Latest / Marketplace Businesses with Fexingo: Two-Sided Networks, Liquidity, and Take Rates / How GrubHub Solved the Chicken-and-Egg Problem
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- Lucas: If these conversations are useful for what you're building or running, we keep them free and ad-free because listener support makes that possible. Luna: Yeah, it's a small thing that adds up. If you want to help, the link is buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo. Lucas: Alright, let's talk about the chicken and egg problem that every two-sided marketplace faces: which side do you build first? Demand or supply? Luna: And it's not just a theoretical question. Get it wrong and you burn through cash with nothing to show for it. Lucas: Exactly. So today I want to look at how GrubHub solved this. GrubHub started in 2004, before the iPhone existed. No app store. No mobile payments. Just a simple website that listed restaurant menus. Luna: Right, and the conventional wisdom at the time was: sign up restaurants first, then find customers. Lucas: But GrubHub's founder, Mike Evans, did the opposite. He went after demand first. He started by posting menus from restaurants in Chicago without their permission. He just scraped the menus and put them online. Luna: Wait, so he had zero supply agreements? That seems risky. Lucas: It was. But he realized that the real friction was on the diner side. People didn't have a good way to browse takeout options. If he could build a loyal audience of hungry office workers, then the restaurants would have to come to him. Luna: And did they? Lucas: Eventually, yes. Once a restaurant noticed that it was getting calls from people who saw the menu on GrubHub, they'd call Mike and say, 'Hey, how do I get listed?' And then he'd sign them up and start charging a commission. Luna: So the key was that he didn't need to sign supply in advance because the demand side gave him leverage. Lucas: Exactly. And he kept it simple. He didn't offer online ordering at first. The website just displayed the phone number. The diner would call the restaurant directly. GrubHub took zero transaction fee. Their only revenue was a flat monthly subscription from restaurants — about $100 a month. Luna: So the take rate was effectively zero on the transaction. But the subscription gave them predictable revenue while they built liquidity. Lucas: Right. And they waited until they had enough diner traffic before they added online ordering. That came in 2007 with the launch of GrubHub.com's order-processing system. Once they handled the order, they could charge a per-order commission — typically 13 to 15 percent. Luna: And that's the classic marketplace playbook: build liquidity on one side, then monetize by adding value on the other. Lucas: It's also why GrubHub survived the dot-com bust and so many others didn't. They didn't try to build both sides at once. They focused on a tiny, specific user group: downtown Chicago office workers who wanted to order lunch. Luna: Which is a great example of the 'liquidity threshold' concept. You only need enough users on both sides to create a self-sustaining loop. For GrubHub, that threshold was just a few hundred restaurants and a few thousand regular diners in one city. Lucas: And then they expanded city by city, replicating the same playbook. By the time they went public in 2014, they were in over 600 cities. But the core insight never changed: get the demand side first, because supply will follow the demand. Luna: Though I'd push back a little. That works when supply is fragmented and they're desperate for customers. But if supply is concentrated, like in the ride-hailing market, you might need to subsidize drivers first. Lucas: That's a great point. Uber actually did the opposite. In 2009, they started by recruiting limo drivers in San Francisco. They had to guarantee a certain number of rides per hour to keep drivers on the platform. So they subsidized the demand side — offering free or discounted rides to early users. Luna: So it's not a one-size-fits-all. You have to look at which side has more elasticity. In food delivery, diners are elastic — they'll switch to a better app easily. In ride-hailing, drivers are more elastic because they can choose which app to drive for. So you subsidize the side that needs the most convincing. Lucas: Right. And Airbnb is another interesting case. They started with the demand side — people looking for affordable accommodations during a conference in San Francisco. But they quickly realized they needed both sides to trust each other. So they invested heavily in professional photography and a review system. Luna: Which is a form of subsidy too — not cash, but a service that reduces friction. Lucas: Exactly. So the lesson from GrubHub is: don't try to solve both sides simultaneously. Pick your wedge. For GrubHub, it was the demand side. They built a simple, useful product for diners. That created enough pull to bring in restaurants, and then they layered on monetization. Luna: And the wedge has to be something that solves a real pain point for that side. For diners, it was 'I don't know what's available for lunch.' For Uber riders, it was 'I can't get a cab in the rain.' Lucas: So if you're building a marketplace today, the first question isn't 'how do I monetize?' It's 'which side do I serve first, and what's the minimum viable product that gets them to the table?' Luna: And once you have that side, you can start the flywheel. That's the GrubHub story in a nutshell. Lucas: We deliberately don't run ads on these shows. If you want to support that choice and help keep the content free, the link is buy me a coffee dot com slash fexingo. Luna: Even a small contribution makes a difference. Thanks for considering it. Lucas: Alright, back to marketplaces. One last thought: GrubHub's early strategy also shows that you don't need to own the transaction to create value. For years, they just listed menus and phone numbers. That was enough to build a loyal user base. Luna: And that's a lesson for any marketplace founder. Sometimes the simplest version of your product is the one that gets you to liquidity. Lucas: So the next time you hear someone say 'we need to build both sides at once,' remember GrubHub. They started with zero supply and zero take rate, and they turned that into a multi-billion dollar business.