Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [1987] Berkshire Hathaway Letter to Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Chairman's Letter 1987 Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the
- 0:04shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated.
- 0:07Our gain in net worth during 1987 was $464 million or 19.5%.
- 0:15Over the last 20-3 years, that is since present management took
- 0:19over, our per share book value has grown from 19.46 dollars to
- 0:242477.47 dollars or at a rate of 23.1% compounded annually.
- 0:32What counts of course is the rate of gain in per share
- 0:35business value, not book value. In many cases a corporations
- 0:40book value and business value are almost totally unrelated.
- 0:44For example, just before they went bankrupt, LTV and Baldwin
- 0:48United published year end audits showing their book values to be
- 0:52652 dollars million and $397 million respectively.
- 0:58Conversely, Belridge Oil was sold to Shell in 1979 for $3.6
- 1:04billion, although it's book value was only $177 million at
- 1:09Berkshire. However, the two valuations have
- 1:12tracked rather closely with the growth rate in business value
- 1:16over the last decade moderately outpacing the growth rate in
- 1:20book value. This good news continued in
- 1:231987. Our premium of business value to
- 1:26book value has widened for two simple reasons.
- 1:29We own some remarkable businesses and they are run by
- 1:32even more remarkable managers. You have a right to question
- 1:36that second assertion. After all, CE OS seldom tell
- 1:40their shareholders that they have assembled a bunch of
- 1:42turkeys to run things. Their reluctance to do so makes
- 1:46for some strange annual reports. Often times in his shareholders
- 1:50letter, Aceo will go on for pages detailing corporate
- 1:54performance that is woefully inadequate.
- 1:57He will nonetheless in with a warm paragraph describing his
- 2:01managerial comrades as our most precious asset.
- 2:05Such comments sometimes make you wonder what the other assets can
- 2:08possibly be at Berkshire. However, my appraisal of our
- 2:12operating managers is if anything understated.
- 2:16To understand why, first take a look at page 7 where we show the
- 2:21earnings on it historical cost accounting basis of our seven
- 2:24largest non financial units. Buffalo News Fetchheimer, Kirby,
- 2:29Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group Sees
- 2:34Candies and World Book In 1987, these seven business units had
- 2:39combined operating earnings before interest and taxes of
- 2:42$180 million. By itself, this figure says
- 2:47nothing about economic performance.
- 2:49To evaluate that, we must know how much total capital, debt and
- 2:54equity was needed to produce these earnings.
- 2:56Debt plays an insignificant role at our 7 units.
- 3:00Their net interest expense in 1987 was only $2,000,000.
- 3:05Thus, pre tax earnings on the equity capital employed by these
- 3:09businesses amounted to $178,000,000.
- 3:13And this equity, again on an historical cost basis, was only
- 3:17$175,000,000. If these seven business units
- 3:22had operated as a single company, their 1987 after tax
- 3:26earnings would have been approximately $100 million, a
- 3:30return of about 57% on equity capital.
- 3:34You'll seldom see such a percentage anywhere, let alone
- 3:38at large, diversified companies with nominal leverage.
- 3:41Here's a benchmark. In its 1988 Investors Guide
- 3:45issue, Fortune reported that among the 500 largest industrial
- 3:49companies and 500 largest service companies, only 6 had
- 3:54averaged a return on equity of over 30% during the previous
- 3:58decade. The best performer among the
- 4:001000 was Commerce Clearing House at 40.2%.
- 4:04Of course the returns that Berkshire earns from these 7
- 4:08units are not as high as their underlying returns because in
- 4:12aggregate, we bought the businesses at a substantial
- 4:14premium too. Underlying equity capital
- 4:17Overall, these operations are carried on our books at about
- 4:21$222 million above the historical accounting values of
- 4:25the underlying assets. However, the managers of the
- 4:29units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the
- 4:32underlying assets. What we pay for a business does
- 4:35not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with.
- 4:39If to become a shareholder and part owner of Commerce Clearing
- 4:43House, you pay say, 6 times book value, that does not change CCHS
- 4:48return on equity. Three important inferences can
- 4:51be drawn from the figures I have cited.
- 4:54First, the current business value of these 7 units is far
- 4:58above their historical book value and also far above the
- 5:01value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet.
- 5:04Second, because so little capital is required to run these
- 5:08businesses, they can grow while concurrently making almost all
- 5:12of their earnings available for deployment and new
- 5:15opportunities. 3rd, these businesses are run by truly
- 5:19extraordinary managers. The Blumpkins, the Heldmans,
- 5:22Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Shay all meld unusual
- 5:27talent, energy and character to achieve exceptional financial
- 5:31results. For good reasons, we had very
- 5:34high expectations when we joined with these managers.
- 5:37In every case, however, our experience has greatly exceeded
- 5:41those expectations. We have received far more than
- 5:45we deserve, but we are willing to accept such inequities.
- 5:49We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving
- 5:53an acting award. I don't deserve this, but then I
- 5:56have arthritis and I don't deserve that either.
- 5:59Beyond the sainted 7, we have our other major unit insurance,
- 6:03which I believe also has a business value well above the
- 6:06net assets employed in it. However, appraising the business
- 6:10value of a property casualty insurance company is a decidedly
- 6:14imprecise process. The industry is volatile,
- 6:17reported earnings often times are seriously inaccurate, and
- 6:21recent changes in the tax code will severely hurt future
- 6:25profitability. Despite these problems, we like
- 6:28the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest
- 6:32operation under Mike Goldberg's management.
- 6:35The insurance business should treat us well over time with
- 6:38managers like ours. My partner, Charlie Munger, and
- 6:41I have little to do with operations.
- 6:44In fact, it is probably fair to say that if we did more, less
- 6:48would be accomplished. We have no corporate meetings,
- 6:51no corporate budgets, and no performance reviews, though our
- 6:55managers, of course, often times find such procedures useful at
- 6:59their operating units. After all, what can we tell the
- 7:03Blumkins about home furnishings or the helmets about uniforms?
- 7:07Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries
- 7:11is applause, but it is not the indiscriminate applause of a
- 7:15Pollyanna. Rather, it is informed applause
- 7:17based upon the 2 long careers we have spent intensively observing
- 7:21business performance and managerial behavior.
- 7:24Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that
- 7:28we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance.
- 7:31Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating
- 7:36managers is appropriate sustained deafening applause.
- 7:40Sources of reported earnings The table on the following page
- 7:44shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings.
- 7:48In the table, amortization of goodwill and other major
- 7:52purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged
- 7:55against the specific businesses to which they apply, but instead
- 7:59are aggregated and shown separately.
- 8:01In effect, this procedure presents the earnings of our
- 8:05businesses as they would have been reported had we not
- 8:08purchased them. In appendixes to my letters in
- 8:11the 1983 and 1986 annual reports, I explained why this
- 8:16form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors
- 8:20and managers than the standard GAP presentation which makes
- 8:24purchase price adjustments on a business by business basis.
- 8:28The total net earnings we show in the table are of course
- 8:32identical to the GAP figures in our audited financial
- 8:35statements. In the business segment data on
- 8:37pages 36 to 38 and in the management's discussion section
- 8:42on pages 40 to 44, you will find much additional information
- 8:46about our businesses. In these sections, you will also
- 8:50find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis.
- 8:53I urge you to read that material, as well as Charlie
- 8:56Munger's letter to Westco shareholders describing the
- 8:59various businesses of that subsidiary, which starts on page
- 9:0345. Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one
- 9:06of her later birthdays. I have everything I had last
- 9:09year. It's just that it's all 2 inches
- 9:12lower. As the table shows, during 1987,
- 9:15almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way.
- 9:19There's not a lot new to report about these businesses, and
- 9:22that's good, not bad. Severe change and exceptional
- 9:26returns usually don't mix. Most investors, of course,
- 9:30behave as if just the opposite were true.
- 9:33That is, they usually confer the highest price earnings ratios on
- 9:37exotic sounding businesses that hold out the promise of fevers.
- 9:41Change that prospect. Let's investors fantasize about
- 9:45future profitability rather than face today's business realities.
- 9:49For such investor dreamers, any blind date is preferable to one
- 9:53with the girl next door, no matter how desirable she may be.
- 9:57Experience, however, indicates that the best business returns
- 10:02are usually achieved by companies that are doing
- 10:04something quite similar today to what they were doing 5 or 10
- 10:08years ago. That is no argument for
- 10:10managerial complacency. Businesses always have
- 10:13opportunities to improve service product lines, manufacturing
- 10:18techniques and the like, and obviously these opportunities
- 10:21should be seized. But a business that constantly
- 10:24encounters major change also encounters many chances for
- 10:28major error. Furthermore, economic terrain
- 10:31that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it
- 10:35is difficult to build a fortress like business franchise, such a
- 10:39franchise as usually the key to sustained high returns.
- 10:43The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view.
- 10:46Only 25 of the 1000 companies met 2 tests of economic
- 10:51excellence, an average return on equity of over 20% in the 10
- 10:55years 1977 through 1986 and no year worse than 15%.
- 11:02These business superstars were also stock market superstars
- 11:06during the decade. 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.
- 11:11The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects.
- 11:14First, most use very little leverage compared to their
- 11:18interest paying capacity. Really good businesses usually
- 11:21don't need to borrow. Second, except for one company
- 11:24that is high tech and several others that manufacture ethical
- 11:28drugs, the companies are in business is that on balance seem
- 11:33rather mundane. Most sell non sexy products or
- 11:36services in much the same manner as they did 10 years ago, though
- 11:40in larger quantities now or at higher prices, or both.
- 11:44The record of these 25 companies confirms that making the most of
- 11:48an already strong business franchise or concentrating on a
- 11:52single winning business theme is what usually produces
- 11:56exceptional economics. Berkshire's experience has been
- 11:59similar. Our managers half produced
- 12:02extraordinary results by doing rather ordinary things, but
- 12:05doing them exceptionally well. Our managers protect their
- 12:09franchises, they control costs, they search for new products and
- 12:13markets that build on their existing strengths and they
- 12:16don't get diverted. They work exceptionally hard at
- 12:19the details of their businesses and it shows.
- 12:22Here's an update O Agatha Christie, whose husband was an
- 12:26archaeologist, said that was the perfect profession for one
- 12:30spouse. The older you become, the more
- 12:33interested they are in you. It is students of business
- 12:36management, not archaeologists, who should be interested in
- 12:39Misses B Rose Blumkin, the 94 year old chairman of Nebraska
- 12:44Furniture Mart 50 years ago, Misses B started the business
- 12:48with $500 and today NFM is far and away the largest home
- 12:53furnishing store in the country. Missus B continues to work seven
- 12:57days a week at the job from the opening of each business day
- 13:00until the close. She buys, she sells, she
- 13:04manages, and she runs rings around the competition.
- 13:08It's clear to me that she's gathering speed and may well
- 13:11reach her full potential in another 5 or 10 years.
- 13:14Therefore, I've persuaded the board to scrap our mandatory
- 13:18Retirement at 100 policy, and it's about time.
- 13:22With every passing year, this policy has seemed sillier to me.
- 13:26Net sales of NFM were $142.6 million in 1987, up 8% from
- 13:331986. There's nothing like this store
- 13:36in the country, and there's nothing like the family Missus B
- 13:39has produced to carry on her son Louis and his three boys, Ron,
- 13:44Irv and Steve possess the business instincts, integrity
- 13:49and Dr. of Misses B. They work as a team and strong
- 13:53as each is individually, the whole is far greater than the
- 13:57sum of the parts. The superb job done by the
- 13:59Blumpkins benefits us as owners, but even more dramatically
- 14:03benefits NFMS customers. They saved about $30 million in
- 14:081987 by buying from NFM. In other words, the goods they
- 14:12bought would have cost that much more if purchased elsewhere.
- 14:16You'll enjoy an anonymous letter I received last August.
- 14:19Sorry to see Berkshire profits fall in the second quarter.
- 14:23One way you may gain back part of your lost sick.
- 14:26Check the pricing at the Furniture Mart.
- 14:28You will find that they are leaving 10% to 20% on the table.
- 14:33This additional profit on $140 million of sells sick is $28
- 14:38million. Not small change in anyone's
- 14:41pocket. Check out other furniture,
- 14:43carpet, appliance and TV dealers.
- 14:46You're raising prices to a reasonable profit will help.
- 14:49Thank you Sign to competitor. NFM will continue to grow and
- 14:53prosper by following missus BS Maxim Sell cheap and tell the
- 14:57truth O. Among dominant papers of its
- 15:00size or larger, The Buffalo News continues to be the national
- 15:04leader in two important ways. One it's weekday and Sunday
- 15:08penetration rate the percentage of households in the papers
- 15:11primary market area that purchase it, and to its news
- 15:15whole percentage the portion of the paper devoted to news.
- 15:19It may not be coincidence that one newspaper leads in both
- 15:22categories. An exceptionally news rich
- 15:25product makes for broad audience appeal, which in turn leads to
- 15:29high penetration. Of course, quantity must be
- 15:32matched by quality. This not only means good
- 15:35reporting and good writing, it means freshness and relevance.
- 15:40To be indispensable, a paper must promptly tell its readers
- 15:44many things they want to know but won't otherwise learn until
- 15:47much later, if ever. At The News, we put out seven
- 15:51fresh editions every 24 hours, each one extensively changed in
- 15:55content. Here's a small example that may
- 15:58surprise you. We redo the obituary page in
- 16:01every edition of The News, or seven times a day.
- 16:05Any obituary added runs through the next 6 editions until the
- 16:09publishing cycle has been completed.
- 16:11It's vital, of course, for a newspaper to cover national and
- 16:15international news well and in depth, but it is also vital for
- 16:20it to do what only a local newspaper can promptly and
- 16:24extensively chronicle, the personally important, otherwise
- 16:27unreported details of community life.
- 16:30Doing this job well requires a very broad range of news, and
- 16:34that means lots of space intelligently used.
- 16:38Our news whole was about 50% in 1987 just as it has been year
- 16:43after year. If we were to cut it to a more
- 16:45typical 40% we would save approximately $4 million
- 16:50annually in new Sprint costs. That interests us not at all and
- 16:54it won't interest us even if for one reason or another our profit
- 16:58margins should significantly shrink.
- 17:01Charlie and I do not believe in flexible operating budgets as in
- 17:05non direct expenses can be X if revenues are Y, but must be
- 17:09reduced if revenues are. Why 5%?
- 17:12Should we really cut our news hole at the Buffalo News or the
- 17:16quality of product and service at Seas simply because profits
- 17:20are down during a given year or quarter?
- 17:23Or conversely, should we add a staff economist, a corporate
- 17:27strategist, an institutional advertising campaign or
- 17:31something else that does Berkshire no good simply because
- 17:34the money currently is rolling in?
- 17:36That makes no sense to us. We neither understand the adding
- 17:39of unneeded people or activities because profits are booming, nor
- 17:44the cutting of essential people or activities because
- 17:48profitability is shrinking. That kind of yo-yo approach is
- 17:51neither businesslike nor humane. Our goal is to do what makes
- 17:56sense for Berkshire's customers and employees at all times and
- 18:00never to add the unneeded. But what about the corporate
- 18:02jet, you rudely ask? Well, occasionally a man must
- 18:06rise above principal. Although the News revenues have
- 18:10grown only moderately since 1984, superb management by Stan
- 18:15Lipsey, its publisher, has produced excellent profit
- 18:18growth. For several years.
- 18:20I have incorrectly predicted that profit margins at the News
- 18:24would fall this year. I will not let the down.
- 18:27Margins will without question shrink in 1988 and profit may
- 18:32fall as well. Skyrocketing new Sprint costs
- 18:35will be the major cost. O.
- 18:36Fetchheimer Brothers Company is another of our family businesses
- 18:40and like the Blumpkins, what a family. 3 generations of Helmans
- 18:45have for decades consistently built the sales and profits of
- 18:49this manufacturer and distributor of uniforms.
- 18:52In the year that Berkshire acquired its controlling
- 18:55interest in Fetchheimer, 1986 profits were a record.
- 18:59The Heldman's didn't slow down after that last year, earnings
- 19:03increased substantially and the outlook is good for 1988.
- 19:08There's nothing magic about the uniform business.
- 19:10The only magic is in the Heldman's Bob George, Gary,
- 19:15Rodger and Fred now the business inside and out, and they have
- 19:18fun running it. We are fortunate to be in
- 19:21partnership with them. Oh Chuck Huggins continues to
- 19:24set new records at SEAS, just as he has ever since we put him in
- 19:28charge on the day of our purchase some 16 years ago.
- 19:32In 1987, volume hit a new high at slightly under £25 million
- 19:38for the second year in a row. Moreover, same store sales
- 19:41measured in pounds were virtually unchanged.
- 19:45In case you were wondering, that represents improvement.
- 19:48In each of the previous six years, same store sales had
- 19:51fallen. Although we had a particularly
- 19:53strong 1986 Christmas season, we racked up better store for store
- 19:58comparisons in the 1987 Christmas season than at any
- 20:02other time of the year. Thus, the seasonal factor it
- 20:05sees becomes even more extreme. In 1987, about 85% of our profit
- 20:11was earned during December. Candy stores are fun to visit,
- 20:14but most have not been fun for their owners.
- 20:17From what we can learn, practically no one besides CS
- 20:21has made significant profits in recent years from the operation
- 20:24of candy shops. Clearly, Chuck's record at CS is
- 20:28not due to a rising industry tide.
- 20:30Rather it is a one-of-a-kind performance.
- 20:33His achievement requires an excellent product, which we
- 20:36have, but it also requires genuine affection for the
- 20:40customer. Chuck is 100% customer oriented
- 20:43and his attitude sets the tone for the rest of the CS
- 20:46organization. Here's an example of Chuck in
- 20:49action. At CS, we regularly add new
- 20:51pieces of candy to our mix and also call a few to keep our
- 20:55product line at about 100 varieties.
- 20:58Last spring, we selected 14 items for elimination 2.
- 21:02It turned out we're badly missed by our customers who wasted no
- 21:06time in letting us know what they thought of our judgement.
- 21:10A pox on all and sees who participated in the abominable
- 21:13decision. May your new truffles melt in
- 21:17transit. May they sour in people's
- 21:19mouths. May your costs go up and your
- 21:21profits go down. We are investigating the
- 21:25possibility of obtaining A mandatory injunction requiring
- 21:28you to supply. You get the picture.
- 21:31In all, we received many hundreds of letters.
- 21:35Chuck not only reintroduced the pieces, he turned this miskew
- 21:39into an opportunity. Each person who had written got
- 21:41a complete and honest explanation in return, said
- 21:45Chuck's letter. Fortunately, when I make poor
- 21:47decisions, good things often happen as a result.
- 21:51And with the letter when a special gift certificate sees
- 21:55increased prices only slightly in the last two years.
- 21:58In 1988, we have raised prices somewhat more, though still
- 22:02moderately. To date.
- 22:04Sales have been weak and it may be difficult for CS to improve
- 22:08its earnings this year. O World Book, Kirby and the
- 22:11Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group are all under the management of
- 22:15Ralph Shea and what a lucky thing for us that they are.
- 22:18I told you last year that Scott Fetzer performance in 1986 had
- 22:22far exceeded the expectations that Charlie and I had at the
- 22:26time of our purchase. Results in 1987 were even
- 22:30better. Pre tax earnings rose 10% while
- 22:33average capital employed declined significantly.
- 22:36Ralph's mastery of the 19 businesses for which he is
- 22:40responsible is truly amazing, and he has also attracted some
- 22:44outstanding managers to run them.
- 22:46We would love to find a few additional units that could be
- 22:49put under Ralph's wing. The businesses of Scott Fetzer
- 22:52are too numerous to describe in detail.
- 22:55Let's just update you on one of our favorites.
- 22:57At the end of 1987, World Book introduced its most dramatically
- 23:02revised edition since 1962. The number of color photos was
- 23:07increased from 14,000 to 24,000. Over 6000 articles were revised.
- 23:13840 new contributors were added. Charlie and I recommend this
- 23:17product too you and your family as we do World Books products
- 23:22for younger children, childcraft and early world of learning.
- 23:26In 1987, World Book Unit sales in the United States increased
- 23:31for the 5th consecutive year. International sales and profits
- 23:35also grew substantially. The outlook is good for Scott
- 23:38Fetzer operations in aggregate and for World Book in
- 23:42particular. The combined ratio represents
- 23:44total insurance cost losses incurred plus expenses compared
- 23:49to revenue from premiums. A ratio below 100 indicates an
- 23:53underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss.
- 23:58When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on
- 24:01to policyholders funds, the float is taken into account.
- 24:05A combined ratio in the 107 to 111 range typically produces an
- 24:11overall break even result exclusive of earnings on the
- 24:15funds provided by shareholders. The math of the insurance
- 24:18business encapsulated by the table is not very complicated.
- 24:23In years when the industries annual gain in revenues premiums
- 24:27pokes along at 4% or 5%, underwriting losses are sure to
- 24:31mount. That is not because auto
- 24:34accidents, fires, wind storms and the like are occurring more
- 24:38frequently. Nor has it lately been the fault
- 24:41of general inflation. Today, social and judicial
- 24:44inflation are the major culprits.
- 24:47The cost of entering A courtroom has simply ballooned.
- 24:50Part of the jump in cost arises from skyrocketing verdicts and
- 24:54part from the tendency of judges and juries to expand the
- 24:58coverage of insurance policies beyond that contemplated by the
- 25:01insurer when the policies were written.
- 25:04Seeing no let up in either trend, we continue to believe
- 25:07that the industry's revenues must grow at about 10% annually
- 25:11for it to just hold its own in terms of profitability, even
- 25:15though general inflation may be running at a considerably lower
- 25:18rate. The strong revenue gains of 1985
- 25:22to 87 almost guaranteed the industry an excellent
- 25:26underwriting performance in 1987.
- 25:28And indeed it was a banner year, but the news soured as the
- 25:32quarters rolled. By best estimates that year over
- 25:35year volume increases were 12.9%, 1.1 percent, 5.7%, and
- 25:425.6% in 1988. The revenue gain is certain to
- 25:47be far below our 10% equilibrium figure.
- 25:51Clearly, the party is over. However, earnings will not
- 25:54immediately sink. A lag factor exists in this
- 25:58industry because most policies are written for a one year term.
- 26:02Higher or lower insurance prices do not have their full impact on
- 26:06earnings until many months after they go into effect.
- 26:10Thus, to resume our metaphor, when the party ends and the bar
- 26:14is closed, you are allowed to finish your drink.
- 26:17If results are not hurt by a major natural catastrophe, we
- 26:21predict a small climb for the industry's combined ratio in
- 26:241988, followed by several years of larger increases.
- 26:29The insurance industry is cursed with a set of dismal economic
- 26:33characteristics that make for a poor long term outlook.
- 26:36Hundreds of competitors, ease of entry in a product that cannot
- 26:40be differentiated in any meaningful way.
- 26:43In such a commodity like business, only a very low cost
- 26:47operator or someone operating in a protected and usually small
- 26:51niche can sustain high profitability levels.
- 26:54When shortages exist, however, even commodity businesses
- 26:59flourish. The insurance industry enjoyed
- 27:01that kind of climate for a while, but it is now gone.
- 27:04One of the ironies of capitalism is that most managers in
- 27:08commodity industries abhor shortage conditions, even though
- 27:12those are the only circumstances permitting them good returns.
- 27:15Whenever shortages appear, the typical manager simply can't
- 27:19wait to expand capacity and thereby plug the hole through
- 27:23which money is showering upon him.
- 27:25This is precisely what insurance managers did in 1985 to 87,
- 27:30confirming again Disraeli's observation.
- 27:33What we learn from history is that we do not learn from
- 27:36history. At Berkshire, we work to escape
- 27:39the industry's commodity economics in two ways.
- 27:43First, we differentiate our product by our financial
- 27:46strength, which exceeds that of all others in the industry.
- 27:50This strength, however, is limited in its usefulness.
- 27:54It means nothing in the personal insurance field.
- 27:57The buyer of an auto or home owner's policy is going to get
- 28:00his claim paid even if his insurer fails as many half.
- 28:04It often means nothing in the commercial insurance arena.
- 28:07When times are good, many major corporate purchasers of
- 28:11insurance and their brokers pay scant attention to the insurer's
- 28:15ability to perform under the Moor adverse conditions that may
- 28:18exist, say, five years later when a complicated claim is
- 28:23finally resolved. Out of sight, out of mind, and
- 28:26later on, maybe out of pocket. Periodically, however, buyers
- 28:31remember Ben Franklin's observation that it is hard for
- 28:34an empty sack to stand upright and recognize their need to buy
- 28:38promises only from insurers that have enduring financial
- 28:42strength. It is then that we have a major
- 28:44competitive advantage. When a buyer really focuses on
- 28:48whether a $10 million claim can be easily paid by his insurer 5
- 28:53or 10 years down the road, and when he takes into account the
- 28:56possibility that poor underwriting conditions may then
- 29:00coincide with depressed financial markets and defaults
- 29:02by reinsure, he will find only a few companies he can trust.
- 29:07Among those, Berkshire will lead the pack.
- 29:10Our second method of differentiating ourselves is the
- 29:12total indifference to volume that we maintain.
- 29:15In 1989, we will be perfectly willing to write five times as
- 29:20much business as we write. In 1988, we're only 1/5 as much.
- 29:25We hope of course, that conditions will allow us large
- 29:28volume, but we cannot control market prices if they are
- 29:32unsatisfactory. We will simply do very little
- 29:35business. No other major insurer acts with
- 29:38equal restraint. 3 conditions that prevail and insurance, but
- 29:42not in most businesses allow us our flexibility.
- 29:46First, market share is not an important determinant of
- 29:49profitability in this business. In contrast to the newspaper or
- 29:54grocery businesses, the economic rule is not survival of the
- 29:58fattest. Second, in many sectors of
- 30:01insurance, including most of those in which we operate,
- 30:04distribution channels are not proprietary and can be easily
- 30:08entered. Small volume this year does not
- 30:11preclude huge volume next year. Third, idle capacity, which in
- 30:15this industry largely means people, does not result in
- 30:19intolerable costs in a way that industries such as printing or
- 30:23steel cannot. We can operate at quarter speed
- 30:26much of the time and still enjoy long term prosperity.
- 30:30We follow a price based on exposure, not on competition
- 30:33policy because it makes sense for our shareholders.
- 30:36But we're happy to report that it is also pro social.
- 30:40This policy means that we are always available, given prices
- 30:44that we believe are adequate to write huge volumes of almost any
- 30:48type of property casualty insurance.
- 30:51Many other insurers follow an in and out approach.
- 30:54When they are out because of mounting losses, capital
- 30:58inadequacy or whatever, we are available.
- 31:01Of course, when others are panting to do business, we are
- 31:04also available. But at such times we often find
- 31:07ourselves priced above the market.
- 31:10In effect we supply insurance buyers and brokers with a large
- 31:14reservoir of standby capacity. One story from mid 1987
- 31:18illustrates some consequences of our pricing policy.
- 31:22One of the largest family owned insurance brokers in the country
- 31:25is headed by a fellow who has long been a shareholder of
- 31:29Berkshire. This man handles a number of
- 31:31large risks that are candidates for placement with our New York
- 31:34office. Naturally, he does the best he
- 31:37can for his clients and just ask.
- 31:39Naturally, when the insurance market softened dramatically in
- 31:431987, he found prices at other insurers lower than we were
- 31:47willing to offer. His reaction was first, to place
- 31:51all of his business elsewhere and 2nd to buy more stock in
- 31:55Berkshire. Had we been really competitive,
- 31:58he said, we would have gotten his insurance business but he
- 32:02would not have bought our stock. Berkshire's underwriting
- 32:05experience was excellent in 1987 in part because of the lag
- 32:09factor discussed earlier. Our combined ratio on a
- 32:12statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and
- 32:16financial reinsurance was 105. Although the ratio was somewhat
- 32:21less favorable than in 1986 when it was 103.
- 32:25Our profitability improved materially in 1987 because we
- 32:29had the use of far more float. This trend will continue to run
- 32:33an hour favor. Our ratio of float to premium
- 32:36volume will increase vary significantly during the next
- 32:40few years. Thus Berkshires insurance
- 32:43profits are quite likely to improve during 1988 and 1989
- 32:48even though we expect our combined ratio to rise.
- 32:51Our insurance business has also made some important non
- 32:54financial gains during the last few years.
- 32:57Mike Goldberg, its manager has assembled a group of talented
- 33:01professionals to write larger risks and unusual coverages.
- 33:05His operation is now well equipped to handle the lines of
- 33:08business that will occasionally offer us major opportunities.
- 33:12Our lost reserve development detailed on pages 41 to 42 looks
- 33:18better this year than it has previously.
- 33:20But we write lots of long tail business, that is policies
- 33:24generating claims that often take many years to resolve.
- 33:28Examples would be product liability or directors and
- 33:32officers liability coverages. With a business mixed like this,
- 33:36one year of reserve development tells you very little.
- 33:40You should be very suspicious of any earnings figures reported by
- 33:44insurers, including our own. As we have unfortunately prove
- 33:48to you in the past. The record of the last decade
- 33:50shows that a great many of our best known insurers have
- 33:54reported earnings to shareholders that later proved
- 33:57to be wildly erroneous. In most cases, these errors were
- 34:01totally innocent. The unpredictability of our
- 34:04legal system makes it impossible for even the most conscientious
- 34:08insurer to come close to judging the eventual cost of long tail
- 34:12claims. Nevertheless, auditors annually
- 34:15certify the numbers given them by management and in their
- 34:19opinions unqualifiedly state that these figures present
- 34:23fairly the financial position of their clients.
- 34:26The auditors use this reassuring language even though they know
- 34:30from long and painful experience that the numbers sell certified
- 34:34are likely to differ dramatically from the true
- 34:37earnings of the period. Despite this history of error,
- 34:40investors understandably rely upon auditors opinions.
- 34:44After all, a declaration saying that the statements present
- 34:48fairly hardly sounds equivocal to the non accountant.
- 34:51The wording in the auditors standard opinion letter is
- 34:55scheduled to change next year. The new language represents
- 34:58improvement but falls far short of describing the limitations of
- 35:02a casualty insurer audit. If it is to depict the true
- 35:06state of affairs, we believe the standard opinion letter to
- 35:09shareholders of a property casualty company should read
- 35:13something like we have relied upon representations of
- 35:16management in respect to the liabilities shown for losses and
- 35:20loss adjustment expenses, the estimate of which in turn very
- 35:25materially affects the earnings and financial condition herein
- 35:28reported. We can express now opinion about
- 35:31the accuracy of these figures, subject to that important
- 35:35reservation in our opinion, etcetera.
- 35:38If lawsuits develop in respect to wildly inaccurate financial
- 35:42statements, which they do, auditors will definitely say
- 35:45something of that sort in court anyway.
- 35:47Why should they not be forthright about their role and
- 35:50its limitations? From the outset, we want to
- 35:53emphasize that we are not faulting auditors for their
- 35:56inability to accurately assess loss reserves and therefore
- 36:00earnings. We fault them only for failing
- 36:03to publicly acknowledge that they can't do this job.
- 36:06From all appearances, the innocent mistakes that are
- 36:09constantly made in reserving are accompanied by others that are
- 36:13deliberate. Various charlatans have enriched
- 36:15themselves at the expense of the investing public by exploiting
- 36:19first, the inability of auditors to evaluate reserve figures and
- 36:242nd, the auditors willingness to confidently certify those
- 36:28figures as if they had the expertise to do so.
- 36:31We will continue to see such chicanery in the future where
- 36:36earnings can be created by the stroke of a pen.
- 36:39The dishonest will gather for them.
- 36:41Long tail insurance is heaven. The audit wording, we suggest,
- 36:46would at least serve to put investors on guard against these
- 36:49predators. The taxes that insurance
- 36:51companies pay, which increased materially, though on a delayed
- 36:55basis, upon enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, took a
- 37:00further turn for the worse at the end of 1987.
- 37:04We detailed the 1986 changes in last year's report.
- 37:08We also commented on the irony of a statute that substantially
- 37:12increased 1987 reported earnings for insurers even as it
- 37:18materially reduced both their long term earnings potential and
- 37:22their business value. At Berkshire, the temporarily
- 37:25helpful Fresh Start adjustment inflated 1987 earnings by $8.2
- 37:30million. In our opinion, the 1986 Act was
- 37:34the most important economic event affecting the insurance
- 37:37industry over the past decade. The 1987 bill further reduced
- 37:42the Inter Corporate Dividends received credit from 80% to 70%
- 37:48effective January 1st, 1988. Except for cases in which the
- 37:52taxpayer owns at least 20% of an investee, investors who have
- 37:57owned stocks or bonds through corporate intermediaries other
- 38:01than qualified investment companies have always been
- 38:04disadvantaged in comparison to those owning the same securities
- 38:08directly. The penalty applying to indirect
- 38:10ownership was greatly increased by the 1986 tax bill and to a
- 38:15lesser extent by the 1987 bill. Particularly in instances where
- 38:20they intermediary is an insurance company.
- 38:23We have no way of offsetting this increased level of
- 38:26taxation. It simply means that a given set
- 38:29of pre tax investment returns will now translate into much
- 38:33poorer after tax results for our shareholders.
- 38:36All in all, we expect to do well in the insurance business though
- 38:40our record is sure to be uneven. The immediate outlook is for
- 38:44substantially lower volume but reasonable earnings improvement.
- 38:48The decline in premium volume will accelerate after our quota
- 38:52share agreement with Fireman's Fund expires in 1989.
- 38:56At some point, likely to be at least a few years away, we may
- 39:00see some major opportunities for which we are now much better
- 39:04prepared than we were in 1985. Marketable securities Permanent
- 39:08holdings Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshires
- 39:12insurance companies, leaving aside arbitrage purchases
- 39:15discussed later, we approach the transaction as if we were buying
- 39:19into a private business. We look at the economic
- 39:23prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it,
- 39:26and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time
- 39:30or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a
- 39:34stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase
- 39:38in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate.
- 39:42When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts,
- 39:45not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not
- 39:49even as security analysts. Our approach makes an active
- 39:53trading market useful since it periodically presents us with
- 39:56mouth watering opportunities, but by no means is it essential.
- 40:01A prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we
- 40:04hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily
- 40:08quotations on World Book or Fetchheimer eventually.
- 40:12Our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate
- 40:15of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or
- 40:19total. Ben Graham, my friend and
- 40:21teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market
- 40:25fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment
- 40:29success. He said that you should imagine
- 40:32market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating
- 40:35fellow named Mr. Market. Who is your partner in a private
- 40:39business? Without fail, Mr. Market appears
- 40:42daily and names a price at which he will either by your interest
- 40:45or sell you his. Even though the business that
- 40:48the two of you own may have economic characteristics that
- 40:51are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but
- 40:56for sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional
- 41:00problems. At times he feels euphoric and
- 41:02can see only the favorable factors affecting the business.
- 41:06When in that mood, he names a very high buy, sell price
- 41:10because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him
- 41:14of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed
- 41:17and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and
- 41:21the world. On these occasions he will name
- 41:23a very low price since he is terrified that you will unload
- 41:27your interest on him. Mr. Market has another endearing
- 41:30characteristic. He doesn't mind being ignored.
- 41:34If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he
- 41:37will be back with a new one tomorrow.
- 41:39Transactions are strictly at your option under these
- 41:42conditions. The more manic depressive his
- 41:45behavior, the better for you. But like Cinderella at the ball,
- 41:49you must heed one warning or everything will turn into
- 41:52pumpkins and mice. Mr. Marketus there to serve you,
- 41:56not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his
- 41:59wisdom, that you will find useful if he shows up someday in
- 42:03a particularly foolish mood. You are free to either ignore
- 42:06him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you
- 42:11fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain
- 42:14that you understand and can value your business far better
- 42:17than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game.
- 42:21As they say in poker, if you've been in the game 30 minutes and
- 42:24you don't know who the Patsy is, you're the Patsy.
- 42:28Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out of date in today's
- 42:32investment world, in which most professionals and academicians
- 42:36talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas.
- 42:39Their interest in such matters is understandable, since
- 42:43techniques shrouded and mystery clearly have value to the
- 42:47purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has
- 42:51ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising?
- 42:54Take two aspirants. The value of market esoterica to
- 42:58the consumer of investment advice is a different story.
- 43:02In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by
- 43:05arcane formulae, computer programs, or signals flashed by
- 43:10the price behavior of stocks and markets.
- 43:12Rather, an investor will succeed by coupling good business
- 43:16judgement with an ability to insulate his thoughts and
- 43:18behavior from the Super contagious emotions that swirl
- 43:22about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay
- 43:25insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr.
- 43:29Market concept firmly in mind. Following Ben's teachings,
- 43:33Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their
- 43:37operating results, not by their daily or even yearly price
- 43:41quotations, whether our investments are successful.
- 43:44The market may ignore business success for a while, but
- 43:48eventually we'll confirm it. As Ben said, in the short run
- 43:52the market is a voting machine, but in the long run it is a
- 43:55weighing machine. The speed at which a business's
- 43:58success is recognized, furthermore, is not that
- 44:01important as long as the company's intrinsic value is
- 44:05increasing at a satisfactory rate.
- 44:07In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage.
- 44:10It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a
- 44:14bargain price. Sometimes, of course, the market
- 44:17may judge a business to be more valuable than the underlying
- 44:20facts would indicate it is. In such a case, we will sell our
- 44:25holdings. Sometimes, also, we will sell a
- 44:28security that is fairly valued or even undervalued because we
- 44:32require funds for a still more undervalued investment or one we
- 44:36believe we understand better. We need to emphasize, however,
- 44:40that we do not sell holdings just because they have
- 44:43appreciated or because we have held them for a long time of
- 44:46Wall Street. Maxim's the most foolish.
- 44:48Maybe you can't go broke taking a profit.
- 44:51We are quite content to hold any security indefinitely so long as
- 44:56the prospective return on equity capital of the underlying
- 44:59business is satisfactory, management is competent and
- 45:03honest, and the market does not overvalue the business.
- 45:07However, our insurance companies own 3 marketable common stocks
- 45:11that we would not sell even though they became far
- 45:14overpriced in the market. In effect, we view these
- 45:17investments exactly like our successful controlled
- 45:20businesses, a permanent part of Berkshire rather than
- 45:23merchandise to be disposed of once Mr. Market offers us a
- 45:27sufficiently high price. To that I will add 1 qualifier.
- 45:31These stocks are held by our insurance companies and we
- 45:35would, if absolutely necessary, sell portions of our holdings to
- 45:39pay extraordinary insurance losses.
- 45:41We intend, however, to manage our affairs so that sales are
- 45:45never required. A determination to have and to
- 45:48hold, which Charlie and I share, obviously involves a mixture of
- 45:52personal and financial considerations.
- 45:55To some, our stand may seem highly eccentric.
- 45:58Charlie and I have long followed David Ogilvy's advice.
- 46:02Develop your eccentricities while you were young.
- 46:05That way when you get old, people won't think you're going
- 46:09Gaga. Certainly in the transaction
- 46:12fixated Wall Street of recent years, our posture must seem odd
- 46:16to many. In that arena, both companies
- 46:18and stocks are seen only as raw material for trades.
- 46:22Our attitude, however, fits our personalities and the way we
- 46:26want to live our lives. Churchill once said you shape
- 46:30your houses and then they shape you.
- 46:32We know the manner in which we wish to be shaped.
- 46:35For that reason, we would rather achieve a return of X while
- 46:39associating with people whom we strongly like and admire, then
- 46:42realize 110% of X by exchanging these relationships for
- 46:47uninteresting or unpleasant ones.
- 46:50And we will never find people we like and admire more than some
- 46:53of the May participants at the three companies are permanent
- 46:57holdings shown below know of shares cost Market 000 Estimated
- 47:053,000,000 Capital Cities ABC Incorporated 517,500 dollars
- 47:131,035,000 dollars 685-0000 GEICO Corporation 45,713 756,920 five
- 47:261727765 The Washington Post Company 9730 one 323,000 and 92.
- 47:36We really don't see many fundamental differences between
- 47:39the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of
- 47:42marketable holdings such as these.
- 47:45In each case, we try to buy into businesses with favorable long
- 47:49term economics. Our goal is to find an
- 47:52outstanding business at a sensible price, not a mediocre
- 47:55business at a bargain price. Charlie and I have found that
- 47:59making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do with
- 48:03Sal's ears. We fail.
- 48:05It must be noted that your chairman, always a quick study,
- 48:08required only 20 years to recognize how important it was
- 48:11to buy good businesses. In the interim, I search for
- 48:15bargains and I had the misfortune to find some.
- 48:19My punishment was an education in the economics of short line
- 48:22farm implement manufacturers, 3rd place department stores, and
- 48:26New England textile manufacturers.
- 48:29Of course, Charlie and I may misread the fundamental
- 48:32economics of a business. When that happens, we will
- 48:35encounter problems whether that business is a wholly owned
- 48:39subsidiary or a marketable security, although it is usually
- 48:43far easier to exit from the latter.
- 48:45Indeed, businesses can be misread.
- 48:48Witness the European Reporter who after being sent to this
- 48:52country too, profile Andrew Carnegie, cabled as editor.
- 48:56My God, you'll never believe the sort of money there is in
- 48:59running libraries. In making both control purchases
- 49:03and stock purchases, we try to buy not only good businesses,
- 49:06but ones run by high grade, talented and likable managers.
- 49:11If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with, the
- 49:14controlled company offers a certain advantage because we
- 49:17have the power to effect change. In practice, however, this
- 49:22advantage is somewhat illusory. Management changes, like marital
- 49:26changes, are painful, time consuming and chancy.
- 49:30In any event, at our three marketable but permanent
- 49:33holdings, this point is moot. With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at
- 49:38Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kate
- 49:42Graham and Dick Simmons at the Washington Post, we simply
- 49:45couldn't be in better hands. I would say that the controlled
- 49:48company offers 2 main advantages.
- 49:51First, when we control a company, we get to allocate
- 49:54capital, whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say
- 49:58about this process. With marketable holdings, this
- 50:01point can be important because the heads of many companies are
- 50:04not skilled in capital allocation.
- 50:07Their inadequacy is not surprising.
- 50:09Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an
- 50:13area such as marketing, production, engineering,
- 50:17administration, or sometimes institutional politics.
- 50:21Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities, now must
- 50:26make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that
- 50:30they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. 2
- 50:34Stretch the point. It's as if the final step for a
- 50:37highly talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall, but
- 50:41instead to be named chairman of the Federal Reserve.
- 50:45The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no
- 50:49small matter. After 10 years on the job, ACEO,
- 50:52who's the company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of
- 50:57net worth, well have been responsible for the deployment
- 51:00of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business.
- 51:04CEOs who recognize their lack of capital allocation skills, which
- 51:08not all do, will often try to compensate by turning to their
- 51:11Staffs, management consultants or investment bankers.
- 51:15Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of
- 51:18such help. On balance, we feel it is more
- 51:21likely to accentuate the capital allocation problem than to solve
- 51:25it. In the end, plenty of
- 51:27unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate
- 51:31America. That's why you hear so much
- 51:33about restructuring. Berkshire however has been
- 51:37fortunate. At the companies that are our
- 51:39major non controlled holdings, capital has generally been well
- 51:43deployed and in some cases brilliantly so.
- 51:47The second advantage of a controlled company over a
- 51:50marketable security has to do with taxes.
- 51:53Berkshire as a corporate holder absorbs some significant tax
- 51:57costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not
- 52:00when our ownership is 80% or greater.
- 52:04Such tax disadvantages have long been with us, but changes in the
- 52:08tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past
- 52:12year. As a consequence, a given
- 52:14business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that
- 52:18are as much as 50% better if they come from an 80% or greater
- 52:22holding rather than from a lesser holding.
- 52:25The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are
- 52:28sometimes offset by a huge advantage.
- 52:31Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non
- 52:34controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at
- 52:37truly ridiculous prices, dramatically below those
- 52:40commanded and negotiated transactions that transfer
- 52:44control. For example, we purchased our
- 52:46Washington Post stock in 1973 at 5.63 dollars per share and per
- 52:52share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were 10.30 dollars.
- 52:58Similarly, our GEICO stock was purchased in 19761979 and 1980
- 53:05at an average of 6.67 dollars per share and after tax
- 53:09operating earnings per share last year were 9.01 dollars.
- 53:14In cases such as these, Mr. Market has proven to be a mighty
- 53:17good friend. An interesting accounting irony
- 53:20overlays a comparison of the reported financial results of
- 53:24our controlled companies with those of the permanent minority
- 53:27holdings listed above. As you can see, those three
- 53:30stocks have a market value of over $2 billion, yet they
- 53:34produced only $11 million in reported after tax earnings for
- 53:39Berkshire in 1987. Accounting rules dictate that we
- 53:43take into income only the dividends these companies pay
- 53:46us, which are little more than nominal, rather than our share
- 53:50of their earnings, which in 1987 amounted to well over $100
- 53:54million. On the other hand, accounting
- 53:57rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings,
- 54:01owned as they are by insurance companies, must be recorded on
- 54:06our balance sheet at current market prices.
- 54:08The result, gap accounting, lets us reflect in our net worth fee
- 54:12up to date underlying values of the businesses we partially own,
- 54:17but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our
- 54:20income account. In the case of our controlled
- 54:23companies, just the opposite is true.
- 54:26Here we show full earnings in our income account but never
- 54:29change asset values on our balance sheet, no matter how
- 54:33much the value of a business might have increased since we
- 54:36purchased it. Our mental approach to this
- 54:38accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus
- 54:42solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and
- 54:46non controlled businesses. Using this approach, we
- 54:49establish our own ideas of business value, keeping these
- 54:53independent from both the accounting values shown on our
- 54:57books for controlled companies and the values placed by a
- 55:00sometimes foolish market on our partially owned companies.
- 55:03It is this business value that we hope to increase at a
- 55:06reasonable or preferably unreasonable rate in the years
- 55:11ahead. Marketable Securities Other In
- 55:14addition to our three permanent common stock holdings, we hold
- 55:18large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance
- 55:22companies. In selecting these, we can
- 55:24choose among five major categories 1 Long term common
- 55:28stock investments, 2 Medium term fixed income securities, 3 long
- 55:33term fixed income securities for short term cash equivalents and
- 55:37five short term arbitrage commitments.
- 55:40We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these
- 55:43categories. We just continuously search
- 55:46among them for the highest after tax returns as measured by
- 55:49mathematical expectation, limiting ourselves always to
- 55:53investment alternatives. We think we understand our
- 55:57criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately
- 56:00reportable earnings. Our goal rather is to maximize
- 56:04eventual net worth. Well, let's look first at common
- 56:07stocks. During 1987, the stock market
- 56:10was an area of much excitement but little net movement.
- 56:14The Dow advanced 2.3% for the year.
- 56:17You are aware, of course, of the roller coaster ride that
- 56:21produced this minor change. Mr. Market was on a manic
- 56:24rampage until October and then experienced a sudden massive
- 56:28seizure. We have professional investors,
- 56:31those who manage many billions, to thank for most of this
- 56:35turmoil. Instead of focusing on what
- 56:37businesses will do in the years ahead, many prestigious money
- 56:41managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to
- 56:45do in the days ahead. For them, stocks are merely
- 56:48tokens in a game like the Thimble and Flatiron in
- 56:51Monopoly. An extreme example of what their
- 56:54attitude leads to is portfolio insurance, a money management
- 56:58strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in
- 57:021986 to 1987. This strategy, which is simply
- 57:06an exotically labeled version of the small Speculators Stop Loss
- 57:11order, dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock
- 57:14portfolio or their index future equivalents be sold as prices
- 57:18decline. The strategy says nothing else
- 57:21matters. The downtick of a given
- 57:23magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order.
- 57:27According to the Brady report, $60 billion to $90 billion of
- 57:32equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid-october of
- 57:361987. If you thought that investment
- 57:38advisors were hired to invest, you may be bewildered by this
- 57:42technique. After buying a farm, would a
- 57:45rational owner next order his real estate agent to start
- 57:48selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property
- 57:51was sold at a lower price? Or would you sell your house to
- 57:54whatever bidder was available at 9:31 on some morning merely
- 57:59because at 9:30 AM, similar house sold for less than it
- 58:02would have brought on the previous day?
- 58:04Moves like that, however, are what portfolio insurance tells a
- 58:09pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of
- 58:13enterprises such as Ford or General Electric.
- 58:16The less these companies are being valued at, says this
- 58:19approach, the more vigorously they should be sold.
- 58:22As a logical corollary, the approach commands the
- 58:26institutions to repurchase these companies.
- 58:29I'm not making this up once their prices have rebounded
- 58:32significantly. Considering that huge sums are
- 58:35controlled by managers following such Alice in Wonderland
- 58:38practices, is it any surprised that markets sometimes behave in
- 58:42aberrational fashion? Many commentators, however, have
- 58:46drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events.
- 58:50They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in
- 58:54a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big
- 58:57boys. This conclusion is dead wrong.
- 59:00Such markets are ideal for any investor, small or large, so
- 59:05long as he sticks to his investment.
- 59:06Knitting volatility caused by money managers who speculate
- 59:10irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more
- 59:14chances to make intelligent investment moves.
- 59:17He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced
- 59:21by either financial or psychological pressures to sell
- 59:25at untoward times. At Berkshire, we have found
- 59:28little to do in stocks during the past few years.
- 59:31During the break in October, a few stocks fell to prices that
- 59:35interested us, but we were unable to make meaningful
- 59:38purchases before they rebounded. At year end 1987, we had no
- 59:43major common stock investments, that is over $50 million other
- 59:48than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings.
- 59:51However, Mr. Market will offer us opportunities, you can be
- 59:55sure of that and when he does we will be willing and able to
- 1:00:00participate. Oh, in the meantime, our major
- 1:00:02parking place for money is medium term tax exempt bonds,
- 1:00:06whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual
- 1:00:10report. Though we both bought and sold
- 1:00:12some of these bonds in 1987, our position changed a little
- 1:00:16overall, holding around $900 million.
- 1:00:20A large portion of our bonds are grandfathered under the Tax
- 1:00:23Reform Act of 1986, which means they are fully tax exempt.
- 1:00:28Bonds currently purchased by insurance companies are not as
- 1:00:32an alternative to short term cash equivalents.
- 1:00:35Our medium term tax exempts have so far served us well.
- 1:00:39They have produced substantial extra income for us and are
- 1:00:43currently worth a bit above our cost.
- 1:00:45Regardless of their market price.
- 1:00:47We are ready to dispose of our bonds whenever something better
- 1:00:50comes along, but we continue to have an aversion to long term
- 1:00:54bonds. In may be making a serious
- 1:00:57mistake by not disliking medium term bonds as well.
- 1:01:01Bonds are no better than the currency in which they are
- 1:01:04denominated, and nothing we have seen in the past year or past
- 1:01:08decade makes us enthusiastic about the long term future of US
- 1:01:13currency. Our enormous trade deficit is
- 1:01:15causing various forms of claim checks, U.S. government and
- 1:01:19corporate bonds, bank deposits, etcetera to pile up in the hands
- 1:01:24of foreigners at a distressing rate.
- 1:01:27By default, our government has adopted an approach to its
- 1:01:30finances patterned on that of Blanche du Bois of A Streetcar
- 1:01:34Named Desire, who said I have always depended on the kindness
- 1:01:39of strangers. In this case, of course, the
- 1:01:42strangers are relying on the integrity of our claim checks,
- 1:01:46although the plunging dollar has already made that proposition
- 1:01:49expensive for them, the faith that foreigners are placing in
- 1:01:52US may be misfounded. When the claim checks
- 1:01:55outstanding grow sufficiently numerous, and when the issuing
- 1:01:59party can unilaterally determine their purchasing power, the
- 1:02:03pressure on the issuer to dilute their value by inflating the
- 1:02:06currency becomes almost irresistible for the debtor
- 1:02:10government. The weapon of inflation is the
- 1:02:12economic equivalent of the H bomb, and that is why very few
- 1:02:17countries have been allowed to swamp the world with debt
- 1:02:20denominated in their own currency.
- 1:02:22Our past relatively good record for fiscal integrity has let us
- 1:02:26break this rule, but the generosity accorded us is likely
- 1:02:30to intensify rather than relieve the eventual pressure on us to
- 1:02:34inflate. If we do succumb to that
- 1:02:37pressure, it won't be just the foreign holders of our claim
- 1:02:40checks who will suffer. It will be all of us as well.
- 1:02:43Of course, the US may take steps to stem our trade deficit well
- 1:02:48before our position as a net debtor gets out of hand.
- 1:02:51In that respect, the falling dollar will help, though
- 1:02:54unfortunately it will hurt in other ways.
- 1:02:57Nevertheless, our government's behavior in this test of its
- 1:03:01mettle is apartment to be consistent with it's Scarlett
- 1:03:04O'Hara approach generally. I'll think about it tomorrow and
- 1:03:08almost inevitably, procrastination in facing up to
- 1:03:12fiscal problems, we'll have inflationary consequences.
- 1:03:15Both the timing and the sweep of those consequences are
- 1:03:18unpredictable. But our inability to quantify or
- 1:03:21time the risk does not mean we should ignore it.
- 1:03:24While recognizing the possibility that we may be wrong
- 1:03:28and that present interest rates may adequately compensate for
- 1:03:31the inflationary risk, we retain a general fear of long term
- 1:03:35bonds. We are, however, willing to
- 1:03:38invest a moderate portion of our funds in this category if we
- 1:03:42think we have a significant edge in a specific security.
- 1:03:46That willingness explains our holdings of the Washington
- 1:03:49Public Power Supply Systems 1-2 and three issues discussed in
- 1:03:54our 1984 report. We added to our WPPSS position
- 1:03:59during 1987. At year end we had holdings with
- 1:04:02an amortized cost of $240 million and a market value of
- 1:04:07$316 million, paying U.S. tax exempt income of $34 million
- 1:04:13annually. But we continued to do well in
- 1:04:15arbitrage last year though, or perhaps because we operated on a
- 1:04:20very limited scale. We enter into only a few
- 1:04:23arbitrage commitments each year and restrict ourselves to large
- 1:04:27transactions that have been publicly announced.
- 1:04:30We do not participate in situations in which green
- 1:04:33mailers are attempting to put a target company in play.
- 1:04:37We have practiced arbitrage on an opportunistic basis for
- 1:04:40decades and to date our results have been quite good.
- 1:04:44Though we've never made an exact calculation, I believe that
- 1:04:48overall we have averaged annual pre tax returns of at least 25%
- 1:04:53from arbitrage. I'm quite sure we did better
- 1:04:55than that in 1987, but it should be emphasized that a really bad
- 1:05:00experience or two, such as many arbitrage operations suffered in
- 1:05:04late 1987 could change the figures dramatically.
- 1:05:08Our only $50 million plus arbitrage position at U Ren 1987
- 1:05:13was 1096200 shares of allergists with a cost of $76,000,000 in a
- 1:05:21market value of $78 million. But we had two other large
- 1:05:25holdings at year end that do not fit precisely into any of our
- 1:05:29five categories. 1 was various Texaco incorporated bonds with
- 1:05:33short maturities, all purchased after Texaco went into
- 1:05:37bankruptcy. Were it not for the
- 1:05:39extraordinarily strong capital position of our insurance
- 1:05:42companies, it would be inappropriate for us to buy
- 1:05:45defaulted bonds at prices prevailing after Texaco's
- 1:05:49bankruptcy filing. However, we regarded these
- 1:05:53issues as by far the most attractive bond investment
- 1:05:56available to us on a worst case basis.
- 1:05:59With respect to the Pennzoil litigation, we felt the bonds
- 1:06:02were likely to be worth about what we paid for them.
- 1:06:05Given a sensible settlement which seemed likely, we expected
- 1:06:10the bonds to be worth considerably more at year end.
- 1:06:13Our Texaco bonds were carried on our books at 104 dollars million
- 1:06:18and had a market value of $119 million.
- 1:06:21By far our largest and most publicized investment in 1987
- 1:06:26was a $700 million purchase of Salomon Inc 9% preferred stock.
- 1:06:32This preferred is convertible after three years and two
- 1:06:35Salomon common stock at $38 per share and if not converted will
- 1:06:40be redeemed ratably over five years beginning October 31st,
- 1:06:451995. From most standpoints, this
- 1:06:48commitment fits into the medium term fixed income securities
- 1:06:51category. In addition, we have an
- 1:06:54interesting conversion possibility.
- 1:06:56We of course have no special insights regarding that
- 1:07:00direction or future profitability of investment
- 1:07:03banking. By their nature, the economics
- 1:07:06of this industry are far less predictable than those of most
- 1:07:09other industries in which we have major commitments.
- 1:07:13This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our
- 1:07:17participation is in the form of a convertible preferred.
- 1:07:20What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and
- 1:07:23integrity of John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon Inc Charlie and I
- 1:07:28like, admire and trust John. We first got to know him in
- 1:07:311976, when he played a key role in Geico's escape from near
- 1:07:36bankruptcy. Several times since we have seen
- 1:07:39John steer clients away from transactions that would have
- 1:07:42been unwise but that the client clearly wanted to make, even
- 1:07:46though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence
- 1:07:50would have delivered a large fee.
- 1:07:52Such service above self behavior is far from automatic in Wall
- 1:07:56Street for the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50 at Urinwi
- 1:08:01valued our Salomon investment at 98% of par $14 million less than
- 1:08:07our cost. However, we believe there is a
- 1:08:10reasonable likelihood that a leading high quality capital
- 1:08:13raising and market making operation can average good
- 1:08:16returns on equity. If so, our conversion right will
- 1:08:20eventually prove to be valuable. 2 further comments about our
- 1:08:24investments in marketable securities are appropriate.
- 1:08:28First, we give you our usual warning.
- 1:08:30Our holdings have changed since year end and will continue to do
- 1:08:34so without notice. The second comment is related.
- 1:08:38During 1987, as in some earlier years, there was speculation in
- 1:08:42the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of
- 1:08:46various securities. These stories were sometimes
- 1:08:49true, sometimes partially true, and other times completely
- 1:08:53untrue. Interestingly, there has been no
- 1:08:56the correlation between the size and prestige of the publication
- 1:09:00and the accuracy of the report. One dead wrong rumor was given
- 1:09:04considerable prominence by a major national magazine, and
- 1:09:07another leading publication misled its readers by writing
- 1:09:11about an arbitrage position as if it were a long term
- 1:09:15investment commitment and not naming names.
- 1:09:18I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick
- 1:09:21fights with people who buy ink by the Beryl.
- 1:09:23You should understand that we simply don't comment in any
- 1:09:26weigh on rumors, whether they are true or false.
- 1:09:30If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse comment on
- 1:09:34the correct once, we would in effect be commenting on all.
- 1:09:38In a world in which big investment ideas are both
- 1:09:40limited and valuable, we have no interest in telling potential
- 1:09:45competitors what we are doing except to the extent required by
- 1:09:49law. We certainly don't expect others
- 1:09:51to tell us of their investment ideas.
- 1:09:54Nor would we expect a media company to disclose news of
- 1:09:57acquisitions it was privately pursuing, or a journalist to
- 1:10:01tell his competitors about stories on which he is working
- 1:10:04or sources he is using. I find it uncomfortable when
- 1:10:07friends or acquaintances you mentioned that they are buying X
- 1:10:11because it has been reported incorrectly that Berkshire is a
- 1:10:14buyer. However, I do not set them
- 1:10:17straight. If they want to participate in
- 1:10:19whatever Berkshire actually is buying, they can always purchase
- 1:10:23Berkshire stock, but perhaps that is too simple.
- 1:10:26Usually I suspect they find it more exciting to buy what is
- 1:10:30being talked about. Whether that strategy is more
- 1:10:33profitable is another question. Financing Shortly after year
- 1:10:37end, Berkshire sold two issues of debentures totaling $250
- 1:10:42million. Both issues mature in 2018 and
- 1:10:46will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations
- 1:10:50that begin in 1999. Our overall interest cost after
- 1:10:55allowing for expenses of issuance is slightly over 10%.
- 1:10:59Salomon was our investment banker and its service was
- 1:11:02excellent despite our pessimistic views about
- 1:11:05inflation. Our taste for debt is quite
- 1:11:08limited. To be sure, it is likely that
- 1:11:10Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a
- 1:11:13much higher, though still conventional debt to business
- 1:11:17value ratio. It's even more likely that we
- 1:11:20could handle such a ratio without problems under economic
- 1:11:24conditions far worse than any that half prevailed since the
- 1:11:27early 1930s. But we do not wish it to be only
- 1:11:31likely that we can meet our obligations.
- 1:11:34We wish that to be certain. Thus, we adhere to policies both
- 1:11:38in regard to debt and all other matters that will allow us to
- 1:11:42achieve acceptable long term results under extraordinarily
- 1:11:45adverse conditions rather than optimal results under a normal
- 1:11:49range of conditions. Good business or investment
- 1:11:52decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory
- 1:11:56economic results with no aid from leverage.
- 1:11:59Therefore, it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to
- 1:12:03risk what is important, including necessarily the
- 1:12:07welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and
- 1:12:11employees for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant.
- 1:12:15This view is not the product of either our advancing age or
- 1:12:19prosperity. Our opinions about debt half
- 1:12:22remain constant. However, we are not phobic about
- 1:12:25borrowing. We're far from believing that
- 1:12:27there is no fate worse than debt.
- 1:12:29We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe on a
- 1:12:33worst case basis will pose no threat to Berkshire's
- 1:12:36well-being. Analyzing what that amount might
- 1:12:39be, we can look to some important strengths that would
- 1:12:42serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy.
- 1:12:46Berkshire's earnings come from many diverse and well entrenched
- 1:12:49businesses. These businesses seldom require
- 1:12:52much capital investment. What debt we have is structured
- 1:12:55well and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets.
- 1:12:59Clearly, we could be comfortable with a higher debt to business
- 1:13:03value ratio than we now have. One further aspect of our debt
- 1:13:07policy deserves comment. Unlike many in the business
- 1:13:10world, we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than
- 1:13:15in reaction to it. A business obtains the best
- 1:13:18financial results possible by managing both sides of its
- 1:13:22balance sheet well. This means obtaining the highest
- 1:13:25possible return on assets and the lowest possible cost on
- 1:13:29liabilities. It would be convenient if
- 1:13:31opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided,
- 1:13:36however. Reason tells us that just the
- 1:13:38opposite is likely to be the case.
- 1:13:40Tight money conditions which translate into high costs for
- 1:13:45liabilities will create the best opportunities for acquisitions
- 1:13:49and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky.
- 1:13:53Our conclusion action on the liability side should sometimes
- 1:13:57be taken independent of any action on the asset side.
- 1:14:01Alas, what is tight and cheap money is far from clear at any
- 1:14:05particular time. We have no ability to forecast
- 1:14:08interest rates and maintaining our usual open minded spirit
- 1:14:13belief that no one else can. Therefore we simply borrow when
- 1:14:17conditions seem non oppressive and hope that we will later find
- 1:14:21intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities, which
- 1:14:25as we have said, are most likely to pop up when conditions in the
- 1:14:29debt market are clearly oppressive.
- 1:14:32Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare fast
- 1:14:35moving elephants, you should always carry a loaded gun.
- 1:14:39Our fund first buy or expand later policy almost always
- 1:14:43penalizes near term earnings. For example, we are now earning
- 1:14:47about 612% on the $250 million we recently raised at 10%, a
- 1:14:53disparity that is currently costing us about $160,000 per
- 1:14:58week. This negative spread is
- 1:15:00unimportant to us and will not 'cause us to stretch for either
- 1:15:04acquisitions or higher yielding short term instruments.
- 1:15:08If we find the right sort of business elephant within the
- 1:15:10next five years or so, the wait will have been worthwhile.
- 1:15:14Miscellaneous. We hope to buy more businesses
- 1:15:17that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help.
- 1:15:21If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me
- 1:15:25or preferably right. Here's what we're looking for.
- 1:15:28One, large purchases at least $10 million of after tax
- 1:15:32earnings. 2 demonstrated consistent earning power.
- 1:15:35Future projections are of little interest to us, nor are turn
- 1:15:40around situations. 3 Businesses earning good returns on equity
- 1:15:44while employing little or no debt for management in place.
- 1:15:48We can't supply it. 5 Simple businesses.
- 1:15:50If there's lots of technology, we won't understand it. 6 An
- 1:15:54offering price. We don't want to waste our time
- 1:15:56or that of the seller by talking even preliminarily about a
- 1:16:00transaction when price is unknown.
- 1:16:03We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers.
- 1:16:06We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast
- 1:16:09answer, customarily within 5 minutes as to whether we're
- 1:16:13interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but
- 1:16:16we'll consider issuing stock when we receive as much an
- 1:16:19intrinsic business value as we give.
- 1:16:22We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting
- 1:16:25people with whom we have done business in the past.
- 1:16:28For the right business and the right people, we can provide a
- 1:16:32good home. On the other hand, we frequently
- 1:16:34get approached about acquisitions that don't come
- 1:16:37close to meeting our tests, new ventures, turnarounds, auction
- 1:16:41like sales and the ever popular among brokers.
- 1:16:45I'm sure something will work out if you people get to know each
- 1:16:48other. None of these attracts us in the
- 1:16:50least. Besides being interested in the
- 1:16:53purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also
- 1:16:57interested in the negotiated purchase of large but not
- 1:17:00controlling blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in
- 1:17:04Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in
- 1:17:08purchasing convertible preferreds as a long term
- 1:17:12investment as we did at Salomon. And now a bit of Deja Vu.
- 1:17:16Most of Berkshire's major stockholders received their
- 1:17:18shares at UREND 1969 and a liquidating distribution from
- 1:17:23Buffett Partnership Ltd. Some of these former partners
- 1:17:27will remember that in 1962 I encountered severe managerial
- 1:17:31problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, a pump
- 1:17:35and farm implement manufacturing company that BPL controlled.
- 1:17:40But at that time, like now, I went to Charlie with problems
- 1:17:43that were too tough for me to solve.
- 1:17:45Charlie suggested the solution might lie in a California friend
- 1:17:49of his, Harry Bottle, who's special knack was never
- 1:17:52forgetting the fundamental. I met Harry in Los Angeles on
- 1:17:56April 17th, 1962 and on April 23rd he was in Beatrice, NE
- 1:18:03running Dempster. Our problems disappeared almost
- 1:18:06immediately. In my 1962 annual letter to
- 1:18:09partners, I named Harry Man of the Year.
- 1:18:12Fade to 24 years later. The scene is K&W Products, a
- 1:18:17small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. 4
- 1:18:22years K&W did well, but in 1985 to 86 it stumbled badly as it
- 1:18:28pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable.
- 1:18:32Charlie, who overseas K&W, knew there was no need to consult me.
- 1:18:37Instead he called Harry, now 68 years old, made him CEO and sat
- 1:18:43back to await the inevitable. He didn't wait long.
- 1:18:46In 1987 K and WS profits set a record up more than 300% from
- 1:18:521986. And as profits went up, capital
- 1:18:56employed went down. K and WS investment in accounts
- 1:19:00receivable and inventories has decreased 20%.
- 1:19:04If we run into another managerial problem 10 or 20
- 1:19:07years down the road, you know whose phone will ring.
- 1:19:10About 97.2% of all eligible shares participated in
- 1:19:15Berkshire's 1987 Shareholder Designated Contributions
- 1:19:19Program. Contributions made through the
- 1:19:21program were $4.9 million and 2050 charities were recipients.
- 1:19:27A recent survey reported that about 50% of major American
- 1:19:31companies match charitable contributions made by directors,
- 1:19:35sometimes by a factor of 3 to one.
- 1:19:37In effect, these representatives of the owners direct funds to
- 1:19:41their favorite charities and never consult the owners as to
- 1:19:45their charitable preferences. I wonder how they would feel if
- 1:19:49the process were reversed and shareholders could invade the
- 1:19:52directors pockets for charities favored by the shareholders.
- 1:19:56When A takes money from B to give to C&A is a legislator, the
- 1:20:00process is called taxation. But when A is an officer or
- 1:20:04director of a corporation, it is called philanthropy.
- 1:20:08We continue to believe that contributions aside from those
- 1:20:11with quite clear direct benefits to the company, should reflect
- 1:20:15the charitable preferences of owners rather than those of
- 1:20:18officers and directors. We urge new shareholders to read
- 1:20:22the description of our shareholder designated
- 1:20:24contributions program that appears on pages 54 and 55.
- 1:20:29If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly
- 1:20:33urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered
- 1:20:36in the name of the actual owner, not in street name or nominee
- 1:20:40name. Shares not so registered on
- 1:20:42September 30th, L 988 will be ineligible for the 1988 program.
- 1:20:48Last year we again had about 450 shareholders at our annual
- 1:20:52meeting. The 60 or so questions they
- 1:20:54asked were, as always, excellent.
- 1:20:57At many companies, the annual meeting is a waste of time
- 1:21:01because exhibitionists turn it into a sideshow.
- 1:21:04Ours, however, is different. It is informative for
- 1:21:07shareholders and fun for us. At Berkshire's meetings, the
- 1:21:11exhibitionists are on the dais. This year our meeting will be on
- 1:21:15May 23rd, 1988 in Omaha and we hope that you come.
- 1:21:20The meeting provides the forum for you too.
- 1:21:22Ask any owner related questions you may have and we will keep
- 1:21:26answering until all except those dealing with portfolio
- 1:21:29activities or other proprietary information have been dealt
- 1:21:33with. Last year we rented 2 buses for
- 1:21:36$100 to take shareholders interested in the trip to the
- 1:21:40Furniture Mart. Your actions demonstrated your
- 1:21:43good judgement. You snapped up about $40,000 of
- 1:21:47bargains. Missus B regards this expense
- 1:21:50sales ratio as on the high side and attributes it to my chronic
- 1:21:54and attention to costs and generally sloppy managerial
- 1:21:57practices. But gracious as always, she has
- 1:22:01offered me another chance and we will again have buses available
- 1:22:05following the meeting. Missus B says you must beat last
- 1:22:08year's sales figures and I have told her she won't be
- 1:22:11disappointed. Warren E Buffett, February 29th,
- 1:22:151988, Chairman of the Board.