Latest / No Way Out / Digital Guerrilla Warfare: Deception in the Cyber Age with Tim Pappa
Transcript
- 0:21Steve McCrone: Kia ora.
- 0:22Steve McCrone: Everybody, welcome to the no Way Up podcast.
- 0:24Steve McCrone: Our guest today is Tim Papper.
- 0:28Steve McCrone: Tim is a cyber security specialist currently working with Walmart.
- 0:34Steve McCrone: Tim's background includes some time at the FBI behavioral analysis unit.
- 0:41Steve McCrone: Tim is a specialist in the use of deception in cybersecurity.
- 0:47Steve McCrone: I met Tim.
- 0:48Steve McCrone: We were doing a cybersecurity strategy for a utility here in New Zealand.
- 0:54Steve McCrone: We wanted to do, you know, what we thought was best in market cybersecurity and we found some of Tim's work through that process, in particular, very interested in his work with using Mujahideen and guerrilla warfare deception tactics and bringing it into the modern age of cybersecurity.
- 1:16Steve McCrone: So we'll probably interrogate you a lot on that, tim, but for the first part let's have a more general conversation about cybersecurity.
- 1:35Tim Pappa: And really what I would like to know from your perspective is over the last few years, what's changing in the field of cyber?
- 1:40Tim Pappa: No, stephen and Brian, thanks for having me on the show.
- 1:41Tim Pappa: I come in at a different, interesting time because I've been in private sector, in the industry, for about a year and a half, and before that I was in government, in the intelligence community and at the fbi.
- 1:51Tim Pappa: So, um, maybe I had a different perspective than people have been in industry for a while.
- 1:56Tim Pappa: What was interesting in this I think this provides some reflection on your question is when I was transitioning out of the FBI, I wasn't sure how difficult it would be with someone with my skillset to land in the infosec industry, right In cybersecurity, because what I specialized in at the FBI and the behavioral analysis unit was specifically cyber behaviors, right Of offenders, nation state actors, things like that.
- 2:28Tim Pappa: But a lot of big companies don't necessarily have positions in like a concentrated focus on the behavior of attackers.
- 2:37Tim Pappa: A lot of people are talking about the psychology of attackers.
- 2:41Tim Pappa: A lot of people for many years have been talking about humans and human behavior as the weak link or the vulnerability in organizations.
- 2:49Tim Pappa: But what I'm talking about is crafting a response for your defense and maybe your offense, based on the behaviors you observe in an attacker looking for their vulnerabilities, right, and their personality, the way they function online, their technical skills.
- 3:07Tim Pappa: It's kind of niche, right Like it.
- 3:10Tim Pappa: Just it wasn't widespread.
- 3:11Tim Pappa: I had heard that, that you go to a company like Google, mandy, and there's not going to be somebody who just does that right, and sure enough, that was the case.
- 3:22Tim Pappa: I was fortunate that Walmart has a dedicated cyber deception team where they were looking for that kind of skill set.
- 3:30Tim Pappa: So I think, in terms of, like, the challenges for sure that a lot of people are facing, that we're facing too is how do we incorporate into what degree AI into what we're doing?
- 3:41Tim Pappa: I just got a question today about, essentially, how would the way we do cyber deception defend against an agentic AI type of actor?
- 3:54Tim Pappa: Right, and I know there's a lot of question marks with that, but I think I would argue we would be able to defend in the same way because, if anything in general, because if anything in general, right, in general, if you think about agentic AI and how an agentic AI actors created through an LLM, large language model and like prompts and and how it's refined, you're still talking about prescribed behavior, right, and that's what this is all about.
- 4:25Tim Pappa: Like, can we see it, can we document it and can we craft something to respond to that?
- 4:31Tim Pappa: That's the most behaviorally responsive?
- 4:33Tim Pappa: I just don't.
- 4:34Tim Pappa: I haven't seen a lot of that in the industry.
- 4:36Tim Pappa: There doesn't really seem to be a space for that.
- 4:37Tim Pappa: I think that'll change in the next 10 years, and I think the same for cyber deception.
- 4:43Tim Pappa: I mean, for a long time, deception tech has had its place in industry and a lot of people were buying that software off the shelf, and I think in general, people in industry have mostly acknowledged there's severe limits to taking off the shelf software and putting it on your network, just that you've got to customize it and adapt it.
- 5:05Tim Pappa: And we have the same perspective in industry and that kind of goes back to my time at the FBI too that you've got to customize your responses to these cyber threats because obviously you see in the headlines every day, right, it's like they're getting better and better, they're victimizing more and more, and I have found the most consistent way to effectively counter that is to have behaviorally based design and how you respond to it so do you use the behaviorally based um approach to identify the bad actor?
- 5:43Steve McCrone: So could you?
- 5:43Steve McCrone: I mean, in my time as a IED specialist the guys used to say when people were manufacturing devices by hand, they could identify the bomb maker by the way that they, for instance, soldered the wires.
- 5:59Steve McCrone: Can you identify bad actors or could?
- 6:01Steve McCrone: Is it potentially viable to identify bad actors through that behavioral analysis it?
- 6:07Tim Pappa: definitely is.
- 6:07Tim Pappa: I mean, surely there's limits, right?
- 6:10Tim Pappa: Because a lot of times offenders, bad actors, they're unknown and we look for those signatures too.
- 6:17Tim Pappa: Behavioral analysis as a methodology it's designed that, even if you have major limits on what you know about them, it's designed that, even if you have major limits on what you know about them, that you can still apply it.
- 6:28Tim Pappa: You can still apply those frameworks for analysis to something.
- 6:30Tim Pappa: So there'd be cases in the past where you know a field office would come to us and make a request related to some kind of activity, some kind of offender, and they usually would have a goal in mind, right?
- 6:43Tim Pappa: Some investigative goal, like we want an interviewing strategy, we want an engagement strategy, what's the best way?
- 6:49Tim Pappa: We should approach them online.
- 6:51Tim Pappa: But that all kind of starts with the behavior analysis and in some cases there'd be a lot of information for us to look at, right, depending on the nature of the case.
- 7:00Tim Pappa: Sometimes it'd be nothing, it'd be whatever you can find on social media, good luck.
- 7:05Tim Pappa: And even that's like a representation too, right?
- 7:09Tim Pappa: That's okay.
- 7:10Tim Pappa: The whole point that I think what sets behavioral analysis apart is a very effective methodology for analysis is, if you think about the example of, like an intelligence analyst, right.
- 7:23Tim Pappa: They usually have key intelligence questions and those questions might be something like we're going to look at someone and ask how loyal are they to this government?
- 7:33Tim Pappa: How nationalistic are they?
- 7:35Tim Pappa: Well, we wouldn't approach things that way.
- 7:38Tim Pappa: Our approach would be on this particular person, what behavioral artifacts do we have?
- 7:44Tim Pappa: It's literally everything we can possibly know about them.
- 7:47Tim Pappa: We want that right.
- 7:49Tim Pappa: But then we want some kind of timeline, right.
- 7:53Tim Pappa: So you have all that information in the aggregate and you can look at different times in their life.
- 7:58Tim Pappa: Why'd they make that decision back then?
- 8:00Tim Pappa: What else is going on in their life?
- 8:02Tim Pappa: Does that reflect the nature of their relationships at the time?
- 8:06Tim Pappa: Always going to be gaps, right.
- 8:09Tim Pappa: But when you take a lot of the literature that's out there in academia, that's been empirically tested or maybe it's just qualitative.
- 8:17Tim Pappa: You have a structure, you have rigor, you can add to it, and that's why I often found it was so effective instead of investigators and operators necessarily just trusting their gut, which isn't always wrong, right, they've got experience, they've been trained, they have skills.
- 8:34Tim Pappa: But what was eye-opening to me as an agent going to BAU was hey, I used to always do interviews in a particular kind of way I think I could develop relationships in a particular kind of way and I was good at it.
- 8:46Tim Pappa: I knew how to talk to people.
- 8:48Tim Pappa: There were approaches or techniques I would use, and it's not that those weren't grounded, but behavioral analysis.
- 8:56Tim Pappa: The way we practiced it at BAU was a much more methodical approach.
- 9:00Tim Pappa: It's like let's get together everything we might know about them, let's look at it over a period of time.
- 9:05Tim Pappa: Can we establish any kind of baseline for when they made those decisions and why?
- 9:11Tim Pappa: And then can we start dropping them in brackets.
- 9:13Tim Pappa: So that's where you start to see like people's lives are so dynamic.
- 9:18Tim Pappa: We want to consider all that.
- 9:19Tim Pappa: That's really a hard part for cyber threat actors, definitely for industry too, right, because you can look at the research literature on how people make decisions and it's very naturalistic, it's very dynamic and there's a lot we don't know.
- 9:35Tim Pappa: And certainly that reflects that same space for the OODA loop, where it's like I'm trying to make a decision, that threat actors trying to make a decision also, maybe in the same environment, but there's so much we don't know.
- 9:46Tim Pappa: And can we do anything to influence their decision making?
- 9:50Tim Pappa: Yeah, that's difficult to do that at scale in industry when you have a massive enterprise and there's a lot of moving parts.
- 10:00Tim Pappa: I think one thing I'd say that might be a little counterintuitive that we've been trying to do and it definitely reflects our approach when I was at the FBI is this whole idea of scalability.
- 10:12Tim Pappa: I often get that question is this even scalable?
- 10:14Tim Pappa: And I'm not saying scalability is some kind of myth, like it's an important question.
- 10:19Tim Pappa: But what we've found often is what is actually the most effective or efficient in the organization is actually look at demonstrated behavior and activity, actually look at the documented activity and then craft a response to that.
- 10:37Tim Pappa: With all these tripwires and that's much more passive and those kind of alerts you can't always depend on them.
- 10:47Tim Pappa: That's how we respond effectively and efficiently to malicious activity.
- 10:52Tim Pappa: It'd be the same thing with BAU, where it's like we might be talking about one person, one threat actor, and sure, maybe they're part of a larger criminal enterprise, maybe they're part of a government, but for that particular individual we're looking for vulnerabilities in their behavior that we can exploit behaviorally, and it might be technical or it might just be how you influence them during an engagement.
- 12:18Steve McCrone: So you're looking for an asymmetry between the attack and the attacker?
- 12:27Tim Pappa: looking for an asymmetry between the attack and the attacker.
- 12:28Tim Pappa: Sure, I a lot of people ask like um, what's the besides, like the cost of trying to do cyber deception to defend an organization?
- 12:33Tim Pappa: What's the value?
- 12:35Tim Pappa: in it and you can measure that in a lot of different ways, right, you can be like what's the notification or alert time span?
- 12:43Tim Pappa: How does this support incident response efforts, whatever?
- 12:46Tim Pappa: I guess my big answer to that big question is it's about managing your environment.
- 12:52Tim Pappa: So, yeah, you can have a GenTech AI, facilitate steps in a cyber attack chain, right, but they're probably going to follow relatively predictable pathways or they're going to be looking for particular kind of things that we know they're looking for.
- 13:11Tim Pappa: So cyber deception is really about managing that environment, influencing the direction of that agentic AI, influencing the direction of that actual human actor and influencing what they end up doing.
- 13:26Tim Pappa: That's a part that, yeah, that might be hard for people to traditionally measure that in terms of, like, how many threat actors did we mitigate?
- 13:35Tim Pappa: But that's not our goal.
- 13:37Tim Pappa: That's where I wonder if a lot of academic research on cyber deception they keep getting stuck in the strange funnel of like applying cyber deception as if it's enterprise wide cyber defense and it's not.
- 13:52Tim Pappa: I think cyber deception just has one small part.
- 13:55Tim Pappa: So for us, we want to go to different teams and look for how can we augment what you're doing, different teams and look for how can we augment what you're doing.
- 14:06Tim Pappa: How can we play a small role in this function that you have and use it to deter attackers, right, yeah, um, so yeah, that's that's often the challenge, like how do we take a lot of this research literature in theory and then apply it to practical, real world application?
- 14:22Steve McCrone: So just to sort of roll back and maybe for some people who are less informed about this whole idea, could you explain.
- 14:30Steve McCrone: When you use the word deception, just explain what you mean.
- 14:34Tim Pappa: Yeah, okay, with deception, you're trying to create erroneous decision-making in someone else, right?
- 14:40Tim Pappa: And maybe another way to think about it is you're distorting their decision-making process, you're distorting their analysis.
- 14:47Tim Pappa: A lot of people want to craft deception to reaffirm things that most people would have expected.
- 14:56Tim Pappa: I think they call that Magruder's principle, right, like you want it as close as possible to what they expect in reality.
- 15:03Tim Pappa: It's really why, if you're familiar with, like you know, soviet cognitive models of, like reflexive control, that's exactly what they're doing, for how organizations and people get information, how they analyze the information, how they make decisions, and they're just injecting right into it.
- 15:26Tim Pappa: Right, that's why it's so hard to catch and why it's so effective.
- 15:30Tim Pappa: So, in deception, we're trying to do a lot of those same things.
- 15:33Tim Pappa: That's really what it comes down to, though.
- 15:37Tim Pappa: Can I distort the processing, thinking, decision making of a threat actor in a cyber deception space?
- 15:43Tim Pappa: That's what I'm looking to do.
- 15:45Tim Pappa: Um, sure, there's like parts of that that come down to influence communication, but really, at the end of the day, that's what we want to manage, because even with reflexive control, um, it's not necessarily about controlling behavior.
- 15:59Tim Pappa: It's about managing behavior.
- 16:01Tim Pappa: That's like a slight nuance to it, um, but there's parallels there.
- 16:06Tim Pappa: There's close parallels.
- 16:09Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Yeah, to me it's all about getting in the mind, time space of the of the opponent, understanding what drives them, and we talk about taking actions that generate information that could be false information or that deceptive information that gets back inside their mind, time space and they make a decision based off of that.
- 16:26Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So that's the whole idea of like getting inside the OODA loop, or getting inside the mind of your, your opponent.
- 16:30Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Um, so we're seeing a lot of talk about guerrilla warfare now, online, we have a lot of information flow, um, misinformation, disinformation.
- 16:40Brian "Ponch" Rivera: We have a lot of information flow, misinformation, disinformation.
- 16:42Brian "Ponch" Rivera: How does that factor into understanding the behaviors of these bad actors, and sometimes good actors too?
- 16:51Brian "Ponch" Rivera: What's changing the landscape so fast for you when it comes?
- 16:58Tim Pappa: to information flow.
- 17:00Tim Pappa: I think my starting point for how I looked at a lot of campaigns in the past couple of years that have been highly publicized by different platforms like Meta and X and other organizations, where they've looked at what are the Russians doing right In terms of manipulating social media accounts and platforms to do large scale disinformation.
- 17:23Tim Pappa: My read on a lot of those reports is you see increasing sophistication, right In terms of how they build their infrastructure, how they grow their infrastructure in terms of accounts, the content creation obviously accelerated right and the delivery.
- 17:41Tim Pappa: The thing I wonder about, though, is how many people are actually affected by this.
- 17:45Tim Pappa: So, certainly people are being impacted.
- 17:48Tim Pappa: We just don't always know to what degree, and it's really hard to measure that.
- 17:52Tim Pappa: Of course, what I've often seen in these broad campaigns is it's not necessarily targeted for individual people and, um, again and again, my experience at the FBI and the behavioral analysis unit was, if you don't have a very customized, concentrated campaign on one person or just a handful of people, it's probably not going to be effective.
- 18:17Tim Pappa: Um, when I'm looking at how you craft something to influence even one person, I'm very interested in their close relationships.
- 18:27Tim Pappa: I want to know the two or three people closest to them.
- 18:30Tim Pappa: I want to know the people they love, the people they hate, because if you think about a lot of our major decisions, it usually is reflected or influenced by other people, or thinking about thinking about other people, how it might impact them, is usually like a consequential decision.
- 18:45Tim Pappa: I don't really see that in these broad campaigns.
- 18:48Tim Pappa: Um, I think, in terms of weaponizing that for our own purposes, I really don't see corporations, organizations doing that.
- 18:57Tim Pappa: I I think it's a huge gap.
- 18:59Tim Pappa: If you look at some of the research going back to 2018 2020 on cyber deception, there's been some great studies by kimberly ferguson.
- 19:10Tim Pappa: Walter and her studies are really, although it was artificial and it was using, like red teamers, the actors, it was a really interesting study because she had so many of them in the virtualized environment they were attacking was so massive and she wired them up to the study their physiology.
- 19:29Tim Pappa: So they wanted to see at the moment.
- 19:31Tim Pappa: They said to them before they tried to penetrate or compromise a part of the network, there's deception on this network or there might be deception on this network.
- 19:42Tim Pappa: They wanted to see if there's a rise in their heart rate and there was.
- 19:45Tim Pappa: I don't know if that surprised a lot of people, but their takeaway from that, they said, was very counterintuitive.
- 19:53Tim Pappa: It's saying you actually shouldn't hide deception.
- 19:55Tim Pappa: You should tell people you have deception even if you don't.
- 19:58Tim Pappa: So a lot of organizations were hiding the fact that they use deception on their network.
- 20:05Tim Pappa: But they're saying go ahead and shout it from the rooftops even if you don't have it, because this will cause attackers to cause right.
- 20:16Tim Pappa: It's really just more conceptual at this point If ransomware gangs and nation state actors whoever are so keen on damaging or disrupting the reputations of organizations because they know organizations fear that and there can be obviously real loss for corporations because of reputational damage.
- 20:36Tim Pappa: What if their reputation was targeted right?
- 20:39Tim Pappa: Their reputations are so important.
- 20:42Tim Pappa: If you take, like a ransomware gang actor, that kind of live and die based off of how many affiliates trust them and want to work with them and how much they believe in their capabilities, if you undermine that reputation, I think you're going to have fallout pretty quickly and people aren't really trying this.
- 21:00Tim Pappa: You know like theoretically, what would?
- 21:03Tim Pappa: What would happen if a pretty well-known threat actor attacks your corporation and it failed and then that corporation said didn't work Right.
- 21:14Tim Pappa: Basically, we spanked them, they tried this.
- 21:16Tim Pappa: This is how poor their trade craft is, whether that was true or not right.
- 21:21Tim Pappa: I mean, people can manipulate artifacts, but that would be pretty embarrassing to a threat actor.
- 21:28Tim Pappa: Most organizations.
- 21:29Tim Pappa: They fear that they're worried that this will incite more attacks.
- 21:35Tim Pappa: I don't know if that's true.
- 21:36Tim Pappa: I think that's folklore for a lot of people.
- 21:40Tim Pappa: I think it's a feelings-based fear that they don't want any attention, they don't want to incite attacks.
- 21:46Tim Pappa: I would argue it is a very strong message, right.
- 21:51Tim Pappa: It's a very strong signaling that we're confident enough in our network defense that not only did we stop you but we could do it again.
- 22:00Tim Pappa: And if there's anyone that's not as good as you, they definitely are not going to be successful.
- 22:05Tim Pappa: I think that would deter a lot of attackers.
- 22:11Steve McCrone: So when we talk about well, you talk about adaptive strategy, but the headline for the piece of work I've just finished is adaptive cybersecurity, and it really goes to the heart of the idea that humans in particular, are hardwired to avoid uncertainty.
- 22:27Steve McCrone: That's why you see the heightened emotional state when you tell them there's deception on this network.
- 22:32Steve McCrone: Their perception of uncertainty lifts and as does their psychological, physiological response to that.
- 22:38Steve McCrone: But I guess what I'm hearing, and certainly the view that we take, is actually that discomfort that you feel when uncertain should be something you seek, because it's then that you actually uh, in a state where you can engage with and better understand the system so comfort is not a desirable outcome, particularly in cyber security.
- 23:00Steve McCrone: If you're comfortable with your cyber security, you're probably in a dangerous place.
- 23:04Steve McCrone: That's the sort of rule that we use.
- 23:07Tim Pappa: Yeah, I would agree with that.
- 23:08Tim Pappa: I also, although it's anecdotal, there's been plenty of cases in the past that I worked with in the FBI where actors didn't act the way I thought they would.
- 23:19Tim Pappa: You know, it's like it's not an unwritten rule, but maybe there's an impression that you have ongoing communication with a threat actor.
- 23:29Tim Pappa: You don't want that communication to end.
- 23:32Tim Pappa: Don't anger them, right, maintain the communication.
- 23:35Tim Pappa: I don't think that's true.
- 23:37Tim Pappa: I've seen too many cases where other agents have angered them, have done something very offensive to them, and it didn't disrupt the communication at all.
- 23:48Tim Pappa: And I think that's because they had other motivations that were much more important.
- 23:53Tim Pappa: They wanted money, they wanted to find out what the FBI knew, they were curious and that could be very damaging to them.
- 24:00Tim Pappa: Someone's curiosity right to find out what's going on here.
- 24:03Tim Pappa: Um, those situations, I know they they seem abstract to some people, but I think we can look to our own lives to think about moments where you've you've been in distress, you've been highly emotional, you've been upset about something.
- 24:20Tim Pappa: When you create those moments, you create an overload, right, it's a cognitive and affective overload.
- 24:25Tim Pappa: People just they miss things, they don't scrutinize things as much.
- 24:30Tim Pappa: That's actually what we would want.
- 24:32Tim Pappa: We want that.
- 24:33Tim Pappa: We want someone in a highly emotionally aroused state so they're not paying attention to certain things.
- 24:38Tim Pappa: They're more vulnerable and this is an opportunity to exploit people behaviorally.
- 24:45Tim Pappa: I've also seen in the past year in the few cases where you look at a ransomware enterprise like Lockbit which has had a lot of trouble reputationally because the FBI, doj and then NCA in the UK have made it a point to troll them, troll some of those people, definitely different, and it's kind of things we had proposed for a long time and people didn't really bite on it.
- 25:15Tim Pappa: Because you can imagine in a law enforcement organization where you've got a certain order to things like you've got a criminal case, you've got other actual political sensitivities out there internationally as well, and you're suggesting you should troll this guy, you should mock him.
- 25:32Tim Pappa: It doesn't seem like a connection for people Like what's that going to do?
- 25:36Tim Pappa: We can point to the research and say this will degrade this guy's decision making, because once you do that he's going to want to respond.
- 25:45Tim Pappa: He's very reactive to what people say about his reputation.
- 25:49Tim Pappa: He's very reactive to what people say about affiliates trusting him or not.
- 25:54Tim Pappa: And once you create it, or he's created that reputational stage, everybody's watching and now you've got them in a very vulnerable spot.
- 26:03Tim Pappa: Um, you know, as an idea, when you look at these things, where you've got department of justice, um, where they're asking for the like, uh, rewards for justice, they're saying, basically, we'll offer reward money if you have any information on, say, these russian cyber actors, a lot of these cyber actors.
- 26:20Tim Pappa: Of course they're cyber actors, of course they're paying attention, of course they're watching that, they want to see what people say about them.
- 26:26Tim Pappa: So even if you're in a situation where someone's on a chat in a forum and they put up that poster, some anonymized individual says 10 million dollars, more like 10 000.
- 26:37Tim Pappa: That kind of crack at someone.
- 26:40Tim Pappa: That that's that's really hurtful.
- 26:42Tim Pappa: Yeah, they care about that because they don't want to be perceived that way, because it does impact them.
- 26:49Tim Pappa: I just haven't really seen governments, and definitely not corporations, willing to try this.
- 26:54Tim Pappa: But in the few samples you've seen in, like LockBit, it's actually effective.
- 27:00Tim Pappa: And the research into just human behavior in bit, it's actually effective.
- 27:01Tim Pappa: And the research into just human behavior in general, it's very effective.
- 27:04Tim Pappa: I mean, again, people can look at their own lives and see how they respond in these kinds of situations.
- 27:11Brian "Ponch" Rivera: It kind of reminds me of like trash talking in the NBA or in basketball or something on the pitch, right?
- 27:16Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I mean, we do that to get in the mind time space of our opponent.
- 27:19Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So, and that's natural behavior that I think any I hate to say, any kid around here would do, but you see that often, right?
- 27:28Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So this exact idea of taking a practice that you see somewhere else and bring it over to this type of defense, it makes sense to me.
- 27:37Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I mean, we, we, you know, trolling for something is, you know, when we used to troll for Migs in the um, uh, in Vietnam, you know we'd set up traps for them.
- 27:44Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Right, we're taunting them, we're, we're, we're encouraging them to do something.
- 27:48Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Right, get in there, they're uh inside their OODA loop and had them act and basically ambush them.
- 27:53Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Uh, which which is, I think, part of the the connection to your view of looking into guerrilla warfare as an inspiration behind all this.
- 28:03Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So this all makes sense to somebody like me.
- 28:05Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I just didn't know this wasn't happening already in this contested space.
- 28:12Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Question to you are cyber crimes underreported, underreported?
- 28:21Tim Pappa: I mean, I don't know.
- 28:22Tim Pappa: I'm more without knowing fully.
- 28:26Tim Pappa: I don't think they necessarily are.
- 28:27Tim Pappa: There's definitely increased reporting requirements now with the SEC in terms of if there's been a compromise.
- 28:34Tim Pappa: But in general, I think another way to phrase it is I think they're under-publicized.
- 28:40Tim Pappa: That's probably what it is right, because most companies they're going to want to resolve that very quickly, they're going to hire vendors, they're probably going to call the FBI or the FBI already knows about it.
- 28:53Tim Pappa: So I think it's just a matter.
- 28:57Tim Pappa: Surprised that I haven't seen as much promotion or projection or highlighting of attacks.
- 29:03Tim Pappa: Is ransomware gangs attacking hospitals, because you know you, can, you hear stories about that where it's like does it result in anyone losing their life?
- 29:13Tim Pappa: I think there's been some situations where that may have happened or they knock out a network so people can't get surgeries or there's issues in the ICU and there's something like that.
- 29:24Tim Pappa: But that's actually something that could be projected much more loudly by those victims Because, again, that actually does matter.
- 29:34Tim Pappa: It does matter in some circles there might be some, there might be limits that are kind of eroding with ransomware gangs Among many of them.
- 29:43Tim Pappa: They don't care about that anymore that they will attack hospitals because they know they have money and they know the hospitals have to pay.
- 29:50Tim Pappa: I just don't see enough of an effort to give it back.
- 29:57Tim Pappa: I don't know if I don't know if I would correlate all this, but around the time I was leaving the FBI and the intelligence community there is a number of denial and deception shops across the government and DOD that were shutting down, and I mean these shops are more for training and education, but you know anyone who studies that irregular warfare and deception in the military.
- 30:17Tim Pappa: It's the same old story where there's cycles right Not until there's a conflict and a war it spins up again.
- 30:24Tim Pappa: There's a lot of attention on it and it spins down.
- 30:28Steve McCrone: Let's explore that.
- 30:29Steve McCrone: We'll put a link to your article on Mujahideen and Russian deception tactics and how that is transposed into cyber.
- 30:41Steve McCrone: We'll put a link in the recording for that.
- 30:45Steve McCrone: But could you, Tim, just for the listeners who don't want to geek out on that stuff, could you just give us an example of the interplay between the Russians and the Mujahideen in terms of deception and then maybe we can explore that in terms of how it translates to a cyber idea.
- 31:04Tim Pappa: Yeah, of course, thanks.
- 31:05Tim Pappa: Like our exploration into looking at Mujahideen ambush and raid tactics against the Soviets.
- 31:13Tim Pappa: It kind of started as a proof of concept.
- 31:16Tim Pappa: It was really just to demonstrate for our own team and other people, if you take this concept of like, how teams can be creative, how they can come up with campaigns right and in terms of like design, this idea of like near and far analogies that sometimes that help people.
- 31:37Tim Pappa: That helps people whether they're technical or not or have different backgrounds, where they're like hey, it's kind of like this and that's really helpful.
- 31:45Tim Pappa: And I was in a used bookstore and I can't.
- 31:47Tim Pappa: I was looking, I was just perusing the shelves.
- 31:50Tim Pappa: I'm like what's this?
- 31:50Tim Pappa: And it was a book from you know, 10, 20 years ago and it was an interesting book because it was a former Marine and an Afghan soldier who went back to Afghanistan and they said this is a little bit different.
- 32:04Tim Pappa: We want to collect vignettes from Mujahideen commanders and fighters and try and organize it.
- 32:09Tim Pappa: Let's organize it into different categories so there's more than just ambushes and raids.
- 32:14Tim Pappa: But I thought there are actually so many examples of this.
- 32:18Tim Pappa: I'm sure you could go to any conflict and be like we can find something, because certainly Barton Whaley is a deception scholar who did that right.
- 32:35Tim Pappa: He studied as many famous battles and wars as he could to try and see empirically is there a difference when someone uses deception or not?
- 32:38Tim Pappa: And overwhelmingly he found people who use deception.
- 32:39Tim Pappa: They typically won that battle.
- 32:40Tim Pappa: He found people who use deception.
- 32:40Tim Pappa: They typically won that battle.
- 32:41Tim Pappa: And even if they didn't win the battle, they typically had lower casualty counts if they use deception.
- 32:46Tim Pappa: This is a significant finding.
- 32:48Tim Pappa: That was in his book Stratagem that came out many years ago.
- 32:54Tim Pappa: But same kind of approach where, like can we take any kind of analogy here, at this one in particular, guerrilla warfare and apply it to the way we design cyber deception?
- 33:04Tim Pappa: And I think most people might think, oh, as a large corporation, we might take the view of a massive power like the Soviet Union.
- 33:12Tim Pappa: But we thought no, mujahideen makes more sense for us actually, because this network is ours.
- 33:20Tim Pappa: We can't be everywhere at the same time, but we know it, we know the land right.
- 33:24Tim Pappa: And we thought same thing with the Mujahideen.
- 33:26Tim Pappa: Not only are some of them not from Afghanistan, but the ones who were.
- 33:30Tim Pappa: It's a big country, they couldn't be everywhere.
- 33:33Tim Pappa: The Soviets had too many people there and then, of course, afghan government under Soviet control, and so they had to look for ways to adapt to that kind of situation.
- 33:43Tim Pappa: We thought this is similar to our network landscape we just can't be everywhere at the same time.
- 33:48Tim Pappa: Our attack landscape service is too big, it's global.
- 33:52Tim Pappa: So the idea was can we look at any of these ambushes and raids and find parallels with Barton Whaley and those deception frameworks right Of simulation and dissimulation?
- 34:05Tim Pappa: And sure enough we could.
- 34:07Tim Pappa: It wasn't that difficult at all.
- 34:09Tim Pappa: I think you look at any of these situations and you can find those parallels.
- 34:14Tim Pappa: What was also illuminating with Barton Whaley that I don't see in a lot of his writing, but he's got a number of unpublished works in his special collection up at National Intelligence University and so I've been looking through the archives to look at some of these unpublished works, and there is one work in particular where he writes a lot more about his deception framework of simulation and dissimulation and he said a lot of people make the mistake thinking it's just one or the other.
- 34:43Tim Pappa: He said this is a simultaneous thing.
- 34:46Tim Pappa: You can't have simulation without dissimulation and vice versa.
- 34:50Tim Pappa: So when you're planning and designing something, you got to keep that in mind, and his example he wrote about was trying to hide the fact that he's wealthy.
- 35:01Tim Pappa: As an example he doesn't want people to know he's wealthy, so he lives in a poor house, a poor looking house, right.
- 35:08Tim Pappa: So he's dissimulating his wealth, but he's simulating that he's poor.
- 35:13Tim Pappa: And so if he's trying to bury a bag of gold coins in his backyard so people don't know about it, he's's again.
- 35:20Tim Pappa: He's simulating that he doesn't have any money and he has gold coins, right, and then simulating that he's not wealthy.
- 35:28Tim Pappa: The example, I think, is useful, because when we look at this we're like how can we do that as well?
- 35:33Tim Pappa: One of the ambushes, um, as a vignette in that book, was actually focused on the Kabul River, which I haven't been to Afghanistan, so I'm pulling this from those vignettes.
- 35:46Tim Pappa: But they talked about how people familiar with the Kabul River in certain spots thought this looks crossable, it looks shallow, but they found in certain parts of the river that was not the case and that people tended to get swept away and especially large military vehicles would get stuck in the mud and undercurrent.
- 36:06Tim Pappa: And so there's one of these ambushes where they drew Soviets to the Kabul river, and the way they did that was they ambushed them with limited people and they wanted to see.
- 36:17Tim Pappa: They wanted the Soviets to see them retreating back to the Kabul River.
- 36:22Tim Pappa: But this was just meant to draw them in and there were Mujahideen hiding down by the river with light camouflage and they wanted the Soviets to see Mujahideen crossing the river on foot.
- 36:36Tim Pappa: But obviously they knew where to cross it safely.
- 36:38Tim Pappa: So the Soviets continued to pursue them and tried to cross that river with tanks.
- 36:44Tim Pappa: The tanks got stuck.
- 36:45Tim Pappa: The other mujahideen opened fire and killed a lot of Soviet soldiers.
- 36:52Brian "Ponch" Rivera: But this was by design, though right, it wasn't by accident, it was by design Okay.
- 36:56Brian "Ponch" Rivera: It was by design.
- 36:57Tim Pappa: So another example and I think this is included in the paper was they had an issue where there was a certain hotel down a major highway that a lot of Soviet convoys would go down and there was constantly ambushes there.
- 37:11Tim Pappa: The Mujahideen would constantly ambush Soviet convoys and obviously they had an issue too right where they would have people spying for the Soviets that would tell them hey, Mujahideen are setting up and there's always at this particular hotel, like near it, in it, around it, and the thing that what we pull from that is because this was so frequent.
- 37:32Tim Pappa: The Mujahideen were establishing patterns, soviets were too.
- 37:37Tim Pappa: And so you can.
- 37:38Tim Pappa: You can manipulate that right.
- 37:40Tim Pappa: And this is the opportunity to apply deception.
- 37:43Tim Pappa: If you want to simulate that you're setting up for an ambush, but then you leave it open.
- 37:49Tim Pappa: Now you've also created another situation where what do the Soviets make of that?
- 37:53Tim Pappa: Are they still going to slow their convoy?
- 37:55Tim Pappa: Yeah, they might.
- 37:56Tim Pappa: Are they still going to add more people to that convoy and pull forces from another area?
- 38:00Tim Pappa: They want to be more vulnerable?
- 38:02Tim Pappa: Yeah, they might.
- 38:03Tim Pappa: This is where it becomes very dynamic and naturalistic.
- 38:06Tim Pappa: They would have situations sometimes where the Mujahideen would set up ambush sites and leave their weapons there and part of it is.
- 38:16Tim Pappa: They wanted to be seen so people would report on it.
- 38:18Tim Pappa: Yeah, but then they wouldn't occupy it until a later stage because they knew there might be Soviet helicopters flying over looking for them and they thought they're not actually there and that can have a lot of cascading effects.
- 38:30Tim Pappa: Right, the people they rely on as informants, how reliable their intelligence is, all those kinds of things.
- 38:36Tim Pappa: But we would take that and say what does that look like in a cyber deception space?
- 38:40Tim Pappa: But we would take that and say what does that look like in a cyber deception space?
- 38:42Tim Pappa: Well, that could be a firewall on a particular part of the network that we only partially configure.
- 38:47Tim Pappa: So an attacker doing the reconnaissance, they might get to a particular part of the network on the perimeter where they're in.
- 38:55Tim Pappa: They have some level of access.
- 38:56Tim Pappa: But they're going to be probing that firewall because they want to see what kind of rules are on that firewall.
- 39:02Tim Pappa: How is that firewall configured If we configure it?
- 39:05Tim Pappa: So we let a lot of traffic go through and they try to go through.
- 39:09Tim Pappa: This is similar to us, to an ambush site that they would probably presume.
- 39:14Tim Pappa: Of course we're going to configure this firewall to keep people like them out and keep certain activities out, but the fact that we let it in, can we, can we plausibly signal why that could be the case?
- 39:25Tim Pappa: Well, it might be something like um, it's on a part of the network where there's a lot of like devops on software and people don't use it as much.
- 39:33Tim Pappa: I don't know it could on a part of the network where there's a lot of like dev ops on software and people don't use it as much.
- 39:34Tim Pappa: I don't know.
- 39:35Tim Pappa: It could be a credential that we've left somewhere that they use to gain access to that part of the network.
- 39:41Tim Pappa: It could be a lot of reasons, but the whole idea here is everyone's got to get through that firewall.
- 39:47Tim Pappa: So what happens if we let them through a few times but later on we reconfigure it to stop them or ensnare them?
- 39:54Tim Pappa: That would be like an example of, theoretically, how we might apply it.
- 39:59Tim Pappa: But now can we build a, can we build an actual cyber deception function out of that?
- 40:05Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Let me ask you this If there's a network of bad actors out there and they see this and they learn from it, they can adjust too right they're they're fighting the same war or same type of mindset.
- 40:14Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So what if you're working with other corporations on this or other vendors?
- 40:19Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Is this network approach work?
- 40:22Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I mean the network approach to sharing information, such as putting a firewall on a DevOps space.
- 40:30Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Would that be something you look into or have you done?
- 40:35Tim Pappa: Um, I think like partnership or collaboration with other corporations.
- 40:38Tim Pappa: Yeah, so far in my experience, in reality I don't.
- 40:41Tim Pappa: I don't think it's very practical.
- 40:43Tim Pappa: I I think too many corporations don't want to share information about that kind of stuff, like the design of their network.
- 40:51Tim Pappa: Um, and then you've got different sectors, right, Like you've got the retail sector, but then a couple of companies like Microsoft and Amazon are very different than Walmart because they're vendors or not.
- 41:03Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Yeah.
- 41:04Tim Pappa: So there's going to be a different dynamic there.
- 41:06Brian "Ponch" Rivera: So how do you share information and grow this type of thought leadership within corporations?
- 41:10Brian "Ponch" Rivera: That's what I'm kind of curious how does this work?
- 41:12Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I mean?
- 41:16Tim Pappa: how do you take your knowledge and share it with other folks?
- 41:18Tim Pappa: I think a lot of it's internal, which is obviously a problem, right?
- 41:24Tim Pappa: I think the opportunities there are actually vast still in terms of how the national security enterprise, how government agencies, interact with private sector.
- 41:30Tim Pappa: What I mean is an example in theory is certainly the government in the United States relies heavily on Amazon and Microsoft for their services right, I mean, that's still a client relationship and certainly they have a number of teams that are involved in, like, countering threats, and so you read about things like Microsoft in Ukraine playing a major role right In rooting out bad actors.
- 41:56Tim Pappa: So in those situations that's valuable.
- 42:01Tim Pappa: But what about the companies like my company that doesn't have that kind of client relationship with the government?
- 42:08Tim Pappa: Do we actually have more freedom to be creative and build different things?
- 42:13Tim Pappa: I would argue we do.
- 42:14Tim Pappa: We do because we're not worried about delivery of services to the government and we don't have to fit what that client wants.
- 42:21Tim Pappa: So potentially it creates flexibility and opportunities.
- 42:25Tim Pappa: I think, in reality, that with corporations sharing with each other, I think there's a lot of concern about proprietary stuff.
- 42:33Tim Pappa: So I think what happens is some of that has to happen out publicly non-affiliated right.
- 42:39Tim Pappa: I've seen some things recently in the past few months from Amazon and Microsoft about some of their deception work which was new.
- 42:48Tim Pappa: It's newer, they can do that.
- 42:50Tim Pappa: It's harder for other companies to do that and again, a lot of companies don't actually have dedicated cyber deception groups as much as everybody needs it.
- 43:01Tim Pappa: So if you look at something like the Mujahideen example, sure we can present on that, we can publish on that.
- 43:06Tim Pappa: People might take some lessons from it.
- 43:09Tim Pappa: I actually think the real value at this point would just be in corporations talking about it publicly.
- 43:13Tim Pappa: That's it.
- 43:13Tim Pappa: I actually think the real value at this point would just be in corporations talking about it publicly.
- 43:16Tim Pappa: That's it.
- 43:17Tim Pappa: That's it, because that can be quite a deterrent.
- 43:21Tim Pappa: My takeaway with something like deterrence or deterrence theory is there's like a key point that I read about a couple of years ago about deterrence theory where they were saying like that I read about a couple of years ago about deterrence theory where they were saying like you can't look at deterrence theory like it's meant to just prevent activity or stop it.
- 43:38Tim Pappa: A lot of times it doesn't.
- 43:39Tim Pappa: What it does do is change the nature of that interaction.
- 43:43Tim Pappa: Right, and I think that's what we're trying to do?
- 43:45Tim Pappa: Would it?
- 43:46Tim Pappa: Would it be?
- 43:47Tim Pappa: Would it give a lot of attackers pause if a bunch of retail companies like target and Walmart suddenly said oh yeah, we've overhauled our whole cyber deception approach and we've incorporated in different ways?
- 44:00Tim Pappa: Or what would happen if they came out and said actually, the past five years we've been applying cyber deception in a customized fashion across the network, whether that's true or not.
- 44:12Tim Pappa: So we.
- 44:14Tim Pappa: Some of the time we get away with that right.
- 44:16Steve McCrone: Yeah, I think we discussed, Tim, the analogy of looking at cyber security and cyber attack as a business, and in that business you have entrepreneurs, you have innovators, you have government agencies, you have small organizations, each of which has its own unique kind of agenda and goals and aspirations.
- 44:41Steve McCrone: Whether that's I mean typically it goes ego, information, money in terms of the gain, and one of the things that we talked about or we tried to do with, particularly our client, is say, well, if it is a business, then I think to what you're saying in terms of keeping stuff out is we want to increase the energy required to get into our system, so, whether that's through deception or whether that's through hard barriers, and then we want to decrease the expectation of return if people do get in, and that could be also the expectation of return if people do get in, and that could be also the expectation that you might actually be made a fool of, you might be mocked, you might be.
- 45:21Steve McCrone: You know you're running that risk.
- 45:22Steve McCrone: So you increase the risk across a broader set of parameters, and I'll just go back to the sort of theme that I see emerging in this conversation, and that is, if we go and take cybersecurity as a very serious topic, then we actually rob ourselves of the ability to be kind of playful, experimental and creative, and that's what drives our ability to create deception or create a mismatch or create an asymmetry between the attacker's resources and our own.
- 45:55Tim Pappa: Yeah, I agree with you, there's all kind of space for that.
- 45:59Tim Pappa: I mean, okay, even if you look at just why do people share certain content online?
- 46:04Tim Pappa: A lot of it is when it's funny.
- 46:06Tim Pappa: Right, it's funny, it's emotional and usually if it's, like you know, in-group, out-group type of studies, that's always the contrast to it.
- 46:17Tim Pappa: If you see content online that's funny about something like they're making fun of an ISIS terrorist or whatever, we might want to share that and our in-group would be like, yeah, they're being ridiculed, this is funny.
- 46:29Tim Pappa: Whatever the out-group, the ISISis terrorists, they'll be angry about that.
- 46:35Tim Pappa: And also, will share that they will also share that widely.
- 46:39Tim Pappa: That's right yeah I mean that that fits within those, um, that framework of like.
- 46:44Tim Pappa: Why do people share what they do online?
- 46:46Tim Pappa: It's it's got to be emotional and usually it's either angering or it's funny, depending on like, what group you're in.
- 46:53Tim Pappa: If you have both people, that's what often makes things viral on a lot of platforms and, um, in in past examples we've tried to do that and sometimes it's worked and sometimes it hasn't.
- 47:05Tim Pappa: Um, things can get complicated when there's been times where it hasn't worked, trying to create content that will drive an adversary to want to share it to their detriment.
- 47:16Tim Pappa: Right, they share within their group and it's probably influencing people's perceptions of people in the group, whether it's true or not.
- 47:24Steve McCrone: I think maybe stop taking cybersecurity so seriously.
- 47:27Steve McCrone: It's not such a good sales pitch.
- 47:28Steve McCrone: I don't know.
- 47:31Tim Pappa: Yeah, that might work for some people.
- 47:32Tim Pappa: I mean, it's kind of like, um, there's, there's that, but then there's also, like for a lot of companies, like what's your, what's your method and your rigor for how you craft something to respond to this and it's it's great that I mean I'm fortunate that I'm at a large corporation that has a lot of resources to be able to do that.
- 47:52Tim Pappa: I know, obviously, like one thing I'm looking at right now for research I'm developing is doing a survey among nonprofits and NGOs about their attitudes toward hiring former cyber criminal felons and why.
- 48:09Tim Pappa: That's kind of interesting.
- 48:10Tim Pappa: Potentially is in the U?
- 48:12Tim Pappa: S, you come here and go to jail.
- 48:14Tim Pappa: You're extradited here and go to jail.
- 48:16Tim Pappa: When you get out, you're still a felon.
- 48:18Tim Pappa: You usually don't have immigration status.
- 48:20Tim Pappa: The federal government's not going to hire you.
- 48:23Tim Pappa: Nobody wants to hire you, even though, yes, you're massively talented.
- 48:27Tim Pappa: That's what got you in jail in the first place because of who you're victimizing.
- 48:32Tim Pappa: So, beyond like reputational concerns about things like that, which are valid, right, um, local and state governments have started to relax their approach on some of that and a lot of us state and local governments part of the law now is on applications for employment.
- 48:48Tim Pappa: You.
- 48:49Tim Pappa: You can't have a question on there about if they're a felon or not.
- 48:52Tim Pappa: Okay, you can ask in an, but the whole point is this opens the door.
- 48:57Tim Pappa: I don't know what the response will be.
- 49:01Tim Pappa: My theory, my hypothesis, is that actually a lot of nonprofits and NGOs that have hardly any staff, they have hardly any money to do network defense, I think they'll actually would have a positive attitude toward the idea of consulting a former cyber criminal, like a Russian cyber criminal who's living in the US now that did their time in prison, to say what can we do to make this stronger?
- 49:24Tim Pappa: If that's a positive response, I think it could influence, potentially, policy in the US.
- 49:30Tim Pappa: I think it could influence larger corporations that are completely unwilling to take a chance on them, even though they want them.
- 49:37Tim Pappa: They want to hire them, but they can't because they've got people who own stock and people on the board and they're concerned about their reputation.
- 49:45Tim Pappa: But I bring that up to say there's got to be some kind of solution for the small guy out there, and I think part of that is not only talent like that, I think it's influence.
- 49:56Tim Pappa: So can you imagine a situation for deception, cyber deception if the kind of threat actors that would normally look at a very small local government and want to attack them or do some kind of attack on a critical infrastructure like a water utility, if they knew that there is a very notorious Russian cyber criminal that's taking a look at their network and try to make it better, that might give them pause.
- 50:23Tim Pappa: I know it's a provocative idea.
- 50:25Tim Pappa: I know a lot of people are like I don't think it's a good idea, but I think it's something to explore because otherwise, as things are right now, I think a lot of people continue to get victimized.
- 50:37Brian "Ponch" Rivera: You got a good point here.
- 50:38Brian "Ponch" Rivera: To me that's like a red team technique Somebody you don't want a red teamer who doesn't understand the system, right, challenging you, so going I was thinking outside the box here going to find somebody who may be motivated to, not by money but by just the challenge, right and the puzzle.
- 50:57Brian "Ponch" Rivera: And, by the way, is there a profile for a cyber criminal that you can kind of give us an archetype for, or anything like that?
- 51:05Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Is there a type of person that you know the characteristics that you know makes up a good cyber criminal?
- 51:13Tim Pappa: I'm going to give you a different kind of answer.
- 51:14Tim Pappa: Okay, when I see a lot of general profiles of a cyber criminal, it gives me pause when it's often like young men who are loners growing up.
- 51:29Brian "Ponch" Rivera: Living in the basement eating Doritos Mountain Dew.
- 51:33Tim Pappa: They love to tinker with things and figure out how they work.
- 51:35Tim Pappa: Um, yes, there's truth to some of that, but I feel like it's a very tired cliche.
- 51:42Tim Pappa: I think the approach is just wipe any mental schema you have whatsoever about cyber criminal, because that whole idea has become much more diffuse.
- 51:53Tim Pappa: Like I did a case study recently on a a um uh, a hacker based in Switzerland who was a trans anarchist hacker leaker, and so her whole thing was I want to find organizations that are not protecting data that's important to the public and I want to expose that.
- 52:13Tim Pappa: And, sure enough, she got indicted and she is stuck there.
- 52:18Tim Pappa: But you have someone who has all these labels, they have all these identities.
- 52:22Tim Pappa: They can be called an activist, they could be called a cyber criminal, they could be called all kinds of things, but they have all these motivations.
- 52:30Tim Pappa: So how could I possibly be like oh, here we go, it's the guy in the basement.
- 52:35Tim Pappa: You can't there.
- 52:36Tim Pappa: It's very different now.
- 52:38Tim Pappa: And, um, I think that also troubles the way we like estimate threat.
- 52:41Tim Pappa: So I think, going back to the way we'd approach things in the BAU and I do it now too is you really got to try and start with a clean slate, because I think that'll help you manage things you probably have to anticipate these days, which is you might be looking at something that's generated by AI.
- 53:01Tim Pappa: Right, you might be looking at a false flag.
- 53:04Tim Pappa: You might be looking at a nation state actor that's trying to act like a hacktivist, and so if you can put aside those presumptions about what you're probably looking at just based on the activity you're seeing or what they claim are the reasons they're doing this, I think it actually helps clarify some of your analysis.
- 53:24Tim Pappa: So for that reason, I usually don't like to try and point to a prototype of a cyber criminal, because they're too different.
- 53:33Tim Pappa: You know, it's all.
- 53:34Tim Pappa: It's too variable.
- 53:35Brian "Ponch" Rivera: I like that contextual answer that it depends, right, and you know that's just my me being naive and talking about the kids I knew growing up that are probably hackers now.
- 53:46Tim Pappa: Well, there are people like that.
- 53:48Tim Pappa: There are people like that, but there's definitely there's.
- 53:54Tim Pappa: I think there's been a very, very slow recognition of what the reality of the cyber crime ecosystem is.
- 54:02Tim Pappa: Yeah, and the stuff that keeps coming out from some some really great longitudinal studies of dark web markets and forms is that it's kind of like think of it like professional sports.
- 54:17Tim Pappa: There's a very small percentage of people in a population that are actually good enough to become professional athletes.
- 54:25Tim Pappa: These are the malware developers.
- 54:28Tim Pappa: These are the people running a ransomware gang.
- 54:31Tim Pappa: Literally everyone else are doing odd jobs and small functions and they're not being paid much for it at all, and that's the reality of cybercrime.
- 54:40Tim Pappa: An organization might be talking to customer service for a ransomware organization, but it might be someone who their English is good, but other than that, they're not even that technically capable.
- 54:51Tim Pappa: So that's why, again, I think you've got to put aside what we think they might be and start with what we're actually observing and experiencing, based on their behavior.
- 55:02Steve McCrone: So the analytical approach of you know, predict the bad actor and then buy something off the shelf to guard against them is not really a reality in the face of the complexity of the system we're in.
- 55:14Tim Pappa: Yeah, I think, at a minimum, if you do that, you got to repurpose it, you know, to something that really fits your organization, even though I think you know, with deception tech, they will tell you nowadays, oh, you can customize it, we can adapt it to whatever you want.
- 55:29Tim Pappa: Okay, that's true, that's fine, but that doesn't work for a lot of people.
- 55:33Tim Pappa: They can't afford it, um, or they're not sure how it's going to function correctly in their you know, unique network enterprise.
- 55:40Steve McCrone: So I think it's got to come down to you really got to try and customize it if you want it to be effective, um, so, before we wrap up, most people who would be listening to this probably don't work for a large retailer or government agency that's massively well-resourced and can afford Tim Pepper and the likes to come in.
- 56:00Steve McCrone: What advice would you give to the average person and the average organisation in respect to the things that we've talked to or about today?
- 56:11Steve McCrone: Okay, organization in respect of the things that we've talked to or about today?
- 56:15Steve McCrone: Okay, I mean, how can they be, how can they be involve themselves in in deception or involve themselves in a more complex, friendly approach to cyber security?
- 56:26Tim Pappa: I think, uh, if, if we're talking about deception, I think the most cost effective thing they can do is look for ways to communicate Whatever works for them.
- 56:37Tim Pappa: Communicate that they have deception on their network, that they use these kind of functions, whatever it takes to slow down an attacker and give them pause.
- 56:46Tim Pappa: They should do it.
- 56:47Tim Pappa: It's going to be very difficult for anyone to verify that right.
- 56:51Tim Pappa: It's going to be very difficult for anyone to verify that right.
- 56:55Tim Pappa: And then advice that I've given many nonprofits and small NGOs before is things that you hear in October for Cybersecurity Awareness Month.
- 57:03Tim Pappa: A lot of it still comes down to.
- 57:06Tim Pappa: You've just got to talk to other people in your try to try to influence people's security practices.
- 57:14Tim Pappa: Like I think.
- 57:15Tim Pappa: Obviously people would be stunned if they knew how, how few employees, even in InfoSec, use multi-factor authentication on everything they do.
- 57:24Tim Pappa: A lot of them don't.
- 57:26Tim Pappa: If an organization did that, they'd be in the 90th percentile in terms of deterring and stopping attacks.
- 57:32Tim Pappa: But a lot of that change happens by people modeling that behavior.
- 57:38Tim Pappa: People they respect.
- 57:39Tim Pappa: People they like.
- 57:40Tim Pappa: They keep finding that in studies of like that truly makes a difference in organizations.
- 57:46Tim Pappa: I've seen things too in spear phishing, where people have been writing legally about.
- 57:52Tim Pappa: Like is spearfishing?
- 57:53Tim Pappa: Is it as effective as people thought in terms of educating organizations so they don't fall for it?
- 57:57Tim Pappa: That might be true and I haven't been involved in the studies, but I've read about some of that.
- 58:02Tim Pappa: What I have seen is effective and I know it's a practice of some in industry is they actually?
- 58:09Tim Pappa: If you get a spearfishing email from your own organization, they want you to tell people on your team.
- 58:15Steve McCrone: Does this explain spear phishing to the uninitiated?
- 58:19Tim Pappa: No, they just want you to not only report it, whatever, but share it to people on your team.
- 58:24Steve McCrone: Tell them about it.
- 58:24Steve McCrone: I heard you, hey, I got this email.
- 58:27Tim Pappa: This is what was involved in it.
- 58:28Tim Pappa: When that's happened, they've seen rates of detection increase dramatically.
- 58:33Tim Pappa: That's not like cheating, it's um.
- 58:36Tim Pappa: That's how it should be, um, because people start to normalize talking openly about that stuff and sharing cues that they find about what might be suspicious or not, and it models shared behavior, because Because now someone with you if you find out, someone that you like and respect has been using MFA and you're not, you probably might be more likely to do it as well.
- 59:01Tim Pappa: So I think that would be the second piece that organizations, the small organizations, should talk openly and share openly about these practices and then model that behavior, because there's simple things they can do to really make a difference.
- 59:15Steve McCrone: Cool, that might be about where we leave it.
- 59:17Steve McCrone: Tim.
- 59:18Steve McCrone: Thanks very much for your time.
- 59:19Steve McCrone: That was an amazingly interesting conversation.
- 59:22Steve McCrone: Thank you, guys.
- 59:23Steve McCrone: Thank you for setting it up, appreciate it.
- 59:26Tim Pappa: No, thank you for your time.
- 59:27Tim Pappa: I appreciate the discussion.