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China's Generals, Purges and Power Plays | China Considered | Hoover Institution · China Considered

• 0:08
  - Welcome to China
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  Considered, a podcast that brings fresh insight
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  and informed discussion to one
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  of the most consequential issues of our time,
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  how China's changing and changing the world.
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  I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove senior fellow
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  and co-director of the program on the us, China
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  and the world at the Hoover Institution at
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  Stanford University.
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  And today I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Bonny Lin.
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  Dr. Lin is the director of the China Power Project
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  and a senior advisor at CSIS think Tank in Washington dc.
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  She also spent several years working in senior positions on
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  Asia in the Department of Defense. Welcome, Bonny.
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  - Great to be with you. - So Bonny,
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  I wanna touch on three broad issues with you today.
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  First, just what are China's security ambitions?
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  You know, are they basically to supplant the United States?
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  Is the dominant power in the Asia Pacific
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  or you know, are the ambitions bigger than that
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  or are they smaller than that?
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  In fact, second, what about Taiwan?
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  It's an issue that I know you've spent a lot
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  of time thinking about.
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  Is Xi Jinping 100% committed
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  to claiming sovereignty over Taiwan?
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  Is the Chinese military ready
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  to take action today if, if need be?
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  And then what is the story about Xi Jinping's
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  anti-corruption campaign in the Chinese military?
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  I mean, I think we can look back
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  to 2012 when he first came into power and then into 2013
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  and we saw a lot of churn, you know,
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  throughout the Chinese political system,
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  including in the People's Liberation Army, then in the PLA
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  in terms of senior officials
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  and actually many junior officials as well, getting purged,
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  getting arrested for corruption.
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  But we're now 13 years on.
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  So I'd love
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  to get your insights into why this is still
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  going on at this point.
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  He's purging people, he appointed.
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  So those are the topics I wanna cover with you.
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  And so let's just start off with the biggest, you know,
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  picture one, which is talk
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  to us a little bit about China's security ambitions.
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  You know, what do you see as the trajectory?
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  What do you see as inflection points?
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  How is Xi j what's his ambition?
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  - Right, well thank you Liz.
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  So I think China under Xi Jinping is very, very ambitious.
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  And in terms of what Xi Jinping wants, it is not just China
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  to be the dominant actor in the Indo-Pacific.
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  I think China wants, sorry, thinking wants China
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  to be either on par with the United States
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  or even more leading the leading the international world in
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  leading the world to the extent that China is number one
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  in terms of inflection points On the security side,
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  I would note this is, this again goes back to
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  how active Xi Jinping is.
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  If you look at what's been happening since Xi Jinping's been
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  in power since late 20 20, 20 12 to 2013,
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  we've basically seen a major change almost every
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  two or three years.
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  So the first one is, for example, in the South China Sea,
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  which actually your book covers quite well from late 2013
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  to 2016, we saw massive island building from China on
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  in the South China Sea.
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  That's unprecedented.
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  We've all, we've often seen China ramp up
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  and down tensions in South China Sea,
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  but we've never seen the island building to the extent
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  that we saw under Xi Jinping.
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  My colleague Greg Polling has done some excellent statistics
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  on this and he's shown that since 2013
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  to now we've seen China reclaim over 4,000 acres
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  of land in the South China Sea.
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  Wow. And, and the difference between prior to Xi Jinping
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  and now is by now, particularly since 2018,
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  we now see China's maritime.
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  We now see China's maritime actors basically able
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  to sustain paramilitary operations in the South China Sea on
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  a day by day basis.
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  Whereas before we would only occasionally see Chinese
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  maritime actors by the various disputed features.
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  The other major change I would say that we've seen,
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  which is only about two or so years
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  after the massive Land Island reclamation campaign is in
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  2015, Xi Jinping engaged in a massive
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  reorganization of the PLA.
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  So starting in late 2015 and continuing for quite some years
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  and even now there it's arguable whether the PLA
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  reforms had been done or not.
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  We see, we saw change across the board.
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  So previously China was organized
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  around seven military regions under Xi Jinping.
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  He changed the number from seven to five
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  and each of the five theater commands now are no longer just
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  administrative actors.
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  They actually control the forces
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  and can execute joint operations within
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  their theater command.
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  At the same time, while we see the massive military
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  or reorganization, we also saw at the central level changing
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  of from from four major departments,
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  four general departments under the PLA
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  to 15 different agencies,
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  we saw changes across the services.
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  So China used to have three major branches, the PLA Navy,
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  PLA Army, and PLA Air Force.
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  The Rocket Force, which controlled China's missile assets,
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  was elevated to a full service under Xi Jinping.
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  And then China also added in the PLAS strategic support
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  force as well as the joint logistics force.
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  As part of this major overhaul around 20 17 20 18,
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  we saw Xi Jing cut about 300,000 people from the PLA,
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  mainly from the army side
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  because at that time the Chinese military was about
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  70% ground force.
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  So he wanted to have each of the forces
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  to have a little bit more equity.
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  And then we also saw the change
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  of the Central Military Commission,
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  which is the top body within the Chinese military.
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  It used to be 11 people in the Central Military Commission.
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  Now it's, oh well
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  about half a year ago it was seven people.
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  Now it's down to four people, which we can talk about later.
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  But it showcases the centralization
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  of power under Xi Jinping
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  and the demotion of other military leaders such
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  that Xi Jinping himself has the most power.
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  So all of these changes within the PLA have caused experts
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  to say that if you look at the PLA,
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  and it was founded in 1927
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  that within its almost a hundred year history,
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  the changes under XI have been the most extensive,
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  much more than we saw under HU Jintao or or ing.
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  The last thing I would say in terms
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  of major inflection points is 2020.
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  I would say it's a major inflection point in terms
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  of thinking about security issues vis-a-vis China
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  and as well as its foreign policy defense outlook.
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  And two things really make 20 20, 22 that significant.
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  First is China's pronouncement of a no limits partnership
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  with Russia and then of course China's support
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  of Russia's invasion of Ukraine
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  and all the fallout from that
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  and what that means in terms of China's alignment,
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  also the same year
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  and partially due to China support
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  of Russia was all the concern about if China supports
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  that type of activity in Europe, what does
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  that mean in terms of how China thinks about Taiwan.
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  And then then speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit
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  to Taiwan in August of 2022
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  and the major Chinese military exercise
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  that happened afterwards really showcase the international
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  community a new type of normal in China's military activity
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  and aggression towards Taiwan.
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  That has really set China on a slightly different trajectory
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  vis-a-vis Taiwan as well as the international community.
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  - So that is just fascinating
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  and you hit on a number of issues
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  that I definitely wanna come back to.
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  But let me just ask you about one other issue
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  that you didn't mention, which is that
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  of Chinese bases overseas.
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  Because I know that up until,
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  or I should say, I think that up
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  until about 2011 you really didn't see much mention
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  of China having overseas bases.
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  In fact, it seemed to be antithetical to their sort
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  of military doctrine as far as I could tell.
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  Then all of a sudden you at least I started seeing,
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  you know, articles by experts that, you know,
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  we both know people like she DLI talking about why shouldn't
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  China have overseas bases?
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  And of course we saw the first one in Djibouti,
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  the military logistics base.
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  But I have to say I expected to see more by now.
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  I thought that China had these big, you know,
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  overseas basing ambitions.
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  What's, do you have a sense for, you know,
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  was I just mistaken in my anticipation
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  that they were gonna move very aggressively in this
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  direction or have they been slowed by some other kinds
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  of factors?
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  - So I think there's still a debate within China on whether
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  having overseas military bases the same way
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  that the United States has ours,
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  is actually beneficial to the Chinese.
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  Because on one hand they don't want the burden
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  that the United States has with our allies and partners.
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  They don't want, China does not want to be responsible
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  for the defense of another country.
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  China doesn't want to be dragged into, conflicts are
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  beyond the Chinese border, which is what they associate some
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  of these military bases with.
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  On the other hand, we do see a PLA that's much more active
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  not only in the Indo-Pacific, but going beyond.
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  We're seeing a PLA that does a lot more port calls in
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  countries across the world.
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  I would say what the, the model that China seems
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  to have set, have settled for is investing in a lot
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  of infrastructure that could be dual use
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  and that infrastructure doesn't have
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  to be called a military base.
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  So it avoids all the burdens of the military base,
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  but still provides China with, for example,
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  the deep water ports that Chinese military,
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  air military vessels can go into.
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  But also provides China with a flexibility
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  to use those bases in a time of crisis.
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  Sorry, use those facilities in a time of crisis.
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  - Right. It does seem
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  to be doing something in Cambodia though, doesn't it?
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  Like I, I've heard something a little more than just a port.
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  - So there is a short list of countries that the Department
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  of Defense has listed in, I believe the 2024
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  annual Chi China military power port.
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  And it's over half a dozen countries
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  of which China is suspected to be, have interest in having
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  a, a facility there that could function as a military base.
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  I don't have that list at the top of my head,
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  but Cambodia was one of those countries.
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  - Right. - And, and the Chinese interest was across,
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  it wasn't just in, in Pacific, we,
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  it was in countries in Africa
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  and in the Middle East as well as,
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  I believe there were reportings of maybe one
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  or two countries in Latin America.
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  But I need to go back and check that list.
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  - Yeah, no, no, I think, I think that's right
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  and I think one of them stuck in my mind
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  for other reasons was the UAE.
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  And so maybe just keep, we should keep our eyes open
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  to see whether they make any progress there.
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  But what you're saying is so interesting, I hadn't realized
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  that there was an ongoing debate over whether, you know,
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  basis would be beneficial for the reasons
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  that you suggested.
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  So it's really, it's really interesting.
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  So let's just like expand that a little bit and,
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  and give us a sense of China's military capabilities,
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  you know, relative to those in the United States.
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  You know, because we keep hearing of course
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  that China now has a larger, you know,
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  Navy than the United States does, you know,
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  it's testing hypersonic missiles.
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  I think there's a sense
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  that China's moving very aggressively in a number
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  of different areas in ways
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  that their capabilities maybe in some cases have even
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  surpassed those of the United States.
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  So what's your assessment?
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  And it's not to, not to ask you to go, you know, you know,
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  from from one weapon system to the next.
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  Yes. Just to give us sort of your broad sense for
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  where the two are, you know, where they have, we have parody
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  or you know, one is slightly ahead of the other, you know,
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  can you give us a sort of picture of what that looks like?
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  - Sure. So I guess I would try to simplify down
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  to hardware, software,
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  and then in addition to capabilities,
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  particularly if we're talking about contingencies,
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  there's also the question of resolve.
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  And then the last dimension I think to think about is
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  friends allies and partners, right?
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  So on the hardware side, I think that's
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  where China has made the most progress
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  hardware across the board.
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  There's lots of discussions of
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  how much China has basically tripled it
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  and doubled its missile capability,
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  ballistic missile capabilities based on since 2020.
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  We've also seen reports that since 2020,
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  China has also doubled its nuclear weapons count from 300
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  warheads in 2020 to, to an estimate 600 warheads This year
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  we know that China has been constructing significant
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  shelters, changing its military bases, adding runways,
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  adding hardening to basically across military bases across
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  across from Taiwan.
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  We also have reports as of this year
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  that China is constructing a massive wartime underground
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  command center near Beijing that's a size of 50 pentagons.
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  So basically across the board you,
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  you can find massive investments on infrastructure,
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  on equipment and on all the hard capabilities.
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  Now in terms of what the software, that's
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  where I think China really has a lot of problems.
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  So we haven't seen China fight a war, actual war in decades.
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  And even when we look at the large scale Chinese exercises,
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  we so far haven't seen a very large scale military exercise
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  that's completely unscripted and evolve life fires.
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  And as you know, when you're thinking about actual combat,
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  it's all, all of the above and more complexities involved.
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  So I have serious doubts on
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  how whether the Chinese military leaders are able
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  to perform in actual real combat situations.
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  And we also see what writings in by Chinese authors that
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  they have what they call the five incapable.
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  So this is how Chinese authors described their,
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  these five incapable include one Chinese commanders not
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  being able to judge situations.
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  Two, not being able to understand higher
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  authority intentions.
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  Three, not being able to make operational decisions.
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  Four, not being able to deploy forces,
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  and five, not being able to manage unexpected situations.
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  That sounds to me that the PLAs commanders are not able
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  to function as commanders
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  and that this is being widely reported
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  within Chinese language materials about weaknesses
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  within the PLA.
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  - So can I just ask, are these writers,
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  are they scholars like traditional foreign policy scholars
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  or are these writers within the PLA
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  or within the Ministry of Defense?
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  - They're writers within the PLA.
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  They're PLA experts, not just foreign
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  foreign policy experts.
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  And this is also reported on in the annual US mil,
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  US Department of Defense, sorry, department
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  of War assessments to Congress as one
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  of the weaknesses from the PLA side. And
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  - Then I sometimes, sorry Bonny, lemme just,
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  lemme just get your thought on this.
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  I do worry sometimes that, you know,
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  as we do in the Chinese economy, you know,
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  that there can be a tendency for us to
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  maybe inflate our capabilities relative to those of China
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  or just to say, you know,
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  because we know that China has a highly centralized system
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  that, you know, their people in the mid-level won't be able
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  to make split, you know, moment decisions they're gonna have
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  to report back to Beijing, you know, in the middle of,
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  of some kind of, you know, air fight and, and
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  therefore they're not going to be successful.
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  Is there any, is there any sort of, do you have any concern
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  that when you would read a Department of Defense,
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  and I still call it department of defense
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  because I I think technically they don't have approval
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  to call it Department of war, but, but,
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  but Department of Defense, you know, writings that, that
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  that might be the case or,
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  or do you, do you think that these are actually,
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  these criticisms are well taken?
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  - I think that these criticisms are well taken.
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  They're criticisms that we've,
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  we are basically reporting on based off of PLA assessments
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  experts within the Chinese system
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  that are assessing the PLA.
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  And I would add that I worry
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  that these issues may have been further exacerbated under
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  the P current PLA purges
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  because if you look at the Xi Jinping's purges of the PLA,
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  if you are a mid to low commander in the pla LA
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  and you're looking at all the people who are purged
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  above you, and one of the criticism of those folks purged
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  above you is either allegations of corruption, which can,
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  you can allege corruption almost any official in China.
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  Right. And then other allegations of
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  of forming these coalitions or,
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  or different loyalties, not necessarily to Xi Jinping,
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  if you look at that
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  and look at the extent of the purges,
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  I don't think it incentivizes lower
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  or mid-level commanders to say,
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  let me take the initiative and do something.
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  I think it incentivizes them to keep their heads down so
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  that they won't be purged.
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  So they won't attract any of the discipline, any of the,
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  I guess, questions about their own discipline.
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  - Yeah, I mean I think that's a, that's a very good point.
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  And let me actually then let's, let's turn to the issue of,
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  of purges because you know, I have
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  to say even I'm surprised about this, you know,
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  I've seen it in other sectors, you know, cyber
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  where you know, officials
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  that Xi Jinping has appointed are now being purged.
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  It's not a matter of once he's brought you into the senior
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  most position that you're safe, right?
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  But as you say, you know, they can look back 20 years
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  and find an example of corruption and you know, go
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  after you for that.
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  But do we actually have any understanding
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  of why this most recent batch of senior military officials,
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  you know, was purged or do we understand it?
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  You mentioned, you know, sort of loyalties outside of
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  just the party and Xi Jinping
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  and not maybe respecting the sort of the, you know,
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  the party as opposed to the military or,
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  or putting military professionalism perhaps over the party.
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  Do you have any thoughts about what's going on in
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  this particular last
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  - Purge?
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  Yeah, so I'll share I guess three different theories for it.
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  And I guess I probably believe more in the, the first
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  or second one and a third is a bit more outlandish,
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  but it's circulated.
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  I'll just say that. So the first theory,
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  and actually you can listen to my podcast with John Culver
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  where he talks about this will do, is basically that there,
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  it's really hard for us to tell from the outside
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  what is causing these purges is probably a combination
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  of different factors for different,
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  different types of purges.
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  One could, some could be for corruption,
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  some could be loyalty, but on the
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  outside you really can't tell,
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  well is this based on corruption?
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  Is this based on loyalty? Is this based on competence?
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  And here John really points to the purges
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  that have been pretty systematic.
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  He tracked over two dozen purges of top PLA leadership
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  and based, and it's across all five military regions
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  with exception of the Southern Theater Command.
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  All the leader, all the commanders of each
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  of the four military regions haven't purged.
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  But if you look, go look one level beyond,
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  below the commanders, you will look at, you see
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  that the political commissar,
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  every single political commissar from across the right,
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  right below the commander across five
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  military regions haven't purged.
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  So doesn't seem to be, if you look, you look at
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  how systematic it is, it's hard to say it is just caused
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  by one particular factor.
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  So that's one theory.
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  The other theory, which I think is well documented
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  by excellent work from Neil, Neil Thomas
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  and others are there are factions within the PLA
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  and the faction that is winning out is more of the shion
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  that is closer to where
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  the current, the remaining vice chair of the CMC is
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  and not necess
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  and not the vice chairman of the CMC that was recently per,
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  which is, so in this, in this argument is that,
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  and others within the PLA system, most
• 20:46
  of them have at one point in their careers
• 20:49
  worked within the Fuji system, either at Fuji
• 20:52
  or within the current, current
• 20:54
  or former Eastern Theater Command.
• 20:56
  And because they grew up through this system
• 20:58
  where they worked at Fuji one, one for another,
• 21:00
  they actually formed their own clique within the PLA
• 21:03
  that was opposed.
• 21:05
  And to the other click led by jam sha
• 21:11
  and Jam sha has sort
• 21:13
  of won this internal factionism.
• 21:16
  So that's why Hu do and others are out the door.
• 21:19
  But to your point, Liz, earlier about how some of the,
• 21:24
  the folks within the PLA were pro were promoted
• 21:26
  by Xi Jing Don is one of the folks who were promoted
• 21:29
  by Xi Jinping and some of the other folks
• 21:32
  that are also out were also promoted very fast by Xi Jing,
• 21:35
  which is why there's a third theory, which I don't quite buy
• 21:39
  'cause we see no other evidence of,
• 21:41
  but it's being, I guess, shared by some princelings in China
• 21:46
  and also shared on Chinese social media, which is that
• 21:51
  John Yha is winning out the, the,
• 21:53
  the internal PLA struggles.
• 21:55
  And he is trying to, he is able to get rid of all
• 21:58
  of the folks who are loyal to seeking Ping
• 22:01
  and he's actually trying to force ing
• 22:03
  to accept a term limit.
• 22:05
  But again, that's a pretty radical theory.
• 22:07
  Yeah, that is a very radical theory. Yeah.
• 22:10
  Pretty radical theory and,
• 22:12
  and the only evidence that these people can point to is
• 22:15
  that Daniel Shah has lasted out the purges.
• 22:18
  And the argument is if he's, you know, remaining
• 22:21
  and he is still in power, that means he still has power,
• 22:24
  which means that he's gotten rid of his enemies.
• 22:26
  But I don't know how that really relates to forcing Xi JP
• 22:29
  to accept term limits.
• 22:32
  So that's why I don't really believe in that theory.
• 22:34
  But again, that speaks to how much we don't know
• 22:36
  because a lot of these folks who were,
• 22:39
  who rose up very fast in the system were she's protege right
• 22:43
  people, he, he promoted very fast,
• 22:45
  which is why some were asking, well why did then
• 22:47
  after promoting him then he within a couple years
• 22:49
  just gets rid of them.
• 22:53
  But I think one thing that we do see from the PLA purchase
• 22:56
  that I think is relatively fact-based, it you don't,
• 22:58
  it doesn't really matter what theory you abide,
• 23:00
  you believe in, is that a lot of the folks
• 23:03
  who are now being purged from the system
• 23:04
  or have been recently purged, did, did start their careers
• 23:08
  or at one point or another, spent a good portion
• 23:11
  of their careers in Food Jam.
• 23:13
  Which means that if they're purged,
• 23:15
  China is losing a significant portion of experts
• 23:18
  that have a lot of expertise on operations vis-a-vis Taiwan,
• 23:23
  which then raises questions if China does want
• 23:26
  to engage in another large scale military exercise
• 23:28
  or large scale military operation vis-a-vis Taiwan,
• 23:31
  how much existing expertise is still within the PLA system
• 23:35
  and how, how do the remaining leaders think about
• 23:38
  operations against Taiwan?
• 23:40
  The other fact I think that is well known
• 23:42
  and you were, you probably noticed
• 23:44
  'cause this coincide
• 23:45
  with your most recent stint in government, which is
• 23:48
  that Huong, the outed vice chairman
• 23:51
  and of the CMC, he was largely responsible for the very
• 23:55
  flashy displays, the PLA power against Taiwan
• 23:59
  during then Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.
• 24:02
  So one other theory that's being circulated is
• 24:06
  Hui do may have been outed
• 24:07
  because he was too supportive
• 24:10
  of these very large demonstrations of military force.
• 24:13
  And John y sha wants the PLA to continue
• 24:15
  to build on his capabilities
• 24:17
  and not demonstrate the force in the same way.
• 24:20
  - Hmm. I mean so many different theories flying around that
• 24:25
  it's, it's difficult to make sense of some of 'em,
• 24:28
  like I have to say,
• 24:29
  I I perhaps the one I find most puzzling is the idea
• 24:31
  that haw is still there
• 24:33
  because he's trying to enforce a term limit on Xi Jinping.
• 24:37
  Did I understand that correctly?
• 24:40
  - So, so the argument, some, some argue
• 24:42
  that Johnny Shah is still there, which means
• 24:44
  that he still has power and he's so powerful
• 24:47
  and I don't really know how that relates
• 24:48
  to Johnny Shah trying to force the term limit eating,
• 24:51
  but those are things
• 24:52
  that I've heard all in one big group batch. Yeah.
• 24:57
  - Yeah. I mean, I guess for me, as someone
• 25:00
  who focuses primarily on the political side,
• 25:02
  it's very difficult to imagine
• 25:03
  that if she didn't ping had somebody underneath him
• 25:07
  who was trying to enforce term limits on him,
• 25:11
  that he wouldn't by now have gotten rid of that person
• 25:15
  as opposed to everybody else around him
• 25:19
  because he does hold, he does hold the,
• 25:22
  the sword when it comes to lopping off the heads
• 25:25
  of the people, you know, right.
• 25:27
  In your military position.
• 25:29
  So that one doesn't make so much sense.
• 25:31
  I guess for me, I, what I always find interesting,
• 25:34
  and this applies not only to the military,
• 25:36
  but more broadly to these purges, is, is the difference
• 25:40
  in the language around the ones that seem
• 25:43
  to be entirely about corruption, which you know,
• 25:46
  is very clear and then the ones where the reasoning seems
• 25:50
  to be a little bit more murky
• 25:52
  and there seems to be some kind
• 25:54
  of political issue behind it.
• 25:57
  And what that, you know, might be whether, you know, if,
• 26:01
  if you have an entire clique of Fuji, you know,
• 26:03
  PLA officials, you know, what was it,
• 26:06
  were they saying things that Xi Jinping didn't like about,
• 26:09
  you know, the potential for, you know, a Taiwan action
• 26:14
  or, you know, who knows, right?
• 26:16
  I mean, we could just sit and speculate,
• 26:17
  you know, all day long.
• 26:18
  It's probably not that fruitful, but,
• 26:21
  but I think it's a, it's an important enough issue that
• 26:25
  - Right.
• 26:26
  - I think, you know, we should all be thinking hard about
• 26:28
  what's actually going on behind the scenes there,
• 26:33
  but thank you for sketching out sort of what's,
• 26:35
  what's in the minds of both people inside China
• 26:38
  and you know, top scholars like yourself
• 26:41
  who focus on this issue.
• 26:45
  Okay. So let's, let's move to our, our third,
• 26:47
  our third issue, which is Taiwan
• 26:50
  and an area that, you know, you are certainly one
• 26:53
  of our country's leading experts on Taiwan
• 26:56
  and on sort of relations between the mainland and Taiwan
• 27:00
  and the US and broader regional security issues.
• 27:03
  So okay, let's just get right to it
• 27:06
  because there seems to be just an insatiable appetite
• 27:09
  for the question of, you know, whether
• 27:12
  or not Xi Jinping is, you know, committed to, you know,
• 27:16
  claiming sovereignty over Taiwan in a, in a real,
• 27:19
  in a real sense.
• 27:21
  Whether that 2027 deadline for the PLA being ready,
• 27:26
  you know, has any material significance.
• 27:29
  How do you understand Xi Jinping's objective?
• 27:33
  You know, when it comes to Taiwan, let's assume for the sake
• 27:36
  of argument that he has at least one more term in him,
• 27:40
  and we probably could agree on that, that 2027 is not going
• 27:45
  to see c Jinping moving himself into retirement.
• 27:49
  So let's say he's got one more term
• 27:51
  as general secretary from 2027 to 2032 and
• 27:55
  after that, you know,
• 27:56
  probably maybe would take a backseat chairman of the party
• 28:00
  or something pertained to chairman
• 28:01
  of the Central Military Commission,
• 28:02
  but most importantly one big five, you know,
• 28:06
  year term left in him.
• 28:07
  What, what do you think he wants
• 28:09
  by the time he actually leaves that position?
• 28:14
  - That's an excellent question.
• 28:16
  So by 2032, the end of the, of potential she, fourth term,
• 28:20
  he would be 79 years old.
• 28:23
  And I think it's, I I found the hot mic moment
• 28:27
  between Xi Jinping and Putin in September when they were
• 28:30
  talking about how people can live
• 28:31
  to 150 years to be interesting.
• 28:33
  'cause that made me wonder if she really wants a sixth term
• 28:36
  or maybe a sixth term
• 28:37
  because if, if you believe you can live to 150,
• 28:39
  80 is not that old.
• 28:41
  Right? But having said that,
• 28:43
  I personally do believe Xi Jinping, if possible,
• 28:47
  wants unification with Taiwan during his term, his
• 28:50
  before he leaves office.
• 28:53
  But if you look at all the official documents,
• 28:56
  they all set rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049.
• 29:00
  So Xi Jining has not boxed himself in to necessarily have
• 29:04
  to unify with Taiwan before he leaves office.
• 29:08
  But if you look at the 2022 China,
• 29:11
  China's new white paper on Taiwan,
• 29:14
  it very clearly spells out why China needs
• 29:18
  to unify with Taiwan.
• 29:19
  So the exact language in there is
• 29:22
  that national unification is the only way to avoid the risk
• 29:26
  of Taiwan being invaded, occupied again by foreign countries
• 29:29
  to foil the attempts of external forces to contain China
• 29:33
  and to safeguard Taiwan
• 29:34
  and to safeguard the sovereignty, security
• 29:36
  and development interests of our country.
• 29:38
  So from China's perspective
• 29:39
  and from teaching things perspective,
• 29:41
  unless Taiwan can be brought back to the motherland,
• 29:45
  China can continue rising, Taiwan will always be used
• 29:49
  by the United States or another foreign power to check China
• 29:52
  and China cannot be as powerful as it needs
• 29:54
  to be both in the Indo-Pacific as well
• 29:56
  as in the world globally.
• 29:58
  So I think it's very much central to
• 30:00
  how Xi Jining views China's rejuvenation.
• 30:05
  - So what does that look like?
• 30:07
  Does that mean it's a one country, two systems?
• 30:10
  Does it mean that he's just made progress in terms
• 30:14
  of closer ties?
• 30:16
  You know, look at the new head of the,
• 30:19
  the new chairperson of the Guang, right?
• 30:21
  Who was just elected, who, you know, speaks in terms of,
• 30:26
  you know, Taiwan and the mainland's, you know, vision
• 30:28
  for the future being the same, right.
• 30:30
  And working together.
• 30:32
  Is it enough to have people like that in power
• 30:35
  who align Taiwan's interests with those of the mainland?
• 30:39
  Or does it actually have to be, you know, a, you know,
• 30:43
  where, where Taiwan no longer has, you know,
• 30:46
  an independent foreign policy has elections?
• 30:50
  What does that look like in your mind?
• 30:52
  - Yeah, that's a really good question.
• 30:53
  So I did a look at
• 30:55
  what terms condition Xi Jinping would be able
• 30:58
  to accept in Taiwan compared to
• 31:01
  what his predecessors were able to accept.
• 31:03
  And if you look at the, the outline of, for example,
• 31:09
  what, who was will, who, who in TA
• 31:11
  and Zae were willing to accept you actually saw
• 31:14
  that they were quite willing to accept
• 31:17
  that Taiwan could keep its political system largely intact,
• 31:21
  that Taiwan may even be able to have its own military forces
• 31:25
  that Taiwan might also be able to conduct some form
• 31:29
  of foreign policy if there is a recognition of sort
• 31:33
  of Taiwan's role subordinate
• 31:36
  to the central government of China.
• 31:39
  But under Xi Jinping,
• 31:40
  and I think this is also quite impacted by
• 31:43
  how he saw dynamics in Hong Kong,
• 31:47
  you don't have Chinese leaders saying
• 31:49
  that Taiwan can keep its military anymore,
• 31:51
  or Chinese scholars or writers talking
• 31:53
  about that understanding team.
• 31:55
  You don't have any discussion about how,
• 31:58
  how Taiwan could keep its political system
• 32:00
  or its legal system in place anymore.
• 32:03
  And it's becoming very clear
• 32:04
  that only Patriots can become the leaders of Taiwan.
• 32:08
  Just as, just as we,
• 32:10
  how we saw only Patriots can now be appointed
• 32:13
  leaders of Hong Kong.
• 32:15
  So the terms for which Taiwan can be unified
• 32:18
  with China are much more stringent now under Xi
• 32:21
  because he, he is worried that
• 32:24
  if he does make protests in Taiwan, Taiwan experience,
• 32:27
  similar things as Hong Kong waves a protest
• 32:29
  and that will challenge Chinese rule
• 32:31
  and he doesn't want that again.
• 32:33
  Right. Having said that, I don't know what she wants
• 32:38
  to achieve or it's possible by 2032,
• 32:41
  I mean ideally it would be
• 32:44
  Taiwan in a similar DEG under a similar degree of control
• 32:47
  as Hong Kong, but he might be okay, for example,
• 32:52
  if they have a KM,
• 32:54
  if there is a KMT leader who's very much pro-China and,
• 32:58
  and see a path towards integration
• 33:02
  between Taiwan
• 33:03
  and the mainland politically, I think
• 33:05
  that might be acceptable.
• 33:06
  I think there's a difference between
• 33:07
  what he would I like ideally like,
• 33:08
  and what is politically feasible.
• 33:10
  But what I don't see is, for example, if we continue
• 33:14
  to have DPP leaders win the Taiwan presidency, that
• 33:17
  that would be acceptable for Xi j Ping particularly
• 33:20
  as it gets closer to the end of his fourth term.
• 33:23
  - And so given that you, you know, you, you left,
• 33:26
  you left me hanging right there.
• 33:28
  So given that, does that then mean if, you know,
• 33:31
  in 2028 when the DPP, when the Taiwan has its next election,
• 33:36
  if another DPP candidate, you know,
• 33:39
  say William Ly is elected for a second term, does
• 33:42
  that then in your mind force Xi Jinping's hand
• 33:45
  to take some kind of military action
• 33:48
  because you know they're both gonna be, you know,
• 33:51
  finishing close to 2032?
• 33:53
  I mean, what does, what does that look like then? I mean,
• 33:57
  - I do worry that the late twenties,
• 33:59
  27, 20 28 is a very dangerous period
• 34:02
  of cross straight relations for all the wrong reasons that,
• 34:06
  that the original 2027 was attributed to.
• 34:10
  But to your point, I do worry that if the C CCP sees
• 34:14
  that another DPP leader, they might actually come
• 34:17
  to the assessment that the prospects
• 34:19
  for peaceful unification with Taiwan is out the door.
• 34:22
  And if that is out the door, it leaves open a lot
• 34:24
  of questions on what are the options for Beijing.
• 34:27
  And here I'm not sure necessarily
• 34:32
  the military option would be the first one.
• 34:34
  It depends on how close the election results are.
• 34:37
  If the results are very close,
• 34:39
  we could see a renewed campaign to destabilize the DPP,
• 34:44
  which we've already started.
• 34:45
  We've seen here, we've saw in the past year
• 34:49
  or so massive recall campaigns both the DPP on the
• 34:53
  KMT and KMT and vice versa.
• 34:54
  We could saw that, see that accelerate, we could see
• 34:59
  gray zone, significant Chinese gray zone
• 35:02
  operations against Taiwan.
• 35:03
  So such as a quarantine
• 35:05
  or a blockade, that does not necessarily mean
• 35:08
  a lead up to innovation.
• 35:10
  I do think as China's looking at the prospects for used
• 35:13
  for evading Taiwan, they are recognizing
• 35:16
  that it's incredibly costly.
• 35:17
  That's a capability and option China wants to have,
• 35:21
  but it's not anywhere clear
• 35:23
  as a first resort option for China.
• 35:26
  - Yeah. So, you know, one thing I did wanna ask you about
• 35:28
  and then we'll just go to our quick, you know,
• 35:30
  wrap up questions.
• 35:32
  You know, you raised the issue of China and Russia
• 35:35
  and of course then you'd expand to that kind of Iran
• 35:38
  and North Korea, you know,
• 35:41
  how concerned are you about this alignment
• 35:44
  that we've seen emerge, you know, around
• 35:46
  and in support of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine
• 35:50
  and you know, does it signal something new to you in terms
• 35:53
  of China's willingness to, to play in a different way?
• 35:57
  It, they're not alliances, I guess.
• 35:59
  Well they technically they do have a formal alliance, right?
• 36:02
  A treaty alliance with North Korea, but,
• 36:04
  but certainly not with Russia.
• 36:06
  But does it say anything new about the way that, you know,
• 36:08
  we should think about China working
• 36:10
  with others in the future
• 36:12
  and in, you know, you know, security in military ways?
• 36:16
  - Sure. I think a couple of things there.
• 36:19
  If you talk to the Russia experts
• 36:21
  before 2022,
• 36:22
  I don't think anyone would've predicted the way the
• 36:25
  Russia has strengthened its relationship, the fact
• 36:28
  that Russia has signed a security re agreement with Iran,
• 36:33
  the way Russia has signed a security agreement
• 36:34
  with North Korea.
• 36:37
  I think some might say
• 36:38
  that they could have predicted some North Korean troops in
• 36:41
  Ukraine because Russia has always had North Korean
• 36:43
  workers in Russia.
• 36:45
  But I think most would probably not have predicted the exact
• 36:48
  extent to which Russia paid
• 36:50
  for North Korean troops in Ukraine.
• 36:52
  And I think very few would've predicted
• 36:56
  that Russia was willing to give many
• 36:59
  of its military crown jewels to China, for example,
• 37:02
  on helping China with its nuclear submarine technology,
• 37:06
  but also providing China with capabilities
• 37:08
  that could be directly relevant to animation of Taiwan
• 37:12
  in some ways as payment
• 37:13
  for all the economic support China has
• 37:15
  provided Russia as well as dual use equipment.
• 37:18
  So le the main lesson learned
• 37:19
  for me from Russia's invasion Ukraine,
• 37:21
  is once you have a war situation,
• 37:24
  it really changes the calculations of the state
• 37:27
  that is engaged in that conflict
• 37:29
  and it makes that state potentially more willing to give
• 37:32
  to other countries, both in terms of payment as well as
• 37:36
  deals, and then it provides this opportunity
• 37:39
  for other countries to deepen friendship, deepen,
• 37:43
  deepen relationship, but also provides support.
• 37:46
  So when I look at that in the context of China,
• 37:49
  I don't think what China
• 37:51
  provided Russia was necessarily that surprising.
• 37:55
  But if China were to take those lessons learned from Russia,
• 37:58
  and if China were to engage in a war with Taiwan,
• 38:01
  particularly a protracted war in what China is not doing
• 38:04
  as well, we could see China in a similar situation
• 38:07
  as Russia, as being more willing to offer things to Russia,
• 38:11
  to North Korea, to Iran, to ask them to help China.
• 38:14
  And that's where I feel like we need
• 38:16
  to use our imagination a little bit and, and not think that
• 38:19
  because China hasn't been willing to offer X, y,
• 38:22
  and z, China won't do so if it's in,
• 38:24
  finds itself in a more dire situation.
• 38:28
  - Yeah, I think, I think it's a really important point just
• 38:31
  that now this sort of, this is a, a new,
• 38:35
  not a new mechanism exactly,
• 38:37
  but that we could see something similar emerge
• 38:40
  around Taiwan, you know, that China has other countries
• 38:44
  that it can call on in
• 38:46
  for support in different kinds of ways.
• 38:48
  I think that is really important lesson to take from,
• 38:52
  you know, Russia's experience in, in Ukraine
• 38:54
  and now, you know, Russia, you know, owes China
• 38:57
  to some extent and you could imagine that it would,
• 38:59
  it would find ways to support China.
• 39:01
  So it just adds to the complexity certainly
• 39:04
  for I think us military planners
• 39:08
  as they're thinking about Taiwan
• 39:09
  and for Taiwanese themselves, of course when contingencies.
• 39:14
  Okay. So let's just, let's go to our, our sort
• 39:17
  of quick four questions, broaden, you know, out our
• 39:21
  the range of things we're gonna discuss a little bit.
• 39:23
  And just quickly, if you are going to sort
• 39:27
  of nominate one book
• 39:28
  or one article that you think our listeners should, should,
• 39:33
  you know, read, what would it be?
• 39:36
  What do you think is most important
• 39:38
  or what's top of mind for you?
• 39:41
  - This is gonna sound a little weird,
• 39:42
  but as a China analyst, I think sometimes
• 39:45
  what I don't understand the most these days is US policy.
• 39:49
  So what I'm gonna recommend that I found most useful
• 39:52
  to understanding the Trump administration's policies is
• 39:54
  Robert O'Brien's recent foreign affair article, the case
• 39:58
  of Trump's second term foreign policy.
• 40:01
  I read that and I think it, it helps me,
• 40:04
  helped me connect quite a bit of dots
• 40:05
  and also helps me understand for the internal logic with
• 40:09
  how folks in the Trump team think
• 40:10
  about their foreign policy.
• 40:12
  - Okay, excellent, excellent suggestion.
• 40:13
  I, I read the Bolton and
• 40:20
  and McMaster's books for the same reason over the summer
• 40:25
  and I think it's, it's useful to get those kinds
• 40:27
  of insights from people who have served
• 40:30
  with the president in, in the past.
• 40:32
  Okay. What do we not know?
• 40:34
  I mean, I guess I guess in your space, you know, there's
• 40:37
  so much, but,
• 40:39
  but what do, what do we not know about China
• 40:42
  that we need to know?
• 40:43
  Like what, if you could pick one thing
• 40:46
  and say I could get access to this sort of set of, of,
• 40:51
  of facts or information, this is what I would want to know
• 40:54
  that we don't know about China, what's most important?
• 40:58
  - I think what would be most important for me as an analyst
• 41:01
  of China security and defense policy would be to understand
• 41:04
  what is driving all the PLA purchase.
• 41:06
  Because if we know why certain people are being purged,
• 41:09
  whether it's mainly for loyalty issues, for competent issue,
• 41:12
  competency issues or disagreement
• 41:14
  and policy issues, we would have a better sense of both
• 41:17
  where the pla A is going, but also she thinking priorities.
• 41:22
  - Yeah, I agree with you. And even not being a, a sort
• 41:24
  of military security specialist, I would love to,
• 41:27
  I would put that close to the top of my list
• 41:29
  of things I'd wanna know as well.
• 41:31
  Okay. Now let's pretend that you are sitting
• 41:36
  at the right hand of President Trump
• 41:38
  and you have served in the defense department before.
• 41:44
  What advice would you give him?
• 41:45
  Like what's again, top of mind for you
• 41:48
  as you're looking at US policy and
• 41:50
  and security policy toward, toward China?
• 41:53
  What would you say this is the number one thing that
• 41:56
  you really need to do?
• 42:00
  - I think that's a really difficult question.
• 42:05
  I guess maybe the one thing
• 42:06
  that we really should be doing is trying
• 42:08
  to capitalize on Chinese mistakes.
• 42:11
  And I think recently China made a pretty big move
• 42:15
  with all its rare earth export controls.
• 42:19
  And I think, I mean,
• 42:20
  of course President Trump has been going around
• 42:23
  to various allies and partners trying
• 42:25
  to secure more rare earth fields working
• 42:28
  with our allies and partners.
• 42:29
  But I think this mistake is actually one
• 42:33
  that could unify us with our all partners a lot more
• 42:36
  and we should be capitalizing it to make, make sure
• 42:39
  to showcase to the Chinese that they overplay their hand
• 42:42
  and if they play this again, which I think they're going
• 42:45
  to continue to do, it's going to only unify us
• 42:49
  with our allies and partners more
• 42:50
  because this is, there's a lot
• 42:51
  of ways in which China's trying
• 42:53
  to divide us from our closest allies and partners,
• 42:55
  but this one tool that China is using is something that all
• 42:59
  of our closest allies and partners are
• 43:00
  really, really worried about.
• 43:02
  - So is your suggestion that we sort of broaden the range
• 43:06
  of issues on which we're working with our allies
• 43:08
  and partners to demonstrate this, you know,
• 43:11
  cooperation and collaboration?
• 43:12
  Or is it that we find new ways in this space
• 43:16
  around rare earth elements to cooperate?
• 43:19
  - I think both, definitely both.
• 43:23
  We do see the Trump administration on security front,
• 43:27
  particularly at the secretary level doing a lot more
• 43:29
  with our allies and partners.
• 43:32
  But at the presidential level we also see President
• 43:35
  Trump emphasizing that.
• 43:37
  But when it comes to US China relations, it's quite puzzling
• 43:41
  to me that President Trump does not seem
• 43:43
  to mention security issues directly with CDP.
• 43:46
  - Yeah, right. That's a that's a good point.
• 43:48
  I mean, I guess the most recent meeting was really just
• 43:51
  about the trade issue,
• 43:52
  which we know is his number one priority,
• 43:56
  but it is important that we see Secretary Hegseth out there.
• 44:00
  I think as you're referencing in a number of occasions,
• 44:03
  frankly, over the past several months,
• 44:05
  really talking about the challenge
• 44:07
  that China presents in the region
• 44:09
  and the importance of all of our allies
• 44:12
  and partners stepping up and, and working together.
• 44:15
  So I yeah, I agree with you. All right.
• 44:19
  Then last, on a scale of one to 10, we have a, a sort
• 44:23
  of summit meeting coming up in Beijing in April.
• 44:27
  On a scale of one to 10, what do you think is the likelihood
• 44:30
  that we have a new, you know, Nixon mao moment
• 44:34
  between President Trump
• 44:36
  and President Xi Jinping,
• 44:37
  some real breakthrough in the US China relationship
• 44:42
  - In April, 2026 or, or during Trump's tenure?
• 44:46
  - Okay, well, all right, I was thinking April, 2026,
• 44:48
  but let's, let's we can, we can include all of, all
• 44:51
  of President Trump's in the next three years.
• 44:54
  - Okay. I think April, 2026 is 2%,
• 44:58
  I don't wanna say zero, but 2%.
• 45:00
  Okay, let's give it some optimism there.
• 45:02
  But under Trump president Trump's tenure, maybe the maximum
• 45:08
  30 40%, but that's really high
• 45:12
  and that might be very optimistic.
• 45:14
  I, I give it, I think it's high
• 45:18
  because I think President Trump has big ambitions
• 45:21
  and wants to have some form of deal with China, as with
• 45:26
  as with any other country.
• 45:27
  And his use of the term G two
• 45:29
  to characterize his recent meeting with Xi thinking,
• 45:31
  I think showcases that desire.
• 45:34
  I think it's low on the 30%
• 45:37
  because I don't think she is interested in doing that.
• 45:40
  When you talk about, for example, Mao Nixon,
• 45:42
  China was in completely different place during the Cold War
• 45:45
  that China was the weaker of three powers
• 45:48
  and was looking to increase its hand
• 45:50
  and leverage against a Soviet Union that it viewed
• 45:52
  as its large main adversary right now,
• 45:55
  China views United States as our,
• 45:57
  as its main adversary, main competitor.
• 46:00
  So it's, I don't think she's necessarily, she's interest
• 46:04
  to have this grand deal with President Trump,
• 46:07
  even if he wants one, because I think
• 46:08
  she wants to be number one. So
• 46:11
  - That I think is an important point,
• 46:12
  but maybe I just suggest that if
• 46:14
  that big deal involves somehow trading out Taiwan security,
• 46:19
  she might be interested in that deal.
• 46:24
  - I think he might be interested in that deal.
• 46:28
  And I think there, that's why I do did have the percentage
• 46:31
  around 30 because I do think President Trump
• 46:36
  would probably be interested in a deal like that
• 46:38
  because as if you look at his first, almost first year,
• 46:43
  he has really prided himself in stopping wars,
• 46:46
  preventing wars from happening.
• 46:47
  And if you think about a, a effort
• 46:50
  that could win him the Nobel Peace Prize,
• 46:52
  I think Taiwan would be high up there.
• 46:55
  - Yes. Although I don't really think
• 46:56
  that trading out Taiwan is going
• 46:58
  to get him the Nobel Peace Prize,
• 47:00
  but I think, I'm pretty sure the Nobel Committee is not,
• 47:03
  would not, would not reward President Trump
• 47:06
  with the Nobel Peace Prize if for he said,
• 47:09
  we are no longer going to sell arms to Taiwan
• 47:12
  and we support unification with the mainland immediately.
• 47:15
  I don't, I don't, I don't think
• 47:17
  that the Nobel committee would,
• 47:18
  would give him that. But anyway,
• 47:21
  - So I think his argument would probably be he's preventing
• 47:23
  war between us and China and that's why he might think so.
• 47:27
  I'm not, I'm not arguing whether that's true or not.
• 47:29
  I'm just saying like looking at his logic,
• 47:31
  I think he would want that to be solving the most, the issue
• 47:35
  between the United States and China that can most,
• 47:37
  that would most likely bring the two sides to war
• 47:39
  and anytime in the future.
• 47:42
  - Okay, well this is what I have to say, Bonny.
• 47:43
  I'm gonna have you on every year at this time
• 47:46
  and we can assess your answer to that question
• 47:49
  and see whether, whether things have moved along,
• 47:54
  you know, in that, in that direction or not.
• 47:56
  But really, I wanna thank you just
• 47:58
  for a fantastic discussion
• 48:01
  and you know, your mastery, both of the big picture
• 48:04
  and the details is really incredible.
• 48:08
  And so thank you for sharing all of that with us today.
• 48:12
  - Oh, thank you very much, Liz, for having me on.
• 48:14
  And it's always a pleasure
• 48:15
  to be in the same platform as you.
• 48:18
  - So if you enjoyed this podcast
• 48:19
  and want to hear more recent discourse
• 48:21
  and debate on China, I encourage you to subscribe
• 48:23
  to China considered via the Hoover Institution YouTube
• 48:26
  channel, or the podcast platform of your choice.