Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / A hijacked analytics script, and the phones it quietly emptied
Transcript
- 0:03Good evening, and welcome to Decrypted.
- 0:05I'm Belinder. It's Friday, the sixth of November, twenty twenty-six, and this is the evening edition.
- 0:11A hijacked analytics script, and the phones it quietly emptied.
- 0:17A Russian-linked spying campaign has come into focus since this morning's post.
- 0:22Security firm Sekoia published its findings on 4 November.
- 0:26Phones were attacked through a third-party analytics script that websites had loaded in good faith.
- 0:32Sekoia attributes the campaign, with moderate to high confidence, to APT29, also called Midnight Blizzard and
- 0:39widely linked to Russian intelligence.
- 0:42That's an attribution, not a court finding.
- 0:45So how did a tracker end up working for the attackers?
- 0:48Between 27 August and 3 September, a file on the servers of Plerdy, a search optimisation tracking service,
- 0:55was modified. Any site loading the tracker pulled in a fingerprinting script.
- 1:00Sekoia says thousands of sites load the tracker, mostly Ukrainian, while SecurityWeek says hundreds were exposed.
- 1:07Lookalike domains and injected code on legitimate sites ran alongside.
- 1:12Think of an embedded script as a front-door key handed to a contractor, who then trusts their own subcontractors.
- 1:18You never vetted the subcontractor, yet visitors walk through the door they hold.
- 1:23What did the attack actually do once it was running?
- 1:26The script profiles each visitor and serves an attack only if the device looks like a real phone.
- 1:32Sekoia describes three chains for iPhones and Android, all built on flaws already patched.
- 1:38So no zero-days, which are flaws attackers use before a fix exists.
- 1:42One iPhone chain steals browser cookies, including those of apps outside Safari.
- 1:47A fuller one harvests messages, the Keychain and Wi-Fi passwords.
- 1:52The Android payload, AndroSnitch, takes Chrome cookies, logins and history.
- 1:57Nothing persists, and bleeping computer notes that a reboot ends the activity.
- 2:02Sekoia calls it consistent with intelligence gathering.
- 2:06Stolen session cookies could let an attacker reuse a logged-in session, webmail included.
- 2:12And if you run one of these websites, what would you see?
- 2:15Almost nothing. Your website loads normally.
- 2:18The script hides inside roughly 2.
- 2:203 megabytes of dead code, about 98% of the file, which Sekoia suggests may make it look legitimate or hinder analysis.
- 2:29The damage happens on the visitor's phone, so your server logs show an ordinary visit.
- 2:33Nothing on your side raises an alert unless you already watch which scripts your pages load.
- 2:39The first you hear of it may be someone else's incident report.
- 2:42So what's the Secure by Design lesson here?
- 2:46The failed design decision was giving an outside script the full authority of your page.
- 2:51Three controls cost little.
- 2:53First, list every third-party script on your public sites, and remove any nobody can justify.
- 2:59Second, set a Content Security Policy, a browser rule limiting where scripts load from and send data to.
- 3:06Third, pin rarely changing files with Subresource Integrity, a checksum the browser verifies.
- 3:13It breaks on self-updating trackers, which is the honest price.
- 3:17Because every chain used patched bugs, the boring control matters too: force phone updates through mobile
- 3:24device management. The UK angle is thin.
- 3:27Sekoia names no UK victims.
- 3:29One lookalike domain imitated a London hotel, which Sekoia says may have aimed at diplomatic guests.
- 3:36That's its reasoning, not a confirmed target.
- 3:39As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 3:43That was Decrypted, with me, Belinder.
- 3:47The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 3:50Thanks for listening. Stay patched, and stay sceptical.