Latest / CLEs You Actually Want to Hear / Standing on Shaky Ground? Recent Developments in Class Action Standing Requirements with Pamela Prescott, Esq.
Transcript
- 0:06Welcome to recent developments and class action
- 0:09standing requirements. I'm Alla Policastro, CLE
- 0:12advisor for the Beverly Hills Bar Association,
- 0:15and today I'm delighted to introduce our speaker,
- 0:17Pamela Prescott. Casaruni Law Group. She specializes
- 0:23in consumer rights litigation, including class
- 0:26actions for violations of the TCPA, FDCPA, and
- 0:30for unfair business practices and false advertising.
- 0:33Piemela also handles individual consumer cases
- 0:35involving inaccurate credit reporting, identity
- 0:38theft, and unfair debt collection. She has managed
- 0:41complex litigation in every federal district
- 0:43court in California and several other states.
- 0:46Pamela has been recognized multiple times by
- 0:49Super Lawyers as a rising star and was named
- 0:51to the National Trial Lawyers Top 40 Under 40
- 0:55list. Pamela, we can't wait to hear what you
- 0:57have to share with us today. Thank you so much
- 1:00for the introduction. And let's go ahead and
- 1:06get into the presentation one second. Okay, so
- 1:12today we're gonna talk about some recent developments
- 1:15in class action standing requirements. This has
- 1:19become a topic of interest following the Supreme
- 1:22Court's recent decision in 2021 called TransUnion
- 1:26versus Ramirez that we'll be going over today
- 1:29as well. And since that opinion came out, district
- 1:32court cases have been applying that ruling. in
- 1:38terms of class action standing requirements.
- 1:41And just recently, I think it was April 30th
- 1:43of this year, the Supreme Court heard oral argument
- 1:48in a new case called Laboratory Court of America
- 1:51versus Davis that might change standing in terms
- 1:56of class actions. And when each class member
- 2:01has to have Article III standing in order to
- 2:04recover damages. So this presentation will kind
- 2:07of start with an overview of standing. I know
- 2:10it's probably a concept that's familiar to most
- 2:12of you, but I think it will help us as we get
- 2:14into the Supreme Court analysis just to kind
- 2:17of have a refresh on that backdrop in terms of
- 2:20Article III standing, what's required to meet
- 2:22that threshold in federal court. And then we'll
- 2:25move into a discussion about TransUnion versus
- 2:28Ramirez. And then we'll finish with a discussion
- 2:31of the more recent Supreme Court case where there
- 2:34isn't a ruling just yet. But I took a look at
- 2:38the briefing and the recent oral argument transcript
- 2:42and have some thoughts there in terms of how
- 2:44the court might rule on that pending decision.
- 2:49So in terms of Article III standing, like I said,
- 2:52I think this is probably a concept that's familiar
- 2:54to most, but will help us as we navigate this
- 2:58area of law. So as we all know, Article 3 standing
- 3:02requires that federal courts are deciding cases
- 3:06and controversies. This helps ensure that there's
- 3:11a separation of power by preventing courts from
- 3:15rendering decisions on cases that might not be
- 3:17right for a decision or a ruling or that might
- 3:22touch on hypothetical issues. And so kind of
- 3:26in that same vein, Article 3 standing is a really
- 3:30important threshold jurisdictional requirement.
- 3:33It has to be maintained at all stages of the
- 3:36litigation. So that's something to keep in mind,
- 3:40unlike some other defenses that could potentially
- 3:43get waived at certain points of litigation, Article
- 3:463 standing can be raised at any time. And it
- 3:49can also be raised by the court itself. with
- 3:53these Supreme Court decisions coming out in terms
- 3:55of TransUnion and the soon to be issued opinion
- 4:00in Lab Corp, we see a lot of judges actually,
- 4:03Sue Esponte, raising the issue of Article 3 standing,
- 4:06even if it's not raised by the defendant. Though
- 4:09this presents a unique hurdle, particularly in
- 4:13the class action arena in terms of at all stages
- 4:18of litigation ensuring that there's Article III
- 4:21standing and how that might implicate whether
- 4:23or not the class members are required to show
- 4:26Article III standing and at which stage, which
- 4:28we'll get into today. And kind of in that same
- 4:35thought is really just making sure that the court
- 4:38is not issuing an advisory opinion, that they're
- 4:41actually. resolving a dispute or the parties
- 4:43have a personal stake in the outcome. And, you
- 4:47know, in terms of maintaining Article 3 standing,
- 4:50a suit could technically become moot. And, you
- 4:54know, one of the Supreme Court decisions that
- 4:57I note in the slide from 2013 was kind of an
- 5:02interesting legal issue before the Supreme Court
- 5:04in terms of whether or not the case had become
- 5:08moot. So Chafin versus Chafin, centered around
- 5:13a child custody dispute in terms of where the
- 5:18child's country of residence was supposed to
- 5:21be. And so at one point, the child actually moved
- 5:25abroad. And so there was an argument that, OK,
- 5:27maybe this issue is moot. The residency has changed.
- 5:31But the Supreme Court said that basically, a
- 5:35case only becomes moot when it's impossible for
- 5:37a court to grant any effectual relief to the
- 5:40prevailing party. So as long as the parties have
- 5:42a concrete interest, even if it's small in the
- 5:45outcome of litigation, the case is not moot.
- 5:48So the court basically went on to say that each
- 5:50parent still maintain their position in terms
- 5:53of residency and where the child was actually
- 5:55physically located to not moot the case for standing
- 5:59purposes. So that's kind of an interesting kind
- 6:04of analysis of, you know, that that case was
- 6:07still deemed as right for rendering this a decision.
- 6:12And then another important consideration when
- 6:14thinking about Article 3 standing is that it's
- 6:16required to reach the merits of the case. So
- 6:20if a court doesn't have jurisdiction, they can't
- 6:24obviously rule on the underlying merits of the
- 6:26case. And so standing can be challenged if it's
- 6:30brought up by the defendant via Rule 12b1 motion.
- 6:34And that's because it's part of the court's subject
- 6:36matter jurisdiction. And then also something
- 6:39to keep in mind is this isn't something that
- 6:42can be waived. So this isn't something that the
- 6:44parties could stipulate to or that, like I mentioned
- 6:48earlier, the defendant could fail the challenge.
- 6:50It's something that can be raised by the court
- 6:52on its own. It has to be maintained at all stages
- 6:55of a litigation. And like I mentioned earlier,
- 6:59we're seeing a lot of courts actually raise it
- 7:01themselves in dismissing cases, suesponte, for
- 7:04lack of standing. In terms of the burden of proof,
- 7:11so the party... asserting federal jurisdiction
- 7:15bears a burden of proving its existence so in
- 7:18most cases that's going to fall on the plaintiff
- 7:20if they chose to initially file the underlying
- 7:22action in federal court but an interesting wrinkle
- 7:26is in cases that are initially filed in state
- 7:29court that might have been removed to federal
- 7:30court then that burden of proving standing would
- 7:35actually fall arguably on the defendant in that
- 7:38instance so That's kind of an interesting procedural
- 7:41wrinkle there, but typically it would be the
- 7:44plaintiff that would have the burden of proving
- 7:46subject matter jurisdiction. And then the overall
- 7:50elements to satisfy Article 3 standing. So the
- 7:53first one that's usually contested is whether
- 7:57or not there's an injury in fact. The second
- 7:59element is that it has to be traceable to the
- 8:02challenge conduct of the defendant. And then
- 8:05the third element is that it's likely to be redressed
- 8:07by a favorable judicial decision. And so I cite
- 8:12here a case from the Ninth Circuit from 2017,
- 8:15Van Patten, that we'll kind of get into that
- 8:17highlights some interesting nuances in terms
- 8:21of standing. Something else to keep in mind when
- 8:25thinking about standing is it's not enough for
- 8:28the plaintiff to show standing as to one claim
- 8:31or one form of relief. The plaintiff actually
- 8:34has to have standing for each and every claim
- 8:37that they have brought forward and each form
- 8:40of relief that they seek. So it's a pretty high
- 8:43burden, especially if you have multiple claims
- 8:46and you might be seeking adjunctive relief and
- 8:48damages that you really need to show standing
- 8:51as to each of those claims and types of relief.
- 8:55And so it kind of touches on this general thought
- 8:58that. If the plaintiff can't show generally that
- 9:04there was an injury in fact caused by the defendant,
- 9:08there's really nothing for the court to do in
- 9:10terms of issuing a remedy. So starting with the
- 9:14first element, the injury in fact requirement.
- 9:17So that really kind of has two sub parts. The
- 9:19first is that there's a concrete and particularized
- 9:22injury. So the injury must be real. It must be
- 9:25a tangible harm. courts when kind of analyzing
- 9:31this look to history and tradition in terms of
- 9:35guidance on what types of harms might lend itself
- 9:39to Article 3. And then the second prong is that
- 9:43the injury in fact must be actual and eminent.
- 9:45So it can't be speculative. It can't be hypothetical.
- 9:49And then in terms of typical types of harm that
- 9:53would meet the injury in fact requirement. So
- 9:56you know, one that's fairly easy to prove is
- 9:59financial loss or physical injury. So, you know,
- 10:04typically those are traditionally, you know,
- 10:09enough to meet the injury and fact requirement.
- 10:11So in the class action context, a lot of times
- 10:14you might have an unfair competition claim and
- 10:18you're alleging the plaintiff and the class were
- 10:22deceived and as a result paid more than they
- 10:25would have but for the deception. In the context
- 10:29of a data breach class action, one way to show
- 10:33financial loss is if, for example, class members
- 10:36had to pay for a creditor, crediting monitoring
- 10:38service, or if they lost access to their credit.
- 10:42So those are some ways that you can show financial
- 10:45loss. Where things get a little bit more complicated,
- 10:52especially in the class action context, is when
- 10:54we're talking about an intangible harm. These
- 11:00types of harms need to have a close nexus to
- 11:04a common law analogous injury. Typical injuries
- 11:10that fall under an intangible harm would be a
- 11:13reputational harm, disclosure of private information,
- 11:17or intrusion upon seclusion. Traditional harms
- 11:21could also be specified by the Constitution,
- 11:24for example, free speech. But something to keep
- 11:27in mind when we're looking at intangible harms
- 11:30is that a mere statutory violation alone does
- 11:34not always equal standing. And we'll really explore
- 11:37that here in a few minutes when we talk about
- 11:38the trans union opinion. But in terms of the
- 11:42Ninth Circuit case law prior to the Supreme Court's
- 11:46decision in TransUnion versus Ramirez was the
- 11:50Van Patten case that was on my prior slide from
- 11:54the Ninth Circuit in 2017. So that centered around
- 11:58a TCPA revocation of consent text message violation.
- 12:04So the Ninth Circuit and Van Patten gave a nice
- 12:08analysis of a prior US Supreme Court case. I
- 12:12think that at the time was the most recent in
- 12:14terms of this issue of statutory standing. or
- 12:19rather looking to a statutory violation to confer
- 12:22standing, and that was Spokio versus Robbins.
- 12:26In reaching its ultimate conclusion in Van Patten,
- 12:29the court explored Spokio's prior ruling. In
- 12:33Spokio, basically, the Supreme Court said that
- 12:37Article 3 standing requires a concrete injury,
- 12:39even in the context of a statutory violation,
- 12:42and reiterated the position that just because
- 12:46you have a statutory violation does not mean
- 12:48you have an injury in fact sufficient to have
- 12:52Article III standing. So ultimately, in the Van
- 12:55Patten case, the court found that two unsolicited
- 13:00text messages in violation of the TCPA was enough
- 13:03to have an injury in fact and satisfy Article
- 13:06III standing. The court looked to the ultimate
- 13:11purpose of the TCPA in reaching that conclusion.
- 13:15So the court ultimately determined that that
- 13:19unwanted telemarketing can be an invasion of
- 13:22privacy or a nuisance and that Congress wanted
- 13:25to protect consumers from unwanted intrusion
- 13:29and nuisances of this kind. especially where
- 13:33the consumer didn't consent to receive the message.
- 13:37In Van Patten, they found that the two text messages
- 13:41was enough. We'll talk about it later too in
- 13:45terms of that arena of TCPA standing, but at
- 13:51least as far as the Ninth Circuit and many other
- 13:53circuit courts, they found that one or two unwanted
- 13:56calls or text messages is generally enough to
- 13:59satisfy Article 3 standing. So moving on to the
- 14:04traceability element. So this just requires that
- 14:07the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the
- 14:10challenge conduct. So that really means that
- 14:14even if we have an injury, it must be actually
- 14:17caused by the defendant. So there must be a direct
- 14:21connection between the injury and the conduct
- 14:23that you're challenging. And then lastly is redressability,
- 14:30which is basically a favorable decision will
- 14:32redress the injury, can't be speculative. So
- 14:36the court's decision should ultimately provide
- 14:39you with some compensation or other form of relief
- 14:42for your alleged injury. So this brings us to
- 14:51the 2021 decision. from the Supreme Court in
- 14:56TransUnion versus Ramirez. In order to analyze
- 15:01the court's ultimate holding, we're going to
- 15:05talk first about the underlying facts of the
- 15:07case, which are rather interesting. We have a
- 15:10plaintiff who lives in California, Mr. Ramirez.
- 15:14He goes to a Nissan dealership to purchase a
- 15:17car jointly with his wife. And he ultimately
- 15:21is denied credit. He can't purchase the car in
- 15:23his name, but his wife is ultimately able to
- 15:27get the car in her name alone. And the reason
- 15:29why is because when Mr. Ramirez was at the dealership,
- 15:33they, as in most credit transactions, took a
- 15:36look at his credit report and his name was actually
- 15:39flagged on a potential terrorist list. And so
- 15:44the underlying facts that gave rise to his name
- 15:49appearing on that list was that I think it was
- 15:52in 2002, TransUnion rolled out a new program
- 15:56for businesses called Name Screen, which sought
- 15:59to essentially flag individuals that were a threat
- 16:06to America's national security and to help businesses
- 16:09avoid doing transactions with those individuals.
- 16:13But the issue with namescreen, at least as alleged
- 16:16in this case, and what potentially led to Mr.
- 16:19Ramirez being falsely flagged, is that TransUnion,
- 16:23the credit reporting agency that offered this
- 16:26additional add -on product, basically just did
- 16:29a name matching. So they pulled the the names
- 16:35off the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
- 16:37Assets control, which maintained this list of
- 16:42potential terrorists, and they just name matched
- 16:45with the credit report. So they didn't consider
- 16:47any other information other than the consumer's
- 16:50first and last name, which as you can imagine,
- 16:52if you have the same name as someone that's on
- 16:55that list, that could result in you being flagged
- 16:58as a potential terrorist. It's interesting that
- 17:01at least at that time, I think there's been some
- 17:03changes made to this product, but at least as
- 17:06it stood in terms of when this injury happened
- 17:09to Mr. Ramirez, they weren't considering other
- 17:11pieces of identifying information like the consumer's
- 17:14social security number or address. It was really
- 17:16just a name match that resulted in this type
- 17:19of violation. So Mr. Ramirez, after being denied
- 17:24credit, calls up TransUnion, requests a copy
- 17:27of his credit report. TransUnion mails his credit
- 17:31file along with the statutorily required summary
- 17:35of rights. However, missing from his file on
- 17:40that first request was the erroneous terrorist
- 17:43alert. So that... I'm sure created some confusion
- 17:48on the part of Mr. Ramirez. And then TransUnion
- 17:51actually sent him a second letter that did include
- 17:56that his name was flagged as a potential terrorist.
- 17:58But the second mailing didn't include a copy
- 18:01of the summary of rights. So Mr. Ramirez retained
- 18:05counsel. Eventually, that alert was removed from
- 18:09his credit file. But at least in terms of how
- 18:13this impacted Mr. Ramirez, He, I think, testified
- 18:18at trial of the confusion and distress at this
- 18:24cause. I think he also indicated that he canceled
- 18:27a planned trip to Mexico, probably out of fear
- 18:30of the implications of this being on his credit
- 18:33report. He was obviously denied credit in connection
- 18:36with the sale of the Nissan vehicle. he eventually
- 18:42filed a class action lawsuit for three different
- 18:46violations of the Fair Cutter Reporting Act.
- 18:49So the first one was the failure of TransUnion
- 18:54to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the
- 18:57accuracy of the information on the credit files
- 18:59of Mr. Ramirez and other class members. The second
- 19:04violation was failure to provide all the information
- 19:07requested in TransUnion's first mailing, specifically
- 19:11that Mr. Ramirez was listed as a potential match
- 19:14on the terrorist list. And then the third bucket
- 19:17was in regards to that second mailing of TransUnion's
- 19:21failure to provide a summary of rice, which is
- 19:24required under the statute. So in the underlying
- 19:35district court case, the class was defined as
- 19:39all people in the United States to whom TransUnion
- 19:42sent a mailing during the period from January
- 19:451, 2011 to July 26, 2011 that was similar in
- 19:51form to the second mailing that Mr. Ramirez received.
- 19:54So it would have been that you were flagged on
- 19:56the terrorist watch list, but that did not have
- 19:59the summary of rights. The class was ultimately
- 20:08certified. Of importance and what will really
- 20:14come up in terms of exploring the Supreme Court's
- 20:18review is that the class was certified and consisted
- 20:21of 8 ,185 members, including the name plaintiff,
- 20:26Mr. Ramirez, but only 1 ,853 of those class members.
- 20:33had their credit reports sent to a third party.
- 20:37So as we can kind of see, that's a small fraction
- 20:40of the ultimate class that was certified that
- 20:42had their credit reports viewed or sent to a
- 20:46third party. So the district court found that
- 21:00all 8 ,185 members had Article III standing and
- 21:05a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs. So in
- 21:09terms of the underlying jury verdict, the jury
- 21:13awarded each class member about $984 in statutory
- 21:18damages and about $6 ,353 in punitive damages
- 21:23for a total award of over $60 million. And I
- 21:28think I touched on this earlier, but kind of
- 21:31relevant layer to the standing analysis is that
- 21:34at trial, Mr. Ramirez offered testimony about
- 21:37his experience of the Nissan dealership, in terms
- 21:41of how this violation impacted him, but there
- 21:45wasn't any evidence about the experience of the
- 21:48other members of the class. And then in terms
- 21:51of how they put forth this this kind of class
- 21:57of individuals, the 1 ,853 members that had their
- 22:01credit report sent to a third party, I believe
- 22:04that that was stipulated between the parties
- 22:06at trial. So on appeal, the Ninth Circuit also
- 22:11held that all class members had standing to recover
- 22:13damages for all three violations of the FCRA.
- 22:17So in reaching that decision, the Ninth Circuit
- 22:20recognized that the Ninth Circuit had previously
- 22:25acknowledged that only the representative plaintiff
- 22:29needed to satisfy standing on the motion to dismiss
- 22:33and class certification stages. So this kind
- 22:37of touches on the issue of, okay, so when do
- 22:40we actually need to show that the individuals
- 22:44in the class beyond the name plaintiff have standing?
- 22:47So in analyzing the case of TransUnion versus
- 22:51Ramirez on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reiterated
- 22:54that based on prior cases, really only the named
- 22:58plaintiff needed to show standing through certification.
- 23:03For thinking about a class action and the procedural
- 23:07mechanisms, typically most class actions are
- 23:10faced with the motion to dismiss. At that phase,
- 23:13the Ninth Circuit was saying that only the named
- 23:15plaintiff needed to demonstrate standing. And
- 23:19even at the class certification stage, again,
- 23:22it was only the named plaintiff that needed to
- 23:24demonstrate Article III standing. And it was
- 23:27also acknowledged that this was the same for
- 23:33seeking injunctive relief. So it's kind of an
- 23:35interesting distinction there that really injunctive
- 23:39relief is looked at quite differently than a
- 23:42class seeking damages. So the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
- 23:47that it was a matter of first impression to determine
- 23:52which parties in terms of the named plaintiff
- 23:54and the absent class members had to demonstrate
- 23:59standing in order to recover monetary damages.
- 24:04So like I said, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
- 24:06said that that all of those 8 ,185 members had
- 24:12demonstrated standing and were entitled to recover
- 24:16monetary damages. And in terms of the analysis
- 24:21there, the Ninth Circuit said that those 8 ,185
- 24:29members had standing on each of the claims because
- 24:33of TransUnion's reckless handling of the information.
- 24:37that it obtained from the name search in terms
- 24:41of flagging people on the terrorist watch list
- 24:43and that it exposed every class member to a real
- 24:47risk of harm that their concrete privacy, reputational,
- 24:51and informational interests protected by the
- 24:54FCRA would be violated. And then in terms of
- 24:59the reasonable procedure claim, the Ninth Circuit
- 25:04said that a violation of statutory rights constituted
- 25:09a concrete injury under Spokeo. So that was kind
- 25:13of how the Ninth Circuit concluded that everyone
- 25:15had standing and ultimately affirmed that part
- 25:20of the district court. judgment, but the Ninth
- 25:25Circuit did, I think, reduce the punitive damages
- 25:29to 3 ,936, which reduced the total award to about
- 25:3440 million. So turning to what the Supreme Court
- 25:43actually decided in TransUnion versus Ramirez.
- 25:47So the question before the Supreme Court was
- 25:49whether these 8 ,185 class members have Article
- 25:53III standing as to their three claims. So as
- 25:57we know, the Ninth Circuit found the answer to
- 25:59that question to be yes. And it's interesting,
- 26:04too, even the way that this question is framed
- 26:07is that it's as to their three claims. So as
- 26:10we talked about earlier, the burden of proving
- 26:13standing isn't just to one claim. You really
- 26:17have to prove it as to each individual claim.
- 26:19And so those are all different. parts of the
- 26:21FCRA that were claimed to be violated, and so
- 26:24the Supreme Court was addressing those three
- 26:27buckets of statutory violations in terms of analyzing
- 26:31whether all these class members had standing.
- 26:39In terms of who wrote the majority opinion, just
- 26:42to give a little bit of context for this ruling,
- 26:45which came out on June 25th, 2021, the majority
- 26:49opinion is issued by Justice Kavanaugh. And it
- 26:53was a five to four decision with two dissents.
- 26:56So it was a pretty close call in terms of the
- 26:58ultimate decision. And the Supreme Court really
- 27:03went into a very detailed overview of Article
- 27:06III standing, specifically in terms of what's
- 27:11required to show concrete harm under the injuring
- 27:13fact requirement. And so the court first looked
- 27:23at that first bucket of violations in terms of
- 27:27the failure to follow reasonable procedures to
- 27:29ensure the accuracy of the reporting. And the
- 27:33Supreme Court ultimately held that only that
- 27:36group of 1 ,853 class members who actually had
- 27:40their credit report sent to a third party suffered
- 27:43a concrete injury in fact under Article 3. So
- 27:46in arriving at that conclusion, the Supreme Court
- 27:57acknowledged that those class members that actually
- 28:00had their credit report published suffered an
- 28:02injury because the harm had a close relationship
- 28:06to a traditionally recognized basis for lawsuit
- 28:10in American courts, namely the reputational harm
- 28:13associated with the tort of defamation. The court
- 28:25then went on to say that basically that other
- 28:27bucket of individuals, I think it would have
- 28:29been 6 ,332 that didn't have their credit report
- 28:33disseminated to a third party, didn't suffer
- 28:36concrete harm. And this is kind of an interesting
- 28:41analogy that this approved court gave that I
- 28:45highlighted here. The Supreme Court said that
- 28:49in cases such as these where allegedly inaccurate
- 28:52or misleading information sits in a company database,
- 28:55the plaintiff's harm is roughly the same, legally
- 28:59speaking, as if someone wrote a defamatory letter
- 29:02and then stored it in her desk drawer. A letter
- 29:05that is not sent does not harm anyone, no matter
- 29:09how insulting the letter is. So the Supreme Court
- 29:13really kind of teased out this idea that we started
- 29:16to see in Spokio that basically a statutory violation
- 29:22is different and apart from being able to show
- 29:26an injury in fact. And just because you have
- 29:30a statutory violation doesn't mean that you've
- 29:33demonstrated your burden of showing that there
- 29:35is Article III standing. And the Supreme Court
- 29:40noted that there's a huge difference between
- 29:42a plaintiff's statutory cause of action to sue
- 29:45a defendant and a defendant's violation of federal
- 29:48law. So here, the violation of the FCRA and the
- 29:52plaintiff suffering a concrete harm because of
- 29:55that violation. And so this approved court said
- 29:59that basically the Congress might create these
- 30:04laws and requirements in terms of obligations,
- 30:08particularly here, the obligation of... of a
- 30:11CRA, but under Article 3, an injury in law is
- 30:16not an injury in fact. And only those individuals
- 30:19that have been concretely harmed by the statutory
- 30:23violation may sue the private defendant over
- 30:26that violation in court. And the Supreme Court
- 30:29went on to note that basically, violations that
- 30:35don't cause any harm you know, are merely a legal
- 30:39infraction. So a legal infraction without harm
- 30:41is not enough to bring a case in court. And so,
- 30:48as you can imagine, in terms of the dissenting
- 30:50opinions, Justice Thompson authored one of the
- 30:55dissenting opinions and basically said that historically
- 30:58a private right has been enough to establish
- 31:02an injury in fact. And Justice Kagan similarly
- 31:06said that if Congress is allowing plaintiffs
- 31:10to bring their claims for the violation of the
- 31:13FCRA, through the statutory requirements, but
- 31:18here we're preventing those plaintiffs from actually
- 31:21asserting those violations because they haven't
- 31:23met the. the harm threshold. So it kind of begs
- 31:27the question of, OK, if we have a violation of
- 31:30a federal law, but we're limiting in terms of
- 31:36who can bring that based on the type of harm,
- 31:39does it make those statutes have less teeth?
- 31:43And we'll get to analyzing informational injury,
- 31:46but it kind of seems to be at tension with the
- 31:50fact that there is an underlying violation, just
- 31:53that the harm is not recognized as to be sufficient
- 31:56to confer Article 3 standing. Before we move
- 32:10on to the second and third violation, which were
- 32:13analyzed by the court together, it's interesting
- 32:17to see that if we look at this group, and I'll
- 32:21kind of go back a little bit just so we can see
- 32:23the visual, but this group of 1 ,853 members
- 32:27that did have their credit report sent to a third
- 32:30party, the Supreme Court basically said, we have
- 32:34no issue finding that those persons were harmed,
- 32:37that they've satisfied Article 3 standing. And
- 32:42they analyze the, like I mentioned earlier, the
- 32:47tort of defamation, but really focused on in
- 32:52terms of finding the other 6 ,000 or so individuals
- 32:54as not being sufficiently harmed is that there's
- 32:57a publication requirement under that Shulman
- 33:01Law claim. And so the Supreme Court said that
- 33:07the violations here had a close enough relationship
- 33:10to the harm associated with defamation, and that
- 33:16potentially flagging individuals as terrorists
- 33:18was enough to be akin to subjecting someone to
- 33:22hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is required,
- 33:27and touches on the injury that would flow from
- 33:30a defamation type of harm. and that the Supreme
- 33:35Court also noted that we don't require an exact
- 33:39duplicate, meaning that there just needs to be
- 33:41a close relationship with the harm that's traditionally
- 33:44recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit
- 33:47in American courts, but it doesn't have to be
- 33:49exact. So in looking at that opinion, I thought
- 33:53that that was kind of an interesting point on
- 33:58this that you just really have to get close to
- 34:01that traditional harm, but it doesn't have to
- 34:03be exact. And here, flagging someone as a potential
- 34:08terrorist was enough and bore a close enough
- 34:12relationship to be defamatory as if they were
- 34:15labeled as a terrorist and that the Supreme Court
- 34:19found that that was enough, but really was focused
- 34:21on this publication requirement. and went on
- 34:27to note that these 6 ,332 class members were
- 34:34missing that publication element. And so we see
- 34:37that in this quote, that with the analogy of
- 34:41the desk drawer, that just because it's a violation,
- 34:45no one saw it, doesn't mean you were harmed,
- 34:48at least from the Supreme Court's perspective.
- 34:52And they expressly said that just the presence
- 34:54of an inaccuracy on an internal credit file that's
- 34:58not disclosed to anyone doesn't cause a concrete
- 35:00harm. And they also pointed out too, in terms
- 35:04of because this case, you know, obviously went
- 35:07to trial, there was evidence put forth at trial
- 35:11and the Supreme Court really acknowledges that
- 35:14the The plaintiffs didn't put forth any evidence
- 35:16that the class members were independently harmed,
- 35:18aside from Mr. Ramirez testifying about his own
- 35:22individual harm. And the Supreme Court even hinted
- 35:27that there wasn't even any evidence put forward
- 35:30that the class members suffered emotional injury
- 35:34or that they even knew that these violations
- 35:36occurred seemed to be something that the Supreme
- 35:39Court drilled down on, that there really just
- 35:41wasn't enough evidence to show that that the
- 35:44other group of individuals apart from the publication
- 35:46issue were aware of the violation and were harmed
- 35:51in any way. When I was initially looking at this,
- 35:54I thought, well, maybe there could be an argument
- 35:56for refraining from utilizing your credit. Maybe
- 35:59you didn't apply for credit, but. I think the
- 36:02Supreme Court kind of closed that door by saying
- 36:04that there wasn't even any evidence that these
- 36:06individuals knew it was on their credit report,
- 36:08which would kind of foreclose any argument that
- 36:11they were refraining from utilizing their credit
- 36:13or that they were distressed by this information,
- 36:16because if they weren't aware of it, in the Supreme
- 36:18Court's view, it really lends itself to showing
- 36:22that there really wasn't any harm. So as for
- 36:28the second and third violations of the FCRA.
- 36:32So the Supreme Court really analyzed these together.
- 36:35And this was the failure to provide all the information
- 36:37requested and the failure to provide the summary
- 36:40of rights. And the Supreme Court found that none
- 36:43of the class members, aside from Mr. Ramirez,
- 36:47suffered a concrete harm. So that's kind of interesting
- 36:53in terms of how this harm was. was framed. And
- 36:59really, the Supreme Court framed it as an informational
- 37:03injury. And so this type of intangible harm,
- 37:07the Supreme Court said, basically, if there's
- 37:10no downstream consequence from this informational
- 37:13injury, that that's not enough to satisfy Article
- 37:17III standing. So it kind of I think clarified
- 37:28this issue of an informational injury that that's
- 37:31not even enough. So you really have to take that
- 37:34extra step and say that it caused some type of
- 37:38downstream consequence or adverse effect. And
- 37:42I pulled a case that what we can talk about in
- 37:45a couple of minutes of how courts are really
- 37:47define the contours of informational injuries,
- 37:50particularly in the class action context post
- 37:53-Ramirez. Because traditionally, if we have an
- 37:58informational injury, for example, the failure
- 38:00to provide the summary of rights, that type of
- 38:03violation lends itself nicely for a lot of other
- 38:06reasons to a class because you have you know,
- 38:11the same consumers receiving the same letter
- 38:13with the same violation and the same language.
- 38:15It was probably, you know, a form letter. But
- 38:18here, the Supreme Court is really drilling down
- 38:20and saying that the informational injury is not
- 38:23enough. You need to allege some other harm that
- 38:25flowed from that informational injury, which
- 38:28makes things a little more difficult in the class
- 38:32context. So some takeaways from TransUnion. The
- 38:42big one was that every class member has to have
- 38:45Article 3 standing to recover damages at trial.
- 38:49So that was kind of a big one that came from
- 38:54this opinion is that that was clarified, but
- 38:57also that the mere risk of future harm can't
- 39:00confer Article 3 standing. So a lot of circuit
- 39:04courts and district courts were looking to Spokio
- 39:06to say that We have a statutory violation. It's
- 39:09exposing consumers to a risk of harm or the name
- 39:14plaintiff to a future risk of harm. But the Supreme
- 39:17Court said that's not enough, that that's insufficient
- 39:20to confer a standing. So that kind of clarified
- 39:24that in the context of really teasing out what's
- 39:29required beyond a statutory violation to show
- 39:32that they're standing. So as we kind of talked
- 39:38about, there's these three buckets of injuries.
- 39:45And it kind of lends the question of, OK, well,
- 39:47what types of harm are sufficiently concrete
- 39:50under trans -union? So as I noted, we have that
- 39:55verbiage from the Supreme Court saying that you
- 39:57have to show downstream consequences in the context
- 40:00of an informational injury. and that the Supreme
- 40:04Court really highlighted that there was no showing
- 40:06that the alleged information, so the failure
- 40:09to provide the summary of rights or the failure
- 40:11to include the terrorist list, the erroneous
- 40:16flag on the terrorist list, hindered their ability,
- 40:22especially because those credit reports weren't
- 40:25disseminated to a third party with regard to
- 40:28the the 6 ,000 individuals in the class. It's
- 40:36interesting in terms of the informational injuries.
- 40:38I took a look at a couple cases that have grappled
- 40:42with this concept post Ramirez. One of them was
- 40:46Bowen versus Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
- 40:49from the District Court of Massachusetts from
- 40:52July 26, 2024. So that was a class action that
- 40:56was brought for violations of RESPA for failure
- 41:00to provide recordings in response to a qualified
- 41:03written request or a QWR letter. And in that
- 41:07case, the plaintiffs actually allege that they
- 41:11were injured because they didn't receive the
- 41:13recordings and the transcripts of the phone calls
- 41:15that they requested. But the court said, no,
- 41:20that's not sufficient under trans union. That's
- 41:23purely an informational injury that caused no
- 41:26adverse effects. So they didn't take that extra
- 41:28step and explain why the withholding of those
- 41:32recordings caused an injury. So that's kind of
- 41:36interesting in terms of those types of violations
- 41:38where you might have a statutory violation, but
- 41:41you haven't sufficiently proven how that violation
- 41:44actually caused a concrete injury. Another case,
- 41:48this one's from the Eastern District of California
- 41:51before Judge Thurston and it's Manzarez versus
- 41:56Madera collection services. So this is interesting.
- 42:00It was a class action lawsuit filed for violations
- 42:03of the FDCPA because basically the punitive class
- 42:08and plaintiff were receiving undated collection
- 42:11letters so they couldn't determine the charge
- 42:14off amount or the date the letter was sent because
- 42:18they were undated. And the defendant filed a
- 42:22motion to dismiss and the court, Sue Esponte,
- 42:26analyzed Article 3 standing and noted that it
- 42:29wasn't raised by the defendant, but the court
- 42:32has an obligation to ensure that there's standing.
- 42:35And ultimately, the court dismissed that case,
- 42:40finding that essentially that the FTCPA doesn't
- 42:47confer the right of an informational injury and
- 42:51that the plaintiff hadn't made a concrete showing
- 42:55that they were actually harmed. And I thought
- 42:57this was kind of an interesting opinion only
- 42:59because the plaintiff did, at least arguably
- 43:04in my view, did allege the downstream consequences
- 43:07of not having a data collection letter, the plaintiff
- 43:10said that they were misled as to the status of
- 43:12the debt, that the letters, they questioned the
- 43:16legitimacy of the letters because they didn't
- 43:18have the date, that it prevented them from making
- 43:24informed decisions regarding the debt because
- 43:27they couldn't determine how long they had to
- 43:32respond to the letter. So they did put forth
- 43:36at least a showing of some related consequences
- 43:39that arguably everyone in the class would have
- 43:41suffered in terms of having undated debt collection
- 43:45letter. But Judge Thurston from the Eastern District
- 43:47didn't think that that was sufficiently concrete.
- 43:50And she even noted that that these were bare
- 43:55-bone allegations that weren't plausible and
- 43:58that she didn't think that there was Article
- 43:59III standing. With decisions like that, it really
- 44:05increases the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate
- 44:09the type of harm flowing from an informational
- 44:12injury. Something to keep in mind in terms of
- 44:18intangible harms. you know, we have the TCPA
- 44:22types of class actions that lend themselves to
- 44:27innovation of privacy. And most circuit courts
- 44:29are on board now that, like I said before, one
- 44:31or two text messages or unwanted calls are enough.
- 44:35And then, of course, we have tangible harms,
- 44:37which still remain alive and well in terms of
- 44:42showing Article III standing. And something important
- 44:46to note, too, that the degree of the monetary
- 44:49harm is not generally considered when thinking
- 44:52about Article III standing. So I think some courts
- 44:55in the Ninth Circuit have even said a penny is
- 44:57enough. So it's really the type of harm that's
- 45:00being scrutinized, not necessarily the degree,
- 45:03which is kind of an interesting distinction there
- 45:06when looking at what types of harms are sufficient.
- 45:11In a recent case, it actually just came out from
- 45:14Judge Vera. in the central district of California
- 45:17examined justice in terms of tangible harms in
- 45:21the class action context. There it's Leon versus
- 45:24Honda Motor Co. And in that case, there was an
- 45:29alleged defect, I guess, on sensors for retractable
- 45:32doors that were causing the vehicles to be unsafe
- 45:36and causing injuries to consumers because they
- 45:39weren't closing properly. And so in that case,
- 45:43Honda argued that there's no harm because the
- 45:47plaintiffs got what they bargained for. The vehicles,
- 45:51you can't just allege that there's a better way
- 45:53to design a vehicle. There's no harm, there's
- 45:55no economic injury. And Judge Vera acknowledged
- 46:00that, no, in the Ninth Circuit, we've consistently
- 46:02held that where a plaintiff alleges that they
- 46:07wouldn't have purchased the property or they
- 46:09would have paid less. that that's enough to show
- 46:14an injury in effect. And then kind of in that
- 46:18same vein, the court also found that the plaintiffs
- 46:22alleged an economic injury because of the diminished
- 46:24economic value. So the car is worth less because
- 46:28of this defect. And so the case was able to proceed.
- 46:33So that was kind of an interesting reaffirming
- 46:36of some of these principles that might lend themselves
- 46:40nicely to particular unfair competition type
- 46:43of class action. Then we have this last bucket
- 46:48that I mentioned earlier about injunctive relief.
- 46:54that essentially, in terms of seeking injunctive
- 46:56relief, that only the named plaintiff has to
- 46:59show standing. So in terms of deciding which
- 47:03types of cases to file in federal court, maybe
- 47:06it might make sense to only seek to certify an
- 47:08injunctive relief class because you wouldn't
- 47:12have to show standing as to individual class
- 47:15members, just the named plaintiff. It's interesting
- 47:21because the Supreme Court kind of left open this
- 47:24big question in TransUnion, which is whether
- 47:27every class member has to demonstrate standing
- 47:29before a court certifies a class. So it's important
- 47:33to remember that in TransUnion, we had a trial,
- 47:36we had a judgment, and the court was determining
- 47:38whether or not the class members had standing
- 47:42as to those three claims to recover damages.
- 47:45Here, there was still no clarity, at least from
- 47:49TransUnion, on whether that would apply before
- 47:54certification. So historically, many courts agreed
- 47:59that TransUnion, and even prior to that, didn't
- 48:02require proof of standing as to each class member
- 48:05prior to certification. So as long as the name
- 48:07plaintiff had standing, which we saw the Ninth
- 48:10Circuit in the underlying Ninth Circuit opinion
- 48:15in TransUnion acknowledged that before certification
- 48:19and at the pleading stage really we're only looking
- 48:23at whether the name plaintiff has standing and
- 48:25some courts have even said that really it's only
- 48:28the remedial phase at trial so up until that
- 48:32point you don't have to show that each individual
- 48:34class member has standing so That kind of lent
- 48:38nicely to the decision that's presently before
- 48:42the Supreme Court, which is Lab Corp of America
- 48:46versus Davis. So the underlying facts of this
- 48:49case. or that the plaintiffs are alleging that
- 48:53LabCorp discriminated against them as it relates
- 48:56to visually impaired individuals because of these
- 49:00touchscreen kiosks that were implemented in LabCorp's
- 49:04businesses, which weren't suitable for the visually
- 49:07impaired. So the plaintiff, Mrs. Vargas, in the
- 49:12underlying district court case, alleged that
- 49:16she I think he rather went to a lab court facility.
- 49:22He tried to check in. He couldn't use the kiosk
- 49:24because he's visually impaired. And that resulted
- 49:30in him having to wait for assistance and being
- 49:32discriminated against because he couldn't properly
- 49:35access that kiosk in order to check himself in
- 49:38to receive services. And so the underlying violations
- 49:43were a host of statutory violations under federal
- 49:46and state law. And at the district court level,
- 49:55Judge O 'Gween from the Central District of California
- 49:57ended up certifying two classes. So a California
- 50:00class, damages class, and then a nationwide class.
- 50:05And so it's interesting because it kind of became
- 50:08relevant to the appeal in terms of what the justices
- 50:13asked at the oral argument. But there's kind
- 50:15of this interesting procedural history on the
- 50:20ultimate, I guess, operable order of the certified
- 50:24class. And I'll kind of break that down. But
- 50:27basically, in May of 2022, the court certified
- 50:30the class, but then amended that order in June.
- 50:34And so it became relevant to the Ninth Circuit's
- 50:40ruling and as well as some concerns by the Supreme
- 50:42Court of whether there was actually jurisdiction
- 50:45because the defendant Lab Corp only technically
- 50:50appealed the May 2022 order, which was superseded
- 50:55and amended by the June order. And we'll kind
- 50:59of get into that too, but it is an interesting
- 51:02kind of procedural wrinkle that could ultimately
- 51:05prevent the Supreme Court from reaching the merits.
- 51:09So at the Ninth Circuit level, the Ninth Circuit
- 51:13ultimately did find that there was Article III
- 51:17standing and kind of explored the ultimate violations
- 51:23in the disability discrimination context. And
- 51:26the Ninth Circuit said that it's not necessary
- 51:28for standing purposes, that the plaintiff was
- 51:32completely precluded from entering or using the
- 51:35facility, rather that they were denied a full
- 51:39and equal enjoyment of the facility. So they
- 51:42found that that was sufficient here and that
- 51:45there was an allegation that there wasn't proper
- 51:50access to fully communicate using the kiosk because
- 51:54of the obstacles that were presented to the visually
- 51:58impaired that couldn't utilize those kiosks.
- 52:01So they found that there was standing ultimately
- 52:06at the Ninth Circuit level. But the Ninth Circuit
- 52:13did ultimately address this issue and basically
- 52:17pointed out that LabCorp only appealed the May
- 52:19order. It didn't amend its appeal. And it didn't
- 52:26attempt to refile or include the June order.
- 52:29So the Ninth Circuit did kind of point that out,
- 52:31even though it went through the ultimate standing
- 52:33analysis. It did note that perhaps the wrong
- 52:36order was ultimately at issue in the appeal,
- 52:39but nonetheless was still able to issue a decision.
- 52:43So that kind of leads us to what the question
- 52:46presented before the Supreme Court is now, which
- 52:49is exactly where trans union left off, which
- 52:52is whether a court can certify a class. under
- 52:5623B3 when only some members of the proposed class
- 53:00lack any Article 3 injury. The argument was based
- 53:04on the fact that the underlying classes that
- 53:07were certified included individuals that may
- 53:09not have wanted to use the kiosk. Some of those
- 53:13individuals may not have suffered harm and they
- 53:16were part of the ultimate class, but the district
- 53:19court was able to certify the class. And it's
- 53:24also interesting because standing wasn't actually
- 53:25raised at the district court level in terms of
- 53:28opposing class certification. So the Supreme
- 53:33Court just heard oral arguments a few weeks ago.
- 53:36If you want to listen to it, it's available.
- 53:39It's pretty interesting because the attorney
- 53:42for LabCorp kind of begins his argument, framing
- 53:45some of the issues as really whether Article
- 53:493 prevents a district court from certifying a
- 53:52class that contains uninjured class members.
- 53:56And the justices immediately jump in and want
- 54:00to talk about this procedural issue. I think
- 54:03it was Justice Thomas, like a minute into the
- 54:07oral argument. says that there's a number of
- 54:09orders, and it seems like the only one that's
- 54:12before us is this May order, which is now inoperative.
- 54:15So why do we have jurisdiction? And they spent
- 54:18quite a bit of time going back and forth on this
- 54:20jurisdictional issue. And Justice Sotomayor also
- 54:26chimed in and said that wouldn't this be an advisory
- 54:30opinion if we were to rule on this issue because
- 54:33the May order is not inoperative. So it's kind
- 54:37of interesting that that was the focus at least
- 54:39of the first half of oral argument rather than
- 54:42getting to the ultimate heart of the question.
- 54:44And it will be interesting to see if the Supreme
- 54:47Court actually reaches this issue. A lot of commentators
- 54:52have said, maybe not, but others have said that
- 54:55the Supreme Court was likely aware of this issue
- 54:57based on the Ninth Circuit's ruling and that
- 55:00there's an interest to resolve the circuit board
- 55:02split in terms of when you have to demonstrate
- 55:05Article 3 scanning and if you have to prove it
- 55:08at certification for a damages class. So, you
- 55:11know, maybe they'll get past that jurisdictional
- 55:14issue and actually reach some merits. But some
- 55:16people say that it looks like they might use
- 55:19that to kind of punt getting to the merits altogether.
- 55:22So an interesting procedural wrinkle that that
- 55:25perhaps might defer the Supreme Court from resolving
- 55:30the circuit court split. And then the other issue,
- 55:34too, is kind of the justice's questioning of
- 55:38LabCorp's position. And so I think Justice Sotomayor
- 55:42was part of the dissenting opinion in TransUnion,
- 55:45and she points out that class actions are fluid,
- 55:49and this is a quote from that oral argument transcript,
- 55:52and that it's not until the judgments enter that
- 55:54you actually have to determine whether they're
- 55:57there's a way to identify who's been injured
- 55:59and who's been not. So she was really framing
- 56:02separating out potentially uninjured members
- 56:06from a certified class as really being a Rule
- 56:0823 issue at trial and not necessarily a jurisdictional
- 56:13issue. And I think she even said that we have
- 56:16jurisdiction or arguments. She's like, we have
- 56:19some named plaintiffs that have been harmed that
- 56:22are part of the class. And the issue is is a
- 56:27way is do we have a way to identify and differentiate
- 56:30between those those that were harmed and those
- 56:32that were not in terms of ultimately awarding
- 56:35damages at trial and that's really a rule 23
- 56:37issue so um it's to be said kind of how the supreme
- 56:42court will ultimately rule if they do ultimately
- 56:46reach the merits it could provide some uniformity
- 56:49certainly if they answer the question and the
- 56:51affirmative um or I guess in the negative that
- 56:55you can't certify a class unless you all of the
- 57:00class members showing that they were injured,
- 57:04that that could potentially increase the burden
- 57:06on plaintiffs. It could certainly make it much
- 57:10more difficult to move for class certification
- 57:12in terms of how you're defining your class. So
- 57:15it will be interesting what they ultimately decide
- 57:18and if they actually reach that issue given kind
- 57:21of the procedural wrinkle that's before them.
- 57:24I think they're supposed to issue an opinion
- 57:26before the end of the term. So probably in the
- 57:28next couple months we'll definitely be keeping
- 57:30an eye out for that and seeing how it continues
- 57:33to define the contours of this ever -changing
- 57:36area. of law. And I think I have a couple minutes
- 57:41for some questions if there are any. Let me see
- 57:46if I can jump out of here. So let me see if there's
- 57:49any questions that we have. I don't think anyone
- 57:54asked any questions, actually. If anyone wants,
- 57:58I know I kind of. listed some cases that might
- 58:00not have been in the slides. So if you want those
- 58:03citations or you want any more information on
- 58:06this topic, you can definitely email me. I think
- 58:09I put my email on the last slide. Always happy
- 58:12to chat about these issues and provide you with
- 58:14those citations and any other legal questions
- 58:17you might have on this issue. I think the big
- 58:19takeaway is, at least for now, in the Ninth Circuit,
- 58:24certainly, you don't have to establish individual
- 58:27damages as to all class members at certification.
- 58:31It really is reserved for trial and when you
- 58:33get to the damages award phase. So until the
- 58:37Supreme Court, if and when they they make this
- 58:40ruling, if they're even able to, I don't know
- 58:43that it's going to impact the timing of kind
- 58:47of establishing Article 3 standing as to absent
- 58:51class members. And another thing that I think
- 58:54I didn't touch on that's relevant to this is
- 58:57that, you know, as the burden on plaintiffs gets
- 59:02higher in terms of of establishing standing,
- 59:05particularly in the consumer class action arena,
- 59:08that that's going to probably drive many cases
- 59:10to state court. I do think it's interesting,
- 59:14you know, if there are questions on standing
- 59:18and if you have a statutory violation, but you
- 59:21might not be sure that there's standing, filing
- 59:25it in state court and then waiting for the defendant
- 59:27to remove. And then at that point, the defendant's
- 59:30the one seeking federal jurisdiction and the
- 59:33burdens on them to prove standing. And then at
- 59:35least you could get remanded back down to state
- 59:37court versus potentially litigating a case for
- 59:42a year in court suespante, raising the issue
- 59:45of Article 3 standing and dismissing the case.
- 59:48So there's always that kind of decision to be
- 59:52made in terms of where to initially file the
- 59:54case. So state court's always an option there.
- 59:59But yeah, that's the end. I appreciate everyone
- 1:00:01spending this hour with me. And like I said,
- 1:00:04if you have any questions, feel free to reach
- 1:00:06out. And thank you to the Beverly Hills Bar Association
- 1:00:10for letting me speak on this topic. You may be
- 1:00:12eligible for CLE credit in your state. Visit
- 1:00:15bhba .org slash podcasts for more information.