Latest / Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign / 020 - Chapter 10 Part 1 - Hagarus Night of Fire

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020 - Chapter 10 Part 1 - Hagarus Night of Fire · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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  Speaker 1: Chapter ten, Part one of US Marine Operations in Korea
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  Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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  Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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  Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Hagaroo's Night of Fire.
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  Speaker 1: The importance of Hagaroo in the marine scheme of things
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  Speaker 1: was starkly obvious after the Chinese cut the MSR. Hagaroo,
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  Speaker 1: with its supply dumps, hospital facilities, and partly finished C
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  Speaker 1: forty seven airstrip, was the one base offering the First
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  Speaker 1: Marine Division a reasonable hope of uniting its separated elements.
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  Speaker 1: Hagarou had to be held at all costs. Yet only
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  Speaker 1: a reinforced infantry battalion less one rifle company and a
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  Speaker 1: third of its weapons company and two batteries of artillery
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  Speaker 1: were available for the main burden of the defense. Owing
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  Speaker 1: to transportation shortages, the third Battalion of the First Marines
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  Speaker 1: did not arrive at Hagaro until after dusk on twenty
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  Speaker 1: six November. Even so, it had been necessary to leave
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  Speaker 1: George Company and a platoon of Weapons company behind at
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  Speaker 1: Chigyong for lack of vehicles. The Parker Clad Mariines, climbing
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  Speaker 1: down stiffly from the trucks, had their first sight of
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  Speaker 1: a panorama which reminded one officer of old photographs of
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  Speaker 1: a gold Rush mining camp. In the Klondike, Tents, huts
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  Speaker 1: and supply dumps were scattered in a seemingly haphazard fashion
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  Speaker 1: about a frozen plain, crossed by a frozen river, and
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  Speaker 1: bordered on three sides by low hills rising to steep
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  Speaker 1: heights on the eastern outskirts. Although many of the buildings
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  Speaker 1: had survived the bombings, the battered town at the foot
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  Speaker 1: of the ice locked Chosen Reservoir was not a spectacle
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  Speaker 1: calculated to raise the spirits of newcomers. It was too
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  Speaker 1: late to relieve two seven Minus. That evening, Lieutenant Colonel's
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  Speaker 1: Ridge and Lockwood agreed that Fox Company seven Marines and
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  Speaker 1: Weapons Company Minus of two seven would occupy positions jointly
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  Speaker 1: with three to one. The hours of darkness passed quietly
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  Speaker 1: and relief was completed the next day. Fox Company then
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  Speaker 1: moved to its new positions near Taktong Pass four mile
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  Speaker 1: perimeter required on the morning of twenty seven November. Of course,
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  Speaker 1: an all out enemy attack was still in the realm
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  Speaker 1: of speculation, but it was evident to Lieutenant Colonel Ridge
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  Speaker 1: co of three to one that one to two infantry
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  Speaker 1: regiments and supporting arms would be required for an adequate
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  Speaker 1: defense of Hagarou. With only a battalion minus at his disposal,
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  Speaker 1: he realized that he must make the best possible use
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  Speaker 1: of the ground for the purposes of a survey. He
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  Speaker 1: sent his S three, Major Trumpeter on a walking reconnaissance
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  Speaker 1: with Major Simmons CO of Weapons Company and three to
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  Speaker 1: one supporting arms coordinating After a circuit of the natural amphitheater,
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  Speaker 1: the two officers agreed that even to hold the reverse
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  Speaker 1: slopes would require a perimeter of more than four miles
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  Speaker 1: in circumference. The personnel resources of three to one would
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  Speaker 1: thus be stretched to an average of one man for
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  Speaker 1: nearly seven yards of front. This meant that the commanding
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  Speaker 1: officer must take his choice between being weak everywhere or
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  Speaker 1: strong in a few sectors to the neglect of others.
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  Speaker 1: In either event, some areas along the perimeter would probably
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  Speaker 1: have to be defended by supporting fires alone. Under the circumstances,
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  Speaker 1: commented General Smith, and, considering the mission assigned to the
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  Speaker 1: first Marine Division, an infantry component of one battalion was
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  Speaker 1: all that could be spared for the defense of Hagarou.
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  Speaker 1: This battalion was very adequately supported by air and had
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  Speaker 1: sufficient artillery and tanks for its purposes. The terrain gave
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  Speaker 1: the enemy two major covered avenues of approach for troop movements.
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  Speaker 1: One was the hill mass east of Hagaroo, the other
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  Speaker 1: a draw leading into the southwest side of the town
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  Speaker 1: where the new airstrip was being constructed. Nor could the
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  Speaker 1: possibility of a surprise attack from some other quarter be
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  Speaker 1: dismissed entirely, Since ccf observers would be able to watch
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  Speaker 1: marine preparations from the surrounding hills in daylight hour. Lieutenant
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  Speaker 1: Colonel Ridge decided that final troop dispositions must depend not
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  Speaker 1: only on terrain, but equally on intelligence as to enemy capabilities.
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  Speaker 1: Until he had more information, the units of three to
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  Speaker 1: one were to remain in the areas formerly occupied by
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  Speaker 1: two seven attempts to clear MSR. The battalion CP had
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  Speaker 1: been set up in a pyramidal tent at the angle
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  Speaker 1: of the road to Yudam Knee. Most of the day
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  Speaker 1: on the twenty seventh was given over to improving positions
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  Speaker 1: at the southwest end of the perimeter. First Lieutenant Fischer's
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  Speaker 1: Item Company took over from Captain Barber's Fox Company the
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  Speaker 1: rifle company of two seven remaining at Hagaroo. On the
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  Speaker 1: strength of preliminary S two reports, Ridge instructed the commanders
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  Speaker 1: of his two rifle companies to improve their sectors, which
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  Speaker 1: included the entire south and southwest curve of the perimeter.
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  Speaker 1: All the Division headquarters troops except one motor convoy had
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  Speaker 1: reached Hagaroo by the twenty seventh, and it was due
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  Speaker 1: to leave Hungnam the next morning. The new Division CP
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  Speaker 1: was located in the northeast quarter of town, near the
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  Speaker 1: long concrete bridge over the frozen chang Jin River. Rows
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  Speaker 1: of heated tents surrounded a Japanese type frame house repaired
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  Speaker 1: for the occupancy of General Smith, who was expected by
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  Speaker 1: helicopter in the morning. Already functioning at the CP were
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  Speaker 1: elements of the General Staff, sections and Headquarters Company. The
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  Speaker 1: busiest marines at Hagaroo on the twenty seventh were the
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  Speaker 1: men of the first Engineer Battalion, while a Company B
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  Speaker 1: platoon built ten decks for the Division CP. Detachments of
• 6:02
  Speaker 1: Company A were at work on the maintenance of the
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  Speaker 1: MSR in the area, and Company D had the job
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  Speaker 1: of hacking out the new air strip. Apparently the latter
• 6:12
  Speaker 1: project had its sidewalk contractors even in subzero weather, for
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  Speaker 1: this comment found its way into the company report. Dozer
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  Speaker 1: work was pleasing to the eye of those who wanted activity,
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  Speaker 1: but contributed little to the overall earth moving problem. Of
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  Speaker 1: ninety thousand cubic yards of cut and sixty thousand cubic
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  Speaker 1: yards of fill. Motor graders and scrapers with a five
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  Speaker 1: point eight cubic yard capacity had been moved up from
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  Speaker 1: ham Hung. So difficult did it prove to get a
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  Speaker 1: bite of the frozen earth that steel teeth were welded
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  Speaker 1: to the blades. When the pan was filled, However, the
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  Speaker 1: earth froze to the cutting edges until it could be
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  Speaker 1: removed only by means of a jackhammer. The strip was
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  Speaker 1: about one fourth completed on the twenty seventh, vording to
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  Speaker 1: minimum estimates of the length required. Work went on that
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  Speaker 1: night as usual under the floodlights. Not until the small
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  Speaker 1: hours of the morning did the first reports reach Hagaroo
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  Speaker 1: of the CCF attacks on Ywnam Knee and Fox Hill.
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  Speaker 1: Since the remnants of two seven were still at Hagaroo
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  Speaker 1: for lack of transportation, when Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood, commanding officer
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  Speaker 1: of the battalion, received a dispatch from Colonel Litzenberg directing
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  Speaker 1: him to proceed to Taktong Pass and assist Fox Company.
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  Speaker 1: At zero five point thirty, he requested the loan of
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  Speaker 1: a rifle company of three to one to reinforce elements
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  Speaker 1: of Weapons Company minus two seven. Lieutenant Colonel Ridge could
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  Speaker 1: spare only a platoon from Howe Company, and at zero
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  Speaker 1: eight thirty the attempt was canceled. An hour later, Weapons
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  Speaker 1: Company and three tanks from the second platoon of Company D,
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  Speaker 1: first Tank Battalion made another effort. They pushed halfway to
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  Speaker 1: the objective, only to be turned back by heavy China.
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  Speaker 1: Any small arms and mortar fire from the high ground
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  Speaker 1: on both sides of the road. Supporting fires from three
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  Speaker 1: to one helped the column to break off contact and
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  Speaker 1: returned to Hagaroo at fifteen hundred no better success. Attended
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  Speaker 1: a reinforced platoon of how Company three to one, accompanied
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  Speaker 1: by three Company D tanks when it set out on
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  Speaker 1: the road to Coto Ree on the outskirts of Hagaroo.
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  Speaker 1: Within sight of Captain Corley's CP The men were forced
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  Speaker 1: to climb down from their vehicles and engage in a
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  Speaker 1: hot firefight. They estimated the enemy force at about fifty,
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  Speaker 1: but a Noy pilot dropped a message warning that some
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  Speaker 1: three hundred Chinese were moving up on the flanks of
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  Speaker 1: the patrol. The Marines managed to disengage at fifteen thirty
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  Speaker 1: with the aid of mortar and artillery fires from Hagaroo,
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  Speaker 1: and returned to the perimeter with losses of one killed
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  Speaker 1: and five wounded. A similar patrol from Item Company three
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  Speaker 1: to one struck off to the southwest of the perimeter
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  Speaker 1: in the direction of hungm On Knee late in the
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  Speaker 1: morning of the twenty eighth. This reinforced platoon encountered and
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  Speaker 1: estimated one hundred and fifty men and called for artillery
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  Speaker 1: and mortar fires. After dispersing this CCF group, the patrol
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  Speaker 1: routed a second enemy detachment an hour later after a
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  Speaker 1: brief firefight. Any lingering doubts as to the extent of
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  Speaker 1: the Chinese attack on the MSR were dispelled by reports
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  Speaker 1: from they and H three S one pilots of VMO six.
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  Speaker 1: They disclosed that defended enemy roadblocks had cut off Eudom Knee,
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  Speaker 1: Fox Hill, Hagaroo, and Cotoree from any physical contact with
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  Speaker 1: one another. The advanced units of the first Marine Division
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  Speaker 1: had been sliced into four isolated segments, as CCF columns
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  Speaker 1: penetrated as far south as the Chinhung Knee area. Intelligence
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  Speaker 1: asked to CCF capabilities. There was no question at all
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  Speaker 1: in the minds of Lieutenant Colonel Ridge and his officers
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  Speaker 1: as to whether the Chinese would attack at Hagarou. As
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  Speaker 1: early as the morning of the twenty seventh. The problem
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  Speaker 1: had simply been one of when, where, and in what strength.
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  Speaker 1: It was up to the S two section to provide
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  Speaker 1: the answers, and upon their correctness would depend the fate
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  Speaker 1: of Hagarou, perhaps even of the First Marine Division. Second
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  Speaker 1: Lieutenant Richard E. Carey, the S two was a newcomer
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  Speaker 1: to the battalion staff, recently transferred from a George Company
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  Speaker 1: Infantry platoon. His group consisted of an assistant intelligence Chief
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  Speaker 1: staff Surgent Saverio P. Gallo, an interpreter, and four scout observers.
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  Speaker 1: There were also two CIC agents assigned to three to
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  Speaker 1: one by Division G two at Hagarou, as at mud
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  Speaker 1: Jan nie. The Marines had one respect at the outset
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  Speaker 1: by allowing the Korean residents all privileges of self government
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  Speaker 1: which could be reconciled with military security. The police department
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  Speaker 1: and town officials had made and permitted to continue functioning.
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  Speaker 1: They in turn briefed the population as to restricted areas
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  Speaker 1: and security regulations, particularly curfew. Korean civilians entering Hagaroo through
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  Speaker 1: marine roadblocks were searched before being taken to the police station,
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  Speaker 1: where they were questioned by an interrogation team from the
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  Speaker 1: S two section. Hagaroo's resemblance to a gold rush mining
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  Speaker 1: camp was heightened on the twenty seventh by a tremendous
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  Speaker 1: influx of both troops and Koreans from outlying districts. A
• 11:30
  Speaker 1: large truck convoy from Headquarters Battalion arrived to set up
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  Speaker 1: the new Division CP, and detachments from various Marine and
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  Speaker 1: Army service units entered in a seemingly endless stream. The
• 11:41
  Speaker 1: Korean refugees had much the same story to tell. Most
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  Speaker 1: of them came from areas to the north and west
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  Speaker 1: of Hagaroo, and they had been evicted from their homes
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  Speaker 1: by large numbers of CCF troops carry instructed his CIC
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  Speaker 1: agents to converse with incoming Koreans and learn everything possible
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  Speaker 1: about the enemy situation. Again, as at majan Ni, people
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  Speaker 1: who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with communism were found highly
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  Speaker 1: cooperative as untrained observers. However, their estimates of CCF numbers
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  Speaker 1: and equipment could not be taken too literally. Since their
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  Speaker 1: statements agreed that the enemy was in close proximity, Carrie
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  Speaker 1: decided to take the risk of sending his two CIC
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  Speaker 1: agents on the dangerous mission of establishing direct contact. They
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  Speaker 1: were enjoined to make a circuit of the perimeter, mingling
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  Speaker 1: whenever possible with the Chinese, and determining the areas of
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  Speaker 1: heaviest concentration. The results went beyond Kerrie's fondest expectations. Not
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  Speaker 1: only did his agents return safely from their long hike
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  Speaker 1: over the hills, but they brought back vital information. Well
• 12:51
  Speaker 1: leting equipped Chinese communist units had been encountered to the
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  Speaker 1: south and west of Hagaru, and since Marine air also
• 12:59
  Speaker 1: reported unused rual activity in this area, it was a
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  Speaker 1: reasonable assumption that the enemy was concentrated there approximately in
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  Speaker 1: division strength. This answered the questions as to how many
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  Speaker 1: and where There remained the problem as to when the
• 13:15
  Speaker 1: attack might be expected. And again, on the twenty eighth,
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  Speaker 1: Carrie sent out his CIC agents to make direct contact.
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  Speaker 1: I expected little or no information he recollected, but apparently
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  Speaker 1: these men had away with them. Upon reporting back, they
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  Speaker 1: told me that they had talked freely with enemy troops,
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  Speaker 1: including several officers who boasted that they would occupy Hagarou.
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  Speaker 1: On the night of twenty eight November, major enemy units
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  Speaker 1: were reported to be five miles from the perimeter. Dusk
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  Speaker 1: was at approximately eighteen hundred, with complete darkness setting in
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  Speaker 1: shortly afterwards. Adding the estimate of three and a half
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  Speaker 1: hours for Chinese movements to the line of departure, the
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  Speaker 1: S two section calculated that the enemy could attack as
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  Speaker 1: as early as twenty one thirty on the night of
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  Speaker 1: the twenty eighth from the south and west in division
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  Speaker 1: strength positions of marine units. These intelligence estimates were accepted
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  Speaker 1: by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge as the basis for his planning
• 14:15
  Speaker 1: and troop dispositions. As the main base of defense, the
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  Speaker 1: tide end sectors of Howe and Item Companies were extended
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  Speaker 1: to include the south and southwest sides of the perimeter,
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  Speaker 1: nearly one third of the entire circumference in a continuous
• 14:30
  Speaker 1: line twenty three hundred yards in length, or more than
• 14:33
  Speaker 1: a mile and a quarter. Each platoon front thus averaged
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  Speaker 1: about three hundred eighty yards, which meant that supporting arms
• 14:41
  Speaker 1: must make up for lack of numbers. East Hill, considered
• 14:45
  Speaker 1: the second most likely point of enemy attack, was to
• 14:48
  Speaker 1: be assigned to George Company on arrival. Captain Sitter's outfit
• 14:53
  Speaker 1: had orders to depart the Chigyong area on the morning
• 14:55
  Speaker 1: of the twenty eighth, so that it would be expected
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  Speaker 1: at Hagarou before dark. The southeast quarter of the perimeter
• 15:03
  Speaker 1: between East Hill and the left flank of How Company
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  Speaker 1: was to be held by the following units. One Weapons Company,
• 15:11
  Speaker 1: less detachments reinforcing the rifle companies than its eighty one
• 15:14
  Speaker 1: millimeter mortars in placed near the Battalion CP manning a
• 15:19
  Speaker 1: roadblock on the route to Coto Ree and defending the
• 15:21
  Speaker 1: south nose of East Hill. Two Dog Company, First Engineer
• 15:27
  Speaker 1: Battalion less men at work on the airstrip, occupying the
• 15:31
  Speaker 1: ground south of the concrete bridge, and three Dog Battery,
• 15:36
  Speaker 1: Second Battalion, eleventh Marines, which had the mission of covering
• 15:39
  Speaker 1: seventy five percent of the perimeter with observed indirect fire
• 15:43
  Speaker 1: and twenty five percent with direct fire. These dispositions left
• 15:47
  Speaker 1: a gap between Weapons Company and the engineer and artillery
• 15:50
  Speaker 1: units on the west bank of the chang Jin River,
• 15:53
  Speaker 1: but this stretch of frozen marshland was so well covered
• 15:56
  Speaker 1: by fire that an enemy attack here would have been welcomed.
• 16:01
  Speaker 1: The first reports of the ccf Onslaughts at Udam Knee
• 16:04
  Speaker 1: and Fox Hill, as interpreted by Lieutenant Colonel Ridge, clearly
• 16:08
  Speaker 1: indicated that no time was to be lost at buttoning
• 16:11
  Speaker 1: up the Hagaroo perimeter. He called on Colonel Bowser the
• 16:15
  Speaker 1: Division G three on the morning of the twenty eighth,
• 16:18
  Speaker 1: and recommended that an overall Defense Commander be designated with
• 16:22
  Speaker 1: operational control over all local units. Ridge also requested that
• 16:27
  Speaker 1: George Company and the forty first Commando be expedited in
• 16:30
  Speaker 1: their movements to Hagaroo. Before a decision could be reached,
• 16:35
  Speaker 1: General Smith arrived by helicopter and opened the Division CP
• 16:38
  Speaker 1: at eleven hundred. A marine rear echelon had remained at
• 16:43
  Speaker 1: Hungnam to cope with supply requirements. Colonel Francis A McCallister,
• 16:48
  Speaker 1: the G four left in command, accomplished during the forthcoming
• 16:53
  Speaker 1: campaign what General Smith termed a magnificent job in rendering
• 16:57
  Speaker 1: logistical support. The VP at Hagarou had been open only
• 17:02
  Speaker 1: half an hour when General Almond arrived in a VMO
• 17:05
  Speaker 1: six helicopter to confer with the division commander. Departing at
• 17:09
  Speaker 1: twelve fifty five, he visited the thirty first Infantry troops,
• 17:13
  Speaker 1: who had been hard hit the night before by CCF
• 17:16
  Speaker 1: attacks east of the Chosen Reservoir. On his return to
• 17:20
  Speaker 1: hamhung the Core commander was informed that Sinkfe had directed
• 17:24
  Speaker 1: him to fly immediately to Tokyo for a conference. There,
• 17:28
  Speaker 1: he learned that the Eighth Army was in full retreat,
• 17:31
  Speaker 1: with some units taking heavy losses both in personnel and equipment.
• 17:35
  Speaker 1: Generals Almond, Walker, Hickey, Willoughby, Whitney, and Wright took turns
• 17:42
  Speaker 1: at briefing the commander in chief during a meeting which
• 17:45
  Speaker 1: lasted from midnight to zero one thirty at Hagaroo. It
• 17:49
  Speaker 1: was becoming more apparent hourly to Ridge that his prospects
• 17:52
  Speaker 1: of employing Captain Sitter's company on East Hill were growing
• 17:55
  Speaker 1: dim As he learned later the unit had left Chigia
• 18:00
  Speaker 1: that morning in the trucks of Company B, seventh Motor
• 18:03
  Speaker 1: Transport Battalion, commanded by Captain Clovis M. Jones. Sitter was
• 18:08
  Speaker 1: met at coto Ree by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rickert,
• 18:12
  Speaker 1: Executive Officer of rct I, and directed to report to
• 18:16
  Speaker 1: the Regimental S three, Major Robert E. Lorigan. Efforts to
• 18:21
  Speaker 1: open up the road to Hagaroo had failed, he was told,
• 18:24
  Speaker 1: and it would be necessary for George Company to remain
• 18:27
  Speaker 1: overnight at cooto Ree. The probability of such an outcome
• 18:31
  Speaker 1: had already been accepted by Ridge on the basis of
• 18:34
  Speaker 1: the resistance met on the road to koto Ree by
• 18:36
  Speaker 1: his How Company patrol. With this development added to his worries,
• 18:41
  Speaker 1: he received a telephone call at fifteen hundred from Colonel
• 18:44
  Speaker 1: Bowser informing him that he had been named Defense Commander
• 18:48
  Speaker 1: of Hagaroo by General Smith. Just ten minutes later, a
• 18:52
  Speaker 1: single CCFSLL assumed to be of seventy six millimeter caliber,
• 18:57
  Speaker 1: exploded in the battalion CP area and fatally wounded Captain
• 19:01
  Speaker 1: Paul E. Storrasley the S four The perimeter was so
• 19:06
  Speaker 1: cluttered with tents and dumps that artillery fire at random
• 19:09
  Speaker 1: could hardly have been wasted, but the enemy gun remained
• 19:12
  Speaker 1: silent the rest of the day, doubtless to avert marine
• 19:16
  Speaker 1: counter battery reprisals. Only three hours of daylight remained. When
• 19:20
  Speaker 1: the newly designated defense commanders summoned unit commanders to an
• 19:24
  Speaker 1: initial conference, it was not made clear just what troops
• 19:29
  Speaker 1: had been placed under his operational control. A primary reason,
• 19:33
  Speaker 1: commented Ridge, was that no one knew what units were there,
• 19:37
  Speaker 1: this being compounded by the numerous small elements such as detachments,
• 19:41
  Speaker 1: advanced parties, et ceter of which many were corps and
• 19:45
  Speaker 1: rock units. Hence the battalion, s Ie and his assistance
• 19:49
  Speaker 1: were a combination of town criers and census takers. We did, however,
• 19:55
  Speaker 1: get most of the commanders of major units, if such
• 19:58
  Speaker 1: they could be called to the initial conference, but the
• 20:02
  Speaker 1: process of locating and identifying smaller units was thereafter a
• 20:06
  Speaker 1: continuous process which we really never accurately completed. The larger
• 20:11
  Speaker 1: outfits could be summoned to the conferences by telephone, but
• 20:14
  Speaker 1: it was necessary to send out runners in other instances.
• 20:18
  Speaker 1: With George Company not available, the question of defending East
• 20:21
  Speaker 1: Hill loomed large Ridge decided against all proposals that one
• 20:26
  Speaker 1: of the two rifle companies be used for that purpose
• 20:30
  Speaker 1: on the strength of the S two report. He preferred
• 20:33
  Speaker 1: to concentrate as much strength as possible against an attack
• 20:36
  Speaker 1: from the southwest. This meant taking his chances on East
• 20:40
  Speaker 1: Hill with such Service troops as he could scrape up,
• 20:43
  Speaker 1: and it was plain that a strong CCF effort in
• 20:46
  Speaker 1: this quarter would have to be met, in large part
• 20:48
  Speaker 1: by firepower from supporting arms. The two main detachments selecting
• 20:53
  Speaker 1: for East Hill excluding the South Nose, were from Dog
• 20:57
  Speaker 1: Company of the tenth Engineer See Battalion, U S Army
• 21:01
  Speaker 1: and elements of ten Corps Headquarters. Since the mission called
• 21:06
  Speaker 1: for control of mortar and artillery fires as well as
• 21:09
  Speaker 1: tactical leadership, two officers of Weapons Company three to one
• 21:13
  Speaker 1: were assigned, Captain John C. Schellnutt to the Army Engineer
• 21:17
  Speaker 1: Company and First Lieutenant John L. Burke Junior to the
• 21:21
  Speaker 1: headquarters troops. Each was to be accompanied by a Marine
• 21:25
  Speaker 1: Radio SCR three hundred operator. Smaller detachments were later sent
• 21:31
  Speaker 1: to East Hill from two other service units, the First
• 21:34
  Speaker 1: Service Battalion, First Marine Division and the four Signal Battalion
• 21:38
  Speaker 1: of ten Corps. The Anti Tank Company of the seventh
• 21:42
  Speaker 1: Marines defended the area to the north of East Hill.
• 21:46
  Speaker 1: Next came Howe Battery, third Battalion, eleventh Marines, which had
• 21:49
  Speaker 1: the mission of supporting Fox Company two seven on the
• 21:52
  Speaker 1: hill near Taktong Pass, but by moving gun trails, the
• 21:57
  Speaker 1: cannoneers could with some difficulty fire the two hundred seventy
• 22:00
  Speaker 1: degree arc of the perimeter, stretching from the right flank
• 22:03
  Speaker 1: of ITEM Company around to the north nose of East Hill.
• 22:07
  Speaker 1: Between the sectors held by how Battery three eleven an
• 22:11
  Speaker 1: Item Company three to one were troops of five marine units,
• 22:15
  Speaker 1: Regulating Detachment, First Service Battalion, first Motor Transport Battalion, Marine
• 22:21
  Speaker 1: Tactical Air Control Squadron, two m Tax two Division, Headquarters Battalion,
• 22:28
  Speaker 1: and H and S Company three to one. The only
• 22:31
  Speaker 1: other unit in this quarter was Weapons Company Minus two seven,
• 22:35
  Speaker 1: which held the roadblock on the route to Udem Knee.
• 22:39
  Speaker 1: At the conference, it was decided that since Lieutenant Colonel
• 22:42
  Speaker 1: Charles L. Banks's Regulating Detachment had taken lead and organizing
• 22:46
  Speaker 1: the supply area on the north side of Hagaroo, the
• 22:49
  Speaker 1: arc of the perimeter east of the River and west
• 22:51
  Speaker 1: of East Hill was to be made into a secondary
• 22:54
  Speaker 1: defense zone. Banks thus became in effect a sub sector commander,
• 23:00
  Speaker 1: the only infantry troops in the supply area being detachments
• 23:03
  Speaker 1: of two seven units. It was also agreed that tactical
• 23:06
  Speaker 1: decisions concerning the zone should be discussed with the two
• 23:09
  Speaker 1: ranking battalion officers, Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood the commander and Major
• 23:15
  Speaker 1: Sawyer the executive. These matters having been settled, the conference
• 23:20
  Speaker 1: broke up shortly after seventeen hundred, and the various commanders
• 23:23
  Speaker 1: hastened back to their outfits to make last minute preparations
• 23:26
  Speaker 1: for the Knight's attack. A strange hush had fallen over
• 23:30
  Speaker 1: the perimeter, broken only by the occasional crackle of small
• 23:33
  Speaker 1: arms fire, and the damp air felt like snow. End
• 23:38
  Speaker 1: of Chapter ten, Part one, read by Aaron Bennett.