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10 - Nicomachean Ethics - Aristotle · The Philosophy Insights Collection

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Book ten, Chapter one. After these things, perhaps it follows that we
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should discuss pleasure, for this appears to be especially familiar and allied to our
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race. Hence, those who educate youth regulate them by pleasure and pain,
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as by a rudder. But it appears to be a thing of the greatest
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consequence with respect to the virtue of manners, to rejoice in those things in
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which it is proper to rejoice, and to hate those things which it is
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proper to hate, For these things extend through the whole of life, and
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have a preponderation and power towards virtue and a happy life. Since things which
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are delectable are indeed the objects of deliberate choice, but those that are painful
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are avoided. It seems, however, that things of this kind are by
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no means to be passed over in silence, especially since they possess an abundant
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ambiguity. For some indeed say that good itself is pleasure, but others,
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on the contrary, assert that pleasure is a very bad thing, the former
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indeed being perhaps persuaded that it is so, but the latter, thinking that
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it will be more beneficial to our life to evince that pleasure ranks among bad
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things, even though it should not, for the multitude tend to it and
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are subserving too pleasures. Hence, say they, it is necessary to lead
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them to the pursuit of the contrary to pleasure, for thus they may arrive
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at the medium. Perhaps, however, this is not well said, for
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words respecting things which pertain to passions and actions are less credible than deeds,
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when therefore they are discordant with the perceptions of sense. Being despised, they
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also subvert the truth. For he who blames pleasure, if he is at
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any time seem to desire, it seems to incline towards it, as if
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every pleasure was of this attractive nature. For to distinguish one pleasure from another
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is not the province of the multitude. Two assertions therefore appear not only to
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be most useful with respect to knowledge, but also with respect to life,
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For they are believed when they accord with deeds. Hence they exhort those who
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understand them to live conformably to them. Of things of this kind, therefore,
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thus much may suffice. Let us now discuss the assertions of others concerning
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pleasure. Chapter two Eudoxus therefore thought the pleasure was good itself, because all
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animals are seen to desire it. Both such as are rational and such as
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are irrational. But in all things the eligible is good, and that which
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is especially eligible is the best of things. And because all things tend to
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the same thing, it is an indication that the object to which they tend
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is to all things that which is most excellent, for everything discovers that which
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is good to it in the same manner as it discovers nutriment. Hence,
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that which is good to all things, and which all things desire, is
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good itself. These arguments, however, are rendered credible more through the virtuous
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manners of their author than through themselves, for it appears that he was a
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remarkably temperate man. It does not seem, therefore, that he made these
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assertions as the friend of pleasure, But because he believed them to be true,
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it likewise appeared to him to be no less evident that pleasure is good
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itself from the contrary. For pain is of itself avoided by all animals,
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and in a similar manner, the contrary to pain is eligible to all animals.
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But that is especially eligible, which we choose, not on account of
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something else, nor for the sake of another thing. It is, however,
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acknowledged that pleasure is a thing of this kind. For no one asks
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another person what the final cause is why he is delighted, as if pleasure
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were a thing eligible of itself, and which renders the good to which it
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is added more eligible, such for instance, as to act justly and temperately.
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The good therefore is itself increased by itself. This argument therefore evinces that
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pleasure ranks among the number of goods, and that it is not more good
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than another good, for every good in conjunction with another good is more eligible
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than when it is alone. Plato also subverts an argument of this kind that
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pleasure is not good itself, for he says that a delectable life in conjunction
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with wisdom is more eligible than without it. But if the mixed life is
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better than a life of pleasure alone, pleasure will not be good itself,
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for good itself will not become more eligible by anything being added to it.
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It is evident, however, that neither will anything else be good itself,
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which, in conjunction with something which is of itself good, becomes more eligible.
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What therefore is the thing of this kind of which we also participate,
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For a thing of this kind is the object of investigation. Those, however,
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who deny that it is good which all beings desire, say nothing to
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the purpose. For we say that the thing which appears to all beings to
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exist does exist. But he who subverts this belief does not assert that which
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is very much more credible. For if they denied that to be good,
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which is desired by beings destitute of intellect, there would be some truth in
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what they say. But if they also deny that to be good, which
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beings endued with prudence and wisdom desire, how will they say anything which can
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be admitted? Perhaps also, even in bad men, there is a certain
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natural good which transcends their depravity, and which aspires after its proper good.
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Neither does that which is a asserted of the contrary to pleasure appear to be
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well said, For it does not follow say they that, if pain is
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an evil, pleasure is good. Since evil is opposed to evil, and
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both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither. And these things
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indeed are asserted by them, not badly. Yet they are not true when
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applied to the present subject. For if both pleasure and pain were bad,
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it would be requisite that both should be avoided. But if neither is bad,
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neither is to be avoided, or each is similarly to be avoided.
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But now, indeed it appears that pain is avoided as an evil, and
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that pleasure is chosen as a good. In this manner, therefore they are
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opposed to each other. Chapter three. Neither does it follow that if pleasure
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is not among the number of qualities, it is not on this account good,
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For neither are the energies of virtue qualities, nor is felicity equality.
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They say therefore, for that good is definite, but that pleasure is indefinite,
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because it receives the more and the less. Hence, if they form
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this judgment from the being delighted, the same thing will also take place in
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justice and the other virtues, in which men evidently assert that there is more
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and less of things of this kind. For some are more just and brave
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than others. It is likewise possible to act justly and to live temperately in
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a greater and less degree. But if they admit this to take place in
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pleasures, they do not seem to have assigned the cause of it. If
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some pleasures indeed are unmingled, but others are mingled, what, however,
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hinders but that, in the same manner as health, which is a definite
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thing, receives the more and the less. This also may be the case
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with pleasure. For there is not the same symmetry in all things, nor
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is there always one certain symmetry in the same thing. But suffering our emission,
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it remains for a certain time and differs in the more and the less.
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A thing of this kind therefore may also happen to pleasure. As they
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likewise admit that good itself is perfect, but that motions and generations are imperfect,
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they endeavor to show that pleasure is motion and generation. They do,
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not, however, appear to assert this well, since pleasure is not motion.
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For to all motion, swiftness and slowness appear to be appropriate, and
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though not per se such as to the motion of the world, yet they
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are appropriate with reference to another motion. But neither of these is inherent in
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pleasure. For it is possible, indeed, to be rapidly delighted in the
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same manner as it is possible to be swiftly enraged. But it is not
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possible for the delight itself to be swift or slow, not even with reference
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to something else. It is possible, however, that walking and argumentation may
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be swift or slow, and everything else of the like kind. Hence,
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it is possible to be changed quickly and slowly into pleasure. But it is
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not possible to energize swiftly according to it viz. To be delighted swiftly according
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to it? And in what manner will pleasure be generation? For it appears
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that not any casual thing is generated from any casual thing, but that a
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thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated, and that of which
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pleasure is the generation of this pain is the corruption. They also say that
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pain is the indigence of that which is according to nature, but that pleasure
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is the complete fullness of it. But these are corporeal passions. If therefore
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pleasure is the complete fulness of that which subsists according to nature, that in
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which this fullness takes place will also be delighted. Hence the body will be
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delighted. But it does not appear that this is the case. Pleasure therefore
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is not complete fulness but complete fullness indeed taking place, someone may be delighted,
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and when cut he may be pained. This opinion, however, appears
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to have originated from the pleasures and pains pertaining to food. For when we
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are in want of nutriment, and have been previously pained in consequence of this
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want, we are delighted with being completely filled. This, however, does
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not happen to be the case in all pleasures, For mathematical pleasures are unattended
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with pain, and also those sensible pleasures which subsist through the smell and hearing
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and the sight. Many recollections, also, and hopes are unattended with pain.
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Of what therefore will these be the generations? For in these there have
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been no previous indigence of anything of which these may be the complete fullness.
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But to those who adduce disgraceful pleasures. In confirmation of this opinion, it
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may be said that these are not simply delectable. For it must not be
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admitted that if these are delightful to those who are badly disposed, they are
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also simply delectable, but that they are so to these only as neither are
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those things simply salubrious or sweet or bitter, which appear to be so to
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those who are diseased. Nor again, are those things white which appear to
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be so to those whose eyes are dimmed with rooum. It may likewise be
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said in reply that pleasures are indeed eligible, yet not from these things,
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just as to be rich is eligible, yet not by treachery, and to
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be well is eligible, yet not by eating any kind of food. Or
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it may be said that pleasures are specifically different, for those pleasures which are
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produced by worthy are different from those which are produced by base pursuits. And
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it is not possible for anyone to be delighted with the pleasure of a just
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man who is not just, or with the pleasure of a musician who is
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not a lover of music. And in a similar manner in other things,
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a friend, also, who is a different person from a flatterer, appears
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to evince that pleasure is not good, or that pleasures are specifically different.
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For it seems that the association of a friend is with a view to good,
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but of a flatterer with a view to pleasure, And the one is
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reprobated, but the other is praised in consequence of their associations being directed to
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different ends. Besides, no one would choose to live possessing a puerile understanding
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through the whole of life and being delighted as much as possible with those things
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which are the objects of puerile delight. Nor would anyone choose so to rejoice
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in doing something most base, as never to be grieved for having done it.
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We likewise earnestly apply ourselves to many things, though they should procure us
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no pleasure, such as to see, to recollect, to know, and
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to possessed the virtues. But it makes no difference if pleasure follows these things
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from necessity, for we should choose these, though no pleasure should be produced
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from them. That pleasure therefore is not good itself, and that all pleasure
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is not eligible, appears to be evident, as likewise, that some pleasures
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are eligible of themselves, but differ in species or in the things from which
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they are produced. And thus much may suffice with respect to what is asserted
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by others concerning pleasure and pain. Chapter four. What pleasure, however,
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is, or what kind of thing it is, will become more evident by
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resuming the consideration of it from the beginning. For the sight indeed seems to
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be perfect at any time, since it is not indigent of anything which taking
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place afterwards will give perfection to its form. But pleasure seems to resemble a
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thing of this kind, for it is a certain hole. Nor can a
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pleasure be assumed at any time, the form of which would be perfected by
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the accession of a longer time. Hence, neither is it motion. For
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all motion is in time and is referred to a certain end. Thus,
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for instance, the motion which exists in building a temple is perfect when it
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affects that which it desires to accomplish. It is perfect therefore, either in
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the whole of the time or in this time. But in the parts of
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the time, all the motions are imperfect, and are specifically different from the
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whole motion and from each other. For the composition of the stones is different
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from the erection of the pillar at right angles, and these motions are different
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from the fabrication of the temple. And the motion indeed employed in building the
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temple is perfect, for it is in want of nothing to the proposed end.
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But the motion employed in laying the foundation and the roof is imperfect.
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For each pertains to a part. The motions therefore are specifically different, and
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it is not possible to assume a motion perfect in its species in any time
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except the whole time. The like also takes place in walking and other motions.
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For if lation is a motion from one place to another, the specific
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differences of this motion are flying, walking, leaping, and the like.
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And not only so, but in walking itself there is a difference. For
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the motion from one place to another in walking is not the same in the
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stadium and a part of the stadium, and in the different parts of it.
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Nor is the mutation of place the same in passing through this line and
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that fiz. In passing through a curve and a straight line. For not
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only a line is passed through, but a line existing in place, and
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this line is in a different place from that. We have therefore accurately discussed
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motion elsewhere i e. In the Fifth Book of the Physics. Hence it
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appears that motion is not perfect in every time, but that the multitude of
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motions are imperfect and specifically different, since they are formalized by proceeding from one
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place to another. The form, however, of pleasure, is perfect in
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any time. It is evident therefore, that motion and pleasure are different from
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each other, and that pleasure is something whole and perfect. This would also
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seem to be evident from the impossibility of being moved except in time, but
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the possibility of being delighted without time, i e. In an instant,
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For that which is affected in the now or an instant is a certain whole
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from these things. However, it is manifest that it is not well said
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that pleasure is motion or generation, for motion and generation are not predicated of
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all things, but of those only which may be distributed into parts, and
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are not holes. For there is not generation of sight, nor of a
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point, nor of the monad. Nor is there either motion or generation of
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these. Neither therefore is there of pleasure, for it is a certain whole.
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Hence, from what has been said, it is evident that a certain
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pleasure is conjoined with every sense in energy, which energizes without being impeded.
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But the energy of the sense is perfect, which is well disposed towards the
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most beautiful of the objects that fall under the sense, for perfect energy appears
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to be especially a thing of this kind. It is, however, of
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no consequence whether it is said that the sense itself energizes, or that in
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which it exists. But in everything the energy is the most excellent of that
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which is disposed in the best manner towards the most excellent of the things which
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are subject to it. But this energy will be most perfect and most delightful.
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For there is pleasure according to every sense, and in a similar according
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to every discoursive energy of the soul and every contemplation. But the most perfect
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energy is the most delectable, and that is the most perfect, which is
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the energy of that which is well disposed towards the best of the things subject
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to it. Pleasure, however, perfects energy. But pleasure does not perfect
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energy after the same manner as the object of sense perfect sense, when both
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are in good condition, just as neither are health, and a physician similarly
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the cause of being made well. It is evident, however, that pleasure
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is produced according to each of the senses. For we say that things which
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are seen and things which are heard are delectable, and it is also evident
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that they are especially delectable when the sense is most excellent and energizes about the
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most excellent object. But where the sensible object, and that which perceives it
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are things of this kind, there will always be pleasure, the agent and
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patient being present. Pleasure, however, perfects energy, not as an inherent
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habit, but as a certain supervening end, such as the flower of age
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in those who are in their acme. As long, however, as that
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which is sensible or intelligible is such as it ought to be, and also
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that which judges or contemplates, pleasure will be in energy. For when that
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which is passive and that which is active are similar in subsisting after the same
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manner with reference to each other, the same thing is naturally adapted to be
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produced. How therefore does it happen that no one is continually delighted? Is
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it because he becomes at length weary? For all human concerns are incapable of
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energizing continually. Neither, therefore, can pleasure be generated in an uninterrupted continuity,
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for it is consequent to energy. Some things, however, delight when
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they are new, but afterwards for this reason, because pleasure cannot be generated
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incessantly, do not similarly delight. For at first, indeed, the discursive
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power of the soul inclines towards and intently energizes about these in the same manner
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as those who look intently at anything. Afterwards, however, an energy of
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this kind is no longer produced, but it becomes remiss. Hence the pleasure
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also is obscured. It may, however, be thought that all men aspire
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after pleasure, because all of them desire to live. But life is a
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certain energy, and everyone energizes about and in those things which he especially loves.
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Thus, for instance, the musician energizes with the hearing about the melodies,
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but the lover of disciplines energizes with the discoursive power of his soul about
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theorems, and in a similar manner, the lover of other pursuits. But
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pleasure perfects energies, and it likewise perfects life, which is the object of
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desire. Reasonably, therefore, do all men aspire after pleasure, for it
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gives perfection to the life of each, which is an eligible thing. We
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shall, however, omit for the present to consider whether we choose to live
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on account of pleasure, or choose pleasure for the sake of living, For
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these things appear to be conjoined, and do not admit of being separated.
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For pleasure is not produced without energy, and pleasure gives perfection to every energy
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Chapter five. Hence, also pleasures appear to be specifically different, For we
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are of opinion that things specifically different are perfected through perfections specifically different. For
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this appears to be the case both with natural and artificial productions, as for
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instance, with animals and trees, pictures and staf, houses and furniture in
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a similar manner. Therefore, we are of opinion that energies specifically different are
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perfected by things that differ in species. But the energies of the discourse of
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powers of reason differ from the energies of the senses, and these are specifically
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different from each other. Hence, also the pleasures which give perfection to these
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are specifically different. This, however, will also become apparent from hints that
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each of the pleasures is intimately familiarized with the energy which it perfects. For
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appropriate pleasures co increase energy, since those who energize in conjunction with pleasure energize
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about everything more accurately and with more exquisite judgment. Thus, for instance,
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those become more excellent geometricians who are delighted to geometrize, and they understand in
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a greater degree everything geometrical the like also takes place with the lovers of music,
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the lovers of architecture, and the lovers of the other arts. For
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each of these makes a proficiency in his proper employment if he delights in it.
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Pleasures therefore co increase energies. But things which co increase are appropriate,
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And to things which are specifically different, the things also which are appropriate,
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are specifically different. Again, this will in a greater degree become apparent from
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considering that pleasures which are produced from different things are an impediment to energies.
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For the lovers of the flute cannot attend to discourse if they hear anyone playing
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on the flute in consequence of being more delighted with the melody of the flute
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then with the present energy, i e. Then with what is said.
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The pleasure therefore, which is produced by the melody of the flute corrupts the
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energy of discourse. And in a similar manner, this also happens in other
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things when a man energizes at one and the same time about two things,
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for the more delectable energy expels the other. And this in a still greater
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degree, if it very much surpasses in pleasure so as to render it impossible
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to energize according to the other energy. Hence, when we are very much
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delighted with anything, we do not in any great degree perform anything else.
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But when we are only moderately pleased with certain things, we can do others.
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Thus, those who in the theaters eat sweetmeats are especially accustomed to do
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this when the performers act badly. Since, however, appropriate pleasure gives accuracy
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two energies and renders them more lasting and better, but foreign pleasures corrupt them.
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It is evident that these pleasures differ very much from each other. For
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nearly foreign pleasures affect the same thing as appropriate pains, i e. As
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the pains which are consequent to certain energies. Thus, if it is unpleasant
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and painful to anyone to write, or to any one to reason, the
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former indeed will not write, and the latter will not reason, in consequence
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of the energy being painful from appropriate pleasures and pains. Therefore, that which
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is contrary happens about energies. But those pleasures and pains are appropriate, which
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are essentially consequent to energy. And with respect to foreign pleasures, we have
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already observed that they affect something similar to pain, for they corrupt, though
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not in a similar manner. Since, however, energies differ in probity and
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depravity, and some of them indeed being eligible, but others to be avoided,
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and others being neither. Pleasures also have a similar mode of subsistence,
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For there is an appropriate pleasure in every energy. The pleasure, therefore,
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which is appropriate to a worthy energy is worthy, but that which is appropriate
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to a bad energy is deprived. For the desires, indeed, of things
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truly beautiful are laudable, but if base things are blameable. The pleasures,
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however, which are in energies, are more appropriate to the energies than desires
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are. For desires, indeed, are separated from energies by time and by
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nature. But pleasures are approximate to energies, and are so indistinct from them
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as to render it dubious whether energy is the same with pleasure. It does
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not appear, however, that pleasure is either the discursive energy of reason or
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sense, for it would be absurd to suppose that it is. Though on
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account of the inseparability of pleasure from energy, it seems to certain persons to
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be the same with it. As therefore, energies are different, so likewise
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pleasures. But the sight differs from the touch in purity, and the hearing,
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and the smell from the taste. Hence the pleasures also of these senses
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similarly differ, and those which pertain to the discursive energy of reason likewise differ,
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And both these differ from each other. It seems, however, that
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there is an appropriate pleasure to every animal, just as there also is an
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appropriate work. For this pleasure is that which subsists according to energy, And
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this will be apparent from a survey of each particular For there is one pleasure
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of a horse, another of a dog, and another of a man.
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And as Heraclitis says, an ass would prefer straw to gold, because food
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is more delectable to asses than gold. The pleasures therefore, of animals specifically
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different, are likewise specifically different. But it is reasonable to suppose that the
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pleasures of the same animals are without a specific difference. There is no small
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variety, however, in pleasures among men, For the same things are painful
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to some and pleasing to others. And to some, indeed, they are
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painful and odious, but to others delectable and lovely. This likewise happens to
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be the case in sweet things. For the same things do not appear sweet
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to a man in a feel and to one who is well, Nor does
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the same thing appear to be hot to him who is weak, and to
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him who is of a good habit of body. And in a similar manner,
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this happens to be the case in other things. In all such things
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as these, however, that is simply delectable, which appears to be so
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to the worthy man. But if this is well said, as it appears
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that it is, and virtue is the measure of everything, and a good
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man, so far as he is good, those things will be pleasures which
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appear to be so to the good man, and those things will be delectable
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in which he rejoices. It is, however, by no means wonderful,
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if things which appear to him to be of a troublesome nature should to another
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person of a different character appear to be delectable. For many corruptions and noxious
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circumstances happen to men, But these are not simply delectable, except to these
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persons and to those who are thus disposed. With respect therefore, to those
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pleasures which are acknowledged to be base, it is evident that they are not
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to be called pleasures except by corrupt men. But with respect to those pleasures
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which appear to be worthy, what is the quality of the pleasure? Or
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what shall we say the pleasure is which is proper to men? Or shall
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we say that this is evident from energies? For pleasures are consequent to these,
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Whether therefore there is one energy, or whether there are many energies of
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the perfect and blessed man. The pleasures which give perfection to these may be
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properly called the pleasures of man, But the remaining pleasures, in the same
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manner as the energies, may be denominated the pleasures of man secondarily and multifariously.
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Chapter six Having therefore spoken concerning the virtues and friendships and pleasures, it
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remains that we should delineate felicity, since we admit that it is the end
29:52
of human concerns. Hence, by recapitulating what we have before said, the
29:56
discussion will be more concise. We have said then that felicity is not a
30:02
habit, for if it were, it might be present with him who passes
30:06
the whole of his life in sleep, living the life of a plant,
30:10
and also with him who is involved in the greatest calamities. If therefore,
30:15
these things cannot be admitted, but felicity must rather be referred to a certain
30:18
energy, as we have before observed. But of energies, some are necessary
30:23
and eligible on account of other things, and others are eligible of themselves.
30:29
If this be the case, it is evident that felicity must be admitted to
30:33
be some one of the energies which are of themselves eligible, and not one
30:37
of those which are eligible on account of something else. For felicity is not
30:42
indigent of anything, but is sufficient to itself. But those energies are eligible
30:48
of themselves, from which nothing except the energy is the object of investigation.
30:55
But the actions which are conformable to virtue appear to be things of this kind.
31:00
For to perform beautiful and worthy deeds is among the number of things which
31:03
are of themselves eligible, and among diversions. This is also the case with
31:08
those that are delectable, since they are not chosen on account of other things.
31:14
For those who are addicted to them are rather injured than benefited. In
31:18
consequence of neglecting their bodies and possessions. Many of those, however, who
31:22
are said to be happy men, fly to diversions, on which account,
31:26
those who are versatile in such like methods of spending their time are esteemed by
31:30
tyrants, for they render themselves pleasing in those things which they desire, and
31:36
they are in want of persons of this description. These things therefore appear to
31:41
pertain to felicity, because men in authority and power are at leisure for these
31:47
Perhaps, However, persons of this description are no indication that these things pertain
31:52
to felicity, for neither virtue nor intellect, from which worthy energies proceed,
31:56
consist in dominion and power. Nor if these men, not having tasted of
32:01
genuine and liberal pleasure, fly to corporeal pleasures. Must it be supposed that
32:07
on this account these pleasures are more eligible for children also fancy that things which
32:13
are honored by them are the best of things. It is reasonable therefore to
32:16
admit that as different things appear to be honorable to children and men, so
32:22
likewise to bad and worthy men. Hence, as we have frequently said,
32:27
those things are honorable and delectable, which are so to the worthy man.
32:30
But the energy to every one is most eligible, which is according to an
32:36
appropriate habit, and to the worthy man the energy is most eligible, which
32:40
is according to virtue. Felicity therefore does not consist in diversions, for it
32:46
is absurd to admit that diversion is the end i e. The chief good
32:51
of man, and that the whole of life is to be busily employed and
32:54
molestations endured for the sake of indulging in sports, since as I may say,
33:00
we choose all things for the sake of something else, except felicity,
33:05
for this is the end. But to act seriously and to labor for the
33:08
sake of diversion appears to be foolish and very puerile. He, however,
33:14
who engages in sports in order that he may act seriously, which Anacharsis thought
33:20
was proper, appears to be right. For diversion resembles repose. But as
33:25
men are incapable of laboring incessantly, they require relaxation. Relaxation, however,
33:31
is not an end, for it subsists for the sake of energy. But
33:36
a happy life appears to be conformable to virtue, and this is a worthy
33:39
life, and does not consist in amusements. We likewise say that serious pursuits
33:45
are better than those that are ridiculous and accompanied with jesting in sport, and
33:50
that the energy of the better part and the better man, is always more
33:53
worthy. But the energy of that which is better is more excellent and more
33:58
adapted to felicity. Any casual person also, and a slave may enjoy corporeal
34:04
pleasures no less than the best of men. No one, however, would
34:07
ascribe felicity to a slave, unless they also ascribe to him a worthy life.
34:13
For felicity does not consist in sports, in corporeal pleasures, but in
34:17
the energies according to virtue, as we have before observed Chapter seven. If,
34:24
however, felicity is an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to
34:29
suppose that it is an energy according to the most excellent virtue, And this
34:34
will be the virtue of the most excellent part or power, Whether therefore this
34:38
be the intellect or something else which appears to rule and be the leader by
34:44
nature and to have a conception of things beautiful and divine, or whether it
34:47
is itself divine or the most divine of all our parts. The energy of
34:52
this according to its proper virtue will be perfect felicity. But we have said
34:58
that this energy is contemporary, and this appears to accord with what we before
35:02
asserted, and also with truth. For this energy is the most excellent,
35:08
since intellect is the best of all our parts, and of objects of knowledge,
35:14
those are the most excellent about which intellect is conversant. This energy also
35:20
is most continued, for we are able to contemplate more incessantly than to perform
35:24
any action whatever. We likewise think that pleasure ought to be mingled with felicity.
35:30
But the energy, according to wisdom is acknowledged to be the most delectable
35:36
of all the energies according to virtue. Wisdom therefore appears to possess pleasures admirable
35:42
both for their purity and stability. It is reasonable also to think that those
35:46
who possess knowledge live more pleasantly than those who investigate. That too, which
35:52
is called self sufficiency, will especially subsist about the contemplative energy. For of
35:58
the necessaries of life, the wise and the just man, and the rest
36:01
of those who possess the moral virtues are in want. But even when they
36:06
are sufficiently supplied with these, the just man is in want of those towards
36:10
whom and together with whom he may act justly and in like manner, the
36:15
temperance, and the brave man, and each of the rest. But the
36:20
wise man, when alone is able to contemplate, and by how much the
36:23
wiser he is, by so much the more does he possess this ability.
36:28
Perhaps indeed, he will contemplate better when he has others to cooperate with him,
36:32
But at the same time he is most sufficient to himself. This energy
36:37
alone, likewise, will appear to be beloved for its own sake, for
36:40
nothing else is produced from it besides contemplation. But from things of a practical
36:46
nature we obtain something more or less besides the action itself. Felicity also appears
36:52
to consist in leisure, for we engage in business that we may be at
36:57
leisure, and we wage more that we may live in peace. The energies,
37:00
therefore, of the political virtues consist either in political or in military transactions.
37:07
But the actions which are conversant with these appear to be full of employment.
37:12
This indeed is perfectly the case with military transactions, for no one chooses
37:16
to wage war or prepare for it for the sake of waging war, since
37:22
he would appear to be perfectly a homicide, who should make enemies of his
37:25
friends for the sake of fighting and slaughter. The energy to of the politician
37:30
is of a busy nature, and besides the management of public affairs, is
37:36
employed in procuring dominion and honor, or a felicity for himself and the citizens,
37:42
different from the political energy, which also as something different we evidently investigate
37:49
if therefore political and military actions surpass in beauty and magnitude all other virtuous actions.
37:55
But these are of a busy nature, aspire after a certain ends,
38:00
and are not eligible for their own sakes. But the energy of intellect,
38:05
which is contemplative, appears to excel other energies in ardor, and to desire
38:09
no other and besides itself, if also it possesses a proper pleasure, which
38:15
increases its energy, and has in addition to this self sufficiency, leisure and
38:22
unweired power. So far as the condition of human nature will permit with whatever
38:27
else is attributed to the blessed and appears to subsist according to this energy.
38:34
If such be the case, this will be the perfect felicity of man when
38:37
it receives a perfect length of life, for nothing belonging to felicity is imperfect.
38:44
Such a life, however, will be more excellent than that which is
38:47
merely human. For man will not thus live so far as he is man,
38:52
but so far as he contains in himself something divine. And as much
38:57
as this part excels the composite, so much does its energy surpass the energy
39:00
belonging to every other virtue. If therefore intellect is divine with respect to man,
39:07
the life, also, according to intellect, will be divine with respect
39:12
to human life. Nor ought we, according to the exhortation of certain persons,
39:16
to be wise in human affairs since we are men, nor to regard
39:22
mortal concerns since we are mortal. But as much as possible, we should
39:25
immortalize ourselves and do everything in order to live according to our most excellent part.
39:31
For this part, though it is small in bulk, far excels all
39:36
things in power and dignity. It would seem also that each of us is
39:40
this part. Since that which obtains dominion is also more excellent. It would
39:45
therefore be absurd for a man not to choose his own life, but the
39:50
life of something else, that too, which was before asserted, accords with
39:53
what is now said. For that which is intimately allied to any nature is
39:59
most excellent and pleasant to that nature. And hence a life according to intellect
40:04
will be most excellent and pleasant to man. Since this part is most eminently
40:08
man. This life therefore is also most happy Chapter eight. But that felicity
40:16
ranks in the second place, which subsists according to another virtue. For the
40:22
energies, according to this virtue are human, for we act justly and bravely,
40:27
and perform other things conformable to the virtues towards each other, in contracts,
40:34
in necessaries, in all various actions, and in the passions, preserving
40:38
to everyone that which is fit and decorous. All these things, however,
40:44
appear to be human. Some things likewise appear to happen from the body.
40:49
And the virtue of manners is in many instances conjoined and rendered familiar with the
40:54
passions. Prudence also is conjoined with the virtue of manners, and the virtue
41:00
of manners with prudence, Since the principles, indeed of prudence subsist according to
41:06
the ethical virtues, and the rectitude of the ethical virtues subsists according to prudence.
41:12
These, however, are connected with the passions, and will subsist about
41:15
the composite, or that which consists of soul and body. But the virtues
41:21
of the composite are human. The life, therefore, and the felicity conformable
41:25
to them, will also be human. The felicity, however, of intellect,
41:30
is separate. For thus much may be asserted concerning it, since to
41:34
discuss it accurately is a greater undertaking, then is adapted to the present treaties.
41:39
It would also seem that this felicity requires but little of external supply,
41:45
or less than ethical felicity. For let it be admitted that both require necessaries,
41:51
and this equally bracket though the political character labors in a greater degree about
41:55
the body in things of this kind close practice. Since this is but of
42:00
small consequence, yet it makes a great difference with respect to energies. For
42:06
the liberal man will be in want of wealth in order to perform liberal deeds,
42:09
and also the just man in order to make retributions, for the wills
42:15
of men are in manifest, and those who are not just pretend they wish
42:17
to act justly. But the brave man will be in want of power in
42:22
order to effect something conformable to the virtue of fortitude, and the temperate man
42:27
will be in want of the means of acting temperately. For how will this
42:30
man, or he who possesses any one of the other virtues become manifest.
42:36
It becomes, however, an object of inquiry, whether deliberate choice possesses greater
42:40
authority in virtue, or whether it is possessed by actions virtues subsisting in both
42:45
these. It is evident therefore that the perfect will be in both. But
42:51
many things are requisite to the perfection of actions, and in proportion as they
42:55
are greater and more beautiful, a greater number of things are necessary to him,
43:00
However, who energizes according to theoretic virtue, there is no need of
43:06
things of this kind so far as pertains to this energy. But as I
43:09
may say, they are impediments to his contemplation. Yet, so far as
43:14
he is a man and lives with many others, he also chooses to perform
43:19
actions conformable to virtue. He will therefore require external things in order that he
43:23
may act like a man. But that perfect felicity is a certain contemplative energy
43:30
may become apparent from hints that we consider the gods to be especially blessed and
43:35
happy. What kind of actions, however, is it fit to ascribe to
43:38
them? Shall we say just actions? Or will they not appear ridiculous?
43:44
If they form contracts and return deposits, and do other things of the like
43:47
kind. Shall we say then that they are brave, sustaining things of a
43:52
terrible nature and encountering dangers because it is beautiful so to do, or that
43:58
they are liberal, but to whom while they give It would, however,
44:01
be absurd to suppose that there is money with them, or anything of this
44:06
kind. And if they are temperate, what will this temperance be? Or
44:10
is not the praise unapt, which celebrates them as not having to prave desires?
44:15
But if we should enumerate everything pertaining to actions, it would appear to
44:20
be small and unworthy of the gods. All men, however, acknowledge that
44:24
they live, and therefore that they energize. For it must not be supposed
44:29
that they pass their life in sleep like endymium. Hence, if action is
44:34
taken away from that which lives, and in a still greater degree production,
44:38
what remains accept contemplation, so that the energy of God, since it excels
44:44
in blessedness, will be contemplative and of human energies. Therefore, that which
44:49
is most allied to this energy of God will be most adapted to procure felicity.
44:54
But as an indication of the truth of this, other animals, which
44:59
are perfectly deprived of an energy of this kind, do not partake a felicity.
45:04
For the whole life of the Gods is indeed blessed, but that of
45:07
men is blessed so far as they possess a certain similitude of such an energy
45:12
as this of other animals. However, no one is happy because they do
45:16
not in any respect participate of contemplation. As far. Therefore, as contemplation
45:22
extends itself, so far also is felicity extended. And the felicity of those
45:28
beings is greater in whom there is more of the contemplative energy. And this
45:32
not from accident, but according to contemplation, for this is of itself honorable.
45:38
Hence felicity will be a certain contemplation. External prosperity, however, will
45:45
be requisite to him who energizes according to theoretic virtue, since he is a
45:50
man, for human nature is not sufficient to itself for the purposes of contemplation,
45:55
but it is also requisite that the body should be well, that it
46:00
should be supplied with food and other necessaries. It must, not, however,
46:04
be supposed that because it is not possible for a man to be blessed
46:07
without external goods, a happy man will therefore require many of these, and
46:12
such as are great. For neither a condition of being sufficient to itself,
46:15
nor judgment nor action, consists in an excess of external goods. But it
46:22
is possible for those who have no dominion over the earth and sea to perform
46:25
beautiful deeds, since a man from moderate possessions may be able to act according
46:30
to virtue. The truth of this, however, may be clearly seen,
46:36
for private persons appear to act no less equitably, but even more so than
46:39
potentates. But moderate possessions are sufficient for this purpose, for the life of
46:45
him will be happy who energizes according to virtue. And Solon perhaps well defined
46:51
those who are happy by saying that they are such as are moderately furnished with
46:55
external possessions, and who perform the most beautiful actions and live temperately. Since
47:00
it is possible for those whose possessions are but moderate to do those things which
47:06
ought to be done. An Axagorus likewise appears to have thought that the happy
47:10
man was neither the rich man nor the potentate, when he says quote,
47:15
that it would not be at all wonderful if I should be considered by the
47:19
multitude as an absurd and miserable man. Close quote, for the multitude judge
47:23
from external circumstances, having a sensible perception of these alone. The opinions also
47:30
of the wise seem to accord with these assertions. Things of this kind therefore
47:35
are attended with a certain credibility. A judgment, however, is to be
47:38
formed of the truth in practical affairs from deeds and the life, for in
47:44
these that which possesses principal authority consists. Hence, it is requisite to consider
47:50
what has been before said by referring it to the deeds and the life of
47:53
a man. And when the assertions accord with deeds, they are to be
47:58
admitted, But when they are diss they are to be considered as nothing but
48:01
words. But the man who energizes according to intellect, who cultivates this and
48:07
is mentally disposed in the best manner, is also it would seem most dear
48:12
to Divinity. For if any attention is paid by the God's too human affairs,
48:16
as it appears there is, it is also reasonable to suppose that they
48:21
will be delighted with that which is most excellent and most allied to themselves.
48:25
But this is intellect, and likewise that they will remunerate those who especially love
48:30
and honor this as taking care of that which is dear to themselves, and
48:35
acting rightly and well. It is, however, not in manifest that all
48:39
these things are especially present with the wise man. Hence he is the most
48:44
dear to divinity. It is also probable that the same man is most happy,
48:49
so that thus also the wise man will be especially happy. Chapter nine.
48:55
Are we therefore to think that if these things, and the virtues,
48:59
and likewise friendship and pleasure have been sufficiently delineated, our purpose is completely affected?
49:06
Or shall we say, as has been before observed, that the end
49:09
in practical affairs is not to survey and know each particular, but rather to
49:15
perform it. Neither therefore is it sufficient in virtue to know it, but
49:19
there should also be an endeavor to possess and use it, or in some
49:22
other way must we strive to become good men. If therefore, words were
49:28
sufficient of themselves to make men worthy, they ought justly, as the Odgness
49:32
says, to be valued at a great price, and it would be necessary
49:37
to procure them. Now. However, they appear to be sufficiently powerful to
49:42
exhort and excite liberal young men, and to make those whose manners are noble
49:45
and who are truly lovers of beautiful conduct, obedient to virtue. But they
49:51
are incapable of exhorting the multitude to probity, For the multitude are not naturally
49:55
adapted to be obedient from shame but from fear, nor to abstain from bad
50:00
conduct through the disgrace with which it is attended, but through punishment for living
50:07
from passion. They pursue their pleasures and those things through which they may be
50:10
procured, but they avoid the pains opposed to these. They have not,
50:15
however, any conception of that which is beautiful in conduct and truly delectable in
50:20
consequence of not having tasted of it. What discourse therefore can dispose such men
50:25
to orderly conduct? For it is not possible or at least, it is
50:30
not easy to obliterate by words things which have been for a long time impressed
50:35
in the manners. But perhaps we must be satisfied if everything being present with
50:39
us through which we are accustomed to become worthy, we may be able to
50:44
partake a virtue. Some, however, are of opinion that men become good
50:49
from nature, others that they become good from custom, and others from doctrine.
50:54
As to goodness from nature, therefore, it is evident that this is
50:58
not in our power, but that it is inherent in those who are truly
51:00
fortunate through a certain divine cause. But it must be considered whether it is
51:06
not true that words and precepts are not accompanied with power towards all men.
51:12
But it is requisite that the soul of the auditor should have been previously excited
51:15
by manners to rejoice and hate properly like land which is intended to nourish deed.
51:22
For he who lives under the influence of passion will not attend to the
51:25
reasoning which dissuades him from such a life. How therefore, is it possible
51:30
to induce one who is so disposed to alter his mode of conduct. In
51:35
short, passion does not appear to yield to reason but to violence. Hence,
51:38
it is necessary that manners should pre exist in a certain respect appropriate to
51:43
virtue, in order that their possessor may love what is beautiful and be indigent
51:47
with what is disgraceful in conduct. To obtain, however, a right education
51:52
for virtue from our youth is difficult without being nurtured by laws which enforce the
51:58
offices of virtue. For to live temperately and accustomed to endurance is not pleasing
52:04
to the multitude, and especially to youth. Hence, it is necessary that
52:07
education, studies, and pursuits should be ordained by laws, for by custom
52:14
they will cease to be painful. But perhaps it is not sufficient for use
52:17
to obtain a right education and to have proper attention paid to them. But
52:22
it is also necessary, when they have arrived at the perfection of manhood,
52:27
that they should study and be accustomed to these things. And in these we
52:30
shall likewise require the assistance of the laws, and in short, through the
52:34
whole of life. For the multitude are more obedient to necessity then to reason,
52:39
and to punishment then to the beautiful in conduct. Hence, some persons
52:44
are of the opinion that legislators ought indeed to excite men to virtue and exhort
52:47
them to it, for the sake of the beautiful in conduct, because worthy
52:52
men will, precedaneously from their manners obey their exhortations, but that castigations and
52:58
punishments should be inflicted on those who disobey them, and who are naturally more
53:01
unapt, and that the incurable should be entirely exterminated from the community. For
53:07
say, they the worthy man and he who lives with a view to the
53:10
beautiful in conduct, will be obedient to reason. But the bad man,
53:15
who aspires after pleasure is to be punished by pain, like a beast of
53:19
burden. Hence, they add, it is necessary that such pains should be
53:22
employed, as are especially contrary to the pleasures which they embrace. If therefore,
53:29
as we have said, it is requisite that he who is to be
53:31
a good man should be well educated and accustomed to virtuous conduct, and afterwards
53:37
should thus live in worthy studies and pursuits, and neither unwillingly nor willingly perform
53:43
base deeds. And if these things may happen to those who live conformably to
53:47
certain intellect and rite order, possessing power and strength. If this be the
53:52
case, the paternal mandate indeed is neither accompanied with strength nor necessity, nor
53:59
in short, the mandate of one man, unless he is a king or
54:01
a person endued with a similar authority. But the law possesses a necessarily compelling
54:07
power, being a mandate proceeding from a certain prudence and intellect. And those
54:12
indeed who are adverse to the impulses of depraved men, though they are right
54:15
in so doing, are hated by the multitude. Law. However, when
54:20
it ordains what is equitable, is not attended with molestation. But in the
54:24
city of the Lacedaemonians alone, the legislator appears to have paid attention to education
54:30
and studies or pursuits, while in most cities things of this kind are neglected,
54:35
and every one, after the manner of the cyclops, lives as he
54:38
pleases. Quote by these, no statutes and no rights are known, no
54:45
council held, no monarch fills the throne. But high on hills or airy
54:50
cliffs they dwell, or deep in caves whose entrance leads to hell. Each
54:55
rules his race, his neighbor, not his care, he of others to
55:00
his own severe close quote. It is best, therefore, that a common
55:07
and right attention should be paid to the citizens, and that there should be
55:10
an ability of affecting this. But if these things are neglected in common,
55:15
it would seem to be fit that everyone should contribute to the promotion of his
55:20
children and friends in virtue, or should predetermine to do so. From what
55:24
has been said, however, it would seem that this may especially be affected
55:29
by him who possesses the power of a legislator. For attentions to the general
55:32
welfare are affected through the laws, but equitable attentions are accomplished through worthy men.
55:38
It does not, however, seem to make any difference whether the laws
55:43
are written or unwritten, nor whether one person or many are disciplined by them,
55:47
as neither does it make any difference in music and gymnastic and other disciplines.
55:52
For as in cities, legal institutions and manners are efficacious, so in
55:58
families paternal mandates and manners, and they are still more efficacious on account of
56:02
alliance and the benefits conferred by parents on their children. For children previous to
56:07
these mandates loved their parents and are naturally disposed to be obedient to them.
56:14
Farther still, private differs from public education in the same manner as in medicine,
56:17
particular differ from universal prescriptions. For universally, indeed, abstinence and quiet
56:24
are advantageous to one who has a fever, But to this particular person perhaps
56:29
they are not. And he who is a master in the pugilistic art will
56:34
not perhaps enjoin the same mode of fighting to all his pupils. It would
56:37
seem, however, that particulars will be more accurately managed when private attention is
56:43
paid to them, For then each individual will in a greater degree obtain that
56:47
which is adapted to him. But the physician, the master of gymnastic exercises,
56:52
and every other artist will, in the best manner, pay attention to
56:57
an individual if they know, universally what is beneficial to all persons, or
57:01
to persons of a certain description. For sciences are said to be, and
57:06
are in reality of that which is common. Nothing, however, perhaps,
57:10
hinders but that a man may pay attention to one certain thing in a proper
57:15
manner, though he is destitute of science, while he accurately surveys from experience
57:20
what happens to each particular thing. Just as some persons appear to be most
57:23
excellent physicians to themselves, but are unable to give medical assistance to another person.
57:30
Perhaps, however, it would seem, notwithstanding this, to be no
57:32
less requisite for him who wishes to become an artist and to be theoretic,
57:37
to proceed to that which is universal, and to know this as far as
57:42
it can be known, For we have already observed that sciences are conversant with
57:45
this. Perhaps also it is requisite that he who wishes to make others better
57:51
by the attention which he pays to them, whether they be many or few,
57:54
should endeavor to become skilled in legislation. If we can be rendered good
57:59
men through the law. Hence, it is not the province of any casual
58:02
person to render some man or one committed to his care fitly disposed to become
58:07
virtuous. But if it belongs to anyone to affect this, it is the
58:12
province of the man of science, just as in medicine and the other arts
58:15
to which a certain attention and prudence pertain. It is requisite therefore, after
58:21
this, to consider whence or how a man may acquire a legislative skill or
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in other arts. Is this to be learned from those who are conversant with
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the management of public affairs. For this appears to be a part of the
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political science. Or shall we say that a similar thing does not seem to
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take place in the political science and the other sciences in powers. For in
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the others the same persons are seen to impart the powers and to energize from
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them, as is evident in physicians and painters. But the sophists profess indeed
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to teach politics. Yet no one of them acts in a political capacity.
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And it would seem that those who are engaged in the manns of public affairs
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do this by a certain power and experience, rather than by the exercise of
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the reasoning faculty. For they do not appear either to write or speak about
59:09
things of this kind, though perhaps this would be better than to compose forensic
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or popular orations. Nor again, is it seen that they have made either
59:19
their own children political characters, or some other children of their friends. It
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is reasonable, however, to suppose that they would have done this if they
59:28
had been able, For neither could they have left anything better to cities,
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nor could they have deliberately chosen anything more excellent than this power, either,
59:37
For themselves or their dearest friends. Nevertheless, experience appears to contribute in no
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small degree to the management of public affairs, for otherwise men would not become
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more political through being accustomed to political affairs. Hence, experience seems to be
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necessary to those who desire to be skillful in the political science. Those sophists,
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however, who pref fest to teach the political science, appear to be
1:00:01
very far from possessing this ability. For in short, they neither know what
1:00:07
kind of a thing it is, nor what the things are with which it
1:00:09
is conversant. For if they did, they would not suppose it to be
1:00:14
the same with the rhetorical art or inferior to it, nor would they think
1:00:17
it easy for him to act the part of a legislator who has collected the
1:00:22
most celebrated and approved laws, since they say that the best laws are to
1:00:25
be selected, just as if the selection did not require intelligence, or as
1:00:30
if to judge rightly was not one of the greatest of things, in the
1:00:34
same manner as in what pertains to music, For skillful men judge rightly respecting
1:00:38
the works in which they are skilled, and understand through what means, or
1:00:43
in what manner they may be accomplished, and what the appropriate adaptations of them
1:00:47
are. But to the unskillful it is sufficient not to be ignorant whether a
1:00:52
work is well or ill done in the same manner as in the painter's art.
1:00:57
Laws, however, resemble political work. How therefore, can anyone be
1:01:01
adapted to become a legislator from these or to judge which of them are the
1:01:07
best. For neither does it appear that men become skilled in medicine by reading
1:01:12
medical books. Though these books not only endeavor to point out the cures,
1:01:15
but likewise the remedies which are to be applied, and the methods of cure,
1:01:20
distinguishing also the habits of each person. It seems, however, that
1:01:24
these things are beneficial too skillful persons, but useless to the unscientific. Perhaps
1:01:30
therefore, collections of laws and politics may be useful to those who are able
1:01:35
to survey and judge what is well established or the contrary, and what the
1:01:39
appropriate adaptations are in these. But those who discuss things of this kind without
1:01:45
the political habit will never be able to judge well, except from chance.
1:01:49
Though perhaps they will become more intelligent in these particulars, since Therefore, the
1:01:54
politicians prior to us have omitted to investigate legislation, it will perhaps be better
1:02:00
for us to consider it more attentively, and in short, to discuss a
1:02:04
polity universally, in order that the philosophy which pertains two human affairs may as
1:02:08
much as possible, be brought to perfection. In the first place, therefore,
1:02:14
if anything has been well said by the ancients on this subject, we
1:02:17
shall endeavor to relate it. In the next place, from the collections which
1:02:22
have been made of polities, we shall endeavor to survey what the nature is
1:02:25
of the things which preserve and corrupt cities, and the several polities, and
1:02:30
from what causes some of them are well but others ill governed. For these
1:02:34
things being surveyed, perhaps we shall be able in a greater degree to perceive
1:02:37
what kind of polity is the best, how each is to be arranged,
1:02:42
and what laws and manners it should use. We shall begin therefore the discussion
1:02:46
of politics. End of Book ten