Latest / New Frontiers / PART I Nukes, Landmines and Disarmament: A Conversation with Matthew Breay Bolton
Transcript
- Charlotte Tate: From the Rohatyn Center for Global Affairs at Middlebury College, this is New Frontiers. I’m Charlotte Tate, the Center’s Associate Director. In this episode, the first of a two-part series, political scientist and Nobel laureate Matthew Bolton joins Mark Williams to discuss his work on the 2017 nuclear weapons ban treaty, the problems landmines and unexploded munitions pose in post-conflict societies, and the Trump State Department’s decision to suspend aid and funding to global demining campaigns. Mark Williams: Matthew Breay Bolton is a professor of political science at Pace University, where he also co-directs the International Disarmament Institute. The author of several books, he's an expert on the United Nations, peacebuilding, disarmament, and the environmental consequences of weapons. He's also conducted extensive research on global demining campaigns, which are efforts to clear away and eliminate unexploded landmines and shells around the world. And in 2017, he was part of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Team, which won the Nobel Peace Prize. While visiting Middlebury as a scholar in residence, Matthew agreed to stop by and record an episode of New Frontiers. And given that in January 2025, the US abruptly ceased its aid and funding for global anti-mining campaigns, I feel really fortunate that he's here to help us think about and assess the ramifications of this new foreign policy. So, Matthew Bolton, welcome to New Frontiers. Matthew Bolton: Thank you so much for having me. Mark Williams: We're glad you're here. Let's start with your work on nuclear disarmament and how that culminated in the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. What led you to engage in this work in the first place, both as a researcher and then as an advocate? Matthew Bolton: Yeah. Thank you so much. And in some ways I think the story of my involvement in the international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, or ICAN, can help to illustrate the ways that ICAN has changed people's minds. Because when I was told by a friend of mine that I should get involved in a campaign to ban nuclear weapons without the nuclear weapons states, I actually laughed at him, and he said, no, hear me out. And the pitch that he made to me and that I would make to all of you is that we don't wait for those who are most responsible for a problem before making policy about that problem. And I had experience working in addressing the impact of weapons in communities that were affected by armed conflict in a variety of different ways, including, as you had mentioned, landmines, cluster munitions, unexploded ordnance–small arms and light weapons–and had seen the impact that international treaties and global processes could have on directing resources to communities that were most affected. And in some ways I failed to have the imagination to think about how those efforts at the kind of peripheries of militarism, the small weapons that did a lot of damage to ordinary people's lives but were not really strategically important (in quotation marks), how what we were doing there might apply to something bigger. And so he was saying, you know that the landmine ban treaty has been effective. So why don't you think we can do that with nuclear weapons? And I started to think about it and thought I respected the boldness of the pitch of the imagination behind it, and thought, why not? And so, that was sometime in 2013, about that. In 2014 I attended a meeting of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and began to see what ICAN was doing to advocate for a humanitarian and human rights based approach to nuclear weapons. And from there, I was hooked. I was convinced that this was a way to reframe the conversation. And I think, now that I look back on it, it seems so obvious to me, but I think there's a way that nuclear weapons are treated as if they are some magical, incomprehensible policy area that people who do other things like public health or environmental policy or humanitarian aid somehow shouldn't be involved in nuclear policy. I can't think of other kinds of areas of international public decision making where we hive it off so clearly other than nuclear weapons. And when you stop to kind of pause and think like why that is, I think it's because there is such a deep ideological structure around nuclear weapons that suggests that only extremely intelligent nuclear physicists and military personnel should ever be allowed into the room to discuss nuclear weapons. And we don't really have that about almost anything else. Mark Williams: I take your point. So let's talk about your experience as part of the team winning the prize. Was this something that was foreseen amongst members? Did it come as a surprise? Matthew Bolton: Of course it came as a surprise and there was some joking about it in 2017 as the Nobel Peace Prize was being discussed. For those who are involved in peace kind of issues, sometimes we watch to see who's going to get the next prize. And we weren't on the list. And there are actually bookies that take bets. And I do not bet on it, but we looked at the bookies. We were not even a bet that they would take. So, there was, yes, there was some jokes that, on text chains and stuff like that, but, so it was a big surprise. We woke up my spouse and I, Emily Welty, who's also here as a scholar in residence this week, and was also involved in ICAN. We woke up and I was making coffee and she picked up her phone that we hadn't looked at over the night, and it had hundreds of messages on it from people all over the world because it had been announced in Norway at the time that Norway wakes up. And in between the time that Norway woke up and when we woke up, there was many people offering their congratulations to us. And it was a strange day because in many ways we were a scrappy group of activists and advocates, and we had successfully persuaded the majority of the world's governments to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons. And I can say more about that in a bit and my, what I did with it, but you know, we were not states, we weren't civil servants. We didn't have a lot of money behind us. Mark Williams: How many were in the team? Matthew Bolton: There was many organizations that were involved, but in terms of the people who were in the room when we were negotiating day in and day out, probably about 30 or 40 people. And some of us were volunteers. Some of us are on NGO salaries and so we didn't really have an extensive press team. And you can imagine what that's like. And so a bunch of us met in Midtown Manhattan in a coworking space that belonged to someone else who was generous and said, you all need an office to meet in. Let me give you this. Our executive director flew in from Geneva overnight. And we were like, okay, now we have to come up with a press strategy. Looming before us was a press conference that we would need to have at the UN. And we were literally calling people at newsrooms at the major network saying, hi we won the Nobel Peace Prize. Do you wanna talk to us? Which was a series of extremely weird conversations that I'll never have again. And yet I think that indicates the kind of way that this was a somewhat ragtag band of people who nonetheless managed to persuade governments to coalesce around a treaty that not only bans nuclear weapons from a humanitarian and security point of view, which is a view that is shared by the majority of the world states, but it also includes a framework for assisting people who are most affected by nuclear weapons use and testing. And in that regard, it is unique among nuclear arms instruments. I think it is strange. If you think about the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty that was negotiated in the 1990s, and that was a ban on nuclear testing still not fully ratified or entered into force, but nonetheless is broadly observed. There's nothing in there about addressing the harm that nuclear testing did to communities where it happened. Even though the political mobilization to have the treaty emerged out of those communities, it was the social movements that really pushed for that. They're often written out of the story. And I think it's so strange. Again, it's sort of like the way that nuclear weapons as a policy area often don't resemble other policy areas in odd ways. It would be very rare, I think, to engage in a conversation about a policy problem and say like, we really shouldn't do anything for the people most affected by this. Or like, not even have the conversation about it, right. Mark Williams: Just not part of it at all. Matthew Bolton: Right. And the conversation is actually led by the people who did it, who were the problem. And the TBNW, the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons or the nuclear ban treaty, I think sort of began to shift who was in the room. Mark Williams: Really? Matthew Bolton: Yeah. In the sense that the nuclear armed states and their allies boycotted the process. But what that did, counterintuitively, was create a room in which those that have been blocking progress on this for the nuclear age were not there to block it. And so you had both the voice of the states most affected by nuclear testing, but also states that neither use nuclear weapons, have them, or were affected, but still have opinions about global security. And I'm thinking about the Caribbean states, CARICOM, which played a really important role in the negotiations in pushing for victim assistance and environmental remediation. And on some level you might be like, why do the Caribbean states care about this? But they care about solidarity with other small island states. They care about a world in which problems are created by states very far from them. And they want frameworks where there is a way to address those problems. What I'm most proud of in that work was that part of the treaty, and that was the work that I did with ICAN. Even though ICAN itself focused mostly on the banning of nuclear weapons, most of what I was doing during the negotiations was focused specifically on the victim assistance and environmental remediation provisions in it. Mark Williams: That's really amazing. That's great. An aspect of a solution to a problem that is much more comprehensive because it takes into account potential or real victims of said problem. That's wonderful. Can we talk a little bit about some of your earlier research? I know that prior to being on this Nobel Laureate team, some of your earlier research focused on the problem of post-conflict landmines. And so could you give a brief history of landmines and their use in war and then perhaps a brief history of some of the early international efforts to try and clean up unexploded ordnance? Matthew Bolton: The reason why I was interested in the victim assistance and remediation aspects of the nuclear issue was because I had been involved in similar conversations about landmines and cluster munitions and unexploded ordnance. And to provide some historical background landmines are explosive traps. And they can either be manufactured to be command detonated, which means that there's someone who is pushing a button, pulling a trigger, or remotely detonating it. Those are in the minority. Most landmines are victim detonated in the sense that they are triggered by the presence or the pressure of a person or an animal or a vehicle. And landmines were developed essentially in response to the tank in World War I. So as you have the development of mechanized warfare, there was a counter effort to try to slow it down. And landmines emerged as a technology. There had been predecessors or precursors in various kinds of traps and wire getting in the way. But landmines emerged out of World War I initially as a way to counter vehicles. And then as people learned how to demine and remove landmines, anti-personnel landmines were developed to try to deter the people trying to remove those anti-vehicular mines. These weapons in World War I were not widely used as tanks weren't either. But then as you move into World War II, there has been a kind of learning process, if you will. Mark Williams: Let me stop you for a moment to make sure that I have this clear. Anti-personnel mines were developed to deter demining efforts. Did I hear that right? Matthew Bolton: Yeah. So there's a strange kind of violent conversation happening between one set of weapons develops and another, and you see it in World War II with unexploded ordnance removal that, there was a kind of dialectic to use an academic word between arms manufacturers, which were trying to make bombs that would be difficult to diffuse and the people who were diffusing them, who would work out how to kind of make the device safe. But there was a lot of intelligence gathering about those people so that they could redesign weapons so that they would be tricky for the people who were diffusing them, would not be able to figure it out. Mark Williams: And initially the people who are trying to diffuse the bombs, this is not a coordinated effort to say demine a territory. This is something else. Matthew Bolton: This is like a scramble to figure out what to do. Right. If you think about the Mark Williams: So this is going on in the midst of the conflict, in the midst of the war, mines are being laid and then. Those for whom the mines have been laid are trying to figure out how to diffuse them and make them inert. Matthew Bolton: Right. So in the run up to World War II, there is a kind of beginning understanding of this. And in World War II, like literally thousands, maybe even millions of these things are laid. And my grandfather fought in North Africa in the British expeditionary force which was where you see the widespread use of mines and tanks for the first time in a very concerted way. And, in North Africa, I think you see also the emergence of all the problems that came later, because the allies would lay a minefield and then they might be forced to advance over the minefield that they themselves laid or retreat over it the next day. And so you get this strange like multiple layered minefield where people don't know whose mines are whose, where they are. The desert doesn't stay still. It moves and shifts with the winds and the people who were fighting there called them the Devil's Gardens. They're like these seeds that you put in the ground that they bear awful fruit and those mines that were laid there during the time when my grandfather was a young man, they're still killing people today. Often Bedouins who raise their herds in the desert are continuing to be killed. And I think this is what you see multiple times in many different conflicts. Landmines are often posited as a solution, quote unquote, to a problem of trying to slow down another adversary's advance. But it rarely does because militaries are often willing to take casualties. The people that it affects are civilians or your own people. And often decades after the war has stopped and maybe decades after the person who laid the mine is actually gone. And we see this repeated throughout history. Mark Williams: So these are weapons whose destructive potential casts very long shadows. Matthew Bolton: Yes. I think that's a really good way of putting it. Mark Williams: It’s difficult to escape the shadow of these weapons once they're planted in the ground. Matthew Bolton: Yeah. And then in the Cold War mines were often thrown in as an extra or like a special deal in an arms deal. So like, if you were buying a lot of weapons they might throw in as an incentive some landmines. Mark Williams: Really? Matthew Bolton: Yes. Mark Williams: Dare I ask who is selling these? Where would one purchase, get these large cashs of arms and have the mines tossed in? Matthew Bolton: Yeah, that's a good question. I think it was quite widespread across the industrialized world. And obviously the primary purveyors of these were the NATO states and the Warsaw PACT states. And where a lot of them ended up going was into the proxy conflicts. And there's a kind of strategic rationale to this, which is that in those proxy conflicts in, say, Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua there was often a government in power that the other side didn't like. And then the other side was sponsoring rebels ,who were often in a haven state next door. And so there was significant mining along the border, between wherever the rebels were hiding and wherever the government was. And again these mines rarely did significant strategic damage to either side. Mark Williams: Or rarely gave strategic advantage perhaps for a long period of time to either side. Matthew Bolton: And even where one might be able to make a military case, if I were to allow my opponents to speak into the room here for landmines, it might be in the very tightly constrained example of an ambush. But in that case you can just use a command-detonated mine, because otherwise you don't know that you put it in the right place. Afghanistan is a particularly horrific example where there are mines, multiple layers of mines from multiple conflicts since the 1980s that overwhelmingly kill civilians. And it is in that context, particularly in Cambodia and in Afghanistan and some of the other proxy conflicts too, Mozambique and Angola, that you see an emerging realization among humanitarian organizations that mines were blocking their ability to deliver aid. The International Committee of the Red Cross was receiving just horrific injuries in their field hospitals because landmines, particularly anti-personnel mines, are actually designed not to kill the person, because they're designed to do the most damage to a human body and not kill them. Because that's more expensive for the military to deal with. But when you have civilians that are getting hurt, sorry to be graphic, but the mine explodes, it often pushes dirt into the wound. And so there's a high degree of sepsis. So you really need very intensive care if you get hurt by a mine. And this is costing the Red Cross a lot of money. Right. Not to be crass about it, but they began to realize we should be trying to solve this problem upstream. Mark Williams: Instead of dealing with the effects we need to find a solution to the root problem. Matthew Bolton: Right. Yes. And there had been some international legal norms put in place in the eighties around landmines, but they were so loophole ridden. Mark Williams: Well, this is what I wanted to talk to you about. If we could go back just a bit. If landmines become more widespread in the Second World War, were there any early campaigns to try and eliminate some of these mines once the war had ended? Could we talk a little bit, if there is an example of that, a little bit about that, and then we'll move up to more modern campaigns? Matthew Bolton: Sure. It's remarkable that in the sixties and seventies there were mines being used, for instance, in Southeast Asia in the wars that the US calls the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese call the American War. And it's remarkable that you don't actually see much public outrage. And even from, say, the North Vietnamese government because mines were seen as a sort of legitimate weapon of war. And I think there's a way that you can trace an interesting conversation about international norms by looking at mines. There were some small spotty efforts, right, by a variety of different people to try to address it. Mark Williams: In Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, and perhaps Cambodia? Matthew Bolton: Yes. And sometimes they were connected to the militaries involved. There was also some intelligence gathering where some demining teams in Laos, where US demining teams were actually trying to gather intelligence on which cluster munitions were working and which weren't. So they were digging up the mines, the cluster bomblets, the unexploded ordnance in order to understand and improve weapons. Mark Williams: Why some were duds, and some were not. Matthew Bolton: Right? So I don't count that as a particularly humanitarian effort, and it wasn't very big. There was an effort by Quakers and Mennonites in Laos in the seventies and eighties to try to address the extensive cluster munition contamination. And this is, as an aside, landmine contamination exists side by side with the fact that many explosive weapons don't actually explode on impact. And so between three to even sometimes 30 percent of shells, cluster munitions, bombs don't explode and remain a kind of, a defacto landmine and often a very unstable one on the landscape. And that's true in Laos. And so the Quakers and the Mennonites were the only humanitarian organizations that were allowed to stay in Laos after the revolution. And so they really tried to figure out various strategies to address this, but they didn't have the technical capacity–and that's no disrespect to them; they've told me that–to really deal with it or the money really to be able to deal with it, and you see them struggling. There was an effort by some non-aligned states and also smaller states that might have been aligned with one side or the other in the Cold War but were somewhat critical, to try to encourage a review of how the international regulations on war addressed mines. There was a protocol negotiated in the eighties to try to address landmine contamination, but it was so loophole ridden that it didn't do anything to stop or stem the real crises in the late eighties and early nineties. Mark Williams: I see. Do you recall who made that proposal? Where it came from? Matthew Bolton: This is like a comps exam. It was Sweden. It was a Swedish proposal, but they had co-sponsors and I believe Egypt was one of their co-sponsors and there were some others. I'm not sure. Mark Williams: When it comes to more modern global demining programs, who is doing this work? Who are the main actors? Is it nonprofits and NGOs? Is it governments and states? Is it the United Nations? Who's involved in this? Matthew Bolton: All of the above. Mark Williams: Really, all of them? Matthew Bolton: But it's NGOs that begin, really, to innovate modern humanitarian demining. And that's a distinction that's made between military counter mining, or the purpose of military demining is often just to be able to create a space for militaries, forces to move through, and it's a somewhat inexact and imprecise effort. Their militaries are often willing to take some casualties, but that's not acceptable if you're trying to build a house right in a civilian area. So, humanitarian demining or civilian demining, or sometimes called humanitarian mine action is developed by nonprofits and some private security firms in the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s, where again the crisis of mines in these proxy conflicts become so obvious that some people who were former soldiers mostly began to innovate methods of clearance. And some of them were working in existing NGOs. Some of them started their own NGOs. Some of them were working in private security firms whose clients wanted clearance for some commercial reason. Mark Williams: Were these efforts that began in certain regions of the world? Matthew Bolton: Yes. So particularly in Afghanistan, and in Cambodia. And then after the Gulf War in Kuwait. But, these efforts also attracted the attention of states and the United Nations. And so the UN moved into Afghanistan to provide a kind of umbrella for the humanitarian effort there and to provide funding and coordination and technical assistance. So you see a mix. Mark Williams: With respect to Afghanistan, are you talking about the period after the Soviet occupation withdrawal? Are you talking about a more recent period? Matthew Bolton: Actually before the Soviet Union had withdrawn. Just before. I think the earliest kind of concerted effort I've been able to track is some efforts that were done in 87, both in Kabul, which was Soviet occupied, but also on the Pakistani side, kind of associated with the US Saudi funded effort against that. And so on both sides of the lines, there were efforts to try to begin a demining process. Then, as you have the end of the Cold War, the end of apartheid you have a sudden drawdown of military forces. And what that meant is there's a lot of people with military training who know a lot about bombs who are looking for a job. Mark Williams: They're no longer in their nation's military, armed forces. Matthew Bolton: Yes. And a lot of them end up in demining for a variety of different reasons. And then there's this emerging attention. What's fascinating about that is they began to pay close attention to how mines actually function–the actual work that they do in the world, if I can put that in quotation marks–and it's very different from what military forces had said they would do. Mark Williams: Please elaborate. Matthew Bolton: Well, the idea that mines could somehow slow an advance, you can see it doesn't happen. The idea that mines are a military weapon, when in fact they are an object of terror for civilians, right? The people who are being killed and being affected by it are civilians that you see over and over again, all this evidence emerging from demining programs. That's quite damning; the idea that mines would be a legitimate weapon of war. The Red Cross is coming to similar conclusions. And then you also have human rights NGOs, disability NGOs, and disability associations who are also coming to similar conclusions, and a group of them meet in New York in the early 1990s and form the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and are led by your fellow Vermonter Jody Williams. And they in the space of essentially five years, from 1992 to 1997, revolutionized how states thought about landmines, but also humanitarian law. Because they encouraged states that had to follow the line of their respective Cold War blocks to pursue an independent path, to like argue that there was a value in pursuing a comprehensive ban on mines and a treaty that might include obligations to demine and assist victims. And they persuaded Canada to be the champion. And this was really unusual because in the Cold War, arms control negotiations were led by the US and the Soviet Union. And when there was a more distributed role, it was in the United Nations, and this was outside the UN convened by Canada and with kind of important roles played by Ireland, Norway, South Africa. And these were not countries that played a big role in the earlier negotiations. And so they also invited NGOs into the room. Allowed them to speak on the floor. And this is just not done even today in many disarmament negotiations. This is really unusual, and the expert information was in the hands of humanitarian organizations, not in the hands of states. Mark Williams: As opposed to being restricted to state officials. Matthew, I know that you've studied the US experience in global demining. Various efforts pretty extensively and particularly in Afghanistan, but also Bosnia and Sudan. And so I wanted to ask you about your research into those cases. What are some of the main takeaways that your research provides and were efforts more successful or more effective in one location as opposed to another? And if so what might explain that? Matthew Bolton: I did a comparison in my PhD of US and Norwegian foreign assistance for demining. And what I found was in both cases for both countries where they had really high strategic interests at stake, they often didn't make very good decisions about demining. And often people critique the US for its behavior. And praise Norway, right? But Norway made similar mistakes when its own strategic interests were really at stake. And the mistakes they made were often focusing on demining what wasn't really best for the people who were on the ground. Often using private security firms that put commercial interests before humanitarian interests. One of the side studies I did was a comparison of commercial entities and NGOs, and I found that commercial demining often had more accidents and quality problems, more than the big NGOs in particular. And this is not all across the board, but as a general trend. And also NGOs would actively select more difficult, more important tasks than commercial entities. Mark Williams: What do you think was the driver behind those differences? Matthew Bolton: Commercial organizations have to make money. The best case scenario for a commercial demining company is to be assigned a task that is a flat field with very little vegetation and that you can see the edges and that there are really good maps of it and that there's actually no mines there at all, but people think there might be because you can get through that really fast comparatively speaking. But that might not be the most valuable land for a community, or the land that is causing the most humanitarian impact. And so for instance in Bosnia, Norwegian People's Aid, which is an NGO, actively picked some of the most tricky and dangerous tasks in the country on purpose, because their motto talks about solidarity. They had long-term funding. And they had staff that they kept on long-term contracts. So the staff had some sense of loyalty, and assurance that they had health insurance that was good. And so people are willing to take a little bit more of a risk. And and so they were doing things like demining apartment buildings in downtown Sarajevo, which is just extraordinarily dangerous. And did it with very few accidents. Which is an indication of the care and attention to management, if you're trying to make money, this is not to say that the companies that I was looking at are necessarily mal-intentioned, they're just looking for where you can shave money. And often that has a material impact. Mark Williams: How are the locations for demining decided? Is it the NGOs that decide; they have a list of priorities and they select the region, the country? Is it the commercial organization that makes the selection? How does that process take place? Matthew Bolton: Yeah, it's a big mix. Ideally you would hope that there will be an inclusive, meaningful process of participation with the communities most affected. Sometimes that happens. Sometimes it's who has the most money. Sometimes that is the big military force, peacekeeping force, or occupying force that's there that has the money to prioritize certain things. Sometimes it's a non-governmental organization or the UN that has managed to get grants or long-term funding that they can really think through, where are there blockages to market access or to be able to get to farmland or to address the concerns of people trying to return home after a conflict. Mark Williams: Are governments ever involved in that? Matthew Bolton: They should be, yes. And often they are. Yes. Mark Williams: So, a government whose territory has been littered with mines in some regions can seek the assistance of one of these NGOs or some other organization? Matthew Bolton: And the landmine ban treaty that was successfully negotiated in 1997 enables landmine affected countries to seek international cooperation and assistance to address their mine problems. And billions of dollars have been raised through that initiative and that's, I think, the greatest achievement of the mine ban treaty. Besides largely stopping the use of mines in warfare in most places, it also directed money to places which were most affected. And I should say, to finish the story of the US and Norway, where their strategic interests were a little less tightly held, both of them could be really good actors at providing assistance to communities that were affected. And I think one of the stories that I would like to tell is that the United States through the persuasion and advocacy efforts of people from Southeast Asia who, or of Southeast Asian heritage here in the United States, have persuaded the US to actively engage in addressing the problem that it had contributed to. And significant increases in funding, bipartisan support for it in Congress and within the executive branch over multiple administrations for addressing the impact of the contamination that the US and other actors had caused in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. And it is such a shame that has been frozen this year. Mark Williams: Matthew Bolton, thank you so much for coming to Middlebury and visiting with us on New Frontiers. In part two of our discussion, you’ll hear more from Matthew about the ethical, political, and strategic implications of a US withdrawal from global demining campaigns.