Latest / Epic Fury: The US-Iran War Podcast / The Fog of War: Inside the Chaos of Modern Conflict
Transcript
- 0:16The alerts arrive before anyone understands what they mean.
- 0:20A radar return that does not match any known flight path.
- 0:23A report from a forward position.
- 0:26Fragmentary cut off mid sentence.
- 0:29A social media post from a city that may or may not be under
- 0:32attack shared 40,000 times before a single analyst has had
- 0:36the chance to verify it. A communication from an allied
- 0:39command that contradicts information received 12 minutes
- 0:42earlier from the same source. A satellite image that could be
- 0:46a missile launcher or could be a civilian vehicle depending on
- 0:49who is interpreting it and what they already believe.
- 0:52This is Epic fury, the US Iran war podcast.
- 0:56In those early hours, certainty is the first casualty before any
- 1:00soldier is killed, before any building falls.
- 1:03The clean picture of events the commanders need and governments
- 1:06demand is already fractured into competing versions of what is
- 1:09happening, each one partial, each one urgent, each one
- 1:13insisting on its own authority. This is the fog of war, not a
- 1:17metaphor, a condition. The phrase was given its
- 1:21definitive articulation by the Prussian military theorist Carl
- 1:25von Clausewitz in the 19th century.
- 1:28He wrote that war is the realm of uncertainty, that 3/4 of the
- 1:31factors on which action in war is based or wrapped in a fog of
- 1:35greater or lesser uncertainty. What Clausewitz was describing
- 1:39was not a failure of intelligence or a failure of
- 1:42technology. He was describing something
- 1:45structural, something that belongs to the nature of
- 1:48conflict itself. The moment 2 opposing forces are
- 1:52in contact, information becomes unreliable, orders are
- 1:56misunderstood, positions shift, the map stops matching the
- 2:01ground. Two centuries later, with
- 2:03satellites in orbit, drones feeding live video to command
- 2:06centers, and AI systems processing thousands of data
- 2:10points per second, the fog is not lifted.
- 2:12It has changed shape, and in some ways it has thickened.
- 2:17Consider what happens in the opening hours of a major
- 2:20military operation. The volume of incoming
- 2:23information is not a trickle. It is a flood.
- 2:27Radar operators tracking contacts that maybe aircraft,
- 2:31maybe electronic spoofing, maybe debris.
- 2:34Analysts in dim rooms trying to cross reference reports that
- 2:37arrive faster than they can be processed.
- 2:40Commanders who must make decisions now, not later, on the
- 2:43basis of information they know is incomplete.
- 2:46Knowing that waiting for certainty is itself a decision
- 2:49with consequences. The cognitive pressure inside
- 2:52those rooms is unlike anything most people will encounter in a
- 2:55lifetime. The friendly fire incident
- 2:57stands as one of the most painful expressions of this fog.
- 3:01It recurs throughout military history with a regularity that
- 3:04should by now be more shocking than it is.
- 3:07In the Gulf War, 28 American soldiers were killed by a
- 3:11Patriot missile battery that misidentified a friendly
- 3:14aircraft. In Afghanistan, American
- 3:16aircraft repeatedly struck positions held by allied forces
- 3:20due to communication failures and targeting errors.
- 3:23The opening days of Operation Epic Fury produced their own
- 3:26friendly fire. Tragedy. 3 American fighter jets
- 3:29down over Kuwait. Not from enemy action, from the
- 3:33fog. Friendly fire does not happen
- 3:36because soldiers are careless or commanders are incompetent.
- 3:40It happens because war moves faster than the information
- 3:43systems designed to manage it, because identification protocols
- 3:47breakdown under pressure, because exhausted operators make
- 3:51split second judgments on ambiguous data, and the
- 3:54consequences are irreversible. The Cold War left behind a
- 3:57series of incidents that examine now carry the weight of near
- 4:01catastrophe. In September 1983, a Soviet
- 4:05early warning satellite detected what its systems interpreted as
- 4:08five incoming American intercontinental ballistic
- 4:11missiles. Stanislav Petrov, the duty
- 4:14officer who received the alert, had minutes to decide whether to
- 4:18report it up the chain of command, a report that, given
- 4:21the doctrine of the time, would almost certainly have triggered
- 4:24A retaliatory launch. He judged it a false alarm.
- 4:28He was right. The satellite had mistaken
- 4:31sunlight reflecting off clouds for missile launches.
- 4:34One man's decision, made in minutes under maximum pressure
- 4:38on the basis of contradictory information, may have prevented
- 4:41a nuclear exchange. The fog had reached to the edge
- 4:44of civilization. Intelligence failures do not
- 4:47only emerge from equipment malfunctions or sensor errors.
- 4:51They emerge from the human architecture that surrounds the
- 4:54data. The Iraq war and the weapons of
- 4:56mass destruction assessment represent perhaps the most
- 4:59consequential intelligence failure of the modern era, not
- 5:02because the analysts were incompetent, but because the
- 5:05process of intelligence analysis have been corrupted by the
- 5:08pressures of what people in positions of power needed to be
- 5:10true. Information that confirmed the
- 5:13desired conclusion was elevated. Information that contradicted it
- 5:17was marginalized. The result was a picture of
- 5:20Iraqi capabilities that had the appearance of certainty and the
- 5:24substance of assumption. This phenomenon has a name in
- 5:28psychology, confirmation bias, the tendency under conditions of
- 5:33uncertainty and stress to weight information that confirms
- 5:36existing beliefs more heavily than information that challenges
- 5:39them. In ordinary life, this is a
- 5:41manageable cognitive quirk. In a command center during a
- 5:45crisis, it can determine whether missiles are launched.
- 5:49The pressure on decision makers during active conflict is
- 5:51difficult to overstate. A commander who hesitates and is
- 5:55wrong will be judged for the casualties that hesitation cost.
- 5:59A commander who acts and is wrong will be judged for the
- 6:01consequences of that action. There is no option that
- 6:05eliminates accountability, and the clock does not stop.
- 6:09In Modern Warfare, the window between a thread appearing and
- 6:13the window for responding to it can be measured in minutes,
- 6:16sometimes seconds. The human nervous system, under
- 6:20that pressure, does not default to deliberation.
- 6:23It defaults to pattern recognition, reaching for the
- 6:26most familiar framework, the most recent precedent, the
- 6:29interpretation that resolves uncertainty fastest.
- 6:32This is how accidental escalation happens.
- 6:36Not through malice, not through recklessness, through the
- 6:40collision of incomplete information, cognitive
- 6:42shortcuts, and the irreversible physics of military hardware
- 6:46already in motion. Vietnam demonstrated what
- 6:49happens when the fog is transmitted live into living
- 6:52rooms. Journalists reported what they
- 6:54could see, which was always a fragment.
- 6:57Editors back home assemble those fragments into narratives that
- 7:01often bore little relationship to the operational reality.
- 7:04The official account and the televised account diverged so
- 7:07completely over so many years that the credibility of both
- 7:11eventually collapsed. The public learned to distrust
- 7:14the briefing. The military learned to manage
- 7:17access. Neither solution addressed the
- 7:20underlying problem, which was that the fog does not clear
- 7:23simply because someone is watching.
- 7:25In the current information environment, the speed of false
- 7:28information during conflict is unprecedented.
- 7:32In the opening hours of a major escalation, social media
- 7:35platforms carry thousands of posts claiming with apparent
- 7:38certainty to know what is happening.
- 7:41Images circulate that are real, fabricated or taken from
- 7:45entirely different conflicts. Numbers, casualty figures,
- 7:49strike counts, aircraft losses are invented, exaggerated and
- 7:53repeated until they acquire the authority of established fact.
- 7:57By the time official corrections arrive, the false numbers have
- 8:00already been embedded in a public understanding of events.
- 8:03This is not simply a media problem.
- 8:06It is an intelligence problem. Analysts monitoring open source
- 8:10information during a crisis must now sort through an ocean of
- 8:13deliberately planted disinformation, accidental
- 8:16misreporting, genuine eyewitness accounts and coordinated
- 8:20amplification campaigns, all arriving simultaneously, all
- 8:23presenting themselves as authoritative.
- 8:26The fog has acquired a social media layer.
- 8:29Drone warfare was expected to cut through this fog.
- 8:32Persistent surveillance. Real time video feeds the
- 8:36ability to observe a target for hours before any decision to
- 8:40strike. And drones have changed the
- 8:42intelligence picture in significant ways, but they have
- 8:46not eliminated uncertainty. Video interpretation remains a
- 8:50human process, subject to all the cognitive pressures of human
- 8:53judgement. Targets are misidentified.
- 8:56Context is missing. A gathering of people that looks
- 9:00from altitude like a military meeting may be a family
- 9:03occasion. The consequences of errors at
- 9:06drone altitude are measured in the same way they have always
- 9:09been measured in the bodies on the ground.
- 9:12Cyber operations have added another dimension to the fog.
- 9:15The ability to spoof radar returns, to inject false data
- 9:19into an adversary's command systems to make a pilot believe
- 9:22an aircraft is friendly when it is not.
- 9:24These capabilities mean that even the raw sensor data feeding
- 9:27into a decision cannot be assumed to be real.
- 9:30The fog now extends into the instruments designed to dispel
- 9:33it. There is a particular kind of
- 9:36exhaustion that builds inside a command center during an
- 9:39extended operation. The analysts have been awake for
- 9:4220 hours. The maps are covered in markers
- 9:45that have been updated and contradicted and updated again.
- 9:49The communications are carrying too many conversations
- 9:52simultaneously. The pressure from above for a
- 9:55clear picture has not diminished, but the picture has
- 9:58not clarified. In that state, the temptation to
- 10:01impose certainty on ambiguity, to decide that the unclear
- 10:04contact is hostile, that the fragmentary report is accurate,
- 10:08that the decision cannot wait, is not a failure of character.
- 10:12It is the predictable output of a human nervous system at its
- 10:15limits. Klausowitz understood this.
- 10:19He wrote not only about the fog but about friction.
- 10:21The accumulated weight of small errors, delays,
- 10:24miscommunications and unexpected events that caused even well
- 10:28designed plans to diverge from reality.
- 10:31Friction and fog together are not aberrations of war, they are
- 10:35its nature. Every satellite in orbit, every
- 10:38drone in the sky, every AI system processing battlefield
- 10:42data in real time represents A genuine reduction in some
- 10:45specific category of uncertainty.
- 10:48Certain things that were once invisible can now be seen.
- 10:52Certain decisions that once required hours can now be made
- 10:55in minutes. The technology is real, and its
- 10:59effects are real. And yet, in the command centers
- 11:02of every military on Earth, in the early hours of every
- 11:05escalation, in the mind of every analyst staring at data that
- 11:09refuses to resolve cleanly into a single conclusion, the fog
- 11:13persists. It is older than any weapon
- 11:15system. It will outlast any technology
- 11:18designed to eliminate it because war is not only a contest of
- 11:23hardware, it is a contest of perception, judgement, and
- 11:27decision making under conditions that are specifically designed
- 11:30by an adversary to make all three as difficult as possible.
- 11:33The fog is not a malfunction, it is the battlefield itself.
- 11:38This has been epic. Fury, the US Iran war podcast.