Latest / Combat Veteran News / Poland: Putin Planning FALSE FLAG Drone Attack!!

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Poland: Putin Planning FALSE FLAG Drone Attack!! · Combat Veteran News

0:00
When you think of Russia, you just have
0:01
to think false flags. It's just part of
0:04
what Russia does at this point. But,
0:07
they are ramping up their efforts to
0:09
stage false flag attacks as even
0:11
Poland's coming out and saying that they
0:13
have a new way to trick the unsuspecting
0:17
public. But, the reality is that this is
0:20
maybe already been going on. Let's talk
0:23
about it. So, this is uh
0:26
an unusual story
0:28
because Poland is saying that Russia is
0:29
likely already using captured Ukrainian
0:32
drones for what they call provocations
0:34
or false flag attacks. And this is
0:38
well, it's actually par for the course
0:41
for Vladimir Putin because as we know,
0:43
Russia has been the well, target of
0:47
hundreds of Ukrainian drone attacks. And
0:50
in most cases, Russian air defenses are
0:52
able to down the majority of these
0:55
Ukrainian long-range drones. But,
0:58
often times, they are downed by
1:00
electronic warfare or other uh
1:02
capabilities that allow these drones to
1:04
be recovered largely intact. And if you
1:07
have enough intact drones, you can
1:09
actually repair them and get them
1:10
serviceable again. And so, Poland is
1:13
warning that now Russia likely has a
1:15
small arsenal of these drones. And in
1:19
one instance, a Ukrainian interceptor
1:22
drone uh actually found a
1:26
uh allegedly footage of a Ukrainian
1:29
drone moving into Russia. Again, this is
1:33
from a Ukrainian drone interceptor
1:34
saying, "Hey man, these things look a
1:35
lot like Ukraine's drones." They almost
1:37
do look like almost repaired Ukrainian
1:40
drones. Now,
1:42
this is
1:43
uh a a
1:46
problem because the when it comes to
1:48
impersonating another drone,
1:50
particularly one that might get
1:51
intercepted or crash, you only need to
1:53
get close to trick people, right? You
1:56
just need to create plausible
1:57
deniability.
1:59
And even if you have to make some pretty
2:01
extensive repairs, as we just saw, uh I
2:04
don't think it's unrealistic, right? All
2:06
of these kind of have similar components
2:09
or similar general silhouettes to a
2:12
Ukrainian Leuty or other drones, but uh
2:15
you only need to make them similar
2:16
enough to a radar cross-section that
2:17
they sort of perform and look to radar
2:19
to be the same thing.
2:21
And
2:22
the
2:24
uh
2:26
issue is that
2:28
Russia likely wants these because they
2:31
want to maintain this plausible
2:33
deniability to pretend that when they
2:35
attack uh Baltic countries, that these
2:38
are
2:39
um
2:41
that they have they create sufficient
2:43
confusion to prevent an organized
2:45
response. And local residents, for
2:48
example, of a drone incident in Moldova
2:50
last month found that a Russian uh
2:54
during a Russian a large-scale Russian
2:55
strike against Ukraine, one unmanned
2:57
aerial vehicle crossed into Moldovan
2:59
airspace and exploded near a village.
3:01
Local residents found Ukrainian language
3:03
markings on the wreckage uh and that the
3:06
Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3:07
said that the drone was highly likely
3:09
Ukrainian in origin. But remember,
3:11
generally Ukraine and Russia, they don't
3:14
often trade strikes in quite the same
3:16
way. And a quick look at a map reveals
3:19
that there's almost no scenario where a
3:21
Ukrainian drone is going to end up in
3:23
Moldova. You can see Moldova is
3:25
literally on the other side of the
3:27
country from Russia. And while it's not
3:29
inconceivable that, say, a drone heading
3:31
to maybe occupied uh Crimea might get
3:35
diverted to Moldova, it's sort of
3:37
possible, but extremely unlikely. And
3:42
the
3:43
the it's
3:44
fairly obvious that this is the work of
3:47
Russians. And again,
3:50
it it says it remains unclear whether
3:52
the UAV entered Moldova due to a
3:53
navigation error, the effects of
3:54
electronic warfare, Russian
3:55
interference, or deliberate use of a
3:57
captured drone. This is part of the
3:59
problem is that for Russia, they want
4:02
all of these things to be debated. They
4:04
want to create a chaotic environment in
4:07
which the truth cannot be known. And
4:10
people in an environment where they
4:12
can't settle on what's true, they simply
4:15
default to what they feel ought to be
4:17
true based on vibes, right? This is
4:20
something that of course the US
4:21
president
4:22
even did last week, right? Very common
4:24
to see. Even somebody as as
4:26
sophisticated as the US president, you
4:28
know, he really wanted his reflecting
4:30
pool to have been damaged by a vandal.
4:32
The depart- his own Department of
4:33
Justice said, "Listen, there's no
4:34
evidence of this." They actually dropped
4:36
the charges against someone who they had
4:38
had brought charges against for
4:40
vandalism. And the president was just
4:42
like,
4:43
"No, it didn't. Like, no, it was it was
4:45
it was vandalized." And
4:48
right? But that's that's a human
4:50
response. That is something that lots
4:52
and lots of human beings do when
4:53
confronted when confronted in an
4:55
environment where
4:57
information is in dispute or where they
5:00
believe information is in dispute, they
5:02
simply default to sort of simple
5:05
simple paradigms, right? Which is
5:07
everyone's out to get me or
5:11
the government's lying about Ukraine or
5:13
Russia is really our friend. Right?
5:15
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We're so close to that big goal. Now,
6:01
I want to point out that
6:03
the
6:05
if the Russians one,
6:08
this is already happened a bunch. We
6:10
talked about the incident in Moldova,
6:11
but in 2026 numerous times Ukrainian
6:14
drones have entered the Baltic states
6:16
and Finland. And just in March, May, and
6:20
June, we've seen these, right? There was
6:21
one notable in Latvia uh where a drone
6:24
was intercepted and destroyed, and the
6:27
drone's origin crossed into Latvian
6:30
airspace from Russia, they said, due to
6:31
Russian electronic warfare interference.
6:33
And this is
6:35
uh
6:36
sort of hiding the truth here, right? In
6:37
Romania, again, an F-16 intercepted and
6:40
destroyed a Ukrainian drone over
6:41
Estonia. Uh but
6:44
again, the aircraft crossed into Russia,
6:47
and then amid a Russian electronic
6:48
warfare, it was tracked and monitored
6:50
prior to its neutralization. Uh and they
6:52
downed it when they could ensure that it
6:54
was in a safe area. Uh Latvia's airspace
6:56
was violated by another drone the same
6:58
way, but they blame Russia for these
6:59
incident while conceding Ukraine's right
7:01
to target inside Russia to diminish
7:02
Russia's ability to wage war, uh
7:04
obviously. But this is what I think is
7:07
is is the most
7:10
But here's the part of the story you
7:11
have to understand is that
7:13
right? We use the word Russian
7:15
electronic interference, and then you
7:16
say, "Oh, the drones get confused." But
7:18
as we have talked about here,
7:19
often times these drones hit very
7:22
specific targets. In Romania, they
7:24
targeted an apartment building. Uh in
7:27
uh I think it was in Lithuania, a
7:30
oil storage facility was targeted. These
7:32
are too precise a targets to necessarily
7:35
have been a function of of just happy
7:37
accidents, of just a a drone getting
7:39
confused, right? A quick look at the map
7:41
and you'll see that statistically
7:42
there's almost no chance that a drone
7:45
randomly landing in Latvia uh totally
7:48
blind is going to hit an oil tanker.
7:49
It's the equivalent of you putting on a
7:51
blindfold and somehow driving through
7:54
Latvia, a country you don't know
7:55
anything about, and finding like a an
7:59
oil storage facility. There's just no
8:01
way uh that it can happen on accident.
8:03
Instead, what this is is that Russians
8:05
are likely deliberately using
8:09
some type of GPS jamming
8:11
in a way that they can control the
8:14
drone, right? If you tell the drone,
8:16
"Hey, it's like a carrot and a stick
8:18
method, right?" Likely the Russians are
8:20
convincing the drone that its target is
8:22
somewhere right in front of it. And by
8:23
using the by giving them the right fake
8:26
target, they can convince the drone to
8:28
fly wherever they want. And where they
8:30
want is almost certainly in these
8:32
targets. So, hacking a drone effectively
8:34
and taking it over and then using it to
8:37
attack NATO countries
8:39
is an act of war. I I don't know what
8:41
else to tell you.
8:42
And so,
8:44
again, what they're what Russia is doing
8:46
is gaining the benefits of targeting
8:49
these countries, right? We're conducting
8:50
what we call reconnaissance by fire in
8:52
the military, where you
8:55
you use actually shooting at your enemy
8:58
to gauge things like what weapon systems
9:00
they have here, at what point do they
9:01
respond, what are they able to respond
9:03
with, how accurate is their response.
9:06
Putin is able to gauge all of these
9:08
things by conducting this reconnaissance
9:09
by fire, but he doesn't actually pay the
9:11
price because he creates enough
9:14
plausible deniability that people go,
9:16
"Well, maybe it was a Ukrainian
9:17
accident. Maybe it was the Ukrainians
9:20
doing some some sort of thing, right?"
9:23
Or maybe it was, again, Russia taking
9:25
over these drones.
9:27
And obviously, in terms of incentive,
9:29
Russia is the only one who has an
9:30
incentive to do these things as as
9:34
the Ukrainians
9:37
like have have gripes with a lot of
9:39
countries, right? Unreliable allies,
9:42
tacit supporters of Putin, but if
9:43
there's one group of countries who has
9:45
been extremely staunch allies, it has
9:47
been the Baltics. And frankly, the
9:49
Baltics have continued to help Ukraine
9:52
if not only with direct aid, but also
9:55
with their own massive increase in
9:56
military spending and their own very
9:58
aggressive stance towards Russia and
10:00
their borders with Russia. This is of
10:01
course forced Russia to divert more of
10:03
its military to guard its own borders.
10:06
And
10:07
all of this again makes it pretty clear
10:10
that the Baltics are the enemies of
10:11
Putin and the allies of Ukraine. So
10:15
the
10:16
idea that Putin would not want to use a
10:18
false flag attack is kind of a joke.
10:20
Putin came to power in a false flag
10:22
attack, right? This is an account called
10:24
Blowing Up Russia Terror from Within.
10:26
This was published in the early 2000s
10:28
documenting a series of apartment
10:31
bombings in Russia as a false flag that
10:34
the that Putin used to justify the
10:36
second Chechen war and consolidate and
10:38
bring him to power and consolidate it.
10:41
Uh
10:42
literally Russia
10:44
Putin has said I never staged false flag
10:46
apartment bombings,
10:48
but this book was prohibited because it
10:50
divulged state secrets and was included
10:52
in a federal extremist materials.
10:55
Now I would like to point out that if I
10:59
published a book that said that aliens
11:00
from interdimensional space were
11:02
operating a food truck in Area 51
11:06
I would not be charged with divulging
11:07
state secrets. That's because that isn't
11:10
true. So if the book that says that
11:14
Putin staged this false flag attack did
11:17
divulge state secrets, that implies that
11:20
it's actually correct. Right?
11:24
And so
11:25
we know that Putin is happy to do these
11:27
things.
11:29
Again, that he's targeted NATO countries
11:31
repeatedly with both his own drones in
11:34
the case of Romania, Ukrainian drones.
11:36
So,
11:37
why is
11:39
NATO out here suddenly saying, "Listen,
11:41
we're going to see more of this."
11:44
Uh and I think
11:46
the reality is that Putin is
11:49
in part he's
11:50
relying more heavily on the only tactic
11:52
that is working for him, which is
11:54
long-range attacks, right? His
11:56
battlefield efforts have largely
11:58
stalled. Uh a little bit of movement in
12:01
Konstantinivka Konstantinivka at
12:03
tremendous cost. But, you can see that
12:05
in terms of things that work, uh Russia
12:07
has fired a record number of missiles at
12:09
Ukraine in July, uh but almost all of
12:11
those missiles were made within weeks of
12:13
being fired. So, for Russia, actually
12:15
hacking Ukrainian drones solves both a
12:17
logistic problem, but also allows him to
12:20
continue his hybrid warfare campaign
12:22
against the Baltics. And
12:25
but
12:27
Ukraine's own campaign is also enjoying
12:30
considerable success, right? The
12:32
Ukrainians have been hitting these
12:33
logistics facilities, energy centers, uh
12:36
really just have have finally said,
12:38
"Listen, we have to give Russia a taste
12:40
of its own medicine." And that includes
12:42
targeting these kind of dual-use type of
12:44
facilities. And
12:46
you know, you don't love it, but also
12:48
Ukraine has been dealing with this for
12:51
from Russia for literally years. So,
12:54
right and you can see Russia's air
12:55
defenses uh
12:57
also having a really rough time of
12:59
things.
13:00
And I think if you if you take away
13:03
anything from this, again, you can see
13:05
Tor-2s, Nebo-SV's, Nebo-U's, radar
13:07
systems, air defense systems, all of it.
13:10
It's that
13:12
Putin
13:13
is really one, he's running out of
13:15
options, but two,
13:17
I think he really needs NATO to respond.
13:19
And I think the reason he kind of does
13:22
is because he needs a pretext to conduct
13:24
his is
13:25
Putin really wants to conduct a
13:27
large-scale mobilization. It will
13:30
save him money in terms right because
13:32
they don't have to pay mobilized troops
13:34
like he pays his very expensive contract
13:36
soldiers.
13:37
He will be able to sort of further
13:39
militarize the Russian economy in ways
13:42
he's been prohibited from doing thus far
13:45
and not politically self-destruct.
13:48
And
13:50
but in order to do so he needs to
13:52
convince the Russian public that this
13:53
isn't a war against tiny little Ukraine
13:56
one that he's told the Russian public is
13:57
on the brink of defeat for the last five
14:00
years. Instead, he is
14:03
he needs it to be against all of NATO
14:04
and he needs NATO to provide the Russian
14:06
people with a clear totally transparent
14:09
sign that he is ready to do so. So while
14:12
there's this tough dynamic, right? You
14:14
don't want NATO to appear passive in the
14:16
face of Russian aggression. think they
14:18
absolutely have been. You also can't
14:21
give Vladimir Putin this pretext to do
14:24
anything that that he wants so badly to
14:27
sort of strike back at NATO countries
14:30
and to create this false emergency of a
14:32
war with NATO. Now, there's a lot and my
14:35
gripe with the EU is that there's a lot
14:36
of in the middle there, right?
14:39
We've talked about some of it. Some of
14:41
it the security services assassination
14:43
attempts of Russian generals, some of it
14:45
being things like the long-range Storm
14:47
Shadow missile strike against Russian
14:48
missile facilities.
14:50
All of these things are I believe
14:53
messages from the EU to Putin. But
14:56
there's still a lot of options in the
14:57
middle,
14:58
right? And that don't involve giving
15:01
Putin the pretext that he wants
15:03
especially operating through Ukraine to
15:06
do a lot of these things, right? So
15:09
if there's a takeaway, it's that
15:11
this
15:14
expect it. Expect more of this BS from
15:16
Putin. He's going to keep playing games
15:18
because the more games he plays the more
15:21
nonsense he employs, the harder a time
15:24
they're going to have
15:28
the more confusing the world is going to
15:29
get. And remember, yes, manipulating
15:32
European politicians is a core part of
15:34
the strategy, but another core part is
15:35
manipulating you.
15:37
The active engaged social media user,
15:40
the voter in these countries that decide
15:42
what kind of politicians, what kind of
15:43
policies the country needs. His goal is
15:45
to create doubt, create questions, have
15:49
you all asking, "Does our support for
15:50
Ukraine make us more safe or less safe?"
15:52
Those are the kind of things that
15:53
Vladimir Putin really wants you to ask
15:56
yourself. And
15:57
creating these false flags, creating
15:58
these lies is an essential part of that
16:00
strategy. And
16:02
again, you are the target.
16:04
So, you can arm yourself by simply
16:07
knowing that this is a trick
16:09
that the Russians pull. Anyway, guys,
16:11
thanks to Chris, Charles, Kevin, Brent,
16:12
Andreas, Jim, John, CPC, Leonis,
16:14
Gabriel, Brendan, Alfred, Peter, and all
16:15
other tenured folks. We really
16:16
appreciate you. Hit subscribe. Cheers.