Latest / The Team House / Are Iranian Sleeper Cells Already in the U.S.? | EYES ON GEOPOLITICS
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- 0:42Speaker 1: to another episode of Eyes on Geopolitics, a midweek episode.
- 0:46Speaker 1: It's been busy around here, so might as well do
- 0:48Speaker 1: an extra episode a week. We have Jack Murphy for
- 0:51Speaker 1: our resident Irishman, so happy Saint Patrick's Day to everybody
- 0:54Speaker 1: who celebrates. Jonathan Hackett and Andy Milburn. Lot going on
- 1:00Speaker 1: as usual. We just saw yes just like update like
- 1:04Speaker 1: terms of news, we saw the Defense Ministry get smoked
- 1:08Speaker 1: uh in Iran yesterday or last night, I guess they
- 1:11Speaker 1: they confirmed it. We have a bunch of news actually
- 1:16Speaker 1: that happened, and we didn't talk about this before him,
- 1:18Speaker 1: but we just saw Joe Kent, the he's like head
- 1:21Speaker 1: of CT resign and say because of the Iran war
- 1:26Speaker 1: and that Israel basically dog walked us in. I really
- 1:32Speaker 1: wanted to talk about because I've seen it like popping
- 1:35Speaker 1: up in the press and like actually talking to like
- 1:37Speaker 1: regular people that are like a lot of people are
- 1:39Speaker 1: worried about like a possible like Iranian sleeper cell attack
- 1:43Speaker 1: or or hesbla sleeper cell attack, and I wanted to
- 1:47Speaker 1: talk to the experts to see like what the actual
- 1:49Speaker 1: like is it actually possible? Is there a real threat?
- 1:53Speaker 1: We've seen a couple three actually attacks, one in a
- 1:57Speaker 1: synagogue that was a Lebanese person who's whose family died.
- 2:00Speaker 1: He rammed into the synagogue and killed a few people.
- 2:04Speaker 1: We also saw the tech the Austin shooter and the
- 2:08Speaker 1: uh what was what for? Was he at what? There's
- 2:12Speaker 1: another guy too that shot up a bunch of people
- 2:14Speaker 1: and then the cadets stabbed.
- 2:15Speaker 2: Them and killed them in university and yeah, there you go.
- 2:19Speaker 1: So we've seen like these lone wolfs. As far as
- 2:21Speaker 1: we know, it's a lone wolf attack, not like these
- 2:24Speaker 1: organized where they could trace it back to like a
- 2:27Speaker 1: sleeper cell, you know, Iranian intelligence or hesbola. So I
- 2:32Speaker 1: have the experts here, So you guys tell me how
- 2:35Speaker 1: how much how at risk are we in the United States?
- 2:40Speaker 2: I can go first few on. So I was a
- 2:41Speaker 2: counter intelligence agent. This is exactly the kind of stuff
- 2:43Speaker 2: we looked at both inside the US and against our
- 2:45Speaker 2: allies and partners as well. And counter intelligence always looks
- 2:49Speaker 2: through the eyes of the adversary, which we call red,
- 2:51Speaker 2: to understand the red's perception of blue, which is the
- 2:54Speaker 2: friendly forces. So in this situation, and I'm looking through
- 2:56Speaker 2: the eyes of hesbolla to think about how do they
- 2:58Speaker 2: want to do stuff inside this country? And they have
- 3:01Speaker 2: people here, they have ideas, they have goals that they
- 3:05Speaker 2: want to achieve. But there's a missing ingredient for any threat,
- 3:08Speaker 2: and that is capability. So they could have intent all
- 3:12Speaker 2: day long, they can dream about these big plans, but
- 3:14Speaker 2: if they don't have the capability to do it, it's
- 3:16Speaker 2: very low threat, right. So that's what we're always looking
- 3:19Speaker 2: for from the exploitation side and the neutralization side as
- 3:22Speaker 2: far as counter intelligence is concerned. That's what the FBI
- 3:24Speaker 2: is going to be looking at right now, is Okay,
- 3:26Speaker 2: they have the intent. Not much we can do about that.
- 3:28Speaker 2: You can't kill an idea, but we can reduce capability
- 3:31Speaker 2: on their side, or we can look at the things
- 3:33Speaker 2: they might be interested in and get ahead of them
- 3:35Speaker 2: so that when they go try to use those capabilities
- 3:37Speaker 2: they don't work out the way they expected them to.
- 3:39Speaker 2: This is kind of a basic level to look at
- 3:40Speaker 2: this picture. When we talk about sleeper cells, it's important
- 3:44Speaker 2: to find what does that mean, because, like you mentioned d,
- 3:48Speaker 2: there might be an inspired lone wolf that just doesn't attack.
- 3:51Speaker 2: That's not a sleeper cell. Sleeper cell, but definitily is
- 3:54Speaker 2: a much deeper, long term thing where the person was
- 3:57Speaker 2: sent there way ahead of time with a very simple
- 4:00Speaker 2: mission statement, and they remain quiet and integrated into the community,
- 4:04Speaker 2: working in that community like a normal person for a
- 4:05Speaker 2: long time until they receive some form of activation to
- 4:08Speaker 2: do whatever it is the task was that they were
- 4:09Speaker 2: sent there to do. That means that years, many years
- 4:13Speaker 2: in some cases, that they have to be doing this.
- 4:15Speaker 2: The mission has to be very simple because things will
- 4:18Speaker 2: change over time, and if you give them too detailed
- 4:19Speaker 2: of a mission, that mission might not even exist, that
- 4:22Speaker 2: capability might not exist in the future when they're activated.
- 4:24Speaker 2: And that's important to think about now because this is
- 4:26Speaker 2: kind of a black Swan situation where the way the
- 4:29Speaker 2: US and Israel are attacking Iran, that's very difficult to
- 4:31Speaker 2: predict when and how that would have happened. It could
- 4:33Speaker 2: have just been something like if there is a war
- 4:35Speaker 2: in Iran, do x It might be something this simple,
- 4:39Speaker 2: and the individual that is a sleeper would not be
- 4:42Speaker 2: sent there alone. They wouldn't know the others in the network,
- 4:45Speaker 2: but they would not be alone. And this means there's
- 4:48Speaker 2: compartmentalization that has to happen, and there has to be
- 4:50Speaker 2: a handle or overhead that's actually helping to coordinate the
- 4:52Speaker 2: activities of these individuals. So that introduces another layer of complexity.
- 4:56Speaker 2: And we have seen how Iran has done things in
- 4:59Speaker 2: Unit States in the past, and also compared to other countries,
- 5:02Speaker 2: it's very different than how they operate in the United States.
- 5:04Speaker 2: I can get into official and non official activities they've done,
- 5:07Speaker 2: especially using business cover for commercial activity, cover what they're
- 5:11Speaker 2: doing in the United States, but on the whole They've
- 5:15Speaker 2: been pretty amateur in the United States. And it's not
- 5:17Speaker 2: because they just suck. It's because their capability level, like
- 5:21Speaker 2: I mentioned earlier, is low for a variety of reasons,
- 5:25Speaker 2: not least of which is it's difficult for a handler
- 5:27Speaker 2: to get into the United States, which means they typically
- 5:28Speaker 2: have to communicate over distance through phones or other electronic means,
- 5:32Speaker 2: or through non non personal communications like leaving notes somewhere
- 5:36Speaker 2: or something like this. That's a limitation on their capability.
- 5:39Speaker 2: It's a limitation on what they can actually achieve when
- 5:40Speaker 2: they're here. The other problem is money. They're not part
- 5:43Speaker 2: of the swift banking system they have in Bens in
- 5:45Speaker 2: twenty eighteen, so they either have to use it a
- 5:47Speaker 2: huala or some kind of other activity to conceal the
- 5:50Speaker 2: origin of the money they're using to pay for these activities.
- 5:52Speaker 2: There is an example on in twenty eleven where it
- 5:54Speaker 2: was around two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. They were
- 5:56Speaker 2: trying to pay to a cartel member to give a
- 5:58Speaker 2: weapon to a gentleman in Texas who was supposed to
- 6:00Speaker 2: go assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, d C. The
- 6:04Speaker 2: cartel member said Hey, I'm a cartel guy. I'm going
- 6:07Speaker 2: to go tell the DEA that this is going on
- 6:08Speaker 2: because I don't want to be involved in your own
- 6:10Speaker 2: And that's actually how the US found out about that,
- 6:12Speaker 2: which is kind of interesting, and that was a very
- 6:15Speaker 2: expensive operation that just evaporated because the capability was so low.
- 6:19Speaker 2: I'll stop there at that kind of functional level and
- 6:21Speaker 2: we can talk more about it. But that's how I
- 6:22Speaker 2: would kind of like set the frame around this discussion.
- 6:26Speaker 3: Yeah, I think that's a great frame too, John. The
- 6:28Speaker 3: question of capability is so important. And another example I
- 6:32Speaker 3: would make to people that demonstrates where there was a capability,
- 6:35Speaker 3: a surprising capability even was when the Russians began the
- 6:39Speaker 3: full scale invasion of Ukraine and these sabotage cells suddenly
- 6:43Speaker 3: activated across Russia. You saw military infrastructure, oil infrastructure really
- 6:49Speaker 3: across the breadth of the country.
- 6:52Speaker 4: Going up in flames.
- 6:54Speaker 3: So there was an intelligence or intelligent entity or entities
- 6:59Speaker 3: that absolutely had a capability. I mean they had the
- 7:02Speaker 3: people in place, but they had the capability, meaning there
- 7:05Speaker 3: was pre plane targets, targeting packets were done up, and
- 7:09Speaker 3: there were cachet site locations full of explosives and those
- 7:12Speaker 3: cells were activated through some sort of covert communications method
- 7:16Speaker 3: or cove com. So that's one example of you know,
- 7:20Speaker 3: where where you see a capability doesn't come out of nowhere.
- 7:24Speaker 3: So when you see a bunch of strikes like that happening,
- 7:26Speaker 3: it lends itself to the safe assumption that there is
- 7:31Speaker 3: an intelligent entity behind this. It's not lone wolves, it's
- 7:35Speaker 3: not you know, it's not just dissident groups. I mean,
- 7:39Speaker 3: dissident groups don't come out of nowhere with a capability
- 7:42Speaker 3: like that. It takes them time to evolve and find
- 7:45Speaker 3: their way with those things. So that's one interesting example
- 7:49Speaker 3: to look at. The other I was mentioned into John
- 7:52Speaker 3: before the show was the and we get into a
- 7:55Speaker 3: little bit in detail, but the book Burnbomb Destroy about
- 8:00Speaker 3: the German sleeper cells that were here during World War
- 8:02Speaker 3: One conducting acts of sabotage, also quite amateurish, but it
- 8:08Speaker 3: evolved over time, and they used incendiary devices, probably not
- 8:13Speaker 3: that different than the stuff that the cells in Russia used,
- 8:16Speaker 3: you know, one hundred years later to destroy ships, you know,
- 8:21Speaker 3: ships that were on their way to Europe. And when
- 8:24Speaker 3: it really got effective again this question of capability was
- 8:29Speaker 3: when you're using sleepers, you're using a surrogate force or
- 8:32Speaker 3: something of this nature. I've had a CIA officer describe
- 8:35Speaker 3: it to me because he tried to he did do
- 8:37Speaker 3: this in Afghanistan. He's like, imagine trying to play pool
- 8:41Speaker 3: and you're sitting on top of overturned trash can ten
- 8:44Speaker 3: feet away from the pool table, and you got like
- 8:47Speaker 3: three queues that are like duct taped together, and you're
- 8:49Speaker 3: like trying to like hit the hit the ball and
- 8:52Speaker 3: knock the eight ball in the corner pocket. He's like,
- 8:54Speaker 3: that's kind of what you're trying to do. The further
- 8:56Speaker 3: away from it you are, the harder it becomes to
- 8:58Speaker 3: control those operations. With the German case, you know, they
- 9:04Speaker 3: became effective once they got a no shit German intelligence
- 9:07Speaker 3: officer into the country to start coordinating and running some
- 9:10Speaker 3: of that stuff. And then that brings us to more
- 9:15Speaker 3: current situation with Iran and are their sleeper cells in
- 9:19Speaker 3: the United States Just a couple of things to tag
- 9:22Speaker 3: on to what John already illuminated there. There's one case
- 9:28Speaker 3: back in the nineteen nineties. I just had to look
- 9:31Speaker 3: it up to get the name right. It was Captain
- 9:33Speaker 3: Will Rogers three. The skipper of the USS Vincennes in
- 9:38Speaker 3: San Diego, there was a bomb found in his van,
- 9:42Speaker 3: and to this day, I don't think it's ever been
- 9:44Speaker 3: fully explained what that was about. There's thoughts in the
- 9:49Speaker 3: intelligence community or there has been over the years that
- 9:51Speaker 3: that was an Iranian plot. But the Iranians also whack
- 9:55Speaker 3: people globally. I mean, they're not like cautious about that
- 9:59Speaker 3: there is an Iran and op And I'm just saying
- 10:02Speaker 3: in Europe that the bomb didn't go off, but when
- 10:06Speaker 3: they deconstructed it, it was a very advanced bomb. It
- 10:10Speaker 3: shocked a lot of people in the security community in Europe.
- 10:15Speaker 3: So the Iranians don't have a lot of hesitation with
- 10:17Speaker 3: this sort of stuff. But now, you know, are these
- 10:21Speaker 3: cells in the United States? And I think I think
- 10:24Speaker 3: we have some pretty good proof that they aren't, that
- 10:27Speaker 3: those cells just don't exist. After the Solemani strike, you
- 10:31Speaker 3: would have expected something to have cooked off, And now we're,
- 10:35Speaker 3: you know, bombing the hell out of Iran and fixing
- 10:39Speaker 3: the due potentially a ground invasion. I mean, if the
- 10:41Speaker 3: Iranians are not activating those cells now, then explain to
- 10:45Speaker 3: me what the trigger is, because they're already in an
- 10:48Speaker 3: existential crisis right now. I mean, they're not going to
- 10:51Speaker 3: topple easily. But if not now, then when that's that
- 10:54Speaker 3: would be my question, And I think that's sort of
- 10:57Speaker 3: the counterfactual. You could look at this to try to
- 11:00Speaker 3: determine if these cells even exist. I would say they
- 11:02Speaker 3: probably don't. However, there are people in this country. They
- 11:07Speaker 3: could be lone wolves, they could be you know, support agents,
- 11:11Speaker 3: people who are sympathetic towards the Iranian regime who take
- 11:14Speaker 3: action on their own or maybe at direction from you know,
- 11:18Speaker 3: back back in Iran. One thing that I was told
- 11:22Speaker 3: about just yesterday is a bunch of suspicious packages have
- 11:25Speaker 3: been showing up at McDill Air Force Base, directed towards
- 11:30Speaker 3: Sentcom Central Command. The FBI is investigating this, they're involved.
- 11:35Speaker 3: I have not heard that an actual bomb has turned
- 11:37Speaker 3: up yet, but I mean this could even just be
- 11:40Speaker 3: a psychological operation to send packages that look like bombs
- 11:44Speaker 3: to just you know, get people on the base, you know,
- 11:47Speaker 3: cautious or afraid. So we'll see what happens with that.
- 11:53Speaker 3: I don't know what's uh, John, is anything I'm missing
- 11:56Speaker 3: here that you'd like to elaborate on.
- 11:59Speaker 2: I just want to kind of pull on a thread
- 12:01Speaker 2: that you mentioned. You mentioned sabotage and a couple of
- 12:03Speaker 2: things like this, and again from that counterintelligence framework, So
- 12:06Speaker 2: there are four types of attacks we'd be looking for
- 12:09Speaker 2: from a potential sleeper element like you're mentioning, and those
- 12:12Speaker 2: attacks would be against certain types of targets, right because
- 12:15Speaker 2: you're trying to achieve some objective by doing this thing.
- 12:17Speaker 2: The four types of targets are persons, organizations, installations, and
- 12:21Speaker 2: then people generally, and there's a specific type of attack
- 12:24Speaker 2: that targets each one of these. So, for example, attacks
- 12:27Speaker 2: against persons are typically espionage related, attacks against organizations are
- 12:31Speaker 2: subversion related. Then against installations it's sabotage. Then against people
- 12:36Speaker 2: or other things to get terrorism as that kind of
- 12:38Speaker 2: catch all at the end. But when we're trying to
- 12:40Speaker 2: protect against these things to produce that capability I was
- 12:42Speaker 2: talking about, you know, like you mentioned, there might be
- 12:44Speaker 2: a low moul or even a person in contact with
- 12:46Speaker 2: some goods forced guy overseas. They could have that intent
- 12:49Speaker 2: all day long. But if we can actually go after
- 12:51Speaker 2: the persons, organizations, and installations to defend those those categories,
- 12:55Speaker 2: we can more precisely protect them. So even if the
- 12:58Speaker 2: adversary had some really good intent and maybe even a
- 13:01Speaker 2: little bit of capability, the target suddenly becomes too hard
- 13:04Speaker 2: to strike and they're going to have to flow around
- 13:05Speaker 2: it and go somewhere else. So this is kind of
- 13:07Speaker 2: the thing we look at when we're trying to preemptively
- 13:09Speaker 2: neutralize these activities is evaluating our own installations, like McDill
- 13:13Speaker 2: Air Force Base, for example. We'd be thinking about how
- 13:16Speaker 2: the vehicles get in on the base, how to packages
- 13:18Speaker 2: go around here, like where are the cameras? All these
- 13:20Speaker 2: things to get these things already ahead of time. So
- 13:22Speaker 2: if something like this comes up, the person approaching their
- 13:24Speaker 2: vehicle already understands how to evaluate their vehicle before getting
- 13:27Speaker 2: into it due to heightened threat environment situations for example.
- 13:31Speaker 2: So these are the things to keep in the back
- 13:33Speaker 2: of the mind as a person evaluating what are these
- 13:36Speaker 2: actual threats and what is the actual capability. And I'll
- 13:38Speaker 2: mention the Bojinka plot, which was a pre al Qaeda
- 13:42Speaker 2: type plot in the nineteen nineties that college Sai Muhammad
- 13:45Speaker 2: and some others were planning to bring a bunch of
- 13:47Speaker 2: aircraft and crash them into buildings, which sounds a lot
- 13:49Speaker 2: like September eleventh, but this was before September eleventh. The
- 13:52Speaker 2: reason they weren't able to do that they had a
- 13:54Speaker 2: really good plan, excellent ideas, and a lot of intent,
- 13:58Speaker 2: that they had almost no capability to do it. It
- 14:00Speaker 2: wasn't until later on that they actually shifted their operations
- 14:03Speaker 2: to be able to have the capability years later in
- 14:05Speaker 2: two thousand and one, to actually execute such a threat
- 14:07Speaker 2: with the capability required to do it. And I only
- 14:10Speaker 2: highlight that because the intent didn't change the entire time.
- 14:13Speaker 2: What did change was their ability and the opportunity to
- 14:16Speaker 2: do that attack.
- 14:19Speaker 3: Just one more thing I'd like to touch upon here
- 14:22Speaker 3: with the nature of sleeper cells, potentially especially sleeper cells
- 14:27Speaker 3: from an authoritarian regime that are placed under cover in
- 14:29Speaker 3: a country like the United States.
- 14:32Speaker 4: There were a few.
- 14:33Speaker 3: The Soviets didn't have as many as we probably thought
- 14:35Speaker 3: they did, but at the end of the Cold War
- 14:37Speaker 3: it was revealed that they did have some sleeper agents.
- 14:41Speaker 3: In the Milt Bearden's book The Main Enemy, he talks
- 14:43Speaker 3: about one of them, a check guy, who they had
- 14:46Speaker 3: placed in the United States, and after the Wall came down,
- 14:50Speaker 3: I think I believe he came forward. If I remember correctly,
- 14:54Speaker 3: and he had just integrated into the community, like he
- 14:58Speaker 3: had a family, he had like kid playing in Little
- 15:01Speaker 3: League baseball and this sort of stuff. And he was like, yeah,
- 15:04Speaker 3: I have like this trunk of like rusty military gear
- 15:07Speaker 3: in my basement if you guys want to come get it, Like,
- 15:10Speaker 3: I don't give a fuck. And I think this is
- 15:13Speaker 3: a problem too with that a country like a Ran
- 15:15Speaker 3: would have you send sleepers to the United States when
- 15:19Speaker 3: they're here for a prolonged period of time building their
- 15:22Speaker 3: cover and building their capabilities, unless they are the most
- 15:26Speaker 3: hardcore ideological dude, they are going to start finding a woman,
- 15:31Speaker 3: They're gonna get a job, they're gonna have kids, the
- 15:34Speaker 3: kids are gonna get into school, and then when that
- 15:37Speaker 3: activation code finally comes thirty years later, they're like, do
- 15:41Speaker 3: I really want to like screw up my whole life
- 15:43Speaker 3: here and end up in a supermax for the rest
- 15:45Speaker 3: of my rest of my days because this authoritarian regime
- 15:50Speaker 3: that doesn't give a shit about me wants me to
- 15:53Speaker 3: go and kill a bunch of innocent people. So I
- 15:56Speaker 3: think that's another dynamic that comes into play when you're
- 15:59Speaker 3: trying to use sleeper agents.
- 16:02Speaker 2: Actually jack on that. So even not just sleep agents,
- 16:04Speaker 2: but embassy personnel from these countries. I was doing a
- 16:07Speaker 2: lot of work in North Africa to the US embassies there,
- 16:09Speaker 2: and there were a few North Korean diplomats that in
- 16:12Speaker 2: the countries that have North Korean embassies there in Northwest Africa.
- 16:16Speaker 2: Those diplomats are not allowed to return back to Pyongyang ever,
- 16:19Speaker 2: they have to rotate around the embassies in Northwest Africa
- 16:22Speaker 2: because the government au oritarian government is worried about the
- 16:25Speaker 2: exposure they've had to things like alcohol and parties and
- 16:28Speaker 2: restaurants and freedom even in Northwest Africa, to the extent
- 16:32Speaker 2: that they will not allow them to return back to
- 16:35Speaker 2: rotate back to the mainland.
- 16:38Speaker 4: That's crazy.
- 16:39Speaker 3: What I'd heard is that the embassy personnel from North
- 16:43Speaker 3: Korea have to travel around in threes. It would make
- 16:46Speaker 3: Detroit play, yeah, to make it impossible for the agency
- 16:50Speaker 3: for CIA.
- 16:50Speaker 4: To recruit them.
- 16:51Speaker 2: We have the same thing with the Chinese as well.
- 16:53Speaker 2: When I was in the Defense Attache staff, the Russians
- 16:56Speaker 2: would always come in a group of three the Troika.
- 16:58Speaker 2: The Chinese would always be in a group of three,
- 17:00Speaker 2: and we wouldn't interact with the North Koreans. But they
- 17:02Speaker 2: also would, and so would the Iranians because they know themselves,
- 17:05Speaker 2: the government knows that this is going to happen.
- 17:08Speaker 3: Right, Is this like mutually assured destruction. Everyone's spying on
- 17:11Speaker 3: everyone else.
- 17:14Speaker 2: They had to go to the bathroom in three's at
- 17:15Speaker 2: any events that we were at.
- 17:19Speaker 4: It's wild.
- 17:20Speaker 5: Thanks to me and you guys.
- 17:21Speaker 1: And restart what you were saying. I apologize you were muted?
- 17:25Speaker 5: Am I muted in?
- 17:26Speaker 1: Now you're good? Now you're good?
- 17:29Speaker 2: Now?
- 17:29Speaker 5: Do you customarily mute meet during these.
- 17:31Speaker 1: Up are yelling at Richie?
- 17:33Speaker 5: Oh okay, all right, yeah, so you know, going getting
- 17:38Speaker 5: back to to Iran though, I mean, I think and
- 17:42Speaker 5: and John you know way more about this than I do.
- 17:44Speaker 5: But you know, this term sleeper cells sounds sexy. It's
- 17:49Speaker 5: it evokes Hollywood. It evokes that mini series, you know,
- 17:53Speaker 5: the Netflix. I think it's a Netflix mini series about
- 17:55Speaker 5: Russian sleeper cells, but I think it's fed a salmon.
- 17:59Speaker 5: That's not the way that the Ranians operate. They can't
- 18:01Speaker 5: afford to operate that way, as you know, as Jack
- 18:03Speaker 5: pointed out, what put a cell into the United States
- 18:07Speaker 5: and with the instructions to act if a war comes,
- 18:12Speaker 5: you know, if war occurs. I mean, neither cou'sforce nor
- 18:15Speaker 5: has BOLLA has that kind of resources. Although and that's
- 18:20Speaker 5: just not that modus operati, right, I mean, they plan
- 18:23Speaker 5: for specific operations, and they insert people for those operations,
- 18:27Speaker 5: but they don't send people to the United States for
- 18:31Speaker 5: two or three decades and have them integrate in the
- 18:33Speaker 5: American society, apply for green cards and residents. All of
- 18:37Speaker 5: this just on the contingency that something might happen. And
- 18:41Speaker 5: I think, you know, although it's say it, there's another
- 18:46Speaker 5: factor to this, right or the gain. I mean, although
- 18:49Speaker 5: this is a super sexy topic that's likely to get
- 18:51Speaker 5: everyone's attention, if you are planning this from an Iranian perspective,
- 18:56Speaker 5: domestic attacks within the United States are actually a relatively
- 19:00Speaker 5: hard target. You've got plenty of softer targets spread out
- 19:04Speaker 5: across not just Middle East, but globally. US interests, overseas,
- 19:09Speaker 5: diplomatic missions, military bases as we've seen. You know, even
- 19:14Speaker 5: military bases that should be hardened in the Middle East
- 19:18Speaker 5: are still subject to attack from from the Uranians, where
- 19:21Speaker 5: they can cause casualties without all the planning and everything
- 19:24Speaker 5: else involved in putting action cells within within the US.
- 19:29Speaker 5: So you know, i'd say that there's there's just no chart,
- 19:32Speaker 5: I mean, very little chance of a Hollywood sleeper cell
- 19:35Speaker 5: type scenario. And what we've seen historically a small targeted
- 19:39Speaker 5: networks you know, that are that are that are put
- 19:43Speaker 5: in for a specific mission, and we've kind of the
- 19:48Speaker 5: other thing is I think we kind of conflated. And
- 19:50Speaker 5: I like to give your thoughts on this, John Iranian
- 19:54Speaker 5: direct Granian action, which would be Kup's force, right, which
- 19:57Speaker 5: is the Forron six Stone operations, arm I gcs except
- 20:01Speaker 5: and and proxies like Hesbala Hosbala does have and overseas
- 20:08Speaker 5: you know, a section that's focused on overseas operations, and
- 20:11Speaker 5: I forget what it's called. It's like the i JO
- 20:14Speaker 5: or something. John, You'll probably probably know that Islamic organization. Yeah,
- 20:20Speaker 5: but they but as far as I mean, there was
- 20:24Speaker 5: an attempt to attack on the Saudi ambassador right back
- 20:27Speaker 5: in twenty eleven. But aside from that, we've seen mainly
- 20:30Speaker 5: you know, fundraising, logistics, procurement, that's kind of things that
- 20:34Speaker 5: they focus on mostly, and and and integration with criminal
- 20:39Speaker 5: networks in the Western hemisphere. That's a great point, actually
- 20:43Speaker 5: seems to me. I'm sorry, it just seems to make
- 20:46Speaker 5: just go ahead, Jim.
- 20:49Speaker 2: I was just gonna mention the financial thing you're talking about.
- 20:51Speaker 2: So Latin America, in particular, Brazil, for example, has six
- 20:55Speaker 2: million Lebanese people. There's almost as many Lebanese people in
- 20:57Speaker 2: Brazil as there are in Lebanon, and of them are
- 21:00Speaker 2: either Druze or Shia descendants from Lebanese diaspora. And Hesbola's
- 21:05Speaker 2: main source of money, even though the regime pays them
- 21:07Speaker 2: a lot of money, their main source of money is
- 21:09Speaker 2: drug sales, and a lot of those drugs are from
- 21:11Speaker 2: South America, especially cocaine being sold in Africa, and Dakar,
- 21:15Speaker 2: Senegal is the main entry point into all the entire
- 21:17Speaker 2: continent of Africa from Latin America, which is a Hesbola
- 21:21Speaker 2: controlled throughway. And actually in Dakar, Senegal, there's a big
- 21:24Speaker 2: Hesbula problem, and there's absolute Iranian embassy right down the
- 21:27Speaker 2: street from the Hesbela house that they live in. Our
- 21:29Speaker 2: team house was across the street from where the Hesbola
- 21:31Speaker 2: house was when I was there, and it's a very
- 21:33Speaker 2: interesting little microcosm of what they're trying to do to
- 21:36Speaker 2: fund themselves, and part of the reason they have this
- 21:38Speaker 2: Islamic Jihad organization, even though the name of it sounds
- 21:41Speaker 2: like an ideological thing, is actually more of a force
- 21:42Speaker 2: protection asset to protect the money and drugs moving back
- 21:46Speaker 2: and forth between these nodes, to make sure that people
- 21:48Speaker 2: aren't going to steal it or do something to it
- 21:51Speaker 2: so they can bring it to the Middle East. Saudi
- 21:53Speaker 2: Arabia is a huge purchaser of these drugs, so was Syria.
- 21:56Speaker 2: We had a thing in Lebanon when I was there
- 21:58Speaker 2: where we had an aircraft that was a Saudi prince's
- 22:00Speaker 2: aircraft that is full of ecstasy pills that has bulahead manufactured,
- 22:03Speaker 2: and this disc prince was selling them and we found
- 22:07Speaker 2: it on his aircraft even though it was diplated or dipnoted.
- 22:10Speaker 2: And these drug networks require a lot of strong arm muscle,
- 22:14Speaker 2: including these overseas operatives who may be trained to protect
- 22:17Speaker 2: the stuff, but could also be activated and turned to
- 22:20Speaker 2: do other things like we were talking about earlier. They
- 22:22Speaker 2: could do sabotage, they could do subversion, they could conduct
- 22:25Speaker 2: terrorism if they need to, especially because they have these
- 22:27Speaker 2: networks that can already move in between in and out
- 22:29Speaker 2: of between these different countries, especially into Latin America.
- 22:31Speaker 3: Yeah, we just I was into Karn like twenty thirteen.
- 22:35Speaker 3: Have a nice new embassy we just built there right now,
- 22:39Speaker 3: significant significant Lebanese population in that country.
- 22:42Speaker 5: But I would guess, I don't know, I would guess
- 22:45Speaker 5: his Balla's external operations capability is likely being degraded compared
- 22:50Speaker 5: to about a decade ago. I mean largely because of
- 22:54Speaker 5: I mean series to be a key hub for moving
- 22:56Speaker 5: people in equipment and a cool set. Environments become much
- 22:59Speaker 5: more content tested and and Asbola has has its own
- 23:03Speaker 5: problems on its hands in in Lebanon itself. You know,
- 23:07Speaker 5: I just again, it just seems to me are far fetched,
- 23:12Speaker 5: but but attention grabbing topic, that is, that has surfaced
- 23:18Speaker 5: without any foundation and uh in in uh in in
- 23:23Speaker 5: in fact, right, I'm not I'm not dismissing the risk,
- 23:27Speaker 5: and of course it's always a risk, but minimal compared
- 23:31Speaker 5: to its real risks facing us, right like the collapse
- 23:36Speaker 5: of the global economy and uh and and and continued
- 23:42Speaker 5: attacks on on U S forces and interests and related
- 23:45Speaker 5: interest overseas.
- 23:49Speaker 3: So I mean, I don't know if we're ready to
- 23:51Speaker 3: shift gears, but I'd love to hear you two guys
- 23:54Speaker 3: opining about the MEW on its way to the Persian Gulf.
- 23:58Speaker 5: I was waiting for for for John to kick it off,
- 24:03Speaker 5: but I'm happy to happy to do so. Yeah, this
- 24:08Speaker 5: has been one of the one of the most important developments,
- 24:15Speaker 5: perhaps not the most of my attention grabbing developments are
- 24:18Speaker 5: in the last last week is the movement of a
- 24:21Speaker 5: Marine Expeditionary Unit, the thirty first Marine Expeditionary Unit out
- 24:25Speaker 5: of Okinawa a garden spot. Does those who spend any
- 24:29Speaker 5: time there?
- 24:30Speaker 2: No?
- 24:31Speaker 5: And why is that important? Well, thirty first MEW has
- 24:34Speaker 5: actually lower level of capability than the mews that are
- 24:40Speaker 5: based out of the United States. You know, I'm not
- 24:43Speaker 5: saying that it's a It's been known as a security
- 24:47Speaker 5: corporation view, right, I'm going to get beaten up by
- 24:50Speaker 5: thirty first MEW guys for saying that. But it's definitely
- 24:54Speaker 5: a lower level of capabilities. My point is it's an
- 24:57Speaker 5: odd choice if you are indeed plan to conduct raids.
- 25:01Speaker 5: It wouldn't necessarily I you know, it wouldn't be my
- 25:04Speaker 5: first choice of MEW. It's a four deployed amphibious landing force,
- 25:10Speaker 5: but it's very small. You'll hear a lot of talk
- 25:12Speaker 5: about two thousand marines, but actually those who go ashore
- 25:16Speaker 5: it's pretty near a twelve hundred, which is a relatively
- 25:20Speaker 5: very small So, you know, I think if they do
- 25:23Speaker 5: go ashore, it's going to be very quick. They're going
- 25:26Speaker 5: to hit specific targets, the raids, and then withdraw. They're
- 25:31Speaker 5: not going to invade Iran, which is what I've seen,
- 25:36Speaker 5: you know, And that's the problem, right you're here talk
- 25:38Speaker 5: about ground force and people don't understand the nuances. So
- 25:42Speaker 5: there's certainly the general public. So marine expedition units I
- 25:46Speaker 5: mentioned about two thousand marines, amphibious ships typically three or five.
- 25:51Speaker 5: They have helicopters, tilt rotor aircraft, limited aviation support, and
- 25:57Speaker 5: it's primarily for raids crisis for US sponse Straits of
- 26:03Speaker 5: Horror moves, potentially targeted raids within the Straits of Horror
- 26:10Speaker 5: moves the islands there because because as we've seen, you know,
- 26:17Speaker 5: you can't there's a couple of problems with the air campaign,
- 26:20Speaker 5: and I mean there are certain things that you that
- 26:24Speaker 5: as we've we've found out, hard to destroy, locate and destroy,
- 26:28Speaker 5: missile launchers being one of them, drones, faster tag boats
- 26:33Speaker 5: can be hidden, coastal radar and mines. You know, all
- 26:38Speaker 5: these things can be can be moved around quite easily.
- 26:41Speaker 5: And although we've seen very optimistic rejections about what we've destroyed,
- 26:46Speaker 5: the real truth is, as anyone who's dealt with battle
- 26:49Speaker 5: damage assessment knows, is that once you get past kind
- 26:52Speaker 5: of like an estimate of fifty percent pass part fifty
- 26:57Speaker 5: estimate that you destroy the enemy's capability, it's really difficult
- 27:01Speaker 5: to be precise about it. And the point here is,
- 27:05Speaker 5: at what point do we say the Strait of hor
- 27:06Speaker 5: Moose is open for traffic? Right, because unless we're really
- 27:11Speaker 5: sure we've eliminated the risk, Well, how are you sure
- 27:13Speaker 5: you eliminated the risk unless you put someone ashore to
- 27:16Speaker 5: do that kind of assessment, to conduct rates, to destroy
- 27:20Speaker 5: UH targeted operations, to destroy enemy infrastructure, and then and
- 27:26Speaker 5: then report it. So you know, I so I mentioned,
- 27:33Speaker 5: I mentioned missile launchers. There's on on these islands. There's
- 27:38Speaker 5: there's also potential for underground storage that of of missiles
- 27:43Speaker 5: and other weapons systems. Another another factor disrupting battle damage
- 27:49Speaker 5: assessment and the Gulf is undoubtedly the Ringians used decoys
- 27:53Speaker 5: and camouflage just the way that you know we would
- 27:56Speaker 5: and the way that Ukrainians have have continue to do
- 28:01Speaker 5: in that conflict. So what value do they bring? Okay,
- 28:09Speaker 5: why would we land them? Spell clear tunnel complexes, you
- 28:14Speaker 5: aside from the missile launches, destroy radar systems, eliminate drone
- 28:20Speaker 5: launch sites and confirmed targets and neutralize those are all things.
- 28:25Speaker 5: I know we're going to talk about separately the enriched
- 28:28Speaker 5: uranium problem. But if we're just talking about kind of
- 28:31Speaker 5: conventional targeting for raids in the Gulf, that's that's more
- 28:34Speaker 5: or less what we're talking about. And there's a series
- 28:36Speaker 5: of violence. John, I'm going to butcher the names, but
- 28:40Speaker 5: there's ab Abu Musa right, the one right at the
- 28:45Speaker 5: entrance to the strait. I think if we were, you know, normally,
- 28:49Speaker 5: we'd have to point these out on a map, but
- 28:51Speaker 5: we haven't got that far far technology yet. And then
- 28:55Speaker 5: there's like the it's spelled t u n B Tunb,
- 29:01Speaker 5: a couple of islands over that which are directly overlooking
- 29:03Speaker 5: the shipping lanes right and Kesherm Island, which is near
- 29:09Speaker 5: Bandura bas which is major of Courserinean support. And we
- 29:13Speaker 5: know that at least open source intelligence suggests that that's
- 29:17Speaker 5: been supporting drones drone attacks. So any of those islands
- 29:22Speaker 5: could be the target for raids. But of course you
- 29:29Speaker 5: put twelve hundred marines are sure it's not quite as
- 29:32Speaker 5: simple as that. You're going it's a major, major operation.
- 29:36Speaker 5: You're going to have to have all kinds of support
- 29:40Speaker 5: for that, and of course you elevate the risk it's huge.
- 29:42Speaker 5: Oh hey, I mentioned I forgot carg Island, which is
- 29:46Speaker 5: our favorite topic. Right, it's primary arounds, primary oil export
- 29:50Speaker 5: terminal critical to each economy. As we've heard some back
- 29:55Speaker 5: and forth about whether we're going after the oil terminals
- 29:59Speaker 5: on that island or whether we want to preserve them,
- 30:01Speaker 5: and perhaps a difference of opinion there with the Israelis
- 30:03Speaker 5: that we can talk about. So you know, a rate
- 30:06Speaker 5: of seizure of car could I could disrupt further Iranian
- 30:10Speaker 5: oil oil exports of that. Indeed, that's one of our
- 30:14Speaker 5: our objectives. But also again conduct battle damage assessment, which
- 30:21Speaker 5: which as I've said, is a is a significant problem.
- 30:27Speaker 5: So when you step back, so the MEW moving towards
- 30:32Speaker 5: the Middle East, all it does is represents it more options,
- 30:36Speaker 5: right I doubt I don't know I'm speculating. I doubt
- 30:39Speaker 5: that they're being moved there with a specific mission in mind.
- 30:43Speaker 5: There will probably be a series of contingencies, and probably
- 30:46Speaker 5: the decision hasn't been made whether or not to land them.
- 30:49Speaker 5: And by the way, you know the last thing I'm saying,
- 30:51Speaker 5: this is a mew A Marine Expeditionory unit. I explained
- 30:54Speaker 5: how small it is. Arguably you get more out of
- 30:58Speaker 5: it while it's at sea, right, it has kind of
- 31:00Speaker 5: an operational impact then, because you could land it anyway,
- 31:03Speaker 5: you keep the NB casting. Once you've landed it, it
- 31:06Speaker 5: becomes very tactical and you elevate your risk, right because
- 31:10Speaker 5: now you've sucked into that one location.
- 31:14Speaker 2: And I want to talk about the streets for a minute. There.
- 31:16Speaker 2: You talked about Andy that it's really important because we're
- 31:19Speaker 2: talking about measuring how safe are the straits, whether we've
- 31:22Speaker 2: reduced to fifty percent, ninety percent, et cetera. Looking at
- 31:26Speaker 2: absolute numbers of straits transits. On February twenty seventh, there
- 31:30Speaker 2: were one hundred and forty plus per day of oil vessels.
- 31:33Speaker 2: That has trickled to six over five days, like one
- 31:38Speaker 2: per day. Roughly, there were eleven Iranian vessels in Persian
- 31:43Speaker 2: Gulf in the past couple of weeks that were able
- 31:44Speaker 2: to transit out and bring oil to China, which is
- 31:46Speaker 2: why they're actually selling more oil right now than they
- 31:48Speaker 2: were before the conflict started. And the only vessel that
- 31:51Speaker 2: has actually gone out and exited the straits with oil
- 31:54Speaker 2: was yesterday. It was a Pakistani flag vessel that had
- 31:57Speaker 2: agreed with the Iranian Foreign Ministry to allow to transit
- 32:00Speaker 2: through for various political reasons. And there were two Indian
- 32:05Speaker 2: vessels that are allowed to move back to repatriate some
- 32:08Speaker 2: Iranian bodies from the Sri Lanka coastline that were bombed
- 32:12Speaker 2: by the submarine a few days ago. So if we're
- 32:15Speaker 2: looking at that, it's down down below single digit percentages
- 32:18Speaker 2: of transits through there. It's absolutely not secured. In no
- 32:22Speaker 2: reality is it safe to transit through there. And the
- 32:25Speaker 2: other challenge is maybe from a military perspective, it's physically safe,
- 32:29Speaker 2: but if you're an insurance company that's ensuring a Marek
- 32:32Speaker 2: ship with three hundred million dollars worth of oil on it,
- 32:36Speaker 2: you may be very hesitant to ensure that ship. And
- 32:39Speaker 2: so this is another like political external factor that the
- 32:41Speaker 2: military can't really control. It's going to have to be
- 32:43Speaker 2: at the political level that this problem is solved, or
- 32:46Speaker 2: else these vessels won't feel safe enough and the insurance
- 32:48Speaker 2: companies won't feel safe enough to ensure those vessels even
- 32:50Speaker 2: if it is physically safe to pass through. So that's
- 32:53Speaker 2: another step that has to occur, as far as messaging
- 32:55Speaker 2: from the US side and from the Israeli side to
- 32:57Speaker 2: tell the world that hey, it is actually safe, or
- 32:59Speaker 2: the US can absorb some of that risk by promising
- 33:03Speaker 2: those insurance companies that they'll almost subsidize that insurance, kind
- 33:06Speaker 2: of like the federal deposit insurance we have for deposits
- 33:08Speaker 2: and banks, which is something that has been discussed but
- 33:10Speaker 2: isn't fully in place yet. And then on the MEW
- 33:14Speaker 2: portion of it, you mentioned, it's this small, versatile entity,
- 33:17Speaker 2: and it's actually the smallest of a certain type of
- 33:19Speaker 2: marine task organization called a Marine Air Ground Task Force,
- 33:22Speaker 2: which is something unique to the Marine Corps. For listeners
- 33:24Speaker 2: who don't know this, this task force is very scalable.
- 33:28Speaker 2: From that MEW size, which is roughly twenty two hundred
- 33:31Speaker 2: total people including logistics and other support and command element,
- 33:35Speaker 2: it can move up to a brigade size element and
- 33:37Speaker 2: it can move up to a force size element. These
- 33:39Speaker 2: are kind of like increasing scale echelon for what a
- 33:42Speaker 2: command might need. And by comparison, during the two thousand
- 33:45Speaker 2: and three invasion of Iraq, there were mews that were there,
- 33:49Speaker 2: but they were part of larger, much larger entities doing
- 33:51Speaker 2: a ground force invasion of Iraq, which is arguably a
- 33:55Speaker 2: far less complex invasion than the terrain facing the ground
- 33:58Speaker 2: forces in Iran, which would require many, many more units
- 34:02Speaker 2: of a much higher scale to actually traverse and secure
- 34:06Speaker 2: those high terrain features to safely move into the country
- 34:10Speaker 2: from a conventional ground force invasion perspective, So when looking
- 34:12Speaker 2: at this MEW, people are thinking about boots in the ground,
- 34:15Speaker 2: probably of some kind of conventional combat force, and it's
- 34:18Speaker 2: important to be hesitant there in question, well, how much
- 34:20Speaker 2: would that MEW actually achieve and would it even be
- 34:23Speaker 2: safe for it to go aground with the small size
- 34:25Speaker 2: it has, because that's not what the MEW is for alone.
- 34:28Speaker 2: As Andy mentioned that MEW is to do things amphibiously
- 34:31Speaker 2: from sea ship to shore and then back to ship.
- 34:34Speaker 2: That's really what it's supposed to be for. That could
- 34:36Speaker 2: be seizing a beach, holding a beach securing a location
- 34:39Speaker 2: for follow on forces to flow through things like this.
- 34:41Speaker 2: They're not supposed to be their long term and they're
- 34:43Speaker 2: not supposed to be the main combat element. That's what
- 34:45Speaker 2: things like the eighty second Airborne and Marine Divisions are for.
- 34:48Speaker 2: We have a great map up here. We can see
- 34:51Speaker 2: straits of war moves.
- 34:53Speaker 4: Masters of technology.
- 34:54Speaker 1: Ye have Jack gaming clutch with this one.
- 34:57Speaker 5: I'm impressed.
- 34:58Speaker 1: Do you see Crag Island though, bit more north?
- 35:01Speaker 2: Uh? There? It says Kark, which is correctly spelled. Yeah, yep,
- 35:08Speaker 2: and that's one hundred kilometers from Abadan.
- 35:13Speaker 3: And I was reading about this island too today that
- 35:15Speaker 3: this has supposedly underground missile facilities on it.
- 35:19Speaker 2: Yeah, you can actually see them on Google satellite imagery.
- 35:21Speaker 2: You can see the Russian you know, the Russian surface
- 35:25Speaker 2: to air missile, the SA nine structure. They usually have
- 35:27Speaker 2: like a pentagon formation. You can see those all up
- 35:29Speaker 2: and down the island.
- 35:30Speaker 1: Have we not been hitting that island? I'm sure, I'm
- 35:33Speaker 1: assuming we have been.
- 35:34Speaker 3: We The desalination plant we hit was on that island,
- 35:37Speaker 3: and that's kind of messed up like it. It basically
- 35:40Speaker 3: deprived thirty villages of fresh water.
- 35:43Speaker 4: I mean, I don't know.
- 35:44Speaker 1: How isn't that a war crime.
- 35:47Speaker 4: I'm not a jag, but it sounds like it.
- 35:50Speaker 2: Remember we don't have those silly rules of engagement anymore.
- 35:53Speaker 1: Oh yeah, that's right, no more politically correct wars. I'm
- 35:56Speaker 1: so excited about that. John's trying to get me triggered. Bro,
- 36:00Speaker 1: this is such a good episode, and he's doing he's
- 36:01Speaker 1: doing this on purpose.
- 36:02Speaker 5: I know it, you know it. I mean it raises
- 36:08Speaker 5: it raises a point that I don't think is commonly understood,
- 36:11Speaker 5: not even in the military, right about uh, the enemy's
- 36:15Speaker 5: order of battle and understanding how much you've tried it,
- 36:19Speaker 5: and even with all the technology the United States has
- 36:23Speaker 5: add its disposable what a difficult task that is made
- 36:27Speaker 5: more difficult by, you know, the terrain, by the fact
- 36:32Speaker 5: that when you're talking about the nature of what is
- 36:34Speaker 5: being potentially could be hidden, and we talked about missile
- 36:37Speaker 5: launchers and drones, small boats, all these things that are
- 36:42Speaker 5: could significantly remain a threat are easy to disperse and conceal.
- 36:49Speaker 5: So it doesn't matter what you have. So so these
- 36:53Speaker 5: press conferences where we are trotting out all the things
- 36:56Speaker 5: that we have done don't really answer the mail the
- 37:00Speaker 5: real question is what does Iran have left and that
- 37:03Speaker 5: that arguably could be what Marines Ashore could do, although
- 37:09Speaker 5: personally I think I would just for a number I mean,
- 37:13Speaker 5: I would select different special operations forces to do that.
- 37:17Speaker 5: If you if you're concerned as BDA and two thousand
- 37:22Speaker 5: marines one view once, once you committed them. As I
- 37:24Speaker 5: made the point earlier, you committed them, right, it's not
- 37:28Speaker 5: something that I mean, yes, you backload them on ships,
- 37:31Speaker 5: but it's not as though you can hop all around
- 37:33Speaker 5: the straits and whole moves using them again and again.
- 37:36Speaker 2: Yeah, that's actually a good point. We were on the
- 37:38Speaker 2: Special Operations Operations Task Force in Iraq in twenty sixteen
- 37:41Speaker 2: and we did a lot of strikes. I think it
- 37:43Speaker 2: was thirty thousand strikes in six months, and we had
- 37:46Speaker 2: to do battle damage assessment after all those strikes to
- 37:48Speaker 2: ensure that we were hitting targets right with the right
- 37:50Speaker 2: things and all that. And even that when we were
- 37:52Speaker 2: we had the ability to get inside the night area
- 37:54Speaker 2: and actually measured the BDA, we had a very hard
- 37:57Speaker 2: time to get accurate BDA on the ground where we
- 38:00Speaker 2: actually were because you have human intelligence that's not always accurate.
- 38:04Speaker 2: You have signals intelligence that only gives you a piece
- 38:05Speaker 2: of the picture. When you look at the physical infrastructure,
- 38:08Speaker 2: that doesn't actually tell you about capability. It just tells
- 38:10Speaker 2: you about the building, right, And if there's bodies in there,
- 38:12Speaker 2: we don't know which bodies. You have sources at the
- 38:15Speaker 2: hospital trying to tell you who they were, but you
- 38:16Speaker 2: still don't know. And that's when you're actually physically there.
- 38:19Speaker 2: And we don't have that scale of deployment in Iran,
- 38:21Speaker 2: which on a much larger scale of destruction already. That's
- 38:24Speaker 2: going to require precise bda to actually measure did we
- 38:28Speaker 2: hit the right things with the right equipment and with
- 38:30Speaker 2: the right follow on effects.
- 38:33Speaker 5: John One thing that hasn't received much attention though, to
- 38:38Speaker 5: my surprise and certainly in the media and discussions are
- 38:42Speaker 5: this time around, in Iran's nuclear facilities. I mean, there
- 38:47Speaker 5: hasn't been mentioned of destruction to them in the battle
- 38:53Speaker 5: discussions of battle damage assessments. You know, first of all,
- 38:56Speaker 5: what's your take on that? And secondly, do you think
- 39:00Speaker 5: have sets the next phase of this operation.
- 39:03Speaker 2: I saw some satellite imagery on January thirty first, I believe,
- 39:07Speaker 2: of some of the facilities, and they're basically buried underground
- 39:11Speaker 2: by the strikes that we did, and the thing there
- 39:14Speaker 2: is you don't know how much is buried or if
- 39:16Speaker 2: there was even anything buried there. And back in June
- 39:19Speaker 2: when we were striking some facilities, the regime had already
- 39:21Speaker 2: moved some of the uranium to other facilities. So it's
- 39:23Speaker 2: very difficult without having people on the ground to actually
- 39:25Speaker 2: know what's in there. And that's not human sources, because
- 39:30Speaker 2: even the sources might not know because they're not digging
- 39:32Speaker 2: in the soil. They might be just guessing and saying, well,
- 39:34Speaker 2: it looks like this was destroyed, so I guess that's
- 39:36Speaker 2: probably what this is. You would actually need to go
- 39:39Speaker 2: there and measure with some technical equipment to figure out
- 39:41Speaker 2: what amount of material remains underground, and the only way
- 39:46Speaker 2: to do that is to obviously dig underground. It's a
- 39:48Speaker 2: very challenging thing to do because these facilities were very
- 39:51Speaker 2: deep underground in the first place. If you've seen some
- 39:54Speaker 2: of the strikes that we did that were the penetrators
- 39:56Speaker 2: that went that, they basically are very heavy. They hit
- 39:59Speaker 2: the ground, go underground before they explode, this little pinpoint
- 40:02Speaker 2: hole in the ground before they go in, and they
- 40:04Speaker 2: do it with a bunker buster explosion deep underground. You
- 40:07Speaker 2: have no way to measure what the efficacy of that was,
- 40:10Speaker 2: or even if that was the right location in that
- 40:12Speaker 2: complex where you should be hitting it, because nobody's got
- 40:14Speaker 2: a flag there saying the uranium is here, even if
- 40:17Speaker 2: at the facility they might have moved it to a
- 40:19Speaker 2: different wing. There might be other tunnels. We can do
- 40:21Speaker 2: a lot of measurement in signature intelligence or amazing to
- 40:24Speaker 2: see what soil was moved where, when, how much soil
- 40:27Speaker 2: was removed, So we can estimate how large the tunnels
- 40:29Speaker 2: are based on what the amount of material that's been
- 40:31Speaker 2: removed is, but that doesn't tell you what the configuration
- 40:34Speaker 2: of the tunnel is and all these other things. There
- 40:35Speaker 2: could be some side room that we never knew existed.
- 40:37Speaker 2: So there's a lot of variables and difficulties on top
- 40:40Speaker 2: of this. Even if you had a good human network
- 40:42Speaker 2: in the country, it's a kind of a black box
- 40:45Speaker 2: without actually physically being there with the tools you need
- 40:48Speaker 2: to measure this material.
- 40:49Speaker 5: Yeah, and there's no you know, when there's talk about
- 40:53Speaker 5: not just damage to facilities, but the potential of securing
- 40:58Speaker 5: enriched uranium itself, right, you see that speculation. I mean,
- 41:04Speaker 5: one of the core problems is aside from the fact
- 41:07Speaker 5: that as we talked about, damaged facilities doesn't necessarily mean
- 41:13Speaker 5: that what we see from damaged facilities doesn't necessarily give
- 41:18Speaker 5: us an accurate picture, and trying to track where that
- 41:23Speaker 5: material is, what condition it's in, whether it has been moved,
- 41:29Speaker 5: whether it can be moved that short notice, all those
- 41:32Speaker 5: things are questions that are going to be very tough
- 41:35Speaker 5: to answer if indeed that becomes the same mission.
- 41:38Speaker 2: And actually that's a great point about the complexity of
- 41:40Speaker 2: this because there isn't just like a box of physio
- 41:44Speaker 2: material in a facility. There are varying ways that this
- 41:47Speaker 2: is stored depending on where it is in the process
- 41:49Speaker 2: of enrichment and refinement. But you know, in the early stages,
- 41:52Speaker 2: you might have some yellow cake, for example, that is
- 41:54Speaker 2: contained in a pretty obvious structural container. But once you
- 41:57Speaker 2: start putting it in the centrifuge cascades, which one uses
- 42:00Speaker 2: the specialized cascade system of centrifugees because they're not allowed
- 42:03Speaker 2: to get the larger centrifuges that the nuclear powered countries have,
- 42:08Speaker 2: so you basically have these very long lines of centrifuges,
- 42:10Speaker 2: all produced by the German company Siemens. That's another thing
- 42:14Speaker 2: to talk about how they got there. Anyways, they're there.
- 42:16Speaker 2: They've got these things all linked together, and these very long,
- 42:18Speaker 2: almost like tubes of many centrifuges spinning at different speeds
- 42:22Speaker 2: to try to separate and enrich the uranium in a
- 42:24Speaker 2: particular facility like natons for example. They maybe thousands of
- 42:27Speaker 2: these centrifuges and they're pretty good. They're bigger than my
- 42:31Speaker 2: head per centrifuge, right, So, I mean, if you want
- 42:33Speaker 2: to go get these things out, you're not talking about
- 42:35Speaker 2: a guy going in with a backpack and just putting
- 42:37Speaker 2: the uranium in his backpack and walking out. You're talking
- 42:39Speaker 2: about a very long tailed logistical requirement to support just
- 42:43Speaker 2: the movement. Not talking about the safety or these other things,
- 42:46Speaker 2: but just the actual logistics of getting this stuff out.
- 42:49Speaker 2: How many people would you need, what kind of equipment
- 42:51Speaker 2: would you need? There might even be a thought going
- 42:53Speaker 2: on in the decision making process about what if we
- 42:55Speaker 2: just physically destroy enough so that nobody can dig down
- 42:59Speaker 2: there and get the stuff, Because that might actually be
- 43:01Speaker 2: a better solution than going over there and actually digging
- 43:04Speaker 2: with heavy machinery to get this out. And I'm sure
- 43:06Speaker 2: this kind of discussion is going on right now with
- 43:08Speaker 2: the National Security Council, and I'm sure Marco Ruby is
- 43:11Speaker 2: talking to himself in the different positions that he holds
- 43:13Speaker 2: to try to figure out how to advise himself to
- 43:15Speaker 2: tell the President about how to get this uranium out.
- 43:19Speaker 5: Yeah, the hottest part of the mission isn't getting there,
- 43:21Speaker 5: it's what you do when you do get that.
- 43:24Speaker 4: Yeah, a little bit.
- 43:25Speaker 3: I'm not going to talk too much about what's actually
- 43:28Speaker 3: going on or potentially going on right now in regards
- 43:31Speaker 3: to this, but a little bit of historical data that
- 43:34Speaker 3: may be useful for to help people think about this.
- 43:39Speaker 3: The counter WMD mission, I mean, of course, has been
- 43:43Speaker 3: you know, with JSX since its inception. Early training exercises,
- 43:47Speaker 3: DELTA was going up against simulated improvised nuclear devices and
- 43:53Speaker 3: having EOD guys come in and disarm them. But then
- 43:56Speaker 3: it kicks into high gear. Or in the nine teen
- 44:00Speaker 3: eighties when Gadaffi had an underground chemical weapons facility in
- 44:05Speaker 3: Tarhuna and Jaysock was tasked with a mission or planning
- 44:10Speaker 3: a mission to go in and destroy it. And interestingly,
- 44:13Speaker 3: the way it was planned was that Marine Corps hovercraft
- 44:17Speaker 3: would come up over the coast of Libya, come as
- 44:20Speaker 3: far as inland as they could. Then they would offload
- 44:23Speaker 3: trucks with the Jaysok guys on it. They would then
- 44:26Speaker 3: drive to Tarhuna using industrial drilling equipment drilled down from
- 44:30Speaker 3: the surface into the facility and then in basically cement
- 44:35Speaker 3: mixer trucks pour an explosive slurry down into the facility
- 44:39Speaker 3: and detonate it. So it was a pretty crazy plan.
- 44:43Speaker 3: I guess it's for the best that it never had
- 44:45Speaker 3: to be executed. That situation was resolved diplomatically and Gadaffi
- 44:50Speaker 3: shut that facility down. But that was sort of the
- 44:53Speaker 3: beginning of Jaysock sort of looking at this problem set,
- 44:57Speaker 3: and it's evolved over the years. It's been called the
- 44:59Speaker 3: deep Underground Mission or the hardened deeply buried target mission,
- 45:05Speaker 3: and over the years that has evolved into essentially, you know,
- 45:08Speaker 3: Jasok going in to conduct WMD sabotage to like just
- 45:12Speaker 3: go in and destroy those facilities, and it could be
- 45:16Speaker 3: like chemical weapons vats, it could be physile material, whatever
- 45:20Speaker 3: the case may be.
- 45:22Speaker 4: And then that evolved.
- 45:23Speaker 3: You know, by the time you get into like the
- 45:24Speaker 3: mid to late nineteen nineties, it evolved not just into
- 45:27Speaker 3: the destruction but to seize the material and take it
- 45:31Speaker 3: out with you. And Jaysok has done extensive training on
- 45:36Speaker 3: this at the Nevada test site and underground tunnels and
- 45:40Speaker 3: things like this, practicing explosive breaching like breaching heavy vault
- 45:45Speaker 3: bunker doors underground. It's a very technically difficult mission to accomplish.
- 45:52Speaker 3: And they've done this and I mean all the way
- 45:54Speaker 3: up until yeah, some other stuff I won't even get
- 45:57Speaker 3: into right now. But the cbrnpeck to the radiological material
- 46:02Speaker 3: aspect of it makes this mission that much more dangerous,
- 46:07Speaker 3: especially if you're going into targets that have already been
- 46:09Speaker 3: hit with air strikes. You don't know like have those
- 46:12Speaker 3: vats been cracked open? Did they topple over? Is this
- 46:15Speaker 3: stuff already in the ground. So it's it's a very
- 46:20Speaker 3: technically and logistically complicated operation to pull off.
- 46:23Speaker 1: And I have a question, it's not going to be
- 46:24Speaker 1: like some quick like Madua raid a few hours overnight.
- 46:29Speaker 1: It's going to take days or weeks I'm assuming to
- 46:31Speaker 1: do this, So there would need to be security, you know,
- 46:35Speaker 1: It's not just a quick in and out, you know,
- 46:36Speaker 1: thanks for coming.
- 46:38Speaker 5: In a in a foreign in a sovereign hostile country.
- 46:44Speaker 5: You need you're going to need a secure perimeter for
- 46:47Speaker 5: an extended period of time, right, I mean days to weeks,
- 46:53Speaker 5: a secure perimeter control, surrounding terrain, protection against counter attack
- 46:59Speaker 5: which come from in any domain. Right, So as a
- 47:05Speaker 5: marine expeditionary unit potentially could provide it could accomplish that mission.
- 47:12Speaker 5: I know, let me rephrase that, that could potentially be
- 47:15Speaker 5: a mission assigned to the marine expeditionary unit. But it's
- 47:18Speaker 5: never been done before, right, It's not something specifically that
- 47:22Speaker 5: marine strainfall for that period of time. And you can imagine,
- 47:26Speaker 5: I mean, so you so you've got all that, You've
- 47:29Speaker 5: got all that inner problems right inside that court, and
- 47:32Speaker 5: all the problems that you're going to have to deal
- 47:34Speaker 5: with locating the material, verifying it, securing it, either destroying
- 47:43Speaker 5: it or removing it. And then you've got the you've
- 47:46Speaker 5: got the external security problem, which is immensely complex too
- 47:51Speaker 5: and makes you all of which makes you hugely vulnerable.
- 47:55Speaker 3: The you know, this is pretty much unprecedented what we're
- 47:58Speaker 3: talking about here, and the precedent you would look to
- 48:02Speaker 3: if anything, It's not like the Maduro raid or the
- 48:05Speaker 3: Bin Laden raid or something like that. Actually, what I
- 48:08Speaker 3: would look to is there was an operation in the
- 48:11Speaker 3: early years of the War on Terror in the early
- 48:13Speaker 3: two thousands, so CALM was somewhat involved, but mostly it
- 48:17Speaker 3: was DITRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, went to a
- 48:21Speaker 3: island in Uzbekistan where the Soviets had a chemical weapons
- 48:26Speaker 3: facility back in the day, and there was tons and
- 48:29Speaker 3: tons of anthracs in the ground. If terrorists wanted, they
- 48:32Speaker 3: could just go to this island and dig anthrax out
- 48:34Speaker 3: of the ground and they'd have their sample ready to go.
- 48:39Speaker 3: So DITTRA goes in there with all their subcontractors and
- 48:44Speaker 3: raytheon contractors and everyone else, and they destroyed that material.
- 48:49Speaker 3: They dug it up out of the ground and destroyed
- 48:50Speaker 3: the I think like sixty tons of anthracs it came
- 48:53Speaker 3: out to. Now, the difference, of course, is this was
- 48:57Speaker 3: a permissive environment. This was done with the cooperation of
- 49:00Speaker 3: the government of uzbeka Stan. You know, we want to
- 49:03Speaker 3: go in and destroy these WMDs and keep the world
- 49:05Speaker 3: safe and use Beckastan's like okay, bring your boys in,
- 49:08Speaker 3: we do this. It wasn't an armed military operation, but
- 49:13Speaker 3: what we're talking about in Iran would have more in
- 49:16Speaker 3: common with what I just described than with like a
- 49:19Speaker 3: Maduro raid.
- 49:21Speaker 2: And plus we're talking about this as if it's like
- 49:23Speaker 2: one facility. There are at least twelve different facilities and
- 49:26Speaker 2: different provinces spread all over the place. You have to
- 49:29Speaker 2: repeat this twelve times or more successfully to achieve the
- 49:34Speaker 2: objective that you're looking for. So that means every single
- 49:36Speaker 2: time you do it, you're introducing new risk, new layers
- 49:39Speaker 2: of complexity, new opportunities for attack. Because let's say you
- 49:42Speaker 2: do it like three times, Well, the adversary is going
- 49:44Speaker 2: to measure how you did those three times and figure
- 49:46Speaker 2: out all kinds of ways to exploit the next nine times.
- 49:50Speaker 2: You have to do this because you're going to have
- 49:51Speaker 2: to keep repeating the same TTPs every time. And if
- 49:54Speaker 2: you reveal your clandestine methodologies in that first couple of goes,
- 49:59Speaker 2: you can't use them anymore in the same way that
- 50:01Speaker 2: you did previously.
- 50:04Speaker 5: Yeah, if this was a what we call a coed brief, right,
- 50:07Speaker 5: a course of action brief, you look at the cons
- 50:11Speaker 5: that we've stanked up here, and it's very difficult to
- 50:15Speaker 5: think of throws that would balance against those cons.
- 50:21Speaker 3: And yes, strategically, Andy, I mean, you look at this
- 50:25Speaker 3: kind of operation that we're talking about. Explain to me
- 50:28Speaker 3: how this brings us closer to victory in Iran? How
- 50:31Speaker 3: does this bring us closer to a democratic Iran? Okay,
- 50:36Speaker 3: you're getting some physsile material out of the ground and
- 50:39Speaker 3: denying that to the Iranian government if they ever get
- 50:42Speaker 3: back on their feet to the point where they can
- 50:44Speaker 3: recover that stuff. But this doesn't really bring us closer
- 50:47Speaker 3: to a victory or a win the kind of win
- 50:52Speaker 3: even that you know, President Trump seems to desire. I
- 50:54Speaker 3: don't think it gets us closer to his own stated
- 50:58Speaker 3: objective here.
- 51:01Speaker 2: It's similar to Desert One. I always go back to
- 51:03Speaker 2: Eagle Claw in Iran because this is a very similar
- 51:05Speaker 2: thing where there's that risk benefit in the military planning
- 51:08Speaker 2: side of it, and then there's the political choice to do
- 51:10Speaker 2: it anyway, even though it's extremely risky and a commander
- 51:12Speaker 2: would never give this green light unless the president tells
- 51:15Speaker 2: them what you're doing this. And it's the same thing
- 51:17Speaker 2: where there's these layers of especially air and logistics capability
- 51:21Speaker 2: that there's so much complexity in there. And it only
- 51:23Speaker 2: takes one crash at a fuel bladder in a desert
- 51:27Speaker 2: to change the whole thing in a direction that you
- 51:29Speaker 2: didn't expect and that people just will not accept.
- 51:33Speaker 5: Yeah, the difference being the rescue of US hostages in
- 51:36Speaker 5: Iran arguably was a strategic comparative, right and correct, Whereas
- 51:42Speaker 5: securing enriched uranium in sites in Iran it's hard to
- 51:47Speaker 5: align with any strategic comparative that would justify the level
- 51:54Speaker 5: of risk.
- 51:55Speaker 3: Yeah, especially when it's buried under rubble. They don't have
- 51:58Speaker 3: any access to it, apparently.
- 52:00Speaker 5: Okay, well, I'm glad we've dealt with that one.
- 52:02Speaker 2: Yeah.
- 52:02Speaker 1: Let's let's also not forget that this was they were,
- 52:05Speaker 1: the uranium was on the table right before we started
- 52:08Speaker 1: bombing Iran.
- 52:10Speaker 2: Didn't exist twenty fifteen.
- 52:12Speaker 5: Well, it gets back to perhaps a lack of coherence
- 52:15Speaker 5: in describing what the end state is. The desired conditions
- 52:20Speaker 5: are the termination of hostilities, right, and we haven't seen
- 52:25Speaker 5: yet kind of a coherent statement. So we're speculating, and
- 52:29Speaker 5: I'm sure military commanders I don't know, but I hope
- 52:33Speaker 5: that they are saying, hey, boss, we're going if our
- 52:38Speaker 5: goals are reduction of Iranian capabilities right to the point
- 52:45Speaker 5: where Iran is effectively neutralized and cannot do X things
- 52:51Speaker 5: for X period of time. Then these are the conditions
- 52:55Speaker 5: that need to exist, and we are one week, two
- 52:58Speaker 5: weeks away from those conditions, right, that's kind of the
- 53:02Speaker 5: conversation that should take place. But Boss, if you want
- 53:05Speaker 5: to destroy the nuclear facilities and set them back six months,
- 53:10Speaker 5: one year, two years, then we need to extend the
- 53:13Speaker 5: campaign by X number of time. And finally, if you
- 53:17Speaker 5: want to regime change, we just can't get that from here,
- 53:21Speaker 5: not within their campaign. Hopefully these conversations are taking place.
- 53:27Speaker 4: Spoiler or they're not.
- 53:31Speaker 3: Yeah, sorry, I'm sorry to be a doomer, Debbie Downer
- 53:35Speaker 3: on ya, Andy, I don't think those conversations are taking place.
- 53:38Speaker 5: Well, you know, one would hope those conversations are taking
- 53:41Speaker 5: place in an open forum too, you know, I mean
- 53:43Speaker 5: these sort of conversations. That's one of the disadvantages with
- 53:48Speaker 5: waging more as a liberal democracy. And I say little
- 53:52Speaker 5: l all right, liberal democracy as in you know, look
- 53:54Speaker 5: it up what it means. Not not you guys, I
- 53:56Speaker 5: meant for those of our audience who start screaming every
- 53:59Speaker 5: time you mentioned is that, Yeah, you lose a little
- 54:03Speaker 5: bit of the opeteness right that an author authoritarian regime
- 54:07Speaker 5: has about the way it ages war. We owe to
- 54:09Speaker 5: the American public, normally via their elected representatives, and explanation
- 54:15Speaker 5: of why we're at war and what the objectives are
- 54:18Speaker 5: because everyone's aware of the cast or perhaps they're not
- 54:21Speaker 5: at this stage, which is a good point that I'll
- 54:24Speaker 5: finish on. Really, and you know, I'm not being a
- 54:27Speaker 5: hand ringer here, but I don't think anyone has a
- 54:30Speaker 5: clear picture of the overall cost of this war. I'm
- 54:33Speaker 5: not talking about the billions a day that we're spending,
- 54:35Speaker 5: and I'm talking about the effects on the global economy,
- 54:38Speaker 5: the effect on our alliance networks, alliances. Sorry, that was
- 54:44Speaker 5: a poorly worded phrase.
- 54:46Speaker 1: John, You wanted to talk a little bit about the
- 54:50Speaker 1: Iranian elite like real estate portfolio in the UK.
- 54:56Speaker 2: Yeah, it's really fascinating. So Ali, I'm sorry, who's this
- 55:00Speaker 2: individual that's closely affiliated with Amah Najad? If everyone remembers
- 55:03Speaker 2: this colorful individual from the presidency that caused the Green
- 55:06Speaker 2: Revolution two thousand and nine, So he just opened up
- 55:10Speaker 2: thirty three new luxury apartments in London using investment money
- 55:14Speaker 2: that he got from Iran, which is fascinating because they're
- 55:16Speaker 2: not part of the international banking system, they're not part
- 55:18Speaker 2: of the Swift banking system, and the money was taken
- 55:22Speaker 2: from a regime affiliated account, right So that's all opening up.
- 55:26Speaker 2: But that's not even the biggest dollar amount because right
- 55:28Speaker 2: now Mochtaba, the potentially alive or dead leader of Iran,
- 55:33Speaker 2: has a one hundred million dollar real estate investment in
- 55:35Speaker 2: London as well. That was just talked about a few
- 55:38Speaker 2: weeks ago that the British government approved this purchase. It's
- 55:43Speaker 2: just fascinating thing because people think, like, aren't they heavily sanctioned,
- 55:46Speaker 2: aren't they not part of the banking system? How are
- 55:48Speaker 2: they getting this money? The thing is, you know, the
- 55:50Speaker 2: sanctions have certain levels of efficacy. There studies done that
- 55:53Speaker 2: say that it's actually not as effective as you think,
- 55:55Speaker 2: and they're not really effective against an authoritarian state because
- 55:58Speaker 2: that authoritarian state controls the market. So it's the regular
- 56:01Speaker 2: people that can't access the banking system and then these
- 56:03Speaker 2: the small group of elites, can get outside of it
- 56:06Speaker 2: and go do things outside of the country like we
- 56:07Speaker 2: see right now, and a great example of that, Andy
- 56:10Speaker 2: and I think we were talking about this a couple
- 56:11Speaker 2: of weeks ago with how are they selling oil? And
- 56:13Speaker 2: what they're doing is they have these banks all over
- 56:15Speaker 2: the world. Bank Melli is an Iranian owned bank. It's
- 56:18Speaker 2: a state owned bank. Bank Melli has a branch in
- 56:20Speaker 2: Hong Kong and it has a branch in London. It's
- 56:22Speaker 2: got a branch in Hamburg, in Paris, and these banks
- 56:25Speaker 2: are in those countries. They can actually do business in
- 56:27Speaker 2: those countries. So if you sell your oil in China
- 56:31Speaker 2: for three hundred million dollars per vessel, you take that
- 56:34Speaker 2: three hundred million dollars. You don't send it back to Iran.
- 56:36Speaker 2: You bring it over to Bank Melly in Hong Kong
- 56:38Speaker 2: and then wire it to London and then go open
- 56:40Speaker 2: up your real estate business in Seville Row right. And
- 56:43Speaker 2: this is what's going on. It's very interesting because most
- 56:45Speaker 2: about for example, the new Supreme Leader, he's never worked,
- 56:49Speaker 2: he's never earned a paycheck, and he has one hundred
- 56:52Speaker 2: million dollars that he can use to open up businesses
- 56:55Speaker 2: in real estate in London. And this is just very
- 56:58Speaker 2: important for listeners to understand about exactly when we talk
- 57:01Speaker 2: about the regime. They're terrible to their own people. But
- 57:05Speaker 2: they're also highly corrupt. And this corruption is the thing
- 57:07Speaker 2: that you can see outside the country. You know, Canada,
- 57:10Speaker 2: for example, a few years ago, the former Central Bank
- 57:13Speaker 2: director of Iran fled to Canada with three point seven
- 57:16Speaker 2: billion dollars in assets. You don't bring that in a
- 57:19Speaker 2: suitcase to Canada. That's wired to Canada. And the government
- 57:22Speaker 2: of Canada proves that. We actually have a professor at
- 57:25Speaker 2: the University of Pennsylvania who's the son of masume Ebtycar.
- 57:30Speaker 2: And if you remember during the hostage crisis, there was
- 57:32Speaker 2: a woman that was the speaker in English during the
- 57:35Speaker 2: hostage crisis inside the US embassy in Tehran that was
- 57:38Speaker 2: the spokesperson for the new colonel of the regime. Her
- 57:41Speaker 2: son is a professor at the University of Pennsylvania. How
- 57:44Speaker 2: is that possible? Right, Zaref former foreign minister went to
- 57:47Speaker 2: Ohio State University. Right. The more you look at this,
- 57:50Speaker 2: the more you realize that these elites, they just escape
- 57:53Speaker 2: all of our restrictions. And this is why there's such
- 57:55Speaker 2: a problem right now to disconnect between the people in
- 57:57Speaker 2: Iran and these elites. No matter what you do, they're
- 58:01Speaker 2: going to find a way to snake around it because
- 58:03Speaker 2: it's not a democracy. You know, they can be as
- 58:04Speaker 2: corrupt as they want and the people can't do anything
- 58:06Speaker 2: about it because first of all, they don't have any guns.
- 58:08Speaker 1: We got to add on a good better note.
- 58:10Speaker 5: Well, I've got that at some point, and I think,
- 58:15Speaker 5: I mean, it's a slight change of topic, but I
- 58:17Speaker 5: think it's important. I think a lot of people will
- 58:19Speaker 5: learn from this. And this gets back to our discussion
- 58:22Speaker 5: of the North Korean policy of the troika. Right, three
- 58:25Speaker 5: people wandering around together, and I want to point out
- 58:28Speaker 5: that that within the Marine Corps, our own research or
- 58:31Speaker 5: the troika has has really revealed that it's ineffective totally.
- 58:36Speaker 5: So we used to operate. And this ties in with
- 58:39Speaker 5: Okinawa too, because this is the liberty policy in Okinawa
- 58:43Speaker 5: that two marines. It used to be the buddy program, right,
- 58:45Speaker 5: But then we discovered of the course of oh, I
- 58:48Speaker 5: don't know, maybe four decades, that where one marine gets drunk,
- 58:51Speaker 5: the others likely also to get drunks. So the policy
- 58:55Speaker 5: became they had to travel in a troika. But guess
- 58:58Speaker 5: what we found that the same.
- 59:03Speaker 1: Three guys got drunk instead of just want.
- 59:07Speaker 5: So and if in North Korean said having the same problem.
- 59:11Speaker 5: The other point alcohol, Yeah, they and Check pulled up
- 59:15Speaker 5: an excellent point too that he talked about where sleeping
- 59:18Speaker 5: cells break down, and he said, you know they someone
- 59:22Speaker 5: finds a woman, right, I mean, that's that that that's
- 59:25Speaker 5: the beginning of the scene.
- 59:28Speaker 3: I mean, even I believe uh Muhammad Atta, one of
- 59:31Speaker 3: the nine to eleven hijackers, was dating a stripper down
- 59:33Speaker 3: in Florida. I mean, these guys get sucked into this stuff. Hell,
- 59:38Speaker 3: maybe if that had gone on a little longer, he
- 59:41Speaker 3: wouldn't have done what he did. As I was saying,
- 59:46Speaker 3: it's only the most committed ideological people that can really.
- 59:51Speaker 4: Stay committed to that.
- 59:52Speaker 3: And I've heard some stories about the Chinese actually not
- 59:55Speaker 3: so much sleeper cells per se, but more like espionage
- 59:59Speaker 3: where they're like super committed maoists and they like they'll
- 1:00:03Speaker 3: like live a life of poverty even if they have
- 1:00:05Speaker 3: like an advanced degree, because they're putting all their money
- 1:00:08Speaker 3: into you know, helping out the fatherland or whatever.
- 1:00:12Speaker 4: It's very weird, actually.
- 1:00:14Speaker 1: Jack, you remember, go ahead, Sorry, John go.
- 1:00:18Speaker 2: I was gonna say, the Ministry of State Security actually
- 1:00:20Speaker 2: is very unique in the great power espionage world because
- 1:00:23Speaker 2: they don't recruit generally, don't recruit non Chinese people. They'll
- 1:00:26Speaker 2: typically only recruit Chinese citizens from China who are in
- 1:00:30Speaker 2: the target country. Like for example, they're going to Berkeley
- 1:00:33Speaker 2: getting a chemical engineering degree, but they're a Chinese. That's
- 1:00:36Speaker 2: who the MSS will go after because they know they
- 1:00:38Speaker 2: have the very like they can measure that loyalty, and
- 1:00:41Speaker 2: it's they don't have to develop it as much as
- 1:00:42Speaker 2: we would have to develop, for example, recruiting an Egyptian
- 1:00:45Speaker 2: guy to work for US in Egypt.
- 1:00:47Speaker 3: You know, well, it's also it's also that you know,
- 1:00:50Speaker 3: if they even find somebody who's not a Chinese citizen
- 1:00:53Speaker 3: but of Chinese ethnicity and they still have family back
- 1:00:55Speaker 3: on the mainland, I mean they call the the MSS
- 1:00:58Speaker 3: calls them up and says, a visiting your aunt the
- 1:01:01Speaker 3: other day. I mean they get the message right away.
- 1:01:03Speaker 3: I mean they know what they're supposed to do.
- 1:01:07Speaker 1: Jack, what was that story about a virologist who's a
- 1:01:09Speaker 1: doctor working in the United States, you know, probably making
- 1:01:13Speaker 1: a decent living. Yeah, he was living in like Squalor
- 1:01:16Speaker 1: because he was.
- 1:01:17Speaker 3: Like I was a friend of mine work that case
- 1:01:19Speaker 3: where it was a Chinese guy had a job working
- 1:01:23Speaker 3: for the government. He was an MD, but he was
- 1:01:25Speaker 3: living out of his van and he was selling ghost
- 1:01:28Speaker 3: guns at a gun shows. And so there's no there's
- 1:01:33Speaker 3: as far as I know, there's no proof of like
- 1:01:34Speaker 3: a Chinese intelligence nexus. But I've heard enough stories like
- 1:01:38Speaker 3: this over the years you start to wonder, like is
- 1:01:40Speaker 3: it really about making money or is it this guy
- 1:01:43Speaker 3: just acting as a chaos agent, like selling ghost guns
- 1:01:47Speaker 3: to Latino and African American gangs in New York City
- 1:01:52Speaker 3: In this case, all.
- 1:01:52Speaker 1: Right, great, now we're just brought in China trying to
- 1:01:54Speaker 1: fuck us up too. Great.
- 1:01:56Speaker 4: Well, there's other stuff too.
- 1:01:57Speaker 3: I mean if you start looking at like the Order
- 1:01:59Speaker 3: of the Nine Angles and like one of their founders
- 1:02:02Speaker 3: lives in Russia.
- 1:02:03Speaker 4: Now, I mean there's stuff.
- 1:02:05Speaker 1: That what is that? I don't I've never heard of that.
- 1:02:08Speaker 3: It's it's like a Satanist nihilistic movement that came out
- 1:02:12Speaker 3: of the UK initially, and those guys go and they do,
- 1:02:16Speaker 3: you know, spree shootings.
- 1:02:18Speaker 4: And stuff like that. Sometimes.
- 1:02:20Speaker 3: I mean, again, I couldn't prove anything as far as
- 1:02:24Speaker 3: like an intelligence nexus, but there's enough things that like
- 1:02:27Speaker 3: you're squinting at it, like what the hell is going
- 1:02:29Speaker 3: on here?
- 1:02:32Speaker 1: What a way to end Satanist fucking shooting spreeze. Yes,
- 1:02:38Speaker 1: I want you guys to check out The high Side,
- 1:02:39Speaker 1: Jack Murphy Sean Naylor. They're working on a really good
- 1:02:42Speaker 1: article coming out soon having to do with Jaysack. Really
- 1:02:46Speaker 1: interesting with several at this point. Yeah, actually yeah multiple
- 1:02:49Speaker 1: uh multiple pants on the fire the with Zach Dorfman right. Uh,
- 1:02:55Speaker 1: he's he's helping out on one of them. What else
- 1:02:59Speaker 1: we got, Andy mill Burn? Of course, Andy, give us
- 1:03:01Speaker 1: a flex just show us one one. No, all right,
- 1:03:05Speaker 1: we'll do that after.
- 1:03:06Speaker 5: You got me on that for the teamhouse.
- 1:03:08Speaker 1: From that, I want you guys to check out Andy's book.
- 1:03:12Speaker 5: The Time He Went Shutless as well as well.
- 1:03:15Speaker 1: Yeah you did, that's a clu. We'll get you shirtless again,
- 1:03:20Speaker 1: not drunk, We'll get your shirtless again. We'll get to
- 1:03:22Speaker 1: get a John shirtless to drop his reputation of a
- 1:03:25Speaker 1: couple of notches too.
- 1:03:27Speaker 2: Uh uh.
- 1:03:31Speaker 1: Your book When the Tempest Gathers an incredible book. Check
- 1:03:33Speaker 1: that out. That link is a description John's book of Course,
- 1:03:35Speaker 1: Theory of a Regular War and a Ran Shadow Weapons. Uh.
- 1:03:39Speaker 1: All those links are down in the description. I know
- 1:03:42Speaker 1: Andy you're working on another book having to do with
- 1:03:45Speaker 1: Gaza in Israel, right, like that's cooking, So we're looking
- 1:03:48Speaker 1: forward to that one. And uh, of course Jack's got
- 1:03:51Speaker 1: a new book coming out in June, very exciting fiction. Uh,
- 1:03:56Speaker 1: The Most Dangerous Man. I read it. It's really good.
- 1:03:59Speaker 1: Uh yeah, all those links are in the descriptions. Support
- 1:04:03Speaker 1: to show, Patreon dot com, slash the Teamhouse. You get
- 1:04:06Speaker 1: both eyes On and Teamhouse episodes AD free and early
- 1:04:12Speaker 1: and there's always a pleasure. Guys.
- 1:04:13Speaker 5: Thank you, yeah, thank you, Thanks guys, all the best us.
- 1:04:19Speaker 3: Hey everyone, I want to tell you about my new novel,
- 1:04:22Speaker 3: The Most Dangerous Man, out in June. It is a
- 1:04:25Speaker 3: novel about a Regimental Reconnaissance Company soldier who gets kidnapped
- 1:04:30Speaker 3: while he's on a mission to West Africa, and when
- 1:04:32Speaker 3: he wakes up, he finds that he is now being
- 1:04:35Speaker 3: hunted for sport by a group of tech billionaires through
- 1:04:38Speaker 3: the wilds of West Africa. This book is based on
- 1:04:42Speaker 3: stories that I heard over the years about safari guides
- 1:04:46Speaker 3: taking wealthy clients hunting for poachers on game reserves in Africa.
- 1:04:51Speaker 3: I took that and I took a century old short story,
- 1:04:54Speaker 3: The Most dangerous game and modernized it. And the product
- 1:04:57Speaker 3: is this book, which I think will feel temporary and
- 1:05:01Speaker 3: resonate with audiences today.
- 1:05:03Speaker 4: Thank you and please check it out.