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What Is the Will? Key Terms Explained | Jonathan Edwards · Reformed Thinking

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  What if the absolute freedom you felt choosing your cereal this
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  morning was, well, a complete illusion?
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  Oh wow, that is quite a way to start.
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  I mean, think about it. Usually when we talk about human
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  choices, there is this underlying assumption of
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  unrestricted autonomy. You know, you walk into a
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  massive supermarket, you look at the cereal aisle, you see 50
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  different boxes and you just pick one, right?
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  You just grab the one you want. Yeah, your hand reaches out and
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  we intuitively assume that at that precise second, you could
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  have easily chosen any of the other 49 boxes with absolutely
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  no prior cause dictating your movement.
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  It feels like a completely blank slate.
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  It feels entirely neutral. We naturally gravitate toward
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  the idea that we are the uncaused originators of our own
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  decisions. I mean, it provides a sense of
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  total independence from any outside influence or internal
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  predetermination. But then you step into the world
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  of rigorous historical theology, and suddenly that blank slate
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  shatter. It really does.
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  We start looking at the actual mechanics of the human heart,
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  and the landscape of our decision making becomes
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  something far more structured and honestly far more
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  challenging to our modern sensibilities.
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  Welcome to Reformed Thinking, a show dedicated to applying
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  rigorous theology to everyday life.
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  Today we are taking on a massive mission.
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  For this deep dive we are looking at Jonathan Edwards
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  classic theological and philosophical text Freedom of
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  the Will. Yes.
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  Our objective here is to uncover the true mechanics of human
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  choice. How do we actually make
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  decisions? Are we truly free in the way
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  human intuition assumes? Grasping these concepts is
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  absolutely essential for a robust Reformed understanding of
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  God's sovereignty and human responsibility.
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  Which is such a critical balance.
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  It is because if we misunderstand the architecture
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  of the will, we will inevitably misunderstand the nature of
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  grace. And we want to speak directly to
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  you, the listener, right out of the gate.
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  We all know the basic tenets of the Westminster Confession.
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  We know the doctrines of the Fall and divine sovereignty.
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  Right, those are the basic. But understanding the specific
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  psychological architecture of your own will clears up massive
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  confusions regarding how those doctrines actually operate in
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  real time. It takes lofty theology and
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  lands it right in the middle of your daily decision making.
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  It really changes how you view your own temptations, your own
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  failures, and the absolute necessity of divine
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  intervention. OK, let's unpack this.
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  Before we can analyze why we choose, we have to define what
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  the will actually is because there is a lot of philosophical
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  fog surrounding this term. Edwards is incredibly helpful
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  right at the outset because he cuts through what he calls the
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  metaphysical refining of philosophers who had obscured
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  the issue. He offers a refreshingly simple
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  definition I. Love how simple he makes.
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  It it is brilliant. The will is simply the capacity
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  by which the mind chooses anything.
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  That is it. The faculty of the will is that
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  principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing.
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  So there is no complicated mystery to it.
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  No. An act of the will is the same
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  as an act of choosing. He also has a crucial point.
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  Choosing one thing automatically means refusing its opposite.
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  The positive and the negative are set before the mind, and the
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  mind's determination between the two is the act of the will.
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  Let us compare this to an everyday scenario to see how
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  practical it is. Suppose you are standing in a
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  room and you decide to sit in a chair.
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  OK, simple enough. Choosing to sit down means you
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  are actively refusing to stand. Every single action is an
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  election of 1 state over another.
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  You cannot sit and stand at the same time.
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  Right, that is physically impossible.
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  So your mind evaluates the options.
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  It develops a preference for sitting over standing, and that
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  preference, that choice, is the will in action.
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  There is no hidden mystical faculty operating behind the
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  scenes pulling levers. The willing is simply the
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  choosing. What is fascinating here is how
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  Edwards defends this straightforward definition
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  against other philosophical heavyweights of his era,
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  specifically John Locke. Locke is a huge figure here.
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  He is, and Locke argued that desire and will are distinct
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  entities that can actually run counter to one another.
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  He posited that a person might will something while
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  simultaneously desiring the absolute opposite.
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  Locke gives a very specific example to try and prove this,
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  and I want to push back on it because it sounds plausible at
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  first glance. Go.
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  Ahead, lay it out. He says imagine a man who is
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  obligated by someone he cannot refuse.
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  Maybe a king or a tyrant to use persuasive words on another
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  person, but secretly the man wishes that his persuasive words
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  will fail. That is a classic dilemma.
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  Locke argues that in this moment the man's will is to speak the
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  words, but his desire is for the words to be ineffective.
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  Therefore, according to Locke, will and desire are clashing.
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  They are running in opposite directions.
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  And Edwards meticulously dissects this scenario to show
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  why Locke is philosophically mistaken.
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  Edwards points out that the will and the desire are not actually
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  clashing over the same object. This is where we have to be
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  really precise. Yes, we have to isolate the
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  immediate object of the will. The immediate object willed is
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  the physical act of speaking the words.
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  Why does he will to speak them? To avoid getting punished by the
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  tyrant, obviously. Precisely to avoid a severe
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  negative consequence from the tyrant forcing him.
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  So in that precise moment, speaking the words is what the
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  person desires to do. The desire for the words to fail
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  in their persuasion is a completely separate object
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  altogether. I see the logic, but let me
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  challenge that from a modern perspective.
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  Think about doing your taxes. Well, everybody loves tax
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  season. Right, I will to pay my taxes,
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  but I certainly do not desire to hand over my money.
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  Are those two things not in conflict?
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  They seem to be in conflict until you define the immediate
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  object. You do not desire to lose your
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  money, true, but you deeply desire to stay out of federal
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  prison. That is a very strong desire,
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  yes. When you are sitting at your
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  computer hitting submit on your tax return, your immediate
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  desire is to comply with the law to secure your own freedom and
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  Peace of Mind. In that exact second, handing
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  over the money becomes your greatest desire relative to the
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  alternative of going to jail. That makes total sense.
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  The will to pay and the desire to stay out of jail are
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  perfectly aligned. You are not willing against your
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  desires. You were simply prioritizing a
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  stronger desire over a weaker 1. For the will and desire to truly
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  run counter to one another, they would have to oppose each other
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  on the identical object at the exact same time.
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  Which is logically impossible. Right.
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  The man would have to desire to speak and desire not to speak in
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  the exact same respect, which is a logical contradiction.
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  Edwards proves that whatever you are willing in the present
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  moment is what you are desiring in that present moment based on
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  the circumstances you are facing.
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  If we connect this to the bigger picture, this affirms a core
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  Protestant truth. Humans are integrated beings.
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  We are not fractured entities where our actions operate
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  completely independent of our core desires.
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  We are a unified whole. Yes.
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  Our choices are not arbitrary loops made by a neutral faculty.
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  They are the direct expression of our underlying inclinations.
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  When we sin, we cannot say. Well, my will did that, but my
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  true desire was against it. That is such a common excuse
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  too. It is, but it is false.
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  The action reveals the true underlying inclination of the
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  heart in that specific moment. We act according to what we
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  favor. Which brings up a massive
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  structural question. If the will is simply the mind
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  choosing, and our choices reveal our present desires, what
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  actually determines the direction of that choice?
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  That is the $1,000,000 question. If I am looking at two options,
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  what tips the scale? Edwards lays down a definitive
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  rule to answer this. He states that the will is
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  always determined by the strongest motive as it stands in
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  the minds view. So define motive in this
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  context. By motive he means the whole of
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  that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition.
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  It could be one single factor or many variables working together
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  as a complex motive, but the rules absolute we always choose
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  what appears to be the greatest good or the most agreeable
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  option at that precise instant of decision.
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  Let us use Edward, his own vivid example to ground this the
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  drunkard staring at a drink. It is a sobering illustration,
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  no pun intended. He has his liquor before him.
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  He has to choose whether to drink it or pour it down the
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  drain. The choice is not a coin flip
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  happening in a vacuum. His mind is actively evaluating
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  competing motives. There was a war happening in his
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  mind. Exactly.
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  On one side, he has the immediate pleasure of the drink.
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  He anticipates the physical sensation, the dopamine hit, the
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  temporary numbing of his anxiety.
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  And on the other side of the scale, you have the distant
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  misery. He knows about the hangover
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  awaiting him tomorrow. He knows about the potential for
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  ruin relationships, lost employment and long term
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  physical destruction. Those are heavyweights.
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  They are. These are the weights resting on
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  the scale of his mind. And if he drinks it, it is not
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  because his will somehow bypassed his motives.
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  If he drinks, it is because in that specific moment, the
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  immediate pleasure of the alcohol appears as the greatest
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  agreeable good to his mind. The future pain simply seems
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  less weighty than the present relief.
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  Yeah, the scale tips toward the drink.
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  Precisely. Now we must define what Edwards
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  means by apparent good or something being agreeable.
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  It does not mean something is morally righteous or objectively
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  beneficial. That is a crucial.
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  Distinction. It means it is pleasing to the
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  mind. In that isolated moment, Edwards
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  breaks down the specific variables that make an option
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  seem agreeable, and this is where his analysis becomes
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  incredibly psychological. First, is the nature of the
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  object itself, like? What is the thing we are
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  actually looking at? Right.
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  Is it inherently beautiful or repulsive to the person?
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  Does it naturally promise pleasure or trouble?
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  The second variable is timing, and I think this is the most
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  relatable aspect of human failure.
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  Nearness and time makes a pleasure seem far more agreeable
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  than a distant 10. Absolutely.
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  Proximity changes everything. Edwards notes that if you have
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  two equal degrees of pleasure, but one is available right now
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  and the other is a year away, the immediate one will appear
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  far more agreeable simply because of proximity.
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  We see this all the time in behavioral economics.
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  People will always take a small amount of cash today rather than
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  a larger amount of cash next year.
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  That is behavioral discounting, and Edwards identified its
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  centuries ago. The immediate gratification of a
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  sin right in front of us often outweighs the distant promise of
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  heavenly reward or the distant threat of judgement.
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  The future consequence feels abstract, while the present
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  temptation feels concrete. That leads directly into his
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  third variable, the manner of you.
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  A vivid, immediate sensation is far more persuasive than a faint
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  imagination. Yes, the senses play a massive
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  role here. Edwards points out that looking
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  looking directly at the sun is much more vivid than closing
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  your eyes and thinking about the sun.
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  Actually tasting a piece of fresh fruit exerts a much
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  stronger pull on the mind and merely contemplating the
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  abstract idea of fruit. When a temptation engages your
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  senses in real time, it creates a massive advantage for that
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  motive to attract the mind and move the will.
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  But let me pause and ask a clarifying question.
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  If we always choose the greatest apparent good, does that mean we
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  are always following logical rationality?
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  That is a very common misunderstanding.
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  Looking at the drunkard, pure logic screams do not drink.
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  That reason calculates the long term devastation and correctly
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  determines the cost is far too high.
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  So why do we do irrational things if our minds are
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  calculating motives? That is a vital distinction to
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  make. Edwards clarifies that when he
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  says the will follows the dictate of the understanding, he
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  is not talking about pure sterile logic.
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  OK, what does he mean by understanding then?
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  By understanding, he means the entire faculty of perception and
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  apprehension, the dictate of cure.
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  Reason might indeed say, do not drink.
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  Reason accurately calculates the future misery.
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  But reason is not the only thing in the room.
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  Exactly. The corrupted minds perception
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  takes all things into account, including the intense physical
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  craving, the vividness of the immediate pleasure, the
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  exhaustion of the person's current emotional state, and all
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  together it finds the immediate gratification more agreeable.
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  Reason is just one single weight on the scale, and its resistance
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  is frequently overpowered by the heavier weight of immediate
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  sensual desire. Which is a perfect illustration
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  of the Westminster doctrine of the Fall.
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  The natural mind is darkened. Edwards is showing us the exact
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  psychological gear shift of how that darkness operates in real
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  time. Our perceptive faculties are
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  broken. Therefore, sin always appears to
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  the unregenerate mind as the most agreeable choice in the
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  moment of temptation. The mind views rebellion against
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  God as more pleasing than submission to Him.
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  We choose sin because in our fallen state, we genuinely
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  prefer it. We find it to be our greatest
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  apparent good. Yes, the preference is deeply
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  rooted in our fallen nature. But wait, if my choices are just
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  a mathematical calculation of my strongest motives, and if my
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  fallen mind naturally perceives sin is the greatest good, aren't
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  you essentially saying I am forced to sin?
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  That my choices are a necessity. I could see how it sounds like.
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  That I am struggling to see the difference between this
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  framework and just being a meet robot programmed by God.
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  If the outcome is fully fixed, how is that not just coercion?
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  Wearing a philosophical mask. We need to figure out what
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  necessity actually means before we turn God into an author of
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  coercion. This brings us to a critical
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  juncture in Edwards argument. We have to correct our
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  vocabulary. Edwards spends a significant
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  amount of time redefining words like necessity and impossibility
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  because using them intuitively rather than philosophically
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  creates massive theological errors.
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  Vocabulary is everything in theology.
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  It really is. We have to contrast the common
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  use of these words with their rigorous philosophical use.
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  Edwards calls the common use, the vulgar use.
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  OK, define the vulgar use of necessity.
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  In the vulgar sense, something is necessary if it happens
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  despite our active opposition. If a man physically throws you
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  off a bridge, your falling is necessary in the vulgar sense.
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  Because I certainly do not want to fall.
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  Right. You cannot stop gravity.
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  Your will is violently opposing the fall, but your will is
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  insufficient to stop it. Vulgar necessity implies an
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  insufficient will fighting against a larger overpowering
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  external force. So applying the vulgar
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  definition to our own choices is completely absurd.
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  It is entirely absurd. If someone says it is necessary
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  that I choose virtue, and they mean that in the vulgar sense,
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  they are saying I am forced to choose virtue even when my will
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  is opposing it, and I am trying my hardest to choose vice.
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  Which is a complete contradiction.
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  You cannot voluntarily oppose your own present voluntary
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  choice. You cannot choose something
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  against your will, because the choosing is the willing.
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  Spot on. Therefore, when we talk about
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  the will, we must discard the vulgar definition entirely.
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  We must use the philosophical definition of necessity.
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  And what does that entail? Philosophical necessity has
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  absolutely nothing to do with opposing forces or fighting
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  against your will. Philosophical necessity simply
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  means a full and fixed connection between a subject and
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  a predicate. It means a certainty of outcome.
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  Just a guarantee of what will happen.
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  Yes, there is no opposition involved whatsoever.
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  If the subject and predicate are perfectly connected, the outcome
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  is certain, and therefore it is philosophically necessary.
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  Let us expand on that, because certainty of outcome is a heavy
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  concept. How do events become
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  philosophically certain? Edwards outlines how things can
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  be universally certain, which he calls general necessity.
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  Mathematical truths are universally certain. 2 + 2 is 4.
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  It is necessary in its own nature.
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  That makes sense. It cannot be anything else.
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  But there is also particular certainty.
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  This is when an event is certain for a particular person at a
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  particular time based on their specific circumstances.
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  Consider a past event. The fact that you woke up this
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  morning is now necessary. Because it is already done.
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  Exactly, it has already happened.
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  The connection is fixed in history.
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  Nothing you will today can alter the fact that you woke up
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  earlier. So applying this to human
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  decision making, when Edwards says our choices follow the
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  strongest motive by moral necessity, he's not saying we
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  are dragged kicking and screaming against our desires.
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  Not at all. He is saying there's a full,
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  fixed and certain connection between the strongest motive in
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  our mind and the choice we make. The outcome is certain, but the
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  mechanism of that certainty is our own active preference.
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  This raises A crucial question regarding Reformed theology and
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  objections to IT. People frequently argue that if
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  God foreordains what's so ever comes to pass, then humans are
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  just puppets and divine decrees force us to act against our
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  will. That is the most common
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  objection you hear. If we connect this to the bigger
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  picture, Edward shows that God's decrees establish a
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  philosophical certainty, meaning the events are absolutely
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  certain to happen, but they do not impose A vulgar necessity.
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  God is not pushing us off a bridge.
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  Right. God does not force humans to act
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  against their own desires. Instead, human beings act
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  precisely according to their own strongest desires, and yet the
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  outcome is perfectly certain and exhaustively known by God.
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  The certainty of the choice does not destroy the voluntariness of
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  the choice. That is the key take away right
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  there. That is a radical paradigm
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  shift. Certainty does not equal
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  coercion. Knowing infallibly what someone
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  will choose based on their distinct inclinations does not
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  mean you force them to choose it against their will.
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  It really reframes the whole debate.
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  If I know my dog will choose a piece of bacon over a piece of
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  broccoli with 100% certainty, my knowledge of that certainty does
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  not mean I am coercing the dog. The dog is acting entirely upon
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  its own motives. That analogy holds up perfectly,
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  and establishing that necessity does not mean coercion sets the
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  stage for what I consider Edwards a most illuminating
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  distinction the difference between natural inability and
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  moral inability. This gets right to the
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  anatomical heart of the human condition.
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  Let us define what we mean when we say someone is unable to do
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  something because we use that word very loosely.
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  We throw it around all the time. I might say I'm unable to lift a
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  car, and I might also say I'm unable to tolerate a specific
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  genre of music. Those are two very different
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  types of inability. Edwards divides inability into
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  two distinct categories to clear this up.
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  First is natural inability. Natural inability means you
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  cannot do a thing, even if you passionately will to do it.
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  The physical or external barriers prevent you.
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  Right. If I say I want to fly by
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  flapping my arms but I am unable, that is a natural
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  inability. I have the sincere desire my
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  will is actively choosing to fly.
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  But you lack the physical wings. The defect is in my nature, my
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  body or my physical environment. My will is not the problem, my
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  physical capacity is the problem.
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  Now contrast that with moral inability.
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  Moral inability means you were unable to do a thing because of
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  a fixed lack of inclination or the overwhelming strength of a
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  contrary very inclination. So the body is capable, but the
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  heart is opposed. Exactly.
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  The physical capacity is fully present.
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  There are no external barriers blocking you.
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  The only thing missing is the disposition of the heart.
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  You cannot do it because you resolutely refuse to want to do
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  it. I love the modern analogy of a
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  dedicated vegan. A dedicated lifelong vegan is
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  naturally able to eat a steak. They have teeth, a functioning
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  digestive tract, and the physical capacity to chew and
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  swallow meat. Nothing physically stops them.
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  But they are morally unable to eat it.
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  Their ethical commitments and desires are so strongly opposed
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  to eating meat that they are completely incapable of
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  generating the will to consume it.
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  That is a great contemporary framing.
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  Edwards provides his own striking examples to solidify
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  this. He asked us to imagine a child
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  who possesses A profound, genuine love and duty toward his
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  father. OK, a loving child.
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  That child is morally unable to assassinate his father.
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  Think about the physical reality.
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  The child has the physical muscles to pick up a weapon.
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  He has the natural ability. There is no physical force field
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  stopping his hand. But his righteous character, his
• 19:54
  deep love, makes it utterly impossible for him to generate
• 19:57
  the will to commit murder. The barrier is entirely moral.
• 20:01
  And Edwards gives an example on the absolute opposite end of the
• 20:04
  spectrum. Imagine a person who is totally
• 20:06
  malicious, consumed by hatred. That person is morally unable to
• 20:10
  do a genuine, heartfelt act of kindness for their enemy.
• 20:13
  Another moral barrier, Yes. Again, they have the physical
• 20:16
  hands to hand over a gift. They have the vocal cords to
• 20:18
  speak a kind word. The natural ability is
• 20:20
  completely intact. But they're overwhelming.
• 20:23
  Hatred creates a moral inability.
• 20:25
  They cannot choose kindness because their heart utterly
• 20:27
  despises the idea. What is fascinating here is the
• 20:30
  implication this has for moral responsibility.
• 20:33
  Edwards makes a rigorous analytical point.
• 20:36
  Moral inability is never a valid excuse for sin.
• 20:39
  Never. If you fail to do something
• 20:40
  because of a natural inability, you are entirely excused.
• 20:44
  If someone asks you to lift a massive boulder to save a
• 20:47
  trapped person and you try your absolute hardest but lack the
• 20:50
  physical strength, you are not blamed for the failure.
• 20:53
  Your will was right, but your natural capacity fell short.
• 20:56
  But if you fail to do something because of a moral inability,
• 20:59
  you are entirely blameworthy. If a malicious person says I
• 21:03
  cannot show kindness to my neighbor because my hatred for
• 21:06
  them is just too strong, we do not excuse them.
• 21:08
  We condemn them precisely because their hatred is so
• 21:10
  strong. The inability itself is the sin.
• 21:13
  The deeper the moral inability, the more corrupt the person is.
• 21:17
  To say I am so wicked that I am unable to choose good is the
• 21:20
  ultimate confession of guilt, not a get out of jail free card.
• 21:23
  This brings us to the mechanics of total depravity.
• 21:26
  When Reformed theology teaches that fallen man is unable to
• 21:29
  come to Christ, it is specifically talking about a
• 21:32
  moral inability, not a natural one.
• 21:34
  That is a massive distinction to make.
• 21:37
  Unregenerate humanity is not naturally unable to believe the
• 21:40
  gospel. They have physical ears to hear
• 21:42
  the sermon. They have brains to process the
• 21:45
  logic of the cross. They have the natural faculties
• 21:47
  required for belief. But they are morally unable.
• 21:51
  Their fallen inclination utterly rejects God.
• 21:54
  The natural mind considers the things of the Spirit to be
• 21:57
  foolishness. They cannot come to Christ
• 22:00
  because they vehemently refuse to come.
• 22:02
  Their strongest motive is always self rule and rebellion against
• 22:05
  their creator. So when a Sinner rejects the
• 22:08
  gospel, the fault lies entirely 100% in their own corrupt will.
• 22:13
  They are choosing precisely what they prefer, and what they
• 22:16
  prefer is to remain in rebellion.
• 22:18
  This completely dismantles the argument that God is unjust for
• 22:21
  demanding faith from those who cannot believe.
• 22:24
  God's demand is perfectly just, because the only thing
• 22:26
  preventing their obedience is their own stubborn, voluntary
• 22:29
  refusal. There is a capacity of nature
• 22:32
  sufficient, but a disposition is wanting.
• 22:34
  Nothing is missing but a willing heart.
• 22:36
  Well said. OK, let me push back on behalf
• 22:39
  of our listeners. If we are morally unable to
• 22:42
  choose good without grace, and our choices are mathematically
• 22:46
  dictated by our strongest motives, are we truly free?
• 22:49
  That is the big push back. We need to define what liberty
• 22:52
  actually is because people will say if my disposition guarantees
• 22:57
  my choice, I am not free, I am just playing out a script.
• 23:00
  To answer this, Edwards goes back to the basic biblical and
• 23:04
  common definition of liberty. What does freedom actually mean?
• 23:07
  In the ordinary use of human language, liberty is simply the
• 23:11
  opportunity to do as one pleases without external constraint or
• 23:15
  restraint. Breakdown constraint and
• 23:17
  restraint for us. Constraint means being forced to
• 23:20
  do something you do not want to do.
• 23:22
  Restraint means being physically blocked from doing what you do
• 23:24
  want to do. If you are free from constraint
• 23:26
  and free from restraint, you possess true liberty.
• 23:29
  If you desire to walk outside and the door is unlocked and no
• 23:32
  one is physically holding you back, you are completely free to
• 23:34
  walk outside. That is it.
• 23:36
  If you can do what you desire, you are free.
• 23:38
  The common definition of liberty.
• 23:40
  It does not ask how you came to have that desire in the 1st
• 23:43
  place, It only asks if you are able to execute the desire you
• 23:47
  currently possess. But Edwards notes that
• 23:49
  theological opponents, specifically Armenians and
• 23:52
  Pelagians, require a much more elaborate, convoluted definition
• 23:56
  of freedom. They argue that true liberty
• 23:58
  requires a self determining capacity.
• 24:01
  They believe the will must have sovereignty over itself,
• 24:04
  operating entirely independent of prior motives or
• 24:07
  inclinations. Here is where it gets really
• 24:09
  interesting. They argue for a state of
• 24:11
  perfect indifference or equilibrium.
• 24:13
  Equilibrium. That sounds so clinical.
• 24:16
  The idea is that for a choice to be genuinely free, the mind must
• 24:20
  be perfectly balanced between two options, completely
• 24:23
  uninfluenced by any prior bias, habit or motive.
• 24:27
  You must be in a state of absolute neutrality, and from
• 24:30
  that neutrality the will simply decides.
• 24:32
  Edwards dismantles this concept of equilibrium using pure
• 24:36
  unassailable logic. Think about what a choice
• 24:38
  actually is. By definition, it is a
• 24:40
  preference. Right, you are preferring one
• 24:41
  over the other. How can a mind that is in
• 24:44
  perfect equilibrium, meaning it has absolutely no preference for
• 24:48
  either option, generate a preference?
• 24:50
  It is a logical absurdity. If the mind is genuinely
• 24:53
  indifferent, it is not moving toward either option.
• 24:56
  For a choice to happen, the equilibrium must be broken by a
• 24:59
  motive. And let us say for the sake of
• 25:01
  argument that a choice were to somehow occur without any motive
• 25:05
  whatsoever, without any reason, desire or inducement tipping the
• 25:11
  scale. What would you even call that?
• 25:12
  Would not be a moral action, it would be random chance.
• 25:15
  If a decision has absolutely no 'cause no thought, no desire
• 25:18
  driving it, it is the equivalent of mental static.
• 25:22
  It is a dice roll in the brain. We do not praise people for
• 25:25
  random spasms of the mind. We praise them for choices
• 25:28
  guided by a desire for goodness. This leads to Edwards most
• 25:31
  devastating and beautiful argument in the entire text,
• 25:34
  which settles the debate permanently.
• 25:36
  The moral agency of God. This is the ultimate, undeniable
• 25:40
  proof that true freedom does not require equilibrium or the
• 25:43
  ability to choose evil. Yes, God is the supreme moral
• 25:46
  agent of the universe. He possesses infinite
• 25:49
  understanding, infinite righteousness, and infinite
• 25:51
  capacity. Yet the Scriptures are
• 25:54
  explicitly clear. God cannot sin.
• 25:56
  It is impossible for God to lie. He is morally unable to choose
• 25:59
  evil. His holy nature dictates that He
• 26:01
  will always, with absolute unbending certainty, choose
• 26:05
  righteousness. His strongest motive is always
• 26:08
  His own glory and perfect holiness.
• 26:11
  This raises A crucial question that Edwards poses to his
• 26:13
  opponents. If true liberty requires the
• 26:16
  ability to choose between good and evil from a state of neutral
• 26:19
  equilibrium, does God lack freedom?
• 26:21
  That is a staggering thought. Because God is certainly not
• 26:24
  neutral and he certainly cannot choose evil.
• 26:27
  If the Armenian definition of freedom is correct, then God is
• 26:30
  the least free being in the entire universe.
• 26:32
  Which is an unthinkable blasphemous conclusion.
• 26:35
  God is the freest being in the universe.
• 26:37
  Why? Precisely because he always acts
• 26:40
  in perfect accordance with his holy desires.
• 26:41
  Nothing constrains him, nothing restrains him.
• 26:44
  He does exactly what he pleases, and what he pleases is always
• 26:47
  infinitely good. This proves conclusively that
• 26:50
  absolute certainty of outcome. The guarantee that God will
• 26:53
  always do right is perfectly consistent with the highest,
• 26:56
  most glorious form of liberty. It proves that true moral agency
• 27:00
  does not require a blank slate. Moral agency requires
• 27:04
  understanding a capacity of choice and the ability to act on
• 27:08
  that choice. Edwards briefly contrast this
• 27:10
  with non moral agents to highlight the point.
• 27:13
  He looks at the sun and the fire.
• 27:15
  Right. The sun does a tremendous amount
• 27:17
  of good. It warms the earth.
• 27:18
  It causes crops to grow. It sustains physical life.
• 27:22
  But we do not praise the sun for its moral virtue.
• 27:24
  It is not a moral agent. It is just doing what it was
• 27:27
  made to do naturally. Similarly, a fire that breaks
• 27:30
  out in a city and burns down buildings does an incredible
• 27:32
  amount of physical evil, but we do not put the fire on trial for
• 27:36
  murder. We do not blame the fire as a
• 27:38
  sinful, responsible agent. Why is that?
• 27:41
  Because the sun and the fire lack understanding.
• 27:43
  They do not act from choice, guided by reason or moral
• 27:46
  inducements. They operate by sheer natural
• 27:48
  force. True moral agency requires a
• 27:51
  mind that perceives good and evil, feels the weight of
• 27:53
  motives, and makes choices based on those perceptions.
• 27:57
  Even though our choices are mathematically tied to our
• 28:00
  strongest motives, we are moral agents because we are making
• 28:03
  real, calculated preferences based on what our minds
• 28:06
  perceive. So synthesizing these massive
• 28:09
  philosophical concepts, we see a framework that completely alters
• 28:14
  how we view ourselves. The will is not an independent
• 28:17
  monarch ruling over the soul making arbitrary decisions.
• 28:20
  The will is simply the mind choosing.
• 28:22
  Those choices are always, without exception, driven by our
• 28:25
  strongest motives, whatever our mind views as the greatest
• 28:28
  apparent good in that exact isolated moment.
• 28:31
  And because our choices follow our motives, there is a
• 28:33
  philosophical certainty to our actions.
• 28:36
  But this certainty does not destroy our liberty.
• 28:39
  True liberty is simply acting on those motives without external
• 28:42
  constraint. We are entirely free to do what
• 28:44
  we want. The tragedy of the human
• 28:45
  condition is that due to the fall, what we naturally want is
• 28:49
  rebellion. That is the moral inability we
• 28:51
  discussed. We are bound by our own corrupt
• 28:53
  desires. We are physically capable of
• 28:56
  obedience but morally bankrupt. This means our hearts need a
• 29:01
  divine overhaul, not just better options placed in front of us.
• 29:06
  If you put a plate of mud and a plate of premium steak in front
• 29:09
  of a pig, the pig will choose the mud every single time.
• 29:13
  The pig is free to choose the steak.
• 29:14
  There is no physical barrier, but its nature dictates that the
• 29:18
  mud is the greatest apparent good.
• 29:20
  To get the pig to choose the steak, you do not just need to
• 29:23
  explain the nutritional value of the steak, you have to change
• 29:26
  the fundamental nature of the animal.
• 29:28
  Which is why this entire philosophical framework
• 29:30
  magnifies the grace of God so brilliantly.
• 29:33
  Since we are morally unable to choose Him, since our strongest
• 29:36
  motives are perpetually bent away from Him, salvation cannot
• 29:39
  be a matter of God. Just offer Him a choice and
• 29:42
  waiting for us to generate the right response from a neutral
• 29:44
  will. We have no neutral will.
• 29:46
  Salvation must be entirely A sovereign act of God changing
• 29:49
  our core disposition. The Holy Spirit has to operate
• 29:52
  on the mind. He must shine a light into the
• 29:54
  darkness so that Christ, who previously appeared foolish or
• 29:58
  undesirable to the natural mind, suddenly becomes our greatest
• 30:02
  apparent good. Grace is God restructuring the
• 30:05
  motives of the heart. When a person is saved, they do
• 30:08
  not come to Christ against their will.
• 30:10
  They come because God has so beautified Christ in their
• 30:13
  perception that their will eagerly, desperately chooses
• 30:17
  Him. The scale is tipped by sovereign
• 30:19
  divine intervention. It is the ultimate display of
• 30:23
  divine sovereignty, working in perfect harmony with human
• 30:26
  responsibility. We are held accountable because
• 30:28
  we choose what we desire. We are saved because God
• 30:31
  mercifully gives us new desires. So what does this all mean for
• 30:35
  you today? This has been a rigorous
• 30:36
  theological study, and it demands serious reflection.
• 30:40
  We want to leave you with a final lingering question to
• 30:42
  ponder on your own as you go about your week.
• 30:44
  And it's something we all need to ask ourselves.
• 30:47
  If your daily choices are mathematically dictated by
• 30:50
  whatever your heart currently views as the greatest agreeable
• 30:52
  good, what are you actively doing today to shape what your
• 30:55
  heart finds agreeable tomorrow? What inputs, what habits, what
• 30:59
  contemplations are you feeding your mind to ensure that
• 31:02
  holiness becomes your strongest motive?
• 31:04
  Thank you for joining us for this deep dive on reformed
• 31:06
  thinking. We will see you next time.