Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / Denmark's population register was drained through a supplier's legitimate access
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Tuesday, the sixth of October.
- 0:06Denmark's population register was drained through a supplier's legitimate access.
- 0:12Denmark disclosed on Monday that attackers had taken the names, addresses and personal identification number
- 0:20s of 8.8 million people from its national population register, the C P R.
- 0:26They didn't break in. They used the front door, with a key that a small Danish company was legitimately entit
- 0:34led to hold. It's a fresh story since this morning's bulletin, and a useful one if your UK organisation shares
- 0:41identity data with suppliers.
- 0:43Next.
- 0:53ccess came through a private company's lawful ability to search the register.
- 0:57Over roughly ten days in September, someone ran what the Danish Data Protection Agency called "a very large n
- 1:05umber of automated searches" to work out which personal numbers were valid.
- 1:10The register's administrators noticed the unusual activity and suspended the company's access.
- 1:16The police are investigating.
- 1:18The data covered current and former residents, and the deceased.
- 1:23That's about 80 per cent of the register's records.
- 1:26People with name-and-address protection were excluded.
- 1:29The Hacker News says official statements didn't name the company.
- 1:33How the attackers gained control of its access hasn't been disclosed, so I won't guess.
- 1:38And also.
- 1:43Imagine a library that lets approved researchers look up one book at a time.
- 1:47A researcher's card is stolen.
- 1:50The thief doesn't need to pick any locks.
- 1:52They simply request every shelf mark in turn and keep whatever comes back.
- 1:57Each request looks legitimate.
- 1:59Only the pattern, a vast number of requests in sequence, gives it away.
- 2:04That's enumeration. A personal number that's highly structured, where every valid guess returns a name and a
- 2:11ddress, is a guessing game the attacker eventually wins.
- 2:14The quiet part is that nothing was "hacked" in the technical sense.
- 2:19So there was no exploit to patch, and no vulnerability scanner to flag it.
- 2:24And also.
- 2:28Denmark's minister, Christina Egelund, said the safeguards around this kind of access "had not been solid en
- 2:35ough." In my opinion, three design decisions would have blunted this.
- 2:39First, volume limits per customer.
- 2:42A small firm with a business need for hundreds of lookups a day should be unable to make millions, whatever i
- 2:49ts credentials say.
- 2:54Sequential or exhaustive queries are a recognisable signature.
- 2:58Here the activity lasted about ten days before it was spotted.
- 3:02Third, less returned per query.
- 3:05If a lookup only needs to confirm a match, it shouldn't hand back a name and address as well.
- 3:11If you're a UK director, the question is less about Denmark and more about your own identifiers.
- 3:18Customer numbers, patient numbers, account references.
- 3:22Which of your portals or APIs answer lookups?
- 3:26What's the most one authorised user can pull in an hour?
- 3:29If you don't know, that's the finding.
- 3:32Throttling is cheap to build at the start.
- 3:35It's awkward to retrofit once a supplier's integration depends on it.
- 3:38And finally.
- 3:42Ask suppliers with bulk or automated access to your data for their query limits and their alerting.
- 3:48Check that your contracts let you suspend an account without negotiation.
- 3:53And watch for follow-on phishing.
- 3:55Names, addresses and national numbers are the raw material for convincing scams.
- 4:00That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:05Thanks for listening.