Latest / MCA Scuttlebutt / #196: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War with Dr. Ben Connable

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#196: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War with Dr. Ben Connable · MCA Scuttlebutt

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Hey, Scuttlebutt listeners. This is episode 196.
1:48
This week, we welcome adjunct professor at Georgetown
1:51
University,
1:52
executive director for Battle Study Research Group, and
1:55
author of the book Ground Combat, Puncturing the
1:57
Myth of Modern War, doctor Ben Conable to
2:00
the show.
2:02
Ben is a retired marine intelligence and Middle
2:04
East foreign area officer,
2:06
was formerly a senior political scientist at the
2:09
RAND Corporation,
2:10
and a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic
2:12
Council.
2:14
Ben talks to us about his experiences in
2:16
uniform and as a foreign area officer,
2:18
the impetus behind the writing of his book,
2:21
and the empirical research he and his team
2:23
at the Battle Research Group are doing to
2:25
help improve
2:26
the collective understanding of modern warfare.
2:29
Ben speaks candidly and authoritatively,
2:32
and it was fascinating to get his thoughts
2:34
on the current course of military thinking.
2:37
Here is episode 196.
2:40
Hey, Scott O'Bart listeners. Thank you for joining
2:42
us in your continued support. I'm Vic. I'm
2:44
here with William. Howdy. And, we're really excited
2:47
to be welcoming Ben Conable to the show.
2:49
Sir, thank you so much for being here.
2:51
Very happy to be here. Yeah. This is
2:52
great.
2:53
This was actually an easy yes for us
2:57
for scheduling,
2:58
because you came referred to us by Tom
3:00
Schuman,
3:01
friend of the show. And
3:03
without even
3:04
really looking into it, like, yeah, let's get
3:06
let's get him on. And then
3:08
looking at everything you've done, really excited
3:12
to have you on,
3:14
because
3:16
of the not only your experience in the
3:18
Marine Corps,
3:20
going from, you know, enlisted to officer,
3:23
places you've been
3:25
extremely pivotal, not only in Marine Corps history,
3:28
but geopolitical,
3:30
the landscape as we see it now.
3:33
But also you've got this book coming out.
3:35
You seem like a real
3:39
freethinker
3:40
seems a little trite,
3:42
but you're not afraid to oppose sort of
3:45
conventional thinking.
3:46
And so really
3:48
excited to kind of dive into a lot
3:51
of that,
3:53
really critical thinking about
3:55
a lot of the axioms and and the
3:59
cultures that we assume are ubiquitous
4:01
throughout time. So,
4:04
yeah. Again, thank you so much for coming
4:06
down, Battling Traffic, and and being here with
4:08
us today. Yeah. Yeah. Well, I I I
4:10
I prefer, professionally blunt. Yeah. For sure. Yeah.
4:13
Yes. Right. That's right. You can work with
4:15
that. Yeah. That,
4:16
it it doesn't do well for retweets. But
4:19
yeah. You're Yeah. No.
4:21
Well, really quick. So just,
4:23
to sort of level the playing field on
4:25
who doctor Ben Conable is, your, adjunct professor
4:29
professor at, Georgetown University
4:32
security studies program,
4:34
also part time principal research scientist at the
4:37
Center for Naval Analyses
4:38
and a senior research adviser at the DT
4:41
Institute here in DC,
4:43
a retired Marine Corps intelligence officer,
4:47
a Middle East, North African Foreign Area Officer.
4:50
And,
4:52
in,
4:53
o six and o nine,
4:55
you co led the Marine Corps culture intelligence
4:59
program, which I think is an empty building
5:01
now, but I Kayokel,
5:03
correct,
5:04
is what we we've known for us
5:07
gray beards. So it would have been Kayokel.
5:08
Is that right? So I was a plank
5:10
holder for Kayokel. I was the cultural intel
5:12
program lead with marine corps intelligence activity. Oh,
5:14
okay. But, yeah, Kayokel
5:16
Yeah. I think it's I think that was
5:18
the pronunciation. Terrible
5:19
accuracy. Yeah. Yeah. But, yeah, they're they're now
5:22
defunct. Yeah. Yeah. Which is just awful.
5:25
We had had talked, I think, with, Colonel
5:28
Woodbridge, our, editor in chief last time he
5:30
was on the show
5:34
about, sort of some of the programs that
5:36
really seem to be leaning into,
5:39
at least a cultural understanding, you know, signing
5:41
officers out of TBS regions. They had to,
5:44
you know, sort of show proficiency in throughout
5:46
their careers. That has gone away.
5:50
And it it seems like we've sort of
5:53
laid the groundwork for this, oh, shit moment
5:55
where we're gonna, like, oh, I wish we
5:57
had some cultural area people or regional
6:00
expertise. We should
6:01
talking standing forces,
6:04
and,
6:05
you know, sort of alone and unafraid,
6:08
immersed within these cultures as we try to,
6:11
you know, battle near peer.
6:13
That stuff, it's gonna be like, wow. I
6:15
really wish we had some cultural expertise out
6:17
there that we had started at a younger,
6:20
you know, younger age or whatever. But, anyhow,
6:23
so, obviously, you've got the pedigree.
6:26
Really excited to dive in,
6:28
on all of your experiences, DLI,
6:33
sort of talent management,
6:35
and then your book, Ground Combat and all
6:38
of the, like you said, sort of
6:41
unpacking a lot of the assumptions that we
6:43
assume about character war, nature
6:45
war, and this sort
6:48
of chasing the bright blue you know, the
6:50
bright light all the time. Like, oh, drones
6:53
and tech and
6:55
some of the things. We were talking before
6:57
we came in.
6:58
I was taking the quiz that's on your
7:00
website.
7:01
You're not doing very well on it. So
7:03
I think you're gonna learn us all something
7:05
today. So,
7:07
really long way of leading into
7:09
what was your,
7:11
experience pre marine corps? Like, why the marine
7:14
corps? Was it,
7:16
you saw, like,
7:18
the marine ethos was just calling to you,
7:21
or was it like, I could do this
7:23
or
7:24
go work at
7:26
I am I am the greatest,
7:29
recruiting office sucker story, you know, poster child.
7:33
They could probably actually put me on a
7:35
poster with a picture of me looking at
7:37
those little tiles. Yeah. The benefit tags. Oh,
7:39
that's right. So I walked I knew I
7:41
wanted to serve and I I, I just,
7:43
you know, was like, the heck with it
7:45
and went down to the recruiting station.
7:47
What area was this? New York. Okay. Yeah.
7:49
I dropped out of college, went to the
7:51
recruiting center, and,
7:54
you know, I went to the army and
7:55
they're like, oh, we can get you, you
7:57
know,
7:58
money for college and that kind of stuff.
8:00
I walked by the navy guy and, you
8:02
know, he didn't look it just wasn't impressive
8:04
to me, and I'll keep it that way.
8:07
And then I went to the marine
8:09
recruiter's office and he looked up and he
8:11
just couldn't have cared less that I was
8:12
there. At least did a really good job
8:14
of convincing me of that. Yeah. Yeah. And,
8:16
what are you doing here? And then threw
8:18
the tiles out. And if you've never done
8:21
those tiles before, it's
8:23
what matters most to you, and it's honor
8:25
and service,
8:26
and then money is there too. And so
8:28
I stacked them all up and put, of
8:30
course, honor and service. Yeah. Yeah. And money
8:33
last, and he did a pause very dramatic
8:36
and stared at me and said, you're exactly
8:38
what we're looking for. And that was it.
8:40
I was hooked, you know, immediately. Of course,
8:42
I I I'm sure that was what rehearsed.
8:44
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. No. That's great. Yeah. I
8:46
they sort of they did the
8:49
the counter thing for me when I same
8:51
thing.
8:52
Look in what I wanna do. Everybody's offering
8:54
me, you know, special forces, money for college,
8:56
whatever. And then the oh so was like,
8:59
I don't know if we could get you
9:00
in. Like, we're kinda stacked up right now.
9:01
I was like, oh, yeah, motherfucker. Let's watch
9:04
this.
9:05
Hold my beer. Yeah.
9:09
So,
9:10
so then you you sign up and, if
9:12
I Celestia, you're a machine gunner. Is that
9:15
right? You went you went o three? I
9:17
did. Yeah.
9:18
You know, I was probably the worst machine
9:20
gunner in the marine corps because I came
9:22
out of Barrack City. I was at the
9:23
camp Camp David. Okay. Yeah. Ethan and I,
9:26
for my first tour. It was that was
9:28
really interesting because it was right in the
9:29
middle of the crack, epidemic in the late
9:31
eighties. Okay. And we were doing security on
9:33
the streets in Southeast DC. About to say
9:36
Southeast DC. That's a Tight crew there,
9:39
of marines from Eighth And Ninth, Camp David.
9:41
I'm still in close contact with a lot
9:43
of them.
9:44
That was from the late eighties.
9:46
Then I went out to 39,
9:48
when I was, you know, I was like
9:50
a barracks corporal, and so, yeah, I got
9:52
deservedly got no respect.
9:55
And and, I was in the Gulf War
9:57
though in in with three nine Okay. Task
10:00
force papa bear. I got to
10:02
the I was in colonel then then lieutenant
10:05
Frank Donovan, now lieutenant general Frank Donovan's platoon,
10:09
and it was he was, he was terrific.
10:12
Some really solid marines, and, you know, we
10:14
did our job. And is that where you're
10:16
sort of, like,
10:18
like, were you reading the tea leaves of
10:20
as far as, like, your the marines involvement
10:22
in The Middle East?
10:24
Is that what led you to that or
10:26
no? It was just, like, I Give me
10:28
the hell out of here. 19 year old
10:29
knucklehead.
10:30
You know, I think I was maybe 20
10:32
by the time I went out there. I
10:33
mean, it was no. I was just along
10:35
for the ride. And I volunteered. It was
10:37
it was kind of a funny story. I
10:38
was actually I had orders
10:40
to two nine and back then a corporal
10:42
would tell you where you were going. You
10:43
know, you would check-in. It was all paperwork.
10:45
Yeah. And he said, well, where you're going
10:46
to 29. I go, well, but I'm a
10:48
I had gone to an,
10:50
chemical biological defense course at Camp David and
10:53
they go, oh, well, we're gonna need you
10:54
and he just immediately switched my orders right
10:56
then and there. 29 was the only battalion
10:58
that didn't deploy if I remember correctly.
11:00
Okay. Well, they have good choice then. Right?
11:02
Yeah. Yeah. So then you went MECEP
11:05
directly after? Is that I did. Sort of
11:07
the promotion?
11:08
Yeah. And, that that is a terrific program.
11:11
It's a marine enlisted commissioning education program, basically
11:14
NCO to officer. Yeah. And I went to
11:16
the University of Colorado.
11:18
But I I will credit my experience even
11:21
as a kind of a crappy NCO,
11:24
to giving me the mindset that you alluded
11:26
to at the beginning of the podcast, which
11:27
is, you know, this be blunt and be
11:30
straightforward.
11:31
Be critical. Don't be afraid to speak your
11:34
mind. But if you if you do speak
11:36
your mind, have a plan Mhmm.
11:38
Of action to to make up for it.
11:40
So, you know, have a recommendation.
11:43
And as long as you come in with
11:45
a recommendation, as long as you're professional, then
11:47
you're doing the right thing. And so I
11:49
carried that with me through the MECEP program,
11:52
into into my time as an officer. Okay.
11:55
Nice. Yeah. And and just for those who
11:57
aren't aware, the MECEP program is an opportunity
12:00
for
12:02
enlisted marines,
12:04
to
12:05
be awarded
12:06
essentially a
12:08
college
12:09
scholarship
12:10
with
12:11
stipend for housing and and food, BRCBAH,
12:16
and non competitive promotion while you're in the
12:18
program
12:19
with a payback tour. Obviously,
12:22
once you're through,
12:23
if I had known about this as a
12:25
young man, I probably wouldn't have gone to
12:27
college. It's such a
12:29
fantastic
12:30
thing. And I encouraged when I was a
12:32
platoon commander, company commander, or even battalion XL,
12:35
like, let's use because in a lot of
12:37
ways, the the
12:40
the screening process is really can you get
12:42
the package together. Like, that's where you get
12:44
most of your attrition.
12:46
And especially now, there's so many universities
12:48
offering this program.
12:51
Yeah, if if you're listening and and
12:53
you're considering college, you feel like you have
12:55
to get out of the Marine Corps to
12:56
do it, you do not look into MICEP.
12:59
It's an unbelievable, unbelievable program. Yeah. I agree.
13:02
I can't say enough about it. Yeah.
13:04
So great. So then,
13:07
Intel then. So you go to TBS
13:10
quality thirds. Was it Oh, no. I I
13:12
I wound up getting,
13:14
military police because I was I think I
13:16
was I was, like,
13:18
aiming squarely at the bottom of the top
13:20
third. Yes. That's right. And I was, you
13:22
know, terrified. Top of the bottom, actually. Yeah.
13:24
I had, like, this
13:27
kernel of fear that I was gonna be
13:29
put into an MOS that I definitely did
13:30
not want. I won't list any of those,
13:33
but you you all know who you are.
13:35
And, so there were only two ways out,
13:37
Intel and MP. And because I had been,
13:39
Ethan and I Okay. And he was a
13:42
possibility. So I actually was a military police
13:44
officer for, for my first tour. Okay. Lap
13:47
moved then into Intel? Is that I lap
13:49
moved later. Yeah. Mhmm. Very cool. And then,
13:52
once you're in that pipeline, then DLI
13:54
followed suit? Or I I simultaneously applied for
13:57
the foreign area officer program fail and a
14:00
lat move into intel, and I got both
14:02
approved at the same time Oh, wow. Coming
14:04
out of a tour in Okinawa, where I
14:06
had been lucky to be on the fourth
14:07
marine staff, which was amazing, you know, just
14:10
kind of full immersion into the Pacific Theater
14:12
Yeah. Yeah. Life. Interesting.
14:15
So yeah. So the this old these thing
14:17
these cards just sort of fell on a
14:18
place then. It wasn't sort of premeditated like,
14:22
hey. I've been I had no no premeditation
14:24
for anything in my life. And so this
14:25
is one of the things I I tell
14:27
students and people that I I sometimes mentor
14:29
now as an older guy.
14:32
You just sink yourself into whatever's in front
14:33
of you, with a fanaticism. You know, you
14:36
just drive
14:37
completely
14:38
drive yourself into the deck, you know, focused
14:41
on the thing right in front of you
14:42
and and commit fully to the organization that
14:44
you're with now. And don't worry about what
14:46
comes next. Because if you do if you
14:48
do the right thing in the present, it
14:51
it'll all pay off. Yeah. So No. That's
14:53
great words. I I kinda yeah. I
14:56
had this really,
14:58
horrible characteristic of always looking at the like,
15:01
what's next even while I'm still learning what
15:04
the hell it is I'm doing. I'm already,
15:06
like, thinking about what's next.
15:08
So yeah. No. That's great. ADHD helps with
15:10
that.
15:13
And then so as your experience as a
15:15
foreign area officer,
15:17
I wanna say that,
15:19
and I might be jumping ahead to your
15:20
career, but you were
15:22
the,
15:23
attache
15:24
in Jordan? Yeah. I was jumping ahead. So
15:26
I I did,
15:27
I I went to Naval Postgraduate School, got
15:29
my degree, got my language training at DLI,
15:32
went to Cairo,
15:34
for a year, traveled around The Middle East,
15:36
which is great. So that's the
15:38
phase. Pre nine eleven?
15:39
That was nine eleven happened while I was
15:41
at Arabic language. Oh, wow. Okay. So it
15:43
was a bit of a How was that,
15:45
actually? Like yeah. How was like,
15:47
is this one of these, like,
15:50
oh, shit. This is now I get granted
15:52
you're already of a combat vet, but, I
15:53
mean,
15:55
I for me, 09/11,
15:58
because I came in through the Clinton era,
16:01
was not something that was, like, quite literally
16:04
on the radar.
16:05
Yep. So it was very
16:07
shocking, and
16:09
things got very real very quickly.
16:12
You being at DLI as
16:15
a as a Middle East you know, future
16:17
Middle East fail and Arabic
16:19
student.
16:20
What was that like for you? Like, were
16:22
you just like, my business is about to
16:24
get a lot busier. Yeah. Yeah. No. We
16:25
all were. I mean, because I was in
16:26
the Arab Arabic,
16:28
you know, cohort there. Yeah. And, you know,
16:30
we had a lot of young students in
16:32
there, and we had some conversations with, like,
16:33
this is it. We're very clearly going to
16:35
war now. Yeah. Everybody immediately knew that we
16:37
were we were going to war.
16:39
The base, you know, there was even concern
16:41
all the way out in Monterey, California that
16:43
we're gonna get attacked, which, you know, in
16:45
retrospect, it's a little bit silly, but the
16:47
feeling was very real. Mhmm.
16:49
And, you know, we transitioned to a wartime
16:51
footing almost almost, on a dime.
16:54
Jeez. Yeah. I can only imagine. So alright.
16:56
So, yeah, so now you're in the middle
16:58
you're in Egypt?
17:00
Sort of. Egypt,
17:02
and then I went back to headquarters Marine
17:04
Corps as an intel officer,
17:06
and was at was a Middle East Desk
17:08
Officer there at headquarters Marine Corps. And then
17:10
I just volunteered to deploy one time after
17:12
another Okay.
17:14
Into into Iraq. And I got to do
17:16
the march up, with the division forward
17:19
command post and then I returned into Anbar,
17:22
with general Mattis as his cultural advisor and
17:25
as an intel ops officer with general
17:28
then lieutenant colonel Gruen, retired
17:30
three star now.
17:32
And then my last tour, I was the
17:34
senior intel officer in Anbar Province,
17:37
working for Pete Devlin. What year was that?
17:40
So I invasion o three, then o four
17:43
for the
17:44
the Anbar tour sort of right there. Was
17:46
that Flusia Ramadi? Yeah. Okay. I was in
17:49
I was at Camp Blue Diamond in Ramadi.
17:51
And then,
17:52
in o five, o '6, I was back
17:54
as the Intel I'll start with Ramadi in
17:56
Flusia then. Okay. Yeah. Wow. They really you've
17:58
really wrecked and stacked it. Yeah. Yeah. What
18:01
was it like in Egypt,
18:03
post nine eleven?
18:04
I've really never talked to anyone who was
18:07
in that area. Like, what were the
18:10
I guess, what were our ally regional allies?
18:12
Like, how was what was the fuel?
18:16
Stunned,
18:16
I think, would be the right term. I
18:18
mean, it was it was vacant. I mean,
18:19
this is a this is a part of
18:21
the world that thrives on tourism. Yeah. And
18:24
so Egypt, Jordan, all the countries that I
18:26
was traveling to had this huge tourism deficit.
18:28
I mean, I went I went to the
18:29
Valley Of Kings,
18:30
and I was the only one there. I
18:32
went to, you know, every every place I
18:34
went, it was like I had the whole
18:35
the whole world to myself.
18:37
So as a tourist,
18:39
which was part of my job to go
18:41
travel around,
18:42
was it was fantastic, but it was terrible
18:45
for their economies. I mean, they probably still
18:47
haven't recovered from it.
18:48
And psychologically,
18:50
I you know, this is an important thing
18:52
to keep in mind as we deal with
18:54
the Canadians and Europeans and Mexicans now,
18:59
is that in my experience historically,
19:02
also I think in literature, if you engage
19:05
with people directly point to point, they'll tell
19:07
you, look, I have no issue with you.
19:10
It's your government.
19:11
That was the same mindset after 09:11 as
19:13
well. Okay.
19:15
Was there you know, because one of the
19:17
really salacious things that,
19:21
media outlets were doing here
19:24
were showing
19:25
sort of the Arab. And I use air
19:28
quotes for because you can't see what I'm
19:29
doing. But the and I I put Arab
19:32
in air quotes because
19:34
the media at that time sort of portrayed
19:36
anybody who was brown and not from South
19:39
America as Arab. Right.
19:41
And so they were showing sort of the
19:43
Arab response in at eleven. Of course, it
19:46
was the
19:47
most
19:48
sort of
19:51
flag
19:51
rallying sort of depictions. What was your experience?
19:56
Because I've heard from folks who,
19:59
you know, that there was actually a a
20:01
really a a sense of
20:04
of sadness and for you know, being really
20:06
forlorn over the thing, kind of already understanding
20:10
what the response is going to be like
20:11
and what its effect on their lives are
20:13
gonna That's a better description. Yeah. Look, I
20:15
mean, it's
20:17
it's average people. It's normal people going about
20:19
their daily lives.
20:21
They don't walk around for the most part
20:24
harboring
20:25
animosity and screaming
20:27
into cameras. I mean, that's Yeah. That's a
20:29
soda straw view, and it's a very select
20:31
one too. No. I didn't experience any of
20:33
that. Yeah. It's fascinating stuff.
20:37
Okay. And then so then, you leave the
20:39
marine corps, and then that's you and then
20:41
oh. Well, then I did
20:43
so my last, couple tours, I was
20:46
at Marine Corps Intelligence Activity here on Quantico,
20:49
which was great. I I really enjoyed it.
20:51
Great learning experience. I got to work with
20:53
some incredibly smart folks. And then my last
20:55
tour,
20:56
I I was in Natache, which was also
20:58
terrific. That was incredible. I mean, I had
20:59
one great tour after another. Yeah. And then,
21:02
yeah. Well, I was at the embassy in
21:03
Algiers for a little bit, and then I
21:05
went to Amman, Jordan for eighteen months as
21:07
a marine and naval attache. And that's how
21:09
I closed out my career. Yeah. You know,
21:11
I can't say enough. My all of my
21:13
experience with the Jordanians has been just absolutely
21:16
outstanding. You
21:19
know, obviously, they were just an absolute
21:22
key ally,
21:24
during the long war, especially, you know, with
21:27
us. And and I was out
21:29
in even though I was in
21:31
Anbar sort of
21:33
along Wadi Heron there at, Wuhayat, we still,
21:38
had a lot of interactions
21:39
out west in just the Jordanian intelligence and
21:43
stuff that they we were
21:45
they were feeding us and cooperation we had,
21:47
like a KV and all kinds of stuff.
21:49
It was just unbelievable.
21:51
And then I worked with some Jordanians when
21:53
I was in UAE as well and just
21:56
I can't say enough about that partnership and
21:58
and everything that they did enabling us to
22:01
do our mission. So They're real professionals, and
22:03
I still count a lot of them as
22:05
very close friends. I go back frequently.
22:08
Still stay heavily engaged in that area and
22:10
also in Iraq too.
22:11
But I may or may not have crossed
22:13
over the border at one point. Isn't that
22:15
tache to say hi to some marine friends
22:17
on the other side. Nice. Yeah. That was
22:19
fun. If it happened, it may not happen.
22:21
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. But there was a
22:23
really sharp colonel on the Jordanian side working
22:25
that border in a very tense time, and
22:27
I know there was a lot of great
22:29
support there. Great. That's that's so cool. So
22:31
how do you transition from the Marine Corps
22:33
and then to academia? Terribly.
22:37
I had no plan, even though I had
22:39
a family, my wife and a kid on
22:40
the way. I'd I'd really I
22:43
did what I always done, which is
22:45
ADHD committed myself to the job at hand.
22:48
And, I will tell you, if you're retiring,
22:50
don't ever do it from overseas.
22:52
Yeah. Really, really challenging
22:54
to do it. Does UAE
22:56
and FifthMed was my Yeah. Really brutal. But
22:59
I got I got really lucky. I I
23:00
was asked to speak at a workshop on
23:02
Anbar Province,
23:04
with Ray Gerber. Some of the listeners may
23:06
know who Ray is.
23:07
And just so happened there's a guy from
23:09
the Rand Corporation there, and he was listening
23:12
to me talk about Anbar, which was, you
23:13
know, one of my areas of expertise.
23:15
And he said, what are you doing? And
23:16
I said, I don't have a plan. He
23:18
goes, send me your CV. And two days
23:20
later, I had a job at Rand. Wow.
23:22
Yeah. It was amazing. That was really amazing.
23:24
And that that that went on to be
23:26
a terrific experience as well.
23:27
And then, you're still focusing in The Middle
23:30
East then through Rand,
23:32
or Diversified.
23:34
I mean, Rand one of the great things
23:36
about Rand so if any if anybody's unfamiliar
23:38
with it, it's a federally it has within
23:40
it federally funded research
23:42
and development centers,
23:44
which are kind of like half government, half
23:46
private,
23:48
research entities.
23:49
And so it it's a flattish
23:52
organization. It gives you an amazing opportunity to
23:55
work on many different areas. So I was
23:57
doing a lot yeah, I was doing a
23:58
lot of Middle East stuff, but I was
23:59
doing insurgency, counterinsurgency
24:01
theory, counterterrorism,
24:03
conventional warfare,
24:04
Middle East I'm sorry, Asia.
24:07
I got to travel all over the world.
24:09
I did a lot of Afghanistan work when
24:11
that
24:13
heated up. So,
24:14
no, it was a
24:16
really fascinating diverse intellectual experience and I got
24:18
to engage what was really great about it
24:20
is I stayed engaged
24:22
with Marines, with soldiers
24:24
on a routine basis. I got to go
24:25
out around the country and around the world
24:27
interviewing them,
24:29
and being in the field with them and
24:30
seeing
24:31
things through their eyes, which was which I
24:34
then tried to convey back to the policy
24:36
makers in DC. That's cool. Yeah. When we
24:38
mentioned,
24:39
before we started recording that you were doing
24:42
actual,
24:44
classes and briefings
24:47
for units that were working up, right? So
24:49
like we were talking about Afghanistan. So you
24:51
were actually working with those units that were
24:53
in the chute. Yeah. And I was lucky
24:55
to have amazing
24:56
Afghan real Afghan experts. I was not one,
24:59
but, Arturo Munoz and Dave Phillips,
25:01
they're,
25:02
talking to these bringing them out to speak
25:04
with marines and soldiers before they deployed.
25:06
Hopefully, we helped a little bit. Yeah. I've
25:09
yeah. I I got a when I my
25:12
brought to Afghanistan,
25:14
I was, I and I
25:16
in Jacksonville
25:17
got orders, and I was told, but don't
25:20
get a apartment. You're leaving, like, in two
25:22
weeks. Yeah. So I didn't get a lot
25:24
of that kinda workup stuff. But based off
25:26
of the performance of the marines, they were
25:28
definitely ready to go.
25:30
I think I was the one holding them
25:31
back. But,
25:33
so how did you end up then at
25:34
Georgetown?
25:36
Part of, part of being at Rand is
25:38
there are actually quite a few Rand folks
25:40
that teach as adjunct at Georgetown, and I
25:42
somebody suggested it, and I got invited over.
25:45
And, I've been teaching there for over ten
25:47
years now. I only teach one class a
25:49
year. I started out with insurgency and counterinsurgency,
25:52
and then I created a course on human
25:53
behavior and war centered on some work on
25:56
the will to fight Yeah. That I had
25:57
led at Rand in the last, I think,
26:00
seven years that I was there.
26:02
But I really Georgetown is also a terrific
26:04
institution. Sounds like an interesting course. Who do
26:06
you have, like, on your syllabus for recommended
26:08
reading for that? So I have two books.
26:12
One is,
26:13
Inside the Insurgency. I can't I'm sorry. The
26:16
name's escaping me at the moment. The Algerian
26:17
Insurgency by Zora Dreif.
26:19
The title is wrong, but,
26:21
it's a female insurgence
26:24
kind of autobiographical
26:25
explanation of what the insurgency was like. And
26:28
it's really her her book was the the,
26:30
inspiration for the movie, The Battle of Algiers,
26:32
if you've if you've ever seen it. Yeah.
26:35
And then the other one is Lord Moran's
26:36
Anatomy of Courage, which any marine should read.
26:40
It should be if if it's not on
26:41
the common knowledge reading list, it should be
26:42
on the common knowledge reading list. Yeah. And
26:44
then I've I overload I've been told I
26:46
overload the students with,
26:48
everything else because I want them to read
26:50
all of them. Yeah. Perfect. Well, we've asked,
26:52
I think, a lot of the, Vik has
26:53
asked a lot of the good cop questions.
26:55
Now it's it's bad cop time. You,
26:57
you currently, have a book that's coming out
26:59
in, this month. Correct? March? It's out. It's
27:01
out. It's out. Perfect. Alright. Go get it.
27:03
But, so the title is Ground Combat Puncturing
27:05
the Myths of Modern War. So just for
27:07
our audience's sake,
27:09
quickly just address, you know, what question what
27:13
gap in academia were you trying to answer
27:15
or fill?
27:16
What's your thesis? And then we can go
27:18
from there.
27:19
When I was at Rand,
27:21
I, you know, I was
27:22
repeatedly
27:23
frustrated
27:24
by
27:25
the lack of kind of constructive analysis of
27:27
modern warfare. We had a lot of kind
27:29
of deep dives on specific events. We had
27:31
a lot of political and sociopolitical analysis of
27:34
war, but we really didn't have like that
27:36
kind of traditional
27:38
historical
27:39
on the ground
27:41
consistent
27:42
approach to understanding what happened. So
27:45
in general, in The United States, we've stopped
27:47
treating war as history.
27:50
We treat war
27:51
as a political this is an academia, as
27:53
a political and social phenomenon,
27:56
which is fine because
27:58
the politics and the social aspects of warfare
28:00
are essential for us to understand, but abandoning
28:03
the history part of it, which we've done
28:05
to a significant extent,
28:07
means that we we don't we don't see
28:10
what has actually happened. And if you don't
28:11
know what has actually happened,
28:13
then you're you're bound to
28:16
draw some
28:17
bad start with bad assumptions and then draw
28:19
bad conclusions Right. From this impartial data that
28:22
we have. So one of the things I
28:23
I really wanted to do was build this
28:25
database
28:26
of of modern combat,
28:29
and to try to make it as comprehensive
28:30
as possible.
28:32
Zero interest
28:33
across the Department of Defense in doing that
28:35
kind of basic research.
28:37
Zero interest from the military historical
28:40
community,
28:41
because it takes money to get people out
28:43
into the field to do these things. So
28:45
So wait. Is that is that really the
28:47
rub? Is the money? Or is there just
28:49
a lack of intellectual curiosity?
28:52
The curiosity is there. The capacity is is
28:55
mostly gone. I mean, there there is don't
28:57
get me wrong. There's still military history departments
28:59
in United States, but they're
29:01
anemic compared to what we used to have.
29:03
And if you look at the kinda history,
29:05
when when we think military history, we think
29:07
like the stuff we read growing up about
29:09
World War two and Vietnam. It's incredibly detailed
29:12
and rich. You could tell
29:13
where
29:14
people were on the battlefield and the timeline
29:17
and the narrative and and Yeah. Order battle
29:19
and that kind of stuff.
29:20
I mean,
29:21
just go ahead and go through your head
29:23
and see if you could pull that up
29:24
for even battles that we participated in Yeah.
29:26
For both sides.
29:28
So, yeah, it it's and it's it does
29:30
take money. So one thing that doesn't take
29:32
a huge amount of money is to do
29:34
a deskside analysis
29:35
and do start by creating this database, which
29:38
I did. And that's what that's the foundation
29:40
of the book is this database of 423
29:44
modern battles. So 2003
29:47
to 2022,
29:48
'20 year period.
29:50
So,
29:52
when I so, essentially, then, I guess, the
29:55
second part of the question is, based off
29:57
of the data you collected from 423 modern
29:59
battles,
30:00
what argument are you trying to to make
30:02
that that a lot of academia is missing?
30:04
What because you said, quote, unquote, in your
30:07
on your website,
30:08
you asked several questions. Like, what if there's
30:10
no character of war? So let's start with
30:11
there.
30:13
You say that, we often assume that we
30:15
can characterize war with a universal explanation. Evidence
30:18
from both historical and modern war suggests that
30:21
there is not, in fact, a universal character
30:23
of war. Readers may be surprised to find
30:25
out who agrees with this conclusion. So my
30:27
first part is, who is making the argument
30:29
that there is universal character's war? Because I
30:31
always interpret it as more of, like, it's
30:32
lightning in the bottle trying to understand the
30:34
character war. It changes so rapidly and so
30:36
quickly,
30:37
especially from a historical perspective.
30:39
I I focus primarily marine corps, American civil
30:41
war.
30:42
Character war can change exponentially
30:44
over the course of of several battles or
30:47
a single battle. So who's making this argument
30:49
that,
30:50
the universal character war that character war is
30:53
universal, and then how do you combat that
30:55
idea?
30:56
Well, almost the entire US government is making
30:59
that argument, and they've done it in writing
31:01
repeatedly, and and,
31:04
verbally articulated. I mean, so you got generals,
31:07
secretaries of defense, so on and so forth
31:09
saying the character of war has dramatically changed.
31:12
The character of war is now x. Because
31:14
the character of war has changed, we need
31:16
to buy this new system.
31:18
We need to divest ourselves of these, you
31:21
know, obviously, we're leaning into forces. Forces. Force
31:24
design here, and I don't want and we
31:26
can come to force design,
31:28
and and I I take a middle ground
31:30
approach on that on that very, very sensitive
31:33
and controversial topic.
31:35
But but this work I do attack force
31:37
design in my book. I hope I do
31:39
so constructively,
31:41
but the the
31:42
the basic argument that the character of war
31:45
is universal is kind of endemic in our
31:47
whole discourse, right? It's the way we talk
31:50
about war.
31:51
And because we haven't defined it and because
31:54
we've just kind of blindly accepted this nebulous
31:57
term,
31:58
it it allows people to make
32:00
kinda hyperbolic statements like that. We can say,
32:02
oh, no. It's it's changed so dramatically
32:05
that if we don't get rid of x
32:07
or if we don't buy this incredibly exquisite
32:09
missile system,
32:10
we're gonna lose the next war. And it
32:12
is almost always painted in existential terms. And
32:15
I I point to
32:17
Andrew Kropinovich,
32:19
Bob Werk when he was his, deputy secretary
32:21
of defense,
32:22
very clearly making these statements and and very
32:25
clearly in writing saying, the character of war
32:28
has changed.
32:30
If we do not buy these things, we
32:32
will die.
32:33
Which is such an interesting thing to hear,
32:36
from the marine corps perspective because that was
32:38
the argument that has been used many times
32:40
to get rid of the marine corps
32:42
that we don't need of anymore
32:44
because we have this exquisite
32:47
I mean, nuclear weapons, for example, was supposed
32:49
to completely
32:50
do away with things like marines. Yeah. Right?
32:54
So is is your issue the definition of
32:56
character war that they're using or the concept
32:58
of character war in the first place?
33:00
The concept. Right? The idea that you can
33:03
create this universal universal
33:06
description. As you yourself just said,
33:09
you know, in in reality, if you if
33:11
you dig in, this kinda goes back to
33:13
why I why I wanted to build this
33:16
database to start out with. If you look
33:18
at the way war has actually been practiced
33:21
around the world and not trying to kind
33:23
of virtually fill in gaps with opinion,
33:27
sometimes a very strong opinion,
33:29
then
33:30
you're you're left the only conclusion you can
33:32
really come away with
33:34
objectively is to say there is no universal
33:37
character of war. It's different in many in
33:40
in around the world at different scales and
33:42
scopes and different kinds of terrain,
33:45
depending on who's who's fighting. So
33:48
if you can accept that,
33:49
then all of these arguments about the dramatically
33:52
changing character of war and the need to
33:54
buy these things or divest
33:56
kind of go out the window. Mhmm. And
33:59
so this is an essential
34:01
policy
34:02
argument that I'm making here, even while I'm
34:04
making what I hope is an interesting kind
34:06
of military history argument and I have some
34:08
case descriptions in there that are Mhmm. I
34:10
I hope are are interesting as well. That's
34:13
so interesting because the idea that I'm trying
34:14
to make a universality of the character war
34:16
when the nature war is supposed to be
34:18
immutable, but the character war is supposed to
34:20
be constantly evolving and changing that you can't
34:21
make a universe. And the fact that the
34:23
a lot of people in the DOD have
34:25
have done so is is is is quite
34:27
interesting. So to go back into your to
34:29
database to support your argument that you're saying
34:32
there is no universal character war, which you
34:33
you have great evidence for,
34:35
what information were you inputting into this dat
34:38
database?
34:39
What,
34:40
like, are are you describing battles? Are you
34:43
just inputting figures?
34:45
Like, please, let's let's let's dig into that
34:48
a little bit. Yeah. Let me let me
34:49
put a hook for something if we wanna
34:51
follow-up a little later about the idea of
34:53
the immutable nature and constantly changing character. Mhmm.
34:56
Klasovitz never said that, so but we can
34:58
come back to that. Mhmm. Yeah. That's on
35:00
the quiz, actually. I think I got that
35:02
one. Yeah. I'm ruining the quiz. I'm ruining
35:04
the quiz here first.
35:06
If anybody wants to take that, it's online
35:07
at groundcombat.org
35:09
and it's free and everything. But,
35:12
so the database itself is is a
35:15
description of as many battles as I could
35:18
find
35:19
in the public domain using as many sources
35:21
as were available to me, including kind of
35:23
paid databases and stuff.
35:26
And I would
35:28
it lists the battle itself, a description of
35:30
the battle, who fought on which side. I
35:32
try to answer four main questions. What was,
35:35
you know, who fought and what was the
35:37
order of battle?
35:38
What was the geometry of forces? How were
35:40
they arrayed against each other throughout the course
35:42
of the battle?
35:44
What was the narrative of the battle? What's
35:45
the story? You know, is there a story
35:47
that can be told in kind of very
35:49
basic terms?
35:50
And then,
35:51
what was the timeline? How how did these
35:53
things transpire over time? And then I very
35:55
specifically dig into the technology that was used
35:57
in each in each fight,
35:59
down to the rifles that were employed by
36:01
both sides all the way up to missile
36:03
technology. And I code for that so it
36:05
can be used by students. Actually, there's a
36:07
team at West Point that's, doing this right
36:09
now with the database,
36:11
and it's available free online to anybody.
36:14
Incredible.
36:15
So,
36:17
my my question is,
36:20
going going forward, so you you you you've
36:22
pulled off
36:23
all of these, battles from various conflicts since
36:26
'20 you said 02/2003. Correct? January 2003. January
36:28
'2 thousand '3. Yes. 02/2003.
36:30
So I guess my question is,
36:35
a lot of this stuff, I guess, because
36:36
you you're right. There really hasn't been a
36:39
a traditional,
36:40
because the idea of traditional versus new military
36:42
history, the idea of like, you mentioned earlier,
36:44
just studying the maps, the tactics that it
36:46
would be is trying to figure out what
36:48
actually happened versus now where it's more,
36:50
again, like,
36:52
the human experience aspect of it.
36:55
To what extent do you do you feel
36:57
there may be gaps in your own in
36:58
databases based on the fact that there is
37:01
limited information out there? Are you just trying
37:03
to at least be a pioneer
37:04
to to guide other historians to follow suit
37:06
in you? Yeah. I think the latter. I
37:08
mean, I I acknowledge multiple times in the
37:10
book and in the database itself that it
37:12
is not comprehensive.
37:13
And I argue that, in fact, we can't
37:15
know,
37:17
all the battles that have taken place around
37:19
the world even in that twenty year period
37:21
because we've done such a poor job of
37:23
of recording them, of being physically present.
37:27
And I am very clear that
37:30
we know that there were hundreds of battles
37:33
in Iraq and Afghanistan
37:35
that are not
37:36
kind of visible in the public domain,
37:39
and but they are in databases
37:42
behind the green door that I'm trying to
37:44
help trying to help get released.
37:47
We'll see. Wish me luck on that one.
37:50
But yeah. No. I wanna I wanna shine
37:51
a light and say, look, we can do
37:53
this. I was told repeatedly when I tried
37:55
to do this at Rand, can't be done.
37:57
You can't come up with this list of
37:59
all these battles, so don't even bother trying.
38:01
And I don't it's not something I like
38:03
hearing.
38:04
So actually, like you said, hold my hold
38:06
my beer. Right?
38:08
And so it was brutal,
38:10
building even this version of it. I'm aware
38:12
of gaps in it already,
38:14
and I just hope it inspires other people
38:16
to do more. Is this was this a
38:17
solo mission? Do you have a team of
38:19
people working or Solo mission, I did have
38:21
some research assistants
38:22
doubling my effort on a select number of
38:25
cases just for what's called intercoder reliability to,
38:28
to but more on more on sourcing to
38:31
make sure I wasn't missing anything.
38:33
So one of the questions, excuse me, that
38:35
you post on your website is, what if
38:37
drones are are not really a game changer?
38:39
And that's obviously a big one. Just you're
38:41
you're seeing drones,
38:44
in a lot of cassette articles. That's it's
38:45
a it's a common reoccurring thing, especially in
38:47
the past, several years
38:49
and further aggravated by the Ukraine Russian war
38:52
that's going on currently.
38:55
Our drone's really a game changer. Yeah. No.
38:58
We are we are,
39:01
kind of hostages to our most recent
39:04
online experience in many ways.
39:07
And that that kind
39:08
of terminology, the kind of exaggeration that we
39:11
live in on a daily basis now,
39:14
this is insane, that'll blow your mind, you
39:16
know, this is a game changer, stop everything.
39:19
It it's we're so accustomed to hearing that
39:21
now that it's almost background noise,
39:24
but we've also accepted at face value that
39:26
drones,
39:27
first of all, are new somehow
39:30
and that they have completely changed the way
39:32
that we fight. They have not. They are
39:34
not new, first of all, and I'll get
39:35
into that in a second, but they haven't
39:36
changed the way that we fight. If you
39:38
spend a significant amount of time examining what's
39:40
actually happening on the ground in Ukraine, which
39:42
I have and I continue to do so,
39:44
I have a team in Ukraine right now
39:47
conducting a battle study.
39:50
We have a previous one called Battle of
39:51
Irpin River that's available online if anybody wants
39:53
to look at it, James Sladen.
39:58
The fighting that takes place
40:01
is similar to what would have happened with
40:03
or without drones flying overhead,
40:05
very, very similar. There are minor modifications here
40:07
and there,
40:09
but
40:10
we are in kind of enraptured by these
40:13
compilations
40:14
of FPV drone strikes and things like that.
40:16
First of all, drones have been around
40:18
since the beginning of the twentieth century.
40:22
They were first used in I'm ruining my
40:24
quiz here today. Right? But, yeah. Taking notes
40:26
actually. I know. Sorry. You're gonna get a
40:28
better score now.
40:30
They were they were used in combat in
40:32
in 1940. They were used throughout the throughout
40:34
World War two. They were used extensively in
40:37
the Vietnam War. They were used in combat
40:38
in the nineteen seventy three war. The Israelis
40:41
and the South Africans really built the modern
40:43
drone industry,
40:44
and they use the drones extensively in Lebanon,
40:47
in places like, Angola,
40:49
and then we adopted fully adopted drones,
40:52
and employed them. I mean, if you were
40:53
involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, drones were part
40:56
of your daily life. Right? Yeah. My dad
40:57
was actually at Dragon Eye when it first
40:59
came out. Yeah. Dragon Eye. Yeah. Right. Exactly.
41:01
At all at all of it. Now
41:02
were micro drones
41:04
anywhere near as ubiquitous?
41:06
No.
41:07
Of course not. That that's that would be
41:09
silly to say. Were drones
41:11
available
41:14
to groups like the Islamic State
41:17
in 2012
41:18
the same way that they were in 2017?
41:20
No, of course not. So there's
41:22
been a clear proliferation of drones
41:25
at the lower level.
41:27
It's, they're now ubiquitous.
41:28
However,
41:30
keep in mind that, and I made this
41:31
point for a CSIS panel the other day,
41:33
that there's a 1,200 kilometer fixed battle line
41:37
in Ukraine.
41:39
The entire industrial base of Ukraine and the
41:42
entire industrial base of Russia
41:44
is co located to a static
41:47
battlefront
41:49
feeding drones in
41:51
from the entire
41:52
world supply,
41:54
all focused on this one war. Right? China
41:57
is is
41:58
funneling
42:00
millions of drones. The United States is paying
42:02
right. So all of these drones are being
42:04
funneled towards this fixed frontline,
42:06
and they're ubiquitous,
42:08
but not every war is going to look
42:10
like that.
42:12
And now so again, keep in mind, the
42:14
fighting that's taken place in Ukraine
42:16
is actually
42:17
very similar to fighting that has taken place
42:19
elsewhere
42:21
and there's a there's a unique aspect to
42:23
the industrial
42:25
fixed nature of the fight too. So I
42:27
I I will make a very strong argument.
42:29
I'll I'll go down swinging on that one
42:31
that, drones have not changed warfare. And and
42:33
what what you mean by,
42:35
it's the same as where you would see
42:37
it in other places is we're talking
42:41
orders of battle of the same,
42:43
troop strengths
42:44
Yep. Positions,
42:46
named area of interests,
42:49
indirect,
42:50
direct,
42:51
FPCs,
42:53
you know, FPFs,
42:55
you know, all of those all the things
42:57
you learn at TBS, right, during, you know,
43:00
offense, defense, and all that good stuff. I
43:02
mean, is that essentially
43:04
I I teach I teach a class on
43:06
on the book. And one of the things
43:08
I do is I show a video montage,
43:10
a drone video montage. I mean, by the
43:12
way, there there are new ones produced every
43:13
single day the Ukrainians and the Russians churn
43:16
them out. Mhmm.
43:17
I probably watch
43:19
a hundred to a 50 drone strikes a
43:21
day on on various websites,
43:24
Telegram channels, things like that.
43:26
And then I show
43:28
trench combat,
43:30
infantry combat, mechanized assault
43:32
montage videos. And I say, if I put
43:35
if I split you into two different rooms
43:37
and I just fed you on a steady
43:39
diet
43:40
of one of these two and put you
43:42
back together, you you the two groups would
43:45
have a completely different perception of what war
43:47
is.
43:48
And what the reality is is that war
43:50
is both of those things simultaneously.
43:52
Okay.
43:54
Drones are there. Yeah. They're absolutely having an
43:56
impact,
43:58
but
43:58
for in a large part, both sides are
44:01
are are relying more heavily on drones because
44:03
they can't rely on their air forces. Mhmm.
44:06
You know, Ukraine has an anemic air force
44:08
compared to the Russians,
44:10
and the Russian air force has been has
44:12
been significantly damaged and is wasn't as strong
44:15
as we anticipated it would be. Yeah. Beginning
44:17
of the war. So, I mean, there's a
44:18
compensatory
44:19
in,
44:21
factor here as well. So you're you're making
44:23
the argument that drones are not changing the
44:25
character of war,
44:27
but it goes back into the this what
44:28
a lot of other people are saying is,
44:30
like, we need to buy,
44:31
this equipment.
44:33
Is is this necessary for us to sustain
44:35
ourselves? Do you but not, not believe that,
44:38
Americans should be investing in drones? Do you
44:40
think that
44:42
maybe if even the carriage war has not
44:44
changed, they're still worthy investment?
44:47
What are your thoughts on that? That's a
44:48
great I mean, that's a great question
44:50
because
44:52
our our culture now is
44:54
essentialist.
44:55
Right? So whatever
44:57
question you're asking, it either it's it has
44:59
a binary answer. Right? It's either all of
45:01
this or none of this or you know?
45:04
And of course, that's not how life
45:06
generally works.
45:07
Of course, we should invest in drones. Of
45:09
course, we should try to maintain the techno
45:12
technological advantage over our our current adversaries and
45:15
our perspective adversaries.
45:17
Absolutely.
45:18
And I think it's very easy to kinda
45:20
dismiss arguments like mine by saying, well, you
45:22
just don't you you just you're, you know,
45:24
Neil Luddite.
45:26
Right? And which, by the way, complete misunderstanding
45:29
of what Luddism was. But right? But I'm
45:32
not I'm not averse to technology,
45:35
but I'm also not a technophile.
45:37
And and the problem with this kind of
45:39
lack of knowledge is that we are vulnerable
45:41
to these
45:43
kind of
45:44
aggressive technophilic arguments. Right? That, you know Mhmm.
45:47
Yeah. It basically goes back to the revolution
45:49
in military affairs if you guys are you're
45:50
familiar with that. I mean, the,
45:53
the idea
45:54
that
45:55
the there is the this earth shattering
45:58
game changing event that takes place or new
46:00
technology that's introduced combined with a new tactic
46:02
or something,
46:03
that
46:04
that reorders the very nature of war, the
46:07
very nature.
46:08
This goes back to the hook that I
46:09
set earlier. Oh, we're coming back to it.
46:11
Don't worry. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
46:13
But it you know, it's an it's a
46:16
it's an important one because the arguments
46:19
for the revolution of military affairs for this
46:21
idea that if we just buy the right
46:22
technology that we'll solve all of war's problems.
46:27
And then painting anybody that disagrees as a
46:30
as a Luddite and not, you know, as
46:32
averse to technology,
46:35
which is just
46:36
often flat out wrong,
46:39
it it hinges on the idea that there
46:41
is this immutable nature of war and this
46:43
constantly changing character. And so if you wanna
46:45
lead in No. Yeah. Myself in. You mentioned,
46:48
you know, that Clausewitz did not say that.
46:49
Yeah. You did not. But MCDP one does
46:51
say that. So would you how would you
46:54
do you think based on
46:56
your arguments that you made that MCDP one
46:58
could use a rewrite in that regard, and
47:00
how would you rewrite it? Boy, that's been
47:02
tried.
47:03
Yeah, multiple times. I'm a huge fan of
47:06
MCDP one, and and, I am I I
47:09
I still refer to it frequently,
47:11
and I cite it,
47:12
and I think it is a fantastic
47:15
document. It is probably the best
47:18
doctrinal
47:19
publication
47:20
in The US military
47:22
period. And there's a reason it's people have
47:24
had so much trouble
47:25
rewriting it.
47:28
However, it doesn't mean it's flawless. Of course.
47:31
Look. I mean, I wouldn't even call it
47:32
necessarily
47:34
a a flaw. It's a gap.
47:36
What is the nature of war?
47:38
Right now, it lists a number of things.
47:41
The MCDP one is,
47:42
friction, chaos,
47:44
uncertainty,
47:45
dynamism.
47:46
What, am I missing?
47:48
I think I'm missing a couple there.
47:50
I miss Yeah. I mean, so the so
47:52
so the authors of MCDP one settled on
47:55
some Klasovitzian
47:57
terms Mhmm. That I think most people would
48:00
generally agree upon.
48:01
But most people generally agreeing on something doesn't
48:04
make it an immutable nature,
48:06
doesn't make it an immutable law.
48:09
And there are elements there there are points
48:12
in warfare where it's clear as day.
48:15
If I'm flying a drone
48:17
over
48:18
an enemy
48:20
target and they have no air defense
48:22
and that it's in the middle of a
48:24
desert and they have no concealment, I see
48:25
exactly where they are and I say blow
48:27
that up and I push a button and
48:29
I kill it. Okay. I mean, that's not
48:31
chaotic or dynamic or right? So Right. Or
48:33
I'm certain Yeah.
48:36
But but if Clausewitz never said that, and
48:39
by the way, Beatrice Heuser,
48:41
Tony Echeverria,
48:43
and others kinda back I think back me
48:45
up on that one. I I won't try
48:47
to speak for them, but I I cite
48:48
the I cite the references in the book.
48:51
Then
48:53
that whole argument is specious. Right? Mhmm. We
48:55
we that means that you can't say, well,
48:57
there's been this dramatic revolutionary change to the
49:00
nature of war because we've invented
49:02
nuclear weapons, because we've invented
49:05
precision guided munitions,
49:07
the historical kind of revolution in military affairs
49:09
arguments.
49:11
That whole argument, that whole thing falls apart
49:14
when you can't define or pin down
49:16
nature and character.
49:18
And I would argue
49:20
that those the RMA
49:23
proponents
49:24
abuse
49:26
our gap in knowledge
49:28
and abuse the lack of definition.
49:31
And I call them out directly.
49:33
I'm still waiting for a blowback on that
49:35
one. I'm sure Perfect. Sure it's perfect. Yeah.
49:37
Yeah. So is there a better set of
49:39
terminology
49:40
Yeah. That you think that we could use
49:42
to replace that's more productive,
49:44
or is it or is it worth reeducating
49:47
and and trying to actually
49:49
pin down these concepts with more with more
49:51
concrete historically informed terms?
49:54
Yeah. What I what I propose in the
49:55
book is just saying characteristics and not trying
49:57
to
49:59
create a reality that doesn't exist. Mhmm. You
50:01
know, I I mean, if you can't define
50:03
something, you can't you can't
50:05
create this clear holistic and comprehensive picture of
50:08
something
50:09
in real terms and you're dealing with something
50:11
very real and violent
50:13
with
50:14
sometimes existential consequences
50:16
like war,
50:17
don't do it.
50:18
Just
50:19
do what we say we do in MCDP
50:22
one,
50:23
which is to accept
50:26
uncertainty,
50:27
accept some chaos,
50:29
accept the fact that there are things we
50:31
just don't know,
50:33
and
50:33
we don't know what the the so called
50:36
character of war is. So just say, okay,
50:38
what can we know? We can know characteristics.
50:40
We can know we can see trends in
50:42
the use of different kinds of equipment or
50:45
tactics or the way that people behave in
50:47
certain conditions.
50:48
We can see trends
50:50
in innovation and economic influences
50:53
on the practice of warfare. So there are
50:55
characteristics
50:56
that are observable,
50:58
and they never give you a satisfying whole
51:00
picture, but they're definitely worth following. What how
51:03
is that
51:04
how is that being received, though, especially in
51:06
this era where, like you had mentioned,
51:09
we do sort of fall into
51:11
this desire for a binary solution.
51:15
And we definitely are out of an era
51:18
where Nuance is even not only is it
51:21
not accepted, but it's frowned upon Yeah. To
51:24
try to look at nuance. Is your approach
51:27
being well received, or
51:29
are you giving scoffed at? I mean, I'm
51:31
being it's it's well received by the people
51:33
that are telling me that they like the
51:35
book. I mean, I you know, but that's
51:36
a very small sample size. I mean, the
51:38
book is selling it's selling well.
51:41
I I I'll take that as,
51:43
hopefully, as some sign that it's being received
51:45
at least with some open mind. I am
51:47
getting
51:49
broader conversations, though. I am getting a little
51:51
bit of a sense of pushback. Yeah. And
51:54
that From which community is the same way?
51:55
Yeah. Is that policy makers or is that
51:57
military folks? Military folks,
52:00
colonels,
52:02
some majors,
52:03
had a couple of corporals and sergeants that
52:05
I had really interesting conversations with who
52:08
are not
52:10
buying into this enormous kind of tech forward
52:13
narrative.
52:15
Yeah. I I
52:17
I but I don't have any enough kind
52:18
of data to back up that I'm that
52:21
I'm winning an argument of any kind.
52:23
You know, we're we're in kind of a
52:24
chaotic moment in history here anyway, so I'm
52:26
not sure what kind of traction I'm gonna
52:28
get. I think, unfortunately, we're gonna be in
52:30
our next conflict before,
52:32
I find out. Mhmm. And then,
52:35
do you find that it's
52:39
sort of does this
52:41
does this
52:43
sort of paradigm shift
52:45
or a mindset
52:46
shift, does it work well in academia, but
52:48
it's hard to apply?
52:50
Or do you see a practical application,
52:53
a direct application to this sort
52:56
of nuanced approach to how we
53:00
prepare for war? Well, my argument is that
53:02
the practical application is gonna smack you right
53:05
in the face.
53:06
Right? And that if either you maintain the
53:08
capabilities that you need to fight an actual
53:10
ground combat Mhmm. Specifically,
53:13
and,
53:14
you know, if do if you wanna be
53:16
able to do the things you say you're
53:17
going to do,
53:19
then you need these things.
53:22
And if you haven't proven to me that
53:23
you don't need them, then don't get rid
53:25
of them.
53:27
We can think of some specific examples here.
53:30
And
53:32
if I'm if I'm wrong,
53:35
I'm only gonna be disproven by a series
53:37
of
53:38
events. But if I'm right, I can
53:41
be proven right in one and I won't
53:42
be happy to be proven right. I want
53:45
specifically, I want the Marine Corps and all
53:47
American and allied partner forces to be successful
53:50
And I don't want them to
53:52
to to fall, to come up short because
53:54
they don't have a capability. They don't have
53:56
the right number of people, the right type
53:57
of people. Yeah. They don't have the people
53:59
aren't don't have the right mindset,
54:02
You know?
54:03
Well, also too, it seems like through this
54:06
extensive research and this database you created that
54:08
there's an underpinning for it. This is just
54:11
opinion
54:12
based off of, you know, very limited empirical
54:15
evidence. Right? Like, you have
54:18
the analytics and the underpinning
54:21
Yeah. The intellectual underpinning. And it's transparent.
54:23
I I I am the database is free
54:25
and available online.
54:27
It is completely transparent. You can see every
54:29
single thing that I did. I walk I
54:31
walk you through
54:32
step by step
54:34
the exact process I took. I point out
54:36
the weaknesses in the database that I'm aware
54:38
of.
54:39
No. So everything is driven
54:41
by logical argumentation from evidence.
54:45
Look, from getting back to the characteristics piece,
54:48
I say, look,
54:50
okay, let's look at the trends and characteristics.
54:53
Tanks were employed
54:55
in,
54:56
I believe it's 69%
54:58
of all of the four twenty three modern
55:01
battles by one side or the other or
55:02
both.
55:03
That means that there was a perceived value
55:07
for armor,
55:09
light armor or lightly armored or
55:11
light armed vehicles,
55:13
I think was,
55:16
something like 96%
55:18
of it of uses. Infantry,
55:20
100%
55:21
of every case.
55:23
Alright.
55:23
Indirect small arms, indirect fire, every case. So
55:28
and artillery was, I believe, was in the
55:31
eighties,
55:32
manned aircraft, I believe, was in the 80%
55:35
range.
55:37
So all of what we would consider the
55:38
kind of traditional core combat capabilities
55:41
were essential to Magtaf stuff. Magtaf stuff. And,
55:45
you know, this does look, this does bring
55:46
us to force design. Right? And if we
55:48
wanna talk about that, I'd be happy to.
55:50
Well, yeah. It's well, so you it seems
55:51
like you've done sort of like the money
55:53
ball approach with of battles since 02/2003.
55:56
And you've already identified, you know, a %
55:58
of battles there's infantry, a % of battles
56:00
there was direct indirect,
56:03
fire in
56:05
80% there was artillery, 69% there was tanks.
56:08
So are you are you do you think
56:09
that in order for a military
56:11
to be prepared for the next conflict, that
56:14
they should embrace,
56:15
like, those specific features that appear more and
56:18
more throughout the 423
56:20
battles that you've observed?
56:21
So it's it's important that
56:24
we keep in mind that past is not
56:26
prologue.
56:27
So by amassing this historical database, I'm not
56:30
saying therefore trends will always continue
56:32
in this kind of steady pattern. However, they
56:34
have
56:36
consistently on a relatively consistent evolutionary trend
56:40
progressed in the same direction.
56:42
And so if we're arguing that there's a
56:44
dramatic break that is taking place right now,
56:47
we need to come up with some really
56:49
good evidence to back that up. And all
56:50
I'm seeing is strong opinion at the moment,
56:53
and anecdotal evidence, a lot of anecdotal evidence
56:57
that if you dig into it, does not
56:59
stack up. And I'll give you I'll give
57:01
you an example, the Nagorno Karabakh war. And
57:03
so a lot of us that were tracking
57:05
force design when it was first cropping up,
57:08
some of the immediate
57:10
told you so evidence was what happened in
57:12
the Gorno Karabakh
57:14
where
57:17
the Armenians
57:18
as Azeris and Artsakh on their side, were
57:21
fighting over control of this disputed region.
57:24
And
57:25
the narrative,
57:26
backed by a lot of video evidence from
57:28
the Bayraktar corporation, was the drones
57:32
won the war and that actually was
57:36
picked up
57:38
and and repeated in the original I think
57:40
it was in the commandant's planning guidance,
57:42
might have might not have been, might have
57:44
just been in the original force design of
57:45
March 2020.
57:48
But that drones dictated the conflict.
57:51
If you go back and look at the
57:53
drone data from that conflict,
57:56
that that's not patently true.
57:59
So,
58:00
yeah because I I have,
58:01
friends who had family fought there and, like,
58:03
asking their, like, their cousins combat experience. They
58:06
all point to at least from their I
58:08
think this could be me bringing the humanistic
58:10
aspect of war rather than historical. But, I
58:11
mean, they they they did note that
58:14
they they at least the the soldiers on
58:16
the ground felt that the drones had had
58:18
an overarching presence. So that's that's interesting that,
58:21
so what what does the data then show?
58:24
Well, first of all, the data that were
58:25
presented by the,
58:28
Azerbaijan
58:29
government
58:30
were heavily inflated. Mhmm. And Ido Hecht,
58:35
an Israeli analyst,
58:36
points that out and he says he kind
58:38
of breaks the data down. The other one
58:40
is the, the video montages
58:42
from that primarily from the Bayraktar Corporation. So
58:45
if you're familiar with the TB2,
58:47
it's a drone that was popularized by that
58:49
war.
58:50
It's a family company in Turkey that that
58:52
makes these drones.
58:53
They had they were highly incentivized
58:55
to,
58:56
you know, promulgate these videos and it and
58:58
they do look really impressive.
59:00
But if you look closely, they're not all
59:03
kills that even the the videos they're collecting
59:06
themselves are not it's not clear that the
59:07
drone itself did the killing.
59:10
A lot of them look to be maybe
59:12
artillery strikes or mine strikes or something like
59:14
that. And so
59:16
when you dig into the data, even in
59:17
this kind of very,
59:19
what appears to be a very obvious case
59:21
at first
59:23
glance, starts to fall apart.
59:25
But there are other
59:27
kind of narrow aspects to one case here
59:29
too.
59:30
This is fought
59:31
in large part in open terrain. The Armenians
59:35
had been sitting in these open trenches,
59:37
done a terrible job of improving
59:40
their defense positions over time.
59:43
Their anti air capabilities were dated and crumbling,
59:47
their morale of the will of fight of
59:49
their troops was very low,
59:51
they had done a poor job integrating their
59:53
Armenian Artsakh forces,
59:56
so they were highly vulnerable
59:59
to strikes from the air. And, you know,
1:00:00
again, when you're fighting on an open tableau
1:00:03
Yeah.
1:00:04
That's very different than fighting when there's even
1:00:07
single canopy tree cover.
1:00:09
And
1:00:11
so it sure looked it it sure looked
1:00:13
like an offset, but I would I the
1:00:14
argument I make in the book is that
1:00:16
a lot of these human factors had a
1:00:17
significant impact on the outcome of the battle
1:00:19
itself. But more importantly,
1:00:22
in what other historical case do we do
1:00:25
we cherry pick
1:00:26
examples that suit our
1:00:29
narrative
1:00:30
and accept
1:00:32
as professionals that that that that's proof of
1:00:34
something? Yeah. Yeah. Absolutely. No. Alright. Excellent point.
1:00:37
So
1:00:38
you you sort of hinted, earlier when we're
1:00:40
talking that, you know, we may have found
1:00:42
out the answers to some of the questions
1:00:44
you posed in the next war.
1:00:47
And part of what marine corps you obviously
1:00:48
wanna talk about forces. I know. I think
1:00:50
we're down for forces. I don't actually want
1:00:52
to. No. No. No. It's no. Because it
1:00:53
it's it's fun. It's a hot topic.
1:00:55
Yeah. Because force design is obviously preparing us
1:00:57
in direction for a war,
1:01:00
the marine corps' role in a war against
1:01:03
China.
1:01:05
Is that the proper trajectory that the marine
1:01:06
corps should be taking?
1:01:12
No.
1:01:13
Mhmm.
1:01:14
So look, I mean, it's not the wrong
1:01:17
trajectory because it and I I looked I'm
1:01:20
I'm sympathetic
1:01:21
to general Berger's
1:01:22
original argument to some extent that there's China
1:01:25
was is identified as a pacing threat,
1:01:28
but I I I am gonna make this
1:01:30
argument in a forthcoming series of articles, hopefully,
1:01:33
in War on the Rocks,
1:01:35
that just because something is a pacing threat
1:01:37
doesn't mean it's all or or nothing. And
1:01:40
I know that the
1:01:41
that there's a very good
1:01:43
force design
1:01:45
pro force design argument that it wasn't all
1:01:47
or nothing and that that's an overstatement of
1:01:49
the case. However,
1:01:52
the one inescapable document
1:01:54
that they can't get away from is a
1:01:56
2019 Commandant Planning Guidance, which very
1:01:59
I would argue makes a pretty clear all
1:02:01
or nothing
1:02:02
argument.
1:02:06
It deprioritizes
1:02:07
the ability of the Marine Corps to fight
1:02:10
in a land war Mhmm.
1:02:12
Significantly.
1:02:13
While, however, unfortunately, for the Marine Corps, still
1:02:16
maintaining requirements for con plans and old plans
1:02:20
around the world where it will be required
1:02:22
to fight in as as of what, you
1:02:25
know, the unpopular term, America's Second land army.
1:02:27
Marine Corps has always been America's Second land
1:02:30
army. You know, I mean, not since its
1:02:32
inception, but certainly since World War one.
1:02:34
I. And the idea that the Marine Corps
1:02:36
is not the America's Second land army is
1:02:39
ridiculous.
1:02:41
Point to me a ground war where the
1:02:42
Marines have not been heavily involved. Right.
1:02:46
And and, you know, there's a better story
1:02:48
there. The marines and the army are constantly
1:02:50
working together,
1:02:53
but if the marines don't bring enough combat
1:02:55
power to the fight, it it undermines
1:02:57
not only the marines who are doing the
1:02:59
fighting, but also the army as well.
1:03:02
So, yeah, I'm not gonna make an argument
1:03:04
that the stand in force should not exist.
1:03:07
I think you can definitely
1:03:09
have the Marine Littoral Regiment doing its thing
1:03:12
out there,
1:03:13
but not have given up, I would argue,
1:03:16
most importantly, the artillery capability that the Marines
1:03:19
gave up initially very quickly without without much
1:03:22
I I would argue that much forethought,
1:03:25
and
1:03:26
not coming up with a way to compensate
1:03:28
for the cuts to the F 35 program.
1:03:31
Look, I think the F-thirty five is a
1:03:32
boondoggle and it's a disaster.
1:03:34
The ace that ate the Marine Corps article
1:03:36
that came out, I'm a big fan of
1:03:38
that article,
1:03:39
and
1:03:41
I was not a fan of General Amos'
1:03:42
approach to the acquisition
1:03:45
of that aircraft.
1:03:47
However, you gotta have something that's gonna deliver
1:03:50
air air,
1:03:52
aerial munitions
1:03:53
to the fight,
1:03:55
and we didn't immediately replace all that capability
1:03:57
with drones. So I you know, we we
1:03:59
got rid of our mobile protected firepower by
1:04:01
dropping the tanks. We have now while we're
1:04:03
waiting for the ACV,
1:04:05
we've got the LAV 25,
1:04:07
which, you know, that you might as well
1:04:09
have a ZU 23,
1:04:10
which any insurgent group around the world would
1:04:13
have a copy of. That's not enough combat
1:04:15
power, not enough firepower for ground combat for
1:04:18
a serious middleweight
1:04:20
force like the Marine Corps.
1:04:22
We we gutted our indirect fire capability. We're
1:04:25
building it back up, but I mean, we
1:04:26
we did a lot of damage to our
1:04:28
ability to provide indirect fires to our our
1:04:30
troops.
1:04:31
We got rid of some of our combat
1:04:32
engineering and bridging capabilities.
1:04:34
The things that are proven
1:04:36
in the data that I show that are
1:04:38
needed are still needed all the way through
1:04:41
the mid twenty twenties.
1:04:42
So,
1:04:43
I think we've done ourselves
1:04:45
unfortunate disservice
1:04:47
by leaning too heavily in one
1:04:50
direction. I think that's that's that's a good
1:04:51
cap to this conversation. I like it. So,
1:04:54
so, Ben, where can we, find your book?
1:04:57
It's available,
1:04:59
all retailers, Amazon, Georgetown University Press website.
1:05:03
If you go to,
1:05:05
httpsgroundcombat.org,
1:05:08
I list links to all of that. You
1:05:10
can also take the quiz,
1:05:12
and you can also download the database if
1:05:14
you want to. Yeah. We'll put all that
1:05:16
stuff in the show description. And
1:05:18
And do you have any, social media presence
1:05:20
you wanna put out there for viewers to
1:05:22
follow you? Or Absolutely not. Awesome.
1:05:25
Good answer. Good answer.
1:05:26
This has been really fascinating discussion.
1:05:29
Of course, I have others. Maybe we'll bring
1:05:31
you back on the show, but I definitely
1:05:33
wanna talk, especially with your intel hat about
1:05:35
information operations. Sounded fascinating
1:05:38
that there's so little that we know about
1:05:40
recent wars.
1:05:42
And, you know, we've got,
1:05:44
you know, in this information age, information
1:05:47
proliferation
1:05:48
rapidly. Like you said, I mean, you see
1:05:50
a 50 drone strikes a day.
1:05:53
But yet we don't know
1:05:55
contextually or historically
1:05:57
much about them at all.
1:06:00
So, yeah, I'd love to
1:06:02
pick pick your brain on that some other
1:06:03
time. Yeah. Be happy to come back. Awesome.
1:06:06
Thank you so much for being here. This
1:06:07
is really great. And, yeah, we'll put all
1:06:09
this stuff, in the show notes. So thank
1:06:11
you again. Yeah. Thanks for having me, guys.
1:06:13
Yeah. Have a good one, y'all.
1:06:15
Scuttlebutt is a production of the Marine Corps
1:06:17
Association.
1:06:18
You have heard the voices or contributions
1:06:21
from major Vic Ruble, USMC retired,
1:06:24
Nancy Lichtman, William Trudy, and our guest.
1:06:27
Ty Frasier is the editor, sound engineer, and
1:06:29
technical producer.
1:06:31
The Marine Corps Association is not an agency
1:06:33
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1:06:35
The opinions expressed in this episode are the
1:06:37
personal views of the participants
1:06:39
and do not reflect the official position of
1:06:41
the United States Marine Corps, the Department of
1:06:43
Defense,
1:06:44
or the Marine Corps Association.