Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Cisco's SD-WAN manager was exploited before it was patched, and it should never face the internet
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Thursday, the first of October.
- 0:06Cisco's S D-W A N manager was exploited before it was patched, and it should never face the internet.
- 0:14Cisco has confirmed that attackers were abusing a critical flaw in Catalyst S D-W A N Manager before a fix e
- 0:23xisted. Patches have only just arrived.
- 0:26It's tracked as C V E twenty twenty-six, seven six five zero four, and it scores 9.
- 0:348 out of 10. It lets an unauthenticated attacker act as the administrator of the system that steers a company'
- 0:41s wide area network.
- 0:46N H S England's cyber team assesses further exploitation as highly likely.
- 0:51If your organisation links offices, branches or clinics with S D-W A N, this is today's job.
- 0:59Next.
- 1:03Cisco describes the fault as improper handling of U R I encoding in an H T T P request.
- 1:09In plain English, a web address can write the same character two ways.
- 1:14As itself, or as a percent code.
- 1:17The letter j, for example, can also appear as %6a.
- 1:21Picture a doorman with a list of rooms guests may not enter.
- 1:24He reads each badge literally, and waves through anything that doesn't match a forbidden name.
- 1:30The staff inside read the badge more cleverly.
- 1:33So a name written in an unexpected hand still sends the guest to the forbidden room.
- 1:39The check and the action disagree about what the request says.
- 1:43And the attacker lives in that gap.
- 1:45The result is that a crafted request reaches the management A P I with the privileges of the admin user.
- 1:52Cisco says all configurations are affected.
- 1:55It hasn't said who is behind the attacks.
- 1:58And also.
- 2:02The clue is in the logs. Cisco advises searching the service proxy access log for requests to j_security_che
- 2:11ck that contain encoded characters, such as %6a.
- 2:15Press coverage adds that the vManage server log deserves a look, and so do login names beginning "viptela-res
- 2:23erved-". False positives are possible, though.
- 2:26There's no workaround. The fixed releases are 20.
- 2:309.10.1, 20.12.8.2, 20.15.6.
- 2:381, 20.18.4.1, 26.1.2.1 and 26.
- 2:472.1. Anything older than 20.
- 2:509 must move to a fixed release.
- 2:53N H S England's advice is to run a compromise assessment before patching, so that evidence isn't overwritten
- 3:00. Then report anything found.
- 3:02Patching closes the door. It doesn't tell you who already walked through it.
- 3:07And finally.
- 3:11A controller that can reconfigure every branch router should not answer to the internet at all.
- 3:17Cisco's own mitigation is to restrict access from unsecured networks, and allow only known, trusted hosts.
- 3:25That's the design decision that turns this from an emergency into a footnote.
- 3:31Put the management plane on a private path.
- 3:33Make it reachable by allow-list or strongly authenticated V P N.
- 3:38Then a bug in the login code is a bug nobody can reach.
- 3:41There's a lesson for vendors too.
- 3:44Convert a request to one canonical form before deciding whether it's allowed, not after.
- 3:50Management consoles are prized because one compromise reaches every site they control.
- 3:55The cost of applying this is modest in money, and larger in knowledge.
- 4:00A firewall rule takes an afternoon.
- 4:02But knowing whether your manager is internet-facing, which version it runs and who reads its logs takes an as
- 4:09set inventory many organisations don't have.
- 4:12So ask your I T lead or managed service provider those three questions before the weekend.
- 4:18The N C S C's Citrix alert this week also began with isolating affected systems.
- 4:25That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:31Thanks for listening.