Latest / Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign / 023 - Chapter 11 Part 2 - Task Force Drysdale

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023 - Chapter 11 Part 2 - Task Force Drysdale · Marine Operations in Korea The Chosin Reservoir Campaign

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Speaker 1: Chapter eleven, Part two of US Marine Operations in Korea
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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty three, Volume three, The Chosen
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Speaker 1: Reservoir Campaign by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona. This LibriVox
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Speaker 1: recording is in the public domain. Task Force Drysdale High
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Speaker 1: Level Command Conference. Although the Marines at Hagaru had little
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Speaker 1: to do with the higher levels of strategy, it was
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Speaker 1: evident that the continued retreat of the Eighth Army in
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Speaker 1: West Korea must ultimately affect the destinies of ten Corps.
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Speaker 1: Of more immediate concern was the deteriorating situation of the
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Speaker 1: three battalions, two infantry and one artillery of the seventh
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Speaker 1: Infantry Division east of the Chosen Reservoir. Brigadier General Henry I. Hohades,
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Speaker 1: assistant division commander, informed General Smith that noon on the
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Speaker 1: twenty ninth that the Army troops had suffered approximately four
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Speaker 1: hundred casualties while falling back to our Hagaroo and were
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Speaker 1: unable to fight their way out to safety. At twenty
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Speaker 1: twenty seven that night, all troops in the Chosen Reservoir area,
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Speaker 1: including the three Army battalions, were placed under the operational
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Speaker 1: control of the Marine Commander by ten Corps the first
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Speaker 1: Marine Division was directed to redeploy one RCT without delay
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Speaker 1: from Umn area to Hagaroo area, gain contact with elements
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Speaker 1: of the seventh Infantry Division e of Chosen Reservoir, coordinate
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Speaker 1: all forces in and north of Hagaroo in a perimeter
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Speaker 1: defense based on Hagaroo, Open and secure Hagaroo Coodo re MSR.
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Speaker 1: On the afternoon of the thirtieth, the command conference was
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Speaker 1: held at Hagaroo in the Division. CP. Generals Almond Smith,
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Speaker 1: Barr and Hohodes were informed at the briefing session that
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Speaker 1: a disaster threatened the three army battalions. Alman was also
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Speaker 1: much concerned about the attacks on the Marine MSR. He
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Speaker 1: had been given a first hand account that morning by
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Speaker 1: the senior Marine officer on the ten Corps staff, Colonel
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Speaker 1: Edward H. Forney, who had just returned from Coto Ree.
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Speaker 1: At the Hagaroo conference, the ten Corps commander announced that
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Speaker 1: he had abandoned any idea of consolidating positions in the
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Speaker 1: Chosen Reservoir area, stressing the necessity for speed and falling
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Speaker 1: back toward hamhung He promised Smith resupply by air after
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Speaker 1: authorizing him to burn or destroy all equipment, which would
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Speaker 1: delay his withdrawal to the seacoast. The Marine general replied
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Speaker 1: that his movements must be governed by his ability to
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Speaker 1: evacuate his wounded. He would have to fight his way out,
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Speaker 1: he added, and could not afford to discard equipment. It
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Speaker 1: was his intention therefore, to bring out the bulk of it.
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Speaker 1: Alman directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan
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Speaker 1: and time schedule for extricating the army battalions east of
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Speaker 1: the reservoir. Those two generals agreed, however, that not much
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Speaker 1: could be done until the udem Knee Marines arrived at Hagaru,
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Speaker 1: and the conference ended on an inconclusive note. That same afternoon,
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Speaker 1: ten Core Operation Order eight DASH fifty was received. It
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Speaker 1: defined the Core mission as maintaining contact with the enemy
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Speaker 1: to the maximum capability consistent with cohesive action oriented to
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Speaker 1: the ham Hung Hung Num base of operation. The decision
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Speaker 1: to concentrate ten CORE forces in that area meant the
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Speaker 1: evacuation of Wan San. General Harris lost no time in
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Speaker 1: directing MAG twelve to move from Wansan Airfield to Yanpo
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Speaker 1: Headron twelve and three combat squadrons began shifting personnel and
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Speaker 1: equipment at once. Transfer of the aircraft was completed on
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Speaker 1: one December. In many instances, the planes took off on
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Speaker 1: combat missions from Wanson and landed at Yanpo, so that
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Speaker 1: the ground forces were not deprived of air support. High
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Speaker 1: level naval commanders were already preparing for an evacuation of
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Speaker 1: Northeast Korea if matters came to the worst. Admiral joy
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Speaker 1: foresaw as early as the twenty eight that if the
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Speaker 1: retreat of the battered eighth Army continued, Tencor would have
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Speaker 1: to choose between falling back and being outflanked. In view
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Speaker 1: of the time needed to collect the enormous quantities of
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Speaker 1: shipping required, he warned Admiral Doyle on that date that
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Speaker 1: a large scale redeployment operation might be necessary. Doyle, in
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Speaker 1: turn directed his staff to commence planning for redeployment, either
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Speaker 1: by an administrative outloading or by a fighting withdraw. CCF
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Speaker 1: attacks of one December at Hagaru during the early hours
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Speaker 1: of darkness on thirty November, it appeared that Hagarou might
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Speaker 1: have a second quiet night. Three bugle calls were heard
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Speaker 1: by Item company at twenty fifteen, and the enemy sent
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Speaker 1: up a green flare an hour later, but no unusual
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Speaker 1: CCF activity was reported until twenty three thirty, when small
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Speaker 1: patrols began probing for weak spots the Item Company lines.
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Speaker 1: The enemy could scarcely have chosen a less rewarding area
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Speaker 1: for such research. As usual, Lieutenant Fisher had built up
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Speaker 1: an elaborate system of concertinas, trip flares, and booby traps,
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Speaker 1: and his sandbag foxholes and weapons and placements afforded his
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Speaker 1: men maximum protection. At midnight when the enemy came on
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Speaker 1: in strength. Each successive assault wave shattered against the terrific
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Speaker 1: firepower which a marine rifle company, aided by artillery tanks,
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Speaker 1: eighty one millimeter mortars and heavy machine guns, could concentrate.
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Speaker 1: Several times, the enemy's momentum carried him to the Item
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Speaker 1: Company foxholes, but no Communists lived to exploit their advantage.
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Speaker 1: On one of these occasions, Sergeant Charles V. Davidson, having
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Speaker 1: expended his ammunition, proved that cold steel has its uses
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Speaker 1: by bayoneting the last of his attackers. Again, as on
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Speaker 1: the night of the twenty eighth, the enemy had chosen
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Speaker 1: to launch his man major attack against marine strength, though
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Speaker 1: his daytime observation must have disclosed the preparations for a
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Speaker 1: hot reception in the Item Company sector and estimated five
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Speaker 1: hundred to seven hundred and fifty Chinese were killed on
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Speaker 1: this front at a cost of Fisher's men of two
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Speaker 1: Ka and ten Wia. The Chinese also repeated themselves by
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Speaker 1: carrying out another attack on East Hill, which ended in
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Speaker 1: a second costly stalemate. The western slope up to the
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Speaker 1: Military Cress was held by the following units from right
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Speaker 1: to left, first Lieutenant Ermine L. Meeker's first platoon of
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Speaker 1: Baker Company engineers, second first and third platoons of George Company,
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Speaker 1: and Lieutenant Scout's third platoon of Able Company engineers. To
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Speaker 1: the left of Scout, near the foot of the hill
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Speaker 1: were Lieutenant Canzona's first platoon of Able engineers, two tanks
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Speaker 1: of the AT Company two seven, and elements of Lieutenant
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Speaker 1: Colonel Banks's first Service Battalion. The action began early before
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Speaker 1: midnight with one of those comedy situations which develop on
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Speaker 1: the grimmest occasions. The sign or password was Abraham and
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Speaker 1: the countersign Lincoln, but two Company A engineers on a
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Speaker 1: listening post did not pause for the customary exchange, having
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Speaker 1: been jumped by what their startled eyes took to be
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Speaker 1: a Chinese regiment. They sprinted downhill, yelling Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln.
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Speaker 1: As they slid into Skelt's lines. With the enemy close behind,
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Speaker 1: his engineers had no leisure for a laugh. Within a
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Speaker 1: few seconds they were mixing it in a wild maleay
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Speaker 1: with Communists who seemed literally to drop on them from above. Meanwhile,
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Speaker 1: George Company was hard hit by welling mortar fire, which
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Speaker 1: threatened to wipe out Lieutenant Hopkins' first platoon. The ensuing
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Speaker 1: double headed CCF attack bent back the left flank of
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Speaker 1: George Company, with both the first and third platoons giving
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Speaker 1: ground on the left. Skelt's platoon was pushed down to
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Speaker 1: the foot of the hill by superior enemy numbers after
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Speaker 1: exactly half of his twenty eight men were killed or wounded. Here,
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Speaker 1: the fight continued, with Banks's Service troops lending a hand
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Speaker 1: until the Chinese were exterminated. This penetration was a hollow
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Speaker 1: triumph for the enemy, no friendly forces being left in
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Speaker 1: the center. The how battery howitzers walked shells up and
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Speaker 1: down the western slope. Mortars and machine guns chimed in,
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Speaker 1: and Lieutenant Canzona's platoon was in position to direct the
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Speaker 1: fire of the two tanks of at Company two seven.
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Speaker 1: The scene became bright as day after an enemy artillery
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Speaker 1: shell set fifty drums of gasolina blaze in a supply
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Speaker 1: area dump like an enormous torch. The flames illuminated the
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Speaker 1: battle so vividly that General Smith looked on from the
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Speaker 1: doorway of his CP some twelve hundred yards away. Several
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Speaker 1: bullets pierced the roof and walls during the night. Again,
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Speaker 1: as in the fight of twenty eight to twenty nine November,
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Speaker 1: marine firepower blocked the gap on the central and northwest
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Speaker 1: slopes of East Hill. Marine and Army Service troops took
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Speaker 1: a part in the fighting, which is the more creditable
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Speaker 1: considering that they were ordered out in the middle of
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Speaker 1: the night, placed in a provisional unit with strange troops,
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Speaker 1: and marched off into the darkness to attack or defend
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Speaker 1: at some critical point. Lieutenant Meeker's engineer platoon, on the
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Speaker 1: right of George Company had a long drawn firefight, but
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Speaker 1: got off with losses of one man killed and three wounded.
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Speaker 1: At zero one hundred, the CCF pressure on Sitter's troops
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Speaker 1: was so heavy that Lieutenant Kerrey, former commander of the
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Speaker 1: first Platoon, was taken from his s two duties to
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Speaker 1: lead a group of reinforcements, which he described as all
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Speaker 1: available hands from the CP or any other units at
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Speaker 1: Hagarou who could spare a personnel carrying as much ammunition
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Speaker 1: as possible. He arrived at the George Company CP to
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Speaker 1: find Sitters still commanding in spite of his wound. Scarcely
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Speaker 1: a full squad was left of Carry's old outfit when
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Speaker 1: he helped to restore the lines. It was necessary for Ridge
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Speaker 1: to send a further reinforcement consisting of British Marines of
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Speaker 1: the forty first Commando before George Company's left flank was secured.
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Speaker 1: A counter attack at daybreak regained lost ground, and the
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Speaker 1: situation was well under control when air came on station
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Speaker 1: at zero nine hundred. Thus ended another night of confusion
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Speaker 1: and frustration for both sides on East Hill. While the
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Speaker 1: Chinese attack had been better organized and in larger force
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Speaker 1: than the effort of the twenty ninth, it was too
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Speaker 1: little and too late for decisive results. In spite of
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Speaker 1: heavy losses. On the other hand, George Company and its
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Speaker 1: reinforcing elements had suffered an estimated sixty men killed and wounded,
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Speaker 1: although the marines of Hagaru could not have suspected it.
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Speaker 1: On the morning of one December, the enemy had for
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Speaker 1: the time being shot his bolt. His first two large
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Speaker 1: scale attacks, as Pow and Terra gateations were to confirm,
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Speaker 1: had used up not only the personnel of a division,
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Speaker 1: but most of the limited supplies of ammunition available. Thus,
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Speaker 1: it is probable that the following estimates of CCF casualties,
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Speaker 1: as published in the three to one report for the
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Speaker 1: period of twenty eight November to five December, were nearer
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Speaker 1: to accuracy than most such summaries. One fifty eight CCF
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Speaker 1: Division estimated casualties of three thousand, three hundred for the
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Speaker 1: one hundred seventy second Regiment, one thousand, seven hundred and
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Speaker 1: fifty each for the one hundred seventy third and one
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Speaker 1: hundred seventy fourth regiments. Two fifty nine CCF Division estimated
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Speaker 1: one thousand, seven hundred and fifty casualties for the one
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Speaker 1: hundred seventy sixth Regiment. No other units identified. The known
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Speaker 1: Chinese dead in the two night battles amounted to at
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Speaker 1: least fifteen hundred, and if it may be assumed that
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Speaker 1: three or four times that number were wounded, the total
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Speaker 1: casualties would have crippled an enemy infantry division of seventy
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Speaker 1: five hundred to ten thousand men, plus an additional regiment.
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Speaker 1: Considering the primitive state of CCF resupply and medical service, moreover,
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Speaker 1: it is likely that hundreds died of wounds and privations
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Speaker 1: behind their own lines. The losses of three to one
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Speaker 1: at Hagaru were given as thirty three KIA, ten dow
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Speaker 1: two MIA, and two hundred seventy WIA, a total of
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Speaker 1: three hundred and fifteen battle casualties, nearly all of which
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Speaker 1: were incurred from twenty eight November to one December. There
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Speaker 1: are no overall casualty figures for Marines or Army Service troops,
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Speaker 1: but it is probable that their total losses exceeded those
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Speaker 1: of three to one. Rescue of U. S. Army wounded
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Speaker 1: casualties estimated as high as seventy five percent, were suffered
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Speaker 1: by the three U. S. Army battalions east of the
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Speaker 1: reservoir at twenty two hundred on the night of one December.
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Speaker 1: The first survivors, most of them walking wounded reached the
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Speaker 1: marine lines north of Hagarou with tales of frightful losses
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Speaker 1: suffered in the five days of continual fighting since the
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Speaker 1: first CCIF attack. On the night of twenty seven to
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Speaker 1: twenty eight November, following this action, Colonel Allan D. Maclain,
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Speaker 1: commanding the thirty first Infantry, had set up a perimeter
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Speaker 1: near Sinhung Knee with the third Battalion of his regiment
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Speaker 1: and the first Battalion of the fifty seventh Field Artillery
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Speaker 1: along the shore. Farther to the north, Lieutenant Colonel Don C.
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Speaker 1: Faith U S Army held a separate perimeter with the
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Speaker 1: first Battalion thirty second Infantry. Both positions were hard hit
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Speaker 1: by the Chinese on the night of twenty seven to
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Speaker 1: twenty eight November and isolated from each other. During the
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Speaker 1: next twenty four hours. They beat off CCIF attacks with
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Speaker 1: the support of marine and FIEF planes, and faith fought
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Speaker 1: his way through to a junction with the Sinhung Knie force.
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Speaker 1: When the senior officer was killed, Faith took command of
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Speaker 1: all three battalions. Immobilized by nearly five hundred casualties, he
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Speaker 1: remained in the Sinhung Ni perimeter, where he was supplied
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Speaker 1: by air. On the twenty ninth, General Hoades sent a
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Speaker 1: relief force in company strength from thirty first Infantry units
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Speaker 1: in the area just north of Hagaroo. These troops, supported
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Speaker 1: by several Army tanks, were hurled back by superior CCF
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Speaker 1: numbers with the loss of two tanks and heavy personnel casualties.
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Speaker 1: On one December, fearing that he would be overwhelmed in
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Speaker 1: his Sinhung knee perimeter, Faith attempted to break through to Hagaroo.
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Speaker 1: After destroying the howitzers and all but the most essential equipment,
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Speaker 1: the convoy, with its hundreds of wounded, moved out under
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Speaker 1: the constant cover of marine close air support, controlled by
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Speaker 1: Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC. Progress was slow and exhausting,
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Speaker 1: with frequent stops for firefights. There were many instances of
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Speaker 1: individual bravery in the face of adversity, but losses of
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Speaker 1: office and NCOs gradually deprived the units of leadership. As
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Speaker 1: an added handicap, a large portion of the troops were
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Speaker 1: Rocks who understood no English. The task force came near
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Speaker 1: to a breakout at dusk. It was only four and
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Speaker 1: a half miles from Hagaroo when Faith fell mortally wounded
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Speaker 1: and the units shattered into leaderless groups. Soon the column
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Speaker 1: had ceased to exist as a military force. A tragic
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Speaker 1: disintegration set in as wounded and frostbit men made their
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Speaker 1: way over the ice of the reservoir in wretched little bands,
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Speaker 1: drawn together by a common misery rather than discipline. By
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Speaker 1: a miracle, the first stragglers to reach Hagaroo got through
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Speaker 1: the minefields and trip flares without harm. Before dawn, a
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Speaker 1: total of about six hundred and seventy survivors of Task
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Speaker 1: Force Faith had been taken into the warming tents of Hagaroo.
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Speaker 1: Lieutenant Colonel Beale, commanding officer of the first Motor Transport Battalion,
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Speaker 1: made a personal search in the morning for other survivors.
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Speaker 1: Finding more than an as jeep could carry, he organized
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Speaker 1: a task force of trucks, jeeps, and sleds. The only
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Speaker 1: CCF opposition to the Marines came in the form of
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Speaker 1: long distance sniping, which grew so troublesome late in the
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Speaker 1: afternoon that the trucker set up a machine gun section
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Speaker 1: on the ice for protection. Far from hindering the escape
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Speaker 1: of the army wounded, the Chinese actually assisted in some instances,
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Speaker 1: thus adding to the difficulty of understanding the oriental mentality.
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Speaker 1: Of the three hundred nineteen soldiers rescued by Beale on
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Speaker 1: two December, Nearly all were wounded or frostbitten. Some were
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Speaker 1: found wandering about in aimless circles on the ice in
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Speaker 1: a state of shock. A company sized task force of
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Speaker 1: Army troops from Hagaroo, supported by tanks, moved out that
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Speaker 1: day to bring in any organized units of the three
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Speaker 1: shattered battalions which might have been left behind. Known as
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Speaker 1: Task Force Anderson, after Lieutenant Colonel Barry K. Anderson, the
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Speaker 1: senior Army officer at Hagarou. The column met heavy CCF
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Speaker 1: opposition and was recalled when it became evident that only
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Speaker 1: stragglers remained. Beale and his men kept up their rescue
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Speaker 1: work until the last of an estimated one thousand, fifty
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Speaker 1: survivors from the original two thousand, five hundred troops had
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Speaker 1: been saved. A marine reconnaissance patrol counted more than three
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Speaker 1: hundred dead in the abandoned trucks of the Task Force
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Speaker 1: Faith Convoy, and there were apparently hundreds of mia. The
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Speaker 1: three hundred eighty five able bodied soldiers who reached Hagaroo
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Speaker 1: were organized into a provisional battalion and provided with marine
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Speaker 1: equipment first landings on Hagarou airstrip. Casualty evacuation had become
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Speaker 1: such a problem by one December that Captain Eugene R.
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Speaker 1: Herring Medical Corps, US Navy, the Division Surgeon, called at
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Speaker 1: General Smith's CP. That morning. He reported that some six
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Speaker 1: hundred casualties at Hagaroo were putting a severe strain on
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Speaker 1: the limited facilities of C and E companies of the
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Speaker 1: first Medical Battalion. It was further estimated that five hundred
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Speaker 1: casualties were being brought in by the udem Knee units
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Speaker 1: and four hundred from the three Army battalions east of
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Speaker 1: the reservoir. Although both figures were to prove far too low,
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Speaker 1: they seemed alarmingly high at a time when only the
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Speaker 1: most critical casualties could be evacuated by helicopter or oy
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Speaker 1: flying in extreme cold and landing at high altitudes where
18:25
Speaker 1: the aircraft had less than normal lift. The pilots of
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Speaker 1: Major Gotchok's VMO six saved scores of lives from twenty
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Speaker 1: seven November to one December, when the transports took over
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Speaker 1: one hundred fifty two casualties were evacuated by the oys
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Speaker 1: and helicopters one hundred nine from udem Knee, thirty six
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Speaker 1: from Hagarou, and seven from Coto Ree. Altogether, two hundred
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Speaker 1: twenty evacuation flights and eleven rescue missions were completed during
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Speaker 1: the entire reservoir campaign by a squadron, which on one
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Speaker 1: November included twenty five officers, ninety five enlisted men, eight
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Speaker 1: O Y two and two L five G observation planes
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Speaker 1: and nine h three S one Sikorsky helicopters. First Lieutenant
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Speaker 1: Robert A. Longstaff was killed by enemy small arms fire
19:14
Speaker 1: near Tuktong Passed while on an evacuation flight, and both
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Speaker 1: Captain Ferrish and Lieutenant Inglehart had their helicopter so badly
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Speaker 1: riddled by CCF bullets that the machines were laid up
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Speaker 1: for repairs. Two surgical teams from hung Nam had been
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Speaker 1: flown to Hagaroo by helicopter, but the evacuation problem remained
19:32
Speaker 1: so urgent on one December that the command of the
19:35
Speaker 1: first Marine Division authorized a trial landing on the new
19:38
Speaker 1: air strip, only forty percent completed at this time, the
19:42
Speaker 1: runway was twenty nine hundred feet long and fifty feet wide,
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Speaker 1: with a two percent grade to the north. It was
19:49
Speaker 1: a tense moment at fourteen thirty that afternoon when the
19:52
Speaker 1: knots of Parker cladmarine spectators watched the wheels of the
19:56
Speaker 1: first fief C forty seven hit the frozen, snow covered strip.
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Speaker 1: The big two motored aircraft bounced and lurched its way
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Speaker 1: over the rough surface, but the landing was a success,
20:07
Speaker 1: and even more nerve racking test ensued half an hour later,
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Speaker 1: when the pilot took off with twenty four casualties. It
20:14
Speaker 1: seemed for a breath snatching instant that the run wouldn't
20:17
Speaker 1: be long enough for the machine to become airborne, but
20:20
Speaker 1: at last the tail lifted and the wings got enough
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Speaker 1: bite to clear the hills to the south. Three more
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Speaker 1: planes landed that afternoon, taking off with about sixty more casualties.
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Speaker 1: The last arrival, heavily loaded with ammunition, collapsed its landing
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Speaker 1: gear on the bumpy strip and had to be destroyed
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Speaker 1: and abandoned at the other end of the evacuation chain.
20:42
Speaker 1: Clearing stations had been established by ten Corps at Yanpo
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Speaker 1: Airfield to receive and distribute casualties. A thirty day evacuation
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Speaker 1: policy was maintained and the casualties to remain in the
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Speaker 1: area went to the First Marine Division Hospital in Hungnam,
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Speaker 1: the Army one hundred twenty first Evacuation Hospital ham hung
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Speaker 1: and the USS Consolation in Hungnam Harbor. Casualties requiring more
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Speaker 1: than thirty days of hospitalization were flown from Yanpo to Japan,
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Speaker 1: though a few critical cases were evacuated directly from Hagaroo
21:13
Speaker 1: to Japan. It was planned for incoming transports at Hagaru
21:18
Speaker 1: to fly both supplies and troop replacements. Meanwhile, on one December,
21:23
Speaker 1: the first Marine Division had its first C one nineteen
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Speaker 1: air drop from Japan, known as Baldwins. These drops consisted
21:32
Speaker 1: of a pre arranged quantity of small arms, ammunition, weapons,
21:36
Speaker 1: water rations, and medical supplies, though the amounts could be
21:40
Speaker 1: modified as desired. The air drops, however, did not have
21:45
Speaker 1: the capability of supplying an RCT in combat, let alone
21:49
Speaker 1: a division. At this time, the Combat Cargo Command FIEF
21:53
Speaker 1: estimated its delivery capabilities at only seventy tons per day,
21:58
Speaker 1: and even though in practice this total was stepped up
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Speaker 1: to one hundred, it fell five short of the requirements
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Speaker 1: of an RCT. Fortunately, the foresight of the division commander
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Speaker 1: and staff had enabled the supply regulating Detachment to build
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Speaker 1: up a level of six days rations and two units
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Speaker 1: of fire at Hagarou. This backlog, plus such quantities as
22:19
Speaker 1: could be delivered by Baldwin Drops, promised to see the
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Speaker 1: division through the emergency. Infantrymen are seldom given to self effacement,
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Speaker 1: but at nightfall on one December, only an ungrateful gravel
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Speaker 1: cruncher could have failed to pay a silent tribute to
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Speaker 1: the other services, as well as to the supporting arms
22:37
Speaker 1: of the Marine Corps, Navy medics, fief airmen, Army service units.
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Speaker 1: They had all helped to make it possible for the
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Speaker 1: Marines to plan a breakout. Yet it is likely that
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Speaker 1: the First Engineer Battalion came first in the affections of
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Speaker 1: wounded men being loaded in the C forty sevens for evacuation.
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Speaker 1: In just twelve days and nights, the engineers of Company
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Speaker 1: D had hacked this air ship strip out of the
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Speaker 1: frozen earth. Marine infantrymen could never forget the two critical
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Speaker 1: knights of battle when they looked back over their shoulders
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Speaker 1: from combat areas at the heartening spectacle of the dozers,
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Speaker 1: puffing and huffing under the floodlights in a pinch. Lieutenant
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Speaker 1: Colonel Partridge's specialists had doubled as riflemen too, and several
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Speaker 1: platoons were riddled with casualties. Thanks in large part to
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Speaker 1: the engineers, the Hagaroo base was no longer isolated on
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Speaker 1: one December, and though the enemy did not yet realize it,
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Speaker 1: he had lost the initiative. On this eventful Friday, the
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Speaker 1: Marines at Umn were coming out, and they were coming
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Speaker 1: out fighting, with their casualties and equipment and of Chapter eleven,
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Speaker 1: Part two, read by Aaron Bennett,