to the
- 4:19:15unjust man himself. Indeed, it is an excess of that which is simply
- 4:19:19beneficial, but a deficiency of that which is hurtful. But to others it
- 4:19:25distributes in a manner wholly similar, and in whatever way the distribution may happen
- 4:19:30to be made, it is contrary to the analogous of an unjust action.
- 4:19:33However, the less extreme is to be injured, and the greater to injure.
- 4:19:38After this manner. Therefore, we have discussed justice and injustice, and
- 4:19:44have shown what is the nature of each. And similarly we have discussed universally
- 4:19:48the just and the unjust. Chapter six. Since, however, it is
- 4:19:53possible that he who acts unjustly may not yet be unjust. For what kind
- 4:19:59of iniquous deeds will a man be unjust? According to each species of injustice?
- 4:20:03For instance, will it be as a thief, or as an adulterer,
- 4:20:07or as a robber? Or thus, indeed, will the difficulty still
- 4:20:11remain? For a man may have connection with a woman, knowing who she
- 4:20:15is, yet not from a principle of deliberate choice, but from passion.
- 4:20:21Hence, in this case he acts unjustly, but is not unjust, as
- 4:20:26neither is a thief, though he may have committed theft nor an adulterer,
- 4:20:30though he may have committed adultery and in a similar manner in other things.
- 4:20:34In what manner, therefore, retaliation subsists with reference to justice has been shown
- 4:20:40by us before. It is necessary, however, not to be ignorant that
- 4:20:45what we at present investigate is the simply just and the politically just. But
- 4:20:51this justice takes place among men connected together in society, and these liberal and
- 4:20:56equal men, either according to analogy or according to number, with a view
- 4:21:00to a sufficiency of the necessaries of life. Hence, those among whom this
- 4:21:07is not found have no political justice towards each other, but a certain justice,
- 4:21:11and which subsists according to a similitude to political justice. For there is
- 4:21:18justice among those with whom there is also law, But there is law among
- 4:21:22those with whom there is injustice. For justice is the judgment of the just
- 4:21:26and the unjust. But with those with whom there is injustice, there is
- 4:21:30also acting unjustly. But with all those with whom there is acting unjustly,
- 4:21:34there is not injustice. But injustice consists in a man distributing to himself more
- 4:21:41of what is simply good and less of what is simply evil than he ought.
- 4:21:45Hence we do not suffer a man to govern, but to reason.
- 4:21:48Because he does this to himself, i e. Distributes to himself more of
- 4:21:52what is good and less of what is evil, and becomes a tyrant.
- 4:21:56He, however, who governs, is the guardian of justice. But if
- 4:22:00of justice, he is also the guardian of the equal. But since if
- 4:22:04he is a just man, it does not appear that he possesses more of
- 4:22:07external good than others, for he does not distribute more of what is simply
- 4:22:11good to himself unless it belongs to him by analogy. Hence he distributes the
- 4:22:17simply good to another. And on this account it is said that justice is
- 4:22:21a foreign good, as we have before observed, a certain reward therefore must
- 4:22:26be given to him. But this is honor and a gift. Those persons,
- 4:22:30however, to whom these are not sufficient to become tyrants. But despotic
- 4:22:33and paternal justice, or the justice of a master towards his servants, and
- 4:22:38of a father towards his children, are not the same with this, but
- 4:22:41similar to it. For there is no injustice simply of a man towards his
- 4:22:45own property, but a possession or a slave and a child while he is
- 4:22:51little and not yet separated from his parents, are as it were, a
- 4:22:55part of the man, and no one deliberately chooses to injure himself. Hence
- 4:22:59there is no no no injustice of a man towards himself. And consequently,
- 4:23:03neither is there injustice nor political justice. For justice is conformable to law,
- 4:23:10and subsists among those with whom law is naturally adapted to exist. But these
- 4:23:15are persons with whom there is an equality of governing and being governed. Hence
- 4:23:19there is more of political justice between a man and his wife than between a
- 4:23:23father and his children, or a master and his servants. For this latter
- 4:23:27is economical justice. But this is different from political justice. Chapter seven.
- 4:23:34With respect however, to political justice, one kind is natural, but the
- 4:23:38other legal. And the natural, indeed is that which has everywhere the same
- 4:23:44power. And this is not because it appears or does not appear to be
- 4:23:48justice. But the legal is that respecting which from the first it is of
- 4:23:52no consequence whether it is established in this or in that way. But when
- 4:23:56it is established is of consequence, such for instance, as that captives shall
- 4:24:02be redeemed for a mina, or that a goat shall be sacrificed, and
- 4:24:06not too sheep. And farther still, such laws as are promulgated about particulars,
- 4:24:11such as that sacrifices shall be offered to bracidis, and whatever is established
- 4:24:17by public decrees to some persons. However, all political justice appears to be
- 4:24:22of this kind, because that which has a natural subsistence is not mutable,
- 4:24:26and everywhere possesses the same power, just as fire burns, both here and
- 4:24:32in persia. But just things are seen to be mutable. This, however,
- 4:24:36is not entirely, but only partially the case, though perhaps with the
- 4:24:40gods it is by no means to be admitted that justice is mutable. But
- 4:24:45with us there is something which is naturally mutable, though not everything. But
- 4:24:49at the same time, justice is partly from nature and partly not. What
- 4:24:55However, the justice is which is from nature is evident from contingencies in things
- 4:25:00which have a various subsistence, and also what the justice is, which is
- 4:25:04not from nature but is legal and established by compact. Since both are similarly
- 4:25:11mutable, the same distinction likewise will be adapted to other things. For the
- 4:25:15right hand, is naturally more excellent i e. Is more adapted to motion
- 4:25:21than the left, though it is possible that some persons may be ambidexter.
- 4:25:26The justice, however, which is from compact and utility, resembles measures.
- 4:25:30For the measures of wine and corn are not everywhere equal, but with those
- 4:25:36who buy wine and corn they are greater, and with those who sell them
- 4:25:40less. In a similar manner, justice, which is not natural but human,
- 4:25:45is not everywhere the same, since neither are polities, but everywhere one
- 4:25:49polity alone is conformable to nature, viz. That which is the most excellent.
- 4:25:55Everything just, however, and everything legal are as universals to particulars.
- 4:26:00For actions are many, but each of them is one thing. For it
- 4:26:03is a universal, but an unjust action, and the unjust differ, and
- 4:26:10also a just action, and the just. For the unjust subsists either by
- 4:26:17nature or by order. But the very same thing, which, when done
- 4:26:21is an unjust action, is not so before it is done, but is
- 4:26:25unjust, and in a similar manner with respect to a just action. But
- 4:26:30that which is common is rather called a deed justly done, but the correction
- 4:26:34of an unjust deed a just deed. With respect to each of these,
- 4:26:38however, what the quality and number of their species are, and what the
- 4:26:44particulars are with which they are conversant. We shall hereafter consider Chapter eight,
- 4:26:51since therefore things just and unjust are those which we have enumerated. A man
- 4:26:56then indeed does an injury or acts just when he thus acts voluntarily. But
- 4:27:03when involuntarily, he neither does an injury nor acts justly, except from accident.
- 4:27:07For it happens that the things which he does are either just or unjust,
- 4:27:12but indeed unjustly done and a just action are defined by the voluntary and
- 4:27:18the involuntary. For when an action is voluntary, it is blamed, but
- 4:27:23at the same time it is then a deed unjustly done. Hence, there
- 4:27:27will be something unjust which is not yet a deed unjustly done, unless the
- 4:27:33voluntary is added to it. But I call a voluntary indeed, as has
- 4:27:37been before observed, that which a man does of things which it is in
- 4:27:42his power to do knowingly and not ignorantly, viz. Not being ignorant of
- 4:27:48the circumstances of the action, as for instance, who it is he strikes,
- 4:27:53and with what he strikes, and on what account and when he does.
- 4:27:59This neither from accident, nor by compulsion, as would be the case
- 4:28:04if someone taking his hand should strike another person with it, for he would
- 4:28:11then not strike willingly, because it was not in his power to avoid giving
- 4:28:14the blow. It may happen, however, that he who is struck is
- 4:28:18a father, but he who strikes him may merely know that he is a
- 4:28:22man, or some one of those who are present, but may be ignorant
- 4:28:26that it is his father. A similar distinction also must be made in that
- 4:28:30for the sake of which a thing is done, and concerning the whole action.
- 4:28:33Hence, that which is not known, or which is known indeed,
- 4:28:37but is not in the power of him who acts, or which he is
- 4:28:41compelled to do, is done involuntarily. For we both do and suffer many
- 4:28:45things which have a natural subsistence, knowingly, no one of which is either
- 4:28:49voluntary or involuntary, such as to grow old or to die. That which
- 4:28:55is accidental, however, similarly takes place in things unjust and just. For
- 4:29:00if a man returns a deposit unwillingly and from fear, he cannot be said
- 4:29:04either to perform a just deed or to act justly, except from accident.
- 4:29:10In a similar manner, he who, from compulsion and unwillingly does not return
- 4:29:15a deposit must be said to be unjust, and to do an unjust deed
- 4:29:18from accident. But of voluntary actions, some indeed, we perform with previous
- 4:29:23choice, and others without previous choice. With previous choice such as have been
- 4:29:30the subjects of previous deliberation, but without it, such as have not been
- 4:29:33deliberated on previously. Since Therefore, there are three kinds of harm in social
- 4:29:38communion. Those which are accompanied with ignorance are errors. When a man neither
- 4:29:44apprehends who the person that is injured is, nor the mode, nor the
- 4:29:48instrument, nor that for the sake of which the harm is done. For
- 4:29:52in this case, he will think either that he has not struck the person,
- 4:29:56or not with this instrument, or not this person, or not on
- 4:30:00this account. But something else happened different from what he expected. Thus,
- 4:30:04one man may strike another not for the purpose of wounding, but of stimulating
- 4:30:08him, and in so doing may accidentally wound him. Or he may not
- 4:30:12strike the person whom he intended to strike, or not in the way he
- 4:30:17intended. When therefore, harm is done unintentionally, it is a misfortune.
- 4:30:22But when it is done not unintentionally yet without vice, it is an error.
- 4:30:27For a man then heirs when the principle of the cause is in himself,
- 4:30:33but he is unfortunate when the principle is external to him. When,
- 4:30:37however, harm is done knowingly but without previous deliberation, it is a deed
- 4:30:41unjustly done, as for instance, whatever happens to men through anger or other
- 4:30:47passions which are necessary or natural. For those who injure others and err through
- 4:30:52the influence of these passions act indeed unjustly, and their deeds are unjustly done.
- 4:30:59Nevertheless, there not yet unjust on account of these actions, nor deprived,
- 4:31:03for the harm which they did was not through depravity. But when a
- 4:31:07man injures another from deliberate choice, he is unjust and depraved. Hence,
- 4:31:11those deeds which are the effect of anger are well judged not to be the
- 4:31:15result of previous design, for the principle of action is not in him who
- 4:31:18is angry, but in him who excited his anger. Again, when one
- 4:31:23man hurts another from anger, there is no controversy about the deed as to
- 4:31:27its having been dead, but about the justice of it, for anger is
- 4:31:32excited on account of apparent injustice. For here there is no controversy about the
- 4:31:37existence of the thing, as there is in contracts in which it is necessary
- 4:31:41that one of the contractors should be a depraved character, unless his conduct is
- 4:31:47the effect of oblivion, but acknowledging the fact, they controvert the justice of
- 4:31:52it. He, however, who hurts another person deliberately, is not ignorant
- 4:31:56of the deed. Hence the one of these thinks he is in but the
- 4:32:00other thinks he is not. But he who does harm to another person from
- 4:32:03deliberate choice acts unjustly. And he who injures another according to those deeds which
- 4:32:10are done unjustly, is unjust when he acts contrary to proportion or to the
- 4:32:15equal. In a similar manner, also, he is just when he acts
- 4:32:18justly from previous choice, But he acts justly if he only acts willingly.
- 4:32:25Of involuntary actions, however, some deserve to be pardoned, but others do
- 4:32:30not. For such involuntary errors as are not only committed ignorantly but also through
- 4:32:36ignorance, deserve to be pardoned. But such as are not committed through ignorance
- 4:32:40but ignorantly yet from passion. Neither natural nor human do not deserve to be
- 4:32:45pardoned Chapter nine. It may, however, be doubted whether a distinction has
- 4:32:52been sufficiently made by us between being injured and injuring in the first place.
- 4:32:59Indeed, if the thing is as Euripides asserts it to be, when he
- 4:33:03absurdly says, quote to speak briefly, I may kill my mother, both
- 4:33:08of us being willing, or I being unwilling and she willing close quote For
- 4:33:15is it true or not that a person can be willingly injured? Or is
- 4:33:19every one unwillingly injured in the same manner as everyone who does an injury?
- 4:33:25Does it willingly? Or do some person suffer an injury voluntarily and others involuntarily?
- 4:33:32And a similar inquiry may also be made with respect to obtaining justice,
- 4:33:37For to act justly is wholly a voluntary thing. Hence, the being injured
- 4:33:42and obtaining justice are deservedly opposed in a similar manner to each other, so
- 4:33:48that they are either voluntary or involuntary. It may, however, appear to
- 4:33:53be absurd that in obtaining justice the whole should be voluntary, for some persons
- 4:33:59of obtain justice unwillingly. And this also may be doubted whether everyone who suffers
- 4:34:04something unjust is injured, or whether as it is in acting so, it
- 4:34:10is in suffering. For it is possible in both these to obtain what is
- 4:34:15just from accident. And it is evident that the like also may take place
- 4:34:18in things unjust, for it is not the same thing to do unjust things
- 4:34:23and to do an injury, nor is it the same thing to suffer unjust
- 4:34:27things and to be injured. The like also takes place in acting justly and
- 4:34:33obtaining justice, for it is impossible to be injured unless there is someone who
- 4:34:37does the injury, or to obtain justice unless there is someone who acts justly.
- 4:34:42But if to do an injury is simply to hurt someone willingly, and
- 4:34:47to hurt willingly is to do so knowing the person who is hurt, and
- 4:34:51the instrument and the manner in which he is hurt. But the intemperate man
- 4:34:55willingly hurts himself. If this be the case, he will be voluntarily injured,
- 4:35:00and it will be possible for a man to injure himself. This,
- 4:35:03however, is also one of the things which are dubious. Whether it is
- 4:35:08possible for a man to injure himself farther still a man may voluntarily, through
- 4:35:14intemperance, be injured by another person, so that it will be possible for
- 4:35:18a man to be injured voluntarily. Or shall we say that the definition which
- 4:35:23we have given of doing an injury viz. That it is to hurt someone
- 4:35:27voluntarily, is not right? But we must add the words to hurt,
- 4:35:33knowing the person who is hurt, and the instrument and the manner in which
- 4:35:37he is hurt contrary to his will. A man therefore may be hurt and
- 4:35:42suffer unjust things willingly. But no one is willingly injured, for no one
- 4:35:48wishes to be injured, not even the intemperate man. But he acts contrary
- 4:35:52to his will. For neither does anyone wish for that which he does not
- 4:35:56fancy to be good. But the intemperate man does which he does not think
- 4:36:00ought to be done. But he who gives what is his own, As
- 4:36:04Homer says, Glaucus gave to Diomede quote for Diomedes brass arms of mean device
- 4:36:11for which nine Oxen paid a vulgar price. He gave his own of gold
- 4:36:17divinely wrought a hundred beeves. The shining purchase bought close quote is not injured,
- 4:36:25for it is in his power to give or not to give, but
- 4:36:29to be injured is not in his power. But it is necessary that the
- 4:36:33person should exist by whom the injury is done. Concerning the being injured,
- 4:36:37therefore, it is evident that it is not voluntary. Of those things,
- 4:36:41however, which we propose to discuss, two particulars remain to be explained,
- 4:36:47whether he does an injury who distributes to another person more than he deserves,
- 4:36:52or the person who receives the distribution. For if what we before observed is
- 4:36:56possible, and he who distributes, but not he who who possesses more,
- 4:37:00does the injury. If anyone distributes to another more than to himself knowingly and
- 4:37:06willingly, he will himself injure himself, which modest men appear to do.
- 4:37:11For a worthy man distributes less to himself than to others. Or shall we
- 4:37:15say that neither is this thing simple? For he who distributes less to himself
- 4:37:21than to others of certain good things will vindicate to himself more of some other
- 4:37:26good, if it should so happen, as for instance, of renown or
- 4:37:30of that which is simply beautiful in conduct. Again, the dote is also
- 4:37:34dissolved from the definition of doing an injury, for he who does it suffers
- 4:37:40nothing contrary to his will. Hence he is not, on this account injured.
- 4:37:44But even admitting that he is, he is only hurt. It is
- 4:37:48also evident that he who distributes more than the receiver deserves does an injury,
- 4:37:52but not the receiver. For it is not the person in whom injustice is
- 4:37:56inherent who does the injury, but he to whom to do this is voluntary.
- 4:38:02But this is the man from whom the principle of the action proceeds,
- 4:38:06which is in the distributor, but not in the receiver. Farther still,
- 4:38:10since to act is predicated multifariously in things inanimate, in a certain respect,
- 4:38:15kill the band as well as the servant by the command of his master.
- 4:38:19These indeed do not act injuriously, but they do unjust things. Again,
- 4:38:25if a man, being indeed ignorant, judges, he does not do an
- 4:38:29injury according to the legally just, nor is his judgment unjust. Yet in
- 4:38:33a certain respect it is unjust, for the legally just differs from the first
- 4:38:38justice, or that which has a natural subsistence. But if he should judge
- 4:38:44unjustly, knowingly he will vindicate to himself more, either of favor or of
- 4:38:48vengeance. As therefore, if someone should partake of a deed unjustly done,
- 4:38:55thus also he who, on account of these things, judges unjustly will possess
- 4:39:00us more. For in those things, he who judges a field to another
- 4:39:03person receives in return not a field but money. Men, however, are
- 4:39:08of opinion that it is in their power to do an entry, and that
- 4:39:11on this account it is easy to be just, but it is not so.
- 4:39:17For to have connection with the wife of a neighbor, to strike another
- 4:39:21person, and to give money with the hand are things easy and in the
- 4:39:25power of those who do them. But to do these things with a certain
- 4:39:27disposition of mind is neither easy nor in the power of those who do them.
- 4:39:33In a similar manner. Also, the multitude fancy that there is no
- 4:39:37portion of wisdom in knowing what is just and what is unjust, because it
- 4:39:41is not difficult to understand those things about which the laws speak. These things,
- 4:39:45however, are not just except from accident. But they are then just
- 4:39:52when they are performed after a certain manner and distributed after a certain manner.
- 4:39:56But this is a greater work than to know things that are so lubrius.
- 4:40:00For there indeed, it is easy to know honey and wine, and hellebore,
- 4:40:04and burning and cutting. But how it is necessary to distribute these in
- 4:40:10order to produce health, and to whom and when they are to be distributed,
- 4:40:14is as great a work as to be a physician. On this very
- 4:40:18account, the multitude fancy that it is no less the province of a just
- 4:40:22man than of an unjust man to do an injury, because the just man
- 4:40:26is no less, but is even more able to do each of these than
- 4:40:30the unjust man. For according to them, a just man may have connection
- 4:40:34with the wife of another man, and may strike another person. And a
- 4:40:38brave man may throw away his shield and be taking himself to flight, may
- 4:40:42run where he pleases. To act cowardly. However, and to do an
- 4:40:47injury is not merely to do these things except from accident, but it consists
- 4:40:52in doing them with a certain disposition of mind, i e. With promptitude
- 4:40:56and delight. Just as to perform the office of a physician and to restore
- 4:41:02to health does not merely consist in cutting or not cutting, in giving or
- 4:41:06not giving medicine, but in doing these after a certain manner. But just
- 4:41:11things subsist among those with whom there is a participation of things which are simply
- 4:41:15good, And in these there is also excess and defect. For to some
- 4:41:21beings, as perhaps to the gods, justice is not a good, because
- 4:41:25in them there is no excess or deficiency. But to others, as to
- 4:41:30men incurable and vicious, no part of things simply good is beneficial, but
- 4:41:33all of them are noxious, and to others they are useful to a certain
- 4:41:37extent. And on this account justice is a human good. Chapter ten.
- 4:41:45It now follows that we should speak concerning equity and the equitable, and show
- 4:41:49how equity indeed subsist with reference to justice, and the equitable with reference to
- 4:41:56the just. For to those who consider rightly the equitable appear spears to be
- 4:42:00neither simply the same, nor yet different in genus from the just. And
- 4:42:04at one time, indeed we praise the equitable and the man of equity,
- 4:42:08so that, also transferring this name to other things, we praise a man
- 4:42:14by calling him a more equitable instead of a good man, manifesting by this
- 4:42:18that it is a better appellation. But at another time to those who follow
- 4:42:23reason. It appears to be absurd that the equitable, if it is something
- 4:42:27different from the just, should be laudable. For either the just is not
- 4:42:32a worthy thing, or the equitable is not just if it is different from
- 4:42:36the just, or if they are both worthy things, both are the same.
- 4:42:41The doubt therefore, concerning the equitable nearly happens through these particulars. All
- 4:42:45these, however, are after a certain manner right, and there is nothing
- 4:42:49in them which is contrary and adverse to itself. For the equitable, being
- 4:42:55something that is just, is a better just thing, and is not better
- 4:42:59than the just, as if it were some other genus. The just,
- 4:43:03therefore and the equitable are the same thing, and both of them being worthy
- 4:43:07things, the equitable is the more excellent of the two. I doubt,
- 4:43:11however, still remains that though the equitable is indeed just, yet it is
- 4:43:15not the legally just, but is a correction of it. But the cause
- 4:43:19of this is that every law indeed is universal, but it cannot speak universally
- 4:43:26with rectitude about certain particulars. In those things therefore in which it is necessary
- 4:43:30to speak universally, but in which this cannot be done rightly, the law
- 4:43:34assumes that which happens, for the most part, not being ignorant of the
- 4:43:38fault which has been committed, and in thus doing it acts no less rightly,
- 4:43:44for the fault is not in the law, nor in the legislator,
- 4:43:47but in the nature of the thing, For such directly is the manner of
- 4:43:51the thing which pertains to action. When the law therefore speaks universally in something
- 4:43:56after this should happen. Besides, then it is right to correct what the
- 4:44:00legislator has omitted and the error which he has committed in speaking simply, since
- 4:44:07the legislator himself would adopt such correction if he were present, and would have
- 4:44:11legally established this if he had known it. Hence, the equitable is just,
- 4:44:17and is better than a certain justice. It is not, however,
- 4:44:21better than what is simply just, but it is better than the justice which
- 4:44:25errs through speaking simply and generally. And this is the nature of the equitable,
- 4:44:30that it is a correction of law where law is deficient on account of
- 4:44:33speaking universally. For this is the cause by all things are not according to
- 4:44:37law, that concerning certain things it is impossible to establish a law. Hence
- 4:44:42a decree is necessary for of the indefinite, the rule also is indefinite,
- 4:44:48just as of a Lesbian building, the rule is led in, since the
- 4:44:52rule is bent conformable to the figure of the stone, and does not remain
- 4:44:56the same. Thus, also a decree is adapted to th things themselves.
- 4:45:00It is evident therefore, what the equitable and the just are, and what
- 4:45:06the justice is which the equitable excels. It is likewise manifest from this who
- 4:45:11is an equitable man? For he who deliberately chooses and practices things of this
- 4:45:15kind, and who is not an accurate distributor of justice in the rigid sense
- 4:45:19of the word, but remits something of the rigor of the law, though
- 4:45:23the law is favorable to such rigor, is an equitable man. And the
- 4:45:27habit itself is equity, being a certain justice and not a different habit Chapter
- 4:45:33eleven. For one has been said, also it is evident whether it is
- 4:45:38possible for a man to injure himself or not, For there are some just
- 4:45:42things established by law which pertain to the whole of virtue. Thus, for
- 4:45:48instance, the law does not order a man to destroy himself, and it
- 4:45:52forbids what it does not command. Again, when one man hurts another contrary
- 4:45:56to law, who has not hurt him. He does an injury willingly.
- 4:46:00But he does an injury willingly, who does it knowing the person whom he
- 4:46:04injures, and the instrument and the manner in which he does it. But
- 4:46:08he who destroys himself through anger does this willingly contrary to right reason, which
- 4:46:14the law does not permit. Hence, he does an injury. But to
- 4:46:18whom is it Not to the city, but not to himself, For he
- 4:46:22voluntarily suffers, but no one is voluntarily injured. Hence, also the city
- 4:46:27punishes him, and a certain disgrace is attached to him who destroys himself,
- 4:46:33as one who injures a city. Farther still, it is not possible for
- 4:46:37a man to injure himself in that way in which he is unjust, who
- 4:46:41only acts unjustly and is not entirely depraved, For this character is different from
- 4:46:47him. For the unjust man is in a certain respect so depraved as the
- 4:46:52timid man is, but not as possessing the whole of depravity. Hence,
- 4:46:56neither, according to this improbity, does he do him self an injury,
- 4:47:00For if he did the same thing might be taken away and added at the
- 4:47:04same time to the same thing, but this is impossible. It is,
- 4:47:08however, necessary, that the just and the unjust should always exist in more
- 4:47:14than one person. Again, he who does an injury does it voluntarily and
- 4:47:18from deliberate choice, and with a precedency in time. For he who injures
- 4:47:25another because he has been injured by him does not appear to act unjustly.
- 4:47:30But he who injures himself suffers and does the same things at the same time.
- 4:47:34Farther still, a man would be injured willingly, to which may be
- 4:47:38added that no one does an injury without a particular species of injustice. But
- 4:47:44no one commits adultery with his own wife, nor does anyone dig through his
- 4:47:48own wall, nor commit a theft on his own property. In short,
- 4:47:52the impossibility that a man should injure himself is evident from the conclusions made by
- 4:47:57us respecting the being voluntarily injured. It is likewise evident that both to be
- 4:48:03injured and to injure are bad things, for the one is to have less,
- 4:48:07but the other more than the medium. In the same manner as the
- 4:48:10salubrious in medicine, and that which contributes to a good habit of body.
- 4:48:14In the gymnastic art. At the same time, however, it is worse
- 4:48:18to injure than to be injured, For to do an injury is accompanied with
- 4:48:22vice, and is blameable, and with vice which is either perfect and simply
- 4:48:26vice, or nearly so. For not everything which is voluntary is accompanied with
- 4:48:32injustice. But to be injured is without vice and injustice. Essentially. Therefore,
- 4:48:37it is less bad to be injured than to do an injury, but
- 4:48:40from accident nothing prevents it from being a greater evil. Art, however,
- 4:48:45pays no attention to this, but it says that the pleurisy is a greater
- 4:48:48disease than a lame foot, though it may happen that the latter may be
- 4:48:52a greater evil than the former, if a man, in consequence of being
- 4:48:56lame, should fall and thus be taken by enemies and put to death.
- 4:49:02Metaphorically speaking, however, and from similitude, the whole man is not just
- 4:49:07to the whole of himself, but one part of him towards another part.
- 4:49:11Yet not according to every kind of justice, but according to the despotic or
- 4:49:15economic. For in these discussions it must be admitted that the rational differs from
- 4:49:21the irrational part of the soul. And if we look to these it appears
- 4:49:25that there is a certain injustice of a man towards himself, because it is
- 4:49:30possible in these parts for a man to suffer something adverse to his own appetites.
- 4:49:34As therefore, between a governor and him who is governed there is a
- 4:49:38certain justice towards each other. This is also the case between these parts of
- 4:49:42the soul. After this manner, therefore, we have discussed justice and the
- 4:49:48other ethical virtues. End of Book five, Chapter one. Since, however,
- 4:49:56we have before observed that it is necessary the medium in conduct should be
- 4:50:02chosen, and neither excess nor deficiency. But the medium is to act as
- 4:50:07right reason prescribes. Let us now consider what right reason is. For in
- 4:50:12all the above mentioned habits, as in other things, there is a certain
- 4:50:17scope to which he who possesses reason looking acts with intention and remission. And
- 4:50:23there is a certain boundary of media, which we say are situated between excess
- 4:50:29and defect, and which exist conformably to right reason. Thus to speak,
- 4:50:34however, is indeed true, but is not at all clear, for in
- 4:50:40other pursuits, also with which science is conversant. It is indeed true to
- 4:50:45say that it is not proper to labor either more or less, nor to
- 4:50:48be indolent, but to labor moderately and as right reason prescribes. He,
- 4:50:55however, who alone knows this, will know nothing more. As if on
- 4:50:59inquiring what kind of things are to be administered to the body, it should
- 4:51:02be said they are such as medicine, and he who possesses the medical art
- 4:51:07prescribe. Hence, it is necessary, with respect to the habits of the
- 4:51:11soul, that this should not only be truly said, but that it should
- 4:51:15also be definitely shown what right reason is and what is the definition of it.
- 4:51:19But we have distributed the virtues of the soul, and have said that
- 4:51:23some of them are ethical, and others dionoetical, or belonging to the discoursive
- 4:51:30power of the soul. With respect to the ethical virtues, therefore we have
- 4:51:34indeed discussed them. But with respect to the remaining virtues, these we shall
- 4:51:40discuss after we have first spoken concerning the soul. It has therefore been before
- 4:51:45observed by us that there are two parts of the soul, that which possesses
- 4:51:49reason and that which is irrational. But now we shall make a division,
- 4:51:55after the same manner, of the part which possesses reason. And it must
- 4:51:59be admitted that there are two parts possessing reason, one indeed, by which
- 4:52:03we survey those kinds of beings, the principles of which cannot subsist otherwise than
- 4:52:08they do, and the other by which we survey things of a contingent nature.
- 4:52:15For since the objects of knowledge are specifically different, it follows that there
- 4:52:18are also different species of knowledge. For it is necessary that knowledge should be
- 4:52:25similar to the thing known, and that the knowledge of that which is necessary
- 4:52:29should be necessary, but contingent of that which is contingent. For all knowledge
- 4:52:34subsists according to similitude and affinity, since it is a certain adaptation and contact
- 4:52:41of that which is known and that which knows. But of these parts of
- 4:52:47the soul, the one is called scientific, but the other ratiocinative. For
- 4:52:52to consult and reason are the same thing. No one, however, consults
- 4:52:56about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do. So that the rationios native
- 4:53:03power is one certain part of the rational part of the soul. It must
- 4:53:07therefore be shown what is the best habit of each of these, for this
- 4:53:12is the virtue of each. But virtue is referred to its proper work.
- 4:53:18Chapter two. There are, however, three things in the soul which have
- 4:53:23dominion over action and truth viz. Sense, intellect, and appetite. But
- 4:53:30of these sense is the principle of no one action, which is evident from
- 4:53:34this that brutes have indeed sense, but have no communion with action, so
- 4:53:40as to have dominion over it. What, however, affirmation and negation are
- 4:53:45in the discoursive energy of the rational part. That pursuit and avoidance are an
- 4:53:49appetite. Hence, since ethical virtue is a habit accompanied with deliberate choice,
- 4:53:56but deliberate choice is an appetite adapted to consultation. Hence, it is necessary
- 4:54:02that reason should be true and the appetite right if the deliberate choice is good,
- 4:54:07and that the one should assert and the other pursue the same things.
- 4:54:14This discursive energy of the soul, therefore, by which we judge that something
- 4:54:18is to be desired, is practical reason and practical truths. But of the
- 4:54:22discursive energy of reason, which is contemplative and neither practical nor effective, the
- 4:54:29good and the evil are truth and falsehood, for this is the work of
- 4:54:33the whole of the discursive power. The work, however, of the practical
- 4:54:37and at the same time discursive energy of reason is truth, subsisting in concord
- 4:54:42with right appetite. The principle therefore of action, whence motion is derived,
- 4:54:49is deliberate choice, though this principle is not the final cause of action.
- 4:54:53But appetite and that reason, which is for the sake of something, or
- 4:55:00which is directed to the final cause, are the principles of deliberate choice.
- 4:55:04Hence, deliberate choice is not without intellect and the discursive energy of reason,
- 4:55:10nor is it without the ethical habit for good conduct, and the contrary to
- 4:55:15it in action are not without the discursive energy of reason and manners. The
- 4:55:19discursive energy, however, of reason itself does not move anything except that which
- 4:55:26is for the sake of something and is practical, since this has dominion over
- 4:55:30that which is effective. For everyone who affects anything does it for the sake
- 4:55:36of something, and that which is affected is not simply the end, but
- 4:55:40is a relative and pertains to something. Though this is not the case with
- 4:55:44that which is practicable. For good conduct is the end of action, but
- 4:55:49appetite is directed to the end. Hence, deliberate choice is either erectic intellect
- 4:55:55or appetite, possessing a discursive energy, and man is a principle of this
- 4:56:00kind. Nothing, however, that has been done, is an object of
- 4:56:03deliberate choice. Thus, for instance, no one deliberately chooses to subvert Troy.
- 4:56:10For neither does anyone deliberate about what is past, but about that which
- 4:56:15is future and contingent. But it is not possible that what has been done
- 4:56:19should not be done. Hence Agatho says rightly, quote all things to God
- 4:56:26are possible, but one that to undo which is already done. Close quote
- 4:56:33of both the intellective parts. Therefore the work is truth. Hence those habits
- 4:56:38according to which each of these parts enunciates the truth are the virtues of both
- 4:56:45Chapter three, Assuming therefore a more elevated exordium, let us again speak concerning
- 4:56:52these virtues. Let therefore the habits by which the soul enunciates truth, in
- 4:56:57affirming or denying, be find in number. But these are art, science,
- 4:57:03prudence, wisdom, and intellect. For it is possible that both hypolepsis
- 4:57:10and opinion may assert what is false, What science therefore is will be from
- 4:57:15hence evident if it is necessary to investigate accurately and not to follow similitudes.
- 4:57:22For all of us are of opinion that it is not possible for that which
- 4:57:26we know scientifically to subsist otherwise than it does. But with respect to things
- 4:57:33which may subsist otherwise, of these, when they are out of our view,
- 4:57:37we are ignorant whether they exist or not. The object of scientific knowledge
- 4:57:42therefore is from necessity. Hence it is eternal. For all beings which are
- 4:57:48simply from necessity are eternal. But things eternal are without generation and incorruptible.
- 4:57:56Again, all science appears to be capable of being taught, and the object
- 4:58:00of scientific knowledge may be obtained by discipline. But all doctrine is produced from
- 4:58:07things previously known, as we have said in the Analytics, for it partly
- 4:58:11subsists through induction, and partly from syllogism. Induction therefore is indeed a principle,
- 4:58:19and the principle of universal, But syllogism is from universal. The principles
- 4:58:26therefore from which syllogism consists are things of which there is no syllogism. Hence
- 4:58:32they are obtained by induction. Science therefore is indeed a demonstrative habit in such
- 4:58:37other things as we have added to the definition of it in the analytics.
- 4:58:41For when a man believes that a thing is after a certain manner, and
- 4:58:47the principles of it are known to him, he has a scientific knowledge of
- 4:58:51that thing. For if the principles are not more known to him, then
- 4:58:55the conclusion he will have a scientific knowledge from accident. Let these things therefore
- 4:59:00be admitted concerning science Chapter four. Of that, however, which may subsist
- 4:59:07otherwise than it does, or which has a various subsistence and is contingent,
- 4:59:12there is something which is effective in something which is practicable. But production and
- 4:59:18action differ. Credibility, however, may be obtained concerning these things from exoteric
- 4:59:25discussions, so that the practic habit in conjunction with reason is different from the
- 4:59:30effective or productive habit in conjunction with reason, And neither are they contained by
- 4:59:37each other. For neither is action affection, nor is affection action. But
- 4:59:41since the building art is a habit effective in conjunction with reason, and neither
- 4:59:48is there any art which is not a habit effective in conjunction with reason,
- 4:59:52nor any such habit which is not art. Art, and habit effective in
- 4:59:56conjunction with true reason will be the all. Art, however, is conversant
- 5:00:03with generation, and machinates and contemplates in order that something may be produced which
- 5:00:08is capable either of existing or not existing, and of which the principle is
- 5:00:14in the maker, but not in the thing made. For art neither belongs
- 5:00:18to things which necessarily are or are necessarily generated, nor to things which have
- 5:00:25a natural subsistence, for these contain in themselves the principle. Since, however,
- 5:00:30production and action are different, it is necessary that art should pertain to
- 5:00:34production but not to action. And after a certain manner, fortune and art
- 5:00:41are conversant with the same things, as also Agatho says, quote art fortune
- 5:00:48loves and fortune art close quote. Art. Therefore, as we have said,
- 5:00:55is a certain habit effect of inconjunction with true reason. But the privation
- 5:01:00of art, on the contrary, or the inartificial habit, is a habit
- 5:01:04effect of inconjunction with false reason, about that which may have a various subsistence.
- 5:01:11Chapter five. With respect to prudence, we shall apprehend what it is
- 5:01:17if we survey who those are whom we denominate prudent persons. It appears,
- 5:01:22therefore, to be the province of a prudent man to be able to consult
- 5:01:26well about things which are good and advantageous to him, not partially as about
- 5:01:32what contributes to health or strengths, but about what universally contributes to a happy
- 5:01:37life. But this is indicated by our calling men prudent about anything when they
- 5:01:41reason well with a view to some worthy end, in things in which there
- 5:01:45is no art, so that, in short, he who has adapted to
- 5:01:49consultation will be a prudent man. No one, however, consults about things
- 5:01:56which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things which it is impossible
- 5:02:00for him to perform. Hence, if science indeed subsists in conjunction with demonstration,
- 5:02:07but of those things of which the principles may have a very subsistence,
- 5:02:11of these there is no demonstration, for all these are contingent. And if
- 5:02:15it is not possible to insult about things which subsist from necessity, prudence will
- 5:02:19neither be science nor art. It will not be science because that which is
- 5:02:23practicable may have a various subsistence, and it will not be art because the
- 5:02:30genus of action is different from the genus of production. It remains therefore,
- 5:02:34that it is a true habit in conjunction with reason, practical about human good
- 5:02:40and evil. For the end of production indeed is different from the production.
- 5:02:45But the end of action is not always different from action. Hence, we
- 5:02:49are of opinion that Pericles and such like persons are prudent men, because they
- 5:02:55are able to survey what is good for themselves and for mankind. And we
- 5:03:00also think that economists and politicians are persons of this description. Hence also we
- 5:03:07call temperance by this name as preserving prudence. But it preserves an opinion of
- 5:03:12this kind. For the delectable and the painful do not corrupt or distort every
- 5:03:18opinion, such as that a triangle has or has not angles equal to two.
- 5:03:23Right, But those opinions which pertain to what is practicable. For the
- 5:03:30principles indeed of practicable things, are those things for the sake of which they
- 5:03:33are performed. But to him who is corrupted through pleasure or pain, the
- 5:03:38principle is not immediately apparent, nor does he perceive that for the sake of
- 5:03:44this and through this, it is necessary to choose and perform all things,
- 5:03:48for vice is destructive of the principle. Hence, it is necessary that prudence
- 5:03:53should be a habit in conjunction with true reason practical about human good. Moreover,
- 5:04:00of art, indeed there is a virtue, but of prudence there is
- 5:04:03not. And in art, indeed, he who voluntarily airs is to be
- 5:04:08preferred to him who errs involuntarily. But in prudence, he who voluntarily airs
- 5:04:15is a subordinate character, he in the same manner as in the virtues.
- 5:04:19It is evident therefore that prudence is a certain virtue, and not art.
- 5:04:25But since there are two parts of the rational soul, prudence will be the
- 5:04:29virtue of the doxastic part, or that part which forms opinions of things.
- 5:04:34For both opinion and prudence are conversant with that which may have a various subsistence.
- 5:04:41Nor yet, is prudence a habit alone in conjunction with reason, of
- 5:04:45which this is an indication that there may be an oblivion of such a habit
- 5:04:49i e. It may be lost through oblivion, but there cannot be of
- 5:04:55prudence. Chapter six. Since however, science is an assent to universals and
- 5:05:02things which have a necessary subsistence, But there are principles of things demonstrable and
- 5:05:07of every science, for science is accompanied with reason. This being the case,
- 5:05:12there will neither be science, nor art, nor prudence of the principle
- 5:05:17of the object of science, For the object of science is demonstrable, but
- 5:05:22art and prudence are conversant with things which may have a various subsistence. Neither
- 5:05:27therefore will wisdom be that through which this principle is known, For it is
- 5:05:33the province of a wise man to have demonstration about certain things. Hence,
- 5:05:37if the habits by which we enunciate the truths and are never deceived about things
- 5:05:41which cannot or which can have a various subsistence, are science and prudence,
- 5:05:47wisdom and intellect. But no one of these three can be the habit by
- 5:05:51which we know principles. But by the three I mean prudence, wisdom,
- 5:05:55and science. It remains that intellect is the habit by which princes are known.
- 5:06:02Chapter seven. We attribute, however, wisdom in the arts to those
- 5:06:07who are most accurately skilled in the arts. Thus we say that Phidias was
- 5:06:11a wise sculptor, and Polyclidus a wise statuary. Here therefore we signify nothing
- 5:06:18else by wisdom, then that it is the virtue of art. But in
- 5:06:22short, we think that certain persons are wise, not partially, and that
- 5:06:26there are not anything else than wise men. As Homer says in his marginies
- 5:06:33quote the gods, nor minor hymn, nor plowmen made, nor wise in
- 5:06:38anything beside close quote. So that it is evident that wisdom will be the
- 5:06:44most accurate of the sciences. Hence it is necessary that the wise man should
- 5:06:48not only know those things which are inferred from principles or the conclusions of scientific
- 5:06:55reasoning, but that he should also perceive and enunciate the truth about princess themselves.
- 5:07:00Wisdom, therefore will be intellect and science, and will possess as a
- 5:07:06head or summit, the science of the most honorable things, i e.
- 5:07:10Of divine natures. For it would be absurd for anyone to fancy that the
- 5:07:15political science or prudence is a thing of all others, the most excellent,
- 5:07:21unless man is the best of everything the world contains. If, however,
- 5:07:26what is salubrious and good is to man one thing and another to fishes,
- 5:07:32but that which is white and that which is straight are always the same.
- 5:07:36All men will acknowledge that a wise man is the same. But the prudent
- 5:07:40man is a mutable character. For they will say that the being is prudent
- 5:07:44who surveys what is excellent in particulars according to the nature of each and to
- 5:07:48him they will commit these particulars. Hence also they say that some brutes are
- 5:07:53prudent viz. Such as appear to have a providential power about what pertains to
- 5:07:59their life life. It is evident, however, that the political science and
- 5:08:03wisdom are not the same. For if it should be said that wisdom is
- 5:08:07that which is conversant with what is useful to mankind, there will be many
- 5:08:11kinds of wisdom, since there is not one science which is conversant with the
- 5:08:17good of all animals, but a different science is conversant with a different good,
- 5:08:22unless indeed, there is one medical science which extends to all beings.
- 5:08:26Nor is it of any consequence if it should be said that man is the
- 5:08:30most excellent of all other animals, For there are many animals naturally more divine
- 5:08:34than man, such as those most apparent beings from which the world is composed.
- 5:08:40From what has been said, therefore, it is evident that wisdom is
- 5:08:42the science and intellect of things most honorable by nature. Hence the multitudes say
- 5:08:48that Anaxagoras and Thales and such like persons were indeed wise but not prudent men,
- 5:08:56in consequence of perceiving that they were ignorant of what was adventageous to them
- 5:09:00with respect to a corporeal life. And they say that they knew indeed things
- 5:09:04superfluous and admirable, difficult and divine, but which are useless because they did
- 5:09:11not investigate human good. Prudence, however, is conversant with human affairs and
- 5:09:18with those things which are the subjects of consultation. For we say that this
- 5:09:22is especially the work of a prudent man to consult well. But no one
- 5:09:26consults about things which cannot subsist otherwise than they do, nor about things of
- 5:09:30which there is not a certain end. And this practical good. He,
- 5:09:36however, simply consults well, who conjectures, by a reasoning process what is
- 5:09:41best to man among practicable things. Nor is prudence only directed to universals.
- 5:09:47But it is also necessary that it should no particulars, for it is practical.
- 5:09:52But action is conversant with particulars. Hence, also some persons who have
- 5:09:56only experimental knowledge without science are more adapted for practical affairs than those who possess
- 5:10:03a scientific knowledge without experience. For he who knows that light flesh is easily
- 5:10:08concocted, but is ignorant what flesh is light will not produce health, but
- 5:10:14he will rather produce it. Who knows that the flesh of birds is light
- 5:10:18and salubrious. Prudence, however, is practical, so that it is necessary
- 5:10:22to possess both viz. A knowledge of what is to be done universally and
- 5:10:27in particular circumstances, or rather the latter than the former. But prudence here
- 5:10:33also i e. Among the practical powers will be a certain architectonic power,
- 5:10:40or a power belonging to a master art Chapter eight. The political science,
- 5:10:45however, and prudence, are indeed the same habit, though they have not
- 5:10:51the same essence. But of the science pertaining to a city, the one
- 5:10:56part, which is legislative, is, as it were, architectonic prudence,
- 5:11:00but the other, in the same manner as particulars, is denominated by a
- 5:11:04common name the political science. This, however, is practical and occupied in
- 5:11:11consultation. For a decree is a thing practicable as the extreme. Hence those
- 5:11:17alone who possess the political science are said to act in a political capacity,
- 5:11:22for they alone act in the same manner as manual artificers. That also appears
- 5:11:27to be especially prudence which a man employs about himself and about one thing.
- 5:11:33And this is called by a common name prudence. But of these species of
- 5:11:38prudence, the one is economy, another legislation, and another the political science.
- 5:11:45And of this last one part pertains to consultation, but another is judicial.
- 5:11:52For a man, therefore, to know his own concerns will be one
- 5:11:56species of knowledge. Nevertheless, it possesses a great difference. And he who
- 5:12:00knows things pertaining to himself and is conversant with them, appears to be a
- 5:12:06prudent man. But those who apply themselves to the management of public affairs are
- 5:12:10busily employed in a multitude of concerns. Hence, also Euripidy says, quote,
- 5:12:17how can the name of wise to me belong who might have mingled in
- 5:12:21the martial's wrong, and vexed with business, and exempt from care taking of
- 5:12:26spoils my honorable share, yet chose by over anxious thought, to move the
- 5:12:33direful hate of all commanding jove close quote, For these men explore what is
- 5:12:38good for themselves, and are of opinion that it is necessary to do this.
- 5:12:44From this opinion, therefore, it comes to pass that these men are
- 5:12:48prudent. Though perhaps it is not possible for a man to know his own
- 5:12:52concerns without economic and political prudence. Again, how a man ought to manage
- 5:12:56his own affairs is a thing immanifest and requires consideration, but as an indication
- 5:13:03of the truth of what has been said. A youth may become a geometrician
- 5:13:08and a mathematician, and may be skilled in things of this kind, but
- 5:13:12it does not appear that he will be prudent. The cause, however,
- 5:13:17of this, is that prudence pertains two particulars, which become known from experience,
- 5:13:22but youth is without experience, which is produced by length of time.
- 5:13:26Since this also deserves to be considered. Why a boy may become a mathematician
- 5:13:32but cannot be wise or a physiologist, shall we say it is because mathematical
- 5:13:37objects subsist by an oblation from matter. But the principles of the objects of
- 5:13:41wisdom and physiology are derived from experience. And with respect to metaphysical principles,
- 5:13:48indeed, youth did not believe in but admit them. But with respect to
- 5:13:53mathematical principles, it is not in manifest what they are. Farther still,
- 5:14:00or in consultation, either pertains to universals or particulars. For in order that
- 5:14:06a man may not drink heavy and therefore bad water, it is requisite that
- 5:14:10he should know either that all heavy water is bad, or that this particular
- 5:14:15water is heavy. But it is evident that prudence is not science, for
- 5:14:19it pertains to the extreme, as we have before observed, since that which
- 5:14:25is practicable is a thing of this kind. It is therefore indeed opposed to
- 5:14:30intellect. For intellect is conversant with terms, i e. Universals, which
- 5:14:36are the extremes upward and above which there are no other principles. But prudence
- 5:14:41is conversant with the extremes downward, which are particulars of which there is no
- 5:14:45science, but only a sensible perception. And this is not a sensible perception
- 5:14:51of peculiarities, but such as that by which we perceive in mathematics that a
- 5:14:56triangle is the extreme. For we stop there. It is therefore rather this
- 5:15:03sense which is prudence. But of that there is another species. Chapter nine
- 5:15:10to investigate However, and to consult differ. For to consult is to investigate
- 5:15:15something, But it is necessary to discuss good consultation and show what it is,
- 5:15:22whether it is a certain science or opinion, or a good conjecture,
- 5:15:26or some other genus. It is not therefore science, for men do not
- 5:15:30investigate about things which they know. But good consultation is a certain consultation.
- 5:15:37And he who consults investigates and reasons. Neither is a good conjecture. For
- 5:15:42good conjecture is without reasoning, and is something which is accomplished with celerity.
- 5:15:48But men consult for a long time and say that the objects of consultation ought
- 5:15:52to be performed rapidly, but that consultation should be done slowly. Again,
- 5:15:59sagacity and good consultation also differ from each other. But sagacity is a certain
- 5:16:04good conjecture. Neither therefore is any good consultation opinion. But since he who
- 5:16:11consults badly heirs, but he who consults well consults rightly, it is evidence
- 5:16:15that good consultation is a certain rectitude. Nor is good consultation either science or
- 5:16:22opinion. For of science, indeed, there is no rectitude, because there
- 5:16:26is no error, but truth is the rectitude of opinion, and at the
- 5:16:30same time, everything of which there is an opinion is definite and determined.
- 5:16:36Nevertheless, good consultation is not without reasoning. It falls short, therefore,
- 5:16:41of dianoia, or the discursive energy of reason, For this is not yet
- 5:16:47nunciation, since opinion is not investigation, but is now a certain enunciation.
- 5:16:53He, however, who consults, whether he consults well or ill, investigates
- 5:16:57something and reasons. But good consultation is a certain rectitude of consultation, on
- 5:17:04which account it must, in the first place be inquired what consultation is and
- 5:17:10with what it is conversant. Since, however, rectitude is multifariously predicated,
- 5:17:15it is evident that not every rectitude is good. Consultation For the incontinent and
- 5:17:22the bad man obtained from reasoning that which they propose to see, so that
- 5:17:26they will have consulted rightly, but have procured for themselves a great evil.
- 5:17:30But to have consulted well appears to be a certain good. For such a
- 5:17:34rectitude of consultation as becomes the means of obtaining good, is good consultation.
- 5:17:41Good, however, may be obtained by false reasoning, and a man indeed
- 5:17:45may obtain that which ought to be done, yet not through a proper medium.
- 5:17:49But the middle term may be false. Hence, neither will that be
- 5:17:53good consultation, according to which that is obtained which ought to be obtained,
- 5:17:59yet not through a proper medium. Further still, it is possible that one
- 5:18:03man may obtain the object of his wishes by consulting for a long time,
- 5:18:07but another by consulting rapidly. Hence, neither is that yet good consultation,
- 5:18:12but the rectitude which subsists according to utility, and to what is proper,
- 5:18:18and as and when it is proper, Again, it is possible simply to
- 5:18:22consult well, and also with a view to a certain end. Good consultation
- 5:18:26therefore simply is that which proceeds with rectitude to an end. Simply, but
- 5:18:33a certain good consultation is that which precedes with rectitude to a certain end.
- 5:18:37Hence, if to consult well is the province of prudent men, good consultation
- 5:18:42will be a rectitude according to utility, with a view to a certain end,
- 5:18:47of which prudence is the true hypothesis. Chapter ten. Intelligence, however,
- 5:18:55and the privation of intelligence, according to which we denominate men intelligent or
- 5:19:00unintelligent, is neither wholly the same way science or opinion. For if it
- 5:19:04were, all men would be intelligent. Nor is intelligence some one of the
- 5:19:08particular sciences, such as medicine, for it would be conversant with health or
- 5:19:14geometry, for it would be conversant with magnitudes. For neither is intelligence conversant
- 5:19:19with things which always are and are immovable, nor with things which are passing
- 5:19:25into existence, but with those which may be the subject of doubt and consultation.
- 5:19:30Hence it is conversant with the same things as prudence. Yet intelligence and
- 5:19:36prudence are not the same. For prudence, indeed, is of a commanding
- 5:19:40nature, for the end of it is what ought or what ought ought to
- 5:19:44be done. But intelligence is alone of a judiciary nature. For intelligence is
- 5:19:49the same as right intelligence, since intelligent men are also rightly intelligent. Intelligence,
- 5:19:56however, is neither the possession nor the acquisition of prudence. But as
- 5:20:00he who learns is said to understand what he learns when he uses science,
- 5:20:04the like also takes place in the use of opinion in forming a judgment of
- 5:20:10those things with which prudence is conversant. In judging of them, will when
- 5:20:15another person is speaking. For what is well is the same with what is
- 5:20:18beautifully done. And hence the name intelligence was derived according to which men are
- 5:20:23said to be rightly intelligent, viz. From intelligence in learning, For we
- 5:20:29frequently use the verb to learn as equivalent to the verb to understand, Chapter
- 5:20:34eleven. But what is called upright decision, according to which we say that
- 5:20:38men decide rightly is the right judgment of the equitable man. As an indication
- 5:20:45of this, however, we say that the equitable man is especially inclined to
- 5:20:48pardon others, and that it is equitable to pardon certain things. But pardon
- 5:20:55is an upright judiciary decision of the equitable man, and the decision is upright
- 5:21:00which is made by a man observant of truth. All these habits, however,
- 5:21:04reasonably tend to the same thing. For we speak of upright decision,
- 5:21:10intelligence, prudence, and intellect with reference to the same persons. When we
- 5:21:15say that they are men of upright decision, are endued with intellect, are
- 5:21:19prudent and intelligent. For all these powers pertain to the extremes downward and to
- 5:21:26particulars. And an intelligent man and one who decides rightly or a man disposed
- 5:21:32to pardon will be one who possesses a judiciary power about things with which the
- 5:21:37prudent man is conversant. For things of an equitable nature are common to all
- 5:21:41good men in their intercourse with others. Everything, however, of a practicable
- 5:21:47nature, pertains to particulars and the downward extremes. For it is necessary that
- 5:21:52a prudent man should have a knowledge of these, and intelligence and equitable decision
- 5:21:59are conversant with them things of a practicable nature, But these are extremes,
- 5:22:03and intellect pertains both to the upward and downward extremes. For intellect, and
- 5:22:08not the discourse of energy of reason, is conversant with both first and last
- 5:22:12terms, i e. With universal principles. The one indeed, i e.
- 5:22:18The intellect, which is the principle of the demonstrative sciences, is conversant
- 5:22:22with immutable and first terms. But the intellect, which is occupied in practical
- 5:22:27affairs, or which is the principle of prudence, is conversant with the extreme
- 5:22:33and with that which is contingent and the other proposition. For these are the
- 5:22:38principles of that for the sake of which a thing is done, or the
- 5:22:42final cause, for universal is from particulars of these. Therefore it is necessary
- 5:22:49to have a sensible perception. But this is the practical intellect. Hence,
- 5:22:55these habits appear to be natural, and no one indeed is wise by nature,
- 5:22:59but everyone one possesses naturally the power of deciding rightly, together with intelligence
- 5:23:03and intellect. But as an indication of this, we are of opinion that
- 5:23:07these habits are attendants on the ages of the life of men. And we
- 5:23:12say that this age i e. Old Age possesses intellect and upright decision,
- 5:23:18as if nature were the cause of this. Hence, also intellect is both
- 5:23:22the principle and the end, for from these demonstrations are framed, and with
- 5:23:27these they are conversant. Hence, in practical affairs, it is no less
- 5:23:32necessary to attend to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of elderly or prudent men than
- 5:23:38to demonstrations, for in consequence of possessing an eye from experience, they perceive
- 5:23:44the principles of things of a practicable nature. And thus we have shown what
- 5:23:48wisdom and prudence are, and with what particulars each is conversant, and that
- 5:23:55each is the virtue of a different part of the soul Chapter twelve. Some
- 5:24:00one, however, may doubt concerning these in what their utility consists. For
- 5:24:06wisdom indeed contemplates none of those things from which men will obtain felicity, since
- 5:24:11it is not conversant with anything which is in generation, or which is becoming
- 5:24:17to be or passing into existence. But prudence indeed does consider those things from
- 5:24:22which human felicity is derived. Yet on what account is it necessary that it
- 5:24:27should. Since prudence is conversant with just and beautiful things, and which are
- 5:24:33good to man. We do, not, however, become at all more
- 5:24:37practically virtuous by knowing these things, since the virtues are habits. As neither
- 5:24:42are things said to be salubrious or to conduce to a good habit of body
- 5:24:47because they have an act of power, but because they proceed from habit.
- 5:24:52For we are not at all more practical from possessing the medical or gymnastic art.
- 5:24:56But if a man is not to be considered as prudent for the sake
- 5:25:00of these things, but for the sake of becoming worthy, they will not
- 5:25:03be at all useful to those who are worthy. Again, neither will prudence
- 5:25:08be useful to those who are not worthy, for it is of no consequence
- 5:25:12whether they are prudent or are persuaded by others that are. Since this will
- 5:25:18be sufficient in the same manner as in what pertains to health, For when
- 5:25:22we wish to be well, we do not at the same time learn the
- 5:25:26medical art, to which we may add that it will appear to be absurd
- 5:25:30that prudence, which is subordinate to wisdom, should possess a greater authority,
- 5:25:36for that which is effective governs and presides in everything. These things, therefore
- 5:25:41must be discussed, for now the doubt is concerning them alone. In the
- 5:25:45first place. Therefore we say that these virtues, wisdom and prudence, are
- 5:25:49necessarily eligible per se, since they are the virtues of each part of the
- 5:25:53soul. Though neither of them should affect anything. In the next place,
- 5:25:59they do indeed affects something, yet not in the same manner as medicine produces
- 5:26:03health, but as health produces the energies of a good habit of body,
- 5:26:07thus also wisdom produces felicity, for being a part of the whole of virtue,
- 5:26:14by the possession and the energy of it, it renders a man happy
- 5:26:18farther still, the work is accomplished by prudence and ethical virtue. For virtue
- 5:26:23renders the scope proposed by the agent right, but prudence gives rectitude to things
- 5:26:29which tend to the scope. A virtue, however, of this kind,
- 5:26:33does not belong to the fourth or nutritive part of the soul, because its
- 5:26:37energies are not in our power, nor irrational, either essentially or by participation.
- 5:26:44But with respect to our not being at all more adapted to the practice
- 5:26:47of things beautiful and just through prudence. In answer to this objection, we
- 5:26:52must begin a little higher, assuming the following principle. For as we say
- 5:26:56that certain persons who perform just things are not yet just, such as those
- 5:27:02who do what is ordered by the laws, either unwillingly or from ignorance,
- 5:27:07or from some other cause, and not on account of the things themselves,
- 5:27:11though they do those things which ought to be done, and such as a
- 5:27:14worthy man ought to do. Thus, also as it seems it is possible
- 5:27:18to do everything with a certain disposition of mind so as to be a good
- 5:27:22man, I mean, for instance, that it is possible to do everything
- 5:27:26with which virtue is concerned from deliberate choice and for the sake of the things
- 5:27:32which are done. Virtue therefore produces a right deliberate choice. But it is
- 5:27:37not the business of virtue, but of some other power to render the deliberate
- 5:27:41choice disposed, to embrace what truly contributes to the end. It is requisite,
- 5:27:45however, to speak more clearly on this subject. There is therefore a
- 5:27:49certain power, which is called skill. But this is a power of such
- 5:27:53a kind that by its assistance those things may be performed and obtained which contribute
- 5:27:59to the proposed scope. And if indeed the scope is beautiful, this power
- 5:28:03is laudable. But if the scope is bad, this power becomes craft,
- 5:28:08on which account also we say that prudent men are skillful and not crafty.
- 5:28:14Prudence, however, is not this power. Yet does not subsist without it,
- 5:28:18but habit is not acquired by this eye of the soul without virtue,
- 5:28:22as we have said, and is evident for the syllogisms of practical affairs rank
- 5:28:29as a principle. Since the end is a thing of this kind, and
- 5:28:33that which is best, whatever it may be. Let the end, for
- 5:28:37instance, be something casual. But this is not apparent except to a good
- 5:28:41man. For depravity distorts the judgment and produces deception about the practical principles.
- 5:28:48Hence, it is evident that it is impossible for anyone to be a prudent
- 5:28:52unless he is a good man Chapter thirteen. Again, therefore, let us
- 5:28:57direct our attention to virtue, for as prudence is not the same, indeed,
- 5:29:03but is similar to sagacity. Thus also natural virtues subsists similarly with reference
- 5:29:10to that which is properly so called. For the several manners appear to all
- 5:29:14men to subsist in a certain respect naturally, since we are just and temperate,
- 5:29:18and brave, and possess the other virtues immediately from our birth. At
- 5:29:22the same time, however, we investigate something else, as that which is
- 5:29:26properly good, and are of opinion that such like virtues are inherent after another
- 5:29:32manner. For the physical habits are inherent in children and brutes, but they
- 5:29:37are seen to be noxious without intellect. Thus much indeed is apparent that,
- 5:29:41as it happens that a strong body which is moved without sight, very much
- 5:29:47errs in its motions in consequence of being deprived of site. This likewise is
- 5:29:52the case here with respect to the physical virtues. But if the possessor of
- 5:29:56these virtues obtains intellect, also he will excel in his actions. The habit,
- 5:30:03however, being similar, will then be properly virtue. Hence, as
- 5:30:07in the doxastic part of the soul, or that part which is characterized by
- 5:30:11opinion, there are two species skill and prudence. Thus also in the ethical
- 5:30:18part there are two species, one of which is physical virtue, but the
- 5:30:21other is virtue properly so called. And of these, virtue properly so called,
- 5:30:26is not without prudence. Hence it is said that all the virtues are
- 5:30:30prudence. And Socrates indeed investigated partly with rectitude and partly with error, For
- 5:30:37because he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he erred. But it
- 5:30:41is well said by him that the virtues are not without prudence. But as
- 5:30:45an indication of this, all men, now, when they define virtue,
- 5:30:51add to the definition habit, and that they energize according to right reason.
- 5:30:56And right reason is that which subsists according to prudence. All men therefore appear
- 5:31:00in a certain respect to prophesy that a habit of this kind, which subsists
- 5:31:06according to prudence, is virtue. It is necessary, however, to change
- 5:31:11in a small degree. The definition for not only a habit according to right
- 5:31:15reason, but also a habit in conjunction with right reason, is virtue,
- 5:31:19but prudence is right reason energizing about things of this kind. Socrates therefore thought
- 5:31:26that the virtues indeed were reasons, because all of them are sciences. But
- 5:31:30we think that they subsist in conjunction with reason. Hence, it is evident
- 5:31:36from what has been said, that it is not possible to be a good
- 5:31:40man properly without prudence, nor a prudent man without ethical virtue. After this
- 5:31:45manner, also the reasoning may be dissolved, by which someone may contend that
- 5:31:49the virtues are separated from each other. For the same person is not naturally
- 5:31:53well adapted to all the virtues. Hence he has now obtained this, but
- 5:31:59not yet that virtue. For this may indeed happen according to the physical virtues,
- 5:32:04but is not possible in those virtues according to which a man is said
- 5:32:07to be simply a good man. For all the virtues are present at the
- 5:32:11same time that prudence, which is one virtue, is present. But it
- 5:32:17is evident that though prudence were not a practical thing, it would be necessary
- 5:32:22because it is the virtue of a part of the soul, and because deliberate
- 5:32:26choice will not be right without prudence nor without virtue. For one of these
- 5:32:30is the end, but the other causes us to do things which contribute to
- 5:32:34the end. Prudence, however, neither has dominion over wisdom, nor over
- 5:32:40the better part of the soul, as neither has the medical science dominion over
- 5:32:44health, for it does not use health, but considers how it may be
- 5:32:48obtained. It prescribes, therefore for the sake of health, but has no
- 5:32:52dominion over it. Again, to say that prudence rules over wisdom is just
- 5:32:57as if some one should say that the political science rules over the gods,
- 5:33:02because it orders everything which is done in the city. End of Book six,
- 5:33:07Chapter one. After these things, making another beginning, it must be
- 5:33:14observed by us that there are three species of things which are to be avoided
- 5:33:18in manners, viz. Vice, incontinence, and brutality. But the contraries
- 5:33:26to two of these are indeed evident, for we call one of the contrary's
- 5:33:30virtue, and the other continence to brutality. However, it will be most
- 5:33:37appropriate to say that the virtue is opposed, which is a certain heroical and
- 5:33:42divine virtue, as Homer represents prim saying of Hector that he was a very
- 5:33:48good man. Quote wretch that I am my bravest offspring, slain you the
- 5:33:56disgrace of Prime's house remains, or the brave renowned in ranks of war with
- 5:34:03Troylus, dreadful in his rushing car and last great Hector more than man divine,
- 5:34:11for sure he seemed not of terrestrial line close quote. Hence, if,
- 5:34:18as it is said, men from being men become gods through excess of
- 5:34:23virtue, the habit which is opposed to a brutal habit will indeed be such
- 5:34:30as this. For as there is neither the vice nor virtue of a brute,
- 5:34:34so neither is there of a god. But the one habit, indeed
- 5:34:38is more honorable than virtue, and the other is of a different genus from
- 5:34:44vice. Since, however, the existence of a divine man is rare bracket,
- 5:34:49just as the Lacedaemonians, when they very much admire a man, are
- 5:34:55accustomed to say, O divine man. Close bracket. Thus, also the
- 5:35:00brutal nature is rare among men, but when it does exist, it is
- 5:35:06principally found among the barbarians. Some men, however, become brutalized through diseases
- 5:35:11and mutilations of the body, and we thus denominate by a defamatory appellation,
- 5:35:18those who surpass other men in vice. But of such a disposition of the
- 5:35:23soul, as this we shall hereafter make mention. And we have before spoken
- 5:35:27concerning vice. Let us now therefore speak concerning incontinence and effeminacy and luxury,
- 5:35:36and concerning their opposites continence and endurance. For each of these must not be
- 5:35:41considered as if they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor yet
- 5:35:47as if they were of a genus different from them. It is necessary,
- 5:35:51however, as we have done in other things, having first premised what is
- 5:35:55apparent i e. What is commonly admitted as true, and doubts, in
- 5:36:00the next place, to show everything which is especially probable about these passions.
- 5:36:07But if not everything, at least the greater part and the principle, For
- 5:36:11if such doubts as are difficult are dissolved, and those things which are probable
- 5:36:17are left, we shall have sufficiently accomplished our purpose. Continents, therefore and
- 5:36:22endurance appear to be among the number of worthy and laudable things, but incontinence
- 5:36:29and effeminacy among the number of things bad and blameable. And the continent man
- 5:36:34and he who abides in the decision of reason are the same person, And
- 5:36:41the incontinent man is the same with him who departs from the decision of reason.
- 5:36:47And the incontinent man, indeed, knowing that the things are bad,
- 5:36:51does them through passion. But the continent man, knowing that desires are bad,
- 5:36:56does not follow them in consequence of being obedient to reason. And all
- 5:37:02men indeed admit that the temperate man is continent and possesses the virtue of endurance.
- 5:37:08But with respect to a man of this description, some say that he
- 5:37:12is in every respect temperate, but others say that he is not. And
- 5:37:18some confusedly say that the intemperate man is incontinent, and the incontinent man is
- 5:37:25intemperate, but others say that they differ from each other. But with respect
- 5:37:30to the prudent man, sometimes they say that he cannot be incontinent, and
- 5:37:34sometimes that certain persons who are prudent and skillful are incontinent. And farther still,
- 5:37:42men are said to be incontinent of anger, of honor, and of
- 5:37:45gain. Such therefore are the assertions concerning continence and incontinence Chapter two. It
- 5:37:56may, however, be doubted how he who thinks rightly can act incontinently.
- 5:38:02Some say, therefore, that it is impossible for a man to act incontinently
- 5:38:07who knows that he ought not, for it would be a dreadful thing when
- 5:38:11science is inherent, as Socrates thought that anything else should have dominion, and
- 5:38:17draw the man about like a slave. For Socrates, in short, opposed
- 5:38:22reason by this opinion, as if there were no such thing as incontinence,
- 5:38:26since he said that no one acted contrary to what he apprehended it was best
- 5:38:32to do, except from ignorance of what was best. This assertion, therefore
- 5:38:37is adverse to those things which are clearly apparent. And it is requisite to
- 5:38:42inquire concerning the passion. If any one acts incontinently through ignorance, what the
- 5:38:48mode of this ignorance is. For it is evident that he who acts incontinently
- 5:38:55does not think he ought so to act till he is under the influence of
- 5:38:59the passion. There are, however, certain persons who admit some of these
- 5:39:03things, but not others, for they grant indeed that nothing is better than
- 5:39:08science. But they do not admit that no one acts contrary to what appears
- 5:39:14to him to be better. And on this account they say that the incontinent
- 5:39:18man, not having science but opinion, is vanquished by pleasures. If,
- 5:39:25however, it is opinion and neither science nor a strong but a weak hypolepsis
- 5:39:30which resists, as it is in those who are dubious. Pardon is to
- 5:39:36be granted to him who yields to strong desires, but improbity is not to
- 5:39:41be pardoned, nor anything else which is blameable. The incontinent man, therefore
- 5:39:47is vanquished by desire prudence at the same time resisting, for this is most
- 5:39:52strong. But this is absurd, for the same person will be at the
- 5:39:59same time prudent and incontinent. No one, however, will say that it
- 5:40:04is the province of a prudent man to perform voluntarily the most base actions,
- 5:40:11to which may be added what we have before shown that the prudent is a
- 5:40:15practical man, for he is conversant with particulars and possesses the other virtues.
- 5:40:22Again, if the continent man consists in having strong and base desires, the
- 5:40:29temperate man will not be a continent man, nor the continent a temperate man.
- 5:40:34For it is not the province of the temperate man to have too much
- 5:40:38desire or to have base desires, but it would be requisite that he should,
- 5:40:44if this were admitted. For if indeed the desires are good, the
- 5:40:48habit which prevents a man from following them is bad, so that not all
- 5:40:52continents will be good. If, however, the desires are weak but not
- 5:40:57bad, there is none nothing venerable incontinence, And if they are bad and
- 5:41:03weak, there's nothing great in it. Farther still, if continence gives permanency
- 5:41:10to every opinion, and even to false opinion, it is a bad thing.
- 5:41:15And if incontinence produces a departure from every opinion, there will be a
- 5:41:18certain incontinence which is good, such as that of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of
- 5:41:26Sophocles. For he is to be praised for not persevering in what he was
- 5:41:30persuaded to do by Ulysses, because it was painful to him to lie.
- 5:41:37Again, that reasoning of the Sophists, which is denominated lying or dissembling,
- 5:41:42is perplexed with doubt. For with these men, in consequence of wishing to
- 5:41:48produce an assent to paradoxes in order that when they obtain their end, they
- 5:41:53may appear to be skillful persons. The syllogism formed by their reasoning becomes very
- 5:41:59dubious, for the discoursive energy of reason is bound when the person whose ascent
- 5:42:06they wish to procure is unwilling to persist because the conclusion does not please him,
- 5:42:11but is unable to proceed because he cannot dissolve the argument from a certain
- 5:42:17reason. However, it may happen that imprudence together with incontinence, is a
- 5:42:22virtue. For a man through incontinence may do the contrary to what he apprehends
- 5:42:29ought to be done. But he apprehends that good things are evil and that
- 5:42:34they ought not to be done. Hence he will do what is good and
- 5:42:38not what is evil. Again, he who performs and pursues what is delectable,
- 5:42:44in consequence of being persuaded and deliberately choosing so to do, will appear
- 5:42:49to be a better character than the man who does so not from reasoning but
- 5:42:55from incontinence, For he may be more easily cured, because he may may
- 5:43:00be induced to change his opinion. But the incontinent man is obnoxious to the
- 5:43:04proverb in which we say, quote when water suffocates, what occasion is there
- 5:43:11to drink close quote? For if indeed he were persuaded to do what he
- 5:43:17did, if he had been induced to change his opinion, he would have
- 5:43:21desisted. But now, not being persuaded, he nevertheless acts in this manner.
- 5:43:27Farther still, if incontinence incontinence are conversant with all things, who is
- 5:43:33the man that is simply incontinent? For no one has every species of incontinence,
- 5:43:38And we say that some persons are simply incontinent. Such therefore are the
- 5:43:44doubts which happen on this subject. But of these it is necessary to take
- 5:43:48away some and to leave others. For the solution of a doubt is the
- 5:43:53discovery of what is investigated Chapter three. In the first place, therefore,
- 5:44:02it must be considered whether the incontinent act knowingly or not, and in what
- 5:44:07manner they act knowingly. In the next place, with what kind of things
- 5:44:12the incontinent and the continent man are conversant, I mean, whether they are
- 5:44:18conversant with all pleasure and pain or with certain definite pleasures and pains and whether
- 5:44:25the continent and the enduring man are the same or different characters, And in
- 5:44:30a similar manner, we must consider such other things as are allied to this
- 5:44:34theory. The beginning, however, of the speculation, is whether the continent
- 5:44:41and incontinent man differ in the things with which they are conversant, or in
- 5:44:47the mode in which they are conversant with them. My meaning is this,
- 5:44:52whether the incontinent man is alone incontinent or not because he is conversant with these
- 5:44:57particular things, or whether it is because he is thus affected or not,
- 5:45:03or whether it is from both of these. In the next place, whether
- 5:45:07incontinence and continence are conversant with all things or not. For he who is
- 5:45:15simply incontinent is not conversant with all things, but with those things with which
- 5:45:19the intemperate man is conversant. Nor is he denominated incontinent from being simply affected
- 5:45:26towards these, for if he were incontinence would be the same with intemperance,
- 5:45:33but from being affected towards them in this particular manner. For the intemperate man,
- 5:45:40indeed, is led by his desires from deliberate choice, thinking that it
- 5:45:45is always necessary to pursue the present delight. But the incontinent man does not
- 5:45:51think this is necessary, yet pursues it with respect. Therefore, to the
- 5:45:56assertion that it is true opinion and not science through which men act incontinently,
- 5:46:02it is of no consequence to the present discussion, for some of those who
- 5:46:07form opinions of things entertain no doubt of their truths, but think that they
- 5:46:11know accurately. If therefore, those who form an opinion act in a greater
- 5:46:17degree contrary to their opinion than those who have a scientific knowledge, because they
- 5:46:22believe negligently science will in no respect differ from opinion. For some persons believe
- 5:46:29no less firmly in things of which they form an opinion than others in things
- 5:46:33which they know scientifically. But this is evident from Heraclitis, Since, however,
- 5:46:40we say that a man knows scientifically in a twofold respect, for both
- 5:46:45he who possesses science indeed but does not use it, and he who uses
- 5:46:49it are said to have scientific knowledge. It makes a difference whether a man
- 5:46:53possessing science but not contemplating, does what he ought not to do, or
- 5:47:00whether possessing science and contemplating he acts improperly for this appears to be absurd,
- 5:47:07but it is not if he does not contemplate again, Since there are two
- 5:47:11modes of propositions, i e. Universal and particular propositions, nothing hinders but
- 5:47:19that he who possesses both these may act contrary to science, using indeed the
- 5:47:26universal proposition, but not the particular one, For particulars are practicable. There
- 5:47:33is a difference also as to the universal. For one difference, indeed,
- 5:47:37is in the man himself, but the other is in the thing. Thus,
- 5:47:42for instance, a man may know that dry food is beneficial to every
- 5:47:47man, and that this person is a man, or that a thing of
- 5:47:52such a kind is dry food. But whether this is a thing of such
- 5:47:56a kind, he either does not know, or or he does not energize,
- 5:48:02as if he did know. There is an immense difference therefore, according
- 5:48:07to these modes, so that no absurdity follows for a man thus to know,
- 5:48:11but for him to know in any other way, it would be wonderful.
- 5:48:15Farther still, science may be inherent in men in a way different from
- 5:48:21that which we have just now mentioned. For we see that habit differs in
- 5:48:26possessing indeed, but not using science, so that a man possesses in a
- 5:48:32certain respect, and does not possess science, as is the case with him
- 5:48:36who is asleep, or insane or intoxicated. But in this way men are
- 5:48:42disposed who are under the influence of the passions for anger and the desire of
- 5:48:48venereal pleasures, and certain other things of this kind evidently produce a change in
- 5:48:53the body, and in some persons also they produce insanity. It is manifest,
- 5:49:00therefore, that the incontinent man must be said to be affected similarly to
- 5:49:07these persons. Nor is it any indication of the contrary if such persons utter
- 5:49:12sentences which are the progeny of science. For those who are under the influence
- 5:49:18of these passions will recite demonstrations and the verses of Empedocles, and those who
- 5:49:25first learn a science connect indeed the words, but do not yet know their
- 5:49:30meaning. For it is necessary that science should increase with advancing age, but
- 5:49:36this requires time. Hence, it must be admitted that the incontinent speak after
- 5:49:41the manner of players, i e. Without attending to the meaning of what
- 5:49:45they say. Again, the cause of this may also be physically surveyed,
- 5:49:52as follows. Opinion indeed is either universal or particular, of which latter send
- 5:50:00is now the mistress. But when one reason is produced from both these,
- 5:50:04it is necessary that, so far as pertains to theory, the soul should
- 5:50:10enunciate the conclusion, but so far as pertains to practice, should immediately act.
- 5:50:15Thus, for instance, if every sweet thing ought to be tasted,
- 5:50:19but this thing is sweet as being some one of particulars, it necessarily follows
- 5:50:25that he who is able and is not impeded, must, at the same
- 5:50:29time that he says this act i e. Taste the sweet thing. When
- 5:50:34therefore the universal proposition is indeed inherent, which prohibits a thing from being tasted.
- 5:50:41But another proposition says, then everything which is sweet is delectable, and
- 5:50:48another that this particular thing is sweet, And this causes the man to energize.
- 5:50:53And when also desire happens to be inherent, then the universal proposition indeed
- 5:51:00says this thing is to be avoided, but desire leads to the fruition of
- 5:51:06it. For each of the parts of the soul is able to move or
- 5:51:10excite. Hence it happens that a man acts incontinently both from reason in a
- 5:51:15certain respect and opinion. Though opinion is not essentially but from accident, contrary
- 5:51:22to reason for desire, but not opinion is contrary to right reason. Hence,
- 5:51:29on this account also brutes are not incontinent, because they have not a
- 5:51:33perception of universal but an imagination and memory of particulars. With respect to the
- 5:51:41manner, however, in which ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent man again becomes
- 5:51:47in possession of scientific knowledge, the reasoning is the same as concerning him who
- 5:51:52is intoxicated or asleep, and is not peculiar to this passion, but the
- 5:51:57explanation of it must be obtained from physiologists. Because however, the last proposition
- 5:52:06is the opinion of the sensible object, and is the mistress of actions.
- 5:52:11He who is under the influence of passion either has not this proposition, or
- 5:52:15he has it in such a way that from possessing he has not a scientific
- 5:52:21knowledge of it, but merely enunciates it, just as he who is intoxicated
- 5:52:26recites the verses of Empedocles. And likewise, because the last proposition is not
- 5:52:32universal and does not appear to be similarly scientific with the proposition which is universal,
- 5:52:40that also which Socrates investigated appears in this case to happen. For the
- 5:52:45passion is not produced when that which is science, properly so called is seen
- 5:52:52to be present, nor is this science drawn about so as to cooperate with
- 5:52:56passion. But this must be asserted of the sensitive power. And thus much
- 5:53:03concerning the knowledge and ignorance of the incontinent man, and how he may act
- 5:53:10incontinently accompanied with knowledge Chapter four. But whether anyone is simply incontinent, or
- 5:53:21all that are incontinent are partially so. And if there is anyone who is
- 5:53:26simply incontinent, what the things are with which he is conversant, must,
- 5:53:32in the next place be shown by us that the continent, therefore, and
- 5:53:37men of endurance, and the incontinent and effeminate, are conversant with pleasures and
- 5:53:42pains. Is evident. Of those things, however, which produce pleasure,
- 5:53:48some indeed are necessary, but others, though they are eligible of themselves,
- 5:53:53yet have excess. But necessaries indeed are things which have reference to the body.
- 5:54:00I mean such things as pertain to food and the use of venereal pleasures,
- 5:54:06and such like corporeal concerns about which we place in temperance and temperance other
- 5:54:12things, however, are not indeed necessary, yet are eligible of themselves,
- 5:54:18I mean, such as victory, honor, wealth, and such like good
- 5:54:23and delectable things. Those therefore, who exceed in these contrary to the right
- 5:54:30reason which is in them, we do not indeed denominate simply incontinent. But
- 5:54:37with an addition we call them incontinent of riches, of game, of honor,
- 5:54:42and of anger. But we do not call them simply incontinent, as
- 5:54:48being different from those that are so, and denominated from similitude. Just as
- 5:54:55the name of a certain person who is victorious in the Olympic Games Anthropos i
- 5:55:00e. Man, for he had as a proper the common name of man,
- 5:55:07and yet at the same time he was different from man universal or the
- 5:55:11species man, as being an individual. As an indication of this, incontinence
- 5:55:18indeed is blamed not only as an error, but also as a certain vice,
- 5:55:23either simply or partially. But no one blames those who are incontinent of
- 5:55:30honor or gain, et cetera, as simply bad. With respect however,
- 5:55:36to those who are conversant with corporeal enjoyments, with which we say the temperate
- 5:55:41and intemperate man are conversant, he who, without deliberate choice, pursues the
- 5:55:45excesses of delectable and avoids the excesses of painful things viz. Hunger and thirst,
- 5:55:53heat and cold, and everything pertaining to the touch and the taste.
- 5:55:59Yet contrary a too deliberate choice and the reasoning power, is called incontinent,
- 5:56:04not with an addition of this or that thing as of anger. But he
- 5:56:08is only simply called incontinent, but as an indication of this, those who
- 5:56:15are conversant with the one are called effeminate, but not those who are conversant
- 5:56:18with the other. Hence we arrange the incontinent and intemperate, and also the
- 5:56:25continent and temperate man in the same class, but not those who are incontinent
- 5:56:30of honor or gain, et cetera, because they are, in a certain
- 5:56:36respect conversant with the same pleasures and pains, though however they are conversant with
- 5:56:41the same things, yet not after the same manner. For the intemperate indeed
- 5:56:48pursue depraved pleasures from the liberate choice, but the incontinent do not. Hence
- 5:56:55we rather call him intemperate, who either not at all desiring or poor desiring
- 5:57:00slightly pursues excess of pleasures and avoids moderate pains, then him who pursues the
- 5:57:07one and avoids the other in consequence of being influenced by a vehement desire.
- 5:57:12For what would the former character do if he were impelled by robust desire and
- 5:57:18suffered violent pain from the want of necessary things? Since, however, of
- 5:57:23desires and pleasures, some rank in the genus of things beautiful and worthy.
- 5:57:29For of things delectable, some are naturally eligible, others are contrary to these,
- 5:57:34and others have an intermediate subsistence, agreeably to the division we have before
- 5:57:40made. And these last are such as riches, gain victory and honor.
- 5:57:47In all these, therefore, and things of the like kind, and in
- 5:57:52those that have an intermediate subsistence. Men are not blamed for being merely influenced
- 5:57:56by the passions and for desiring in loving, but for the manner in which
- 5:58:02they are influenced by them, and for indulging them to excess. Hence,
- 5:58:07with respect to those who are vanquished by the passions or pursue anything naturally beautiful
- 5:58:14and good contrary to reason, such as those who pursue honor more than is
- 5:58:18proper, or are irrationally attached to their parents and children. For these also
- 5:58:23rank among the number of things that are good, and those who pay attention
- 5:58:29to these are praised. Yet there is at the same time a certain excess
- 5:58:33even in these things, if anyone like Niobe contends about them, even with
- 5:58:38the gods, or like Satyris, who, for his attachment to his father
- 5:58:45was called Philopator, for he appeared, through this attachment to be very infatuated.
- 5:58:52There is therefore no depravity indeed in these things, for the reason already
- 5:58:57assigned, because as each of these things is naturally eligible of itself, but
- 5:59:03the excesses of them are bad and are to be avoided. This, however,
- 5:59:08is not the case with incontinence, for incontinence is not only to be
- 5:59:14avoided, but is also among the number of blameable things. But from the
- 5:59:18similitude of the passion. In speaking about each of these, it is usual
- 5:59:22to add the term incontinence, just as we say that a man is a
- 5:59:27bad physician or a bad player, whom we should not simply call a bad
- 5:59:33man. As therefore we did not here call these simply bad men. Because
- 5:59:40each of these is not a vice, but similar to vice from analogy.
- 5:59:44So likewise there viz. In the immoderate pursuit of honor, Gain, et
- 5:59:48cetera. Those things only are to be considered as incontinence and continents, which
- 5:59:56are conversant with the same things as temperance and intemperance. But with respect to
- 6:00:00incontinence and anger we speak of it from similitude. Hence, also by making
- 6:00:07an addition, we say that a man is incontinent of anger, just as
- 6:00:11we say that he is incontinent of honor or gain. Chapter five. Since,
- 6:00:18however, some things are naturally delectable, and of these some are simply
- 6:00:22so, but others to the genera of animals and men. But other things
- 6:00:26are not naturally delectable. But some things are pleasing in consequence of mutilations,
- 6:00:33and others are so, partly from custom and partly from depraved natures. This
- 6:00:38being the case, similar habits may be perceived in each of these. But
- 6:00:44by savage habits I mean such a habit as that of the woman who is
- 6:00:48said to have cut open the bellies of pregnant women and to have devoured the
- 6:00:52fetus, or such habits as certain savage nations about Pontus are said to possess.
- 6:01:00For of these, some are delighted to feed on raw and others on
- 6:01:04human flesh, and others at banquets feast each other with their own children,
- 6:01:11or such a habit as Phalaris is said to have possessed, for he is
- 6:01:15reported to have eaten his own son. These habits, therefore, are savage.
- 6:01:21Some of these habits, however, are produced in certain persons from disease
- 6:01:25and insanity, as was the case with him who immolated and ate his mother,
- 6:01:30and also with him who ate the liver of his fellow servant. But
- 6:01:36other savage habits either originate from disease or from custom, such as evulsions of
- 6:01:42the hairs, biting the nails, and besides these, eating coals and earth,
- 6:01:48to which may be added the venereal connection of males with males. For
- 6:01:55these habits are produced in some persons by nature, but in others from custom,
- 6:02:00them as being accustomed to them from childhood. No one therefore would call
- 6:02:04those in whom nature is the cause of these habits incontinent, as neither are
- 6:02:10women called incontinent, because in the venereal connection they are not active but passive.
- 6:02:17And in a similar manner, those are not called incontinent, who are
- 6:02:22in a diseased condition from custom. The possession therefore of each of these is
- 6:02:27something beyond the boundaries of vice, in the same manner as a savage nature.
- 6:02:33But when possessing these propensities, to subdue or be subdued by them,
- 6:02:38is not simple continence or incontinence, but is only so from similitude. Just
- 6:02:44as he who subsists after this manner with respect to anger is incontinent of this
- 6:02:49passion. But passion is not to be called incontinent for every vice, folly,
- 6:02:56timidity, intemperance, and fority, when excessive, is either savage or
- 6:03:03the effect of disease. For he who is naturally so disposed as to be
- 6:03:08afraid of everything, even though a most should make a noise, is timid
- 6:03:14according to a savage timidity. But he who is afraid of a cat is
- 6:03:18timid from disease. And among the number of the stupid, those who are
- 6:03:23most irrational from nature and live only from sense, resemble savage animals, as
- 6:03:30is the case with some nations of remote barbarians. But those who are so
- 6:03:34from disease, such as epilepsy or insanity, these are in a morbid state.
- 6:03:41It is, however, possible that some one may sometimes possess these habits
- 6:03:47and yet not be vanquished by them. I mean as if, for instance,
- 6:03:51Valerius desiring to eat his son should refrain from so doing, or should
- 6:03:56abstain from absurd venereal pleasure. And it is not only possible to have these
- 6:04:02propensities, but also to be vanquished by them. As therefore, with respected
- 6:04:07depravity, that which pertains to a man is simply said to be depravity,
- 6:04:12but that which subsists with an addition, is said to be a savage or
- 6:04:17diseased depravity, but is not simple depravity. After the same manner, with
- 6:04:22respect to incontinence, it is evident that one kind is savage, but another
- 6:04:27the effect of disease, while that alone is simply incontinence, which subsists according
- 6:04:33to human intemperance. It is evident therefore, that incontinence and continence are alone
- 6:04:41conversant with those things with which intemperance and temperance are conversant, and that another
- 6:04:48species of incontinence subsists about other things, which is denominated metaphorically and not simply.
- 6:04:56Chapter six. Let Us, however, now consider whether the incontinence of
- 6:05:02anger is not less base than the incontinence of desires. For anger indeed seems
- 6:05:08to hear something of reason, but to hear it negligently, just like hasty
- 6:05:14servants who run away before they have heard the whole of what is said to
- 6:05:18them, and thus err in the performance of what they are order to do,
- 6:05:22or like dogs who bark at a noise alone before they perceive whether he
- 6:05:27who makes it is a friend or not. Thus, also anger, through
- 6:05:33the heat and celerity of its nature, hears indeed reason, but does not
- 6:05:37hear its mandates in consequence of impetuously tending to vengeance. For reason, indeed,
- 6:05:45or the imagination, renders it evident that something has been done attended with
- 6:05:49insolence or contempt. But anger, as if syllogistically concluding that it is necessary
- 6:05:56to be hostile to one who has acted in them manner, is immediately enraged.
- 6:06:03Desire, However, if sense or reason corrupted by sense, only says
- 6:06:08that a thing is delectable, rushes to the enjoyment of it. Hence anger
- 6:06:15in a certain respect follows reason, but desire does not. Desire therefore is
- 6:06:21more base than anger, for he who is incontinent of anger is after a
- 6:06:26manner vanquished by reason. But he who is incontinent of desire is subdued by
- 6:06:32desire and not by reason. Again, it is more pardonable to follow the
- 6:06:37natural appetites, since such desires as are common to all men, are more
- 6:06:42pardonable, and so far as they are common. But anger and asperity are
- 6:06:48more natural than desires, which are excessive and which are not necessary. Thus,
- 6:06:53one who was accused of striking his father said, as an apology for
- 6:06:57it, that his own father and even his grandfather committed the same fault,
- 6:07:03And pointing to his child, he likewise said, he will strike me when
- 6:07:07he becomes a man, for this is a family failing. A certain person,
- 6:07:11also being dragged about by his son, ordered him to stop at the
- 6:07:15gates of his house, for he likewise had dragged his father as far as
- 6:07:21to that place. Farther Still, those who act more insidiously are more unjust.
- 6:07:26The irascible man, therefore, is not insidious, nor is anger,
- 6:07:32but he is open in what he does. Desire, however, is fraudulent,
- 6:07:37as it is said of Venus quote, the Cyprian goddess skilled in weaving
- 6:07:42wiles, close quote. And as Homer says, speaking of her Cestus,
- 6:07:49quote in this was every art and every charm to win, the wisest and
- 6:07:56the coldest, warm, fond love, the gentle vow, the gay desire,
- 6:08:02the kind deceit, the still reviving fire, persuasive speech and more persuasive
- 6:08:08size, silence that spoke, and eloquence of eyes close quote. Hence,
- 6:08:17if this incontinence is more unjust, it is also more base than that which
- 6:08:22pertains to anger. And this is simply incontinence. And in a certain respect
- 6:08:26vice Again, no one who is pained acts insolently i e. Lasciviously towards
- 6:08:33another person. But everyone who acts from the impulse of anger acts with pain.
- 6:08:40He, however, who conducts himself insolently towards another acts with pleasure.
- 6:08:45If therefore, those things with which it is especially just to be angry are
- 6:08:51more unjust. The incontinence, also, which subsists through desire, is more
- 6:08:56unjust, for anger is not attended within anes. Hence, it is evident
- 6:09:03that the incontinence which is conversant with desires is more base than that which is
- 6:09:07conversant with anger. And also that continance and incontinence are conversant with corporeal pleasures.
- 6:09:15The differences, however, of these, must be assumed, for,
- 6:09:19as we said in the beginning, some desires are human and natural, both
- 6:09:25in their genus and magnitude, but others are savage, and others subsist from
- 6:09:30mutilations and diseases. But with the first of these, temperance and intemperance are
- 6:09:37alone conversant. Hence we neither call brutes temperate nor intemperate, except metaphorically.
- 6:09:45Though one genus of animals differs in short from another in insolence, insolaciousness,
- 6:09:52and inveracity, for they have neither any deliberate choice nor reasoning process, but
- 6:09:59they revolt from nature sure, in the same manner as insane men. Ferocity,
- 6:10:03however, is a less evil than vice, but it is more terrible,
- 6:10:08for that which is most excellent is not corrupted through this, as it
- 6:10:12is in men. But those that labor under this malady are deprived of it,
- 6:10:18i e. Of reason. It is just, therefore, as if
- 6:10:22that which is inanimate should be compared with that which is animated, in order
- 6:10:26to know which of the two is the worse, For the improbity is always
- 6:10:32more innoxious, which is without a principle, but intellect is a principle.
- 6:10:38Hence a similar thing takes place, as if in justice should be compared with
- 6:10:44an unjust man, for it is possible that the one may be worse than
- 6:10:48the other. For a bad man may be the cause of an infinitely greater
- 6:10:52number of evils than a brute Chapter seven. With respect however, to the
- 6:11:00pleasures and pains which subsist through the touch and the taste, and also with
- 6:11:04respect to the desires and aversions pertaining to these about which intemperance and temperance have
- 6:11:11been before defined, it is possible, indeed, that a man may be
- 6:11:15so disposed as to be vanquished by those pleasures and pains to which the multitude
- 6:11:21are superior. And it is also possible that he may vanquish those by which
- 6:11:26the multitude are vanquished. But of these characters, he who is vanquished by
- 6:11:32pleasures is incontinent, and he who vanquishes them is continent. He also,
- 6:11:37who is vanquished by pains is effeminate, but he who vanquishes them is a
- 6:11:42man of endurance. The habits, however, of most men, are between
- 6:11:48these, though they rather verge to the worse habits, since, however,
- 6:11:52of pleasures, some are necessary, but others are not, And those that
- 6:11:56are necessary are so to a certain extent, but the excesses and defects are
- 6:12:02not necessary, And the like also takes place in desires and pains. This
- 6:12:07being the case, he who pursues the excesses of pleasures, or who pursues
- 6:12:12pleasures excessively, or from deliberate choice, and on their own account, and
- 6:12:18not from anything else which may happen, is an intemperate man. For this
- 6:12:22man will necessarily not repent of his conduct, so that he is incurable.
- 6:12:27But he who is deficient in the pursuit of pleasures is opposed to this character,
- 6:12:33and he who subsists in a meeting between both is the temperate man.
- 6:12:37In a similar manner, also, he is intemperate who avoids corporeal pains,
- 6:12:42not because he is vanquished by them, but from deliberate choice. But of
- 6:12:48those who pursue pleasures yet not from deliberate choice, one indeed is led to
- 6:12:52the pursuit through pleasure, but another through an avoidance of pain, so that
- 6:12:56they differ from each other. It will, however, be obvious to everyone
- 6:13:02that he is a worse character who not desiring or desiring, but slightly does
- 6:13:07anything which is base than him who desires vehemently. And also that he who,
- 6:13:14not being angry, strikes a man, is a worse character than the
- 6:13:18man who strikes another through the impulse of anger, For what would such a
- 6:13:22one do if he were influenced by passion. Hence, the intemperate is worse
- 6:13:27than the incontinent man. Of the characters therefore that we have mentioned, the
- 6:13:33one has more the form of effeminacy, but the other is incontinent. But
- 6:13:38the continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the man of endurance to the
- 6:13:45effeminate man. For endurance indeed consists in resisting, but continence in subduing.
- 6:13:52It is one thing, however, to resist, and another to subdue,
- 6:13:56just as it is one thing not to be vanquished, and another to vanquish.
- 6:14:02Hence, continence is more eligible than endurance. But he who fails in
- 6:14:07those things in which the multitude resists and are able to resist, is effeminate
- 6:14:12and luxuriously delicate. For luxurious delicacy is a certain effeminacy, as when a
- 6:14:19man draws his garments on the ground lest he should be pained by the labor
- 6:14:25of holding it up, and by his manner of living, imitates one who
- 6:14:29is ill, yet does not think he is miserable, though he resembles one
- 6:14:33who is miserable. The like also takes place with respect to continance and incontinence.
- 6:14:40For it is not wonderful if a man is vanquished by strong and transcendent
- 6:14:45pleasures or pains, but he deserves to be pardoned if, though vanquished,
- 6:14:49he makes a resistance, like the philctities of Theoctates when bit by a viper,
- 6:14:57or the Cercian of Carcinus in his aelopie, or like those who,
- 6:15:03endeavoring to restrain their laughter, burst forth into a profuse laugh, as it
- 6:15:08happened to Xenophantus. But he is very blameable who is vanquished by those pleasures
- 6:15:15which the multitude are able to resist, and is unable to oppose them.
- 6:15:21And this not through the nature of his race or from disease, as is
- 6:15:25the case with the Persian kings, with whom effeminacy is hereditary, and who
- 6:15:30on this account are as females when compared to males. The jocose man also
- 6:15:37appears to be intemperate, but he is effeminate, for jesting is a relaxation,
- 6:15:42since it is a repose from serious and laborious pursuits. But the jocose
- 6:15:48man ranks among the number of those who exceed in this relaxation. With respect
- 6:15:53to incontinence, however, one kind is precipitate, but another is from imbecise.
- 6:16:00For some, indeed, having deliberated, do not persist in what they
- 6:16:04have deliberated on account of passion, but others, in consequence of not having
- 6:16:10deliberated, are led captive by passion. For some persons, just as those
- 6:16:15who have previously tickled themselves are not tickled by others, so these, in
- 6:16:21consequence of previously perceiving and foreseeing the future perturbation, and having pre excited themselves
- 6:16:27and their reasoning power, are not vanquished by passion, whether it be delectable
- 6:16:33or painful. But persons of acute feelings and those who are melancholy are especially
- 6:16:38incontinent according to precipitate incontinence. For the former, indeed, through celerity,
- 6:16:47and the latter survehemence, do not wait for the decision of reason, because
- 6:16:51they are disposed to follow the imagination. Chapter eight. The intemperate man,
- 6:16:57however, as we have four observed, is not inclined to repentance, for
- 6:17:03he persists in his deliberate choice. But every incontinent man is inclined to repent.
- 6:17:10Hence the thing is not as we doubt it it might be. But
- 6:17:14the intemperate man indeed is incurable, and the incontinent man is curable. For
- 6:17:19depravity appears to resemble the diseases of the dropsy and consumption, but incontinent seems
- 6:17:26to resemble the epilepsy, since the former indeed is continued without interruption, but
- 6:17:33the latter is not a continued improbity. And in short, the genus of
- 6:17:37incontinence is different from that of vice, for vice indeed is latent, but
- 6:17:44incontinence is not latent. But of these characters, the precipitately incontinent are better
- 6:17:49than those who possess reason indeed, but do not abide in its decisions,
- 6:17:55for the latter are vanquished by a less passion, and not without previous deliberation,
- 6:18:00like the former. For the man who is incontinent from imbecility resembles those
- 6:18:07who become rapidly intoxicated, and from a little wine, and from less than
- 6:18:11that through which most men become intoxicated. That incontinence therefore is not a vice
- 6:18:18is evident, but perhaps it is partially so, for incontinence is contrary,
- 6:18:23but vice is conformable to deliberate choice. The intemperate and the incontinent man,
- 6:18:30however, are similar in their actions, just as Demadoca said of the Milesians
- 6:18:37viz. Quote, the Milesians are not indeed foolish, yet they act as
- 6:18:41if they were so close quote. Thus, also, incontinent men are not
- 6:18:47indeed unjust, yet they act unjustly. Since therefore, the incontinent man is
- 6:18:53one who does not pursue corporeal pleasures in excess and contrary to right reason from
- 6:18:59Persua. But the intemperate man, because he is intemperate, is persuaded to
- 6:19:03pursue such pleasures. This being the case, the former is easily induced to
- 6:19:08change his opinion, but the latter is not. For virtue preserves the principle
- 6:19:15of right conduct, but depravity corrupts it, and in actions that for the
- 6:19:19sake of which or the end is the principle. In the same manner as
- 6:19:25hypotheses are principles in the mathematics, Hence, neither in the mathematics nor here
- 6:19:32are principles to be taught. But virtue, either physical or ethical, is
- 6:19:37the cause of right opinion. Concerning the principle of conduct, A man of
- 6:19:41this description therefore is temperate, but the contrary character is an intemperate man.
- 6:19:48There is also a certain person who, through passion departs from right reason,
- 6:19:53whom passion indeed so subdues that he does not act conformably to right reason.
- 6:20:00But yet passion does not so far subdue him as to cause him to be
- 6:20:03persuaded that pleasures of this description ought to be largely pursued. This person is
- 6:20:11the incontinent man, who is better than the intemperate, and is not absolutely
- 6:20:15a bad man, for in him that which is best the principle of right
- 6:20:21conduct is saved. But there is another person contrary to this, viz.
- 6:20:26The continent man, who persists in the decision of reason and is not diverted
- 6:20:32from it through passion. From these things, therefore, it is evident that
- 6:20:37one of these habits is worthy, but the other bad. Chapter nine.
- 6:20:44Whether therefore, is he the continent man who persists in any kind of reason
- 6:20:49and in any kind of deliberate choice, or he who persists in right reason.
- 6:20:56And whether is he the incontinent man who does not persist in any kind
- 6:21:00of deliberate choice, nor in any kind of reason, or he who persists
- 6:21:06in a false reason and in an erroneous deliberate choice, as it was doubted
- 6:21:11by us before. Or shall we say that the continent man is one who
- 6:21:15persists, from accident in any kind of reason and deliberate choice, but essentially
- 6:21:22in true reason and right deliberate choice, But that the incontinent man does not
- 6:21:27thus persist. For if any one chooses or pursues that thing on account of
- 6:21:34this, he pursues, indeed, and chooses this thing per se. But
- 6:21:40the former thing from accident. We speak, however, of that which is
- 6:21:44per se simply. Hence, it is possible that the one may persist in
- 6:21:48any kind of opinion, but that the other may abandon any kind of opinion.
- 6:21:55But the one simply persists in true opinion, and the other does not.
- 6:22:00There are, however, some persons who are disposed to persist in an
- 6:22:03opinion, and these are those who are called pertinacious, such as the obstinate,
- 6:22:08and those who are not easily persuaded to relinquish their opinions, who have
- 6:22:14indeed something similar to the continent man in the same manner as the prodigal has
- 6:22:19to the liberal, and the audacious to the confident man. But in many
- 6:22:25things they are different. For the confident man, indeed, is not changed
- 6:22:29through passion and desire, since when it so happens, he is easily persuaded.
- 6:22:34But the pertinacious man is not persuaded by reason, since most of this
- 6:22:40description admits desire and are led by pleasures. Those persons, however, are
- 6:22:45pertinacious who have certain opinions of their own, and also unlearned and rustic men.
- 6:22:52And those indeed who have certain opinions of their own are pertinacious through pleasure
- 6:22:57and pain, for their joyce when they are victorious if they are not induced
- 6:23:03to change their opinion, and they are grieved when their opinions, as if
- 6:23:07they were decrees, are without efficacy. Hence they resemble the incontinent more than
- 6:23:14the continent man. But there are certain persons who did not persist in their
- 6:23:18opinions, yet not through incontinence, such as Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles,
- 6:23:26since he did not persist in his opinion, yet not on account of
- 6:23:30pleasure, but on account of the beautiful in conduct. For to him it
- 6:23:34was beautiful to speak the truth, though he was persuaded by ulysses to lie.
- 6:23:40For not every one who does anything on account of pleasure is intemperate or
- 6:23:45a bad or an incontinent man. But he is intemperate who does it on
- 6:23:52account of base pleasure. Since, however, there is a character of such
- 6:23:56a kind as to be delighted less than is proper with corporal orial pleasures,
- 6:24:00and not to abide in the decisions of reason, the continent man is a
- 6:24:04medium between this character and the incontinent man. For the incontinent man, indeed,
- 6:24:11does not abide in the decisions of reason, because he is delighted with
- 6:24:15corporeal pleasures more than is proper, but this man, because he is delighted
- 6:24:21with them less than is proper. The continent man, however, abides in
- 6:24:26the decision of reason, and is not changed through anything else. It is
- 6:24:30also necessary, if continence is a good thing, that both the contrary habits
- 6:24:36should be bad, as it appears that they are, Because however, one
- 6:24:40of these characters viz. The man who is delighted less than is proper,
- 6:24:45with corporeal pleasures exists but among a few men and is rarely seen. Hence,
- 6:24:51as temperance appears to be contrary to intemperance alone, thus also continents to
- 6:24:56incontinence. But since many things are denied dominated from similitude, the continence also
- 6:25:03of the temperate man, follows according to similitude. For both the continent and
- 6:25:07the temperate man do nothing contrary to reason through the influence of corporeal pleasures.
- 6:25:14But the one, indeed, viz. The continent man, possesses but the
- 6:25:18other does not possess the prey of desires. And the one indeed is a
- 6:25:23man of such a description as not to be delighted contrary to reason, But
- 6:25:29the other is delighted, indeed, it is not led by this delight.
- 6:25:33The incontinent and the intemperate man also resemble each other, though indeed they are
- 6:25:38different characters. Both, however, pursue corporeal delights, but the latter indeed
- 6:25:45thinking that it is proper, and the other not thinking that it is proper
- 6:25:48to pursue them. Chapter ten. Nor is it possible that the same person
- 6:25:55can, at one and the same time be prudent and incontinent or it has
- 6:26:00been shown by us that a prudent man is at the same time a man
- 6:26:04of worthy manners. Again, a man is not only prudent from knowing what
- 6:26:08ought to be done, but also from acting properly. But the incontinent man
- 6:26:14does not act properly. Nothing, however, prevents the incontinent man from being
- 6:26:19skillful. Hence, also sometimes certain persons appear to be prudent but incontinent,
- 6:26:26because skillfulness differs from prudence in the way we have before explained. And these
- 6:26:33so far as pertains to reason, indeed are near to each other, but
- 6:26:37they differ according to deliberate choice. Neither therefore does the incontinent man possess reason
- 6:26:45as one who knows and contemplates, but as one who is asleep or intoxicated.
- 6:26:51And he acts indeed voluntarily, for after a certain manner, he acts,
- 6:26:56knowing both what he does and for the sake of what he acts as
- 6:27:00he does. But he is not depraved, for his deliberate choice is good,
- 6:27:06so that he is half depraved and not unjust, because he is not
- 6:27:10insidious. For one incontinent man, indeed, i e. The man who
- 6:27:15is incontinent from debility does not persist in what he has deliberated, And he
- 6:27:22who is of a melancholy temperament i e. The man who is precipitately incontinent,
- 6:27:27is not, in short disposed to deliberate. The incontinent man, therefore,
- 6:27:33resembles a city which decrees indeed everything that is proper, and has good
- 6:27:38laws, but uses none of them as anaxandrates revilingly said quote. The state
- 6:27:45consults, but its own laws neglects close quote. But the bad man resembles
- 6:27:52a city which uses indeed laws, but uses bad laws. In continence,
- 6:27:57however, and continents are conversant with that which exceeds the habit of the multitude.
- 6:28:03For the continent man persists more, but the incontinent man less then the
- 6:28:10multitude are able to do in the decisions of reason. The incontinence, however,
- 6:28:15of the melancholy, is more easily cured than the incontinence of those who
- 6:28:21deliberate indeed, but do not persist in doing what they have deliberated to do.
- 6:28:26Those also, who are incontinent from custom, may be more easily cured
- 6:28:30than those who are naturally so, for it is more easy to change custom
- 6:28:36than nature. For on this very account, it is difficult to change custom
- 6:28:41viz. Because it resembles nature, as Evanous also says, quote, by
- 6:28:45long attention, custom is produced and is at length as nature to mankind close
- 6:28:52quote. We have shown therefore, what continence and incontinence, and also what
- 6:28:59endurance and effeminacy are, and how these habits subsist with reference to each other.
- 6:29:06Chapter eleven. The discussion, however, of pleasure and pain, pertains
- 6:29:11to him who philosophizes about the political science, for he is the architect,
- 6:29:17as it were, of the end looking to which we say that one thing
- 6:29:21is evil, but another is simply good. Again, it is likewise necessary
- 6:29:26that we should make these the objects of consideration. For we admit that ethical
- 6:29:32virtue and vice are conversant with pleasures and pains. And most men assert that
- 6:29:37felicity is accompanied with pleasure. Hence also they denominate the blessed man from especially
- 6:29:45rejoicing some. Therefore, no pleasure appears to be good, neither essentially,
- 6:29:52nor from accident, for good and pleasure are not the same thing. But
- 6:29:56to others, some pleasures appear to be good, but many of them to
- 6:30:00be bad. Others, again, in the third place, assert that though
- 6:30:04all pleasures were good, Yet at the same time that which is most excellent
- 6:30:08cannot be pleasure. In short, therefore they say pleasure is not good,
- 6:30:14because all pleasure is a generation tending to a sensible nature as to its end.
- 6:30:19But no generation is allied to ends, as no act of building a
- 6:30:25house i e. The energy of building is allied to the house. Again,
- 6:30:30the temperate man avoids pleasures. Farther still, the prudent man pursues a
- 6:30:36freedom from pain and not the delectable, to which may be added that pleasures
- 6:30:41are an impediment to the energy of prudence, and this in proportion to the
- 6:30:47delight which they afford, as is the case with venereal pleasures, for no
- 6:30:52one when engaged in this pleasure can intellectually perceive anything. Again, pleasure is
- 6:30:59not the offspring of art, though everything which is good is the work of
- 6:31:03art. Farther still, children and brutes pursue pleasures. But that all pleasures
- 6:31:08are not worthy is indicated by this that some are base and disgraceful and pernicious,
- 6:31:15for some pleasures produced disease. It is also evident that pleasure is not
- 6:31:21the best of things, because it is not an end but generation such.
- 6:31:26Therefore, nearly are the assertions respecting pleasure Chapter twelve, that it does not
- 6:31:33happen. However, from these arguments that pleasure is neither good nor the best
- 6:31:38of things is evident from the following considerations. In the first place, indeed,
- 6:31:44because good is predicated in a twofold respect, for one kind of good
- 6:31:49is simply and absolutely good, but another is good to a certain person,
- 6:31:55and natures and habits receive the same division, so that this will also be
- 6:32:00the case with motions and generations. With respect to these pleasures likewise, which
- 6:32:04appear to be bad, some indeed are simply bad, but are not bad
- 6:32:10to a certain person, but to him are eligible. And some are not
- 6:32:14pleasures to this person except once and for a short time, but they are
- 6:32:18not eligible to him. And some are not pleasures but only appear to be
- 6:32:23so, viz. Those which are attended with pain, and are for the
- 6:32:27sake of a remedy, such as those of the sick. Again sins of
- 6:32:33good. One kind is energy, but another is habit. Those pleasures which
- 6:32:37restore their possessor to his natural habit are delectable in desires. However, there
- 6:32:45is the energy of an indigent and imperfect habit and nature. There are also
- 6:32:51pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain and desire, such as the energies of contemplation,
- 6:32:57nature in these not being in But that some pleasures are delectable of themselves,
- 6:33:03and others only on account of the indigence which they remove. Is indicated
- 6:33:08by this that men are not pleased with the same delectable thing when the indigence
- 6:33:14of nature is removed and when it is not. For in the former case
- 6:33:18they are delighted with things simply and absolutely pleasant, but in the latter with
- 6:33:25their contraries. For they are then delighted with things sharp and bitter, none
- 6:33:30of which are either naturally or absolutely delectable, so that neither are they pleasures.
- 6:33:36For as things delectable are to each other, so likewise are the pleasures
- 6:33:41produced by these Farther Still, it is not necessary that something else should be
- 6:33:45better than pleasure, as some say the end of generation is better than generation.
- 6:33:52For pleasures are not generations, nor are all of them accompanied with generation,
- 6:33:56but they are energies and an end. Nor do pleasures happen when things
- 6:34:03are passing into existence but from the use of things. Nor is the end
- 6:34:07of all pleasures something different from them, but of those only which lead to
- 6:34:12the perfection of nature. Hence, it is not well said that pleasure is
- 6:34:17a sensible generation. But it must rather be said that it is the energy
- 6:34:22of habit, according to nature. And instead of saying that it is a
- 6:34:26sensible it must be said that it is an unimpeded generation. It appears,
- 6:34:32however, to be a certain generation, because it is properly good. For
- 6:34:37they fancied that energy is generation, but it is different from it. To
- 6:34:41say also that pleasures are bad because some delectable things produce diseases is what may
- 6:34:48likewise be said of things to lubrious, For some of these are bad as
- 6:34:52to pecuniary affairs. In this respect, therefore both will be bad. And
- 6:34:57yet they are not on this account, for contemplation is likewise sometimes injurious to
- 6:35:03health. Yet the pleasure proceeding from each habit is neither an impediment to prudence
- 6:35:10nor to any habit. But the pleasures which are an impediment to these are
- 6:35:15such as our forum. Since the pleasures arising from contemplation and discipline produce in
- 6:35:21a greater degree contemplation and learning. But it reasonably happens, that no pleasure
- 6:35:27is the work of art, since neither is there an art of any other
- 6:35:32energy, but of power, though the arts pertaining too unguents and cooking appear
- 6:35:38to be the arts of pleasure. With respect to the assertions also that the
- 6:35:42temperate man avoids pleasures, and that the prudent man pursues a life unattended with
- 6:35:48pain, and that children and brutes pursue pleasure, all these are solved after
- 6:35:53the same manner. For since we have shown how all pleasures are, in
- 6:35:59a certain rispace simply good, and how they are not good. Hence,
- 6:36:03children and brutes pursue such pleasures as are accompanied with desire and pain, and
- 6:36:10are corporeal, and the prudent man pursues a freedom of pain from these.
- 6:36:15For of such a kind are these pleasures, viz. They are accompanied with
- 6:36:18pain. Children and brutes also pursue the excesses of these, according to which
- 6:36:25the intemperate man becomes intemperate. Hence the temperate man avoids these, since there
- 6:36:32are also pleasures which belong to the temperate man. Chapter thirteen. It is
- 6:36:37also admitted that pain is an evil and is to be avoided. For one
- 6:36:42kind of pain, indeed is simply evil, but another in a certain respect,
- 6:36:48because it is an impediment. That, however, which is contrary to
- 6:36:52what is to be avoided, so far as it is something to be avoided
- 6:36:56and is evil, is good. Pleasure therefore is necessar fairly something good.
- 6:37:00For the solution of spucipis is not appropriate. Viz. Then pleasure is contrary
- 6:37:07to pain, just as the greater is contrary to the less and the equal.
- 6:37:11Since no one will say that pleasure is a certain evil, but nothing
- 6:37:15prevents a certain pleasure from being the best of things. If certain pleasures are
- 6:37:19bad, just as a certain science viz. Wisdom is the best of sciences,
- 6:37:26though some sciences are bad. Perhaps too, it must necessarily be the
- 6:37:30case that if of every habit there are unimpeded energies, whether felicity is the
- 6:37:37energy of all habits or of some one of them, this energy, if
- 6:37:41it is unimpeded, is most eligible. But this is pleasure, So that
- 6:37:47a certain pleasure will be the best of things, many pleasures, if it
- 6:37:52should so happen, being simply bad. And on this account all men are
- 6:37:56of opinion that a happy is a delectable life. And they reasonably connect pleasure
- 6:38:02with felicity. For no energy is perfect when it is impeded, but felicity
- 6:38:08is among the number of perfect energies. Hence, the happy man requires the
- 6:38:14goods pertaining to the body and external possessions, and also good fortune, lest
- 6:38:21the want of these should be an impediment to his felicity. Those, however,
- 6:38:26who say that a man, if he is a good man, may
- 6:38:29be happy, though he should be tormented in a wheel and fall into the
- 6:38:33greatest calamities, say nothing to the purpose, whether they assert this willingly or
- 6:38:38unwillingly, Because however, happy man requires good fortune. Prosperity appears to some
- 6:38:45persons to be the same with felicity, though it is not the same,
- 6:38:49since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity. Perhaps
- 6:38:56likewise, it is no longer just a call prosparity when it is excessive good
- 6:39:02fortune, For the definition of prosperity has a reference to felicity. That all
- 6:39:07brutes, too, and all men pursue pleasure is an indication that pleasure is,
- 6:39:12in a certain respect the best of things. Quote that fame which crowds
- 6:39:18of humankind extol will ne'er completely perish close quote, Because however, neither the
- 6:39:26same nature nor the same habit either is or appears to be the best.
- 6:39:32Neither do all men pursue the same pleasure. Though pleasure is pursued by all
- 6:39:37men. Perhaps also they pursue not the pleasure which they fancy, nor that
- 6:39:41which they say they pursue, but the same pleasure. For all things naturally
- 6:39:47possess something divine. Corporeal pleasures, however, obtain the inheritance of the name,
- 6:39:52because men are for the most part occupied in them, and all animals
- 6:39:56partake of them, because their Therefore, these pleasures alone are generally known.
- 6:40:02These are the only pleasures which are fancied to have in existence. It is,
- 6:40:07however, evident that unless pleasure is good and also energy, it will
- 6:40:11not be possible for the happy man to live delectably. For on what account
- 6:40:15would delight be requisite to a happy life if it is not good? But
- 6:40:21it would also be possible for life to be happy though attended with pain,
- 6:40:26For pain will neither be evil nor good. If pleasure is not good,
- 6:40:30Why therefore is pain to be avoided? Neither therefore will the life of the
- 6:40:34worthy man be more delectable unless his energies are more delectable Chapter fourteen. With
- 6:40:42respect, however, to corporeal pleasures, we must direct our attention to the
- 6:40:47assertions of those who say that some pleasures are very eligible viz. Such as
- 6:40:52are worthy, but not corporeal pleasures with which the intemperate man is conversant.
- 6:40:57Why therefore, are the pains contrary to these pleasures depraved? For good is
- 6:41:03contrary to evil. Or shall we say that necessary pleasures are so far good
- 6:41:10because that which is not evil is good, or that they are good to
- 6:41:14a certain extent. For in those habits and motions in which there is no
- 6:41:18excess of that which is better, there is no excess of pleasure. But
- 6:41:23in those in which there is an excess of what is better, there is
- 6:41:26also an excess of pleasure. But of corporeal goods there is an excess.
- 6:41:32And the bad man becomes bad by pursuing the excess of pleasure and not necessary
- 6:41:37pleasures. For all depraved men are delighted with meats and wine and veneri,
- 6:41:44but not in such a manner as is proper, And they are affected in
- 6:41:48a contrary way with respect to pain, For they do not avoid the excess
- 6:41:52of pain, but pain altogether, for pain is not contrary to excess,
- 6:41:57but to him who pursues ecxace. Since, however, it is not only
- 6:42:03necessary to speak the truth, but also to assign the cause of a false
- 6:42:07assertion, for this contributes to credibility, since when the cause why a thing
- 6:42:12seems to be true though it is not, appears to be reasonable, it
- 6:42:17then gives greater credibility to the truth. This being the case, it must
- 6:42:21be shown why corporeal pleasures appear to be more eligible in the first place.
- 6:42:26Therefore, they appear to be so because they expel pain and because excessive and
- 6:42:32in short, corporeal pleasure is pursued on account of the excesses of pain as
- 6:42:37a remedy, but the remedies are vehement, And on this account, corporeal
- 6:42:42pleasures are pursued because they become more apparent when placed by that which is contrary
- 6:42:48to them. Pleasure therefore does not appear to be good for these two reasons,
- 6:42:53as we have before observed. Because some pleasures indeed are the actions of
- 6:42:59a depraved nature, either from the birth of the animal, as those of
- 6:43:03a brute, or they originate from custom such as those of bad men.
- 6:43:07But other pleasures are remedies because they are the pleasures of that which is in
- 6:43:12want, and it is better to have them than for them to be passing
- 6:43:17into existence. And others happen to be pleasures of that which is in a
- 6:43:22perfect condition from accident. Therefore they are worthy pleasures. Again, pleasures that
- 6:43:27are vehement are pursued by those who are incapable of being delighted with other pleasures.
- 6:43:34These therefore procure for themselves certain thirsts. Hence, when pleasures are innoxious,
- 6:43:41they are not to be reprehended, but when they are noxious, they
- 6:43:44are bad. For those that pursue these pleasures have no other with which they
- 6:43:48are delighted. And if neither these nor any others are present, the vulgar
- 6:43:53are in pain through the indigence of nature, For the animal always laylabors,
- 6:44:00as physical arguments testify, since, as physiologists say, to see and hear
- 6:44:06are painful. But we are now accustomed to these energies, and therefore do
- 6:44:11not perceive the pain in a similar manner. In youth, in consequence of
- 6:44:15the augmentation which then takes place, we are affected, like those who are
- 6:44:19intoxicated and youth is a delectable period of human life. But the melancholic naturally
- 6:44:26always require a remedy, for their body experiences a continual molestation from its temperament
- 6:44:33through the acrimony of the bile, and they are always agitated with vehement appetite.
- 6:44:41Pleasure, however, always excels pain as well, the pain which is
- 6:44:45contrary to pleasure, as that which is casual if the pleasure is strong,
- 6:44:52and on this account the melancholic becomes intemperate and depraved. But the pleasures which
- 6:44:57are without pain have no exit. And these are such as are derived from
- 6:45:02things naturally delectable and which are not accidentally. So I mean, however,
- 6:45:07by things delectable from accident remedies, For because it happens that we are cured
- 6:45:12of a malady, the part which is sane performing something. On this account,
- 6:45:18the remedies appear to be delectable. But by things naturally delectable I mean
- 6:45:23those which produce the action of such a nature, i e. Which produce
- 6:45:27an energy essentially adapted to such a nature. Nothing, however, which remains
- 6:45:33the same, is always delectable, because our nature is not simple. But
- 6:45:37there is also something in it different according to which it is corruptible. Hence,
- 6:45:42if the one part does anything, this to the other, nature is
- 6:45:47preternatural. But when both the parts are equalized, that which is performed neither
- 6:45:52appears to be painful nor pleasing. For if there is any being, the
- 6:45:57nature of which is simple to this being, the same action will always be
- 6:46:03most delectable. Hence God always rejoices according to one simple pleasure, For there
- 6:46:08is not only an energy of corporeal motion, but also of immobility, And
- 6:46:15pleasure exists more abundantly in rest than in motion. But mutation is the sweetest
- 6:46:21of all things, according to the poet, through a certain depravity. For
- 6:46:26as a depraved man is mutable, so likewise is the nature which requires mutation,
- 6:46:32for it is neither simple nor good. And thus we have spoken concerning
- 6:46:36continence and incontinence, pleasure and pain, and have shown what each of them
- 6:46:41is, and how some of them are good but others bad. It now
- 6:46:45remains that we speak concerning friendship. End of Book seven, Book eight,
- 6:46:52Chapter one. After these things, it follows that we should discuss friendship or
- 6:47:00it is a certain virtue or subsists in conjunction with virtue, And besides this
- 6:47:07it is most necessary to life. For no one would choose to live without
- 6:47:11friends, though he possessed every other good. For the rich, princes and
- 6:47:17magistrates appear to be especially in want of friends. For what advantage is there
- 6:47:22in a prosperity of this kind if beneficence is taken away, which is especially
- 6:47:30exerted towards friends, and is most praised when thus exerted. Or how can
- 6:47:36prosperity be preserved and saved without friends? For by how much the greater,
- 6:47:41by so much the more insecure it is. But in poverty and other misfortunes,
- 6:47:47friends are considered to be the only refuge. Friendship also is useful to
- 6:47:52youth in preventing them from error, and to elderly men by the attention which
- 6:47:59it pays to the wants and the assistance it affords to their deficiency in action
- 6:48:04arising from the imbecility of age. To those likewise in the acme of life,
- 6:48:11it is useful because it aids them in the performance of beautiful actions quote
- 6:48:17when two in concord meat close quote, for they are more able through it
- 6:48:22both to conceive and act. Friendship also appears to be naturally inherent in that
- 6:48:30which begets towards that which is begotten, And this not only in the human
- 6:48:33race, but likewise in birds, in most animals, in those of the
- 6:48:38same nation, towards each other, and especially among men, And hence we
- 6:48:44praise those that are philanthropic. It may also be seen in traveling how accommodating
- 6:48:51and friendly every man is to man. It seems, too that friendship connects
- 6:48:56cities together, and legislators pay more attention to it than to justice. For
- 6:49:03concord appears to be something similar to friendship. But this legislators are especially desirous
- 6:49:10of affecting, and they principally expel sedition, which is hostile to concord.
- 6:49:17And when the citizens indeed are friends, there is no need of justice.
- 6:49:22But though they are just, they require friendship among just things. Also,
- 6:49:29that which is especially just appears to be of a friendly nature. Nor is
- 6:49:34friendship alone necessary, but it is also a beautiful thing. For we praise
- 6:49:41those who are lovers of friends, And an abundance of friends appears to be
- 6:49:45one among the number of beautiful things. Again, some are of opinion that
- 6:49:51the same persons are good men and friends. There is however, no small
- 6:49:56controversy concerning friendship, for some consider it to be a certain similitude, and
- 6:50:03that similar persons are friends, whence also it is said quote like tends to
- 6:50:08like a jackdaw to a jackdaw close quote, et cetera. Others, on
- 6:50:15the contrary, say that all such persons are potters to each other, and
- 6:50:19they investigate concerning these things from a higher and more physical origin. Euripides,
- 6:50:26indeed, saying quote, Earth when she's dry rejoices in the rain, and
- 6:50:33venerable Heaven with rain, when filled on Earth delights to fall close quote,
- 6:50:41and Heraclitis asserting quote that what is adverse is advantageous, that the most beautiful
- 6:50:48harmony results from things of a different nature, and that all things originate from
- 6:50:53strife close quote. Others, however, are of a contry very opinion respecting
- 6:51:00friendship, and among these is Empedocles, for he says, quote that the
- 6:51:07similar aspires after the similar close quote. Such of these doubts, therefore,
- 6:51:12as are of a physical nature, we shall omit, for they are not
- 6:51:18adapted to the present speculation. But we shall direct our attention to such of
- 6:51:22them as pertain to human affairs and to the manners and passions of men,
- 6:51:29such as whether there is friendship among all men, or it is not possible
- 6:51:34that depraved men can be friends, and whether there is one or many species
- 6:51:41of friendship. For those who are of opinion that there is but one species
- 6:51:45of it, because it receives the more and the less, do not found
- 6:51:48their opinion on a sufficient argument, for things specifically different receive the more and
- 6:51:55the less. But of these we have spoken before chapter two. These things,
- 6:52:03however, will perhaps become evident when that which is the object of friendly
- 6:52:07love is known. For it seems that not everything is beloved, but that
- 6:52:12only which is the object of love. But this is either what is good
- 6:52:18or what is delectable, or what is useful, that, however, may
- 6:52:23appear to be useful through which some good or pleasure is procured. Hence,
- 6:52:30the good and the delectable will be objects of love. As ends whether therefore,
- 6:52:36do men love that which is simply good or that which is good to
- 6:52:40them? For these sometimes are discordant. A similar inquiry also may be made
- 6:52:47concerning the delectable. It appears, however, that everyone loves that which is
- 6:52:52good to himself, and that good is that which is simply the object of
- 6:52:57love, but that what is good to each person is the object of love
- 6:53:03to each Each person, however, loves not that which is really good to
- 6:53:07him, but that which appears to be so. But this makes no difference,
- 6:53:14for that which appears to be good will be the object of love.
- 6:53:18Since, however, there are three things through which love is produced, viz.
- 6:53:22The good, the delectable, and the useful. In the love of
- 6:53:26things inanimate, there is not said to be friendship, for there is no
- 6:53:32reciprocal love, nor a wish that any good may befall them. For it
- 6:53:37would be perhaps ridiculous to wish that some good might befall wine. But if
- 6:53:42a man does, he wishes that it may be preserved in order that he
- 6:53:47may have it. But it is said to be requisite to wish well to
- 6:53:51a friend for his own sake, And those who entertain this wish for their
- 6:53:56friends are said to be benevolent, though the same wish should not be made
- 6:54:00by them, For it is said that benevolence in reciprocal regard is friendship,
- 6:54:07to which perhaps it should be added if the benevolence is not latent, For
- 6:54:14many persons are benevolent to those whom they never saw in consequence of believing them
- 6:54:18to be worthy or useful men. And those whom they never saw may also
- 6:54:25be benevolent to them. They appear, therefore, indeed, to be benevolent
- 6:54:30to each other. But how can it be said that they are friends when
- 6:54:34they are ignorant of the manner in which they are mutually affected. Hence,
- 6:54:40it is necessary, in order to their being friends, that they should be
- 6:54:44benevolent to and wish well to each other on account of one of the things
- 6:54:48we have mentioned, viz. On account of the good, the delectable,
- 6:54:55or the useful Chapter three. These however, are specifically different from each other,
- 6:55:03and therefore the loves also and the friendships differ. For there are three
- 6:55:08species of friendship equal in number to the objects of friendly love, since in
- 6:55:14each there is a reciprocal love which is not latent. But those who love
- 6:55:19each other wish well to each other so far as they love. Those therefore,
- 6:55:26who love each other on account of utility do not mutually love for their
- 6:55:30own sake, but so far as they obtain some good from each other.
- 6:55:34This is also the case with those who love on account of pleasure, for
- 6:55:40they do not love those who are versatile because they possess certain qualities, but
- 6:55:45because they afford them pleasure. And those who love on account of utility possess
- 6:55:51this friendly love on account of the good which they derive from it. Those
- 6:55:56likewise who love on account of pleasure love on account of that which is delectable
- 6:56:00to them. And the attachment of these is not personal, but is produced
- 6:56:07so far as the object of their attachment is useful or delectable. These friendships
- 6:56:12therefore are accidental, for the object of their attachment is not beloved so far
- 6:56:19as he is such a person as he is, but so far as he
- 6:56:23administers to them some good or some pleasure. Such friendships therefore are easily dissolved,
- 6:56:32the objects of them not remaining in a similar condition. For if they
- 6:56:37are no longer delectable or useful, they cease to be beloved, and the
- 6:56:42useful is not permanent, but at a different time becomes different. Hence that
- 6:56:48through which they were friends being dissolved. The friendship also is dissolved in consequence
- 6:56:53of existing for the sake of it. A friendship, however, of this
- 6:56:57kind, appears especially to subsist among elderly men, for those who have arrived
- 6:57:03at this period of life do not pursue the delectable, but the useful.
- 6:57:08Nor is the delectable pursued by such young men in the acme of life as
- 6:57:14make utility the object of their pursuit. But such persons do not very much
- 6:57:18live together, for sometimes they are not pleasing to each other. They do
- 6:57:23not therefore require an association of this kind unless they are useful, for they
- 6:57:30are delectable to each other so far as they hope for some good. Among
- 6:57:34these friendships, also viz. Those of utility, hospitable friendship is ranked.
- 6:57:41But the friendship of young men appears to subsist on account of pleasure, for
- 6:57:48they live according to passion, and especially pursue that which is delectable to them,
- 6:57:52and that which is present. In consequence of the mutation of age,
- 6:57:57however, other things become delectable, on which account they rapidly become and cease
- 6:58:03to be friends. For their friendship is changed together with that which is delectable,
- 6:58:10but the mutation of such a pleasure is rapid. Young men also are
- 6:58:15amorous, for much of the amatory propensity subsists according to passion, and on
- 6:58:21account of pleasure. Hence they love and rapidly cease to love, frequently changing
- 6:58:26in the same day. They wish, however, to spend the day with
- 6:58:30each other and to live together. For thus they obtain what friendship requires.
- 6:58:36The friendship, however, of good men and of those who are similar in
- 6:58:40virtue, is perfect, for they similarly wish well to each other so far
- 6:58:45as they are good. But they are good of themselves. But those who
- 6:58:49wish well to their friends for their sake are especially friends, for they are
- 6:58:55thus affected towards them on their own account i e. Personally, and not
- 6:59:00from accident. The friendship therefore, of these remains as long as they are
- 6:59:06good men. But virtue is stable, and each of these is simply good
- 6:59:11and good to his friend. For good men are simply good, and are
- 6:59:15useful to each other in a similar manner. Also, they are delectable to
- 6:59:19each other. For good men are simply and mutually delectable, for to each
- 6:59:26their proper actions and such like actions viz. Such as are similarly virtuous,
- 6:59:32are attended with pleasure. But the actions of good men are such as these,
- 6:59:37or resemble them. It reasonably follows also that such a friendship is stable,
- 6:59:44for all such things subsist in it, connectedly as ought to be present
- 6:59:48with friends. For all, friendship is on account of good or on account
- 6:59:52of pleasure, either simply or to him who loves, and this according to
- 6:59:57a certain similitude. But in this friendship, i e. In the friendship
- 7:00:03founded on virtue, all the above mentioned particulars are essentially inherent, since in
- 7:00:10this all the rest are similar, and that which is simply good is also
- 7:00:14simply delectable. These things, however, are especially lovely, and in these
- 7:00:19the most excellent love and friendship principally subsist. But it is likely that such
- 7:00:26friendships are rare, for persons of this description are few. Farther Still,
- 7:00:32virtuous friendship requires time and custom. For according to the proverb, it is
- 7:00:37not possible for men to know each other until they have eaten a peck of
- 7:00:41salt together. Nor is it proper for one person to become intimate with or
- 7:00:45a friend to another till he appears to be amiable to him and worthy of
- 7:00:51belief. But those who rapidly perform towards each other the offices of friendship wish
- 7:00:56indeed to be friends, but are not unless they are amiable and know that
- 7:01:02they are so, They rapidly therefore contract the wish to be friends. But
- 7:01:07they do not contract friendship. Hence, virtuous friendship is perfect according to time,
- 7:01:14as being lasting, and according to other things, and consists from all
- 7:01:18these. Each friend, likewise is in this friendship similar to each which is
- 7:01:25a thing necessary to friends. Chapter four. The friendship, however, which
- 7:01:30subsists on account of the delectable, has a similitude to virtuous friendship, For
- 7:01:37good men also are delectable to each other. This is likewise the case with
- 7:01:42the friendship which subsists on account of utility. For good men are also such
- 7:01:48i e. Useful to each other. But among these, viz. Those
- 7:01:53who are friends through the delectable. Friendships are especially permanent when and the quality,
- 7:02:00as for instance, of pleasure subsists between them, and not only so,
- 7:02:06but likewise from the same thing, as is the case with men of
- 7:02:10versatile manners, and not as between the lover and the beloved person, for
- 7:02:15these are not delighted with the same thing. But the lover is delighted with
- 7:02:21the sight of the beloved person, and he who is beloved is delighted with
- 7:02:26the attention which is paid him by the lover. When the flower of age,
- 7:02:30however, is no more, sometimes the friendship also ends, for to
- 7:02:34the one the sight of his friend is no longer pleasing, and to the
- 7:02:38other bland attention is no longer paid. Many of these, however, continue
- 7:02:45permanent in their friendship if each loves the manners of each from custom in consequence
- 7:02:51of possessing similar manners. Those, however, who do not reciprocally exchange delight
- 7:02:56in amatory affairs but utility, are friends in a less degree, and their
- 7:03:02friendship is less permanent. But the friendship of those who are friends on account
- 7:03:07of utility is dissolved together with advantage, for they are not friends of each
- 7:03:12other but of the profitable on account of pleasure. Therefore, and on account
- 7:03:18of utility, it is possible for bad men to be friends to each other,
- 7:03:22and also for worthy with bad men, and for those who are neither
- 7:03:26good nor bad with each other, and with the good or the bad.
- 7:03:32But it is evident that the good alone can be friends through or on account
- 7:03:37of themselves. For bad men are not delighted with each other unless each derive
- 7:03:41some advantage from the other, and the friendship of good men alone is unattended
- 7:03:47with calumny, for it is not easy to believe anything bad of him who
- 7:03:52has been tried by us for a long time. Among these, also there
- 7:03:56is mutual credibility and a confidence that the one will not injure the other,
- 7:04:02and such other particulars as are thought worthy to be ranked in true friendship.
- 7:04:07In other friendships, however, there is nothing to prevent things of this kind
- 7:04:11from taking place. For since men denominate friends those who are connected together on
- 7:04:17account of utility, in the same manner as cities bracket, for to cities,
- 7:04:22warlike confederacies appear to take place for the sake of advantage close bracket.
- 7:04:29And since those likewise are called friends, who like boys, love each other
- 7:04:33on account of pleasure, perhaps indeed it is necessary that we also should call
- 7:04:40such persons friends, and should admit that there are many species of friendship.
- 7:04:45And we must denominate, indeed, the friendship of good men, so far
- 7:04:49as they are good, that which is primarily and properly so called. But
- 7:04:55we must admit that the rest are called friendships from similitude. They are friends
- 7:05:00so far as there is something good and similar among them, since the delectable
- 7:05:06is something good to the lovers of pleasure. These friendships, however, are
- 7:05:11not very much conjoined. Nor do the same persons become friends on account of
- 7:05:15the useful and the delectable. For things which are from accident are not very
- 7:05:21much united, but friendship being distributed into these species. Bad men indeed will
- 7:05:26be friends on account of pleasure or advantage through which they are similar. But
- 7:05:32good men will be friends on their own account, for they are friends so
- 7:05:37far as they are good. These therefore are simply friends, but those from
- 7:05:41accident and from being assimilated to these Chapter five. As however, in the
- 7:05:48virtues, some men are said to be good according to habit, but others
- 7:05:53according to energy. Thus also it is in friendship, for those friends who
- 7:05:59live together are delighted with and impart good to each other. But those who
- 7:06:03are asleep or are separated by places do not indeed energize. And yet they
- 7:06:10are so disposed as to be able to energize in such a way as friendship
- 7:06:15requires. For places do not dissolve friendship simply, but only the energy of
- 7:06:21it. If, however, the absence is long, it seems to produce
- 7:06:25an oblivion of friendship. Whence it is said that taciturnity dissolves many friendships.
- 7:06:33But neither elderly nor austeremen appear to be adapted to friendship, for in them
- 7:06:38there is but little of pleasure. No one, however, can constantly associate
- 7:06:44with one who is sorrowful or with one who is not pleasant, for nature
- 7:06:48appears especially to avoid the painful, and to aspire after the pleasing. But
- 7:06:53those who admit the company of each other and yet do not live together,
- 7:06:59rather rea semble benevolent persons than friends, since nothing is so much the province
- 7:07:03of friends as living together. For those who are in want aspire after advantage.
- 7:07:10Those also who are blessed constantly associate with each other, for it is
- 7:07:15not in the smallest degree fit that these should lead a solitary life. But
- 7:07:21it is not possible for men to live together whose company is not delightful,
- 7:07:26and who are not pleased with the same things which fellowship appears to possess.
- 7:07:30The friendship, therefore, of good men is eminently friendship, as we have
- 7:07:36frequently observed, for that which is simply good or delectable appears to be lovely
- 7:07:41and eligible. But to everyone that is lovely and eligible, which is to
- 7:07:48him a thing of this kind. A good man, however, is lovely
- 7:07:52and eligible to a good man through both these. Dilection, however, is
- 7:07:57similar to passion, but friendship to habit, For dilection is no less exerted
- 7:08:03towards inanimate things. But reciprocal love exists in conjunction with deliberate choice, And
- 7:08:10deliberate choice is from habit. We likewise wish well to those whom we love
- 7:08:15for their own sake, not according to passion, but according to habit.
- 7:08:21And those who love a friend loves that which is good to themselves. For
- 7:08:26a good man becoming a friend becomes a good to him to whom he is
- 7:08:30a friend. Each therefore loves that which is good to himself, and they
- 7:08:34mutually impart to each other that which is equal, both in wishing well and
- 7:08:41affording delight, for equality is said to be friendship. But these things are
- 7:08:45specially present with the friendship of good men. Chapter six. Friendship, however,
- 7:08:52subsists in a less degree among austere and elderly men, in proportion as
- 7:08:59they are more morose and less delighted with associations. For these appear to be
- 7:09:03especially friendly and effective of friendship. Hence, young men rapidly become friends,
- 7:09:10but not elderly men, for they do not become friends to those with whom
- 7:09:15they are not delighted. In a similar manner, neither do the austere become
- 7:09:19rapidly friends. But men of this description are indeed benevolent to each other,
- 7:09:25for they wish well and afford assistance to the wants of each other. They
- 7:09:30are, not, however, very much friends, because they do not constantly
- 7:09:33associate nor are delighted with each other. Which things appear to be especially of
- 7:09:40a friendly nature. But it is not possible to be a friend to many
- 7:09:45according to perfect friendship, as neither is it possible to love many at one
- 7:09:49and the same time, for this resembles excess, and a thing of this
- 7:09:55kind is naturally adapted to take place towards one person. Moreover, it is
- 7:10:00not easy for many persons to please the same person very much at one and
- 7:10:03the same time, nor perhaps would it be a good thing if it were
- 7:10:07easy. Experience and custom, likewise, are necessary to a perfect friendship,
- 7:10:14which are very difficult things. But it is possible to please many persons on
- 7:10:18account of utility and delight. For there are many of this description fiz.
- 7:10:25Who are thus to be pleased, and a little experience is sufficient for this
- 7:10:30purpose. Of these two, however, the friendship which subsists through the delectable
- 7:10:34is more similar to true friendship, when the same things are affected by both
- 7:10:40persons, and they are delighted with each other or with the same things,
- 7:10:45as is the case in the friendship of young men. For there is more
- 7:10:49of the liberal in these friendships. But the friendship which subsists on account of
- 7:10:55utility is the friendship of merchants, and of those who are occupied in sordid
- 7:11:00and illiberal pursuits. And those who are blessed indeed viz. Who are as
- 7:11:07happy as the condition of human nature will permit, are not in want of
- 7:11:11anything useful or delectable, because they already possess everything of this kind. For
- 7:11:17they wish to live with certain persons, and they endure what is painful,
- 7:11:22but for a short time, since no one could endure it continually, not
- 7:11:26even good itself if it were attended with molestation. Hence they search for friends
- 7:11:32who can procure them delight. It is, however, perhaps necessary to search
- 7:11:37for good men who are such i e. Who are delectable, and who
- 7:11:41are also such to their friends. For thus those things will be present with
- 7:11:45them which ought to be present with friends. But men in authority and power
- 7:11:51appear to use their friends by making a distinction between them, for some are
- 7:11:56useful and others delectable to them. The same things, however, are not
- 7:12:00very much affected by both these, for neither do they search for those who
- 7:12:06are delectable in conjunction with virtue, nor for those who are useful for worthy
- 7:12:11purposes. But aspiring after pleasure, they search for men of versatile manners,
- 7:12:17and for those who are skillful in accomplishing what they are ordered to do.
- 7:12:21But these qualifications are not very much found in the same person. We have,
- 7:12:26however, already observed that the worthy man is at the same time pleasing
- 7:12:30and useful. But such a one will not be the friend of the man
- 7:12:34who surpasses others in power and authority, unless he also surpasses others in virtue.
- 7:12:41But if he does not, he who surpasses will not equalize. According
- 7:12:45to the analogous men of this description, however, are rare. The above
- 7:12:51mentioned friendships, therefore, are in equality, for either the same things are
- 7:12:56affected by both, and they mutually wish the same things, or they exchange
- 7:13:02one thing for another, as for instance, pleasure for utility. But that
- 7:13:07these are friendships in a less degree, and that they are less permanent,
- 7:13:11has been already observed by us. They appear, however, through a similitude
- 7:13:17and dissimilitude of the same thing, to be and not to be friendships.
- 7:13:22For from their similitude to the friendship, which is according to virtue, they
- 7:13:26appear to be friendships, since the one of these has the delectable, but
- 7:13:32the other the useful. But both these are inherent in virtuous friendship. They
- 7:13:37differ, however, in this that virtuous friendship is free from calumny and is
- 7:13:44stable. But these are rapidly changed, and they also differ in many other
- 7:13:48things. And from this dissimilitude to the friendship, which is according to virtue,
- 7:13:56they do not appear to be friendships. Chapter seven. There is,
- 7:14:02however, another species of friendship which subsists according to transcendency. Such is that
- 7:14:07between a father and his son, and in short, between a more elderly
- 7:14:12and a younger man, between a husband and his wife, and between every
- 7:14:18governor and him who is governed. But These friendships also differ from each other.
- 7:14:23For there is not the same friendship between parents and children as there is
- 7:14:29between governors and the governed, nor between a father and a son, as
- 7:14:33between a son and his father, nor between a husband and wife as between
- 7:14:38a wife and husband. For the virtue and also the work of each of
- 7:14:44these are different, and the things are different on account of which they love.
- 7:14:48Their loves therefore and their friendships are different. Hence, neither are the
- 7:14:55same things affected by each towards each, nor is it fit they should be
- 7:15:00required. But when children indeed bestow on their parents those things which offspring ought
- 7:15:07to bestow on those by whom they were begotten, and parents bestow on their
- 7:15:11children those things which it is proper to bestow on their offspring, than the
- 7:15:15friendship between such as these will be stable and worthy. It is, however,
- 7:15:22necessary, in all the friendships which subsist according to transcendency, that the
- 7:15:27love should be analogous, as for instance, that the better character should be
- 7:15:33beloved in a greater degree than he loves, and that this should also be
- 7:15:37the case with the more useful character, and in a similar manner with each
- 7:15:42of the rest. For when love exists according to Dessert, then in a
- 7:15:47certain respect, equality is produced, which appears to be the peculiarity of friendship.
- 7:15:53The equal, however, does not appear to subsist similarly in just things
- 7:15:59and in friendship. For in just things, indeed, the equality which is
- 7:16:03according to Dessert ranks in the first place, but that which is according to
- 7:16:08quantity in the second place. But in friendship the equality which is according to
- 7:16:15quantity ranks in the first place, and that which is according to Dessert in
- 7:16:19the second place. This, however, becomes evident if there is a great
- 7:16:23interval of virtue, or vice, or affluence, or of some other things,
- 7:16:30For then they are no longer friends, nor do they think themselves qualified
- 7:16:34to be so. But this is most apparent in the gods, for they
- 7:16:40most abundantly transcend in everything that is good. It is also evident in kings,
- 7:16:45for those who are much inferior to them do not think themselves worthy to
- 7:16:49be their friends. Nor do those who are of no worth aspire to be
- 7:16:55friends of the best or the wisest of men. In such as these,
- 7:16:59therefore, there is no accurate definition as long as they are the friends of
- 7:17:03some one. For many things being taken away, the friendship may yet remain.
- 7:17:08But if they are separated by a great interval from each other, as
- 7:17:14is the case with man and divinity, friendship no longer remains. Whence,
- 7:17:18also it is doubted whether friends would wish for their friends the greatest of goods,
- 7:17:22such for instance, as for them to be gods. For in this
- 7:17:26case they would no longer be friends to them. Neither therefore would they be
- 7:17:32a good to them. For friends are a good to each other. Hence,
- 7:17:34if it is well said that a friend wishes well to his friend for
- 7:17:38his sake, it is requisite that he should remain such as he is.
- 7:17:44But he wishes the greatest good may befall him, still remaining a man.
- 7:17:48And perhaps he does not wish that every good may befall him, for every
- 7:17:52one especially wishes to obtain good himself. Chapter eight. The multitude, however,
- 7:18:00appear from ambition, to be more desirous of being beloved than of loving.
- 7:18:04Hence the multitude love flatterers. For a flatterer is a friend who is
- 7:18:10surpassed by him whom he flatters or pretends to be so, and also professes
- 7:18:15to love in a greater degree than he is beloved, But to be beloved
- 7:18:22appears to be proximate to the being honored after which the multitude aspire. It
- 7:18:26seems, however, that they do not choose honor on its own account,
- 7:18:30but from accident. For the multitude are delighted when they are honored by those
- 7:18:36in power, through the hope of the benefits they may thence derive, for
- 7:18:41they fancy they shall obtain from them that of which they are in want.
- 7:18:45They are delighted therefore with honor as an indication that they shall be benefited.
- 7:18:51But those who aspire after honor from worthy and intelligent men desire to confirm their
- 7:18:56own opinion of themselves, joice therefore that they are worthy persons, believing in
- 7:19:03the judgment of those who say that they are worthy. But they are delighted
- 7:19:07to be beloved per se. Hence, it would seem that this is a
- 7:19:11better thing than to be honored, and that friendship is a thing eligible of
- 7:19:17itself. Friendship, however, seems to consist more in loving than in being
- 7:19:22beloved, of which this is an indication. Let mothers rejoice in loving their
- 7:19:26children. For some mothers give their children to be privately educated by others,
- 7:19:32and love them, knowing them to be their own offspring, but are not
- 7:19:36anxious to be beloved in return, if both cannot be affected. But it
- 7:19:41appears to them to be sufficient if they see their children doing well, and
- 7:19:45they love their offspring, though the offspring are unable to pay that attention to
- 7:19:51their mother, which is fit because they are ignorant of her. Since therefore,
- 7:19:56friendship consists rather in loving than in being beloved, and we praise those
- 7:20:00who are lovers of friends. To love appears to be the virtue of friends.
- 7:20:06Hence, those in whom this exists, according to Dessert, are stable
- 7:20:10friends. And the friendship of such as these is stable. But thus also
- 7:20:15those who are unequal may especially become friends, for thus they will be equalized.
- 7:20:22Equality, however, and similitude are friendship, and especially the similitude of
- 7:20:29those who resemble each other in virtue, For being of themselves stable, they
- 7:20:33are also stable towards each other, and neither require anything depraved, nor are
- 7:20:38subservient to anything of this kind. But as I may say, they prohibit
- 7:20:45what is base, for it is the province of good men neither to air
- 7:20:48themselves nor permit their friends to be subservient to erroneous conduct. But depraved men
- 7:20:56have no stability, for they do not remain similar to themselves, but are
- 7:21:00only friends for a short time, being delighted with the depravity of each other.
- 7:21:07Useful, however, and pleasing men remain friends for a longer time,
- 7:21:11for they continue friends as long as they impart to each other pleasure and advantage.
- 7:21:17But the friendship which subsists on account of utility appears to be composed from
- 7:21:22contraries, such as the friendship of the poor with the rich man, and
- 7:21:26of the unlearned with the learned man. For he who is in want of
- 7:21:30anything aspiring to the position of it, recompenses with something else, him from
- 7:21:37whom he obtains what he wants. Hither also may be referred the lover and
- 7:21:42the beloved, the beautiful and the deformed. Hence, lovers sometimes appear to
- 7:21:48be ridiculous when they think they ought to be beloved as much as they love.
- 7:21:52If therefore they are similarly amiable, perhaps it is fit they should thus
- 7:21:57think, But it is ridiculous if they possess nothing of this kind. Perhaps
- 7:22:04also, neither does one contrary desire another, essentially, but only from accident.
- 7:22:11But the appetite is directed to the medium, for this is good.
- 7:22:15Thus, for instance, it is good to a dry thing not to become
- 7:22:19moist, but to arrive at the medium between dryness and moisture. And in
- 7:22:25a similar manner to a hot thing, and to other substances. These things,
- 7:22:30however, must be omitted, for they are more foreign than is proper.
- 7:22:36Chapter nine. It seems, however, as we said in the beginning,
- 7:22:41that both friendship and justice are conversant with and exist in the same things.
- 7:22:48For in all society there appears to be a certain justice and friendship.
- 7:22:53Men therefore call their fellow sailors and fellow soldiers friends, and in a similar
- 7:23:00manner those who associate with them in other employments. But such as is the
- 7:23:07extent of their associations, such also is the extent of their friendship, For
- 7:23:14such likewise is the extent of justice. The proverb too rightly says that all
- 7:23:19things are common among friends, for friendship consists in communion. Among brothers,
- 7:23:26however, and associates, all things are common, but among others they are
- 7:23:32limited to certain bounds, and to some indeed more so, but to others
- 7:23:37less. For with respect of friendship, also some are friendships int a grater
- 7:23:42and others in a less degree. Just things also differ, for there is
- 7:23:48not the same justice between parents and children as between brothers towards each other,
- 7:23:53nor as between associates and fellow citizens, and the like takes place in others.
- 7:24:00Friendships. Injuries, therefore, are different towards each of these, and
- 7:24:04they receive an increase by how much the more the persons injured are friends.
- 7:24:10Thus, for instance, it is a more dire thing to defraud an associate
- 7:24:14of money than a fellow citizen, and not to assist a brother than to
- 7:24:18refuse assistance to a stranger, and to strike a father than to strike any
- 7:24:23other person. But the just is naturally adapted to be increased at one and
- 7:24:30the same time with friendship, as subsisting in the same things, and being
- 7:24:34equally extended. All communions or societies, however, resemble the parts of the
- 7:24:41political or civil communion. Four men journey together with a view to a certain
- 7:24:45advantage, and in order to procure something which pertains to human life. Political
- 7:24:52communion also appears to exist for the sake of advantage, to have been established
- 7:24:57with a view to this from the beginning, and to continue so for the
- 7:25:02attention of legislators is directed to this, and they say that what is advantageous
- 7:25:07in common is just other communions therefore partially aspire after utility. Thus sailors aspire
- 7:25:15after the utility pertaining to navigation, or to the acquisition of wealth, or
- 7:25:21something of the like kind. But soldiers aspire after the utility pertaining to war,
- 7:25:26whether riches are the object of their desire, or victory or the capture
- 7:25:30of cities. The like also takes place among tribes and the populace. Some
- 7:25:37communions, however, appear to have been formed on account of pleasure, such
- 7:25:41as the communion from the celebration of festivals, or from societies instituted to promote
- 7:25:47good fellowship. For these subsist for the sake of sacrificing and association. But
- 7:25:53all these appear to be subject to political communion. For political communion does not
- 7:25:59as by our after present advantage, but to that which pertains to the whole
- 7:26:03of life, performing sacrifices, and for this purpose forming assemblies, bestowing honors
- 7:26:10on the gods, and affording a cessation from labour in conjunction with pleasure.
- 7:26:15Four ancient sacrifices and assemblies appear to have been instituted after collecting the fruits of
- 7:26:22the earth as first fruits. All communions therefore appear to be parts of the
- 7:26:27political communion. But such like friendships follow such like communions. Chapter ten.
- 7:26:37There are, however, three species of a polity, and as many deviations
- 7:26:41from them, which are, as it were, the corruptions of these polities.
- 7:26:47But the polities indeed are a kingdom, an aristocracy, and the third
- 7:26:52is derived from the distribution of honors through the medium of wealth, which,
- 7:26:56as it seems, may be appropriately called a timocracy. Most men, however,
- 7:27:03are accustomed to call it simply a polity. But of these, a
- 7:27:07kingdom is the best, and a timocracy is the worst. The deviation,
- 7:27:12also from a kingdom, is indeed a tyranny, for both are monarchies.
- 7:27:18They differ, however, very much from each other. For the tyrant indeed
- 7:27:22looks to his own advantage, but the king to the advantage of those whom
- 7:27:26he governs. For he is not a king who is not sufficient to himself,
- 7:27:33and who does not surpass his subjects in every kind of good. But
- 7:27:37a man of this description is in want of nothing. Hence his attention will
- 7:27:41not be directed to what is advantageous to himself, but to the benefit of
- 7:27:47those whom he governs. For he who is not a person of this description
- 7:27:52will be a certain elected king. A tyrant, however, is the contrary
- 7:27:56to a king properly so called, for he pursues his own good, and
- 7:28:02from this it is more evident that he is the worst of rulers, for
- 7:28:07that which is contrary to the best is the worst. But the transition from
- 7:28:11a kingdom is into a tyranny. For a tyranny is the depravity of a
- 7:28:17monarchy, and a depraved king becomes a tyrant. The transition from an aristocracy
- 7:28:22is into an oldigarchy through the vice of the governors, who distribute civil offices
- 7:28:29in a manner contrary to dessert, bestow upon themselves all or the greater part
- 7:28:33of everything that is good, and always appoint the same person's magistrates, paying
- 7:28:40more attention to wealth than to anything else. Those therefore that govern are few
- 7:28:45and are depraved instead of being the most worthy men. But the transition from
- 7:28:51a timocracy is into a democracy, since these polities border on each other.
- 7:28:56For in a democracy also the slitude have dominion, and all those that are
- 7:29:02rich are equal. A democracy, however, is in the smallest degree depraved,
- 7:29:07for it deviates but little from the form of a polity, i e.
- 7:29:12From a democracy. After this manner, therefore, polities are especially changed,
- 7:29:18for thus they are changed the least and the most easily. The resemblances,
- 7:29:23however, and as it were, paradigms of them, may be derived
- 7:29:29from families. For the communion or society between a father and his children has
- 7:29:34the form of a kingdom, for a father pays attention to his children for
- 7:29:38their own sake. Hence, also Homer calls Jupiter father, for the intention
- 7:29:45of a kingdom is to be a paternal government. But among the Persians,
- 7:29:49the government of a father is tyrannical, for they use their children as slaves.
- 7:29:55The government, likewise, of a master towards his servants is tyrannic,
- 7:30:00for in this government that alone which is advantageous to the master is performed.
- 7:30:06This therefore appears to be right, But the Persian government is erroneous. For
- 7:30:11of things that are different, the governments also are different. But the government
- 7:30:15of man and wife appears to be aristocratic, for the man governs according to
- 7:30:22dessert, and in those things in which it is proper for the man to
- 7:30:26govern, but he permits his wife to rule over such things as are adapted
- 7:30:30to be governed by a woman. If the man, however, has dominion
- 7:30:34in all things, the government is changed into an oligarchy, for he does
- 7:30:38this contrary to dessert, and not so far as he is the better character.
- 7:30:44But it sometimes happens that women, in consequence of being heiresses, governed
- 7:30:49even in things pertaining to men. The government, therefore, in this case,
- 7:30:55is not according to virtue, but is through wealth and power, in
- 7:30:59the same manner as in oligarchies. And the government of brothers resembles a democracy,
- 7:31:04for they are equal, except so far as they differ in their ages.
- 7:31:10Hence, if there is a great difference in their ages, the friendship
- 7:31:12is no longer fraternal. But a democratic government is especially to be seen in
- 7:31:18those families which are without a master, for here all govern equally. In
- 7:31:23those families, also, where he who governs is a man of a weak
- 7:31:27understanding, everyone has the power of acting as he pleases Chapter eleven. In
- 7:31:36each of the polities, however, friendship appears to have the same extent as
- 7:31:40justice, and the friendship indeed between a king and his subjects. Consists in
- 7:31:45transcendency of beneficence, for he benefits his subjects since being a good man,
- 7:31:52he is attentive to their interest, like a shepherd, in order that they
- 7:31:57may do well. Whence, also Homer calls Agamemnon the shepherd of the people.
- 7:32:03Such likewise is paternal friendship, but it differs in the magnitude of the
- 7:32:08benefits which it confers. For the father is the cause of the existence of
- 7:32:14his child, which appears to be a thing of the greatest consequence, and
- 7:32:18also procures him nutriment and education. The same things likewise are attributed to progenitors,
- 7:32:26for a father is naturally adapted to rule over his children, and progenitors
- 7:32:30over the offspring of their children, and kings over their subjects. But these
- 7:32:37friendships consist in transcendency, on which account also parents are honored. The just.
- 7:32:44Therefore, in these is not the same, but subsists according to dessert.
- 7:32:48For thus also the friendship subsists. There is likewise the same friendship between
- 7:32:53a husband and a wife as in an aristocracy, for it subsists according to
- 7:32:59virtue, and a more ample good is attributed to the better character, and
- 7:33:03that which is adapted and appropriate is attributed to each. For thus also justice
- 7:33:10is affected. But the friendship of brothers resembles that of associates, for they
- 7:33:15are equal and of the same age. And persons of this description apply themselves,
- 7:33:21for the most part, to the same disciplines, and are similar in
- 7:33:23their manners. The friendship, therefore, which exists in a democracy, resembles
- 7:33:30this, For in this government it is requisite that the citizens should be equal
- 7:33:33and worthy persons. Hence they alternately and equally govern. Such therefore is the
- 7:33:40friendship of brothers. In corrupt polities, however, as the justices, but
- 7:33:45small, so likewise is the friendship, and it exists in the smallest degree
- 7:33:49in the worst polity. For in a tyranny there is either no friendship or
- 7:33:56very little, since among those with whom there is nothing common. Between the
- 7:34:00governor and the governed, there is not any friendship, for neither is there
- 7:34:03any justice. But the friendship between them resembles that which is between an artist
- 7:34:10and his instrument, between the soul and the body, and between a master
- 7:34:14and his servant, For these indeed are benefited by those that use them.
- 7:34:18There is not, however, any friendship with nor justice towards things inanimate,
- 7:34:23as neither is there towards a horse or an ox, or towards a slave,
- 7:34:27so far as he is a slave, since there is nothing common between
- 7:34:32these. For a slave is an animated instrument, but an instrument is an
- 7:34:37inanimate slave. So far therefore as he is a slave, there is no
- 7:34:42friendship between him and his master. But there may be so far as he
- 7:34:47is a man. For it appears that there is a certain justice due from
- 7:34:52every man towards every man who is able to partake of law and compact.
- 7:34:56And therefore there may also be a friendship between any one man and another,
- 7:35:02so far as each is a man. In tyrannical governments, however, there
- 7:35:07is but little friendship and justice, But there is very much of each in
- 7:35:11democracies, For among those that are equal, many things are common. Chapter
- 7:35:18twelve. All friendship, therefore, as we have before observed, consists in
- 7:35:23communion. But it may be divided into that which subsists between kindred and that
- 7:35:30which subsists between associates. But political friendships, the friendships of those of the
- 7:35:36same tribe, of those who sail together, and such like, are more
- 7:35:40similar to the friendships of associates, for they appear to exist, as it
- 7:35:45were, from compact. Among these, also, hospitable friendships may be ranked.
- 7:35:51The friendship, likewise of kindred, appears to be multiform, and the
- 7:35:56whole of it depends from paternal friendship. For parents love their children as being
- 7:36:00something of themselves, but children love their parents as being something proceeding from them.
- 7:36:07Parents, however, have a greater knowledge of their offspring, so as
- 7:36:11to know more accurately that they are their offspring, than the offspring know that
- 7:36:17they proceeded from their parents. And that from which a thing is generated has
- 7:36:22a greater familiarity and alliance with the thing produced than the thing produced has with
- 7:36:27its maker. For that which originates from a thing is the property of that
- 7:36:33from which it originates, as a tooth, or a hair or anything else,
- 7:36:38is the property of its possessor. But that from which a thing originates
- 7:36:42is not the property of any one of the things which originate from it,
- 7:36:48or is so in a less degree. The love also of parents to their
- 7:36:52children is superior to that of children to their parents by length of time,
- 7:36:57For parents love their children as as soon as they are born, but children
- 7:37:02their parents in process of time when they begin to understand or perceive that they
- 7:37:07are their parents. From these things. Likewise, it is evident on what
- 7:37:11account mothers love their children more than fathers love them. Parents indeed therefore love
- 7:37:18their children as themselves, for those that proceed from them are as it were,
- 7:37:22their other selves by being separated from them. But children love their parents
- 7:37:27as proceeding from them. Brothers, however, love each other in consequence of
- 7:37:33being born from the same parents, for sameness with their parents causes them to
- 7:37:37be the same with each other. Hence it is said that they have the
- 7:37:41same blood, the same root, and such like expressions. They are,
- 7:37:47therefore, in a certain respect one and the same in separate bodies. The
- 7:37:51being educated together also, and equality of age greatly contribute to friendship, for
- 7:37:57according to the proverb quote equal delights in equal age close quote, and those
- 7:38:04who are accustomed to the same things are associates. Hence, also fraternal friendship
- 7:38:11is assimilated to the friendship of associates cousins. Likewise, and the remaining kindred
- 7:38:17become conjoined from the friendship of brothers in consequence of mediately originating from the same
- 7:38:23persons. Some, however, become more united in friendship, and others less
- 7:38:29in consequence of the source of their race being nearer or more remote. But
- 7:38:33the friendship of children towards their parents, and of men towards the gods is
- 7:38:40as towards that which is good and transcendent. For parents and the gods confer
- 7:38:45the greatest benefits, for they are the causes of existence and of being nourished,
- 7:38:52and when they are of a proper age of being educated. A friendship,
- 7:38:56also of this kind, possesses the delectable and the useful in a greater
- 7:39:00degree than the friendship of strangers, because their life is in a greater degree
- 7:39:06more common. Those things, however, are to be found in fraternal friendship,
- 7:39:11which exist in the friendship of associates, and in a greater degree in
- 7:39:15those that are worthy, and in short, in those that are similar in
- 7:39:19proportion as they are more familiar and love each other from their birth, and
- 7:39:25in proportion as those who are born from the same parents, who are nourished
- 7:39:30together and similarly educated, are more similar in their manners in this friendship.
- 7:39:34Likewise, the proof which is obtained from time is most abundant and most firm,
- 7:39:41And things pertaining to friendship subsist analogously in the remaining gradations of kindred.
- 7:39:48But the friendship between man and wife appears to be according to nature. For
- 7:39:52man is more a connubial than a political animal, and this by how much
- 7:39:57more a family is prior to and more necessary than a city. And the
- 7:40:02procreation of offspring is more common to all animals in other animals. Therefore,
- 7:40:07the communion proceeds thus far i e. As far as to the procreation of
- 7:40:12offspring. But men and women not only cohabit for the sake of begetting children,
- 7:40:18but also with a view to the necessaries and conveniences of life. For
- 7:40:23their employments are immediately divided, and those of the husband are different from those
- 7:40:27of the wife. Hence they assist each other, referring their own private possessions
- 7:40:33to the common good of the family. On account of these things, therefore,
- 7:40:37both the useful and the delectable appear to be contained in this friendship.
- 7:40:41It will also exist on account of virtue if the husband and wife are worthy
- 7:40:45characters, for there is a virtue pertaining to each, and they will rejoice
- 7:40:51in a thing of this kind. Children, however, appear to be a
- 7:40:55bond, and hence those marriages that are without children are more swiftly dissolved,
- 7:41:00for children are a common good to both husband and wife, and that which
- 7:41:04is common connects to inquire also how a husband ought to live with his wife.
- 7:41:10And in short, one friend with another appears to be nothing else than
- 7:41:15to inquire how justice subsists between them, For it does not appear that there
- 7:41:18is the same justice between one friend and another, nor between one stranger,
- 7:41:23one associate, and one disciple with another. Chapter thirteen. Since therefore there
- 7:41:30are three kinds of friendship, as was observed in the beginning, and according
- 7:41:36to each some are friends inequality, but others according to transcendency. For similarly,
- 7:41:41good men are friends, and between worthy men who are not equally worthy,
- 7:41:47the more may be the friend of the less worthy. And in a
- 7:41:49similar manner, with respect to friendships which subsist on account of delight and on
- 7:41:56account of utility, they may be equal or unequal, and different in the
- 7:42:02advantages with which they are attended. This being the case, it is requisite
- 7:42:07that those friends who are equal should be equalized in loving and other things pertaining
- 7:42:12to friendship, but that those who are unequal should render to themselves that which
- 7:42:18is analogous in transcendencies. Accusations, however, in complaints, reasonably take place
- 7:42:23in that friendship alone or principally, which is founded in utility. For those
- 7:42:30who are friends on account of virtue are readily disposed to benefit each other,
- 7:42:36for this is the peculiarity of virtue and friendship. But with those who contend
- 7:42:41with each other in kindness, there are no accusations nor contests. For no
- 7:42:47one is indignant with him who loves and benefits him. But if he is
- 7:42:51grateful, he will recompence him by benefiting him in return. He, however,
- 7:42:56who transcends in the benefits which he confers, obtaining that which he desires,
- 7:43:02will not accuse his friend, for each aspires after good. Nor do
- 7:43:06accusations and complaints very much take place in the friendships which are founded in pleasure,
- 7:43:11for at one and the same time both obtain the objects of their desire
- 7:43:17if they rejoice to live together. He, however, will appear to be
- 7:43:21ridiculous who accuses him by whom he is not delighted, whain it is not
- 7:43:26possible to spend his time with him. But the friendship which is founded in
- 7:43:30utility is full of accusations and complaints, For since they make use of each
- 7:43:34other with a view to advantage, they are always in want of more,
- 7:43:38and fancy they have less than is proper, and blame their friends because they
- 7:43:42do not obtain as much as they are in want of, though they deserve
- 7:43:47to obtain it. But those who benefit are not able to supply as much
- 7:43:51as those who are benefited require. It appears, however, that as the
- 7:43:55justice twofold, for one kind is unwritten but the other is legal. Us
- 7:44:00also with respect to the friendship which is founded in utility, one kind indeed
- 7:44:04is ethical, but the other is legal. Accusations therefore, then especially take
- 7:44:11place when compacts are formed and dissolved, not with a view to the same
- 7:44:15friendship as that by which they are united. But the legal friendship founded in
- 7:44:21utility is that which subsists by compacts, one kind indeed being entirely venal from
- 7:44:27hand to hand viz. Such as takes place in buying and selling. But
- 7:44:33another kind is more liberal, in which one thing is to be given for
- 7:44:37another at a stated time, but from compact. In this friendship, however,
- 7:44:42that which is owing is manifest, and is not ambiguous, but a
- 7:44:47friendly delay is permitted to take place. Hence, with some of these there
- 7:44:52are no judicial processes. But they think it is requisite to love those who
- 7:44:56form compacts from the obliomeation of fidelity. But the ethical friendship does not consist
- 7:45:04in compacts. But what it gives, it gives as to a friend.
- 7:45:10And this is also the case with whatever is imparted by the one to the
- 7:45:15other. He, however, who gives, thinks it fit that he should
- 7:45:18receive in return an equivalent or more than an equivalent, as if he had
- 7:45:23not given but lent. But if he does not receive the retribution which he
- 7:45:29expected from the contract, he accuses his friend. And this happens because all
- 7:45:34or most men wish to obtain things which are truly beautiful, but deliberately choose
- 7:45:40what is advantageous. But it is beautiful to benefit, not with a view
- 7:45:45to be benefited in return, and it is advantageous to be benefited. He,
- 7:45:51therefore, who is able ought to make a retribution equivalent to the benefit
- 7:45:55he has received and willingly for a friend, must not return kindness unwillingly,
- 7:46:00if therefore, he has erred from the first and has been benefited by an
- 7:46:06improper person, For he was not benefited by a friend, nor by one
- 7:46:11who did this for his sake. If this be the case, retribution must
- 7:46:15be made as if he had been benefited by compact. Hence, he who
- 7:46:21has been benefited by such a one ought to promise that he will make a
- 7:46:23retribution if he can, But if he cannot, he who conferred the benefit
- 7:46:29ought not to think it fit that he should be recompensed, So that,
- 7:46:33if possible, retribution is to be made in the beginning. However, it
- 7:46:37is requisite when a benefit is offered to consider by whom it is offered,
- 7:46:42and with what view swas either to accept or refuse it. But it may
- 7:46:48be doubted whether retribution is to be measured by the advantage of him who receives
- 7:46:52it, or by the beneficence of him who made it. For those who
- 7:46:56receive it say in extenuation that they receive such things from benefactors as are of
- 7:47:03little use to them, and which they might have received from others. But
- 7:47:07on the contrary, the benefactors say that they bestow the greatest things which it
- 7:47:12was in their power to give, and which could not be obtained from others,
- 7:47:17and that they conferred them in dangerous circumstances or such like necessities. Since
- 7:47:23therefore this friendship subsists on account of utility, the measure of it is the
- 7:47:29advantage of him who is benefited, For he is the person who is in
- 7:47:33want, and his friend assists him in order that he may receive an equal
- 7:47:37benefit in return. The assistance therefore afforded by him who is benefited will be
- 7:47:44as great as that which he received, and as much or even more,
- 7:47:48must be given by him in return, for it is more beautiful and becoming.
- 7:47:53But in those friendships which are founded in virtue, there are no accusations,
- 7:47:59and the deliberate choice of him who benefits resembles a measure. For the
- 7:48:03authority of virtue and manners consists in deliberate choice Chapter fourteen. Dissensions, however,
- 7:48:11take place in those friendships which subsist according to transcendency. For each thinks
- 7:48:18it fit that he should have more than the other. But when this takes
- 7:48:22place, the friendship is dissolved. For the better character of the two thinks
- 7:48:26it is proper that he should have more than the other, for more ought
- 7:48:32to be distributed to a good man. This is also the case with him
- 7:48:36who is the more useful person of the two. For they say it is
- 7:48:38not fit that he who is useless should have an equal portion with him who
- 7:48:44is useful, since ministrant offices will take place, and not friendship, unless
- 7:48:49what is done from friendship is according to the dessert of the deeds. For
- 7:48:55they are of opinion that, as in pecuniary negotiations, those to employ a
- 7:49:00greater sum of money receive more profit. Thus also it ought to be in
- 7:49:03friendship. The contrary, however, is the opinion of him who is indigent
- 7:49:10and who is the worst character. For these think that it is the province
- 7:49:14of a good friend to assist those that are in want. For what advantage,
- 7:49:18say they, is there in being the friend of a worthy or powerful
- 7:49:22man if no benefit is to be derived from him. It seems, however,
- 7:49:26that each thinks rightly, and that it is requisite to distribute more to
- 7:49:30each from friendship, yet not of the same thing, but more of honor
- 7:49:34indeed to him who transcends, but more of gain to him who is indigent.
- 7:49:40For honor, indeed is the reward of virtue and beneficence, but gain
- 7:49:45is the auxiliary of indigence. This also appears to be the case in polities,
- 7:49:49for he is not honored who is the cause of no good to the
- 7:49:53community, Since that which is common is given to him who benefits the community.
- 7:49:59But honor is something common. For it is not possible for a man
- 7:50:03at one and the same time to be enriched and honored by the community,
- 7:50:07since no one endures to have less in all things. Hence to him who
- 7:50:11is inferior in wealth, honor is given, but money to him who is
- 7:50:15to be bribed by gifts. For distribution, according to Dessert, equalizes and
- 7:50:22preserves friendship, as we have before observed. In this manner. Therefore,
- 7:50:26it is requisite to act towards those who are unequal, And he who is
- 7:50:32benefited, either in wealth or in virtue, should remunerate him by whom he
- 7:50:37is benefited with honor, thus recompensing him as far as he is able.
- 7:50:42For friendship requires that which is possible, and not that which is according to
- 7:50:47Dessert, For a recompense according to Dessert is not possible in all things,
- 7:50:52as in honors conferred on the gods and parents, since no one can bestow
- 7:50:57these according to Dessert, but he who pays homage to them to the utmost
- 7:51:03of his power appears to be a worthy man. Hence, though it would
- 7:51:07seem not to be lawful for a son to abandon his father, yet it
- 7:51:11is lawful for a father to abandon his son for a return ought to be
- 7:51:15made by him who is a debtor. But a son can do nothing worthy
- 7:51:19of the benefits he has received from his father, so that he will always
- 7:51:23be his debtor. Those, however, to whom others are indebted, have
- 7:51:27the power of abandoning their debtors, and therefore a father has this power.
- 7:51:33At the same time, however, no father perhaps will abandon his son unless
- 7:51:37the son is transcendently depraved. For exclusive of natural friendship, it is human
- 7:51:44not to refuse giving assistance when it is wanted. But if the son is
- 7:51:48depraved, he is either to be avoided by his father, or his father
- 7:51:52must not be anxious to assist him. A depraved son, however, sometimes
- 7:51:56hates his father, or at least does not very much endeavor to assist him.
- 7:52:02For the multitude wish to be benefited, but they avoid acting beneficently as
- 7:52:07a useless thing, And thus much concerning these particulars. End of Book eight,
- 7:52:15Book nine, Chapter one. In all friendships, however, which are
- 7:52:23of a dissimilar species. The analogous, as we have already observed, equalizes
- 7:52:30and preserves friendship. Thus, for instance, in the political friendship to the
- 7:52:36shoemaker, a retribution is made for his shoes according to their worth, end
- 7:52:41to the weaver and other artificers. Here therefore a common measure, money is
- 7:52:48employed. End to this everything is referred, and by this is measured.
- 7:52:56But in the amatory friendship, sometimes indeed the lover accuses the object of his
- 7:53:02love that, though he loves her beyond measure, he is not beloved in
- 7:53:07return, though if it should so happen, he has nothing which can excite
- 7:53:12love. Frequently, however, she who is beloved, complains that her lover,
- 7:53:18having formerly promised everything, now performs nothing that he had promised. But
- 7:53:25things of this kind happen when the one indeed loves the object of his love
- 7:53:30on account of pleasure, but the other loves her lover on account of utility,
- 7:53:34And these things are not present with both. For since the friendship exists
- 7:53:41on account of these things, a dissolution of it takes place when those things
- 7:53:45are not accomplished, which are the final causes of their love, For they
- 7:53:51do not love each other, but what each possesses which is not stable.
- 7:53:56Hence, such also are their friendships viz. They are not stable. The
- 7:54:03friendship, however, which is founded in manners i e. Virtuous friendship,
- 7:54:08since it exists per se or independent of external circumstances, is permanent, as
- 7:54:15we have before observed. But friends also disagree when other things happened to them,
- 7:54:22and not those which were the objects of their desire. For when a
- 7:54:26man does not obtain that which he desired, it is just as if he
- 7:54:30obtained nothing. Thus, a certain person promised a harper that he would reward
- 7:54:37him in proportion to the excellence of his singing. But in the morning,
- 7:54:41when the harper demanded the fulfillment of his promise, he said that he had
- 7:54:45returned pleasure for pleasure. If therefore, this i e. Pleasure had been
- 7:54:52the wish of each the harper would have been sufficiently recompensed. But if the
- 7:54:59object of the the one was delight and of the other gain, and if
- 7:55:03the object of the one was accomplished but not of the other, the compact
- 7:55:08between them was not well fulfilled. For a man will attend to those things
- 7:55:15of which he is in want, and for the sake of them will give
- 7:55:18what is requisite. With respect, however, to the recompense which ought to
- 7:55:23be made, whether ought it to be estimated by him who gives or by
- 7:55:29him who receives. For he who gives first seems to leave to the receiver
- 7:55:34what the recompence should be, which they say Protagoras also did, for when
- 7:55:41he had taught anything, he ordered the learner to estimate what appeared to him
- 7:55:45to be the worth of the knowledge he had gained, and he received according
- 7:55:48to his valuation. But in things of this kind, to some persons it
- 7:55:53is sufficient to say, sufficient be the price a friend appointment. Close quote.
- 7:56:02Those however, who, having first received money, afterwards perform nothing which
- 7:56:07they had promised to do on account of the excess of magnitude of their promise,
- 7:56:12are deservedly accused, for they do not perform what they had agreed to
- 7:56:18accomplish. But the sophists perhaps are compelled to do this because no one would
- 7:56:22give money for those things which they know. These, therefore, because they
- 7:56:29do not perform that for which they received a reward, are justly blamed.
- 7:56:33With those persons, however, among whom there is no compact for services performed.
- 7:56:38We have already observed that those who first give to others on their own
- 7:56:44account are not to be blamed. For of this kind is the friendship,
- 7:56:48which is founded in virtue. Retribution also must be made according to deliberate choice,
- 7:56:56for this is the province of a friend and of virtu This conduct,
- 7:57:02likewise, as it seems, should be adopted by those who are associates in
- 7:57:07philosophy. For the worth of philosophy is not to be measured by money,
- 7:57:12nor can any honor be conferred equivalent to its dignity. But perhaps it is
- 7:57:18sufficient that a recompense as great as possible is made in the same manner as
- 7:57:23towards the gods and parents, where however, the gift is not such as
- 7:57:29this, but is conferred with a view to a certain thing, i e.
- 7:57:33With a view to some recompense. A remuneration perhaps ought especially to be
- 7:57:38made, which to both friends will appear to be according to dessert. But
- 7:57:45if this should not happen to take place, it may not only appear to
- 7:57:48be necessary, but also to be just. That he who first received should
- 7:57:52determine what is an equal compensation. For if as much advantage or pleasure is
- 7:58:00turned as was received, the remuneration will be according to dessert. For this
- 7:58:06also appears to take place in traffic. And in some places there are laws
- 7:58:10which forbid any judicial processes respecting voluntary contracts. As if it were fit that
- 7:58:15in communions of this kind, there should be no other judge, nor any
- 7:58:21other law, but that all differences should be decided by the person in whom
- 7:58:25trust is reposed and by whom such contracts are used. For they think that
- 7:58:30he who was instructed to estimate the retribution will judge more justly than he who
- 7:58:37reposed that trust, since for the most part, those who possess and those
- 7:58:41who wish to receive anything do not estimate equitably. For everyone thinks that his
- 7:58:48own property and what he gives are of great value. At the same time,
- 7:58:52however, the retribution should be as great as it is determined to be
- 7:58:56by those who receive the gift. Perhaps, however, a thing is not
- 7:59:00to be estimated to be worth so much as it appeared to its possessor,
- 7:59:06but to be worth as much as he would have estimated it to be before
- 7:59:08he possessed it. Chapter two. Such particulars, however, as the following
- 7:59:17are dubious, viz. Whether all things are to be assigned to a father,
- 7:59:22and he is to be obeyed in all things, or whether the sick
- 7:59:26man ought indeed to obey the physician, and he who votes for the general
- 7:59:30of an army ought to give the preference to a man skilled in warlike concerns.
- 7:59:36And in a similar manner, whether it is proper to be subservient to
- 7:59:40a friend rather than to a worthy man, and whether remuneration is rather to
- 7:59:45be made to a benefactor than to an associate, if it is impossible to
- 7:59:51make it to both. It is not therefore easy to determine all such particulars
- 7:59:56accurately, for they have man and all various differences in magnitude and parvitude,
- 8:00:04in the beautiful and the necessary. But it is not in manifest that not
- 8:00:11all things are to be given to the same person, and that for the
- 8:00:15most part, benefits are rather to be returned to those from whom they were
- 8:00:18received, than gifts are to be bestowed on associates. Just as it is
- 8:00:23more proper to return alone to him from whom it was borrowed than to make
- 8:00:29a present to an associate. Perhaps, however, this must not always be
- 8:00:33done. For if anyone should be made a prisoner by robbers, it may
- 8:00:38be inquired whether he who redeems him should be redeemed in his turn, be
- 8:00:44he who he may, or whether the price of redemption should be given to
- 8:00:48him who demands it as his due, though he has not been taken prisoner,
- 8:00:52or whether, in preference to all these a father ought to be redeemed,
- 8:00:57For it would seem that a man should should rather ransom his father than
- 8:01:02himself. Universally, Therefore, as we have said, a debt ought to
- 8:01:06be paid. But if the donation surpasses in the beautiful or the necessary,
- 8:01:11we should incline to it rather than to the discharge of a debt. For
- 8:01:17sometimes it is not equitable to return a benefit which another person has first conferred,
- 8:01:22when he indeed conferred the benefit, knowing that it was bestowed on a
- 8:01:26worthy man. But the retribution will be made to one whom he who is
- 8:01:32to make it believes to be a depraved man. For neither sometimes is alone
- 8:01:37to be granted to him who has lent for the one. Indeed, i
- 8:01:41e. The depraved man, thinking that he shall receive back what he has
- 8:01:45lent, grants alone to the worthy man, but the other i e.
- 8:01:51The worthy man does not expect that what he has lent will be returned by
- 8:01:56the depraved man, whether therefore the thing thus exist in reality the merit of
- 8:02:02the parties is not equal, or whether it does not thus exist, but
- 8:02:07it is fancied that it does, they will not appear to act absurdly.
- 8:02:11Therefore, as it has frequently been observed, assertions concerning passions and actions are
- 8:02:18similarly definite and certain with the things about which they are conversant. It is
- 8:02:23not therefore it manifest that the same things are not to be bestowed on all
- 8:02:29men, nor all things on a father, as neither are all things to
- 8:02:33be sacrificed to Jupiter. Since, however, different things are to be returned
- 8:02:38to parents, brothers, associates, and benefactors, a retribution is to be
- 8:02:44made to each of such things as are proper and appropriate. And thus indeed
- 8:02:49men appear to act. For they invite their kindred to weddings, since the
- 8:02:55genus of these is common, and therefore the actions also, which are conversant
- 8:03:00with this are common. For the same reason, likewise, they think it
- 8:03:04especially necessary that kindred should be present at funerals. But it would seem that
- 8:03:11it is especially necessary to supply our parents with nutriment, because we are their
- 8:03:15debtors, and it is more beautiful to supply with these things the causes of
- 8:03:21our existence than ourselves. Honor also is to be paid to parents, as
- 8:03:26to the gods. Yet not every honor is to be paid to them,
- 8:03:30For neither is the same honor to be paid to a father and a mother,
- 8:03:34nor again to a wise man, or to the general of an army.
- 8:03:38But to a father paternal and to a mother maternal honor is to be
- 8:03:42paid to every elderly man. Likewise, honor is to be paid according to
- 8:03:48his age, by rising from our seat and resigning it to him, and
- 8:03:52by other things of the like kind to associates again and brothers. Freedom of
- 8:03:59speech must be granted, and a participation in common of all things to kindred,
- 8:04:04also to those of the same tribe, to fellow citizens, and to
- 8:04:10all the rest of mankind. We should endeavor to distribute what is appropriate,
- 8:04:15and judiciously determine what pertains to each according to familiarity and virtue or use.
- 8:04:22A judgment therefore may more easily be made respecting those who are of the same
- 8:04:26genus, But in those of a different genus, the decision is more difficult.
- 8:04:32We must, not, however, on this account, desist, but
- 8:04:34determine as far as circumstances will permit. Chapter three. The dissolution also of
- 8:04:42friendships is attended with a doubt fiz. Whether friendship is to be dissolved with
- 8:04:48those who do not continue to be our friends, or shall we say that
- 8:04:53with those who are friends on account of advantage and delight when they no longer
- 8:04:59possess these It is by no means absurd that the friendship should be dissolved,
- 8:05:03for they were the friends of these things viz. Of things advantageous and delectable,
- 8:05:08and these failing, it is reasonable to suppose that they will no longer
- 8:05:14be attached to each other. He, however, may be justly accused who
- 8:05:18loving another person on account of advantage or delight pretends that he loves on account
- 8:05:23of manners i e. Virtuously, For as we said in the beginning,
- 8:05:30numerous dissensions take place among friends when they are not in reality such friends as
- 8:05:34they fancy they are. When therefore anyone is deceived and apprehends that he is
- 8:05:41beloved on account of his manners, though at the same time he does nothing
- 8:05:45that is virtuous, he should blame himself. But when he is deceived by
- 8:05:51the pretensions of the others, it is just to accuse the deceiver, and
- 8:05:55more so than those who adulterate money, because the improbity pertains to a more
- 8:06:00honorable thing. If, however, he admits him into his friendship as a
- 8:06:04good man, but he becomes a bad man, or should appear to have
- 8:06:08become a bad man, is he still to be beloved? Or is this
- 8:06:14not possible? Since not everything deserves to be beloved, but that only which
- 8:06:19is good. Neither therefore is a bad man to be beloved, nor is
- 8:06:25it necessary that he should, For it is not fit to be a lover
- 8:06:29of what is deprived, nor to be assimilated to a bad man. And
- 8:06:33we have already observed that the similar is a friend to the similar. Is
- 8:06:38the friendship therefore to be immediately dissolved? Or shall we say, not with
- 8:06:44all persons, but with those who are incurable on account of their depravity?
- 8:06:48For assistance ought rather to be given to the manners of those who are capable
- 8:06:52of being corrected, than to their worldly possessions, because this is better and
- 8:06:59more adapted to friends. He, however, who dissolves such a friendship,
- 8:07:03will appear not to act at all absurdly, for he was not a friend
- 8:07:07to this man, or to a man of this description. Hence, as
- 8:07:11he cannot restore him, being thus changed to virtue, he abandons him.
- 8:07:17But if the one indeed continues such as he was at first, and the
- 8:07:21other should become more worthy, so as very much to transcend in virtue,
- 8:07:26is the latter still to use the former as a friend? Or is this
- 8:07:30not possible? This, however, becomes especially evident in a great interval,
- 8:07:36as in the friendships formed from childhood. For if one of these should still
- 8:07:40remain a child in understanding, but the other should be a most excellent man,
- 8:07:45how can they be friends when they are neither addicted to the same pursuits,
- 8:07:48nor delighted and pained with the same things. For neither will these be
- 8:07:53present with them towards each other. But without these they cannot be friends,
- 8:07:59for they cannot live together. Concerning these particulars, however, we have already
- 8:08:03spoken. Shall we say therefore, that when the friendship is dissolved, the
- 8:08:08one ought nevertheless, so to conduct himself towards the other as if he had
- 8:08:12never been his friend, or is it necessary that he should still retain the
- 8:08:17memory of their past friendship. And as we think it is proper to gratify
- 8:08:22friends rather than strangers. Thus also shall we say something must be conceded to
- 8:08:27former friends on account of pristine friendship, when the dissolution of it was not
- 8:08:33occasioned by an excess of depravity. Chapter four. With respect however, to
- 8:08:40friendly offices and those things by which friendships are defined, they seem to proceed
- 8:08:45from the conduct of a man towards himself. For he is defined to be
- 8:08:49a friend who wishes well to another and performs things which are really or apparently
- 8:08:55good for his sake, or who wishes his friend to exist and live for
- 8:08:59his just as mothers are affected towards their children, or friends who for a
- 8:09:04time are offended with each other. Others, however, define a friend to
- 8:09:10be one who lives with another person and who chooses the same things or mutually
- 8:09:14grieves and rejoices with him. But this also especially happens to mothers by some
- 8:09:19one of these particulars. Likewise, they define friendship each of these, however,
- 8:09:25exists in the worthy man towards himself, but they exist in other men
- 8:09:30so far as they apprehend themselves to be worthy. For it seems, as
- 8:09:34we have before observed, that virtue and a worthy man are a measure to
- 8:09:38every one. Since a worthy man accords with himself and aspires after the same
- 8:09:44things with his whole soul i e. With both the rational and irrational part.
- 8:09:49Hence, he wishes for himself both real and apparent good, and acts
- 8:09:55conformably to his wishes. For it is the province of a worthy man to
- 8:10:00a labor in what is good, and this for his own sake. Since
- 8:10:03he labors for the sake of his dionoetic part, which each of us appears
- 8:10:07to be i e. In which our very essence consists, he also wishes
- 8:10:12that he himself may live and be preserved, and especially this part by which
- 8:10:18he is wise. For to a worthy man existence is a good thing.
- 8:10:22Everyone, however, wishes well to himself. But there is no one who,
- 8:10:27if he should become a different person from what he is, would choose,
- 8:10:32having lost his identity, that the person into whom he is changed should
- 8:10:36possess all things. For now, Also God possesses good, but he always
- 8:10:41remains such as he is, whatever that may be. It would seem,
- 8:10:45however, that each of us is that which energizes intellectually, or that each
- 8:10:52of us is principally this. Such a man also wishes to live with himself,
- 8:10:56since he does this willingly, for the remembrance of what he has done
- 8:11:02is delightful to him, and his hopes of what is future are good.
- 8:11:06But such things are delectable. He abounds likewise in his Dionoeitic part with contemplations,
- 8:11:14and he is especially pained and pleased in conjunction with himself, for the
- 8:11:19same thing is always painful and pleasing to him, and not a different thing
- 8:11:23at a different time, Since, as I may say, he is without
- 8:11:27repentance i e. He does nothing of which he has occasion to repent.
- 8:11:33Since therefore each of these things is present with the worthy man towards himself,
- 8:11:38but he is disposed towards his friends in the same manner as towards himself.
- 8:11:42For a friend is another self. This being the case, the friendship also
- 8:11:48of these appears to be something, and those with whom these things are present
- 8:11:52appear to be friends. At present However, we shall omit the consideration whether
- 8:11:57or not there can be friendship between a man and himself. But it would
- 8:12:03seem that there may be friendship between a man and himself when the rational and
- 8:12:07irrational parts are no longer two things, but one thing through their union and
- 8:12:11consent, and also because an excess of friendship resembles the regard which a man
- 8:12:18has for himself. The particulars likewise which we have mentioned are seen to take
- 8:12:22place among the multitude, though they are depraved characters. Shall we say therefore,
- 8:12:29that so far as they are pleasing to themselves and apprehend themselves to be
- 8:12:33worthy, so far they participate of these things. For these things are not
- 8:12:37inherent, nor do they even appear to be inherent in any one of those
- 8:12:41who are very depraved and wicked. And nearly indeed, they are not inherent
- 8:12:47even in those who are merely depraved, for they are discordant with themselves,
- 8:12:52and like the incontinent, they desire one thing but wish another, For they
- 8:12:56choose delectable things which are noxious, instead of those things which appear to them
- 8:13:02to be good. Others, again, through timidity and indolence, abstain from
- 8:13:07doing those things which they think are best for themselves. But those by whom
- 8:13:11many and dreadful deeds are performed, and who are hated on account of their
- 8:13:15depravity, fly from life and destroy themselves. Deprived men likewise search for those
- 8:13:22with whom they may pass their time, but fly from themselves. For they
- 8:13:26recollect when they are alone the many crimes they have committed, and expect the
- 8:13:30evils which are attendant on such wickedness will befall them. But they forget these
- 8:13:36when they are with others, Possessing likewise nothing amiable. They are not affected
- 8:13:41in a friendly manner towards themselves. Persons therefore of this description neither rejoice nor
- 8:13:47condole with themselves. For their soul is in a state of sedition, and
- 8:13:52one part of it indeed is pained on account of depravity when it abstains from
- 8:13:56certain things, but the other part is delighted. And the one part indeed
- 8:14:03draws this, but the other that way the soul, as it were,
- 8:14:07being lacerated by sense and reason. If, however, it is not possible
- 8:14:11for him to be at one and the same time pained and pleased, Yet
- 8:14:15after a short time he is pained that he was pleased, and wishes that
- 8:14:21these delectable things had not befallen him, For bad men are full of repentance.
- 8:14:26The bad man, therefore, does not appear to be disposed in a
- 8:14:29friendly manner, even towards himself, because he possesses nothing amiable. But if
- 8:14:34it is very miserable to be in this condition, everyone should strenuously fly from
- 8:14:38depravity and endeavor to be worthy. For thus a man will be disposed in
- 8:14:44a friendly manner towards himself, and will become the friend of others. Chapter
- 8:14:48five. Benevolence, however, resembles indeed friendship, yet is not friendship,
- 8:14:55for benevolence may be exerted towards unknown persons and latently, but friendship cannot.
- 8:15:02These things therefore have been asserted before. But neither is it dilection, for
- 8:15:07it has not either impulse or appetite, and these are consequent to dilection,
- 8:15:12and dilection indeed subsists in conjunction with custom. But benevolence may be suddenly produced.
- 8:15:19Thus the spectators sometimes becomes suddenly benevolent towards those who contend for prizes at
- 8:15:25public solemnities, and unite with them in their wishes for success, but they
- 8:15:30do not at all co operate with them, for as we have said,
- 8:15:33they become suddenly benevolent towards them and love them superficially. Benevolence therefore appears to
- 8:15:41be the beginning of friendship, just as the pleasure received through the site is
- 8:15:45the beginning of love. For no one loves who has not been previously delighted
- 8:15:51with the form of the beloved object. He, however, who is delighted
- 8:15:55with this form, does not love the more on that account, but his
- 8:15:59life is then more ardent when he longs for the object of his love when
- 8:16:03absent, and desires her presence. This also, it is impossible for men
- 8:16:08to be friends unless they have been first benevolent. But those who are benevolent
- 8:16:14only do not on this account love each other the more, for they only
- 8:16:18wish well to those two whom they are benevolent, but they do not cooperate
- 8:16:22with them in anything, nor do they endure any molestation for their sake.
- 8:16:26Hence, it may be metaphorically said that benevolence is sluggish friendship, but by
- 8:16:33length of time and custom it may become friendship. Yet not that friendship which
- 8:16:37is founded in utility, nor that which is founded in delight. For benevolence
- 8:16:41does not subsist on account of these things. For he indeed, who is
- 8:16:47benefited, distributes benevolence in return for the favors he has received in so doing,
- 8:16:52acting justly. But he who wishes prosperity to the actions of anyone,
- 8:16:56hoping that through him he shall be enriched, does not appear to be benevolent
- 8:17:00to him, but rather to himself, as neither is he a friend if
- 8:17:06he pays attention to him with a view to a certain advantage. In short,
- 8:17:11benevolence is produced through virtue and a certain probity when some one appears beautiful
- 8:17:17or brave or the like to another person, in the same manner as we
- 8:17:21said it was produced towards those who contend for prizes at public solemnities. Chapter
- 8:17:27six. Concord likewise, appears to pertain to friendship, on which account it
- 8:17:33is not an agreement in opinion, For this indeed may exist between those who
- 8:17:37are ignorant of each other. Nor are those said to be concordant who are
- 8:17:41unanimous about anything as about the celestial bodies, for it does not belong to
- 8:17:47friendship to be concordant about these things. But cities are said to be concordant
- 8:17:52when they are unanimous about things which contribute to the general good, and when
- 8:17:56they deliberately choose the same things and do what has been deemed in common fit
- 8:18:02to be done. Men are therefore concordant about practical affairs, and of these
- 8:18:07about such as surpass others in magnitude, and which may befall two persons or
- 8:18:12all men. Thus cities are in concord when it appears to all citizens that
- 8:18:18magistrates should be elected, or that a warlike compact should be formed with the
- 8:18:22Lacedaemonians, or that Pittacus should be the Arkon, because he also is willing
- 8:18:29to accept this office. But when each of the citizens wishes to be himself
- 8:18:33the arkon, as was the case among the Phoenicians, then they are in
- 8:18:38a state of sedition. For concord does not consist in each person forming the
- 8:18:44same conception about a thing, whatever that thing may be. But when they
- 8:18:48agree in wishing the same thing to the same person, as when the people
- 8:18:52and worthy men agree in wishing that the most excellent men may govern. For
- 8:18:56thus all the citizens obtain what they desire. Concord, however, appears to
- 8:19:02be political friendship, as also it is said to be, for it is
- 8:19:06conversant with what is advantageous and with those things which relate to the purposes of
- 8:19:11life. But a concord of this kind exists among worthy men, for these
- 8:19:18are in concord with themselves and with each other, since they are, as
- 8:19:22I may say, conversant with the same things. For the wishes of men
- 8:19:26of this description are permanent and do not undergo a flux and reflux like the
- 8:19:33euripus. For their will is directed two things, just and advantageous, and
- 8:19:37these they desire in common. But bad men cannot be concordant except in a
- 8:19:42small degree, just as they cannot likewise be friends, since they desire in
- 8:19:48things advantageous to have the greater part themselves. But in labors and ministrant services
- 8:19:53they are deficient. Each however, wishing that these things may befall himself,
- 8:19:59he explores how he may prevent others from obtaining that which he desires. For
- 8:20:03concord perishes when justice, which is a common good, is not preserved.
- 8:20:07It happens, therefore, that they are in a state of sedition, compelling
- 8:20:11indeed each other, but being themselves unwilling to do what is just Chapter seven.
- 8:20:19Benefactors, however, appear to love in a greater degree those whom they
- 8:20:23benefit than those who are benefited do their benefactors, and the cause of this
- 8:20:30is investigated as a thing not conformable to reason. To most men, therefore,
- 8:20:34the cause appears to be this, that these are debtors and those the
- 8:20:38persons to whom they are indebted. Hence, as in loans, debtors wish
- 8:20:44their creditors not to be in existence, but creditors are concerned for the safety
- 8:20:48of their debtors. Thus, also benefactors wish those whom they have benefited to
- 8:20:53exist in order that they may obtain a recompense, but those who are benefited
- 8:21:00are not concerned about making a recompense. Epicarmus, therefore, perhaps would say
- 8:21:04that these things are asserted by most men in consequence of looking to the depravity
- 8:21:10of mankind. But to act in this manner seems to be conformable to human
- 8:21:15nature, for the multitude are unmindful of the benefits they have received, and
- 8:21:21are more desirous to be benefited than to benefit. It would seem, however,
- 8:21:26that the cause of this is more natural and does not resemble that which
- 8:21:30pertains to the loan of money. For creditors do not love their debtors,
- 8:21:33but wish them to be preserved for the sake of receiving what they have lent.
- 8:21:37But benefactors love and are fond of those they have benefited, though at
- 8:21:42present they derive no advantage from them, nor are likely to drive any in
- 8:21:47future. And this also happens to be the case with artificers, for every
- 8:21:52artist loves his own work more than he would be beloved by it if it
- 8:21:56should become animated. Perhaps, however, this particularly happens to be the case
- 8:22:02with poets, for they love their own poems beyond measure, and have an
- 8:22:07affection for them as if they were children. Similarly, therefore, to this
- 8:22:11is that which pertains to benefactors, For he who is benefited is their work.
- 8:22:15Hence this person is more dear to them than a work is to him
- 8:22:21by whom it is produced. The cause, however, of this, is
- 8:22:25that existence is to all beings eligible and lovely. But we exist in energy,
- 8:22:32for we exist by living and acting. He therefore, who produces a
- 8:22:36work is in a certain respect in energy in the work. Hence he loves
- 8:22:41the work with a parental affection, because existence also is dear to him.
- 8:22:47But this is natural, for what the agent is in capacity is indicated by
- 8:22:52the work in energy. At the same time, also to the benefactor,
- 8:22:56that which results from the action is beautiful, so that he is delighted with
- 8:23:00him in whom it is inherent. But to him who is benefited, nothing
- 8:23:04is beautiful in the benefactor. But if anything is, it is utility.
- 8:23:10Then this is in a less degree delightful and lovely. The energy, however,
- 8:23:15of present good, is delectable, as is likewise the hope of future
- 8:23:19and the memory of past good. But the good is most delectable, which
- 8:23:23subsists in energy, and in a similar manner that which is lovely to him
- 8:23:30who benefits. Therefore the work remains, for a beautiful deed is lasting,
- 8:23:34but to him who is benefited the advantage passes away. The memory, likewise
- 8:23:40of beautiful deeds is delectable, but the memory of useful actions is not very
- 8:23:45delightful, or is so in a less degree. It appears, however,
- 8:23:49that the contrary takes place with respect to expectation and dilection indeed resembles production.
- 8:23:56But to be beloved is similar to the being passive to love. Therefore,
- 8:24:02and such things as pertained a friendship are consequent to those who excel in action.
- 8:24:07Again, all men love in a greater degree things which are laboriously obtained.
- 8:24:11Thus, for instance, men love the wealth which they have themselves procured,
- 8:24:17more than that which they have received from others. It appears therefore,
- 8:24:21that to be benefited is a thing unattended with labor, but that to benefit
- 8:24:26is laborious. On this account, also, mothers love their children in a
- 8:24:30greater degree than fathers, for the part which they sustain in the generation of
- 8:24:36them is more laborious than that which fathers sustained, and they, in a
- 8:24:40greater degree know that they are their own offspring. But it would seem that
- 8:24:45this reasoning also is adapted to benefactors. Chapter eight. It may, however,
- 8:24:51be doubted whether a man ought to love himself more than some other person,
- 8:24:56For those are reprehended who love themselves trans sendently, and they are called
- 8:25:02as a thing disgraceful lovers of themselves. And a bad man indeed appears to
- 8:25:07do everything for the sake of himself, and in a greater degree the more
- 8:25:12he is deprived. Hence he is accused as doing nothing without a view to
- 8:25:18his own advantage. But the worthy man does everything on account of the beautiful
- 8:25:22in conduct, and he acts in a greater degree in this manner and for
- 8:25:29the sake of his friend, the more worthy he is. But he neglects
- 8:25:33to act for his own sake. The deeds, however, of men,
- 8:25:37are discordant with these assertions, not unreasonably, for they say that he who
- 8:25:44is eminently a friend ought to love his friend in an eminent degree. But
- 8:25:48he is eminently a friend who wishes well to him who is the subject of
- 8:25:53this wish for his sake, though no one should know it. These things,
- 8:25:59however, are especially inherent in a man towards himself, and therefore everything
- 8:26:03else by which a friend is defined. For we have before observed that all
- 8:26:08friendly offices proceed from himself and purveyed to others, And all proverbs accord with
- 8:26:15this, such as that friends are one soul, that among friends all things
- 8:26:21are common, that friendship is equality, and that the knee is near to
- 8:26:26the leg. For all these things are especially present with a man towards himself,
- 8:26:32Since a man is especially a friend to himself, and therefore he is
- 8:26:37especially to be beloved by himself. It may, however, be reasonably doubted
- 8:26:41which of these arguments it is requisite to follow, since both of them are
- 8:26:47accompanied with probability. Perhaps therefore it is necessary to divide such like arguments,
- 8:26:53and to distinguish how far and in what respect each of them is true.
- 8:26:59If therefore we understand in what manner each of these denominates a man a lover
- 8:27:03of himself, perhaps the thing will become manifest. Those therefore, who consider
- 8:27:08this as a disgraceful thing call those men lovers of themselves who distribute to themselves
- 8:27:15the greater part in wealth and honors and corporeal pleasures. For the multitude aspire
- 8:27:22after these things and are earnestly employed in endeavoring to acquire them as being the
- 8:27:27best of things, and on this account they become objects of contention. Hence,
- 8:27:33those who vindicate to themselves more of these things than is fit are subservient
- 8:27:38to desires and in short, to passions and the irrational part of the soul.
- 8:27:44But the multitude are persons of this description. Hence, also the appellation
- 8:27:49was derived from the multitude who are deprived justly. Therefore are those reprehended who
- 8:27:56are in this way lovers of themselves. The multitude, however, are accustomed
- 8:28:02to denominate those who distribute to themselves things of this kind. Lovers of themselves
- 8:28:07is not inmanifest. For he who always earnestly endeavors to act justly or temperately,
- 8:28:14or to act according to any other of the virtues the most of all
- 8:28:18things, and in short, who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful
- 8:28:22in conduct, such a man will never be called by anyone a lover of
- 8:28:26himself, nor will he be blamed by anyone. It would seem, however,
- 8:28:30that such a man as this is in a greater degree a lover of
- 8:28:34himself, For he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good,
- 8:28:41is gratified in his most principal part intellect, and in all things,
- 8:28:47is obedient to it. But as that which is the most principal thing in
- 8:28:51a city appears to be most eminently the city, and this is the case
- 8:28:56in every other system of things, thus also that which is his most principal
- 8:29:00in man is especially the man. He therefore, who loves this principal part
- 8:29:06of himself, is especially a lover of himself, and is gratified with this.
- 8:29:11Hence also one man is denominated continent and another incontinent, because in the
- 8:29:18former intellect has dominion, but has not in the latter. In consequence of
- 8:29:22every man being this i e. Intellect, men likewise appear to have performed
- 8:29:29things, and to have performed them willingly, which they have especially performed in
- 8:29:33conjunction with reason. That every man therefore is principally intellect, and that the
- 8:29:40worthy man principally loves this is not a manifest. Hence he will be especially
- 8:29:45a lover of himself, according to a different species of self love from that
- 8:29:51which is disgraceful, and differing, as much permit as to live according to
- 8:29:56reason differs from living according to passion, and as much as the desire of
- 8:30:00that which is beautiful in conduct differs from the desire of that which appears to
- 8:30:04be advantageous. All men therefore approve of and applaud those who, in a
- 8:30:11manner superior to others, endeavor to perform beautiful actions. But if that which
- 8:30:17is really beautiful in conduct was that for which all men contend, and if
- 8:30:22they endeavored to perform the most beautiful deeds. Whatever is becoming would be possessed
- 8:30:26by all men in common, and the greatest of goods by every one,
- 8:30:30particularly since virtue is a thing of this kind. Hence, it is necessary
- 8:30:36that a good man should be a lover of himself, for he himself is
- 8:30:41benefited by acting well, and he also benefits others. But it is not
- 8:30:45proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself, for he will
- 8:30:49hurt both himself and his neighbors in consequence of being subservient to base passions.
- 8:30:56With the depraved man, therefore there is a dissonance between what he ought to
- 8:31:00do and what he does. But with the worthy man, those things which
- 8:31:06he ought to do he also does. For every intellect chooses that which is
- 8:31:11best for itself, and the worthy man is obedient to intellect. That,
- 8:31:15however, which is asserted of the worthy man, is true, that for
- 8:31:18the sake of his friends and his country, he will do many things,
- 8:31:22even though it should be requisite to die for them, For he will give
- 8:31:26up riches and honors, and in short, those goods which are the objects
- 8:31:30of contention with mankind, in order that he may vindicate to himself that which
- 8:31:37is beautiful in conduct, For he will rather choose to be very much delighted
- 8:31:41for a short time than to experience a small delight for a long time,
- 8:31:45and to live worthily for one year than casually for many years. He will
- 8:31:51also prefer one beautiful and great action to many and small actions. And this
- 8:31:56perhaps happened to be the case with those who have died for their country or
- 8:32:00their friends. Worthy men therefore choose a great good for themselves, and will
- 8:32:07give up their riches in order that they may obtain a greater number of friends.
- 8:32:12For thus indeed, riches befal the friend of the worthy man, But
- 8:32:15that which is really beautiful befalls the worthy man himself. But he distributes to
- 8:32:22himself the greater good. There is also the same mode of conduct with him
- 8:32:25as to honors and dominion, for he will give up all these to his
- 8:32:30friend, for this to him is beautiful and laudable. Reasonably, therefore does
- 8:32:37he appear to be a worthy man who chooses that which is beautiful in conduct
- 8:32:40instead of these things. It may likewise happen that he may give up actions
- 8:32:45to his friends, and that it may be better for him to be the
- 8:32:49cause of their being performed by his friends, than to do them himself.
- 8:32:53Hence, in all audible things, the worthy man appears to distribute to himself
- 8:32:58more of that which is truly beauty after this manner. Therefore, as we
- 8:33:02have said, it is necessary that a man should be a lover of himself,
- 8:33:07but it is not proper he should be so in the way in which
- 8:33:09the multitude love themselves. Chapter nine. With respect to the happy man,
- 8:33:16also it is doubted whether he will be in want of friends or not.
- 8:33:21Ford is said that those who are blessed and sufficient to themselves have no need
- 8:33:25of friends, because things truly good are present with them as they are.
- 8:33:30Therefore, say they sufficient to themselves. They are not in want of anything.
- 8:33:36But a friend, being a man's other self, imparts to him those
- 8:33:38things which he cannot obtain through himself. Whence, also it is said,
- 8:33:44quote, when divinity is propitious, what need is there of friends? Close
- 8:33:50quote. It seems, however, to be absurd, that those who attribute
- 8:33:53every good to the happy man should not give him friends, which appear to
- 8:33:58be the greatest of external goods. But if it is the province of a
- 8:34:01friend rather to benefit than to be benefited. And if it is also the
- 8:34:07province of a good man and the virtue to benefit, and it is better
- 8:34:10to do good to friends than to strangers, the worthy man will want those
- 8:34:15who may be benefited by him. Hence, likewise, it is inquired whether
- 8:34:19there is more need of friends in adversity than in prosperity, because he who
- 8:34:23is unfortunate is in want of those by whom he may be benefited, and
- 8:34:29the fortunate are in want of those whom they may benefit. Perhaps, however,
- 8:34:34it is also absurd to make the blessed man a solitary being, for
- 8:34:37no one would choose to possess every good by himself, since man is a
- 8:34:42social animal and is naturally adapted to live with others. This therefore will also
- 8:34:46be the case with the happy man, for he possesses those things which are
- 8:34:51naturally good. But it is evident that it is better to pass the time
- 8:34:54with friends and worthy men than with strangers and casual persons. Hence the happy
- 8:35:00man has need of friends. In what respect? Therefore, is the first
- 8:35:05assertion true that the happy man is not in want of friends? Is it
- 8:35:09because the multitude think those persons to be friends who are useful to them.
- 8:35:14The blessed man therefore will not be in any want of such persons, since
- 8:35:19real good is present with him. Neither therefore will he be in want of
- 8:35:23those who are friends on account of the delectable, or he will want them
- 8:35:29but for a short time, for since his life is delightful, he will
- 8:35:32be in no want of adventitious pleasure, but not being in want of friends.
- 8:35:37Of this description, he does not appear to be in want of friends.
- 8:35:43This, however, perhaps is not true. For it was observed by
- 8:35:45us in the beginning that felicity is a certain energy. But with respect to
- 8:35:51energy, it is evident that it is in generation or is passing into existence,
- 8:35:57and is not present with him who energizes, like a certain possession.
- 8:36:01But if to be happy consists in living and energizing, and the energy of
- 8:36:07the good man is of itself worthy and delectable, as we observed in the
- 8:36:10beginning, if also that which is appropriate ranks among the number of things that
- 8:36:15are delightful. But we are more able to survey our neighbors than ourselves,
- 8:36:21and their actions than our own. And if the actions of worthy men that
- 8:36:24are friends are delightful to good men bracket, for both have those things which
- 8:36:30are naturally delectable close bracket. If this be the case, the blessed man
- 8:36:36will be in want of such friends as these, since he deliberately chooses to
- 8:36:39survey worthy and appropriate actions. But the actions of a good man who is
- 8:36:45a friend are of this description. It is likewise thought to be necessary that
- 8:36:51the happy man should live delectably. The life therefore of a solitary man is
- 8:36:57indeed difficult, for it is not easy for a man to energize continually by
- 8:37:02himself, but with others, and towards others it is easy. The energy
- 8:37:07therefore will be more continued, which is delectable by itself, which should necessarily
- 8:37:15be present with the blessed man. For the worthy man, so far as
- 8:37:19he is worthy, rejoices in the actions which are conformable to virtue, but
- 8:37:23is indignant with those which proceed from vice. Just as a musician is delighted
- 8:37:29with beautiful melodies, but is pained with those that are bad. A certain
- 8:37:34exercise of virtue likewise will be produced from living with good men, as also
- 8:37:39the oddness says to those, however, who consider this affair more physically,
- 8:37:45it appears that a worthy friend is naturally eligible to a worthy man, for
- 8:37:50it has been said by us that what is naturally good is of itself to
- 8:37:54a worthy man, good and delectable. To live, however, is in
- 8:38:00animals defined by the power of sense, but in men by the power of
- 8:38:04sense or intellection. But power is referred to energy, and that which has
- 8:38:08the principal authority in a thing consists in energy. It seems, therefore,
- 8:38:15that to live is properly either to perceive sensibly or intellectually, And to live
- 8:38:21is among the number of things which are good and delectable, for it is
- 8:38:24a definite thing. But that which is definite pertains to the nature of the
- 8:38:29good, as it also appeared to the Pythagoreans, And that which is naturally
- 8:38:35good is also good to the worthy man. Hence, to live appears to
- 8:38:38all men to be delightful. A depraved and corrupted life, however, not
- 8:38:44not to be assumed nor a life of pain, for such a life is
- 8:38:49indefinite, as well as the things which belong to it. This, however,
- 8:38:52will be more evident in what we shall say concerning pain hereafter. But
- 8:38:58if to live is its self good. It is also delectable, and it
- 8:39:02appears that it is so from this that all men aspire after it, and
- 8:39:07especially worthy and blessed men, For to these life is most eligible, and
- 8:39:13the life of these is most blessed. He, however, who sees,
- 8:39:16perceives that he sees. He who hears perceives that he hears, and he
- 8:39:22who walks perceives that he walks. And in a similar manner in other things,
- 8:39:27there is something which perceives that we energize. But we may perceive that
- 8:39:30we perceive, and we may understand that we understand. For us, however,
- 8:39:37to perceive that we perceive, or to understand that we understand, is
- 8:39:40for us to be For we have said that our very being consists in perceiving,
- 8:39:45sensibly or intellectually. But for a man to perceive that he lives is
- 8:39:51among the number of things essentially delectable. For life is naturally good, and
- 8:39:57for man to perceive that good is present with him is delightful. But to
- 8:40:01live is eligible, and especially to good men, because existence to them is
- 8:40:07good and delecable. For having a cosensation of essential good, they are delighted.
- 8:40:14As however, the worthy man is disposed towards himself. Thus also he
- 8:40:17is disposed towards his friends. For a friend is another self, as therefore
- 8:40:23it is eligible to everyone for himself to exist. Thus also or similarly,
- 8:40:30it is eligible to him for his friend to exist. But we have said
- 8:40:35that existence is eligible because it is for a man to perceive himself, which
- 8:40:39is good, and a sensation of this kind is of itself delightful. It
- 8:40:45is necessary, therefore, that he should at the same time perceive that his
- 8:40:49friend exists. But this will be affected by living together with him and in
- 8:40:53a communication with him of words and thoughts. For it would seem that in
- 8:40:59this way men are said to live together, and not as cattle by feeding
- 8:41:02in the same place. If therefore, existence is of itself eligible to the
- 8:41:08blessed man, since it is naturally good and delectable, the like also must
- 8:41:13be asserted of a friend. And hence a friend will be among the number
- 8:41:16of eligible things to the happy man. But not which is eligible to him
- 8:41:22ought to be present with him, or in this respect he will be indigent.
- 8:41:27The man, therefore, who is to be happy, will require worthy
- 8:41:30friends. Chapter ten. Are numerous friends therefore to be procured or as it
- 8:41:37appears to be elegantly said of hospitality, quote want not nor be of multitudes
- 8:41:45a guest close quote. May it also, in friendship be appropriately said that
- 8:41:51a man should neither be without a friend, nor again should have an excess
- 8:41:54of multitude of friends. This assertion, therefore, will indeed appear to be
- 8:41:59very much such adapted to those who regard utility in friendship, For to be
- 8:42:04alternately subservient to many persons is laborious, and life is not sufficient to them
- 8:42:08to perform this. Hence, more friends than are sufficient for the proper purposes
- 8:42:14of life are superfluous and are impediments to a worthy life. Hence there is
- 8:42:20no need of them. And with respect to the friends that are procured for
- 8:42:23the sake of pleasure, a very few are sufficient in the same manner as
- 8:42:29sauced of food. But whether or not ought a good man to have many
- 8:42:32worthy friends, or shall we say that there is a certain measure of a
- 8:42:37multitude of friends in the same manner as there is of a city. For
- 8:42:40a city will not consist of ten men, nor is it any longer a
- 8:42:45city if it is composed of one hundred thousand men. Perhaps, however,
- 8:42:51one certain number of citizens cannot be assigned, but every number may be admitted,
- 8:42:55which is between certain definite terms of friends. Therefore, or there is
- 8:43:00also a certain definite multitude, And perhaps those persons are not numerous with whom
- 8:43:05it is possible for a man to live, For this appears to be a
- 8:43:08thing of a most friendly nature. But that it is not possible for a
- 8:43:13man to live with many and distribute himself among them is not a manifest.
- 8:43:17Farther still, it is necessary, if the friends are numerous, that they
- 8:43:22should be friends to each other, if all of them intend to pass the
- 8:43:25time with each other. But this among many friends is laborious. It is
- 8:43:30likewise difficult to rejoice and grieve appropriately together with many persons, for it is
- 8:43:35probable that it may, at one and the same time happen that a man
- 8:43:38ought to rejoice together with one person and grieve together with another. Perhaps,
- 8:43:44therefore, it is well not to endeavor to have a great number of friends,
- 8:43:46but as many as are sufficient for the purposes of social life, For
- 8:43:52it would seem that it is not possible to be very much a friend to
- 8:43:54many persons. Hence, neither is it possible to love many love is a
- 8:44:00certain excess of friendship, but this is confined to one person, and therefore
- 8:44:06vehement love must be confined to a few. That this indeed is the case
- 8:44:10seems to be verified by themselves. For there are not many friends according to
- 8:44:15that friendship which subsists among associates. But the friendships which are celebrated are said
- 8:44:22to have subsisted between two persons. Those, however, who are the friends
- 8:44:27of many persons, and are familiarly conversant with all of them, appear to
- 8:44:31be the friends of no one except politically. And these persons are also called
- 8:44:36obsequious. It is possible, therefore, to be politically a friend to many
- 8:44:40persons, though he who is so should happen not to be obsequious, but
- 8:44:45a truly worthy man. But it is not possible to be a friend to
- 8:44:50many on account of virtue and for their own sake. But we must be
- 8:44:54satisfied if we can find a few such i e. Who are true friends.
- 8:45:00Chapter eleven. But whether is there more need of friends in prosperity or
- 8:45:07in adversity? For in both they are sought after. For those who are
- 8:45:12in adversity require assistance, and those who are in prosperity are in want of
- 8:45:15associates and those whom they may benefit, since they wish to confer favors on
- 8:45:21others. In adversity, therefore, friends are more necessary, on which account.
- 8:45:27When this is the case, there is need of useful friends. In
- 8:45:30prosperity. However, friends are a more worthy and beautiful possession, on which
- 8:45:35account, Also, men whose circumstances are prosperous search for worthy friends, for
- 8:45:40it is more eligible to benefit these, and with these to pass through life.
- 8:45:45For the presence itself of friends is delightful, both in prosperity and adversity,
- 8:45:52since the grief of those who are in affliction is lightened when their friends
- 8:45:55participate of their sorrow. Hence, likewise, it may be doubted whether friends
- 8:46:00share a part of the affliction of their friends, as if it were part
- 8:46:05of a burden. Or is this not the case, But the presence of
- 8:46:08friends being delightful, the conception that they participate of the sorrow produces a diminution
- 8:46:15of the grief. Whether therefore those who are in affliction are alleviated through these
- 8:46:20causes or through some other cause, we shall omit to investigate what we have
- 8:46:25mentioned. However, appears to happen, but the presence of friends appears to
- 8:46:30be something mixed. For the sight itself of friends is delectable, and especially
- 8:46:36to those in adverse circumstances, and it becomes a certain auxiliary against affliction.
- 8:46:42For a friend possesses a consoling power, both in his presence and his words
- 8:46:46if he is dexterous, since he knows the manners of his friend and with
- 8:46:52what he is pleased and pained. It is painful, however, to perceive
- 8:46:57that our friend is afflicted by our misfortunes, for every one avoids being the
- 8:47:01cause of pain to his friends. Hence, those who are of a virile
- 8:47:06nature are careful to prevent their friends from being afflicted in conjunction with themselves,
- 8:47:10unless they perceive that by subjecting their friends to a little pain, they shall
- 8:47:15themselves experience an alleviation of great affliction. And in short, they do not
- 8:47:21permit others to lament with them, because they are not themselves addicted to lamentation.
- 8:47:25But women who are weaker than the rest of their sex and men who
- 8:47:30resemble them are delighted with those who groan with them and love them as their
- 8:47:35friends. And the associates of their sorrow. In all things, however,
- 8:47:38it is necessary to imitate the better character. But the presence of friends in
- 8:47:44prosperity is attended with a pleasing association, and with the conception that they are
- 8:47:50delighted with our good fortune. Hence, it would seem to be necessary that
- 8:47:53in prosperity we should readily and cheerfully invite our friends to partake of our good
- 8:47:59forties. For it is beautiful to be beneficent, but that we should be
- 8:48:04remiss in inviting them to partake of our ill fortune. For it is requisite
- 8:48:08to impart to our friends as little as possible of evils. Whence it is
- 8:48:13said quote that I am wretched is sufficient close quote. But friends are then
- 8:48:19especially to be called upon, when having received small molestations, we can be
- 8:48:23greatly benefited by their presence. On the contrary, it is perhaps proper to
- 8:48:29go to those who are in adversity, uncalled and cheerfully, for it is
- 8:48:34the province of a friend to benefit and especially to benefit those who are in
- 8:48:37want and who do not think fit to solicit relief. For this is better
- 8:48:43and more delectable to both With fortunate friends. However, we should cheerfully co
- 8:48:47operate. For in prosperity also there is need of a friend. But we
- 8:48:52should slowly betake ourselves to a friend in order to be benefited by him,
- 8:48:58For it is not beautiful to be readily and cheerfully disposed to be benefited.
- 8:49:02It is, perhaps, however, requisite to be cautious that we do not
- 8:49:07conduct ourselves unpleasantly in rejecting the beneficence of our friends, for this sometimes happens
- 8:49:13to be eligible in all things Chapter twelve. Whether therefore, as to lovers,
- 8:49:20the sight of the beloved object is most delectable, and they prefer this
- 8:49:23sense to the rest, because love especially subsists and is produced from this.
- 8:49:30Thus, also it is most eligible to friends to live together, For friendship
- 8:49:35is communion, and in the same manner as a man is affected towards himself,
- 8:49:39he is also affected towards his friend. But it is eligible to everyone
- 8:49:45to perceive with respect to himself that he exists and lives, and therefore this
- 8:49:51is also eligible with respect to a friend. This energy, however, is
- 8:49:55affected among friends by living together, so that this is reasonable desired by them,
- 8:50:00and that in which to everyone his very being consists. Or for the
- 8:50:06sake of which he chooses to live. In this he wishes to pass his
- 8:50:08life with his friends. Hence, some friends indeed drink together, others play
- 8:50:14at days together, Others engage in gymnastic exercises, and hunt together, or
- 8:50:20philosophize together. But they severally pass their time together in that to which,
- 8:50:24of all things in life they are most attached. For wishing to live with
- 8:50:30their friends, they do these things and communicate with them in these through which
- 8:50:35they are of opinion, they associate together. The friendship therefore of bad men
- 8:50:39is deprived, for being unstable, they communicate with each other in bad things,
- 8:50:45and they become depraved being assimilated to each other. But the friendship of
- 8:50:51worthy men is worthy, and is mutually increased by mutual converse. They also
- 8:50:57appear to become better by energizing with and correcting each other, for they mutually
- 8:51:01express those things with which they are delighted. Whence, it is said,
- 8:51:06quote from good men, what is good is learnt close quote, and thus
- 8:51:10much concerning friendship it remains to discuss in the next place pleasure end of Book
- 8:51:17nine, Book ten, Chapter one. After these things, perhaps it follows
- 8:51:25that we should discuss pleasure, for this appears to be especially familiar and allied
- 8:51:31to our race. Hence those who educate youth regulate them by pleasure and pain
- 8:51:37as by a rudder. But it appears to be a thing of the greatest
- 8:51:43consequence with respect to the virtue of manners, to rejoice in those things in
- 8:51:47which it is proper to rejoice, and to hate those things which it is
- 8:51:52proper to hate, For these things extend through the whole of life, and
- 8:51:55have a preponderation and power towards virtue and a happy life. Since things which
- 8:52:01are delectable are indeed the objects of deliberate choice, but those that are painful
- 8:52:07are avoided. It seems, however, that things of this kind are by
- 8:52:12no means to be passed over in silence, especially since they possess an abundant
- 8:52:16ambiguity. For some indeed say that good itself is pleasure, but others,
- 8:52:22on the contrary, assert that pleasure is a very bad thing, the former
- 8:52:28indeed being perhaps persuaded that it is so, but the latter, thinking that
- 8:52:31it will be more beneficial to our life to evince that pleasure ranks among bad
- 8:52:37things, even though it should not. For the multitude tend to it and
- 8:52:43are subservient too pleasures. Hence, say they, it is necessary to lead
- 8:52:47them to the pursuit of the contrary to pleasure, for thus they may arrive
- 8:52:52at the medium. Perhaps, however, this is not well said, for
- 8:52:57words respecting things which pertain to pass actions and actions are less credible than deeds.
- 8:53:02When therefore they are discordant with the perceptions of sense. Being despised,
- 8:53:08they also subvert the truth. For he who blames pleasure, if he is
- 8:53:14at any time seen to desire, it seems to incline towards it, as
- 8:53:17if every pleasure was of this attractive nature. For to distinguish one pleasure from
- 8:53:22another is not the province of the multitude. Two. Assertions therefore appear not
- 8:53:29only to be most useful with respect to knowledge, but also with respect to
- 8:53:31life, For they are believed when they accord with deeds. Hence they exhort
- 8:53:37those who understand them to live conformably to them. Of things of this kind.
- 8:53:42Therefore, thus much may suffice. Let us now discuss the assertions of
- 8:53:46others concerning pleasure. Chapter two. Eudoxus therefore thought the pleasure was good itself,
- 8:53:55because all animals are seen to desire it. Both such as are rational
- 8:54:00and such as are irrational. But in all things the eligible is good,
- 8:54:06and that which is especially eligible is the best of things. And because all
- 8:54:10things tend to the same thing, it is an indication that the object to
- 8:54:15which they tend is to all things that which is most excellent, For everything
- 8:54:21discovers that which is good to it in the same manner as it discovers nutriment.
- 8:54:25Hence, that which is good to all things, and which all things
- 8:54:30desire, is good itself. These arguments, however, are rendered credible more
- 8:54:36through the virtuous manners of their author than through themselves, For it appears that
- 8:54:40he was a remarkably temperate man. It does not seem, therefore, that
- 8:54:45he made these assertions as the friend of pleasure. But because he believed them
- 8:54:51to be true, it likewise appeared to him to be no less evident that
- 8:54:54pleasure is good itself from the contrary. For pain is of itself avoided by
- 8:55:00all animals, and in a similar manner, the contrary to pain is eligible
- 8:55:05to all animals. But that is especially eligible, which we choose not an
- 8:55:09account of something else, nor for the sake of another thing. It is,
- 8:55:15however, acknowledged that pleasure is a thing of this kind, For no
- 8:55:19one asks another person what the final cause is why he is delighted, as
- 8:55:23if pleasure were a thing eligible of itself, and which renders the good to
- 8:55:28which it is added more eligible, such for instance, as to act justly
- 8:55:32and temperately. The good therefore is itself increased by itself. This argument therefore
- 8:55:39evinces that pleasure ranks among the number of goods, and that it is not
- 8:55:44more good than another good, for every good in conjunction with another good is
- 8:55:50more eligible than when it is alone. Plato also subverts an argument of this
- 8:55:54kind that pleasure is not good itself, for he says that a delighttible life
- 8:56:00in conjunction with wisdom is more eligible than without it. But if the mixed
- 8:56:06life is better than a life of pleasure alone, pleasure will not be good
- 8:56:08itself, for good itself will not become more eligible by anything being added to
- 8:56:14it. It is evident, however, that neither will anything else be good
- 8:56:19itself, which, in conjunction with something which is of itself good, becomes
- 8:56:22more eligible. What therefore is the thing of this kind of which we also
- 8:56:29participate for a thing of this kind is the object of investigation. Those,
- 8:56:35however, who deny that it is good which all beings desire, say nothing
- 8:56:38to the purpose. For we say that the thing which appears to all beings
- 8:56:43to exist does exist. But he who subverts this belief does not assert that
- 8:56:47which is very much more credible. For if they denied that to be good,
- 8:56:52which is desired by beings destitute of intellect, there would be some truth
- 8:56:57in what they say. But if they are also deny that to be good,
- 8:57:00which beings endued with prudence and wisdom desire, how will they say anything
- 8:57:06which can be admitted? Perhaps also even in bad men, there is a
- 8:57:10certain natural good which transcends their depravity, and which aspires after its proper good.
- 8:57:17Neither does that which is asserted of the contrary to pleasure appear to be
- 8:57:22well said, For it does not follow say they that, if pain is
- 8:57:25an evil, pleasure is good, since evil is opposed to evil, and
- 8:57:30both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither. And these things
- 8:57:36indeed are asserted by them not badly. Yet they are not true when applied
- 8:57:39to the present subject. For if both pleasure and pain were bad, it
- 8:57:45would be requisite that both should be avoided. But if neither is bad,
- 8:57:49neither is to be avoided, or each is similarly to be avoided. But
- 8:57:53now, indeed it appears that pain is avoided as an evil, and that
- 8:57:58pleasure is chosen as a good. In this manner, therefore they are opposed
- 8:58:02to each other. Chapter three. Neither does it follow that if pleasure is
- 8:58:07not among the number of qualities, it is not on this account good,
- 8:58:13For neither are the energies of virtue qualities, nor is felicity equality. They
- 8:58:19say therefore that good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite, because it
- 8:58:23receives the more and the less. Hence, if they form this judgment from
- 8:58:28the being delighted, the same thing will also take place in justice and the
- 8:58:32other virtues, in which men evidently assert that there is more and less of
- 8:58:37things of this kind. For some are more just and brave than others.
- 8:58:43It is likewise possible to act justly and to live temperately in a greater and
- 8:58:47less degree. But if they admit this to take place in pleasures, they
- 8:58:52do not seem to have assigned the cause of it. If some pleasures indeed
- 8:58:58are unmingled, but others are maing, what, however, hinders but that,
- 8:59:02in the same manner as health, which is a definite thing, receives
- 8:59:07the more and the less. This also may be the case with pleasure.
- 8:59:12For there is not the same symmetry in all things, nor is there always
- 8:59:16one certain symmetry in the same thing. But suffering our emission, it remains
- 8:59:22for a certain time and differs in the more and the less. A thing
- 8:59:25of this kind therefore may also happen to pleasure. As they likewise admit that
- 8:59:30good itself is perfect, but that motions and generations are imperfect, they endeavor
- 8:59:37to show that pleasure is motion and generation. They do, not, however,
- 8:59:42appear to assert this well, since pleasure is not motion. For to
- 8:59:45all motion, swiftness and slowness appear to be appropriate, and though not per
- 8:59:52se such as to the motion of the world, yet they are appropriate with
- 8:59:55reference to another motion. But neither of these. It is inherent in pleasure.
- 9:00:00For it is possible, indeed, to be rapidly delighted in the same
- 9:00:05manner as it is possible to be swiftly enraged. But it is not possible
- 9:00:09for the delight itself to be swift or slow, not even with reference to
- 9:00:14something else. It is possible, however, that walking and argumentation may be
- 9:00:20swift or slow, and everything else of the like kind. Hence, it
- 9:00:24is possible to be changed quickly and slowly into pleasure. But it is not
- 9:00:30possible to energize swiftly according to it viz. To be delighted swiftly according to
- 9:00:35it. And in what manner will pleasure be generation? For it appears that
- 9:00:40not any casual thing is generated from any casual thing, but that a thing
- 9:00:45is dissolved into that from which it was generated, and that of which pleasure
- 9:00:50is the generation of this pain is the corruption. They also say that pain
- 9:00:55is the indigence of that which is according to nature, but that pleasure is
- 9:01:00the complete fullness of it. But these are corporeal passions. If therefore pleasure
- 9:01:07is the complete fulness of that which subsists according to nature, that in which
- 9:01:12this fullness takes place will also be delighted. Hence the body will be delighted.
- 9:01:16But it does not appear that this is the case. Pleasure therefore is
- 9:01:22not complete fullness, but complete fullness indeed taking place. Some one may be
- 9:01:28delighted, And when cut, he may be pained. This opinion, however,
- 9:01:31appears to have originated from the pleasures and pains pertaining to food. For
- 9:01:37when we are in want of nutriment, and have been previously pained in consequence
- 9:01:42of this want, we are delighted with being completely filled. This, however,
- 9:01:45does not happen to be the case in all pleasures, For mathematical pleasures
- 9:01:51are unattended with pain, and also those sensible pleasures which subsist through the smell
- 9:01:57and hearing and the sight many recks. Collections, also, and hopes are
- 9:02:01unattended with pain. Of what therefore, will these be the generations? For
- 9:02:07in these there have been no previous indigence of anything of which these may be
- 9:02:12the complete fullness. But to those who adduce disgraceful pleasures. In confirmation of
- 9:02:17this opinion, it may be said that these are not simply delectable. For
- 9:02:22it must not be admitted that if these are delightful to those who are badly
- 9:02:25disposed, they are also simply delectable, but that they are so to these
- 9:02:30only, as neither are those things simply salubrious, or sweet or bitter,
- 9:02:37which appear to be so to those who are diseased. Nor again, are
- 9:02:40those things white which appear to be so to those whose eyes are dimmed with
- 9:02:45rooum. It may likewise be said in reply that pleasures are indeed eligible,
- 9:02:52yet not from these things, just as to be rich is eligible, yet
- 9:02:55not by treachery, and to be well is eligible, yet not by eating
- 9:03:00any kind of food. Or it may be said that pleasures are specifically different,
- 9:03:06for those pleasures which are produced by worthy are different from those which are
- 9:03:09produced by base pursuits. And it is not possible for anyone to be delighted
- 9:03:15with the pleasure of a just man who is not just, or with the
- 9:03:17pleasure of a musician who is not a lover of music. And in a
- 9:03:22similar manner in other things, a friend, also, who is a different
- 9:03:27person from a flatterer, appears to evince that pleasure is not good, or
- 9:03:30that pleasures are specifically different. For it seems that the association of a friend
- 9:03:37is with a view to good, but of a flatterer with a view to
- 9:03:39pleasure, And the one is reprobated, but the other is praised, in
- 9:03:45consequence of their associations being directed to different ends. Besides, no one would
- 9:03:51choose to live, possessing a puerile understanding through the whole of life, and
- 9:03:55being delighted as much as possible with those things which are the objects of puerile
- 9:04:00delight. Nor would anyone choose so to rejoice in doing something most base,
- 9:04:07as never to be grieved for having done it. We likewise earnestly apply ourselves
- 9:04:12to many things, though they should procure us no pleasure, such as to
- 9:04:15see, to recollect, to know, and to possess the virtues. But
- 9:04:21it makes no difference if pleasure follows these things from necessity, for we should
- 9:04:25choose these, though no pleasure should be produced from them. That pleasure therefore
- 9:04:31is not good itself, and that all pleasure is not eligible, appears to
- 9:04:36be evident, as likewise, that some pleasures are eligible of themselves, but
- 9:04:40differ in species or in the things from which they are produced. And thus
- 9:04:45much may suffice with respect to what is asserted by others concerning pleasure and pain.
- 9:04:52Chapter four. What pleasure, however, is, or what kind of
- 9:04:58thing it is, will become more evident by resuming the consideration of it from
- 9:05:02the beginning. For the sight indeed seems to be perfect at any time,
- 9:05:07since it is not indigent of anything which, taking place afterwards will give perfection
- 9:05:14to its form. But pleasure seems to resemble a thing of this kind,
- 9:05:19for it is a certain whole. Nor can a pleasure be assumed at any
- 9:05:22time, the form of which would be perfected by the accession of a longer
- 9:05:27time. Hence, neither is it motion. For all motion is in time
- 9:05:31and is referred to a certain end. Thus, for instance, the motion
- 9:05:37which exists in building a temple is perfect when it affects that which it desires
- 9:05:40to accomplish. It is perfect therefore, either in the whole of the time
- 9:05:45or in this time. But in the parts of the time, all the
- 9:05:50motions are imperfect, and are specifically different from the whole motion and from each
- 9:05:55other. For the composition of the stones is different from the erection of the
- 9:06:00pillar at right angles, and these motions are different from the fabrication of the
- 9:06:05temple. And the motion indeed employed in building the temple is perfect, for
- 9:06:09it is in want of nothing to the proposed end. But the motion employed
- 9:06:14in laying the foundation and the roof is imperfect, for each pertains to a
- 9:06:17part. The motions therefore are specifically different, and it is not possible to
- 9:06:23assume a motion perfect in its species in any time except the whole time.
- 9:06:30The like also takes place in walking and other motions. For if lation is
- 9:06:35a motion from one place to another, the specific differences of this motion are
- 9:06:39flying, walking, leaping, and the like. And not only so,
- 9:06:45but in walking itself there is a difference. For the motion from one place
- 9:06:49to another in walking is not the same in the stadium and a part of
- 9:06:52the stadium, and in the different parts of it. Nor is the mutation
- 9:06:58of place the same in pass through this line and that viz. In passing
- 9:07:02through a curve and a straight line. For not only a line is passed
- 9:07:07through, but a line existing in place, and this line is in a
- 9:07:12different place from that. We have therefore accurately discussed motion elsewhere i e.
- 9:07:17In the Fifth Book of the Physics. Hence, it appears that motion is
- 9:07:22not perfect in every time, but that the multitude of motions are imperfect and
- 9:07:28specifically different, since they are formalized by proceeding from one place to another.
- 9:07:32The form, however, of pleasure, is perfect in any time. It
- 9:07:37is evident therefore, that motion and pleasure are different from each other, and
- 9:07:42that pleasure is something whole and perfect. This would also seem to be evident
- 9:07:47from the impossibility of being moved except in time, but the possibility of being
- 9:07:52delighted without time, i e. In an instant, For that which is
- 9:07:57affected in the now or an instant is a certain whole. From these things.
- 9:08:01However, it is manifest that it is not well said that pleasure is
- 9:08:06motion or generation. For motion and generation are not predicated of all things,
- 9:08:12but of those only which may be distributed into parts, and are not holes.
- 9:08:16For there is not generation of sight, nor of a point, nor
- 9:08:22of the monad. Nor is there either motion or generation of these. Neither
- 9:08:28therefore is there of pleasure, for it is a certain whole. Hence,
- 9:08:32from what has been said, it is evident that a certain pleasure is conjoined
- 9:08:37with every sense in energy, which energizes without being impeded. But the energy
- 9:08:43of the sense is perfect, which is well disposed towards the most beautiful of
- 9:08:46the objects that fall under the sense, for perfect energy appears to be especially
- 9:08:52a thing of this kind. It is, however, of no consequence whether
- 9:08:55it is said that the sense itself energizes or in which it exists, But
- 9:09:01in everything the energy is the most excellent of that which is disposed in the
- 9:09:06best manner towards the most excellent of the things which are subject to it.
- 9:09:10But this energy will be most perfect and most delightful. For there is pleasure
- 9:09:16according to every sense, and in a similar manner, according to every discoursive
- 9:09:21energy of the soul and every contemplation. But the most perfect energy is the
- 9:09:27most delectable, and that is the most perfect, which is the energy of
- 9:09:31that which is well disposed towards the best of the things subject to it.
- 9:09:36Pleasure, however, perfects energy. But pleasure does not perfect energy after the
- 9:09:40same manner as the object of sense perfect sense, when both are in good
- 9:09:45condition, just as neither are health, and a physician similarly the cause of
- 9:09:51being made well. It is evident, however, that pleasure is produced according
- 9:09:55to each of the senses. For we see that things which are seen and
- 9:10:00things which are heard are delectable, and it is also evident that they are
- 9:10:05especially delectable when the sense is most excellent and energizes about the most excellent object.
- 9:10:12But where the sensible object and that which perceives it are things of this
- 9:10:16kind, there will always be pleasure. The agent and patient being present.
- 9:10:22Pleasure, however, perfects energy, not as an inherent habit, but as
- 9:10:28a certain supervening end, such as the flower of age in those who are
- 9:10:32in their acme. As long, however, as that which is sensible or
- 9:10:37intelligible is such as it ought to be, and also that which judges or
- 9:10:43contemplates, pleasure will be in energy. For when that which is passive and
- 9:10:50that which is active are similar in subsisting after the same manner with reference to
- 9:10:53each other, the same thing is naturally adapted to be produced. How therefore,
- 9:11:00or does it happen that no one is continually delighted? Is it because
- 9:11:04he becomes at length weary? For all human concerns are incapable of energizing continually.
- 9:11:10Neither therefore, can pleasure be generated in an uninterrupted continuity, for it
- 9:11:15is consequent to energy. Some things, however, delight when they are new,
- 9:11:22but afterwards, for this reason, because pleasure cannot be generated incessantly,
- 9:11:27do not similarly delight. For at first, indeed, the discoursive power of
- 9:11:32the soul inclines towards and intently energizes about these in the same manner as those
- 9:11:37who look intently at anything. Afterwards, however, an energy of this kind
- 9:11:44is no longer produced, but it becomes remiss. Hence the pleasure also is
- 9:11:49obscured. It may, however, be thought that all men aspire after pleasure,
- 9:11:53because all of them desire to live. But life is a certain energy,
- 9:11:58and everyone energy about and in those things which he especially loves. Thus,
- 9:12:04for instance, the musician energizes with the hearing about the melodies, but
- 9:12:08the lover of disciplines energizes with the discoursive power of his soul about theorems,
- 9:12:15and in a similar manner, the lover of other pursuits. But pleasure perfects
- 9:12:21energies, and it likewise perfects life, which is the object of desire.
- 9:12:27Reasonably, therefore, do all men aspire after pleasure, for it gives perfection
- 9:12:31to the life of each, which is an eligible thing. We shall,
- 9:12:36however, omit for the present to consider whether we choose to live on account
- 9:12:40of pleasure, or choose pleasure for the sake of living, For these things
- 9:12:45appear to be conjoined, and do not admit of being separated. For pleasure
- 9:12:50is not produced without energy, and pleasure gives perfection to every energy. Chapter
- 9:12:55five. Hence, Also, pleasures of appear to be specifically different. For
- 9:13:02we are of opinion that things specifically different are perfected through perfections specifically different.
- 9:13:09For this appears to be the case both with natural and artificial productions, as
- 9:13:15for instance, with animals and trees, pictures and statues, houses and furniture
- 9:13:22in a similar manner. Therefore, we are of opinion that energies specifically different
- 9:13:27are perfected by things that differ in species. But the energies of the discourse
- 9:13:31of powers of reason differ from the energies of the senses, and these are
- 9:13:37specifically different from each other. Hence, also the pleasures which give perfection to
- 9:13:43these are specifically different. This, however, will also become apparent from hints
- 9:13:47that each of the pleasures is intimately familiarized with the energy which it perfects.
- 9:13:53For appropriate pleasures co increase energy, since those who energize incann junction with pleasure
- 9:14:00energize about everything more accurately and with more exquisite judgment. Thus, for instance,
- 9:14:07those become more excellent geometricians who are delighted to geometrize, and they understand
- 9:14:14in a greater degree everything geometrical. The like also takes place with the lovers
- 9:14:19of music, the lovers of architecture, and the lovers of the other arts.
- 9:14:23For each of these makes a proficiency in his proper employment if he delights
- 9:14:29in it. Pleasures therefore co increase energies. But things which co increase are
- 9:14:35appropriate, and to things which are specifically different, the things, also which
- 9:14:39are appropriate, are specifically different. Again, this will in a greater degree
- 9:14:45become apparent from considering that pleasures which are produced from different things are an impediment
- 9:14:51to energies. For the lovers of the flute cannot attend to discourse if they
- 9:14:55hear anyone playing on the flute in consequence of being more delighted with the melody
- 9:15:00of the flute then with the present energy i e. Then with what is
- 9:15:06said. The pleasure therefore, which is produced by the melody of the flute
- 9:15:09corrupts the energy of discourse. And in a similar manner, this also happens
- 9:15:15in other things when a man energizes at one and the same time about two
- 9:15:20things, for the more delectable energy expels the other. And this in a
- 9:15:24still greater degree, if it very much surpasses in pleasure, so as to
- 9:15:30render it impossible to energize according to the other energy. Hence, when we
- 9:15:35are very much delighted with anything, we do not in any great degree perform
- 9:15:39anything else. But when we are only moderately pleased with certain things, we
- 9:15:45can do others. Thus, those who in the theaters eat sweetmeats are especially
- 9:15:50accustomed to do this when the performers act badly. Since, however, appropriate
- 9:15:55pleasure gives accuracy to energies and renders them more lasting and better, but foreign
- 9:16:00pleasures corrupt them. It is evident that these pleasures differ very much from each
- 9:16:06other. For nearly foreign pleasures affect the same thing as appropriate pains, i
- 9:16:12e. As the pains which are consequent to certain energies. Thus, if
- 9:16:15it is unpleasant and painful to anyone to write, or to any one to
- 9:16:21reason, the former indeed will not write, and the latter will not reason,
- 9:16:25in consequence of the energy being painful from appropriate pleasures and pains. Therefore,
- 9:16:30that which is contrary happens about energies. But those pleasures and pains are
- 9:16:36appropriate, which are essentially consequent to energy. And with respect to foreign pleasures,
- 9:16:42we have already observed that they affect something similar to pain, for they
- 9:16:46corrupt, though not in a similar manner, Since, however, energies differ
- 9:16:52in probity and depravity, and some of them indeed being eligible, but others
- 9:16:57to be avoided, and others being neither. Pleasures also have a similar mode
- 9:17:00of subsistence, For there is an appropriate pleasure in every energy. The pleasure,
- 9:17:07therefore, which is appropriate to a worthy energy is worthy, but that
- 9:17:12which is appropriate to a bad energy is deprived. For the desires, indeed,
- 9:17:15of things truly beautiful are laudable, but of base things are blameable.
- 9:17:22The pleasures, however, which are in energies, are more appropriate to the
- 9:17:25energies than desires are. For desires, indeed, are separated from energies by
- 9:17:31time and by nature. But pleasures are approximate to energies, and are so
- 9:17:37indistinct from them as to render it dubious whether energy is the same with pleasure.
- 9:17:43It does not appear, however, that pleasure is either the discursive energy
- 9:17:46of reason or sense, for it would be absurd to suppose that it is,
- 9:17:52though on account of the inseparability of pleasure from energy, it seems to
- 9:17:57certain persons to be the same with it. Therefore, energies are different,
- 9:18:00so likewise pleasures. But the sight differs from the touch in purity, and
- 9:18:07the hearing, and the smell from the taste. Hence, the pleasures also
- 9:18:10of these senses similarly differ, And those which pertain to the discourse of energy
- 9:18:15of reason likewise differ, And both these differ from each other. It seems,
- 9:18:21however, that there is an appropriate pleasure to every animal, just as
- 9:18:24there also is an appropriate work. For this pleasure is that which subsists according
- 9:18:30to energy, And this will be apparent from a survey of each particular.
- 9:18:35For there is one pleasure of a horse, another of a dog, and
- 9:18:37another of a man. And as Heraclitis says, an ass would prefer straw
- 9:18:43to gold, because food is more delectable to asses than gold. The pleasures,
- 9:18:47therefore, of animals specifically different, are likewise specifically different. But it
- 9:18:52is reasonable to suppose that the pleasures of the same animals are without a specific
- 9:18:58difference. There is no small variety, however, in pleasures among men,
- 9:19:02For the same things are painful to some and pleasing to others. And to
- 9:19:07some, indeed they are painful and odious, but to others delectable and lovely.
- 9:19:13This likewise happens to be the case in sweet things. For the same
- 9:19:16things do not appear sweet to a man in a fever and to one who
- 9:19:21is well, Nor does the same thing appear to be hot to him who
- 9:19:23is weak and to him who is of a good habit of body. And
- 9:19:28in a similar manner, this happens to be the case in other things.
- 9:19:31In all such things as these, however, that is simply delectable, which
- 9:19:36appears to be so to the worthy man. But if this is well said,
- 9:19:39as it appears that it is, and virtue is the measure of everything,
- 9:19:44and a good man, so far as he is good, those things
- 9:19:46will be pleasures which appear to be so to the good man, and those
- 9:19:50things will be delectable in which he rejoices. It is, however, by
- 9:19:54no means wonderful, if things which appear to him to be of a troublesome
- 9:19:59nature should, to another person of a different character appear to be delectable.
- 9:20:04For many corruptions and noxious circumstances happen to men, But these are not simply
- 9:20:09delectable except to these persons and to those who are thus disposed. With respect
- 9:20:15therefore, to those pleasures which are acknowledged to be base. It is evident
- 9:20:20that they are not to be called pleasures except by corrupt men. But with
- 9:20:24respect to those pleasures which appear to be worthy, what is the quality of
- 9:20:28the pleasure? Or what shall we say the pleasure is which is proper to
- 9:20:31men? Or shall we say that this is evident from energies? For pleasures
- 9:20:37are consequent to these, Whether therefore there is one energy, or whether there
- 9:20:42are many energies of the perfect and blessed man. The pleasures which give perfection
- 9:20:46to these may be properly called the pleasures of man. But the remaining pleasures,
- 9:20:51in the same manner as the energies, may be denominated the pleasures of
- 9:20:54man, secondarily and multifariously. Six. Having therefore spoken concerning the virtues and
- 9:21:04friendships and pleasures, it remains that we should delineate felicity, since we admit
- 9:21:10that it is the end of human concerns. Hence, by recapitulating what we
- 9:21:15have before said, the discussion will be more concise. We have said then
- 9:21:21that felicity is not a habit, for if it were, it might be
- 9:21:23present with him who passes the whole of his life in sleep, living the
- 9:21:28life of a plant, and also with him who is involved in the greatest
- 9:21:31calamities. If therefore, these things cannot be admitted, but felicity must rather
- 9:21:37be referred to a certain energy, as we have before observed. But of
- 9:21:42energies, some are necessary and eligible on account of other things, and others
- 9:21:46are eligible of themselves. If this be the case, it is evident that
- 9:21:52felicity must be admitted to be some one of the energies which are of themselves
- 9:21:55eligible, and not one of those which are eligible on account to something else.
- 9:22:00For felicity is not indigent of anything, but is sufficient to itself.
- 9:22:06But those energies are eligible of themselves, from which nothing except the energy is
- 9:22:12the object of investigation. But the actions which are conformable to virtue appear to
- 9:22:17be things of this kind. For to perform beautiful and worthy deeds is among
- 9:22:22the number of things which are of themselves eligible, and among diversions. This
- 9:22:28is also the case with those that are delectable, since they are not chosen
- 9:22:31on account of other things. For those who are addicted to them are rather
- 9:22:36injured than benefited in consequence of neglecting their bodies and possessions. Many of those,
- 9:22:42however, who are said to be happy men, fly to diversions,
- 9:22:45on which account, those who are versatile in such like methods of spending their
- 9:22:49time are esteemed by tyrants, for they render themselves pleasing in those things which
- 9:22:53they desire, and they are in want of persons of this description. These
- 9:22:59things therefore appear to pertain to felicity, because men in authority and power are
- 9:23:05at leisure for these Perhaps, However, persons of this description are no indication
- 9:23:09that these things pertain to felicity, for neither virtue nor intellect, from which
- 9:23:15worthy energies proceed, consist in dominion and power. Nor if these men,
- 9:23:21not having tasted of genuine and liberal pleasure, fly to corporeal pleasures. Must
- 9:23:25it be supposed that on this account these pleasures are more eligible. For children
- 9:23:30also fancy that things which are honored by them are the best of things.
- 9:23:36It is reasonable therefore to admit that as different things appear to be honorable to
- 9:23:39children and men, so likewise to bad and worthy men. Hence, as
- 9:23:45we have frequently said, those things are honorable and delectable, which are so
- 9:23:50to the worthy man. But the energy to every one is most eligible,
- 9:23:54which is according to an appropriate habit, and to the worthy man, the
- 9:23:59energy is most eligible, which is according to virtue. Felicity therefore does not
- 9:24:04consist in diversions, for it is absurd to admit that diversion is the end
- 9:24:08i e. The chief good of man, and that the whole of life
- 9:24:13is to be busily employed and molestations endured for the sake of indulging in sports,
- 9:24:19since as I may say, we choose all things for the sake of
- 9:24:22something else, except felicity, for this is the end. But to act
- 9:24:27seriously and to labor for the sake of diversion appears to be foolish and very
- 9:24:31puerile. He, however, who engages in sports in order that he may
- 9:24:37act seriously, which Anacharsis thought was proper, appears to be right. For
- 9:24:42diversion resembles repose. But as men are incapable of laboring incessantly, they require
- 9:24:49relaxation. Relaxation, however, is not an end, for it subsists for
- 9:24:53the sake of energy. But a happy life appears to be conformable to virtue,
- 9:24:59and this is is a worthy life, and does not consist in amusements.
- 9:25:02We likewise see that serious pursuits are better than those that are ridiculous and
- 9:25:07accompanied with jesting in sport, and that the energy of the better part and
- 9:25:12the better man, is always more worthy. But the energy of that which
- 9:25:15is better is more excellent and more adapted to felicity. Any casual person also,
- 9:25:22and a slave may enjoy corporeal pleasures no less than the best of men.
- 9:25:27No one, however, would ascribe felicity to a slave, unless they
- 9:25:30also ascribe to him a worthy life. For felicity does not consist in sports,
- 9:25:35in corporeal pleasures, but in the energies according to virtue, as we
- 9:25:39have before observed Chapter seven. If, however, felicity is an energy according
- 9:25:46to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is an energy according to
- 9:25:51the most excellent virtue, And this will be the virtue of the most excellent
- 9:25:55part or power, Whether therefore this be the intellect or something else which appears
- 9:26:01to rule and be the leader by nature and to have a conception of things
- 9:26:06beautiful and divine, or whether it is itself divine or the most divine of
- 9:26:09all our parts. The energy of this, according to its proper virtue,
- 9:26:15will be perfect felicity. But we have said that this energy is contemplative,
- 9:26:20and this appears to accord with what we before asserted, and also with truth.
- 9:26:24For this energy is the most excellent, since intellect is the best of
- 9:26:30all our parts, and of objects of knowledge, those are the most excellent
- 9:26:35about which intellect is conversant. This energy also is most continued, for we
- 9:26:40are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform any action whatever. We likewise
- 9:26:46think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity. But the energy, according
- 9:26:52to wisdom, is acknowledged to be the most delectable of all the energies according
- 9:26:57to virtue. Wisdom therefore appears to pass pleasures, admirable both for their purity
- 9:27:01and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those who possess knowledge live
- 9:27:07more pleasantly than those who investigate. That too, which is called self sufficiency,
- 9:27:13will especially subsist about the contemplative energy. For of the necessaries of life,
- 9:27:20the wise and the just man, and the rest of those who possess
- 9:27:22the moral virtues are in want. But even when they are sufficiently supplied with
- 9:27:28these, the just man is in want of those towards whom, and together
- 9:27:31with whom he may act justly and in like manner, the temperance and the
- 9:27:37brave man, and each of the rest. But the wise man, when
- 9:27:40alone, is able to contemplate, and by how much the wiser he is,
- 9:27:45by so much the more does he possess this ability. Perhaps indeed,
- 9:27:49he will contemplate better when he has others to cooperate with him. But at
- 9:27:52the same time he is most sufficient to himself. This energy alone, likewise,
- 9:27:58will appear to be beloved for its own sake, for nothing else is
- 9:28:01produced from it besides contemplation. But from things of a practical nature we obtain
- 9:28:07something more or less besides the action itself. Felicity also appears to consist in
- 9:28:13leisure, for we engage in business that we may be at leisure, and
- 9:28:16we wage more that we may live in peace. The energies, therefore,
- 9:28:21of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions. But the
- 9:28:27actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment. This indeed
- 9:28:32is perfectly the case with military transactions, for no one chooses to wage war
- 9:28:37or prepare for it for the sake of waging war, since he would appear
- 9:28:42to be perfectly a homicide, who should make enemies of his friends for the
- 9:28:46sake of fighting and slaughter. The energy, too, of the politician,
- 9:28:51is of a busy nature, and besides the management of public affairs, is
- 9:28:55employed in procuring dominion and honor, or a felicity for himself and the citizens,
- 9:29:00different from the political energy, which also as something different, we evidently
- 9:29:07investigate if therefore political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous
- 9:29:15actions. But these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain end,
- 9:29:20and are not eligible for their own sakes. But the energy of intellect,
- 9:29:23which is contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor, and to
- 9:29:29desire no other and besides itself, if also it possesses a proper pleasure,
- 9:29:36which increases its energy, and has in addition to this self sufficiency, leisure
- 9:29:42and unwearied power, so far as the condition of human nature will permit with
- 9:29:46whatever else is attributed to the blessed and appears to subsist according to this energy.
- 9:29:52If such be the case, this will be the perfect felicity of man,
- 9:29:57when it receives a perfect length of life for nothing belonging to felicity is
- 9:30:02imperfect. Such a life, however, will be more excellent than that which
- 9:30:07is merely human. For man will not thus live so far as he is
- 9:30:10man, but so far as he contains in himself something divine. And as
- 9:30:15much as this part excels the composite, so much does its energy surpass the
- 9:30:21energy belonging to every other virtue. If therefore intellect is divine with respect to
- 9:30:27man, the life, also, according to intellect, will be divine with
- 9:30:30respect to human life. Nor ought we, according to the exhortation of certain
- 9:30:36persons, to be wise in human affairs since we are men, nor to
- 9:30:40regard mortal concerns since we are mortal. But as much as possible, we
- 9:30:45should immortalize ourselves and do everything in order to live according to our most excellent
- 9:30:51part. For this part, though it is small in bulk, far excels
- 9:30:54all things in power and dignity. It would seem also that each of us
- 9:31:00is this part. Since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent. It
- 9:31:05would therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life, but
- 9:31:08the life of something else. That too, which was before asserted, accords
- 9:31:14with what is now said, for that which is intimately allied to any nature
- 9:31:19is most excellent and pleasant to that nature. And hence a life according to
- 9:31:22intellect will be most excellent and pleasant to man. Since this part is most
- 9:31:28eminently man. This life therefore is also most happy Chapter eight. But that
- 9:31:36felicity ranks in the second place, which subsists according to another virtue. For
- 9:31:40the energies, according to this virtue are human, for we act justly and
- 9:31:45bravely, and perform other things conformable to the virtues towards each other, in
- 9:31:52contracts, in necessaries, in all various actions, and in the passions,
- 9:31:58preserving to every one that which is fit and decorous. All these things,
- 9:32:02however, appear to be human. Some things likewise appear to happen from the
- 9:32:07body, And the virtue of manners is in many instances conjoined and rendered familiar
- 9:32:14with the passions. Prudence also is conjoined with the virtue of manners, and
- 9:32:20the virtue of manners with prudence, since the principles, indeed of prudence subsist
- 9:32:24according to the ethical virtues, and the rectitude of the ethical virtues subsists according
- 9:32:30to prudence. These, however, are connected with the passions and will subsist
- 9:32:35about the composite, or that which consists of soul and body. But the
- 9:32:39virtues of the composite are human. The life, therefore, and the felicity
- 9:32:45conformable to them, will also be human. The felicity, however, of
- 9:32:49intellect, is separate. For thus much may be asserted concerning it, since
- 9:32:52to discuss it accurately is a greater undertaking, then is adapted to the present
- 9:32:58treaties. It would also seem that this felicity requires but little of external supply,
- 9:33:05or less than ethical felicity. For let it be admitted that both require
- 9:33:09necessaries, and this equally bracket. Though the political character labors in a greater
- 9:33:15degree about the body in things of this kind close bracket. Since this is
- 9:33:20but of small consequence, Yet it makes a great difference with respect to energies.
- 9:33:25For the liberal man will be in want of wealth in order to perform
- 9:33:29liberal deeds, and also the just man in order to make retributions, for
- 9:33:34the wills of men are in manifest, and those who are not just pretend
- 9:33:37they wish to act justly. But the brave man will be in want of
- 9:33:40power in order to effect something conformable to the virtue of fortitude, and the
- 9:33:45temperate man will be in want of the means of acting temperately. For how
- 9:33:50will this man, or he who possesses any one of the other virtues become
- 9:33:53manifest. It becomes, however, an object of inquiry, whether deliberate choice
- 9:33:59is as as greater authority in virtue, or whether it is possessed by actions
- 9:34:04virtues subsisting in both these. It is evident therefore that the perfect will be
- 9:34:09in both. But many things are requisite to the perfection of actions, and
- 9:34:15in proportion as they are greater and more beautiful, a greater number of things
- 9:34:19are necessary to him. However, who energizes according to theoretic virtue, there
- 9:34:24is no need of things of this kind so far as pertains to this energy.
- 9:34:29But as I may say, they are impediments to his contemplation. Yet,
- 9:34:32so far as he is a man and lives with many others, he
- 9:34:37also chooses to perform actions conformable to virtue. He will therefore require external things
- 9:34:43in order that he may act like a man. But that perfect felicity is
- 9:34:47a certain contemplative energy may become apparent from hints that we consider the gods to
- 9:34:52be especially blessed and happy. What kind of actions, however, is it
- 9:34:57fit to ascribe to them? Shall we say just actions? Or will they
- 9:35:01not appear ridiculous? If they form contracts and return deposits, and do other
- 9:35:07things of the like kind. Shall we say then, that they are brave,
- 9:35:10sustaining things of a terrible nature and encountering dangers because it is beautiful so
- 9:35:15to do, or that they are liberal. But to whom will they give?
- 9:35:20It would, however, be absurd to suppose that there is money with
- 9:35:23them, or anything of this kind. And if they are temperate, what
- 9:35:28will this temperance be? Or is not the praise unapt, which celebrates them
- 9:35:32as not having to prave desires? But if we should enumerate everything pertaining to
- 9:35:37actions, it would appear to be small and unworthy of the gods. All
- 9:35:43men, however, acknowledge that they live, and therefore that they energize.
- 9:35:46For it must not be supposed that they pass their life in sleep like endymium.
- 9:35:52Hence, if action is taken away from that which lives, and in
- 9:35:57a still greater degree production, what remains except contemplation? So that the energy
- 9:36:01of God? Since it excels in blessedness will be contemplative and of human energies.
- 9:36:07Therefore, that which is most allied to this energy of God will be
- 9:36:12most adapted to procure felicity. But as an indication of the truth of this,
- 9:36:16other animals, which are perfectly deprived of an energy of this kind,
- 9:36:22do not partake of felicity. For the whole life of the Gods is indeed
- 9:36:25blessed. But that of men is blessed so far as they possess a certain
- 9:36:30similitude of such an energy as this. Of other animals, however, no
- 9:36:35one is happy, because they do not in any respect participate of contemplation.
- 9:36:40As far. Therefore, as contemplation extends itself, so far also is felicity
- 9:36:45extended. And the felicity of those beings is greater in whom there is more
- 9:36:50of the contemplative energy. And this not from accident, but according to contemplation,
- 9:36:55for this is of itself honorable. Hence felicity will be a certain contemplation.
- 9:37:02External prosperity, however, will be requisite to him who energizes according to
- 9:37:07theoretic virtue, since he is a man. For human nature is not sufficient
- 9:37:12to itself for the purposes of contemplation. But it is also requisite that the
- 9:37:17body should be well, and that it should be supplied with food and other
- 9:37:21necessaries. It must, not, however, be supposed that because it is
- 9:37:24not possible for a man to be blessed without external goods, a happy man
- 9:37:29will therefore require many of these, and such as are great. For neither
- 9:37:32a condition of being sufficient to itself, nor judgment, nor action, consists
- 9:37:37in an excess of external goods. But it is possible for those who have
- 9:37:43no dominion over the earth and sea to perform beautiful deeds, since a man
- 9:37:47from moderate possessions may be able to act according to virtue. The truth of
- 9:37:52this, however, may be clearly seen, for private persons appear to act
- 9:37:57no less equitably, but even more so than potentates. But moderate possessions are
- 9:38:02sufficient for this purpose, for the life of him will be happy who energizes
- 9:38:07according to virtue. And Solon perhaps well defined those who are happy by saying
- 9:38:13that they are such as are moderately furnished with external possessions, and who perform
- 9:38:17the most beautiful actions and live temperately. Since it is possible for those whose
- 9:38:22possessions are but moderate to do those things which ought to be done. An
- 9:38:27Axagorus likewise appears to have thought that the happy man was neither the rich man
- 9:38:31nor the potentate, when he says, quote, that it would not be
- 9:38:36at all wonderful if I should be considered by the multitude as an absurd and
- 9:38:39miserable man. Close quote, for the multitude judge from external circumstances, having
- 9:38:45a sensible perception of these alone. The opinions also of the wise seem to
- 9:38:51accord with these assertions. Things of this kind therefore are attended with a certain
- 9:38:55credibility. A judgment, however, is to be formed of the truth in
- 9:39:00practical affairs from deeds and the life, for in these that which possesses principal
- 9:39:06authority consists. Hence, it is requisite to consider what has been before said
- 9:39:10by referring it to the deeds and the life of a man. And when
- 9:39:15the assertions accord with deeds, they are to be admitted. But when they
- 9:39:19are dissonant they are to be considered as nothing but words. But the man
- 9:39:22who energizes according to intellect, who cultivates this and is mentally disposed in the
- 9:39:29best manner, is also it would seem most dear to Divinity. For if
- 9:39:32any attention is paid by the God's two human affairs, as it appears there
- 9:39:37is, it is also reasonable to suppose that they will be delighted with that
- 9:39:42which is most excellent and most allied to themselves. But this is intellect,
- 9:39:46and likewise that they will remunerate those who especially love and honor this as taking
- 9:39:52care of that which is dear to themselves, and acting rightly and well.
- 9:39:57It is, however, not in manifest that all these things are especially present
- 9:40:00with the wise man, hence he is the most dear to Divinity. It
- 9:40:06is also probable that the same man is most happy, so that thus also
- 9:40:09the wise man will be especially happy. Chapter nine. Are we therefore to
- 9:40:15think that if these things, and the virtues, and likewise friendship and pleasure
- 9:40:21have been sufficiently delineated, our purpose is completely affected? Or shall we say,
- 9:40:27as has been before observed, that the end in practical affairs is not
- 9:40:30to survey and know each particular, but rather to perform it. Neither therefore
- 9:40:36is it sufficient in virtue to know it, but there should also be an
- 9:40:39endeavor to possess and use it, or in some other way, must we
- 9:40:44strive to become good men. If therefore, words were sufficient of themselves to
- 9:40:49make men worthy, they ought justly, as the oddness says, to be
- 9:40:53valued at a great price, and it would be necessary to procure them.
- 9:40:58Now. However, they appear to be sufficiently powerful to exhort and excite liberal
- 9:41:02young men, and to make those whose manners are noble and who are truly
- 9:41:07lovers of beautiful conduct, obedient to virtue. But they are incapable of exhorting
- 9:41:12the multitude to probity, For the multitude are not naturally adapted to be obedient
- 9:41:16from shame but from fear, nor to abstain from bad conduct through the disgrace
- 9:41:22with which it is attended, but through punishment for living from passion. They
- 9:41:28pursue their pleasures and those things through which they may be procured, but they
- 9:41:31avoid the pains opposed to these. They have, not, however, any
- 9:41:36conception of that which is beautiful in conduct and truly delectable in consequence of not
- 9:41:40having tasted of it. What discourse therefore can dispose such men to orderly conduct?
- 9:41:46For it is not possible, or at least it is not easy to
- 9:41:51obliterate by words things which have been for a long time impressed in the manners.
- 9:41:55But perhaps we must be satisfied if everything being present with us through which
- 9:42:00we are accustomed to become worthy, we may be able to partake a virtue.
- 9:42:06Some, however, are of opinion that men become good from nature,
- 9:42:09others that they become good from custom, and others from doctrine. As to
- 9:42:15goodness from nature, therefore, it is evident that this is not in our
- 9:42:17power, but that it is inherent in those who are truly fortunate through a
- 9:42:22certain divine cause. But it must be considered whether it is not true that
- 9:42:27words and precepts are not accompanied with power towards all men. But it is
- 9:42:31requisite that the soul of the auditor should have been previously excited by manners to
- 9:42:37rejoice and hate properly, like land which is intended to nourish seed. For
- 9:42:42he who lives under the influence of passion will not attend to the reasoning which
- 9:42:45dissuades him from such a life. How therefore is it possible to induce one
- 9:42:51who is so disposed to alter his mode of conduct. In short, passion
- 9:42:54does not appear to yield to reason, but to violence. Hence, it
- 9:42:59is necessary that manners should pre exist in a certain respect appropriate to virtue,
- 9:43:04in order that their possessor may love what is beautiful and be indigent with what
- 9:43:07is disgraceful in conduct. To obtain, However, a right education for virtue
- 9:43:14from our youth is difficult without being nurtured by laws which enforce the offices of
- 9:43:19virtue. For to live temperately and accustomed to endurance is not pleasing to the
- 9:43:23multitude, and especially to youth. Hence, it is necessary that education,
- 9:43:29studies, and pursuits should be ordained by laws, for by custom they will
- 9:43:34cease to be painful. But perhaps it is not sufficient for use to obtain
- 9:43:37a right education and to have proper attention paid to them. But it is
- 9:43:42also necessary, when they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, that they
- 9:43:45should study and be accustomed to these things. And in these we shall likewise
- 9:43:51require the assistance of the laws, and in short through the whole of life,
- 9:43:54For the multitude are more obedient to necessity, then to reason, and
- 9:43:59to punishment than to the beautiful In conduct he Some persons are of the opinion
- 9:44:04that legislators ought, indeed to excite men to virtue and exhort them to it
- 9:44:07for the sake of the beautiful in conduct, because worthy men will, precedaneously
- 9:44:13from their manners obey their exhortations, but that castigations and punishments should be inflicted
- 9:44:19on those who disobey them, and who are naturally more unapt, and that
- 9:44:22the incurable should be entirely exterminated from the community. For say, they the
- 9:44:28worthy man and he who lives with a view to the beautiful in conduct,
- 9:44:31will be obedient to reason. But the bad man who aspires after pleasure is
- 9:44:36to be punished by pain, like a beast of burden. Hence, they
- 9:44:39add, it is necessary that such pains should be employed, as are especially
- 9:44:44contrary to the pleasures which they embrace. If therefore, as we have said,
- 9:44:49it is requisite that he who is to be a good man should be
- 9:44:52well educated and accustomed to virtuous conduct, and afterwards should thus live in worthy
- 9:44:59studies, in pursuit utes, and neither unwillingly nor willingly perform bas deeds.
- 9:45:04And if these things may happen to those who live conformably to certain intellect and
- 9:45:08right order, possessing power and strength. If this be the case, the
- 9:45:13paternal mandate, indeed, is neither accompanied with strength, nor a necessity,
- 9:45:17nor in short, the mandate of one man, unless he is a king
- 9:45:22or a person endued with a similar authority. But the law possesses a necessarily
- 9:45:25compelling power, being a mandate proceeding from a certain prudence and intellect. And
- 9:45:30those indeed, who are adverse to the impulses of depraved men, though they
- 9:45:35are right in so doing, are hated by the multitude. Law. However,
- 9:45:39when it ordains what is equitable, is not attended with molestation. But
- 9:45:44in the city of the Lacedaemonians alone, the legislator appears to have paid attention
- 9:45:49to education and studies or pursuits, while in most cities things of this kind
- 9:45:53are neglected, and every one, after the manner of the cyclops, lives
- 9:45:58as he pleases. By these no statutes and no rights are known, no
- 9:46:04council held, no monarch fills the throne. But high on hills or airy
- 9:46:09cliffs they dwell, or deep in caves whose entrance leads to hell. Each
- 9:46:15rules his race, his neighbor, not his care, heedless of others,
- 9:46:21to his own severe close quote. It is best, therefore that a common
- 9:46:27and right attention should be paid to the citizens, and that there should be
- 9:46:30an ability of affecting this. But if these things are neglected in common,
- 9:46:35it would seem to be fit that every one should contribute to the promotion of
- 9:46:38his children and friends in virtue, or should predetermine to do so. From
- 9:46:44what has been said, however, it would seem that this may especially be
- 9:46:47affected by him who possesses the power of a legislator. For attentions to the
- 9:46:52general welfare are affected through the laws, but equitable attentions are accomplished through worthy
- 9:46:58men. It does not, however, seem to make any difference whether the
- 9:47:01laws are written or unwritten, nor whether one person or many are disciplined by
- 9:47:07them. As neither does it make any difference in music and gymnastic and other
- 9:47:12disciplines. For as in cities legal institutions and manners are efficacious, so in
- 9:47:17families paternal mandates and manners, and they are still more efficacious on account of
- 9:47:22alliance and the benefits conferred by parents on their children. For children previous to
- 9:47:28these mandates loved their parents and are naturally disposed to be obedient to them.
- 9:47:32Farther still, private differs from public education in the same manner as in medicine,
- 9:47:37particular differ from universal prescriptions. For universally, indeed, abstinence and quiet
- 9:47:44are advantageous to one who has a fever, but to this particular person perhaps
- 9:47:49they are not. And he who is a master in the pugilistic art will
- 9:47:52not perhaps enjoin the same mode of fighting to all his pupils. It would
- 9:47:58seem, however, that particularly will be more accurately managed when private attention is
- 9:48:02paid to them, For then each individual will in a greater degree obtain that
- 9:48:07which is adapted to him. But the physician, the master of gymnastic exercises,
- 9:48:13and every other artist will, in the best manner, pay attention to
- 9:48:16an individual if they know, universally what is beneficial to all persons, or
- 9:48:21to persons of a certain description. For sciences are said to be, and
- 9:48:25are in reality of that which is common. Nothing, however, perhaps hinders
- 9:48:30but that a man may pay attention to one certain thing in a proper manner,
- 9:48:35though he is destitute of science, while he accurately surveys from experience what
- 9:48:39happens to each particular thing. Just as some persons appear to be most excellent
- 9:48:44physicians to themselves, but are unable to give medical assistance to another person.
- 9:48:50Perhaps, however, it would seem, notwithstanding this, to be no less
- 9:48:52requisite for him who wishes to become an artist and to be theoretic, to
- 9:48:58proceed to that which is universal, and to know this as far as it
- 9:49:01can be known, For we have already observed that sciences are conversant with this.
- 9:49:06Perhaps also it is requisite that he who wishes to make others better by
- 9:49:10the attention which he pays to them, whether they be many or few,
- 9:49:14should endeavor to become skilled in legislation. If we can be rendered good men
- 9:49:19through the laws. Hence, it is not the province of any casual person
- 9:49:22to render some man or one committed to his care fitly disposed to become virtuous.
- 9:49:29But if it belongs to anyone to affect this, it is the province
- 9:49:31of the man of science, just as in medicine and the other arts to
- 9:49:36which a certain attention and prudence pertain. It is requisite therefore, after this,
- 9:49:40to consider whence or how a man may acquire a legislative skill or in
- 9:49:45other arts. Is this to be learned from those who are conversant with the
- 9:49:49management of public affairs, For this appears to be a part of the political
- 9:49:53science. Or shall we say that a similar thing does not seem to take
- 9:49:58place in the political science and the other sciences and powers. For in the
- 9:50:02others the same persons are seen to impart the powers and to energize from them,
- 9:50:07as is evident in physicians and painters. But the sophists profess indeed to
- 9:50:12teach politics. Yet no one of them acts in a political capacity. And
- 9:50:16it would seem that those who are engaged in the management of public affairs do
- 9:50:21this by a certain power and experience, rather than by the exercise of the
- 9:50:24reasoning faculty. For they do not appear either to write or speak about things
- 9:50:30of this kind, though perhaps this would be better than to compose forensic or
- 9:50:34popular orations. Nor again, is it seen that they have made either their
- 9:50:38own children political characters, or some other children of their friends. It is
- 9:50:44reasonable, however, to suppose that they would have done this if they had
- 9:50:47been able, For neither could they have left anything better to cities, nor
- 9:50:52could they have deliberately chosen anything more excellent than this power, either for themselves
- 9:50:58or their dearest friends. Nevertheless, experience appears to contribute in no small degree
- 9:51:02to the management of public affairs, for otherwise men would not become more political
- 9:51:07through being accustomed to political affairs. Hence, experience seems to be necessary to
- 9:51:14those who desire to be skillful in the political science. Those sophists, however,
- 9:51:19who profess to teach the political science, appear to be very far from
- 9:51:22possessing this ability, For in short, they neither know what kind of a
- 9:51:27thing it is, nor what the things are with which it is conversant.
- 9:51:30For if they did, they would not suppose it to be the same with
- 9:51:34the rhetorical art or inferior to it, nor would they think it easy for
- 9:51:38him to act the part of a legislator who has collected the most celebrated and
- 9:51:43approved laws, since they say that the best laws are to be selected,
- 9:51:46just as if the selection did not require intelligence, or as if to judge
- 9:51:51rightly was not one of the greatest of things. In the same manner as
- 9:51:54in what pertains to music, for skillful men judge rightly respecting the works in
- 9:51:59which they are skilled, and understand through what means or in what manner they
- 9:52:04may be accomplished, and what the appropriate adaptations of them are but to the
- 9:52:08unskillful it is sufficient not to be ignorant whether a work is well or ill
- 9:52:13done in the same manner as in the painter's art. Laws, however,
- 9:52:17resemble political works. How therefore, can anyone be adapted to become a legislator
- 9:52:22from these or to judge which of them are the best. For neither does
- 9:52:28it appear that men become skilled in medicine by reading medical books. Though these
- 9:52:32books not only endeavor to point out the cures, but likewise the remedies which
- 9:52:37are to be applied and the methods of cure, distinguishing also the habits of
- 9:52:42each person. It seems, however, that these things are beneficial too skillful
- 9:52:45persons, but useless to the unscientific. Perhaps therefore, collections of laws and
- 9:52:52politics may be useful to those who are able to survey and judge what is
- 9:52:57well established or the contrary, and the appropriate adaptations are in these. But
- 9:53:01those who discuss things of this kind without the political habit will never be able
- 9:53:07to judge well, except from chance, though perhaps they will become more intelligent
- 9:53:10in these particulars, Since therefore the politicians prior to us have omitted to investigate
- 9:53:16legislation, it will perhaps be better for us to consider it more attentively,
- 9:53:22and in short, to discuss a polity universally, in order that the philosophy
- 9:53:27which pertains two human affairs may as much as possible, be brought to perfection.
- 9:53:31In the first place, therefore, if anything has been well said by
- 9:53:36the ancients on this subject, we shall endeavor to relate it. In the
- 9:53:39next place, from the collections which have been made of polities, we shall
- 9:53:43endeavor to survey what the nature is of the things which preserve end corrupt cities
- 9:53:47and the several polities, and from what causes some of them are well but
- 9:53:52others ill governed. For these things being surveyed, perhaps we shall be able
- 9:53:55in a greater degree to perceive what kind of polity is the best, how
- 9:54:00each is to be arranged, and what laws and manners it should use.
- 9:54:04We shall begin therefore the discussion of politics. End of Book ten