Latest / Beyond The Horizon / Mega Edition: The OIG Report Into The Death And Circumstances Of Epstein's Death (Part 9) (6/14/26)
Transcript
- 0:00Speaker 1: What's up everyone, and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles.
- 0:04We're going to pick up where we left off in
- 0:07the last episode, and that's with Chapter seven, Section four.
- 0:12Clearing the ten PM institutional count knowing that it was inaccurate.
- 0:18The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that, on August ninth,
- 0:22twenty nineteen, MCC New York staff clear the ten PM
- 0:27institutional count knowing that the inmate count from two housing
- 0:31units were inaccurate. BOP policy and New York Shoe post
- 0:36orders require that coos conducting an institutional count relay the
- 0:41count verbally to the control Center, which maintains the master
- 0:45count of all inmates. If account reported verbally does not
- 0:49match the master count, the control center must notify the
- 0:52Operations Lieutenant and the staff members must recount the inmates.
- 0:57Mcc new York Shoe post orders further provide that count
- 1:02slips which appear to be altered will not be accepted.
- 1:06As discussed previously, the OIG determined that an internal transfer
- 1:11of an inmate, Inmate four from the Shoe to receiving
- 1:14and discharge on August ninth, was not documented appropriately at
- 1:18the time of the transfer. The failure of the document transfer,
- 1:23along with the shoe staff not conducting the required inmate counts,
- 1:27resulted in the mcc New York Control Center receiving account
- 1:31slip from the Shoe with an incorrect number of inmates
- 1:34identified as being present within the shoe at the ten
- 1:38PM institutional count. During his OIG interview, Senior Officer Specialist six,
- 1:45who was assigned to the Control Center, admitted that he
- 1:48amended the ten PM count slips he received from the
- 1:51Shoe and receiving in discharge an attempt to reflect the
- 1:54correct number of inmates in the shoe following the internal
- 1:58inmate transfer that resulted in a Shoe inmate in May
- 2:02four being moved to receiving in discharge earlier in the day,
- 2:06Senior Officer Specialist six acknowledged that he should have requested
- 2:10a recount from the Shoe, but instead he cleared the
- 2:14ten PM count. Senior Officer Specialist six explained that the
- 2:19actions he took was known as ghost counting, something he
- 2:23said he would not have done without authorization from the
- 2:26Operations Lieutenant or someone of a higher rank than himself.
- 2:31The morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having authorized a ghost count,
- 2:35and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist
- 2:40six claim that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of
- 2:44and approved the false count. The OIG found that Senior
- 2:48Specialist six modified the count slips received from the shoe
- 2:52and receiving in discharge, failed to request a recount of
- 2:56the shoe inmates, and cleared the ten PM institutional count
- 3:00knowing that it was inaccurate and violation of BOP policy
- 3:04and mcc new York Shoe Post Orders Part five failure
- 3:10to adequately supervised shoe staff and conduct lieutenant rounds. The
- 3:15OIG also found that mcc new York supervisory personnel failed
- 3:20to effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact
- 3:24that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death.
- 3:29As discussed above, federal regulations require that mcc new York
- 3:34supervisory personnel put forth honest effort in performance of their duties,
- 3:39which includes appropriate supervision of shoe personnel. Additionally, BOP policy
- 3:45requires that a lieutenant visit the shoe during each shift
- 3:49to ensure that all procedures are being followed. The OIG's
- 3:54investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the
- 3:58morning Watch Operations lieutenant had oversight of the shoe during
- 4:02their respective shifts. The evening watch Operations lieutenant told the
- 4:06OIG that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, he did not
- 4:10supervise the four pm count or conduct any rounds in
- 4:15the shoe. He acknowledged that he signed some of the
- 4:18pages of the four pm count, but he did not
- 4:21sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning
- 4:25at ten pm on August ninth, the morning Watch Operations
- 4:28lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the shoe. The morning
- 4:33Watch Operations lieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an
- 4:38error in the twelve am count on August tenth, which
- 4:41was due to shoe staff, including in May four, who
- 4:44had been internally transferred to receiving in discharge, among the
- 4:48inmates in the shoe. According to the morning Watch Operations lieutenant,
- 4:53the shoe staff should have conducted another count and submitted
- 4:57a new count slip, but she did not know if
- 5:00they actually did so. During her shift, the morning Watch
- 5:03Operations Lieutenant conducted one round in the shoe at approximately
- 5:08four am on August tenth. The OIG's review of the
- 5:12available shoe security camera video revealed that the morning Watch
- 5:17Operations Lieutenant was present in the shoe for approximately seven minutes,
- 5:22during which time she conferred with Noel and Thomas, who
- 5:25were seated at and around the shoe officer's station in
- 5:29the common area of the shoe. The morning Watch Operations
- 5:33Lieutenant told the OIG that she was not required to
- 5:37visit each tier or go to each individual cell during
- 5:41a lieutenant round, but rather the purpose of the lieutenant
- 5:44round was for her to speak with the officers on duty.
- 5:48This description of a lieutenant round is inconsistent with the
- 5:52statements of many of the supervisors and BOP lieutenant training,
- 5:57all of which emphasized the need for lieutenants to walk
- 6:00down all of the shoe tears during around. During their
- 6:05interviews with the OIG, the Northeast Regional Director, the Warden Associate,
- 6:10Warden I, and the Captain clarified that they expected a
- 6:13lieutenant conducting around in the shoe to check in with
- 6:17the officers, walk down each of the tears in the shoe,
- 6:21speak with the inmates, and address inmate concerns. They explained
- 6:26that the lieutenants did not act responsibly if they did
- 6:29not walk down each of the tears to check on
- 6:32the inmates in the shoe, as the acting Evening Watch
- 6:35Activities Lieutenant explained, unlike inmates in general population, shoe inmates
- 6:40cannot approach a supervisor because they are confined within a cell. Further,
- 6:46the GOP lieutenant training which the Morning Launch Operations Lieutenant
- 6:50attended in twenty eleven, taught the operations lieutenants were required
- 6:55to visit the shoe at least once during each shift,
- 6:59and that this visit it will be substantially more than
- 7:02just entering the unit, signing the logbook and talking with staff. Instead,
- 7:08operations lieutenants were trained to, among other things, walk through
- 7:12each range or tier, inspect logs and reports, observe activities,
- 7:17and periodically observe counts within the shoe. The OIG found
- 7:23that the failure of the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and
- 7:26the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately supervise shoe staff,
- 7:32end of the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant to adequately conduct
- 7:36a lieutenant round in the shoe, which contributed to the
- 7:39shoe staff's failure to conduct mandatory rounds and counts, constituted
- 7:44a job performance failure. Part c mcc New York staff
- 7:50allowed Epstein to place an unmonitored telephone call. On August ninth,
- 7:55The OIG's investigation and review revealed that on the night
- 7:59before or death, Epstein placed an unrecorded, unmonitored telephone call
- 8:04using a non inmate telephone system line from six fifty
- 8:08eight pm to seven nineteen pm. Other than an mcc
- 8:13New York call log, No other BOP records exist regarding
- 8:17this unmonitored call, including the identity of the person Epstein called,
- 8:22or a summary of the conversation. Federal regulations require that
- 8:27the warden of each BOP institution established procedures to monitor
- 8:31inmate telephone conversations, which is done to preserve the security
- 8:36and orderly management of the institution and to protect the public.
- 8:41For safety and security reasons, BOP policy requires that all
- 8:45inmate telephone calls be made through the inmate telephone system.
- 8:49BOP policy recognizes that, on rare occasion, in times of crisis,
- 8:54inmates may be permitted to make a telephone call outside
- 8:58of the inmate telephone system. In such circumstances, the telephone
- 9:03must be placed in a secure area eg. A loft office,
- 9:06and must be set to record telephone calls. Additionally, the
- 9:11staff members coordinating the call must notify the BOPS Special
- 9:15Investigative Services via email, providing the inmates name and register number,
- 9:21the date and time of the call, the number and
- 9:24name of the individual called, and the reason for the call.
- 9:29The Special Investigative Services must enter this information into the
- 9:33telephone recording system within seven days. The OIG's investigation determined
- 9:39that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, Epstein asked to call
- 9:43his mother. The unit manager told the OIG that after
- 9:47Epstein's attorney visited had concluded, he agreed to allow Epstein
- 9:51to place a telephone call on an unrecorded legal line.
- 9:55The unit manager explained that it was his understanding that
- 9:59Epstein he did not have the ability to place a
- 10:01telephone call through the Inmate telephone system. The OIG's investigation
- 10:07established both that Epstein's mother was deceased at the time
- 10:11he asked a telephoner, and that Epstein had been assigned
- 10:14the necessary documentation that would have allowed him to place
- 10:18calls through the Inmate telephone system, although he did not
- 10:22take the necessary steps to complete the setup process that
- 10:26would have given him the ability to place calls through
- 10:28that system. The captain told the OIG that when the
- 10:33unit manager was escorting Epstein from his attorney visit back
- 10:37to the shoe and epstein requested call was discussed, he
- 10:40told the unit manager that Epstein's telephone call had to
- 10:44be monitored and logged. The unit manager told the OIG
- 10:48that he escorted Epstein from his attorney visit to the
- 10:51shower area of the shoe, where he connected a telephone
- 10:54into an unrecorded legal line and dialed the phone number
- 10:58provided by Eppstein. The unit manager said that when a
- 11:02mail answered the call, he handed the telephone to Epstein
- 11:06and then left mcc New York for the day because
- 11:09his shift had ended. Before leaving the shoe, the unit
- 11:12manager said he told the evening watch shoe officer in charge,
- 11:16the material handler, and Noel, who were at the shoe
- 11:19officer's station, to make sure Epstein got his fifteen minutes
- 11:23on the telephone, but he did not instruct them to
- 11:26monitor the telephone call. The unit manager admitted that he
- 11:30did not verify the recipient of the telephone call, and
- 11:33that neither he nor anyone monitored or logged the telephone
- 11:37call as required. The OIG found that the unit manager
- 11:42violated BOP policy by allowing Epstein to make an unrecorded
- 11:47and unmonitored telephone call and by failing to verify the
- 11:51telephone call recipient, monitor and log the call. We further
- 11:56found that the unit manager exercised poor judgment when he
- 11:59left New York while Epstein was still on the telephone
- 12:03call that the unit manager had arranged, and failed to
- 12:06instruct the evening watch shoe officer in charge the material
- 12:09handler or NOEL to monitor the call. All right, so
- 12:13we're gonna wrap it their, folks, and when we pick
- 12:16up in the next episode, we're going to look at
- 12:19part D mcc new York staff failed to conduct and
- 12:23document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in epstein cell
- 12:28on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.
- 12:33All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 12:36be found in the description box. It's up, everyone, and
- 12:39welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode, we're
- 12:44going to pick up where we left off with the
- 12:47OIG report into the circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.
- 12:53In our last episode, we were talking about how the
- 12:56mcc New York staff had to allow Jeffrey Epstein to
- 12:59place an unmonitored telephone call on August ninth. So we're
- 13:03going to pick up right where we left off at
- 13:06Part D. Mcc new York staff failed to conduct and
- 13:10document cell searches and eliminate safety hazards in Epstein cell
- 13:15on August ninth, leaving Epstein with excessive linens in his cell.
- 13:20The OIG's Investigation and Review determined that mcc new York
- 13:24staff assigned to the shoe on August ninth, twenty nineteen,
- 13:29failed to conduct and document searches of Epstein cell in
- 13:33the shoe. BOP policy requires BOP staff routinely and irregularly
- 13:40search the housing units.
- 13:42Speaker 2: Mcc new York.
- 13:43Speaker 1: Shoe post orders require that shoe staff conduct at least
- 13:47five cell searches during each shift during daytime and evening
- 13:52hours seven forty five am to twelve am, in addition
- 13:56to other searches of the shoe cells and common areas
- 13:59and BP policy end mcc new York shoe post orders
- 14:04require written documentation of cell searches. BOP policy explains that
- 14:10the purpose of cell searches is to, among other things,
- 14:14maintain sanitary conditions and eliminate safety hazards. To that end,
- 14:20mcc new York General Housing Unit post orders provide that
- 14:24when an inmate is transferred out of a facility, all
- 14:27of the inmates linen should be taken to receiving in discharge.
- 14:32Speaker 2: The OIG reviewed.
- 14:33Speaker 1: Mcc new York Shoe truscope entries for August ninth and
- 14:37identified only one cell search entered by mcc new York
- 14:41Shoe staff for the entire day. During his interview with
- 14:45the OIG, the day watch shoe officer in charge stated
- 14:49that multiple cell searches were conducted in the mcc new
- 14:53York Shoe on August ninth. However, the day watch shoe
- 14:57officer in charge stated that he failed to docu emit
- 15:00the cell searches within the true scope system as required
- 15:04because he was too busy with other duties. The day
- 15:07watch shoe officer in charge further stated that any of
- 15:11the shoe staff could have logged the cell searches into
- 15:14truth Scope, but that it was primarily the shoe officer
- 15:17in charge's responsibility to do so. The evening watch shoe
- 15:22officer in charge told the OIG that he and other
- 15:25staff members did not conduct any cell searches during his
- 15:29shift in the shoe on August ninth. Additionally, the OIG
- 15:33determined that there was an excessive amount of bed linen
- 15:36within Epstein's cell. The Captain reviewed photographs of epstein cell
- 15:41and told the OIG that the excess of linens were
- 15:44a security issue because they could give inmates materials to
- 15:48fashion and improvised noose or use as escape paraphernalia. The
- 15:53OIG found that on August ninth, twenty nineteen, the day
- 15:57watch Shoe Officer in charge either failed to conduct the
- 16:00required cell searches or failed to document the cell searches
- 16:04that he conducted in the shoe, and that the evening
- 16:07watch Shoe Officer in charge failed to ensure that mcc
- 16:10new York staff assigned to the shoe conducted cell searches
- 16:14and himself fell to log cell searches in violation of
- 16:18BOP policy and mcc new.
- 16:21Speaker 2: York Shoe post orders.
- 16:23Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG found that it was a performance failure
- 16:27for the day watch Shoe Officer in charge, the Evening
- 16:30watch Shoe Officer in charge, and Noel, who served as
- 16:34the Shoe officer in charge during their respective shifts on
- 16:37August ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen, to have permitted Epstein
- 16:42to have an excessive amount of linens in his cell
- 16:45section E. Mcc new York staff failed to ensure that
- 16:49the institution's security camera system was fully functional, resulting in
- 16:54limited recorded video evidence. The investigation and review revealed long
- 17:00standing deficiencies with mcc new york security camera system. These
- 17:05deficiencies resulted in nearly all the cameras in and around
- 17:09the shoe where Epstein was being housed to not record video,
- 17:13starting in late July twenty nineteen and continuing through the
- 17:17date of Epstein's death on August tenth, twenty nineteen. According
- 17:22to forensic analysis conducted by the FBI after Epstein's death,
- 17:26on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, a disc failure in
- 17:30mcc new York's DVR two system caused approximately half of
- 17:35the institution's cameras, including nearly all of the cameras in
- 17:39and around the shoe, to display only live video feed
- 17:43with no video recording. Mcc new York personnel did not
- 17:48learn of this system failure until eleven days later. On
- 17:51August eighth, twenty nineteen, mcc new York personnel determined that
- 17:57the DVR two system need to be rebuilt to restore
- 18:01recording functionality. Despite the lack of recording functionality, this repair
- 18:06was not completed until after Epstein's death. The Warden told
- 18:10the OIG that he was generally aware that there were
- 18:13problems with the camera system. The warden sought and received
- 18:17approval from BOP to replace the entire camera system, and
- 18:21in September twenty eighteen, BOP entered into contracts totaling over
- 18:27seven hundred and thirty thousand dollars to purchase new equipment
- 18:31for the camera replacement project. Although mcc new York Management
- 18:36procured new DVR components approximately nine months prior to Epstein's death,
- 18:42the new system was not installed in a timely manner.
- 18:45The new cameras were required new conduit and wiring to
- 18:49be installed before the camera installation management phase, staffing shortages,
- 18:54temporary rotating facility managers, and other competing priorities that did
- 18:59not allow the completion of the installation of the wiring
- 19:03or the new camera system. The OIG determined that as
- 19:07of August twenty twenty one, nearly three years after mcc
- 19:11new York contracted for replacement camera equipment, the system upgrade
- 19:16still had not been completed. Mcc new York's failure to
- 19:21ensure that its security camera system was fully functional and
- 19:25make timely repairs is consistent with the OIG's previous observations
- 19:31regarding weaknesses in the goop's overall system of security cameras.
- 19:36Dating back to at least twenty thirteen, the OIG has
- 19:40repeatedly observed inadequacies in the BP's overall system of security cameras,
- 19:47including inoperable cameras, an insufficient number of cameras, poor video quality,
- 19:52and inadequate video storage. In a twenty sixteen report on
- 19:58the BOP's contraband intern a diction efforts, the OIG identified
- 20:02specific deficiencies with the camera system and recommended that the
- 20:07BOP evaluate the system to determine needed upgrades. In response
- 20:13to the twenty sixteen recommendation, the BOP assessed the camera
- 20:17systems at each institution over the next several years and
- 20:21determined that forty five of its one hundred twenty two institutions,
- 20:25including mcc new York, required camera system upgrades. The BOP
- 20:31worked to upgrade the systems at those forty five institutions
- 20:35between twenty nineteen and twenty twenty one. In June twenty
- 20:40twenty one, the BOP reported that it had updated all
- 20:43cameras at the forty five institutions with the latest software
- 20:48and equipment, and that it had installed additional cameras to
- 20:51bolster surveillance. However, as reported in October twenty twenty one,
- 20:57management advisory memorandum issued to the BOP had addressed some
- 21:02but not all, of the deficiencies described in the twenty
- 21:05sixteen OIG report. In its twenty twenty one management Advisory memorandum,
- 21:11the OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic
- 21:16plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system.
- 21:21The BOP has provided the OIG with a strategic plan
- 21:26that includes estimated cost projections and timelines for addressing the
- 21:30camera system concerns and completing the system upgrades. As of
- 21:35twenty twenty three, the OIG's twenty twenty one recommendation remains open.
- 21:40The BOP's failure to address the issue of functional security
- 21:44camera systems across the agency and that individual institutions presents
- 21:49an ongoing risk to the safety of BOP staff and
- 21:53inmates and has the potential to impair the investigation of
- 21:58an accountability of staff inmate misconduct. It is imperative that
- 22:03the BOP prioritize the expeditious expansion and modernization of its
- 22:09security camera system to mitigate security risks. All right, folks,
- 22:13So we're gonna end this episode here and we're gonna
- 22:16pick back up with part two of Chapter seven, which
- 22:20is Recommendations, and we're blazing through this. We're almost done,
- 22:24probably another oh, I don't know, three or four episodes
- 22:28or so, and we'll have this whole entire OIG Report
- 22:31added to the catalog and then from there we're gonna
- 22:34go through it and we're gonna deconstruct the whole entire thing.
- 22:37So as soon as we have it all added to
- 22:39the catalog, that's going to be the next step.
- 22:42Speaker 2: All right, folks.
- 22:43Speaker 1: All of the information that goes with this episode can
- 22:46be found in the description box. Hello, what's up, everyone,
- 22:50and welcome back to the Epstein Chronicles. In this episode,
- 22:55we're gonna dive right back in to the OIG Report
- 22:58and we're gonna finish it up. We have a little
- 23:01bit remaining here, plus the appendix, but we're gonna piecemell
- 23:05that together and we'll add that later on, because after
- 23:09we're done with this last section, we're gonna start going
- 23:13through this report, but doing it with commentary, because, as
- 23:17you can all imagine, I have a few things to
- 23:19say about the contents.
- 23:21Speaker 2: Of this report. But before we do that, let's.
- 23:25Speaker 1: Finish giving the government a chance to get their narrative
- 23:28on the record. Part two Recommendations. The OIG investigation identified
- 23:35multiple shortcomings in BOP policies that should be further assessed
- 23:40to ensure the BOP can more effectively handle issues that
- 23:44arise in connection with the custody and care of inmates.
- 23:49The recommendations address issues related to and the custody in
- 23:53care of inmates at risk for suicide. Measures designed to
- 23:58increase safety, such a staff rounds, inmate counts and cell searches,
- 24:03and institutional security camera systems and staffing shortages, two long
- 24:09standing issues for the GOP. One, the BOP should implement
- 24:14a process for assigning a cellmate following suicide watch or
- 24:19psychological observation, with criteria for exceptions based on the particular
- 24:24individual or security considerations. According to the mcc New York
- 24:30Institution Supplement Policy to the Suicide Prevention Program Policy, statement
- 24:36five thirty two four dot zero eight. Inmates discharge from
- 24:40suicide Watch will be assigned to cellmate. The supplemental policy
- 24:45does not, however, describe how long that cellmate requirement should last,
- 24:49or if any staff must approve the removal of the
- 24:53cellmate requirement. The Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty
- 24:59two fours dot zero eight does not describe any process
- 25:03or procedure that requires cell made assignments for inmates coming
- 25:07off of suicide Watch. The warden stated that there was
- 25:11no BOP policy mandating that an inmate coming off of
- 25:15suicide Watch have a cellmate, but that doing so was
- 25:18sound correctional judgment. The OIG's investigation and review revealed that
- 25:24there were knowledge gaps among mcc New York staff regarding
- 25:29Epstein's cellmate requirements, indicating that improved communication with institutional staff
- 25:35would be beneficial. The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP
- 25:40implement a requirement that all inmates coming off suicide Watch
- 25:44or psychological observation to be assigned cellmates, with criteria for
- 25:49exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations, providing
- 25:55guidance for determining when a cellmate is no longer required,
- 25:59and lament a process for approving, documenting, and communicating to
- 26:04institutional staff the assignment and removal of cellmates for these inmates. Two,
- 26:11the BOP should establish procedures to ensure inmates at high
- 26:15risk for suicide and for whom a cellmate is recommended
- 26:18will continue to have a cell mat until the recommendation
- 26:21is changed or rescinded, including establishing a contingency plan for
- 26:26cellmate reassignment with criteria for exceptions based on the particular
- 26:31individual or security considerations. The OIG's investigation and review found
- 26:38that there was no contingency plan in place to assign
- 26:41Epstein a new cellmate when his then cellmate was transferred
- 26:45out of mcc New York. Although the failure to assign
- 26:49a new cellmate was due in part to Shoe staff
- 26:52failing to make required notifications and supervisory staff failing to
- 26:57adequately supervise Shoes stefe, the gap in cell made assignment
- 27:02was also due to the lack of a contingency plan.
- 27:06The Evening Watch Shoe officer in charge told the OIG
- 27:09that although he knew that Epstein needed a new cell mate,
- 27:13he said that Shoe staff did not have the authority
- 27:16to assign a cellmate, which was consistent with what mcc
- 27:20new York supervisory personnel told the OIG. A contingency plan,
- 27:25such as a list of alternate cellmates, would have increased
- 27:28the likelihood that Epstein would not have been housed alone
- 27:32at the time.
- 27:33Speaker 2: Of his death.
- 27:34Speaker 1: The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP developed contingency plans
- 27:39for cell made assignment for high risk inmates, with criteria
- 27:43for exceptions based on the particular individual or security considerations. Three,
- 27:51The BOP should evaluate its current process for obtaining and
- 27:55documenting approval for social or legal visits while an inmate
- 28:00is on suicide watch or psychological observation, which allows for
- 28:05institution specific variations in the process, and provide guidance on
- 28:10standard components that each institution should include in its process
- 28:14to mitigate security issues that can arise when an inmate
- 28:18is on suicide watch or psychological observation. According to the
- 28:23GOP's Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement five thirty two four
- 28:29dot zero eight and the mcc new York Institution Supplement
- 28:33to the Suicide Prevention Policy, inmates on suicide watch must
- 28:38be put under constant observation by staff or trained inmate observers.
- 28:44The MCC new York Institution Supplement Policy states that only
- 28:49with rare exceptions that are approved by the Captain as
- 28:52well as by the Associate Warden of the programs, will visitation,
- 28:57either social or legal, be permitted for inmates on Suicide Watch. Additionally,
- 29:04the mcc new York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states
- 29:09that inmates on psychological observation will be continuously monitored by
- 29:14either an inmate companion or a staff member. Mcc new
- 29:18York Procedural Memorandum for Psychological Observation states that inmates on
- 29:23psychological observation will be continuously monitored by either an inmate
- 29:28companion or a staff member. A review of the Suicide
- 29:31Watch chronological logs for July twenty three, twenty nineteen, revealed
- 29:36Epstein was allowed to leave the Suicide Watch room to
- 29:39visit with his attorneys for more than six hours. According
- 29:43to the psychological reconstruction conducted by the Assistant Director of
- 29:47the re Entry Services Division during Epstein's psychological observation on
- 29:52July twenty fourth through July thirtieth, twenty nineteen, Epstein was
- 29:57allowed to visit with his attorneys between eight and eleven
- 30:01hours each day without direct observation. Although the NCC New
- 30:06York supplemental policy described an approval process for social and
- 30:11legal visits while an inmate is on suicide watch or
- 30:14psychological observation, the OIG found no evidence that Epstein's legal
- 30:19visits were approved by the captain or an associate warden. Additionally,
- 30:25the BOP Suicide Prevention Program Policy Statement fifty three twenty
- 30:30four dot zero eight does not describe any process or
- 30:34procedure that allows an inmate to have legal or social
- 30:37visits while on suicide watch or psychological observation. The OIG
- 30:43therefore recommends that the BOP evaluate its current process for
- 30:48such visits to be approved and documented. Four, The BOP
- 30:53should evaluate its methods of accounting for inmates whereabouts and
- 30:57well being and make changes as may be appropriate to
- 31:01improve those methods through policy, training, or other measures. The
- 31:06OIG's investigation and review revealed many inmate accountability deficiencies, most fundamentally,
- 31:13mcc New York staff assigned to the Shoe on August
- 31:17ninth and tenth, twenty nineteen did not conduct many of
- 31:21the required rounds and inmate counts. Additionally, there was lacking
- 31:26or delayed documentation regarding inmates, including cell assignments and internal
- 31:31inmate transfers. Internal reports such as the daily call out
- 31:36List and the Lieutenant Log are either not retained or
- 31:39subject to continuous modification, which reduces their utility as accountability tools. Therefore,
- 31:47the OIG recommends that the BOP evaluate its methods of
- 31:51accounting for inmate whereabouts and well being and make changes
- 31:55as appropriate to improve those methods through policy, training.
- 31:59Speaker 2: Or or other measures.
- 32:02Speaker 1: Five, BOP policy should clarify what is required of a
- 32:06lieutenant when conducting around TIS. The OIG's investigation and review
- 32:13revealed significant gaps in the supervision of the mcc new
- 32:17York staff assigned to the Shoe. Although BOP policy requires
- 32:22mcc new York lieutenants to conduct at least one round
- 32:25in the Shoe during each shift, what was required of
- 32:29a lieutenant during the round is not specified. During their
- 32:32interviews with the OIG, experienced mcc new York supervisory personnel
- 32:38described what should be done during around which is also
- 32:41reflected in BOP lieutenant training, but this expectation was not
- 32:47memorialized in any BOP or mcc new York policy or
- 32:52post order. The OIG recommends that the BOP develop a policy,
- 32:57either at an agency wide or in institutions specific level,
- 33:01to define what is expected of supervisory personnel during a
- 33:06round in the Shoe to better ensure that BOP staff
- 33:09are appropriately supervised. Six, The BOP should continue to develop
- 33:15and implement plans to address staffing shortages at its prisons.
- 33:21Since at least twenty fifteen, the OIG has repeatedly found
- 33:25the need for BOP to address staffing shortages, including medical
- 33:29staffing shortages. This investigation and review revealed the direct impact
- 33:35of staffing deficiencies on inmate safety. For example, the material
- 33:40handler worked three consecutive shifts twenty four hours straight on
- 33:44August ninth, twenty nineteen, which was certainly a contributing cause
- 33:49to the lack of adequate means of accounting for inmate
- 33:52location and well being in the Shoe. The material handler
- 33:56told the OIG that no one did the ten pm
- 34:00schee inmate count.
- 34:02Speaker 2: Because they were tired.
- 34:03Speaker 1: Additionally, the OIG's investigation and review found that, in connection
- 34:08with the MCC New York's upgrade of its security camera system,
- 34:12the GOP's Northeast Regional Office arranged for technicians from other
- 34:17BP institutions to perform temporary duty assignments to MCC New
- 34:22York to perform necessary mechanical, electrical, plumbing, and wiring work.
- 34:28Yet during the course of the TDY rotations, work was
- 34:32not consistently conducted on the camera upgrade because sometimes TDY
- 34:37staff were used to cover shortages at MCC's New York
- 34:41custody posts. Without adequate staffing, the BOP cannot fulfill its
- 34:46mandate to insure safe and secure correctional facilities. The OIG
- 34:51therefore recommends that the BOP continue to develop and implement
- 34:56plans to address staffing shortages at its institutions. Seven, The
- 35:02GOP should evaluate its cell search procedures and make changes
- 35:07as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,
- 35:12or other measures. The OIG's investigation and review found that
- 35:17there was an excessive amount of linens in Epstein's cell
- 35:20at the time of his death. BOP policy and MCC
- 35:24New York shoe post orders require that shoe cells be searched,
- 35:29but they do not specifically address the issue of excessive
- 35:32bed linens, which the captain told the OIG present a
- 35:35safety hazard because an inmate can use them to harm
- 35:39themselves or escape from the institution. Therefore, the OIG recommends
- 35:44that the BOP evaluated cell search procedures and make changes
- 35:49as may be appropriate to improve those procedures through policy, training,
- 35:54or other measures. And, last, but not least, eight, the
- 35:59BP should enhance existing policies regarding institutional security camera systems
- 36:05to ensure they specifically state that such systems must have
- 36:09the capacity to record video and that Goop institutions must
- 36:13conduct regular security camera system functionality checks, as discussed in
- 36:19the conclusion section of this chapter. The OIG found that
- 36:24even though the highest levels of leadership knew of the
- 36:27mcc New York security camera system reoccurring deficiencies prior to
- 36:32Epstein's death, no one was tasked with the responsibility of
- 36:36checking the security camera system on a routine basis to
- 36:40ensure that the system was functional. As a result, when
- 36:44on July twenty ninth, twenty nineteen, video from approximately half
- 36:49of the institution security cameras was no longer being recorded,
- 36:53the problem went undetected for eleven days. The OIG also
- 36:58found that there was no BOP policy see that specifically
- 37:01state that security camera systems must have the capacity to record,
- 37:06or that institutional staff must perform periodic checks to ensure
- 37:11the camera system is fully functional. Cameras that are failing
- 37:15to provide good quality or any live video streams put
- 37:18the safety of BOP staff members and inmates at risk.
- 37:22Speaker 2: The lack of video.
- 37:24Speaker 1: Recordings can potentially hinder investigations of wrongdoing by staff and inmates.
- 37:30The OIG therefore recommends that the BOP enhance existing policies
- 37:35and protocols, so they specifically state that all institutional security
- 37:40camera systems must have the capacity to record, and that
- 37:44the specified staff at each institution must conduct periodic checks
- 37:49of the security camera system to determine its operational status
- 37:53and take corrective action as soon as possible when the
- 37:57system is found to be inoperable. Such routine checks would
- 38:01help ensure that camera system malfunctions are detected and corrective
- 38:05actions are initiated in a timely manner. And that, my friends,
- 38:10is the end of the Inspector General's report into Jeffrey
- 38:14Epstein's death. And like I said, over the next few days,
- 38:18over the next couple of weeks, we're going to go
- 38:20through this whole entire thing again, but with commentary. All Right, folks,
- 38:24that is going to do it for this one. All
- 38:26of the information that goes with this episode can be
- 38:28found in the description box