Latest / The Vault: The Epstein Files / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 41-44) (7/4/26)

Transcript

Mega Edition: The OIG Report Detailing The Investigation Into Epstein's NPA (Part 41-44) (7/4/26) · The Vault: The Epstein Files

0:00
Speaker 1: What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
0:03
This episode, we're picking up with the OIG report into
0:07
Jeffrey Epstein's NPA. D Acosta's decisions led to difficulties enforcing
0:13
the NPA. After the agreement was reached, the collateral attacks
0:17
and continued appeals raised the specter that the defense had
0:21
negotiated in bad faith. At various points, individual members of
0:25
the USAO team became frustrated by defense tactics, and in
0:29
some instances consideration was given till whether the USAO should
0:33
declare a unilateral breach. Indeed, on November twenty fourth, two
0:37
thousand and eight, the USAO gave notice that it deemed
0:40
Epstein's participation and work release to be a breach of
0:44
the agreement with a failure to report on October twentieth,
0:48
and had envisioned that entire collateral attack. I think would
0:52
have looked at this very differently. Once the NPA was signed,
0:55
the COSTA could have ignored Epstein's request for further review
0:58
by the department, and if Epstein failed to fulfill his
1:01
obligations under the NPA to enter his state guilty plea
1:05
declared Epstein to be in breach and proceeded to charge
1:08
him federally. When questioned about this issue, Acosta explained that
1:12
he believed the department had the right to address Epstein's concerns.
1:17
He told OPR that, because the USAO is part of
1:20
the Department of Justice, if a defendant asked for a
1:23
departmental review, it would be unseemly to object. During his
1:28
OPR interview, Sloman described a Costa as very process oriented,
1:32
which he attributed to Acosta's prior department experience. Sloman, however,
1:37
believed the USAO gave Epstein too much process, a result
1:41
of the usao's desire to do the right thing and
1:44
to the defense team's ability to keep pressing for more
1:47
process without triggering a breach of the NPA. Furthermore, Epstein's
1:51
defense counsel repeatedly and carefully made clear that they were
1:55
not repudiating the agreement. A Costa told OPR that the
1:59
USAO would have had to declare Epstein in breach of
2:02
the NPA in order to proceed to file federal charges,
2:06
and Epstein would undoubtedly have litigated whether his effort to
2:09
obtain departmental review constituted a breach. A Costa recalled that
2:14
he was concerned, as with Slowman, that a unilateral decision
2:18
to rescind the non prosecution agreement would result in collateral
2:21
litigation that would further delay matters and make what was
2:25
likely a difficult trial even harder. A Costa in Slowman's
2:28
concerns about declaring a breach were not unreasonable. A court
2:32
would have been unlikely to have determined that defense counsel's
2:36
appeal of the NPA to the Department and an unwillingness
2:39
to set a plea date while the appeal was ongoing,
2:42
was sufficient to negate the agreement. However, some of the
2:45
difficulty the USAO faced in declaring a breach was caused
2:49
by decisions Acosta made before and shortly after the NPA
2:53
was signed. For example, and significantly, it was a Costa
2:56
who changed the language Epstein shall enter his guilty please
3:00
and be sentenced not later than October twenty six, two
3:03
thousand and seven, to Epstein shall use his best efforts
3:07
to enter his guilty plea and be sentenced not later
3:09
than October twenty six, two thousand and seven. Acosta also
3:13
agreed not to enforce the NPA's October twenty six, two
3:17
thousand and seven deadline for entry of Epstein's plea, and
3:20
he told defense counsel that he had no objection if
3:23
they decided to pursue an appeal to the department. Following
3:27
these decisions, the USAO would have had significant difficulty trying
3:31
to prove that Epstein was not using his best efforts
3:34
to comply with the NPA and was intentionally failing to comply,
3:38
as opposed to pursuing a course to which the us
3:41
Attorney had at least implicitly agreed. E Acosta did not
3:45
exercise sufficient supervisory review over the process. The question at
3:50
the center of much of the public controversy concerning the
3:53
usao's handling of its criminal investigation of Epstein is why
3:56
the USAO agreed to resolve the case in which the
4:00
defendant faced decades in prison for sexual crimes against miners
4:03
with such an insignificant term of incarceration and made numerous
4:08
other concessions to the defense. As OPR set forth in
4:12
substantial detail in this report, OPR did not find evidence
4:15
to support allegations that the prosecutors sought to benefit Epstein
4:19
at the expense of the victims. Instead, the result can
4:23
more appropriately be tied to Acosta's misplaced concerns about interfering
4:27
with a traditionally staid crime and intruding on state authority.
4:30
Acosta was also unwilling to abandon the path that he
4:34
had set, even when Villa Fauna and Lori advocated to
4:37
end the negotiations, even though Acosta himself learned that the
4:41
state authorities may not have been a reliable partner, Many
4:45
of the problems that developed might have been avoided had
4:48
Acosta engaged in greater consultation with his staff before making
4:51
key decisions. The contemporaneous records revealed problems with communication and
4:57
coordination among the five key participants. Acosta was involved to
5:01
a greater extent and made more decisions than he did
5:04
in a typical case. Laurie told OPR that it was
5:08
unusual to have a US attorney get involved with this
5:11
level of detail. Metchell told OPR, I know we would
5:14
have spoken about this case a lot, okay, And I'm
5:17
sure with Jeff as well, that there were conversations a
5:20
meeting that I had with Marie and Andy as well.
5:23
Laurie similarly told OPR, well, he would have been talking
5:27
to Jeff and Matt, talking to me to the extent
5:29
that he did, and he would have been looking at
5:31
the pro's memo and the guidance from CEOs. He would
5:35
have been reading the defense attorney's letters, maybe talking to
5:38
the state attorney. I don't know, just all these different
5:41
sources of information. He was uncomfortable that he knew the case.
5:45
You know that he was. He was reading everything. Apparently
5:48
he read the prose memo, He read all the stuff.
5:52
At the same time, Acosta was significantly removed in physical
5:56
distance and in levels in the supervisory chain from the
6:00
individuals with the most knowledge of the facts of the case,
6:03
Villa Fauna and to the lesser extent Lori. Lorii normally
6:06
would have signed off on the prosecution memorandum on his own, but,
6:10
as he told OPR, recognized that the case was going
6:14
to go through the front office, because there was front
6:16
office involvement from the get go. Yet, although Acosta became
6:20
involved at certain points in order to make decisions, he
6:23
did not view himself as overseeing the investigation or the
6:26
details of implementing his decisions. OPR observed that, as a consequence,
6:31
management of the case suffered from both an absence of
6:34
ownership of the investigation and failures in communication that affected
6:39
critical decisions. On occasion, Villa Fauna included Acosta directly in emails,
6:44
but often information upon which a Costa relied for his decisions,
6:48
and information about the decisions Acosta had made traveled through
6:52
multiple layers between Acosta and Villa Fauna. Villa Fauna did
6:57
draft a detailed analytical prosecution memoranda, but it's not clear
7:01
that a Costa reddit and instead may have relied on
7:03
conversations primarily with Menchell and later with Sloman after Menchel's departure.
7:09
Despite these discussions, though it is not clear that a
7:12
Costa was aware of certain information such as Ostraband's strong
7:15
opinion from the outset in favor of the prosecution, or
7:19
of Villa Fauna's concerns and objections to state based resolutions
7:23
or the final NPA. Acosta interpreted the state indictment on
7:27
only one charge as a sign that the case was
7:29
weak evidentially, but it's not clear that when making his
7:33
decision to resolve the matter through a state based plea,
7:36
he knew the extent to which both Villa Fauna and
7:38
Laurie believed that the state had intentionally failed to aggressively
7:42
pursue a broader state indictment. One example illustrates this communication
7:47
gap in September twentieth, two thousand and seven email to
7:50
Louri asking him to read the latest version of the
7:53
proposed hybrid federal plea agreement calling for Epstein to plead
7:57
to both state and federal charges. V I don't typically
8:01
sign plea agreements. We should only go forward if the
8:03
trial team supports and signs this agreement. I didn't even
8:07
sign the public Corruption or CALI cartel agreements, so this
8:10
should not be the first. In his email to Villa Fauna,
8:13
Lorie attached to Costa's email and instructed Villa Fauna to
8:17
change the signature block to your name and send as
8:19
a final to Jay Lefkowitz. Fila Fauna raised no objections
8:23
to signing the agreement. A Costa told OPR that he
8:26
wanted to give the trial team a chance to speak
8:28
up and let him know if they did not feel
8:31
comfortable with the agreement. Phila Fauna, however, told OPR that
8:35
she did not understand that she was being given an
8:38
opportunity to object to the agreement. Rather, she believed a
8:41
Costa wanted her to sign it because he was taking
8:44
an arm's length approach and signaling that this was not
8:48
his deal. The fact that the top decision makers believed
8:51
he was giving the line Ausa an opportunity to reflect
8:55
and stop the process if she believed the deal was inappropriate,
8:58
but the line Ausa believed she was being ordered to
9:02
sign the agreement because her boss wanted to distance himself
9:05
from the decision reflects a serious communication gap. As another example,
9:10
At one point, Villa Fauna, frustrated and concerned about the
9:13
decisions being made concerning a possible resolution, requested a meeting
9:18
with Acosta. In a sternly worded rebuke. Menchell rejected the request.
9:23
Although Menchell told OPR that he was not prohibiting Villa
9:26
Fauna from speaking with Acosta, Villa Fauna interpreted Menchell's email
9:30
to mean that she could not seek a meeting with Acosta.
9:33
As a consequence, Acosta made his decision about a state
9:36
resolution and the term of incarceration without any direct input
9:40
from Villa Fauna. Acosta told OPR that he was unaware
9:44
that Villa Fauna had sought a meeting with him, and
9:46
he would have met with her if she had asked
9:48
him directly. OPR did not find any written evidence of
9:52
a meeting involving both Acosta, the final decision maker, and
9:56
Villa Fauna, the person most knowledgeable about the facts and
9:59
the law before Acosta made his decision to resolve the
10:02
case through state charges or to offer a two year term,
10:06
and Villa Fauna said she did not have any input
10:09
into that decision. Although a US attorney is certainly not
10:12
required to have such direct input, and it may be
10:15
that Mentchell presented what he believed to be Villafana's views,
10:19
OPR found no evidence that Acosta was aware of Villafauna's
10:23
strong views about and objections to the proposed resolution. All right, folks,
10:28
we're gonna wrap up right here, and then the next
10:30
episode we're going to pick up where we left off.
10:33
All of the information that goes with this episode can
10:36
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
10:39
welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. This episode, we're picking
10:43
up where we left off with the Jeffrey Epstein OIG
10:47
report into the NPA. Two logistical problems hindered effective communication. First,
10:53
the senior managers involved in the case, Acosta, Sloman and
10:57
Menchell had offices located in Miami, while the offices of
11:01
the individuals most familiar with the facts of the case,
11:03
Villa Fauna and to a lesser extent, Lori, were located
11:07
in West Palm Beach. Consequently, Villa Fauna's discussions with their
11:11
senior managers required more effort than in other offices, where
11:15
a line ausa can more easily just stop by a
11:18
supervisor's office to discuss the case. Second key personnel were
11:22
absent at varying times. Menchell's last day in the office
11:26
was August third, two thousand and seven, the day he
11:28
sent to the defense's letter making the initial offer, and
11:31
presumably in the immediate period before his departure date, Menchell
11:36
would have been trying to wrap up his outstanding work.
11:39
Yet this was also the time when Acosta was deciding
11:42
how to resolve the matter. Similarly, in the critical month
11:45
of September, the NPA and plea negotiations intensified and the
11:49
NPA evolved significantly, with the USAO having to consider multiple
11:54
different options as key provisions were continuously added or modified,
11:58
while Villa Fauna pressed him meet her late September deadline.
12:02
Although Lorie was involved with the negotiations during this period,
12:05
he was at the same time transitioning not only to
12:08
a new job, but to one in Washington, d C.
12:11
And was traveling between the two locations. Slowman was on
12:14
vacation in the week preceding the signing, when many significant
12:18
changes were made to the agreement. Andy did not participate
12:22
in drafting or reviewing the NPA before it was signed. Accordingly,
12:26
during the key negotiation period for a significant case involving
12:30
a unique resolution, no one involved had both a thorough
12:34
understanding of the case and full ownership of the decisions
12:37
that were being made. Villafana certainly felt that during the
12:40
negotiations she was only implementing decisions made by Acosta. Acosta, however,
12:46
told OPR that when reviewing the NPA, I would have
12:49
reviewed this for the policy concerns, did it do the
12:53
bullet points? And my assumption, rightly or wrongly, would have
12:56
been that Andy and Marie would have looked at this
13:00
and that this was appropriate. The consequences flowing from the
13:04
lack of ownership and effective communication can be seen in
13:07
the NPA itself, as demonstrated by the contemporaneous communications. The
13:12
negotiations were at times confusing, as the parties considered multiple
13:16
options and even revisited proposals previously rejected. Meanwhile, Villa Fauna
13:21
sought to keep to a deadline that would allow her
13:24
to charge Epstein when she planned to if the parties
13:27
did not reach agreement. In the end, Acosta accepted several
13:30
terms with little apparent discussion or consideration of the ramifications.
13:35
The usao's agreement not to prosecute any potential co conspirators
13:40
is a notable example. As previously noted, the only written
13:43
discussion about the term that OPR found was Villafana's email
13:47
to Lori and the incoming West Palm Beach manager with
13:50
copies to her co council and direct supervisors, stating that
13:54
she did not believe the provision hurts us, and neither Acosta,
13:57
Lori nor Villa Fauna recalled any further discussions about the provision.
14:01
Although OPR did not find evidence showing that Acosta, Lori
14:05
or Villa Fauna intended the scope of the provision to
14:09
protect anyone other than Epstein's for assistance, the planned language
14:12
of the provision precluded the USAO from prosecuting anyone who
14:16
engaged with Epstein in his criminal conduct within the limitations
14:20
set by the overall agreement. This broad prosecution declination would
14:25
likely be unwise in most cases, but in this case,
14:28
in particular, the USAO did not have a sufficient investigative
14:31
basis from which it could conclude with any reasonable certitude
14:35
that there were no other individuals who should be held
14:38
accountable along with Epstein, or that evidence might not be
14:41
developed implicating others. Prosecutors rarely promised not to prosecute unidentified
14:47
third parties. The rush to reach resolution should not have
14:51
led the USAO to agree to such a significant provision
14:54
without a full consideration of the potential consequences in justification
14:58
for the provision. It's highly doubtful that the usao's refusal
15:03
to agree to that term would of itself cause the
15:05
negotiations to fail. The usao's rejection of the defense proposal
15:10
concerning immigration consequences did not affect Epstein's willingness to sign
15:14
the agreement. The possibility that individuals other than Epstein's for
15:18
female assistants, could have criminal culpability for their involvement in
15:22
his scheme, could have been anticipated and should have caused
15:26
more careful consideration of the provision. Similarly, the confidentiality provision
15:32
was also accepted with little apparent consideration of the implications
15:35
of the provision for the victims, and it eventually became
15:39
clear that the defense interpreted the provision as precluding the
15:42
USAO from informing the victims about the status of the investigation.
15:47
Agreeing to a provision that restricted the usao's ability to
15:51
disclose or release information as it deemed appropriate mired the
15:55
USAO in disputes about whether it was or would be
15:58
violating the terms of the end by disclosing information to
16:02
victims or the Special Master. Decisions about disclosure of information
16:06
should have remained within the authority and the province of
16:09
the USAO to decide as it saw fit. There is
16:12
nothing improper about a us attorney not having a meeting
16:15
with the line USA or other involved members of the
16:18
prosecution team before he or she makes a decision in
16:22
a given case. Indeed, US attorneys often make decisions without
16:26
having direct input from line Ausas and Acosta did have
16:30
discussions with Menchel and possibly Slowman before making the critical
16:34
decision to resolve the matter through a state plea, although
16:37
the specifics of those discussions cannot be recalled by the
16:40
participants due to the passage of time. This case, however,
16:44
was different from the norm, and Acosta was considering a
16:47
resolution that was significantly different from the usual plea agreement.
16:52
Contemporaneous records show that Acosta believed the case should be
16:56
handled like any other, but Acosta's decision to fashion and
16:59
unorthance dooxed resolution made the case unlike any other, and
17:03
it therefore required appropriate oversight. Acosta may well have decided
17:08
to proceed in the same fashion even if he sought
17:11
and received a full briefing from Villafauna and others, but
17:14
given the highly unusual procedure being considered, his decision should
17:18
have been made only after a full consideration of all
17:21
of the possible ramifications and consequences of pushing the matter
17:25
into the state court system, with which neither Villa, Fauna
17:29
nor other subjects had experience, along with consideration of the
17:33
legal and evidentiary issues and possible means of overcoming those issues.
17:39
OPR did not find evidence indicating that such a meeting
17:42
or discussion with the full team was held before the
17:45
decision was made to pursue the state based resolution, before
17:48
the decision was made to offer a two year term
17:51
of incarceration, or before the NPA with its unusual terms,
17:55
was signed, as a Costa later recognized and told OPR
17:59
and a question that I think is a valid one
18:01
in my mind is did the focus on let's just
18:04
get this done and get a jail term mean that
18:07
we didn't take a step back and say, let's evaluate
18:09
how this train is moving. Many features of the NPA
18:13
were given inadequate consideration, including core provisions like the term
18:17
of incarceration and sexual offender registration, with the result that
18:21
Epstein was able to manipulate the process to his benefit.
18:25
Members of his senior staff held differing opinions about some
18:28
of the issues that a Costa felt were important and
18:31
that factored into his decision making. There does not seem
18:34
to be a point, however, at which those differing opinions
18:37
were considered when forming strategy. Rather, a Costa seems to
18:41
have made a decision that everyone beneath him followed and
18:44
attempted to implement, but without a considered strategy beyond detaining
18:48
the three core elements. As US attorney, a Costa had
18:52
authority to proceed in this matter, but many of the
18:54
problems that developed with the NPA might have been avoided
18:57
with a more thoughtful approach as a cost so belatedly recognized.
19:01
If I was advising a fellow US attorney today, I
19:04
would say, think it through. No one of the individual
19:08
problems discussed above necessarily demonstrates poor judgment by itself. However,
19:13
in combination, the evidence shows that the state based resolution
19:17
was ill conceived from the start and that the NPA
19:20
resulted from a flawed decision making process. From the time
19:24
the USAO opened its investigation, a Costa recognized the federal
19:28
interest in prosecuting Epstein, yet after that investigation had run
19:32
for more than a year, he set the investigation on
19:35
a path not originally contemplated. Having done so, he had
19:40
responsibility for ensuring that he received and considered all of
19:43
the necessary information before putting an end to the federal
19:47
investigation into serious criminal conduct. A Costa's failure to adequately
19:52
consider the full ramifications of the NPA contributed to a
19:55
process and ultimately a result that left not only the
19:59
Line and the FBI case agents dissatisfied, but also cause
20:04
victims and the public to question the motives of the
20:08
prosecutors and whether any reasonable measure of justice was achieved. Accordingly,
20:13
OPR concludes that Acosta exercised poor judgment in that he
20:17
chose a course of action that was in market contrast
20:21
to the action that the Department would reasonably expect an
20:24
attorney exercising good judgment to take. Chapter three, Issues relating
20:30
to the Government's interactions and communications with victims, Part one
20:34
Factual Backgrounds one Overview. Chapter three describes the events pertaining
20:39
to the federal government's interactions and communications with the victims
20:43
in the Epstein case and should be read in conjunction
20:46
with the factual background set forth in Chapter two, Part one.
20:50
This chapter sets forth the pertinent legal authorities and department
20:53
policies and practices regarding victim notification and consultation, as well
20:59
as oprs and now in conclusions, OPR discusses key events
21:03
relating to the USAOs and the FBI's interactions with victims
21:07
before and after the signing of the NPA, beginning with
21:10
the FBI's initial contact with victims through letters informing them
21:14
that the FBI had initiated an investigation. A timeline of
21:19
key events is provided on the following page. All right,
21:22
we're going to wrap up this episode here and in
21:24
the next episode we're going to pick up with two
21:27
the CVRA US Code eighteen, Section thirty seven seventy one.
21:32
All of the information that goes with this episode can
21:35
be found in the description box. What's up, everyone, and
21:38
welcome back to the program. This episode, we're picking up
21:41
where we left off with the OIG report into Jeffrey
21:45
Epstein's NPA B Enumerated Rights. The CVRA defines the term
21:51
crime victim as a person directly and proximately harmed as
21:54
a result of the commission of a federal offense or
21:57
an offense in the District of Columbia initially at the
22:00
time relevant to the federal Epstein investigation. The cvr A
22:05
afforded crime victims the following eight rights. One the right
22:09
to be reasonably protected from the accused. Two the right
22:12
to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of public court proceeding
22:16
or any parole proceeding involving the crime, or of any
22:20
release or escape of the accused. Three the right not
22:24
to be excluded from any such public court proceedings unless
22:27
the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that
22:31
testimony by the victim would be materially altered. If the
22:34
victim heard of their testimony at the proceeding four, the
22:38
right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
22:41
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. Five,
22:47
the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
22:49
government in the case. Six, The right to full and
22:52
timely restitution as provided in law. Seven. The right to
22:56
proceedings free from unreasonable delay. The right to be treated
23:01
with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.
23:06
Although many of the rights included in the CVRA already
23:09
existed in federal law, as part of the VRR, the
23:13
CVR afforded crime victims standing to assert their rights in
23:16
federal court or by administrative complaint to the Department, and
23:20
obligated the court to ensure that such rights were afforded.
23:24
The passage of the CVRA repealed the rights portion of
23:28
the VRRA US Code forty two, Section ten six zero six,
23:32
but kept intact the portion of the VRRA directing federal
23:36
law enforcement agencies to provide certain victim services, such as
23:40
counseling and medical care referrals. US Code forty two, Section
23:44
one zero six zero seven. C Department training emphasizes that
23:49
VRRA obligates the Department to provide victim services which attach
23:54
upon the detection of a crime, while the CVRA contains
23:58
court enforceable rights that attack upon the filing of a
24:01
charging instrument. In twenty fifteen, Congress amended the CVRA and
24:06
added the following rights. Nine the right to be informed
24:10
in a timely manner of any plea, bargain or deferred
24:13
prosecution agreement. Ten, the right to be informed of the
24:17
rights under this section and the services described in Section
24:20
five oh three C of the Victims Rights and Restitution
24:23
Act of nineteen ninety US Code forty two, Section ten
24:28
six zero seven C. And provided contact information for the
24:32
Office of the Victims Rights on Budsman of the Department
24:35
of Justice. Part three. The Department's interpretation of the cvra's
24:40
definition of crime victim at the time of the Epstein
24:43
investigation a April one, two thousand and five Office of
24:48
Legal Council preliminary review. In two thousand and five, Department
24:53
management requested in formal guidance from the Department's Office of
24:56
Legal Counsel OLC regarding interpretation of the cvra's definition of
25:02
crime victim. On April one, two thousand and five, OLC
25:06
provided preliminary and informal guidance by email, concluding that the
25:10
status of a crime victim may be reasonably understood to
25:14
commence upon the filing of a complaint, and the status
25:17
ends if there is a subsequent decision not to indict
25:19
or prosecute the federal offense that directly caused the victim's arm.
25:23
OLC concluded that because the CVRA defines crime victim as
25:28
a person directly and proximately harmed by the commission of
25:31
a federal offense, the definition of victim is thus tethered
25:34
to the identification of a federal offense, an event that
25:37
occurs with the filing of a complaint. OLC further concludes
25:42
that because the House Report stated that the CVRA codifies
25:46
the rights of crime victims in the federal judicial system,
25:49
and the complaint commences the judicial process and places an
25:52
offense within the judicial system, the legislature must have intended
25:57
for CVR rights to commence upon the filing of a complaint.
26:01
OLC also found that the language of the CVR rights
26:05
supported its interpretation. For example, the first right grants a
26:09
victim protection from the accused, not a suspect. Additionally, the second, third,
26:13
and fourth rights referred to victim notification and access to
26:17
public proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, or parole, none of
26:21
which commence prior to the filing of a complaint. B
26:25
two thousand and five Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and
26:28
Witness Assistants. In May two thousand and five, Department updated
26:32
its Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistants, the
26:36
two thousand and five Guidelines to include the CVRA. The
26:39
two thousand and five guidelines specifically cited the CVRA requirements
26:44
that agencies engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of
26:48
crimes shall make their best efforts to see that crime
26:51
victims are notified of and accorded their CVR rights, which
26:55
in two thousand and five encompassed the initial eight CVRA rights.
27:00
The two thousand and five guidelines provide details regarding implementation
27:04
of the Department CVRA duties and divided criminal cases into
27:08
an investigation stage, a prosecution stage, and a correction stage.
27:13
The individual responsible for notifying crime victims of their CVRA
27:17
rights varied depending on the stage of the proceedings. During
27:21
the investigation stage of cases in which the FBI has
27:24
the investigative agency. The special Agent in charge was responsible
27:29
for identifying victims at the earliest opportunity after the detection
27:33
of a crime and notifying them of their rights under
27:36
the CVRA services available under the VRRA and other federal statutes.
27:41
During the investigative stage, the Department mandates compliance with the
27:45
Victims' Rights and Restitution Act US Code forty two, Section
27:49
ten six zero seven, which requires federal officials to, among
27:53
other things, identify victims, protect victims, arrange for victims to
27:57
receive reasonable protection from soil expected offenders, and provide information
28:02
about available services for victims. Therefore, even though the Department
28:06
may not afford CVRA rights to the victims if charges
28:10
have not been filed in their cases, the Department may
28:13
provide certain services to victims that may serve the same
28:16
function as some CVRA rights. The two thousand and five
28:20
guidelines stated that the prosecution stage of the case began
28:24
when charges are filed and continued through pre sentencing legal proceedings.
28:28
The U S attorney in whose district the prosecution is
28:31
pending was responsible for making the best efforts to see
28:35
that crime victims are notified of their rights under the
28:38
CVRA during the prosecution stage. The two thousand five guidelines
28:42
required the U S Attorney or a designee to notify
28:46
crime victims of case events such as the filing of charges,
28:49
the release of an offender, the schedule of court proceedings,
28:52
the acceptance of a guilty plea or no low contendre,
28:56
or rendering of a verdict, and any sentence imposed. The
29:00
two thousand and five guidelines required the responsible official to
29:04
provide the victim with reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of
29:07
any public court proceeding that involves a crime against the victim.
29:12
The two thousand and five guidelines specifically required federal prosecutors
29:16
to be available to consult with victims about their major
29:19
case decisions, such as dismissals, releases of the accused, plea negotiations,
29:25
and pre trial diversion. In particular, in two thousand and
29:28
five guidelines required the responsible official to make reasonable efforts
29:32
to notify the identified victims of and considered victims views
29:36
about perspective plea agreements. Nevertheless, the two thousand and five
29:40
guidelines caution prosecutors to consider a factor as relevant to
29:44
the wisdom and the practicality of giving notice and considering
29:47
the victim's views in light of various factors such as
29:50
whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions, and
29:55
whether the victim is a possible witness in the case,
29:58
and the effect that relaying any information may have on
30:01
the defendant's rights to a fair trial. Lastly, the two
30:04
thousand and five guidelines stated that a strong presumption exists
30:08
in favor of providing, rather than withholding, assistants and services
30:12
to victims and witnesses of crimes. The correction stage involved
30:16
both pre trial detention and the defendant and incarceration following
30:20
a conviction, depending on the agency having custody of the defendant.
30:24
The u S attorney or other agencies were responsible for
30:27
victim notifications during this stage. USAO and the FBI victim
30:32
witness notification practice. At the time of the Epstein investigation,
30:37
a USAO training as us attorney Alex Acosta, disseminated the
30:43
May two thousand and five updated guidelines to USAO personnel
30:47
with a transmittal memorandum dated February twenty seventh, two thousand
30:51
and six, stating that he expected each recipient to read
30:55
and become familiar with the two thousand and five guidelines.
30:58
Acosta noted in the memorandum that the USAO had recently
31:02
held an all office training addressing the two thousand and
31:05
five guidelines, and that new USAO attorneys who missed the
31:09
training were required to view a videotape version of the
31:12
training immediately. Acosta further noted that the usao's Victim Witness
31:17
staff were ready to assist with details of victim notification
31:21
and other areas for which United States Attorney's Offices are
31:25
now explicitly responsible under the Act. The usao's Victim Witness
31:29
Program coordinator told OPR that the USAO provided annual mandatory
31:34
office wide training on victim witness issues and training for
31:39
new employees b the Automated Victim Notification System. Both the
31:44
FBI and the USAO managed contacts with crime victims through
31:47
the Victim Notification System, an automated system maintained by the
31:51
Executive Office for the United States Attorney The two thousand
31:55
and five guidelines mandated that victims, contact information, and noticed
31:58
to victims of events shall, absent exceptional circumstances, such as
32:03
cases involving juvenile or foreign victims, be conducted and maintained
32:07
using VNS. The VNS is separate from agency case management
32:11
systems maintained by the FBI and the USAO. Both the
32:15
FBI and the USAO use the VNS to generate form
32:18
letters to victims at various points in the investigation and
32:22
the prosecution of a criminal case. Although each form letter
32:25
can be augmented to add some limited individual matter specific content,
32:29
the letters contain specific language concerning the purpose of the
32:33
contact and cannot be removed, such as the arrest of
32:36
the defendant or the scheduling of a sentencing hearing. In
32:40
the usual course of a criminal case, the FBI collects
32:43
victim contact information during the investigation stage, which it stores
32:47
in its case management system. The FBI Victims Specialist exports
32:51
the victim's information data from the FBI's case management system
32:55
into the VNS database. Victim information stored in the VNNA
33:00
is linked to the investigations VNS case number at the
33:04
time of Epstein's investigation. The FBI Victim Specialist could use
33:08
the VNS to generate seven different form notification letters one
33:12
initial notification, two cases under investigation, three arrest of the defendant,
33:18
four declination of prosecution, five other, six advice for victims rights,
33:24
and seven Investigation closed. After a charging document has been
33:28
filed and the prosecution stage begins, the usao's Victim Witness
33:32
Specialist assumes responsibility for victim notification. The USAO imports data
33:38
from the Case Management System into the VNS. The USAO
33:42
Victims Witness Specialist uses the VNS to generate form letters
33:46
providing notice of case events such as charges filed, an arrangement,
33:50
a proposal, plea agreement, change of plea hearings, sentence hearings,
33:54
and the result of sentencing hearings. All right, we're going
33:57
to wrap this episode up right here and then the
33:59
next up. So we're going to pick up with part
34:01
C FBI Victim Notification Pamphlets. All of the information that
34:05
goes with this episode can be found in the description box.
34:10
What's up, everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
34:14
This episode, we're picking up where we left off with
34:16
the OIG Report into Jeffrey Epstein's NPA c FBI Victim
34:22
Notification Pamphlets. The two thousand and five guidelines recommended that
34:27
victims be given a printed brochure or a card that
34:30
briefly describes their rights and available services and contact information
34:35
for the victim, witness coordinator, or specialist. At the time
34:38
of the Epstein investigation, FBI agents nationwide routinely followed a
34:43
practice of providing victims with pamphlets entitled Help for Victims
34:47
of Crime and the Department of Justice Victim Notification System.
34:51
The Help for Victims of Crime pamphlet contained a listing
34:54
of the eight CVRA rights. The pamphlets stated, most of
34:58
these rights pertain to events occurring after the indictment of
35:01
an individual for the crime, and it will be the
35:03
responsibility of the prosecuting United States Attorney's Office to ensure
35:07
you are afforded those rights. The case agent in the
35:10
Epstein investigation told OPR that she provided victims with the
35:15
FBI pamphlet upon the conclusion of an interview. The pamphlet,
35:19
entitled the Department of Justice Victim Notification System, provided an
35:23
overview of the VNS and the instructions on how to
35:26
access the system. Five. The introductory USAO and FBI Letters
35:33
to victims a August two thousand and six. The FBI
35:37
Victim Notification Letters on August Day, two thousand and six,
35:41
shortly after the FBI opened its investigation into Abstein. The
35:45
victim specialist for the West Palm Beach FBI office, under
35:49
the case agent's direction, prepared a victim notification form, naming
35:53
thirty victims in the Epstein investigation and stating that additional
35:57
pertinent information about them was available in them. Thereafter, the
36:02
victim specialist entered individual victim contact information she received from
36:06
the case agent into the VNS. Whenever the case agent
36:10
directed the victim specialist to generate an initial letter to
36:13
a particular victim, the FBI case agent told OPR that
36:18
formal victim notification was always handled by the FBI victim specialist.
36:23
According to the VNS records, beginning on August twenty eight,
36:27
two thousand and six, the FBI Victim specialist used the
36:30
VNS to generate FBI letters to be sent to the
36:34
victims over her signature, identifying eight CVR rights and inviting
36:39
victims to provide updated contact information in order to receive
36:43
current status information about the matter. The FBI letters described
36:47
the case as currently under investigation and noted that this
36:51
can be a lengthy process and we request your continued
36:54
patients while we conduct a thorough investigation. The letters also
36:58
stated that some of the cvras did not take effect
37:01
until after an arrest or an indictment. We will make
37:04
our best efforts to ensure you were accorded the same
37:07
rights described. Most of these rights pertain to events occurring
37:11
after the arrest or indictment of an individual for the crime,
37:14
and it will become the responsibility of the prosecuting United
37:17
States Attorney's Office to ensure you were accorded those rights.
37:21
A sample letter follows. The ns data logues, correspondence maintained
37:26
in the FBI's case management system, and the FBI interview
37:30
reports for the Epstein investigation reflect that during the Epstein investigation,
37:34
the FBI generally issued its victim notification letters after the
37:38
victim had been interviewed by the FBI case agents, but
37:42
its practice was not uniform. B August two thousand and
37:45
six the usao's letters to the victims. During the time
37:49
that the FBI Victims Specialist was preparing and sending FBI
37:52
victim notification letters, Villafauna was also preparing her own introductory
37:57
letter in anticipation of meeting with each vis victim receiving
38:00
the letter, Villa Funa told OPR that she was generally
38:04
aware that the FBI sends letters, but believe the FBI's
38:07
process didn't have anything to do with my process, Villa
38:10
Fanna told the OPR the FBI had their own victim
38:14
notification system and their own guidelines for them and when
38:17
the information had to be provided and what that information
38:20
had to be provided. Moreover, Villa Fauna didn't know when
38:24
FBI letters went out or what they said. Nevertheless, Villa
38:28
Fanna told OPR that she did not intend for letters
38:32
she drafted to interfere with the FBI's notification responsibilities. In
38:36
August of two thousand and six, Villa Fauna drafted her
38:39
letters to victims who had initially been identified by the
38:43
FBI based on the Palm Beach investigative file. Villa Fauna
38:47
told OPR that she made the decision to make contact
38:50
with victims early, and she composed the introductory letter and
38:54
determined to whom they would be sent. Although these letters
38:57
contained CVR rights information, Villa fon 'a mainly intended to
39:01
use them as a vehicle to introduce herself and let
39:04
the victims know the federal investigation would be a different
39:07
process from the State Attorney's office investigation in which the
39:10
victims felt they had not been particularly well treated. Villafana
39:14
told OPR that in the case in which she needed
39:17
to be talking to young girls frequently and asking them
39:20
really intimate questions, she wanted to make sure that they
39:23
feel like they can trust me. Villafana directed the FBI
39:26
case agents to hand deliver the letters as they were
39:29
conducting interviews. Villafuna told OPR that the USAO had no
39:34
standardized way to do any victim notifications prior to filing
39:38
of federal charges, and therefore Villa Fauna did not use
39:41
a template or VNS generated letter for content, but instead
39:45
used a letter she had created and crafted herself for
39:48
another case. The letters contained contact information for Villa Fauna,
39:53
the FBI case agent, and the Department's Office for Victims
39:56
of Crime in Washington, DC, and itemized the sea v rights.
40:01
The USAO letters described the case as under investigation and
40:05
stated that the victims would be notified if anyone is
40:08
charged in connection with the investigation. The letters stated that
40:13
in addition to their rights under the CVRA, victims were
40:16
entitled to counseling, medical services, and potential restitution from the perpetrator,
40:21
and that upon request, the government would provide a list
40:24
of counseling and medical services. Lastly, the letter advised that
40:29
investigators for the defense might contact the victims, and those
40:32
who felt threatened or harassed should contact Villa Fauna or
40:36
the FBI case agent. Although the USAO letters did not
40:40
contain any language limiting CVRA rights to the post arrest
40:44
or indictment stage, Bili Fauna told OPR that she did
40:48
not intend for the letters to activate the usao's CVR obligations,
40:53
which she believed attached only after filing of criminal charge.
40:57
Bila Fauna told OPR that she did not think that
41:00
the victims potentially receiving both an FBI letter and a
41:04
USAO letter would be confused about their CVRA rights because
41:08
the USAO letter was coming with an introduction from the
41:12
agents who were hand delivering them. Later in the course
41:15
of the CVR litigation, Villa Fauna stated that she and
41:18
the investigative team adopted an approach of providing more notice
41:23
and assistance to potential victims than the CVRA may have required,
41:27
even before the circumstances of those individuals had been fully
41:30
investigated and before any charging decisions had been made. Villa
41:35
Fauna informed Lori and Sloman about the letters, but the
41:38
letters were not reviewed by any of Villa Fauna's supervisors,
41:41
who considered such correspondence to be a non management task.
41:46
Acosta told OPR, I've had no other case where I'm
41:49
even aware of victims being notified, because i assume it
41:53
all operates without it rising to management level. Similarly, Menchell
41:58
told OPR, as to chief of the Criminal Division of
42:01
the USAO, I did not consider it to be within
42:03
my purview to ensure that appropriate victim notifications occurred in
42:08
every matter investigated or brought by the office. I also
42:11
recalled that the USAO employed one or more victim witness
42:15
coordinators to work with line prosecutors to ensure that appropriate
42:18
victim notifications occurred in every matter investigated or brought by
42:22
the office. C USAO and FBI letters are hand delivered.
42:28
The FBI case agent told OPR that the FBI made
42:31
its notifications at the time that we met with the girls.
42:35
The case agent recalled that she had delivered the USAO
42:38
letters to the FBI letters to some victims following in
42:42
person interviews, and in the instances where she did not
42:45
provide a victim with a letter she provided an FBI
42:48
pamphlet containing CVR rights information similar that set forth in
42:53
the FBI letters. The COCSE agent also recalled that he
42:57
may have delivered a few letters to victims. The FBI
43:01
Victim specialist told OPR that she mailed some FBI letters
43:04
to victims, and she provided some FBI letters to the
43:07
case agent for hand delivery. Nevertheless, the case agent told
43:12
OPR that she did not sit there and go through
43:14
every rite with victims. She stated, however, in the beginning,
43:18
whether it was through the FBI victim specialist giving the letter,
43:22
me giving a letter the pamphlet, I believe that the
43:24
girls knew that they were victims and they had rights,
43:27
and they had a resource the FBI victim Specialist that
43:31
they could call for that. The FBI case agent further
43:34
explained that once the case agents connected the FBI victim
43:38
specialist with each victim, the victim specialist handled the victims
43:41
rights and resources. Six August two thousand and six to
43:45
September two thousand and seven FBI and USAO contacts with
43:50
victims before the NPA was signed. Early in the investigation,
43:54
Villa Fauna informed her supervisors that up to that point,
43:58
everyone whom the agents have spoken with so far has
44:01
been willing to tell her story. Getting them to tell
44:03
their stories in front of a jury ed trial may
44:06
be much harder. Between August two thousand and six and
44:09
September twenty fourth, two thousand and seven, when the NPA
44:12
was signed, the FBI case agents interviewed twenty two victims.
44:17
On a few occasions, Villa Fauna met with victims together
44:20
with the FBI. Villa Fauna's May first, two thousand and
44:23
seven draft indictment included substantative crimes against multiple victims, and
44:28
Villa Fauna described the circumstances of each of their encounters
44:31
with Epstein in our prosecution memorandum. There is some evidence
44:36
indicating that during interviews, some of the victims expressed to
44:39
the FBI case agents and Villa Fauna concerns about participating
44:43
in a federal trial of Epstein, and those discussions touched
44:46
upon in broad terms, the victim's views regarding the desired
44:50
outcome of the investigation. Before the USAO entered into the NPA, however,
44:56
no one from the government informed any victim about the
44:59
potential for RAZ revolving the federal investigation through a state plea.
45:03
All right, we're going to wrap up this episode right here,
45:05
and in the next episode, we're going to pick up
45:07
with a the case. Agents in Villa Fauna solicit some
45:10
victims' opinions about resolving the federal investigation. All of the
45:14
information that goes with this episode can be found in
45:17
the description box.