Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Q3] Costco Deep Value Analysis: The Perfect Business at a Speculative Price?
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome back to the Deep Dive. All right, we've got a mountain
- 0:04of research in front of us. Forensic financial reports,
- 0:06strategy papers, deep dives into consumer psychology, and it's
- 0:10all focused on one company that is, frankly, one of the biggest
- 0:14enigmas on the market today. Costco Ticker COST.
- 0:19It really is an anomaly and I think the goal for us today is
- 0:23to try and resolve what looks like a massive financial
- 0:26paradox. A paradox?
- 0:27How so? Well, on one hand you have a
- 0:29business machine that legendary investors, I mean you think
- 0:32Charlie Munger revered for its perfection.
- 0:35It has this incredibly deep Moat.
- 0:36But on the other hand, the market is pricing it like a like
- 0:39a high growth tech startup, not a retailer that sells pallets of
- 0:43paper towels. OK.
- 0:44So that's our mission today. We need to go way beyond the
- 0:46simple retail metrics, you know, the usual sales growth numbers.
- 0:50We're going to use these sources to really get under the hood and
- 0:52understand that tension. Exactly why is Costco seen as a
- 0:55platinum quality compounder from that Munger perspective?
- 0:58But at the same time, it's trading at a price that a value
- 1:01investor, say S S Klarman, would look at and probably call
- 1:05distressed or speculative. It's the ultimate battle of
- 1:08quality versus price. We're going to dissect a
- 1:11business that is for all intents and purposes, built for
- 1:14flawlessness. The problem is it's stock price
- 1:17demands that same flawless execution for what, the next
- 1:21decade? A high bar, A very high bar.
- 1:23So if we can unpack its financial architecture, and I
- 1:26mean really get into the psychological engineering behind
- 1:28it, I think we can show you exactly why that risk reward
- 1:32equation looks so, well, so lopsided right now.
- 1:35OK, let's unpack this. We're starting at the very
- 1:38foundation, the philosophy, because Costco, from what I'm
- 1:42reading here, it seems to have fundamentally inverted the logic
- 1:44of capitalism as we know it. It did.
- 1:47So, Section 1, The philosophical architecture of a retail
- 1:50anomaly. Right.
- 1:51So think about it, when you walk into almost any store, 99% of
- 1:56them the model is adversarial. What do you mean by adversarial?
- 1:59The relationship between the store and you, the customer,
- 2:02it's all built around maximizing their margin.
- 2:05The merchants one and only goal is to make the spread between
- 2:08their cost and the price you pay as wide as humanly possible.
- 2:11That's just business, right? Yeah.
- 2:13That's the traditional model, yes, and it's the model Costco
- 2:15just completely rejected. Their whole philosophical
- 2:18architecture is different. They don't operate as a merchant
- 2:21trying to sell you something. They see themselves as a a
- 2:24fiduciary purchasing agent acting on your behalf.
- 2:27So their goal isn't to see how high they can price ATV.
- 2:30No, it's the opposite. Their internal goal, their
- 2:34mission, is to figure out how low they can possibly price that
- 2:38TV and still cover their operating costs.
- 2:41And this isn't just some, you know, marketing slogan on a
- 2:44poster in the break room. It's actually built into their
- 2:47financial DNA. That's the critical point.
- 2:49The sources all hammer home they have a mandated internal cap on
- 2:53their gross margins. It's not a suggestion, it's a
- 2:56rule. And the numbers are specific.
- 2:58Very specific for any brand name goods, think Sony TV's or Heinz
- 3:02Ketchup. The gross margin is capped at
- 3:0414% for their own private label, Kirkland's Signature, which is a
- 3:08massive business in itself. They allow themselves a little
- 3:11more room, up to 15%. This is a strategic choice, a
- 3:14self-imposed constraint. OK, I have to stop you there
- 3:17because that just seems counterintuitive.
- 3:20If your whole goal is to make a profit, why 14%?
- 3:23Why not 16 or 18? Two percentage points on their
- 3:27scale would be what, hundreds of millions of dollars in pure
- 3:30profit? Why are they leaving that on the
- 3:33table? Because leaving that money on
- 3:35the table is the strategy. That's what builds and deepens
- 3:38the Moat. The moment they start squeezing
- 3:40that margin up to 1617%, you, the customer, you start to
- 3:44notice the price gap between them and everyone else shrinks
- 3:48and that hard won trust begins to erode.
- 3:51So the discipline to stick to that cap is actually their
- 3:54reinvestment. They're pouring potential profit
- 3:57back into the customer experience, into the price.
- 3:59Precisely. And this idea, this concept of
- 4:02giving away your scale savings directly to the customer, this
- 4:05is what the legendary investor Nick Sleep built his entire
- 4:09thesis around. He called it scale Economy
- 4:12Shared. Right.
- 4:13The bigger you get, the cheaper things you get for your
- 4:14customer, not just more profitable for you.
- 4:17Exactly. I mean, think about the immense
- 4:19purchasing power at Costco has They're buying more of almost
- 4:21anything than anyone else. Instead of hoarding those
- 4:24savings to boost their own bottom line, they systematically
- 4:27pass them back to the consumer through lower prices.
- 4:30And that creates a flywheel. A perfect reciprocal flywheel.
- 4:34Lower prices build loyalty. Loyalty drives more volume and
- 4:38more members, which in turn gives them even greater
- 4:41purchasing power to negotiate even lower costs.
- 4:45And on and on it goes. So the consumer surplus they
- 4:47create, I mean the actual dollars you save on your grocery
- 4:51bill, that becomes this trust Moat.
- 4:53It's an asset that is almost impossible for a competitor to
- 4:56replicate. How could they imagine a
- 4:59competitor trying to suddenly cap their margins at 14%?
- 5:02It would completely gut their business.
- 5:04Their shareholders would revolt. They'd have to destroy their
- 5:07legacy business model to compete.
- 5:08So yeah, the forensic conclusion is that Costco has built an
- 5:10asset based on psychology and trust, not just on price.
- 5:13You just know in implicitly when you walk in there that if
- 5:16they're stocking it, it's probably the best value you're
- 5:19going to find. Which leads right into the next
- 5:21point, which I think is the most critical for anyone trying to
- 5:24analyze this company. Right, Costco isn't really in
- 5:27the business of selling goods. They're selling a subscription.
- 5:30They are selling a subscription to an incredibly efficient
- 5:34supply chain. The goods, the hot dogs, the
- 5:38giant teddy bears, Yeah, they're just the mechanism to get you to
- 5:42renew. And the financial architecture,
- 5:44I mean, it really flips the whole script.
- 5:46Let's look at those numbers you flagged for me.
- 5:48Yeah. So if you just look at the top
- 5:50line revenue, merchandise sales are you know, almost everything
- 5:53over 98%, the membership fees, that subscription income, it
- 5:57looks like a tiny sliver, only about 1.93% of total revenue.
- 6:02A rounding error basically, but that's not the real.
- 6:04Story. Not at all, because that
- 6:06merchandise revenue has huge costs attached to it, right?
- 6:09You have the cost of the goods themselves, shipping, labor,
- 6:13keeping the lights on, all that. Exactly.
- 6:15So when you slide down the income statement to operating
- 6:18income, the picture completely inverts.
- 6:21Those Piney membership fees suddenly account for a
- 6:24staggering 52 to 70% of the company's entire operating
- 6:29profit. Wait, say that again, up to 70%.
- 6:32Up to 70%, yeah, depending on how you decide to allocate some
- 6:35of the general and admin expenses.
- 6:36But the point is, it's the majority.
- 6:39The vast majority. So what you're saying is if the
- 6:42entire merchandise side of the business, all the warehouses,
- 6:45all the products just broke even or even ran at a small loss?
- 6:50The company would still be massively profitable just from
- 6:53those 60 and $120.00 a year subscription fees alone.
- 6:57That's incredible. The entire retail operation is
- 6:59basically a break even logistics service.
- 7:01It's a marketing service. It's sole purpose is to uphold
- 7:04that low price promise to a degree that makes renewing your
- 7:07membership an absolute no brainer.
- 7:10So for our analysis, the standard retail metrics like
- 7:13same store sales are secondary. They're important, but they're
- 7:16not the main thing. The true non negotiable health
- 7:19indicator for this Organism is the renewal rate.
- 7:22And that number is. It's consistently pushing 93%
- 7:26globally, and in their core markets, the US and Canada, it's
- 7:29in the high 90s. If you ever see that number
- 7:32start to dip even a little, that's when you know the entire
- 7:35model is in trouble. It's the ultimate Canary in the
- 7:37coal mine for them. They basically weaponized the
- 7:40idea of a loss leader, but they turned it into a high margin
- 7:43recurring revenue subscription service.
- 7:45That's genius. So OK, we get the philosophy.
- 7:49This Moat of trust is powerful, but trust alone doesn't fend off
- 7:54the biggest companies in the world.
- 7:56How does Costco strategically defend its turf against, I mean,
- 8:00the two Titans of retail, Walmart and Amazon?
- 8:03This is where we get into the concept of counter positioning.
- 8:06It's a beautiful strategic idea. It means you adopt A business
- 8:09model that's not just different, but superior in a way that the
- 8:12big entrenched incumbents simply cannot copy.
- 8:15Why can't they copy you? Because it would require them to
- 8:18damage their existing highly profitable businesses.
- 8:20It's a form of competitive jiu jitsu.
- 8:22OK, let's break that down. Let's start with the Walmart
- 8:24constraint. Walmart is huge.
- 8:27They're efficient. They have incredible logistics,
- 8:29why can't they just launch a competing warehouse club that
- 8:32matches Costco on price? Because Walmart is fundamentally
- 8:36trapped by its own success, by its customers expectations.
- 8:40Their whole model, the Supercenter, is built on the
- 8:43promise of endless selection. Right, you go there for
- 8:46everything. Everything.
- 8:48A typical Walmart stocks what, 140,000 different items or SKUs?
- 8:53Toys, car parts, groceries, clothes, everything.
- 8:57Costco, in stark contrast, is all about intense curation.
- 9:01They only stock about 4000 SKU's.
- 9:03So if Walmart tried to compete head to head with Costco, they'd
- 9:07have to drastically slash their selection and cap their margins
- 9:10at that 14% level. And in doing so, they would be
- 9:13destroying the very foundation of their brand.
- 9:15Their core customer who goes there for that one stop variety
- 9:18would be alienated. And capping their margins across
- 9:21the board would decimate the profitability they get from
- 9:24higher margin stuff like apparel and electronics.
- 9:27Cisco's limited selection is actually a strength that Walmart
- 9:30can't mimic without essentially committing corporate suicide.
- 9:34Exactly. It's self harm.
- 9:36Now what about the other giant Amazon?
- 9:38Right. Amazon has infinite money and
- 9:40they dominate convenience. They're obsessed with
- 9:43efficiency. What's stopping them?
- 9:45Amazon runs head first into a wall.
- 9:48A wall called the Logistics Physics Problem.
- 9:50The logistics physics problem explain that.
- 9:53E-commerce, for all its wonders, has really, really bad unity and
- 9:57economics when it comes to things that are heavy, bulky, or
- 10:00cheap. I mean, think about shipping a
- 10:0140 LB bag of dog food, or a 30 pack of paper towels, or a case
- 10:06of bottled water. The shipping cost would be more
- 10:09than the item itself. It often is that that last mile
- 10:11cost the actual expense of getting that heavy thing from a
- 10:15warehouse onto a truck and onto your specific doorstep.
- 10:18It just destroys any potential profit margin.
- 10:21Costco, they just sidestep that problem entirely.
- 10:24They sidestep it brilliantly. They've effectively outsourced
- 10:26the most expensive, most complicated part of the
- 10:29logistics chain that last mile to you, the customer.
- 10:32We're providing free labor. You are.
- 10:34You willingly drive your own car.
- 10:36You push the cart, you pick the items, you load them up, and you
- 10:39haul them home. You provide the free labor and
- 10:41the free transport, and in exchange Costco gives you a
- 10:45massive price. Arbitrage O.
- 10:47It's this great bifurcation of retail Amazon wins on
- 10:50convenience and that endless aisle.
- 10:53Costco wins on curated quality and extreme value per unit.
- 10:56They occupy slightly different orbits.
- 10:58They can coexist because they're solving different problems for
- 11:01the consumer. Here's where it gets really
- 11:03interesting. Funny, though, it's not just
- 11:05about the logistics, it's the psychology.
- 11:07They somehow managed to turn a mundane chore into stocking up
- 11:11on toilet paper into a treasure hunt.
- 11:14This is their merchandising secret weapon.
- 11:16It's all about using scarcity and the dopamine rush of
- 11:19discovery. They strategically and
- 11:21constantly rotate about 25% of their inventory.
- 11:24The so-called Wow products. Exactly.
- 11:27You walk in one week and there's a $10,000 diamond ring next to
- 11:30the asparagus, or a case of super high end Bordeaux wine.
- 11:33The next week it's gone, and in its place are gold bars or a
- 11:37fancy kayak or a giant wheel of Parmesan cheese.
- 11:41I remember seeing this once they were selling this massive
- 11:43industrial grade safe and I'm thinking who is buying an
- 11:47industrial safe at Costco? But because it was there and it
- 11:50was a great deal, people were looking at it.
- 11:52That fear of missing out, that FOMO, it has to have a real
- 11:56financial purpose. Oh, it has two very critical
- 11:59forensic purposes. First, it increases frequency.
- 12:03You might not need paper towels this week, but you go to the
- 12:06warehouse anyway. Why?
- 12:07Because you're afraid you might miss out on that limited time
- 12:10Kayak or that discounted TV, That compulsion dramatically
- 12:14drives up what's called their share of wallet.
- 12:16And we actually saw the data on this from fiscal year 2024.
- 12:20We did. The data is clear.
- 12:22This strategy is the lifeblood of the model.
- 12:25Traffic. Just the number of people
- 12:26walking in the door increased by a huge 6.4% worldwide in 2024.
- 12:31And they need that constant traffic.
- 12:32They absolutely need it. It's essential to offset their
- 12:35massive fixed costs. I mean running those huge
- 12:38refrigerated warehouses isn't cheap.
- 12:40And to pay for their famously high employee wages, which are
- 12:43way above the retail average. OK, so that's the first purpose,
- 12:46get people in the door more often.
- 12:48What's the second? The second is that it speeds up
- 12:51the cash conversion cycle, which we're going to dive into in a
- 12:53bit, but the short version is urgency makes people buy faster.
- 12:57If you see a high ticket item, a discretionary purchase, and you
- 13:02know it's a one time deal, you buy it now.
- 13:05You don't go home and compare prices online for three weeks.
- 13:08Right, you just pull the trigger.
- 13:09You pull the trigger and that velocity, that speed
- 13:13dramatically improves the rate at which Costco converts its
- 13:16inventory into cash. They're basically leveraging
- 13:19your impulsiveness to make their balance sheet stronger that.
- 13:22Philosophical framework is compelling, but does it actually
- 13:26show up on the Ledger? Let's switch gears to Section 3
- 13:29and see if the accounting really backs up the philosophy.
- 13:32When we're looking at a company this big, the first step is
- 13:35always to check the quality of the earnings.
- 13:37It's essential, especially for a stock trading at this kind of
- 13:41multiple. So the reported net income for
- 13:43fiscal year 2025 was a very healthy $8.099 billion.
- 13:50But a proper forensic analysis means we have to adjust that
- 13:53number. We have to strip out some non
- 13:55recurring tax benefits that, you know, artificially inflated that
- 13:58headline figure. OK.
- 14:00What were the specific adjustments we need to be aware
- 14:02of? We found two big ones.
- 14:04First, in the fourth quarter of 2024, they booked a $63 million
- 14:09tax benefit that wasn't operational.
- 14:11It was related to something called a transfer pricing
- 14:14settlement. That sounds complicated.
- 14:15It is, but all you need to know is it's a one off accounting
- 14:18thing between their international divisions.
- 14:20It's not repeatable income from the core business.
- 14:22OK. So that's 63,000,000.
- 14:24What was the second adjustment? In the first quarter of 2025,
- 14:27there was another one, a $100 million tax benefit.
- 14:31This one came from deductions related to employees exercising
- 14:35their stock based compensation. So again, real cash savings for
- 14:39the company, but not from selling more rotisserie
- 14:41chickens. Exactly.
- 14:42It doesn't reflect the core repeatable earning power of the
- 14:45business. So when you strip out these, you
- 14:48know, below the line tax items. What happens to the growth rate?
- 14:52The result is a slightly lower but much cleaner estimate of
- 14:56their true earnings and more importantly, the organic growth
- 14:59rate for that year drops from the reported 9.9%, which is a
- 15:04really attractive near double digit headline number, down to a
- 15:10still very strong but noticeably slower rate of about 7.8%.
- 15:15So the core business is still growing at a great clip, but if
- 15:18you're an investor paying a 48 times multiple for this stock,
- 15:22the difference between 9.9% growth and 7.8% growth
- 15:26compounded over a decade is absolutely massive.
- 15:29It creates this subtle but very real gap between the story and
- 15:33the reality. It's all about managing
- 15:34expectations. The machine is humming along
- 15:36beautifully, but the investment thesis demands we know exactly
- 15:40where that growth is coming from.
- 15:42Now let's look at a metric that for any other company, we'd
- 15:44analyze completely differently. Gross margin discipline.
- 15:47Yes, this is so counterintuitive, but it's where
- 15:50you see their commitment to the philosophy in black and white.
- 15:53For fiscal 2025, their gross margin was about 12.8%.
- 15:58And if I were looking at, I don't know any other retailer,
- 16:00I'd be asking why aren't you expanding that margin,
- 16:04especially with all the inflation we've seen, consumers
- 16:06are used to prices going. Up.
- 16:08And that would be the novice mistake here for Costco, seeing
- 16:12that margin expand, say moving from 12 .8 up to 15%.
- 16:17That would be a 5 alarm fire. A huge red flag.
- 16:20A red flag. Yet because it would signal that
- 16:22they're drifting from their strategy, it would mean
- 16:25management is getting greedy or complacent, that they're pushing
- 16:28prices higher and abandoning that scale economy's shared
- 16:31promise. So the discipline to keep
- 16:33margins flat or even let them compress a little during high
- 16:36inflation is actually the strongest possible sign that
- 16:39they're sticking to the plan. It's proof it proves they're
- 16:42prioritizing customer trust and those long term renewal rates
- 16:45over any short term profit boost.
- 16:47The margin is optimized for loyalty, not-for-profit.
- 16:51That razor thin margin is what they pay to acquire and keep the
- 16:54best customer base in all of retail.
- 16:57All right. Let's move from the income
- 16:58statement over to the balance sheet, because this is where all
- 17:01that operational efficiency really translates into raw
- 17:05financial power. Yeah, this is where you see the
- 17:07structural strength of the whole enterprise.
- 17:09And the absolute centerpiece of this is the anomaly known as the
- 17:12cash conversion cycle, or CCC. Right.
- 17:15So the CCC, it basically measures how fast a company can
- 17:18turn its investment in inventory into actual cash from sales.
- 17:24For most companies, this number is positive.
- 17:26You have to spend money on inventory, wait to sell it, and
- 17:29then wait for the customer to pay you.
- 17:30Which means your cash is tied up.
- 17:31You often have to borrow money just to finance your own
- 17:34inventory. Exactly.
- 17:35But Costco, along with a few other elite retailers, operates
- 17:39with a negative or near 0 cash conversion cycle.
- 17:43Which means they sell their inventory and collect the cash
- 17:45before they even have to pay their suppliers for it.
- 17:47Precisely. Let's just walk through the
- 17:48numbers quickly because it's pretty amazing.
- 17:50First, is Day's inventory outstanding, or DIO?
- 17:53That's how long stuff sits on the shelf.
- 17:55For Costco, it's about 28 days, very fast.
- 17:58Then you have day's sales outstanding DSO, how long to get
- 18:02the cash from the customer? Which is almost instant, right?
- 18:05You pay with cash or a credit card.
- 18:07So that's only about four days. OK, and here's the magic lever
- 18:10Days payables, outstanding DPO, how long they take to pay their
- 18:15suppliers. And thanks to their massive
- 18:17scale, they can stretch that out to about 30 days.
- 18:20So you run the math 28 days for inventory plus four days to
- 18:24collect, minus the 30 days they get to pay their bills.
- 18:27You get ACCC about two days and you said in some cases it even
- 18:30goes negative. It can dip down to -9 days
- 18:34depending on the timing, but whether it's 2 or -9 the
- 18:37implication is the same. Costco suppliers are effectively
- 18:41giving them an interest free loan to finance their inventory.
- 18:45This float is a massive hidden form of leverage.
- 18:49Give me an analogy for that. Why is that such a superpower?
- 18:52OK, imagine you went grocery shopping today.
- 18:54You get the food, you take it home, but your credit card isn't
- 18:58actually charged until next month, and then tomorrow someone
- 19:01pays you for those groceries. So I'm holding their money for a
- 19:05month for free. You're holding free third party
- 19:07cash. That's the float.
- 19:09That's Costco superpower. It gives them the capital to
- 19:12expand, to build new warehouses, to enter new countries, all
- 19:16without having to take on expensive debt or dilute their
- 19:19shareholders by issuing new stock.
- 19:21And Speaking of debt, their overall balance sheet as of the
- 19:24end of August 2025, it really is a fortress.
- 19:28It looks more like a conservative utility company
- 19:30than a retailer. It's anomalous.
- 19:32I mean the company's sitting on $14.16 billion in cash and cash
- 19:38equivalents, a huge pile of cash.
- 19:40But against that, against that they have only 5.71 billion in
- 19:43long term debt. So they have a net cash position
- 19:45of over $8 billion. Their cash on hand is almost
- 19:49three times bigger than their long term debt.
- 19:51That gives them ultimate flexibility.
- 19:53They can weather any economic storm.
- 19:55They can pay those huge special dividends we'll talk about.
- 19:58And it's not even the biggest hidden asset.
- 20:00The true hidden value, the one that doesn't fully show up on
- 20:03the balance sheet, is their real estate.
- 20:05Unlike so many competitors who lease their stores, which can
- 20:08make their numbers look good in the short term, Costco owns the
- 20:11vast majority, about 80%, of its warehouses.
- 20:14And accounting rules mean that property is on the books at its
- 20:17historical cost, not its current market value.
- 20:20Exactly. So the net book value is
- 20:22recorded at around $32 billion. But for a warehouse they bought
- 20:2720 years ago in a now booming suburban area, the fair market
- 20:31value of that land and building is vastly higher.
- 20:34It creates this massive hidden inflation hedge.
- 20:37While their competitors face rising lease payments every
- 20:40year, Costco's occupancy costs are basically fixed.
- 20:43Let's tie this all together with free cash flow.
- 20:45The reported FCF for FY20 25 was 7.84 billion.
- 20:50But you make a key distinction between reported FCF and what
- 20:53you call structural FCF. This is a vital distinction.
- 20:56If you want to value the company for the long term.
- 20:58You need to strip out the spending on growth to see the
- 21:01true cash generating power of the existing machine.
- 21:04So total capital expenditures or CapEx was high in 2025, about
- 21:094.7 billion. OK.
- 21:11And if we use depreciation, which was about 2.4 billion, as
- 21:15a rough proxy for just maintenance spending, you know,
- 21:18the money needed to keep the existing stores running.
- 21:21Then we can estimate that the difference about 2.27 billion
- 21:24was all investment in growth, new stores, new logistics
- 21:28centers and that lets us calculate the structural FCF.
- 21:32That's the cash the business would spit out if management
- 21:35just decided to stop growing and milk the existing assets.
- 21:38And that number is huge. It's approximately $10.1
- 21:42billion. So that $2.27 billion difference
- 21:45is really significant. It shows the company is actively
- 21:48under earning its potential cash flow because it's reinvesting so
- 21:52heavily. For a long term investor, that's
- 21:54incredibly bullish. Assuming of course that the
- 21:57return on that new investment stays high.
- 21:59That's the key assumption. All right, we've established
- 22:01that Costco is a structural masterpiece, a platinum quality
- 22:05business. Now we have to confront the
- 22:08elephant in the room, the price. As the great value investor Seth
- 22:12Klarman always said, no asset is so good that it can't be
- 22:15overpriced. And this is where the cold hard
- 22:18math just forces you to pump the brakes.
- 22:20Costco is currently trading at a trailing PE ratio of about 48.7.
- 22:2648.7 times earnings. It's an extreme premium.
- 22:29It really forces you to ask some profound questions about what
- 22:33the market is thinking. So let's put that number in
- 22:34context. How does it stack up against its
- 22:37peers or the market as a whole? Well.
- 22:38The S&P 500 is trading at about 24 times earnings, so it's more
- 22:42than double the market average. Their biggest rival, Walmart, is
- 22:45at 42 times, which is is already seen as historically expensive.
- 22:49But then you look at other competitors.
- 22:50Target is trading at a normal 16 times earnings.
- 22:53BJ's Wholesale is at about 21. So Costco's valuation suggests
- 22:58it's not even in the same category.
- 22:59It's like it's detached from the laws of retail gravity.
- 23:02And the PEG ratio, which divides that PE by the expected growth
- 23:06rate? It tells an even crazier story.
- 23:08What's that look like? Costco's PEG ratio is almost 5.
- 23:12Historically a PEG ratio over 1 is considered a bit pricey.
- 23:17A ratio of 5 is what you'd expect to see from a hyper
- 23:19growth tech monopoly that's inventing a new industry, not a
- 23:23mature retailer. The market is essentially saying
- 23:26Costco's earnings are safer than AUS Treasury bond and that
- 23:30they're going to grow at a phenomenal rate.
- 23:32But wait, if the business really is platinum quality, shouldn't
- 23:36it get a premium? Isn't that the whole point of
- 23:38having a durable Moat? Shouldn't its earnings be worth
- 23:40more than a generic company's? That is the bull case, and it's
- 23:43partially true. Quality deserves a premium.
- 23:45The question is how much of A premium?
- 23:48And that leads us to the most dangerous part of this whole
- 23:50valuation story, the equity risk premium inversion.
- 23:54OK, break that down for us. So if we look at the big picture
- 23:57of the capital markets right now, this becomes really
- 23:59concerning. As of December 2025, the 10 year
- 24:04U.S. Treasury yield, that's our risk
- 24:06free rate is 4.14%. That's the return you get
- 24:10guaranteed for just parking your money with the US government.
- 24:14OK, 4.14% risk free. Now, what's Costco's earnings
- 24:18yield, The return you get on your investment today?
- 24:21The earnings yield is just the inverse of the PE ratio, so 1 /
- 24:2648.7. That gives you a yield of 2.05%.
- 24:31OK, now you calculate the equity risk premium by subtracting that
- 24:34earnings yield from the risk free rate.
- 24:36So 4.14% - 2.05%. That gives you a negative number
- 24:41-2.09%. It's a financial contradiction.
- 24:44It means you, the investor, are accepting a negative carry to
- 24:48own this stock. You are paying a premium to own
- 24:51a risky asset that currently yields less than the safest
- 24:54asset on earth. So you're bidding entirely on
- 24:56future growth to make up for that?
- 24:58Entirely the market has priced out any possibility of things
- 25:02going even slightly wrong mathematically.
- 25:05It's pure speculation at this price.
- 25:07This feels like a feature of the current market, this scramble
- 25:11for anything that looks like quality and safety.
- 25:14By the way, for anyone listening who wants to track the overall
- 25:16market temperature and see if these kinds of premiums are
- 25:19normal, you might want to check out the Buffett Indicator app.
- 25:22It's a pretty neat tool that gives you a daily read on
- 25:25whether the total market is looking frothy or undervalued
- 25:29relative to GDP. It's great for putting an
- 25:31extreme valuation like Costco's into a broader context.
- 25:35That's a great point because this price is a symptom of a
- 25:38broader market condition. And to quantify just how much
- 25:41optimism is baked into this price, we can run a reverse DCF,
- 25:45a reverse discounted cash flow analysis.
- 25:47So instead of trying to find the value, we start with the price
- 25:50and work backwards to see what growth rate is implied.
- 25:53Exactly. To justify today's share price
- 25:56of around $888, what rate of free cash flow growth does the
- 26:00market need for the next 10 years?
- 26:02Let's hear it. Assuming a conservative cost of
- 26:04capital of about 8% and a long term terminal growth rate of 3%,
- 26:09the math suggests the market is pricing in 12 to 14% annual FCF
- 26:14growth for the next 10 straight years. 12 to 14%.
- 26:18That's basically demanding that they maintain their peak
- 26:21pandemic era growth rates forever.
- 26:24Their historical five year revenue growth is around 11%.
- 26:28So the market is demanding they actually accelerate from an
- 26:30already high base. And that creates a huge
- 26:32asymmetry in the risk reward. What happens if growth just
- 26:36slows down to a more normal but still excellent rate of say 7 or
- 26:408%? This stock would have to re
- 26:41rate. It would have to if the multiple
- 26:43just compressed from 48 down to a still very premium 30 times
- 26:48earnings, that implies a stock price of around $550.
- 26:52That's a nearly 40% drop, and not because the company did
- 26:55anything wrong, just because the valuation came back to earth.
- 26:58The machine is perfect, but the prices runway way ahead of the
- 27:02fundamentals. The downside risk here from the
- 27:04valuation is just immense. All right, let's use Charlie
- 27:07Munger's favorite tool, Invert. Always invert.
- 27:11Instead of just admiring how great Costco is, let's ask what
- 27:15could actually go wrong? What could kill this Organism,
- 27:18Or at least what could trigger that multiple compression we
- 27:20just talked about? The 1st and maybe most subtle
- 27:24risk is an internal one. It's this idea of a demographic
- 27:27Cliff and shrinking basket sizes.
- 27:30What's the data show? The data shows that about half
- 27:32of all new members signing up are now under the age of 40,
- 27:35Millennials and Gen. Z.
- 27:37On one hand that's great for the future, but in the short term
- 27:41it's a headwind. A.
- 27:42Headwind Why you'd think getting younger customers is always a
- 27:45good thing. Because younger people generally
- 27:48have less spending power and more importantly, they have less
- 27:51storage space, they tend to live in smaller, more urban homes.
- 27:54So that core Costco value proposition and buying huge bulk
- 27:58quantities is just less compelling.
- 28:00So traffic is going up. We saw that 6.4% number, but the
- 28:04average amount spent per trip. The basket size might be
- 28:07flattening or even going down. Exactly, and that puts pressure
- 28:11on the single most important metric for warehouse
- 28:14profitability, which is sales per square foot.
- 28:17To keep these younger, more digitally native members happy,
- 28:21Costco is also having to learn more into things like Instacart
- 28:24delivery, which adds a layer of cost and complexity that hurts
- 28:28their beautiful simple unit economics.
- 28:30OK. So that's a demographic
- 28:32headwind. What about market saturation?
- 28:34I mean, they have 630 warehouses in the US alone, and almost 1/4
- 28:39of them are just in California. How much more room is there to
- 28:42grow? This is the cannibalization
- 28:44effect. It's a real and unavoidable drag
- 28:47on growth. Increasingly, their new store
- 28:49openings are happening inside the trade areas of their
- 28:52existing successful stores. Management says this is just to
- 28:55relieve overcrowding. That's the public rationale, and
- 28:58there's some truth to it, but mathematically it's a direct
- 29:00headwind to same store sales growth for the older.
- 29:04If your valuation demands 12 to 14% growth, cannibalization is a
- 29:08force pushing you back down towards that 7 or 8% reality.
- 29:11Which means the whole growth story becomes heavily reliant on
- 29:15international expansion. And while that's promising, it's
- 29:18not a slam dunk. The club model is built on
- 29:21American habits. Big cars, big suburban homes, a
- 29:24culture of stockpiling. Trying to transplant that model
- 29:28to dense European cities or Asian markets with different
- 29:31shopping habits is well, it's just not guaranteed to scale
- 29:35with the same velocity. Let's talk about some of the
- 29:37yellow flags that forensic investors look for.
- 29:40What are the insiders, the management team doing with their
- 29:44own money? The trend here is pretty clear,
- 29:46and it's not bullish. The data shows that company
- 29:49executives have been net sellers of the stock for eight straight
- 29:52quarters. Quarters.
- 29:53Yes, key executives including the new CEO Ron Vakris who sold
- 29:57over $12 million worth and the CFO Gary Miller Chip, they have
- 30:01been consistent significant sellers.
- 30:04OK, but the counter argument is always that executives sell for
- 30:07all sorts of reasons, taxes, diversification.
- 30:10And that's true. But what's more telling here is
- 30:13the complete absence of any open market buying at these prices.
- 30:17The people who know this business better than anyone on
- 30:19earth are choosing to take money off the table, not put more on.
- 30:23It's a quiet signal of caution. It lines up perfectly with the
- 30:27priced for perfection thesis. They know how great the business
- 30:30is, but they also seem to know the stock price is prohibitive.
- 30:33Exactly. And finally, let's talk about
- 30:36the biggest macro risk, the one geopolitical threat that could
- 30:40shatter their entire model Tariffs.
- 30:43Costco is a massive global importer, so the threat of a
- 30:46universal 10 or 20% tariff, something that gets talked about
- 30:49a lot in political cycles, that's an existential threat to
- 30:52their whole philosophy. It is if tariffs suddenly raise
- 30:55their cost of goods by, say, 10%.
- 30:58Costco is stuck between a rock and a hard place because of that
- 31:01strict 14% margin cap. They have two impossible
- 31:03choices. Choice One Pass that 10% cost
- 31:07increase directly to the consumer.
- 31:09Which violates their sacred low price pledge.
- 31:12It narrows the value gap, it hurts trust, and it could damage
- 31:15renewal rates. It attacks the very foundation
- 31:18of the Moat. OK.
- 31:19So choice 2, they absorb the 10% cost themselves.
- 31:23They can't. Their merchandise margins are
- 31:25already razor thin, only around 12 or 13%.
- 31:28A 10% cost increase would wipe out their merchandise profit
- 31:32entirely, maybe even push it into the red.
- 31:34The whole business would become totally dependent on membership
- 31:37fees just to survive. It's a massive, unhedgeable
- 31:41political risk. All right, before we get to our
- 31:43final verdict, let's quickly look at how management uses all
- 31:46the cash this machine generates capital allocation, starting
- 31:49with that membership fee hike we saw in September 2024.
- 31:53Yeah, it was a modest increase, $5 more for Gold Star, $10 more
- 31:56for executive members. So how does a small change like
- 31:59that flow through the financials, and what does it
- 32:01mean for a stock that's already priced for the moon?
- 32:04Well, with their huge membership base, analysts figure this adds
- 32:07about $290,000,000 to operating income over the next couple of
- 32:11years. But the key here is that unlike
- 32:14revenue from selling merchandise, this fee hike
- 32:17revenue flows 100% to the bottom line.
- 32:20Pre tax there's no cost of goods sold.
- 32:22It's pure high octane profit, a direct injection into earnings.
- 32:27Correct, but it functions as a one time step function increase.
- 32:31The market being a forward-looking machine, has
- 32:34already fully anticipated and priced this in.
- 32:36So once this catalyst is fully cycled through, the company goes
- 32:40right back to its underlying organic growth rate, which we've
- 32:43established is probably closer to that 7 to 8% range.
- 32:46The market has already drunk the juice from that catalyst.
- 32:48Absolutely. And that brings us to their very
- 32:50unique capital return policy. They prefer these big one off
- 32:54special dividends over consistent share buybacks.
- 32:57They paid a massive $15 per share special dividend in 2024.
- 33:03And they've done this multiple times before.
- 33:05Multiple times, 2020, 28201720152012.
- 33:08It's part of their playbook and from a forensic standpoint it's
- 33:12a sign of incredible discipline. Why is it superior to just
- 33:15buying back their own stock, which is what most companies do?
- 33:18Because the stock is trading at nearly 50 times earnings,
- 33:22management is implicitly acknowledging that buying back
- 33:25their own stock at such a high multiple would actually destroy
- 33:28shareholder value. They're signaling that they
- 33:31think their own equity is overpriced.
- 33:33So by paying a special dividend, they're giving the excess cash
- 33:36directly back to shareholders instead of overpaying for their
- 33:39own shares. It's a subtle but powerful
- 33:42admission that the stock is overvalued, but they're still
- 33:45committed to being prudent with shareholder capital.
- 33:47It's management telling you the business is a gusher, but the
- 33:50stock price is too high for us to be buyers here.
- 33:53So what does this all mean? We've done the deep dive.
- 33:56We've looked at the reports and the conclusion feels dual.
- 34:01There's this fundamental conflict between the quality of
- 34:04the business and the price of the investment.
- 34:06That's it exactly. The verdict on quality from a
- 34:09Mungo perspective is undeniable. It's platinum.
- 34:12The trust Moat from the Scale Economy shared model is deep.
- 34:16It's getting deeper, and it's almost impossible for anyone to
- 34:19attack. The balance sheet is a fortress.
- 34:21The business machine is perfect. The verdict on valuation, from a
- 34:24Klarman perspective, is just as clear.
- 34:26It's distressed or speculative. The price demands absolute
- 34:30perfection. It accepts a negative risk
- 34:33premium. It bakes in a decade of growth
- 34:35that looks mathematically heroic.
- 34:37There is simply no margin of safety for anyone putting new
- 34:40money to work at today's price. The machine is perfect, the
- 34:43price is a high wire act without a net.
- 34:45The asymmetry is just too great. A prudent investor based on this
- 34:49work has to wait. You can't pay a speculative
- 34:52price even for a platinum asset. Absolutely.
- 34:55The rational move based on everything we've seen is to wait
- 34:58for the inevitable meaner version in that multiple a pull
- 35:01back to a more reasonable 30 to 35 times PE range.
- 35:06That would put the stock somewhere around the $600.00
- 35:08level. And history shows these
- 35:10pullbacks do happen whenever the market gets nervous or the
- 35:13growth story hits a speed bump. Which leads us to our final
- 35:16provocative thought for you to take away and consider.
- 35:19We know the machine is built to last, but what specific systemic
- 35:24shock could be big enough to trigger that necessary multiple
- 35:27compression? Would it be a long, deep
- 35:29recession that finally crimps consumer spending?
- 35:32Or could it be a technological breakthrough from Amazon that
- 35:35finally solves that logistics physics problem for bulk goods?
- 35:39Think about what external force could be powerful enough to
- 35:41temporarily disrupt this perfect narrative and bring this
- 35:44incredible company back down to a price where it's actually
- 35:47great investment.