Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [2000] Berkshire Hathaway Letter Shareholders
Transcript
- 0:00Berkshire Hathaway, Inc to the shareholders of Berkshire
- 0:03Hathaway Incorporated. Our gain in net worth during
- 0:062000 was $3.96 billion, which increased the per share book
- 0:11value of both our Class A and Class B stocked by 6.5%.
- 0:16Over the last 36 years, that is, since present management took
- 0:19over, per share book value has grown from $19.00 to $40,442, a
- 0:26gain of 23.6% compounded annually.
- 0:30Overall, we had a decent year, our book value gain having
- 0:34outpaced the performance of the S&P 500.
- 0:37And though this judgement is necessarily subjective, we
- 0:40believe Berkshire's gain in per share intrinsic value moderately
- 0:44exceeded its gain in book value. Intrinsic value, as well as
- 0:48other key investment and accounting terms and concepts
- 0:52are explained in our owner's manual on pages 59 to 66.
- 0:57Intrinsic value is discussed on page 64.
- 1:00Furthermore, we completed 2 significant acquisitions that we
- 1:04negotiated in 1999 and initiated 6 more.
- 1:08All told, these purchases have cost us about $8 billion with
- 1:1297% of that amount paid in cash and 3% in stock.
- 1:16The eight businesses we've acquired have aggregate sales of
- 1:20about $13 billion and employ 58,000 people.
- 1:24Still, we incurred no debt in making these purchases and our
- 1:28shares outstanding have increased only one of 1%, better
- 1:32yet, three. We remain awash in liquid assets
- 1:35and are both eager and ready for even larger acquisitions.
- 1:39I will detail our purchases in the next section of the report,
- 1:43but I will tell you now that we have embraced the 21st century
- 1:46by entering such cutting edge industries as brick, carpet,
- 1:50insulation and paint. Try to control your excitement.
- 1:54On the minus side, policyholder growth at GEICO slowed to a halt
- 1:58as the year progressed. It has become much more
- 2:01expensive to obtain new business.
- 2:03I told you last year that we would get our money's worth from
- 2:06stepped up advertising at GEICO in 2000, but I was wrong.
- 2:10We'll examine the reasons later in the report.
- 2:13Another negative, which has persisted for several years, is
- 2:16that we see our equity portfolio as only mildly attractive.
- 2:20We own stocks of some excellent businesses, but most of our
- 2:23holdings are fully priced and are unlikely to deliver more
- 2:27than moderate returns in the future.
- 2:29We're not alone in facing this problem.
- 2:32The long term prospect for equities in general is far from
- 2:35exciting. Finally, there is the negative
- 2:38that recurs annually. Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice
- 2:41Chairman, and my partner and I are a year older than when we
- 2:45last reported to you. Mitigating this adverse
- 2:48development is the indisputable fact that the age of your top
- 2:52managers is increasing at a considerably lower rate.
- 2:55Percentage wise then is the case at almost all other major
- 2:58corporations. Better yet, this differential
- 3:01will widen in the future. Charlie and I continue to aim at
- 3:04increasing Berkshire's per share value at a rate that over time
- 3:09will modestly exceed the gain from owning the S&P 500.
- 3:13As the table on the facing page shows, a small annual advantage
- 3:17in our favor can, if sustained, produce an anything but small
- 3:21long term advantage. To reach our goal, we will need
- 3:25to add a few good businesses to Berkshire Stable each year, have
- 3:28the businesses we own generally gain in value and avoid any
- 3:32material increase in our outstanding shares.
- 3:35We are confident about meeting the last two objectives.
- 3:39The first will require some luck.
- 3:41It's appropriate here to thank two groups that made my job both
- 3:44easy and fun last year, Sid 190, just as they do every year.
- 3:49First, our operating managers continue to run their businesses
- 3:52in splendid fashion, which allows me to spend my time
- 3:56allocating capital rather than supervising them.
- 3:59I wouldn't be good at that anyway.
- 4:00All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares,
- 4:04the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding
- 4:08before 1996. The B shares have an economic
- 4:11interest equal to 130th that of the A3.
- 4:15Our managers are a very special breed.
- 4:18At most large companies, the truly talented divisional
- 4:21managers seldom have the job they really want.
- 4:24Instead, they yearn to become CEOs, either at their present
- 4:27employer or elsewhere. Indeed, if they stay put, they
- 4:32and their colleagues are likely to feel they have failed.
- 4:34At Berkshire, our All Stars have exactly the jobs they want, ones
- 4:38that they hope and expect to keep throughout their business
- 4:41lifetimes. They therefore concentrate
- 4:44solely on maximizing the long term value of the businesses
- 4:48that they own and love. If the businesses succeed, they
- 4:51have succeeded and they stick with us.
- 4:53In our last 36 years, Berkshire has never had a manager of a
- 4:58significant subsidiary voluntarily leave to join
- 5:01another business. The other group to which I owe
- 5:04enormous thanks is the Home Office staff.
- 5:06After the 8 acquisitions more than doubled our worldwide
- 5:10workforce to about 112,000. Charlie and I went soft last
- 5:14year and added one more person at headquarters.
- 5:18Charlie, bless him, never lets me forget Ben Franklin's advice.
- 5:22A small leak can sink a great ship.
- 5:25Now we have 13.8 people. This tiny band works miracles.
- 5:29In 2000, it handled all of the details connected with our 8
- 5:32acquisitions, processed extensive regulatory and tax
- 5:36filings. Our tax return covers 4896
- 5:40pages, smoothly produced an annual meeting to which 25,000
- 5:45tickets were issued and accurately dispensed checks to
- 5:483660 charities designated by our shareholders.
- 5:54In addition, the group dealt with all the routine tasks
- 5:57served up by a company with a revenue run rate of $40 billion
- 6:01and more than 300,000 owners. And to add to all of this, the
- 6:06other 12.8 are a delight to be around.
- 6:09I should pay to have my job acquisitions of 2000.
- 6:13Our acquisition technique at Berkshire is simplicity itself.
- 6:16We answer the phone. I'm also glad to report that it
- 6:20rings a bit more often now because owners and or managers
- 6:23increasingly wish to join their companies with Berkshire.
- 6:27Our acquisition criteria are set forth on page 23 and the number
- 6:31to call is 402-346-1400. Let me tell you a bit about the
- 6:37businesses we have purchased during the past 14 months,
- 6:40starting with the two transactions that were initiated
- 6:44in 1999 but closed in 2000. This list excludes some smaller
- 6:49purchases that were made by the managers of our subsidiaries and
- 6:53that in most cases will be integrated into their
- 6:56operations. I described the first purchase
- 6:5976% of Mid American Energy in last year's report.
- 7:03Because of regulatory constraints on our voting
- 7:06privileges, we perform only a one line consolidation of Mid
- 7:10Americans earnings and equity in our financial statements.
- 7:14If we instead fully consolidated the company's figures, our
- 7:18revenues in 2000 would have been $5 billion greater than we
- 7:23reported, though net income would remain the same.
- 7:26On November 23rd, 1999, I received a one page fax from
- 7:31Bruce Court that appended a Washington Post article
- 7:34describing an aborted buyout of Court Business Services.
- 7:37Despite his name, Bruce has no connection with Court.
- 7:41Rather, he is an airplane broker who had sold Berkshire Jet in
- 7:451986. And who, before the fax, had not
- 7:48been in touch with me for about 10 years.
- 7:51I knew nothing about Court, but I immediately printed out its
- 7:54SEC filings and liked what I saw.
- 7:57That same day I told Bruce I had a possible interest and asked
- 8:00him to arrange a meeting with Paul Arnold, Court CEO.
- 8:04Paul and I got together on November 29th, and I knew it
- 8:07once that we had the right ingredients for a purchase.
- 8:10A fine, though unglamorous business and outstanding
- 8:14manager. And a price going by that on the
- 8:16failed deal that made sense. Operating out of 117 showrooms,
- 8:21Cord is the national leader in rent to rent furniture primarily
- 8:25used in offices but also by temporary occupants of
- 8:28apartments. This business, it should be
- 8:31noted, has no similarity to rent to own operations, which usually
- 8:35involve the sale of home furnishings and electronics to
- 8:38people having limited income and poor credit.
- 8:41Four, we quickly purchased Court for Wesco, our 80% own
- 8:46subsidiary, paying about $386 million in cash.
- 8:51You will find more details about Courts operations in Wesco's
- 8:551999 and 2000 annual reports. Both Charlie and I enjoy working
- 9:00with Paul and Court looks like a good bet to beat our original
- 9:04expectations. Early last year Ron Ferguson of
- 9:07General Ree put me in contact with Bob Berry, whose family had
- 9:12owned US Liability for 49 years. This insurer, along with two
- 9:17sister companies, is a medium sized, highly respected rider of
- 9:21unusual risks, excess and surplus lines and insurance
- 9:24jargon. After Bob and I got in touch, we
- 9:27agreed by phone on 1/2 stock, half cash deal.
- 9:30In recent years, Tom Nerney has managed the operation for the
- 9:34Berry family and has achieved a rare combination of excellent
- 9:38growth and unusual profitability.
- 9:40Tom is a powerhouse in other ways as well.
- 9:43In addition to having 4 adopted children, 2 from Russia, he has
- 9:47an extended family, the Philadelphia Bells, a young teen
- 9:51girls basketball team that Tom coaches.
- 9:53The team had a 62 to 4 record last year and finished second in
- 9:58the AAU National Tournament. Few property casualty companies
- 10:02are outstanding businesses. We have far more than our share
- 10:06and US liability adds luster to the collection.
- 10:09Ben Bridge Jeweler was another purchase we made by phone prior
- 10:12to any face to face meeting between me and the management.
- 10:16Ed Bridge, who with his cousin John manages this 65 store West
- 10:22Coast retailer, is a friend of Barnett Helzberg, from whom we
- 10:25bought Helzberg Diamonds in 1995.
- 10:29Upon learning that the Bridge family proposed to sell its
- 10:32company, Barnett gave Berkshire a strong recommendation.
- 10:36Ed then called and explained his business to me, also sending
- 10:39some figures, and we made a deal again, half for cash and half
- 10:43for stock. Ed and John are 4th generation
- 10:46owner managers of a business started 89 years ago in Seattle.
- 10:50Both the business and the family, including Herb and Bob,
- 10:54the fathers of John and Ed and Joy, extraordinary reputations.
- 10:58Same store sales have increased by 9 percent, 11 percent, 13
- 11:03percent, 10%, twelve percent, 21% and 7% over the past seven
- 11:09years. A truly remarkable record.
- 11:11It was vital to the family that the company operate in the
- 11:14future, as in the past no one wanted another jewelry chain to
- 11:18come in and decimate the organization with ideas about
- 11:22synergy and costs saving, which though they would never work,
- 11:26were certain to be tried. I told Ed and John that they
- 11:29would be in charge and they knew I could be believed.
- 11:32After all, it's obvious that you're chairman would be a
- 11:35disaster at actually running a store or selling jewelry.
- 11:38Though there are members of his family who have earned black
- 11:42belts as purchasers in their typically classy way.
- 11:45The bridge is allocated A substantial portion of the
- 11:47proceeds from there sale to the hundreds of coworkers who had
- 11:51helped the company achieve its success.
- 11:53Were proud to be associated with both the family and the company.
- 11:58In July we acquired Justin Industries, the leading maker of
- 12:01Western boots, including the Justin, Tony, Llama, Nakona and
- 12:06Chippewa brand Sid 190, and the premier producer of Brick in
- 12:10Texas and five neighboring states.
- 12:13Here again, our acquisition involved serendipity.
- 12:16On May 4th, I received a fax from Mark Jones, a stranger to
- 12:20me, proposing that Berkshire join a group to acquire an
- 12:23unnamed company. I faxed him back, explaining
- 12:27that with rare exceptions, we don't invest with others, but
- 12:30would happily pay him a Commission if he sent details
- 12:33and we later made a purchase. He replied that the mystery
- 12:36company was Justin. I then went to Fort Worth to
- 12:39meet John Roach, chairman of the company, and John Justin, who
- 12:43had built the business and was its major shareholder.
- 12:46Soon after, we bought Justin for $570 million in cash.
- 12:51John Justin loved Justin Industries, but I've been forced
- 12:54to retire because of severe health problems, which sadly led
- 12:58to his death in late February. John was a class act Sid 190 as
- 13:03a citizen, businessman and human being.
- 13:06Fortunately, he had groomed 2 outstanding managers, Harold
- 13:09Melton at Acme and Randy Watson at Justin Boot, each of whom
- 13:13runs his company autonomously. 5 Acme, the larger of the two
- 13:18operations, produces more than 1 billion bricks per year at its
- 13:2222 plants, about 11.7% of the industry's national output.
- 13:28The brick business, however, is necessarily regional and in its
- 13:32territory. Acme enjoys unquestioned
- 13:35leadership. When Texans are asked to name a
- 13:37brand of brick, 75% respond Acme, compared to 16% for the
- 13:43runner up. Before our purchase, I couldn't
- 13:45have named a brand of brick. Could you have?
- 13:48This brand recognition is not only due to Acme's product
- 13:52quality but also reflects many decades of extraordinary
- 13:56community service by both the company and John Justin.
- 13:59I can't resist pointing out that Berkshire, whose top management
- 14:02has long been mired in the 19th century, is now one of the very
- 14:06few authentic clicks and bricks businesses around.
- 14:09We went into 2000 with GEICO doing significant business on
- 14:13the Internet and then we added Acme.
- 14:16You can bet this move by Berkshire is making them sweat
- 14:18in Silicon Valley. In June, Bob Shaw, CEO of Shaw
- 14:22Industries, the world's largest carpet manufacturer, came to see
- 14:27me with his partner Julian Saul, and the CEO of a second company
- 14:31with which Shaw was mulling A merger.
- 14:34The potential partner, however, faced huge asbestos liabilities
- 14:38from past activities, and any deal depended on these being
- 14:42eliminated through insurance. The executives visiting me
- 14:45wanted Berkshire to provide a policy that would pay all future
- 14:49asbestos costs. I explained that though we could
- 14:51write an exceptionally large policy, far larger than any
- 14:55other insurer would ever think of offering, we would never
- 14:58issue a policy that lacked a cap.
- 15:01Bob and Julian decided that if we didn't want to bet the ranch
- 15:04on the extent of the acquires liability, neither did they.
- 15:07So their deal died. But my interest in Shaw was
- 15:10sparked and a few months later Charlie and I met with Bob to
- 15:14work out a purchase by Berkshire.
- 15:16A key feature of the deal was that both Bob and Julian were to
- 15:19continue owning at least 5% of Shaw.
- 15:22This leaves us associated with the best in the business, as
- 15:26shown by Bob and Julian's record.
- 15:28Each built a large successful carpet business before joining
- 15:32forces in 1998. Shaw has annual sales of about
- 15:36$4 billion and we own 87.3% of the company.
- 15:41Leaving aside our insurance operation, Shaw is by far our
- 15:44largest business now. If people walk all over us, we
- 15:49won't mind. In July, Bob Mundhane, a
- 15:51director of Benjamin Moore Paint, called to ask if
- 15:54Berkshire might be interested in acquiring it.
- 15:57I knew Bob from Salomon, where he was general counsel during
- 16:01some difficult times and held him in very high regard.
- 16:04So my answer was, tell me more. In late August, Charlie and I
- 16:08met with Richard Rub and Yvonne Dupuy, past and present, CE OS
- 16:12of Benjamin Moore. We like them, we like the
- 16:15business and we made a $1 billion cash offer on the spot
- 16:20in October. Their board approved the
- 16:22transaction and we completed it in December.
- 16:25Benjamin Moore has been making paint for 117 years and has
- 16:29thousands of independent dealers that are a vital asset to its
- 16:33business. Make sure you specify our
- 16:35product for your next paint job. Finally, in late December we
- 16:39agreed to buy John's Manville Corporation for about $1.8
- 16:42billion. This companies incredible
- 16:46odyssey over the last few decades.
- 16:48Sid 192 Multifaceted to be chronicled here, Sid 190 was
- 16:53shaped by its long history as a manufacturer of asbestos
- 16:57products. The much publicized health
- 16:59problems that affected many people exposed to asbestos led
- 17:03to JM's declaring bankruptcy in 1982.
- 17:07Subsequently, the Bankruptcy court established a trust for
- 17:10victims, the major asset of which was a controlling interest
- 17:14in JM. The trust, which sensibly wanted
- 17:17to diversify its assets, agreed last June to sell the business
- 17:21to an LBO buyer. In the end, though, the LBO
- 17:25group was unable to obtain financing. 6 Consequently, the
- 17:30deal was called off on Friday, December 8th.
- 17:33The following Monday, Charlie and I called Bob Felice,
- 17:36Chairman of the trust, and made an all cash offer with no
- 17:39financing contingencies. The next day the trustees voted
- 17:43tentatively to accept our offer and a week later we signed a
- 17:47contract. JM is the nation's leading
- 17:49producer of commercial and industrial insulation and also
- 17:53has major positions in roofing systems and a variety of
- 17:57engineered products. The company's sales exceed $2
- 18:00billion and the business has earned good, if cyclical
- 18:04returns. Jerry Henry, JMCEO hat announced
- 18:08his retirement plans a year ago, but I'm happy to report that
- 18:11Charlie and I have convinced him to stick around. 2 economic
- 18:15factors probably contributed to the rush of acquisition activity
- 18:19we experienced last year. First, many managers and owners
- 18:23foresaw near term slowdowns in their businesses.
- 18:25Sid 190 and in fact, we purchased several companies
- 18:30whose earnings will almost certainly decline this year from
- 18:33peaks they reached in 1999 or 2000.
- 18:36The declines make no difference to us, given that we expect all
- 18:40of our businesses to now and then have UPS and downs.
- 18:44Only in the sales presentations of investment banks do earnings
- 18:48move forever upward. We don't care about the bumps.
- 18:52What matters are the overall results, but the decisions of
- 18:55other people are sometimes affected by the near term
- 18:58outlook, which can both spur sellers and temper the
- 19:01enthusiasm of purchasers who might otherwise compete with us.
- 19:05A second factor that helped us in 2000 was that the market for
- 19:09junk bonds dried up as the year progressed.
- 19:12In the two preceding years, junk bond purchasers had relaxed
- 19:15their standards, buying the obligations of ever weaker
- 19:19issuers at inappropriate prices. The effects of this laxity were
- 19:23felt last year in a ballooning of defaults.
- 19:26In this environment, financial buyers of businesses Sid 190,
- 19:30those who wish to by using only a sliver of equity, Sid 190
- 19:35became unable to borrow all they thought they needed.
- 19:38What they could still borrow, moreover, came at a high price.
- 19:42Consequently, LBO operators became less aggressive in their
- 19:46bidding when businesses came up for sale last year.
- 19:49Because we analyze purchases on an all equity basis, our
- 19:53evaluations did not change, which means we became
- 19:56considerably more competitive. Aside from the economic factors
- 20:00that benefited us, we now enjoy a major and growing advantage in
- 20:04making acquisitions in that we are often the buyer of choice
- 20:08for the seller. That fact, of course, doesn't
- 20:10assure a deal, Sid. 190 Sellers have to like our price, and we
- 20:15have to like their business and management.
- 20:17Sit 190 But it does help we find it meaningful when an owner
- 20:21cares about whom he sells to. We like to do business with
- 20:24someone who loves his company, not just the money that a sale
- 20:28will bring him, though we certainly understand why he
- 20:30likes that as well. When this emotional attachment
- 20:33exists, it signals that important qualities will likely
- 20:36be found within the business. Honest accounting, ride of
- 20:40product, respect for customers, and a loyal group of associates
- 20:44having a strong sense of direction.
- 20:46The reverse is at to be true also.
- 20:49When an owner auctions off his business, exhibiting a total
- 20:53lack of interest in what follows, you will frequently
- 20:56find that it has been dressed up for sale, particularly when the
- 21:00seller is a financial owner. And if owners behave with little
- 21:03regard for their business and its people, there conduct will
- 21:07often contaminate attitudes and practices throughout the
- 21:10company. When a business masterpiece has
- 21:13been created by a lifetime or several lifetimes of unstinting
- 21:16care and exceptional talent, it should be important to the owner
- 21:20what corporation is entrusted to carry on its history.
- 21:24Charlie and I believe Berkshire provides an almost unique home.
- 21:27We take our obligations to the people who created a business
- 21:31very seriously, and Berkshire's ownership structure ensures that
- 21:35we can fulfill our promises. When we tell John Justin that
- 21:38his business will remain headquartered in Fort Worth or
- 21:41assure the Bridge family that its operation will not be merged
- 21:45with another jeweler, these sellers can take those promises
- 21:48to the bank. How much better it is for the
- 21:50painter of a business, Rembrandt, to personally select
- 21:53its permanent home than to have a trust officer or uninterested
- 21:57heirs auction it off. Throughout the years, we have
- 22:00had great experiences with those who recognize that truth and
- 22:03apply it to their business creations.
- 22:05We'll leave the auctions to others. 7 The Economics of
- 22:09Property Casualty Insurance Our main business, though we have
- 22:12others of great importance is insurance.
- 22:15To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that
- 22:19you understand how to evaluate an insurance company.
- 22:22The key determinants are one the amount of float that the
- 22:25business generates 2 its cost and three, most critical of all,
- 22:29the long term outlook for both of these factors.
- 22:33To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own.
- 22:36In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are
- 22:40received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes
- 22:44extends over many years. During that time, the insurer
- 22:48invests the money. This pleasant activity typically
- 22:51carries with it a downside, the premiums that an insurer takes
- 22:55and usually do not cover the losses and expenses it
- 22:58eventually must pay. That leaves it running in
- 23:00underwriting loss, which is the cost of float.
- 23:03An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time
- 23:07is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to
- 23:10obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if
- 23:13it's cost afloat is higher than market rates for money.
- 23:17A caution is appropriate here because lost costs must be
- 23:20estimated. Insurers have enormous latitude
- 23:23in figuring they're underwriting results, and that makes it very
- 23:27difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost
- 23:31afloat. Errors of estimation, usually
- 23:33innocent but sometimes not, can be huge.
- 23:37The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly
- 23:40into earnings. An experienced observer can
- 23:43usually detect large scale errors in reserving, but the
- 23:47general public can typically do no more than accept what's
- 23:50presented. And at times I have been amazed
- 23:52by the numbers that big name auditors have implicitly
- 23:55blessed. Both the income statements and
- 23:57balance sheets of insurers can be minefields.
- 24:01At Berkshire, we strive to be both consistent and conservative
- 24:04in our reserving. But we will make mistakes and we
- 24:08warn you that there is nothing symmetrical about surprises in
- 24:11the insurance business. They almost always are
- 24:14unpleasant. The table that follows shows at
- 24:16intervals the float generated by the various segments of
- 24:19Berkshires insurance operations since we entered the business 34
- 24:23years ago. Upon acquiring National
- 24:26Indemnity Company whose traditional lines are included
- 24:29in the segment other primary for the table, we have calculated
- 24:32our float which we generate in large amounts relative to our
- 24:36premium volume by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment
- 24:40reserves, funds held under reinsurance, assumed and
- 24:44unearned premium reserves and then subtracting insurance
- 24:47related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes
- 24:52and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance.
- 24:56Don't panic, there won't be a quiz.
- 24:58We're pleased by the growth in our float during 2000, but not
- 25:02happy with its cost. Over the years, our cost a float
- 25:06has been very close to 0, with the underwriting profits
- 25:09realized in most years offsetting the occasional
- 25:12terrible years such as 1984 when our cost was a staggering 19%.
- 25:17In 2000, however, we had an underwriting loss of $1.6
- 25:22billion, which gave us a float cost of 6%.
- 25:26Absent a mega catastrophe, we expect our float cost to fall in
- 25:302001 Sid 190, perhaps substantially Sid 190 in large
- 25:36part because of Corrections and pricing at General RE that
- 25:39should increasingly be felt as the year progresses.
- 25:42On a smaller scale, GEICO may experience the same improving
- 25:46trend. There are two factors affecting
- 25:48our cost of float that are very rare at other insurers, but that
- 25:51now loom large at Berkshire. First, a few insurers that are
- 25:56currently experiencing large losses have offloaded a
- 25:59significant portion of eight these on us in a manner that
- 26:03penalizes our current earnings, but gives us float we can use
- 26:06for many years to come. After the loss that we incur in
- 26:09the first year of the policy, there are no further costs
- 26:12attached to this business. When these policies are properly
- 26:16priced, we welcome the pain today, gain tomorrow effects
- 26:19they have in 1999 for $100 million of our underwriting
- 26:24loss, about 27.8% of the total came from business of this kind
- 26:29and in 2000 the figure was $482 million.
- 26:33Thirty 4.4% of our loss. We have no way of predicting how
- 26:37much similar business we will right in the future, but what we
- 26:40do get will typically be in large chunks.
- 26:43Because these transactions can materially distort our figures.
- 26:47We will tell you about them as they occur.
- 26:50Other reinsurers have little taste for this insurance.
- 26:52They simply can't stomach what huge underwriting losses due to
- 26:56their reported results, even though these losses are produced
- 26:59by policies whose overall economics are certain to be
- 27:03favorable. You should be careful,
- 27:05therefore, in comparing our underwriting results with those
- 27:08of other insurers. An even more significant item in
- 27:12our numbers, which again you won't find much of elsewhere,
- 27:16arises from transactions in which we assume pass losses of a
- 27:19company that wants to put its troubles behind it.
- 27:22To illustrate, the XYZ Insurance Company might have last year
- 27:26bought a policy obligating us to pay the 1st $1 billion of losses
- 27:31and loss adjustment expenses from events that happened in say
- 27:351995 and earlier years. These contracts can be very
- 27:40large, though we always require a cap on our exposure.
- 27:44We entered into a number of such transactions in 2000 and expect
- 27:48to close several more in 2001. Under gap accounting, this
- 27:52retroactive insurance neither benefits nor penalizes our
- 27:55current earnings. Instead, we set up an asset
- 27:59called deferred charges applicable to assumed
- 28:01reinsurance in an amount reflecting the difference
- 28:04between the premium we receive and the higher losses we expect
- 28:08to pay for which reserves are immediately established.
- 28:11We then amortize this asset by making annual charges to
- 28:15earnings that create equivalent underwriting losses.
- 28:18You will find the amount of the loss that we incur from these
- 28:21transactions in both our quarterly and annual management
- 28:24discussion. By their nature, these losses
- 28:27will continue for many years, often stretching into decades.
- 28:32As an offset though, we have the use of float Sid 190, lots of
- 28:36it. Clearly, float carrying an
- 28:39annual cost of this kind is not as desirable as float we
- 28:42generate from policies that are expected to produce an
- 28:46underwriting profit, of which we have plenty.
- 28:48Nevertheless, this retroactive insurance should be decent
- 28:52business for us. The net of all this is that AI
- 28:55expect our cost of float to be very attractive in the future,
- 28:58but be rarely 2 return to a no cost mode because of the annual
- 29:02charge that retroactive reinsurance will lay on us.
- 29:06Also obviously Sid 190 the ultimate benefits that we derive
- 29:10from float will depend not only on its cost, but fully is
- 29:14important how effectively we deploy it.
- 29:17Our retroactive business is almost single handedly the work
- 29:20of AG Jane, whose praises I sing annually.
- 29:24It is impossible to overstate how valuable Ajeed is to
- 29:28Berkshire. Don't worry about my health,
- 29:31worry about his. Last year, Ajeed brought home a
- 29:34$2.4 billion reinsurance premium, perhaps the largest in
- 29:38history, from a policy that retroactively covers a major UK
- 29:42company. Subsequently, he wrote a large
- 29:45policy protecting the Texas Rangers from the possibility
- 29:49that Alex Rodriguez will become permanently disabled.
- 29:52As sports fans know, a rod was signed for $252 million, a
- 29:57record, and we think that our policy probably also set a
- 30:00record for disability insurance. We cover many other sports
- 30:04figures as well. In another example of his
- 30:07versatility, Aji last fall negotiated a very interesting
- 30:11deal with grab.com, an Internet company whose goal was to
- 30:15attract millions of people to its site and they're to extract
- 30:18information from them that would be useful to marketers.
- 30:22To lurethesepeoplegrab.com held out the possibility of a $1
- 30:26billion prize having a $170 million present value, and we
- 30:31insured its payment. A message on the site explained
- 30:34that the chance of anyone winning the prize was low, and
- 30:37indeed no one won, But the possibility of a win was far
- 30:41from nil. Writing such a policy, we
- 30:43receive a modest premium, face the possibility of a huge loss,
- 30:47and get good odds. Very few insurers like that
- 30:50equation, and they're unable to cure their unhappiness by
- 30:54reinsurance because each policy has unusual CID 190 and
- 30:59sometimes unique CID 190 characteristics.
- 31:02Insurers can't lay off the occasional shock loss 9 through
- 31:07their standard reinsurance arrangements.
- 31:09Therefore, any insurance CEO doing a piece of business like
- 31:12this must run the small but real risk of a horrible quarterly
- 31:17earnings number one that he would not enjoy explaining to
- 31:21his board or shareholders. Charlie and I, however, like any
- 31:25proposition that makes compelling mathematical sense,
- 31:28regardless of its effect on reported earnings.
- 31:31At General Rhee, the news has turned considerably better.
- 31:34Ron Ferguson, along with Joe Brandon, Tadd Montrose and a
- 31:39talented supporting cast took many actions during 2000 to
- 31:43bring that company's profitability back to pass
- 31:46standards. Though our pricing is not fully
- 31:48corrected, we have significantly repriced business that was
- 31:52severely unprofitable or dropped it all together if there's no
- 31:56mega catastrophe in 2001. General residential flow cost
- 32:00should fall materially. The last couple of years haven't
- 32:03been any fun for Ron and his crew, but they have stepped up
- 32:06to tough decisions and Charlie and I applaud them for these.
- 32:10General Rhee has several important and enduring business
- 32:14advantages. Better yet, it has managers who
- 32:17will make the most of them. In aggregate, our smaller
- 32:20insurance operations produced an excellent underwriting profit in
- 32:232000 while generating significant float, just as they
- 32:27have done for more than a decade.
- 32:29If these companies were a single and separate operation, people
- 32:33would consider it an outstanding insurer because the companies
- 32:36instead reside in an enterprise as large as Berkshire.
- 32:40The world may not appreciate their accomplishments, but I
- 32:43sure do. Last year I thanked Rod Eldred,
- 32:46John Kaiser, Don Tall and Don Werster, and I again do so.
- 32:50In addition, we now also owe thanks to Tom Nernie at US
- 32:54Liability and Michael Stearns, the new head of Cyprus.
- 32:58You may notice that Brad Kinsler, who was CEO of Cyprus
- 33:01and whose praises I've sung in the past, is no longer in the
- 33:05list above. That's because we needed a new
- 33:07manager at Fetchheimer Brothers, our Cincinnati based uniformed
- 33:11company, and called on Brad. We seldom move Berkshire
- 33:14managers from 1 enterprise to another, but maybe we should try
- 33:18it more often. Brad is hitting home runs in his
- 33:20new job, just as he always did at Cypress.
- 33:23GEICO 1-800-847-7536 or geico.com.
- 33:30We show below the usual table detailing Geico's growth.
- 33:33Last year, I enthusiastically told you that we would step up
- 33:37our expenditures on advertising in 2000 and that the added
- 33:41dollars were the best investment that GEICO could make.
- 33:44I was wrong. The extra money we spent did not
- 33:47produce a commensurate increase in inquiries.
- 33:50Additionally, the percentage of inquiries that we converted into
- 33:53sales fell for the first time in many years.
- 33:56These negative developments combined to produce a sharp
- 33:59increase in our per policy, one voluntary only excludes assigned
- 34:04risks and the like. Agonizing over errors is a
- 34:07mistake, but acknowledging and analyzing them can be useful,
- 34:11though that practice is rare in corporate boardrooms.
- 34:14There, Charlie and I have almost never witnessed A candid post
- 34:18mortem off a failed decision, particularly one involving an
- 34:22acquisition. A notable exception to this
- 34:24never look back approach is that of the Washington Post Company,
- 34:28which unfailingly and objectively reviews its
- 34:31acquisitions three years after they are made.
- 34:34Elsewhere, triumphs are trumpeted, but dumb decisions
- 34:38either get no follow up or are rationalized. 10 The financial
- 34:42consequences of these boners are regularly dumped into massive
- 34:46restructuring charges or write offs that are casually waved off
- 34:50as non recurring. Management's just love these.
- 34:53Indeed, in recent years, it has seemed that no earnings
- 34:56statement is complete without them.
- 34:58The origins of these charges, though, are never explored.
- 35:03When it comes to corporate blunders, CEOs invoke the
- 35:06concept of the virgin birth. To get back to our examination
- 35:09of GEICO, there are at least four factors that could account
- 35:12for the increased costs we experienced in obtaining new
- 35:16business last year and all probably contributed in some
- 35:19manner. First, in our advertising, we
- 35:21have pushed frequency very hard and we probably overstepped in
- 35:25certain media. We've always known that
- 35:28increasing the number of messages through any medium
- 35:31would eventually produce diminishing returns.
- 35:34The third ad in an hour on a given cable channel is simply
- 35:37not going to be as effective as the first.
- 35:40Second, we may have already picked much of the low hanging
- 35:43fruit. Clearly, the willingness to do
- 35:46business with a direct marketer of insurance varies widely among
- 35:49individuals. Indeed, some percentage of
- 35:53American Sid 190, particularly older ones Sid 190, are
- 35:57reluctant to make direct purchases of any kind.
- 36:00Over the years, however, this reluctance will ebb.
- 36:04A new generation with new habits will find the savings from
- 36:07direct purchase of their auto insurance too compelling to
- 36:10ignore. Another factor that surely
- 36:12decreased the conversion of inquiries into sales.
- 36:15With stricter underwriting buy GEICO, both the frequency and
- 36:19severity of losses increased during the year, and rates in
- 36:23certain areas became inadequate, in some cases substantially so.
- 36:27In these instances, we necessarily tightened our
- 36:30underwriting standards. This tightening, as well as the
- 36:33mini rate increases we put in during the year made our
- 36:37offerings less attractive to some prospects.
- 36:40A high percentage of callers, it should be emphasized, can still
- 36:43save money by insuring with us. Understandably, however, some
- 36:48prospects will switch to save $200 per year, but will not
- 36:51switch to save $50. Therefore, rate increases that
- 36:55bring our prices closer to those of our competitors will hurt our
- 36:58acceptance rate even when we continue to offer the best deal.
- 37:02Finally, the competitive picture changed in at least one
- 37:05important respect. State Farm Sid 190, by far the
- 37:09largest personal auto insurer with about 19% of the market,
- 37:14has been very slow to raise prices.
- 37:16Its costs, however, are clearly increasing right along with
- 37:20those of the rest of the industry.
- 37:22Consequently, State Farm had an underwriting lost last year from
- 37:26auto insurance, including rebates to policyholders of 18%
- 37:30of premiums compared to 4% at GEICO.
- 37:33Our loss produced a float cost for us of 6.1%, an
- 37:37unsatisfactory result indeed. At GEICO, we expect float over
- 37:42time to be free, but we estimate that State Farms float cost in
- 37:462000 was about 23%. The willingness of the largest
- 37:50player in the industry to tolerate such a cost makes the
- 37:54economics difficult for other participants.
- 37:56That does not take away from the fact that State Farm is one of
- 37:59America's greatest business stories.
- 38:02I've urged that the company be studied at business schools
- 38:05because it has achieved fabulous success while following a path
- 38:09that in many ways defies the dogma of those institutions.
- 38:13Studying counter evidence is a highly useful activity, though
- 38:16not one always greeted with enthusiasm at citadels of
- 38:20learning. State Farm was launched in 1922
- 38:23by a 45 year old semi retired Illinois farmer to compete with
- 38:28lawn established insurers Sid 190 hottie institutions in New
- 38:32York, Philadelphia and Hartford. Sid 190 that possessed
- 38:37overwhelming advantages in capital reputation and
- 38:40distribution. Because State Farm is a mutual
- 38:43company, it's board members and managers could not be owners and
- 38:47it had no access to capital markets during its years of fast
- 38:51growth. Similarly, the business never
- 38:54had the stock options or lavish salaries that many people think
- 38:57vitalifen American Enterprise is to attract able managers and
- 39:01thrive. In the end, however, State Farm
- 39:05eclipsed all its competitors. In fact, by 1999, the company
- 39:09had amassed A tangible net worth exceeding that of all but four
- 39:13American businesses. If you want to read how this
- 39:16happened, get a copy of The Farmer from Myrna 11.
- 39:20Despite State Farm strengths, however, GEICO has much the
- 39:23Better Business model, one that embodies significantly lower
- 39:27operating costs. And when a company is selling a
- 39:30product with commodity like economic characteristics, being
- 39:34the low cost producer is all important.
- 39:37This enduring competitive advantage of GEICO Sid 191 it
- 39:42possessed in 1951 when as a 20 year old student, I first became
- 39:46enamored with its stock. Sid 190 is the reason that over
- 39:51time, it will inevitably increase its market share
- 39:53significantly while simultaneously achieving
- 39:56excellent profits. Our growth will be slow,
- 39:59however, if State Farm elects to continue bearing the
- 40:02underwriting losses that it is now suffering.
- 40:05Tony Nicely, Geico's CEO, remains an owner's dream.
- 40:10Everything he does makes sense. He never engages in wishful
- 40:14thinking or otherwise distorts reality as so many managers do
- 40:18when the unexpected happens. As 2000 unfolded, Tony cut back
- 40:24on advertising that was not cost effective.
- 40:26And he will continue to do that in 2001.
- 40:28F cutbacks are called for, though we will always maintain a
- 40:32massive media presence. Tony has also aggressively filed
- 40:36for price increases where we need them.
- 40:38He looks at the loss reports every day and is never behind
- 40:41the curve to steal a line from a competitor.
- 40:44We are in good hands with Tony. I've told you about our profit
- 40:47sharing arrangement at GEICO that targets only two variables,
- 40:50growth in policies and the underwriting results of seasoned
- 40:54business. Despite the headwinds of 2000,
- 40:57we still had a performance that produced an 8.8% profit sharing
- 41:02payment amounting to $40.7 million.
- 41:05GEICO will be a huge part of Berkshire's future because of
- 41:09its rock bottom operating costs. It offers a great many Americans
- 41:13the cheapest way to purchase a high ticket product that they
- 41:16must buy. The company then couples this
- 41:19bargain with service that consistently ranks high in
- 41:22independent surveys. That's a combination inevitably
- 41:25producing growth and profitability.
- 41:28In just the last few years, far more drivers have learned to
- 41:31associate the GEICO brand with saving money on their insurance.
- 41:35We will pound that theme relentlessly until all Americans
- 41:38are aware of the value that we offer investments.
- 41:41Below, we present our common stock investments.
- 41:44Those that had a market value of more than $1 billion at the end
- 41:49of 2000 are itemized 123,100 shares.
- 41:54Company cost market. In 2000, we sold nearly all of
- 41:57our Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae shares, established 15%
- 42:01positions in several mid sized companies, bought the high yield
- 42:05bonds of a few issuers, very few.
- 42:07The category is not labeled junk without reason and added to our
- 42:11holdings of high grade mortgage-backed securities.
- 42:14There are no bargains among our current holdings.
- 42:17We're content with what we own, but far from excited by it.
- 42:21Many people assume that marketable securities are
- 42:23Berkshire's first choice when allocating capital, but that's
- 42:27not true. Ever since we first published
- 42:30our economic principles in 1983, we have consistently stated that
- 42:34way would rather purchase businesses than stocks.
- 42:37See #4 on page 61. Reason for that preference is
- 42:41personal in that I love working with our managers.
- 42:44They are high grade, talented and loyal and frankly I find
- 42:49their business behavior to be more rational and owner oriented
- 42:53than that prevailing at many public companies. 12 But there's
- 42:57also a powerful financial reason behind the preference and that
- 43:00has to do with taxes. The tax code makes Berkshires
- 43:04owning 80% or more of a business far more profitable for us
- 43:08proportionately than our owning a smaller share.
- 43:11When a company we own all of earns $1 million after tax, the
- 43:16entire amount in euros to our benefit.
- 43:19If the $1 million is upstream to Berkshire, we owe no tax on the
- 43:23dividend. And if the earnings are retained
- 43:26and we were to sell the subsidiary Sid 190, not likely
- 43:29at Berkshire, Sid 190 for $1 million more than we paid for
- 43:34it, we would owe no capital gains tax.
- 43:36That's because our tax cost upon sale would include both what we
- 43:40paid for the business and all earnings it's subsequently
- 43:43retained. Contrast that situation to what
- 43:46happens when we own an investment in a marketable
- 43:49security there. If we own a 10% stake in a
- 43:52business earning $10 million after tax, our $1 million share
- 43:57of the earnings is subject to additional state and federal
- 44:00taxes of one, about $140,000 if it is distributed to us.
- 44:05Our tax rate on most dividends is 14% or two no less than
- 44:10$350,000. If the $1 million is retained
- 44:13and subsequently captured by us in the form of a capital gain on
- 44:17which our tax rate is usually about 35%, though it's sometimes
- 44:22approaches 40%, We may defer paying the $350,000 by not
- 44:27immediately realizing our gain, but eventually we must pay the
- 44:31tax. In effect, the government is our
- 44:34partner twice when we own part of a business through a stock
- 44:37investment, but only once when we own at least 80%.
- 44:41Leaving aside tax factors, the formula we use for evaluating
- 44:45stocks and businesses is identical.
- 44:48Indeed, the formula for valuing all assets that are purchased
- 44:52for financial gain has been unchanged since it was first
- 44:55laid out by a very smart man in about 600 BC, though he wasn't
- 44:59smart enough to know it was 600 BC.
- 45:02The Oracle was ESOP and his enduring, though somewhat
- 45:05incomplete, investment insight was A bird in the Hand is worth
- 45:102 in the Bush. To flesh out this principle, you
- 45:13must answer only three questions.
- 45:15How certain are you that there are indeed birds in the Bush?
- 45:19When will they emerge and how many will there be?
- 45:21What is the risk free interest rate which we consider to be the
- 45:25yield on long term US bonds? If you can answer these three
- 45:29questions, you will know the maximum value of the Bush Sid
- 45:32190 and the maximum number of the birds you now possess that
- 45:36should be offered for it. And of course, don't literally
- 45:39think birds, think dollars. Esop's investment axiom, thus
- 45:44expanded and converted into dollars, is immutable.
- 45:47It applies to outlays for farms, oil royalties, bonds, stocks,
- 45:52lottery tickets and manufacturing plants.
- 45:55And neither the advent of the steam engine, the harnessing of
- 45:59electricity nor the creation of the automobile change the
- 46:02Formula One iota. Nor will they Internet.
- 46:06Just insert the correct numbers and you can rank the
- 46:09attractiveness of all possible uses of capital throughout the
- 46:12universe. Common yardsticks such as
- 46:15dividend yield, the ratio of price to earnings or to book
- 46:18value, and even growth rates have nothing to do with
- 46:21valuation except to the extent they provide clues to the amount
- 46:25and timing of cash flows into and from the business.
- 46:29Indeed, growth can destroy value if it requires cash inputs in
- 46:33the early years of a project or enterprise that exceed the
- 46:37discounted value of the cash that those assets will generate
- 46:40in later years. Market commentators and
- 46:43investment managers who glibly refer to growth and value styles
- 46:47as contrasting approaches to investment are displaying their
- 46:51ignorance, not their sophistication.
- 46:53Growth is simply a component CID 190, usually A+, sometimes a
- 46:58minus CID 190 in the value equation.
- 47:01Alas, though, Esop's proposition and the third variable, CID 190,
- 47:06that is, interest rate CID 190, are simple.
- 47:10Plugging in numbers for the other two variables is a
- 47:13difficult task. Using precise numbers is in fact
- 47:17foolish. Working with a range of
- 47:19possibilities is the better approach.
- 47:22Usually the range must be so wide that no useful conclusion
- 47:26can be reached. Occasionally, though, even very
- 47:29conservative estimates about the future emergence of birds reveal
- 47:32that the price quoted is startlingly low in relation to
- 47:36value. Let's call this phenomenon the
- 47:39IBT Sid 190 Inefficient Bush theory.
- 47:42To be sure, an investor needs some general understanding of
- 47:46business economics as well as the ability to think
- 47:49independently to reach a well founded positive conclusion.
- 47:53But the investor does not need brilliance nor blinding
- 47:56insights. At the other extreme, there are
- 47:58many times when the most brilliant of investors can't
- 48:01muster A conviction about the birds to emerge, not even when a
- 48:05very broad range of estimates is employed.
- 48:08This kind of uncertainty frequently occurs when new
- 48:11businesses and rapidly changing industries are under
- 48:15examination. In cases of this sort, any
- 48:17capital commitment must be labeled speculative. 13 Now
- 48:22speculation, in which the focus is not on what an asset will
- 48:25produce, but rather on what the next fellow will pay for it is
- 48:29neither illegal, immoral, nor UN American, but it is not a game
- 48:33in which Charlie and I wish to play.
- 48:35We bring nothing to the party, so why should we expect to take
- 48:38anything home? The line separating investment
- 48:41and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes
- 48:45blurred still further when most market participants have
- 48:48recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like
- 48:52large doses of effortless money. After a heady experience of that
- 48:56kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that
- 49:01of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the
- 49:03festivities Sid 190 that is continuing to speculate in
- 49:08companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash
- 49:12they are likely to generate in the future.
- 49:14Sid 190 will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice, but they
- 49:18nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is 1 hell
- 49:21of a party. Therefore, the giddy
- 49:23participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight.
- 49:27There's a problem, though. They are dancing in a room in
- 49:31which the clocks have no hands. Last year, we commented on the
- 49:34exuberance Sid 190, and yes, it was a rational Sid 190 that
- 49:40prevailed, noting that investor expectations had grown to be
- 49:44several multiples of probable returns.
- 49:47One piece of evidence came from a Paine Weber Gallup survey of
- 49:50investors conducted in December 1999, in which the participants
- 49:55were asked their opinion about the annual returns investors
- 49:58could expect to realize over the decade ahead.
- 50:01Their answers averaged 19%. That, for sure, was an
- 50:06irrational expectation for American business as a whole.
- 50:10There couldn't possibly be enough birds in the 2009 Bush to
- 50:14deliver such a return. Far more irrational still were
- 50:17the huge valuations that market participants were then putting
- 50:21on businesses, almost certain to end up being of modest or no
- 50:24value. Yet investors, mesmerized by
- 50:27soaring stock prices and ignoring all else, piled into
- 50:31these enterprises. It was as if some virus racing
- 50:35wildly among investment professionals as well as
- 50:38amateurs induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in
- 50:42certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the
- 50:45businesses that underlay them. This surreal scene was
- 50:48accompanied by much loose talk about value creation.
- 50:51We readily acknowledge that there has been a huge amount of
- 50:54true value created in the past decade by new or young
- 50:58businesses, and that there is much more to come.
- 51:01But value is destroyed, not created, by any business that
- 51:05loses money over its lifetime, no matter how high its interim
- 51:09valuation may get. What actually occurs in these
- 51:11cases is wealth transfer, often on a massive scale.
- 51:15By shamelessly merchandising birdless bushes, promoters have
- 51:19in recent years moved billions of dollars from the pockets of
- 51:22the public to their own purses and to those of their friends
- 51:25and associates. The fact is that a bubble market
- 51:28has allowed the creation of bubble companies, entities
- 51:32designed more with an eye to making money off investors
- 51:35rather than for them. Too often an IPO, not profits,
- 51:39was the primary goal of a company's promoters.
- 51:42At bottom, the business model for these companies has been the
- 51:46old fashioned chain letter for which many fee hungry investment
- 51:49bankers acted as eager postman. But a pin lies in wait for every
- 51:54bubble, and when the two eventually meet, a new wave of
- 51:58investors learns some very old lessons.
- 52:01First, many in Wall Street. Sid 190, a community in which
- 52:05quality control is not prized. Sid 190 will sell investors
- 52:10anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most
- 52:13dangerous when it looks easiest. At Berkshire we make no attempt
- 52:17to pick the few winners that will emerge from an ocean of
- 52:20improvement enterprises. We're not smart enough to do
- 52:23that and we know it. Instead, we try to apply Esop's
- 52:272600 year old equation to opportunities in which we have
- 52:31reasonable confidence as to how many birds are in the Bush and
- 52:35when they will emerge. A formulation that my grandsons
- 52:38would probably update to a girl in a convertible is worth 5 in
- 52:42the phone book. Obviously, we can never
- 52:45precisely predict the timing of cash flows in and out of a
- 52:48business or their exact amount. We try, therefore, to keep our
- 52:53estimates conservative and to focus on industries where
- 52:56business surprises are unlikely to wreak havoc on owners.
- 53:00Even so, we make many mistakes in the fellow Remember who
- 53:04thought he understood the future economics of trading stamps,
- 53:08textiles, shoes and 2nd tier department stores.
- 53:12Lately, the most promising bushes have been negotiated
- 53:15transactions for entire businesses, and that pleases us.
- 53:19You should clearly understand, however, that these acquisitions
- 53:23will at best provide us only reasonable returns.
- 53:27Really juicy results from negotiated deals can be
- 53:30anticipated only when capital markets are severely constrained
- 53:34and the whole business world is pessimistic.
- 53:37We are 180° from that .14 Sources of reported earnings.
- 53:42The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's
- 53:45reported earnings in this presentation.
- 53:48Purchase accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific
- 53:51businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and
- 53:55shown separately. This procedure lets you view the
- 53:58earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported
- 54:01had we not purchased them for the reasons discussed on page
- 54:0465. This form of presentation seems
- 54:07to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one
- 54:11utilizing generally accepted Accounting Principles GAP, which
- 54:15require purchase premiums to be charged off business by
- 54:18business. The total net earnings we show
- 54:20in the table are of course identical to the GAP total in
- 54:24our audited financial statements in millions.
- 54:27The exception was shoes, particularly at Dexter in our
- 54:31shoe businesses. Generally, our attempt to keep
- 54:33the bulk of our production in domestic factories has cost us
- 54:37dearly. We face another very tough year
- 54:40in 2001 also as we make significant changes in how we do
- 54:44business. I clearly made a mistake in
- 54:46paying what I did for Dexter in 1993.
- 54:49Furthermore, I compounded that mistake in a huge way by using
- 54:53Berkshire Shares and Payment last year to recognize my error.
- 54:57We charged off all the remaining accounting goodwill that was
- 55:00attributable to the Dexter transaction.
- 55:03We may regain some economic goodwill at Dexter in the
- 55:06future, but we clearly have none at present.
- 55:08The managers of our shoe businesses are first class from
- 55:11both a business and human perspective.
- 55:14They are working very hard at a tough Sid 190 and often terribly
- 55:19painful Sid 190 job. Even though they're personal
- 55:22financial circumstances don't require them to do so.
- 55:26They have my admiration and thanks 15.
- 55:29On a more pleasant note, we continue to be the undisputed
- 55:33leader in two branches of aircraft services, Sid 190 pilot
- 55:37training at flight safety FSI and fractional ownership of
- 55:40business jets at Executive Jet EJ.
- 55:43Both companies are run by their remarkable founders.
- 55:47Al Uelchi at FSI is now 83 and continues to operate at full
- 55:51throttle. Though I am not a fan of stock
- 55:53splits, I am planning to split ALSH 241 when he hits 100.
- 55:59If it works, guess who's next? We spent $272 million on flight
- 56:04simulators in 2000 and well spend a similar amount this
- 56:08year. Anyone who thinks that the
- 56:10annual charges for depreciation don't reflect a real cost Sid
- 56:14190 every bit as real as payroll or raw materials Sid 190 should
- 56:20get an internship at a simulator company.
- 56:22Every year we spend amounts equal to our depreciation charge
- 56:26simply to stay in the same economic place Sid 190 and then
- 56:30spend additional sums to grow. And growth is in prospect for
- 56:34FSI as far as the eye can see. Even faster growth awaits EJA,
- 56:39whose fractional ownership program is called Net Jet Sid
- 56:42226. Rich Santoulius, the Dynamo
- 56:46behind this business. Last year, I told you that Egas
- 56:49recurring revenue from monthly management fees and hourly usage
- 56:53grew by 46% in 1999. In 2000, the growth was 49%.
- 56:59I also told you that this was a low margin business in which
- 57:02survivors will be few. Margins were indeed slim at EJA
- 57:06last year, in part because of the major costs we are incurring
- 57:10and developing our business in Europe.
- 57:12Regardless of the cost, you can be sure that EJA spending on
- 57:16safety will be whatever is needed.
- 57:18Obviously we would follow this policy under any circumstances,
- 57:22but there's some self-interest here as well.
- 57:24I, my wife, my children, my sisters, my 94 year old aunt,
- 57:29all but one of our directors and at least 9 Berkshire managers
- 57:33regularly fly in the NET Jets program.
- 57:36Given that cargo, I applaud Rich's insistence on unusually
- 57:40high amounts of pilot training an average of 23 days a year.
- 57:44In addition, our pilots cement their skills by flying 800 or so
- 57:48hours a year. Finally, each flies only one
- 57:52model of aircraft, which means our crews do no switching around
- 57:56among planes with different cockpit and flight
- 57:58characteristics. EJ's business continues to be
- 58:01constrained by the availability of new aircraft.
- 58:05Still, our customers will take delivery of more than 50 new
- 58:08jets in 2001, 7% of world output.
- 58:12We are confident we will remain the world leader in fractional
- 58:16ownership in respect to number of planes flying, quality of
- 58:20service and standards of safety. Additional information about our
- 58:24various businesses is given on pages 42 to 58 where you will
- 58:28also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis.
- 58:32In addition, on pages 67 to 73 we have rearranged Berkshire's
- 58:37financial data into four segments on a non GAAP basis, a
- 58:42presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think
- 58:45about the company look through earnings reported.
- 58:49Earnings are an inadequate measure of economic progress at
- 58:52Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table on
- 58:55page 15 include only the dividends we received from
- 58:59investees Sid 190, though these dividends typically represent
- 59:03only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our
- 59:06ownership. To depict something closer to
- 59:09economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though,
- 59:13we employ the concept of look through earnings.
- 59:16As we calculate these, they consist of one the operating
- 59:20earnings reported on page 15 + 2.
- 59:24Our share of the retained operating earnings of major
- 59:27investees that under GAAP accounting are not reflected in
- 59:30are profits less 3. An allowance for the tax that
- 59:34would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of
- 59:36investees had instead been distributed to us.
- 59:40When tabulating operating earnings here we exclude
- 59:43purchase accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and
- 59:47other major non recurring items. The following table sets forth
- 59:50our 2000 look through earnings, though I warn you that the
- 59:54figures can be no more than approximate since they are based
- 59:57on a number of judgement calls. The dividends paid to us by
- 1:00:01these investees have been included in the operating
- 1:00:04earnings itemized on page 15, mostly under Insurance group Net
- 1:00:09investment income 16 Berkshire's approximate Berkshire's share of
- 1:00:14undistributed Berkshire's major investees.
- 1:00:16Ownership at year end 1 Operating earnings in millions
- 1:00:20too. American Express Company 11.4
- 1:00:23percent $265 The Coca-Cola Company. 8.1 percent 160 Freddie
- 1:00:31Mac 0.3 percent 106 The Gillette Company 9.1 percent 51 M&T Bank
- 1:00:417.2 percent 23 The Washington Post Company 18.3 percent 18
- 1:00:48Wells Fargo and Company 3.2 percent 117 Berkshire share of
- 1:00:54undistributed earnings of major investees 740 Hypothetical tax
- 1:00:59on these undistributed investee earnings Three 104 Reported
- 1:01:03operating earnings of Berkshire 1779 Total look through earnings
- 1:01:08of Berkshire 2415 dollars. One does not include shares
- 1:01:13allocable to minority interests. Two, calculated on average
- 1:01:16ownership for the year 3 the tax rate used is 14%, which is the
- 1:01:21rate Berkshire pays on most dividends it receives.
- 1:01:24Full and fair reporting at Berkshire full reporting means
- 1:01:28giving you the information that we would wish you to give to us
- 1:01:31if our positions were reversed. What Charlie and I would want
- 1:01:35under that circumstance would be all the important facts about
- 1:01:38current operations as well as the CE OS frank view of the long
- 1:01:42term economic characteristics of the business.
- 1:01:45We would expect both a lot of financial details and a
- 1:01:48discussion of any significant data we would need to interpret
- 1:01:52what was presented. When Charlie and I read reports,
- 1:01:56we have no interest in pictures of personnel, plants or
- 1:01:59products. References to EBITDA make us
- 1:02:02shutter sit 190. Does management think the tooth
- 1:02:05fairy pays for capital expenditures?
- 1:02:07We're very suspicious of accounting methodology that is
- 1:02:10vague or unclear, since too often that means management
- 1:02:14wishes to hide something, and we don't want to read messages that
- 1:02:17a public relations department or consultant has turned out.
- 1:02:21Instead, we expect a company CEO to explain in his or her own
- 1:02:26words what's happening. For us, fair reporting means
- 1:02:29getting information to our 300,000 partners simultaneously
- 1:02:33or as close to that mark is possible.
- 1:02:35We therefore put our annual and quarterly financials on the
- 1:02:38Internet between the close of the market on a Friday and the
- 1:02:42following morning. By our doing that, shareholders
- 1:02:45and other interested investors have timely access to these
- 1:02:48important releases and also have a reasonable amount of time to
- 1:02:52digest the information they include before the markets open
- 1:02:56on Monday. This year, our quarterly
- 1:02:58information will be available on The Saturdays of May 12th,
- 1:03:02August 11th and November 10th. The 2001 annual report will be
- 1:03:07posted on March 9th. We applaud the work that Arthur
- 1:03:10Levitt Junior, until recently chairman of the SEC, has done in
- 1:03:15cracking down on the corporate practice of selective disclosure
- 1:03:18that had spread like cancer in recent years.
- 1:03:21Indeed, it had become virtually standard practice for major
- 1:03:25corporations to guide analysts or large holders to earnings
- 1:03:29expectations that were intended either to be on the nose or a
- 1:03:32tiny bit below what the company truly expected to earn.
- 1:03:36Through the selectively dispersed hints, winks and nods
- 1:03:39that companies engaged in, speculatively minded
- 1:03:42institutions and advisors were given an information edge over
- 1:03:46investment oriented individuals. This was corrupt behavior,
- 1:03:50unfortunately embraced by both Wall Street and corporate
- 1:03:53America. Thanks to Chairman Levitt, whose
- 1:03:56general efforts on behalf of investors were both tireless and
- 1:03:59effective, corporations are now required to treat all of their
- 1:04:03owners equally. The fact that this reform came
- 1:04:06about because of coercion rather than conscience should be a
- 1:04:09matter of shame for CE OS and their investor relations
- 1:04:13departments. 17 One further thought while I'm on my soapbox,
- 1:04:17Charlie and I think it is both deceptive and dangerous for CE
- 1:04:21OS to predict growth rates for their companies.
- 1:04:24They are, of course, frequently egged on to do so by both
- 1:04:28analysts and their own investor relations departments.
- 1:04:31They should resist, however, because too often these
- 1:04:35predictions lead to trouble. It's fine for ACEO to have his
- 1:04:38own internal goals, and in our view, it's even appropriate for
- 1:04:43the CEO to publicly express some hopes about the future if these
- 1:04:47expectations are accompanied by sensible caveats.
- 1:04:50But for a major corporation to predict that it's per share
- 1:04:54earnings will grow over the long term Ad say 15% annually, is to
- 1:04:59court trouble. That's true because a growth
- 1:05:02rate of that magnitude can only be maintained by a very small
- 1:05:05percentage of large businesses. Pay raise a test.
- 1:05:09Examine the record of say, the 200 highest earning companies
- 1:05:13from 1970 or 1980 and tabulate how many have increased per
- 1:05:18share earnings by 15% annually since those dates.
- 1:05:22You will find that only a handful half.
- 1:05:24I would wager you a very significant sum that fewer than
- 1:05:2710 of the 200 most profitable companies in 2000 will attain
- 1:05:3215% annual growth in earnings per share over the next 20
- 1:05:36years. The problem arising from lofty
- 1:05:38predictions is not just that they spread unwarranted
- 1:05:42optimism. Even more troublesome is the
- 1:05:44fact that they corrode CEO behavior.
- 1:05:47Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many instances in
- 1:05:51which CE OS engaged in uneconomic operating maneuvers
- 1:05:55so that they could meet earnings targets they had announced were
- 1:05:58still. After exhausting all that
- 1:06:00operating acrobatics would do, they sometimes play to wide
- 1:06:04variety of accounting games to make the numbers.
- 1:06:07These accounting shenanigans have a way of snowballing.
- 1:06:10Once a company moves earnings from one period to another,
- 1:06:13operating shortfalls that occur thereafter require it to engage
- 1:06:17in further accounting maneuvers that must be even more heroic.
- 1:06:21These can turn fudging into fraud.
- 1:06:23More money, it has been noted, has been stolen with the point
- 1:06:27of a pen than at the point of a gun.
- 1:06:29Charlie and I tend to be leery of companies run by CE OS who
- 1:06:32woo investors with fancy predictions.
- 1:06:35A few of these managers will prove prophetic, but others will
- 1:06:38turn out to be congenital optimists or even charlatans.
- 1:06:42Unfortunately, it's not easy for investors to know in advance
- 1:06:45which species they're dealing with.
- 1:06:47I've warned you in the past that you should not believe
- 1:06:50everything you read or hear about Berkshire, said 190 even
- 1:06:54when it is published or broadcast by a prestigious news
- 1:06:57organization. Indeed, erroneous reports are
- 1:07:00particularly dangerous when they are circulated by highly
- 1:07:03respected members of the media, simply because most readers and
- 1:07:08listeners know these outlets to be generally credible and
- 1:07:11therefore believe what they say. An example is a glaring error
- 1:07:15about Berkshire's activities that appeared in the December
- 1:07:1829th issue of the Wall Street Journal, a generally excellent
- 1:07:22paper that I have for all of my life found useful on the front
- 1:07:25page and above the fold, as they say.
- 1:07:28The Journal published a news brief that said in unequivocal
- 1:07:32terms that we were buying bonds of Conseco and Finova.
- 1:07:36This item directed the reader to the lead story of the Money and
- 1:07:39Investing section. There.
- 1:07:41In the second paragraph of the story, the Journal reported,
- 1:07:45again without any qualification, that Berkshire was buying
- 1:07:48Conseco and Finova bonds, adding that Berkshire had invested
- 1:07:52several $100 million in each. Only in the 18th paragraph of
- 1:07:57the story, which by that point had jumped to an inside page,
- 1:08:00did the paper hedge a bit, saying that our Conseco
- 1:08:04purchases had been disclosed by people familiar with the matter.
- 1:08:07Well, not that familiar. True, we had purchased bonds and
- 1:08:11bank debt of Finova Sid 190, though the report was wildly
- 1:08:15inaccurate as to the amount. But to this day, neither
- 1:08:18Berkshire nor I have ever bought a share of stock or a bond of
- 1:08:22Conseco. Berkshire is normally covered by
- 1:08:25a Journal reporter in Chicago who is both accurate and
- 1:08:28conscientious. In this case, however, the scoop
- 1:08:32was the product of a New York reporter for the paper.
- 1:08:34Indeed, the 29th was a busy day for him.
- 1:08:38By early afternoon, he had repeated the story on CNBC
- 1:08:42immediately in lemming like manner, other respected news
- 1:08:46organizations, relying solely on the journal, began relating the
- 1:08:50same facts. The result?
- 1:08:52Conseco stock advanced sharply during the day on exceptional
- 1:08:56volume that placed it 9th on the NYSE most active list.
- 1:09:00During all of the stories iterations, I never heard or
- 1:09:03read the word rumor. Apparently, reporters and
- 1:09:06editors, who generally pride themselves on their careful use
- 1:09:10of language, just can't bring themselves to attach this word
- 1:09:14to their accounts. But what description would fit
- 1:09:16more precisely? Certainly not the usual, sources
- 1:09:19say, or it has been reported. 18.
- 1:09:22A column entitled Today's Rumors, however, would not
- 1:09:26equate with the self-image of the many news organizations that
- 1:09:30think themselves above such stuff.
- 1:09:32These members of the media would feel that publishing such
- 1:09:35acknowledged fluff would be akin to Ella Servitor Romano
- 1:09:39initiating a gossip column. But rumors are what these
- 1:09:42organizations often publish and broadcast whatever euphemism
- 1:09:46they duck behind. At a minimum, readers deserve
- 1:09:50honest terminology, said 190, A warning label that will protect
- 1:09:53their financial health in the same way that smokers who's
- 1:09:57physical health is at risk are given a warning.
- 1:10:00The Constitution's First Amendment allows the media to
- 1:10:02print or say almost anything. Journalism's first principles
- 1:10:07should require that the media be scrupulous in deciding what that
- 1:10:11will be. Miscellaneous In last year's
- 1:10:13report, we examine the battle then raging over the use of
- 1:10:17pooling and accounting for mergers.
- 1:10:19It seemed to us that both sides were voicing arguments that were
- 1:10:23strong in certain respects and seriously flawed and others.
- 1:10:27We are pleased that the Financial Accounting Standards
- 1:10:29Board has since gone to an alternative approach that
- 1:10:32strikes us as very sound. If the proposed rule becomes
- 1:10:36final, we will no longer incur a large annual charge for
- 1:10:39amortization of intangibles. Consequently, our reported
- 1:10:43earnings will more closely reflect economic reality.
- 1:10:47See page 65. None of this will have an effect
- 1:10:50on Berkshire's intrinsic value. Your Chairman, however, will
- 1:10:54personally benefit in that there will be 1 less item to explain
- 1:10:58in these letters in enclosing a report.
- 1:11:01Sid 190 generously supplied by Outstanding Investor Digest Sid
- 1:11:06190 of Charlie's remarks at last May's WESCO Annual Meeting.
- 1:11:10Charlie thinks about business, economics and investment matters
- 1:11:13better than anyone I know, and I've learned a lot over the
- 1:11:16years by listening to him. Reading his comments will
- 1:11:19improve your understanding of Berkshire.
- 1:11:22In 1985, we purchased Scott Fetzer, acquiring not only a
- 1:11:26fine business, but the services of Ralph Shea, a truly
- 1:11:30outstanding CEO as well. Ralph was then 61.
- 1:11:33Most companies focused on the calendar rather than ability
- 1:11:37would have benefited from Ralph's talents for only a few
- 1:11:39years. At Berkshire, in contrast, Ralph
- 1:11:43ran Scott Fetzer for 15 years until his retirement at the end
- 1:11:46of 2000. Under his leadership, the
- 1:11:49company distributed $1.03 billion to Berkshire against our
- 1:11:54net purchase price of $230 million.
- 1:11:57We use these funds, in turn, to purchase other businesses.
- 1:12:01All told, Ralph's contributions to Berkshire's present value
- 1:12:05extend well into the billions of dollars.
- 1:12:08As a manager, Ralph belongs in Berkshire's Hall of Fame, and
- 1:12:11Charlie and I welcome him to it. A bit of nostalgia.
- 1:12:15It was exactly 50 years ago that I entered Ben Graham's class at
- 1:12:18Columbia. During the decade before, I had
- 1:12:21enjoyed Sid 190, Make that loved Sid 190, analyzing, buying and
- 1:12:27selling stocks. But my results were no better
- 1:12:30than average. Beginning in 1951, my
- 1:12:33performance improved. No, I hadn't changed my diet or
- 1:12:36taken up exercise. The only new ingredient was
- 1:12:39Ben's ideas. Quite simply, a few hours spent
- 1:12:43at the feet of the master proved far more valuable to me than had
- 1:12:4710 years of supposedly original thinking.
- 1:12:49In addition to being a great teacher, Ben was a wonderful
- 1:12:52friend. My debt to him is incalculable.
- 1:12:5519 Shareholder Designated contributions About 97% of all
- 1:13:01eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 2000 Shareholder
- 1:13:05Designated Contributions Program, with contributions
- 1:13:08totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the
- 1:13:12program appears on pages 74 to 75.
- 1:13:16Cumulatively, over the 20 years of the program, Berkshire has
- 1:13:20made contributions of $164 million pursuant to the
- 1:13:25instructions of our shareholders.
- 1:13:27The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries,
- 1:13:30which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before
- 1:13:34they were acquired, except that they're former owners themselves
- 1:13:37take on the responsibility for their personal charities.
- 1:13:40In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $18.3
- 1:13:45million in 2000, including in kind donations of $3,000,000.
- 1:13:51To participate in future programs, you must own Class A
- 1:13:54shares that are registered in the name of that actual owner,
- 1:13:57not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository.
- 1:14:01Shares not so registered on August 31st, 2001 will be
- 1:14:06ineligible for the 2001 program. When you get the contributions
- 1:14:09form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put
- 1:14:13aside or forgotten. Designations received after the
- 1:14:16due date will not be honored the Annual meeting.
- 1:14:20Last year we moved the Annual meeting to the Civic Auditorium
- 1:14:23and it worked very well for us. We will meet there again on
- 1:14:27Saturday, April 28th. The doors will open at 7:00 AM,
- 1:14:31the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will
- 1:14:35commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at
- 1:14:37noon for food, with sandwiches available at the Civics
- 1:14:41concession stands. Except for that interlude,
- 1:14:44Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30.
- 1:14:47For the next couple of years, the Civic is our only choice.
- 1:14:51We must therefore hold the meeting on either Saturday or
- 1:14:54Sunday to avoid the traffic and parking nightmare that would
- 1:14:57occur on a weekday. Shortly, however, Omaha will
- 1:15:00have a new Convention Center with ample parking.
- 1:15:03Assuming that the center is then available to us, I will pull
- 1:15:06shareholders to see whether you wish to return to a Monday
- 1:15:10meeting. We will decide that vote based
- 1:15:12on the wishes of a majority of shareholders, not shares.
- 1:15:16An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with
- 1:15:19this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will
- 1:15:22need for admission to this year's meeting and other events.
- 1:15:26As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again
- 1:15:30signed up American Express 800-799-6634 to give you special
- 1:15:36help. In our normal fashion, we will
- 1:15:39run buses from the larger hotels to the meeting.
- 1:15:41After the meeting, the buses will make trips back to the
- 1:15:45hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheims and the airport.
- 1:15:49Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.
- 1:15:53We have added so many new companies to Berkshire this year
- 1:15:56that I'm not going to detail all of the products that we will be
- 1:15:59selling at the meeting, but come prepared to carry home
- 1:16:02everything from bricks to candy. One new product, however,
- 1:16:06deserves special note. Bob Shaw has designed a three by
- 1:16:095 rug featuring and Excellent likeness of Charlie.
- 1:16:13Obviously it would be embarrassing for Charlie Sid 190
- 1:16:16make that humiliating Sid 190 if slow sales forced us to slash
- 1:16:21the rugs price. So step up and do your part.
- 1:16:24GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top
- 1:16:27counselors from around the country, all of them ready to
- 1:16:30supply you with auto insurance quotes.
- 1:16:33In most cases, GEICO will be able to offer you a special
- 1:16:36shareholders discount, usually 8%.
- 1:16:39Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out
- 1:16:42whether we can save you some money at the Omaha Airport on
- 1:16:45Saturday. We will have the usual array of
- 1:16:48aircraft from Executive Jet available for your inspection.
- 1:16:52Just ask an EJ representative at the Civic about viewing any of
- 1:16:55these planes. If you buy what we consider an
- 1:16:58appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well
- 1:17:01need your own plane to take them home.
- 1:17:04And Nebraska Furniture Mart located on a 75 acre site on
- 1:17:0872nd St. between Dodge and Pacific.
- 1:17:11We will again be having Berkshire weekend pricing, which
- 1:17:14means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is
- 1:17:18customarily given only to employees.
- 1:17:20We initiated this special pricing at NFM 4 years ago and
- 1:17:24sales during the weekend grew from $5.3 million in 1997 to
- 1:17:30$9.1 million in 2020. To get the discount, you must
- 1:17:35make your purchases between Wednesday, April 25th and
- 1:17:38Monday, April 30th and also present your meeting credential.
- 1:17:42The period special pricing will even apply to the products of
- 1:17:46several prestige manufacturers that normally have ironclad
- 1:17:50rules against discounting, but that in the spirit of our
- 1:17:53shareholder weekend have made an exception for you.
- 1:17:56We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10:00 AM to
- 1:18:019:00 PM on weekdays and 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on Saturdays and
- 1:18:05Sundays. Borsheim Sid 190, the largest
- 1:18:09jewelry store in the country except for Tiffanis Manhattan
- 1:18:12Store Sid 190, will have two shareholder only events.
- 1:18:16The first will be a cocktail reception from 6:00 PM to 10:00
- 1:18:19PM on Friday, April 27th. The second, the main gala, will
- 1:18:25be from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM on Sunday, April 29th.
- 1:18:29Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through
- 1:18:32Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will
- 1:18:35assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and
- 1:18:39identify yourself as a shareholder.
- 1:18:42On Saturday, we will be open until 6:00 PM.
- 1:18:45Borsheim's operates on a gross margin that is fully 20
- 1:18:48percentage points below that of its major rivals.
- 1:18:51So the more you buy, the more you save.
- 1:18:54Or at least that's what my family always tells me.
- 1:18:56In the mall outside of Borsheim's, we will have local
- 1:18:59bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday.
- 1:19:03Bob Hammond, who normally is with us, will be in Africa this
- 1:19:07year. He has promised, however, to be
- 1:19:10on hand in 2002. Patrick Wolf, twice US chess
- 1:19:14champion, will also be in the mall taking on all comers.
- 1:19:18Sid 190 blindfolded. Last year, Patrick played as
- 1:19:22many as six games simultaneously.
- 1:19:24Sid 190 With his blindfold securely in place.
- 1:19:28Sid 190 and demolished his opponents.
- 1:19:31As if all this isn't enough to test your skills, our Borsheims
- 1:19:35Olympiad this year will also include Bill Robert E, 1 of only
- 1:19:38two players to twice win the Backgammon World Championship.
- 1:19:42Backgammon can be a big money game, so bring along your stock
- 1:19:46certificates. Gorret's Sid 190 My favorite
- 1:19:49steakhouse Sid 190, will again be open exclusively for
- 1:19:53Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, April 29th and will be
- 1:19:56serving from 4:00 PM until 10:00 PM.
- 1:19:59Please remember that you can't come to Gorret's on Sunday
- 1:20:02without a reservation. To make one, call 402551. 3733
- 1:20:09on April 2nd, but not before. If Sunday is sold out, try
- 1:20:13Goritz on one of the other evenings you will be in town.
- 1:20:16If you order a rare T-bone with a double order of hash Browns,
- 1:20:20you will establish your credentials as an epicure.
- 1:20:23The usual baseball game will be held at Rosenblatt Stadium at
- 1:20:267:00 PM on Saturday night. This year the Omaha Golden
- 1:20:30Spikes will play the New Orleans Zephyrs.
- 1:20:33Ernie Banks is again going to be on hand to Sid 190.
- 1:20:36Bravely, Sid 190 faced my fastball once clocked at 95 MPM
- 1:20:41Sid 190 miles per month. My performance last year was not
- 1:20:45my best. It took me 5 pitches to throw
- 1:20:48anything resembling a strike, and believe me, it gets lonely
- 1:20:52on the mound when you can't find the plate.
- 1:20:54Finally I got one over and Ernie lashed a line drive to left
- 1:20:58field. After I was yanked from the
- 1:21:00game, the mini sports writers present asked what I had served
- 1:21:04up to Ernie. I quoted what Warren Spahn said
- 1:21:07after Willie Mays hit one of his pitches for a home run, Willie's
- 1:21:10first in the majors. It was a hell of a pitch for the
- 1:21:131st 60 feet. It will be a different story
- 1:21:16this year. I don't want to tip my hand, so
- 1:21:18let's just say Ernie will have to deal with a pitch he has
- 1:21:21never seen before. Our proxy statement contains
- 1:21:24instructions about obtaining tickets to the game and also a
- 1:21:27large quantity of other information that should help you
- 1:21:30enjoy your visit in Omaha. There will be plenty of action
- 1:21:33in town, so come for Woodstock Weekend and join our celebration
- 1:21:38of capitalism at the Civic. Warren E Buffett, February 28th,
- 1:21:432001. Chairman of the Board.