Latest / Deep Values: Value Investing Deep Dives / [Deep Value] Housing Market Paralysis The Welded Door
Transcript
- 0:00Welcome back to the Deep Dive today.
- 0:02We are not here to talk about a temporary market correction or
- 0:06you know, some kind of seasonal slow down.
- 0:08No, not at all. We are plunging head first into
- 0:11a state of structural dysfunction so profound in the
- 0:16US housing market that it can only be described as, well, a
- 0:19full blown paralysis. Think of the housing market.
- 0:22Historically, this primary engine of middle class wealth
- 0:25generation as an engine that hasn't just broken, but has
- 0:29actively seized up entirely, just grinding transactions to a
- 0:33halt. That's absolutely the right
- 0:34framing. I mean, if you look across all
- 0:36the source material we've got, the consistent description is
- 0:39one of a broken engine and a door that has been, and I'm
- 0:42quoting, welded shut. Welded shut.
- 0:44Wow. Yeah.
- 0:45Our mission in this deep dive is really to unpack this specific
- 0:49brand of paralysis, this crisis. It stems from a really unique
- 0:52collision. You have, on one hand, this
- 0:55historic and incredibly rapid monetary tightening the Federal
- 0:59Reserve. The rate hikes.
- 1:00Exactly. And that's colliding with a
- 1:02chronic, decades long national shortage of actual physical
- 1:07housing supply. And the analysis of this, this
- 1:09really strange static market is heavily anchored by insights
- 1:14from market veterans like Steve Eisman, right?
- 1:17He was, you know, one of the few who correctly identified the
- 1:20speculative mechanics of the 2008 crisis.
- 1:23And now he's sounding the alarm on a completely different kind
- 1:25of problem. And that's the core paradox
- 1:27here. It's so crucial for you to
- 1:29understand this. This is fundamentally not 2008.
- 1:31OK, so let's make that distinction really clear.
- 1:33In 2008, the system failed because of massive speculative
- 1:37excess. It was fueled by loose credit
- 1:39standards. You know, exotic derivatives.
- 1:42Too much money chasing bad assets.
- 1:43Precisely today we have the opposite problem.
- 1:47We have this unique lock in effect that has just killed
- 1:50market liquidity, even though the underlying debt is actually,
- 1:53you know, pretty sound. OK, So where does the data take
- 1:56us next? That lock in effect, you said,
- 1:58has created a severe bifurcation in the entire economic
- 2:02landscape. Tell us about that divide.
- 2:04It's an economy that's really split between the haves and the
- 2:07have nots. The haves are the incumbent
- 2:10homeowners. These are the people who
- 2:12purchased or refinanced during that era of ultra low interest
- 2:16rates, what we sometimes call the ZRP era.
- 2:19We should probably define that for clarity.
- 2:21What exactly do we mean by the ZRP era?
- 2:23Sure. ZRP stands for 0 interest rate
- 2:26policy. So this was basically the decade
- 2:28following the Great Financial Crisis.
- 2:30The Federal Reserve kept its benchmark rate near 0 to try and
- 2:34stimulate the economy, and that led to mortgages being available
- 2:38in like the 2.5% to 4% range. Unbelievably low.
- 2:42Historically low. So these homeowners now hold
- 2:45fixed cheap debt and they're sitting on massive amounts of
- 2:49equity. They are, for the most part,
- 2:51insulated. And the have nots.
- 2:53The have nots are the new entrants, the renters, the first
- 2:55time buyers, and they are facing prohibitive costs that make
- 2:59entry, well, mathematically impossible for many of them.
- 3:02Mathematically impossible. Yeah, they're trying to compete
- 3:04in a market where the cost structure is just completely
- 3:06disconnected from the labor market.
- 3:08So as a result, the market has ceased to be what it should be,
- 3:12which is, you know, a liquid clearing house for shelter where
- 3:16transactions happen regularly. It has.
- 3:18It's functioning less like a market and more like a a static
- 3:23repository of entrenched wealth, and it's inaccessible to the
- 3:27vast majority of new households. The single most defining metric
- 3:31of this whole dysfunction is housing affordability.
- 3:33It has just plummeted to levels we have not seen since the
- 3:37extreme distress periods of the early 1980s.
- 3:39So you're talking about when Paul Volcker was forcing
- 3:41mortgage rates up toward what, 15% to crush inflation?
- 3:44Exactly that period and this structural affordability crisis,
- 3:47that is where we absolutely have to start our deep dive.
- 3:50OK, let's dive into the scale of this affordability collapse.
- 3:53Then. When we look at historical
- 3:55norms, what was the foundational benchmark for a healthy market
- 3:59in the US? And just how far have we drifted
- 4:02from it? To really understand the
- 4:03deviation, you have to look at that benchmark.
- 4:05For decades, the generally accepted, you know, safe rule of
- 4:09thumb was that a household should allocate approximately 25
- 4:13to 30% of their gross monthly income to service the debt and
- 4:17the full carrying costs. So it's principal, interest,
- 4:20taxes and insurance, the whole package.
- 4:22The whole package PITI. Right.
- 4:24And that 25 to 30% range, that isn't just some arbitrary
- 4:29suggestion, right? It's a critical pillar of the US
- 4:31economy. Why is keeping housing costs
- 4:34within that boundary so vital? It's absolutely critical for
- 4:39macroeconomic stability. If housing costs stay below 30%,
- 4:43it leaves the vast majority of a household's income available for
- 4:46everything else. Like discretionary spending?
- 4:48Discretionary spending services. Retail, education, savings.
- 4:53This is what fuels consumption and drives GDP growth, right?
- 4:56When housing consumes too much, it just becomes a severe drag on
- 5:00the whole economy. It's like a consumption vortex,
- 5:02just swallowing up income that should be circulating through
- 5:05all those other sectors. OK.
- 5:07So that's the historical norm. Where are we today for an entry
- 5:11level buyer who's just trying to purchase that median priced
- 5:14home? Well, the shocking new reality
- 5:17is that the required allocation of an entry level households
- 5:20income to cover all of that P and I taxes and insurance has
- 5:24surged to approximately 60%. 60%. 60 And this isn't a
- 5:29regional anomaly like just in California or New York.
- 5:31This is a national statistical average.
- 5:34This figure is a historic outlier that just signals A
- 5:36fundamental system breakdown. 60%, So that means the housing
- 5:40cost alone consumes more than half of a new buyer's gross
- 5:44paycheck. What context do the sources give
- 5:46us for just how bad this number is?
- 5:48The sources make it really clear that this figure actually
- 5:51surpasses the peak unaffordability we saw during
- 5:53the notorious housing bubble of 2006, 2007.
- 5:56So it's worse now than it was at the peak of the last bubble.
- 5:59Worse, back then prices were obviously inflated by
- 6:02speculation. This level of strain is
- 6:05comparable only to the most distressed periods of the late
- 6:0870s and early 80's. The sources are pretty
- 6:11definitive. This strain just cannot be
- 6:13maintained by the working population without massive
- 6:16societal repercussions. OK.
- 6:18So if housing costs are 60% of income, what is the practical
- 6:24implication for someone who trying to secure a mortgage?
- 6:26I mean, does this just mathematically exclude them?
- 6:29It creates an ironclad mathematical barrier to entry,
- 6:32and we need to introduce a key term here, DTI, or debt to
- 6:35income ratio, standard mortgage underwriting guidelines,
- 6:39particularly those set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- 6:42They typically cap a borrower's total DTI at around 43 to 50%.
- 6:46And that's total debt, right? Not just the house.
- 6:48Right. That means the sum of all their
- 6:50monthly debt payments, student loans, credit cards, auto loans
- 6:53and the proposed housing payment cannot exceed half of their
- 6:56gross monthly income. So if the housing payment alone
- 6:59is 60%, they're DOA. Precisely.
- 7:02A median earner cannot, by definition, qualify for a
- 7:06conventional mortgage without some kind of significant outside
- 7:10intervention. They're mathematically excluded
- 7:12from the market. So what are the only paths left?
- 7:15The only pathways remaining are, well, a massive sudden increase
- 7:19in income, which is unlikely for most, right?
- 7:21Or, and this is happening more and more, relying on significant
- 7:25accumulated wealth, maybe a down payment gifted through
- 7:29intergenerational transfers. The Bank of mom and dad.
- 7:31Exactly. And This is why the sources
- 7:34conclude that home ownership is transitioning from, you know, a
- 7:37meritocratic milestone, something you could achieve
- 7:39through your labor, into a hereditary privilege.
- 7:42That distinction between a milestone or privilege is pretty
- 7:45sobering. Let's look at this income price
- 7:48decoupling. Give us a concrete numbers that
- 7:50really demonstrate the gap between the labor market and the
- 7:53asset market. The required income data is just
- 7:55devastating. The median household income
- 7:58that's necessary to purchase the median priced home in the US,
- 8:01the home that kind of dictates the market, has risen to
- 8:03approximately $124,000 a. 124,000 needed OK what is the
- 8:09reality of the American labor market?
- 8:11What do people actually make? The actual median household
- 8:15income in the US currently hovers somewhere between 79 and
- 8:18$88,000. So if we take the lowest end of
- 8:21that range, we're looking at a structural chasm of nearly
- 8:24$40,000 between what the market demands and what the median
- 8:28family actually earns. It's a huge gap and it's
- 8:32structural. It can't be closed by, you know,
- 8:34minor budget cuts or skipping lattes.
- 8:37No, this is fundamental. It's a fundamental misalignment
- 8:40that really accelerated under the cheap money policies of the
- 8:43last decade and then just solidified under the rate shock.
- 8:46And we can actually see this exclusion happening in real time
- 8:50through the market data, the National Association of
- 8:52Realtors, the NAR data, it confirms that only higher
- 8:56earners are successfully transacting.
- 8:58Absolutely. The NAR data basically proves
- 9:00the gentrification of the home buying process.
- 9:03The median income of actual successful homebuyers has
- 9:06climbed significantly. It's hit $109,000.
- 9:10So that tells you right there who is able to buy.
- 9:12It confirms that the market is selecting exclusively for the
- 9:15top third of the income distribution.
- 9:17The median house is just no longer accessible to the median
- 9:20family. It's reserved for dual high
- 9:23earner households or again, those who have successfully
- 9:26monetized pre-existing wealth. So beyond the principal and
- 9:29interest payment shock from the high rates, you also highlighted
- 9:32this silent inflation, the auxiliary carrying costs of
- 9:36property taxes and insurance. Why has this become such a
- 9:40significant part of the problem? This is a crucial and I think
- 9:43often overlooked segment of that 60% affordability burden.
- 9:47The total cost of ownership is like a three legged stool.
- 9:50P and I taxes and insurance and the latter 2.
- 9:54Taxes and insurance have been undergoing the significant rapid
- 9:57inflationary period. They're rising faster than
- 10:00general CPI inflation and. Historically, these were a
- 10:03pretty stable and minor line item, right?
- 10:05Exactly. Historically, these auxiliary
- 10:08costs consumed around 5% of an entry level income say before
- 10:12the year 2000 and now today they consume approximately 7% of
- 10:16entry level income. Now, 2 percentage points might
- 10:19not sound like a lot in isolation.
- 10:21But when a buyer is already struggling to meet a 50% DTI
- 10:24cap, this 40% relative increase in their auxiliary costs is
- 10:29often the final straw that just breaks the camel's back.
- 10:33It makes the math impossible. Let's breakdown the drivers
- 10:36then, starting with property taxes.
- 10:38Why are they surging? Property taxes are surging
- 10:41primarily because of municipal reassessments.
- 10:44Local governments, you know, they're facing their own
- 10:46inflationary pressure. So their costs are going up too.
- 10:48Higher costs for everything from diesel for snow plows to
- 10:51salaries for teachers and police officers.
- 10:54So to meet these budget demands, they're aggressively reassessing
- 10:57residential properties to capture the massive nominal
- 11:00price appreciation that happened between 2020 and 2022.
- 11:04So even if I have a low fixed rate mortgage that I got years
- 11:08ago, my overall monthly payment is still going up because my
- 11:11property tax bill has gone up dramatically.
- 11:13That's correct. Your monthly escrow requirement,
- 11:16that portion of your payment that's dedicated to taxes and
- 11:18insurance, is spiking. And that's a surprise for a lot
- 11:21of people. It's a huge surprise, variable
- 11:24cost hitting people who believe their housing expenses were
- 11:27locked in for 30 years. It creates tremendous financial
- 11:31stress for retirees and people on fixed incomes, even if they
- 11:34have substantial home equity. And the second component,
- 11:37insurance, seems to be undergoing a nationwide crisis
- 11:41of its own. It is a fundamental repricing
- 11:44event. It's being driven by a
- 11:46combination of factors. First, you have the increased
- 11:49frequency and severity of climate events.
- 11:51So. We're talking wildfires out
- 11:53West. Wildfires in the West, severe
- 11:55hurricanes and coastal flooding in the Southeast, and a really
- 11:58sharp rise in what the industry calls convective storms across
- 12:01the Midwest. OK, what exactly are convective
- 12:04storms? That sounds like specialized
- 12:05jargon. It is an insurance industry
- 12:07term, but it's critical to understand Convective storms
- 12:10refer to severe weather events that are driven by rising heat.
- 12:13So think intense thunderstorms, large hail, straight line winds
- 12:18and tornadoes. These localized but really
- 12:21devastating events are becoming more common, and they're leading
- 12:24to higher claims frequency in areas that weren't traditionally
- 12:27considered high risk, like parts of Texas or Colorado.
- 12:30And 2nd, it's not just the storms, it's the cost to repair
- 12:33the damage. Exactly.
- 12:35Replacement cost inflation has just surged.
- 12:38That's due to labor material shortages.
- 12:40It costs significantly more to repair a roof or replace a
- 12:43damaged structure today than it did just five years ago.
- 12:46So the insurers have to raise their premiums.
- 12:48They have to raise premiums dramatically just to cover their
- 12:51exposure. In some high risk markets, you
- 12:54know, insurance is no longer a trivial annual fee.
- 12:56It's become a major monthly burden that can actually rival
- 12:59the interest portion of the mortgage payment.
- 13:01So the overall total cost structure of home ownership is
- 13:04becoming dangerously unstable even for current owners.
- 13:08These auxiliary costs are a substantial variable rate
- 13:12liability attached to what we all once considered a secure
- 13:15fixed rate asset. It really highlights the
- 13:17pervasiveness of the structural stress.
- 13:20The affordability burden isn't just about high rates, it's
- 13:23about a fundamentally rising total cost of ownership that is
- 13:26squeezing the market from all sides.
- 13:29OK. So that's the buyer side of the
- 13:30equation. Right now that we've established
- 13:32why buyers are mathematically excluded that 60% affordability
- 13:35threshold, we have to transition to the mechanism that explains
- 13:39why the supply of existing homes has just evaporated.
- 13:42This is the lock in effect. This is the lock in effect, and
- 13:45it's tied specifically to the unique nature of the American 30
- 13:49year fixed rate mortgage. And this is where the US market
- 13:52is a true global outlier. I mean, most of our listeners in
- 13:56other parts of the world like Canada or the UK, they have
- 13:59mortgages that regularly reset to current market rates.
- 14:02That's the key contrast in most global markets.
- 14:05If the central bank hikes rates, the entire housing stock
- 14:08eventually reprices. The housing market becomes
- 14:11expensive for everybody, pretty much regardless of when they
- 14:13bought. But not in the US.
- 14:15No. the US 30 year fixed rate model allows homeowners to lock
- 14:21in their cost of capital for three decades.
- 14:24It's a unique feature. And thanks to that ZRP era we
- 14:27discussed, a massive portion of the market benefited from these
- 14:31historical lows. Analysis confirms this is the
- 14:33source of the paralysis. Approximately 50% of all US
- 14:37homeowners currently hold a mortgage with an interest rate
- 14:40of 4% or less. 50%, half the market.
- 14:43Half the market and within that Group A really substantial
- 14:46cohort, has rates below 3.5%, some even below 3%.
- 14:50So when the Fed rapidly hiked rates, these low rate mortgages
- 14:54became these incredible financial assets.
- 14:56They absolutely did when market rates surged to say 6.5% or
- 15:007.5%, the debt itself transformed into what we call
- 15:04the golden handcuffs, right? The homeowner is essentially
- 15:07receiving an enormous non transferable subsidy from the
- 15:10financial system. I mean to service half
- 15:12$1,000,000 of debt at 3% instead of 7% is a staggering monthly
- 15:16savings that is economically irrational to give up.
- 15:19Let's run the numbers on the replacement cost calculus.
- 15:23I think that makes the argument perfectly clear just how big
- 15:26that penalty for moving it. Yeah, let's use the exact
- 15:28example from the source material.
- 15:30Imagine a family, they own a home.
- 15:32They have a $500,000 mortgage locked in at 3.5%.
- 15:36OK, Their principal and interest payment is roughly $2245 per
- 15:43month. That is an incredibly
- 15:45comfortable low cost of shelter. Let's say they need to upsize or
- 15:49maybe relocate for a job. They go across town.
- 15:52They find an equivalent house and they have to take out a new
- 15:55$500,000 mortgage. At the current market rate,
- 15:59let's say 6.75%. The math instantly paralyzes
- 16:02them. Their new monthly P and I
- 16:04payment jumps to approximately $3243.
- 16:08That's an increase of almost $1000 a month.
- 16:10Almost $1000 a month. It's a 45% spike in their debt
- 16:14service costs. And what do they gain for that
- 16:16$1000 a month? 00 Housing utility.
- 16:20They aren't getting a bigger house.
- 16:21They're not getting a better location, not a better school
- 16:24district. They're simply paying $1000 more
- 16:28every single month to the bank for the privilege of changing
- 16:31their mailing address. When you put it like that.
- 16:34I mean, to put that $1000 in perspective, that's a serious
- 16:36annual family vacation or two years of car payments or a
- 16:41massive boost college savings just forfeited to the bank's
- 16:46interest expense line. It is an economic penalty that
- 16:49no rational, non distressed person would willingly absorb.
- 16:53They are financially incentivized to stay put even if
- 16:56their house no longer fits their family's needs.
- 16:59Exactly. They won't move unless they're
- 17:00forced by severe life events. You know, divorce, death, or a
- 17:04mandatory job relocation that they just can't turn down.
- 17:06And this reality, this leads us directly to Steve Eiseman's
- 17:09critical analysis of the current buyer, seller standoff and the
- 17:13required price correction. Yes, his analysis is key here.
- 17:16What was the magnitude of the price correction he calculated
- 17:19was necessary just to make the economics work for the buyer?
- 17:22Eisman calculated the economic parity point for a buyer with
- 17:27today's high mortgage rate. Let's use 6.25% to achieve the
- 17:31same monthly payment as a seller who's sitting on a 4% mortgage,
- 17:35right? The nominal home price would
- 17:36need to decline by approximately 25%. 25% that figure.
- 17:42That is the core reason for the paralysis.
- 17:44It defines the entire chasm. It summarizes the dilemma
- 17:47perfectly. The buyer cannot afford the
- 17:50house at the current price with today's interest rates.
- 17:52It's just too expensive. Meanwhile, the seller.
- 17:55The seller is under no financial duress whatsoever.
- 17:58They have cheap debt. They have strong job security in
- 18:00this economy, so they cannot afford to sell the house at a
- 18:0325% discount. That would just wipe out years
- 18:06of wealth accumulation and equity gains.
- 18:08So the result is a complete collapse of inventory.
- 18:11Inventory paralysis is the consequence.
- 18:13Existing home sales, which historically dominate the
- 18:15transaction volume in the market, have fallen to multi
- 18:18decade lows. So the churn has stopped.
- 18:21The necessary market churn. The movement of people from
- 18:24starter homes to family homes or family homes down to empty
- 18:27nester homes. It has stopped entirely.
- 18:30People are trapped in financially viable but often
- 18:33functionally inappropriate houses.
- 18:35And this paralysis, it distorts classical economics.
- 18:38I mean, typically high rates crash prices.
- 18:41Why are prices not crashing now? Because the supply of homes
- 18:45available for sale has fallen even faster than demand has.
- 18:49So even though affordability is completely crushed, there are
- 18:52fewer people willing to sell than there are people hoping to
- 18:56buy. This scarcity, created entirely
- 18:59by the lock, in effect acts as a firm structural floor under home
- 19:02prices. So it prevents the deep nominal
- 19:05correction that high interest rates would normally trigger.
- 19:07That's exactly right, and This is why it's not a bubble waiting
- 19:10to pop, but a market that's been welded shut.
- 19:12OK, so the lock in is the acute problem, the thing caused by the
- 19:16Feds actions, but the structural issue, the chronic illness that
- 19:21actually precedes the rate shock is the physical housing
- 19:25shortage. How big is this deficit, and
- 19:28what were the fundamental economic mistakes that allowed
- 19:32the US to spend a decade just not building enough homes?
- 19:35The consensus among economists and real estate bodies is that
- 19:39the shortage is massive. The estimates differ a bit
- 19:42depending on whether you're just counting the vacancy gap or if
- 19:45you include what's called suppressed household formation.
- 19:47OK, give us the spectrum of those estimates just to show the
- 19:50scale of the problem we're dealing with.
- 19:51The more conservative estimates, like those from the National
- 19:54Association of Home Builders, the NAHB, they suggest a gap of
- 19:57roughly 1.5 million units. OK, then you have Freddie Mac.
- 20:02They factor in suppressed household formation.
- 20:04So that's all the young adults living with their parents or
- 20:07with roommates who would otherwise form their own
- 20:08independent households if they could.
- 20:10They're. Estimate puts the shortage
- 20:12closer to 3.8 million units. And what about the most alarming
- 20:17figures, the ones used by analysts like Eisman and the
- 20:19NAR? The most encompassing figures
- 20:22suggest a shortage upwards of 5.5 million homes.
- 20:25Seven and a half million. Yeah.
- 20:27And this figure is derived from a pretty simple time series
- 20:30comparison. You look at the actual housing
- 20:33starts recorded from 2010 through 2020, and you compare
- 20:36that to the historical average of starts that prevailed
- 20:39between, say, 1968 and 2000. For an entire decade, housing
- 20:44production just stagnated severely while the population
- 20:47continued to grow rapidly, creating this unprecedented
- 20:50structural deficit. So why did the faucet turn off
- 20:53after 2008? You mentioned industry PTSD.
- 20:56How did the trauma of the great financial crisis reshape the
- 20:59entire building industry? The 2008 crisis, which was
- 21:03defined by oversupply and bad credit, remember, was
- 21:06devastating to the production side of housing.
- 21:08Thousands of small local home builders, which historically
- 21:11were the entities responsible for building affordable entry
- 21:14level tailored housing in specific communities.
- 21:17They just went bankrupt. They never returned.
- 21:18The industry consolidated dramatically into fewer, much
- 21:21larger publicly traded entities. And that consolidation forced
- 21:25the survivors to change their whole strategy.
- 21:27They had to prioritize financial stability over flexible supply.
- 21:31How did that strategic pivot work?
- 21:34The surviving builders correctly realized that owning massive
- 21:37amounts of raw land was what sank them when land values
- 21:41collapsed in 2008. It was a liability on their
- 21:43books. A huge liability.
- 21:45So they shifted to a land light strategy.
- 21:48Instead of owning huge land banks outright, they now use
- 21:51options to control the land just in time for construction.
- 21:54This protected their balance sheets and improved their return
- 21:57on equity, but it critically reduced the industry's aggregate
- 22:01capacity. So they can't just ramp up
- 22:02production quickly. They physically cannot ramp up
- 22:05production quickly because they don't have enough ready to build
- 22:07entitled land instantly available.
- 22:09And compounding that financial pivot was the loss of physical
- 22:13capacity, the labor force itself.
- 22:15The labor exodus was catastrophic.
- 22:17Millions of skilled construction workers, carpenters, framers,
- 22:21HVAC technicians, electricians. They left the sector following
- 22:25the 2008 collapse. And they never came back.
- 22:27Many found better, more stable wages elsewhere and simply never
- 22:31returned. Today, builders face a chronic
- 22:34structural shortage of skilled labor which limits the physical
- 22:38speed at which they can erect new homes.
- 22:40Even if financing and land were abundant, the shortage of Labor
- 22:44means the supply side solution is inherently a slow multi year
- 22:48process. And this structural supply
- 22:50drought hits the market at the absolute worst possible time, a
- 22:54massive demographic collision. Absolutely the largest
- 22:57demographic cohort in U.S. history, the millennials are now
- 23:00squarely in their prime home buying years, ages 30 to 40.
- 23:04They're forming families. They're forming families,
- 23:06they're demanding shelter and immediately behind them you have
- 23:09Generation Z entering the starter market.
- 23:12This demographic wave creates A fundamental non negotiable floor
- 23:15of demand that's driven by the well, the biological imperative
- 23:19of shelter. So it's not speculative demand
- 23:21like we saw in 2005. This is families needing a place
- 23:24to live. Exactly.
- 23:25And when you pair the largest demographic ever with the
- 23:28smallest inventory in decades, structural price appreciation is
- 23:31the only mathematical outcome, regardless of what interest
- 23:34rates are doing. OK, now we need to move to the
- 23:36mechanism that actively strangles any attempt to solve
- 23:40this shortage. Regulatory strangulation.
- 23:43The sources argue that the inability to build affordable
- 23:46housing is not a technological or financial failure, but a
- 23:50regulatory choice. It's imposed at the local level.
- 23:53It is a deliberate, localized political choice, and we need to
- 23:57dissect the three main tools of this regulatory strangulation,
- 24:01starting with impact fees. These are often an invisible tax
- 24:05that just destroys the profitability of starter homes.
- 24:07What are these fees and how much are they adding to the cost of a
- 24:10new home? Impact fees are one time levies
- 24:13charged by local municipalities on any new construction.
- 24:17The stated purpose is to fund the necessary offsite
- 24:20infrastructure. So new roads, new utility
- 24:22connections, schools. Exactly the things the new
- 24:24residents will utilize, the fees along with associated
- 24:27development soft costs can add anywhere from 10 to 15% to the
- 24:32total cost of building a new home before the 1st nail is even
- 24:34hammered. That's a huge burden.
- 24:36And you said these fees are profoundly regressive.
- 24:38How so? Inherently so, because they're
- 24:40often charged as a flat fee per unit, regardless of the home's
- 24:44sale price. So let's imagine a municipality
- 24:47charges a flat $60,000 in impact fees, permits and soft costs on
- 24:53a $3,000,000 luxury home. That 60 grand is a mere 2% tax.
- 24:58It's easily absorbed. But on a $350,000 starter home.
- 25:02That $60,000 fee becomes a crushing 17% tax on the
- 25:07development cost. Wow.
- 25:09And since a builder's profit margins are typically only 10 to
- 25:1215%, that flat fee completely wipes out the profit on the
- 25:16affordable home. The regulatory structure forces
- 25:19the builder to build larger, more expensive homes just to
- 25:21absorb the fixed fee while maintaining A viable margin.
- 25:25So the system itself actively makes it unprofitable and in
- 25:28some cases illegal to build entry level housing, Yes.
- 25:32The regulatory system kills the starter home.
- 25:34OK, so impact fees kill the starter home.
- 25:36Second, let's talk about zoning, the outright ban on density.
- 25:40Zoning is the most powerful tool of exclusion.
- 25:43The vast majority of residential land in the US is zoned
- 25:46exclusively for single family detached homes.
- 25:49This is what's known as exclusionary zoning.
- 25:52And that prohibits what exactly? It prohibits the construction of
- 25:56the missing middle housing types, duplexes, triplexes,
- 25:59townhomes or accessory dwelling units AD us.
- 26:03These types of slightly denser housing are essential for
- 26:06affordability, but they are banned in most suburbs.
- 26:09And they use other tools too, like minimum square footage
- 26:12requirements, to maintain that exclusivity.
- 26:14Absolutely. Many suburbs have minimum square
- 26:16footage requirements, sometimes demanding 2500 square feet or
- 26:20more. This is explicitly designed to
- 26:22maintain high property values and exclude lower income
- 26:25residents. It effectively bans the 1000 or
- 26:281200 square foot starter homes that house previous generations.
- 26:31And it doesn't stop there. Specific requirements like large
- 26:34minimum lot sizes and excessive parking requirements further
- 26:38drive up the cost of land and reduce the number of units that
- 26:40can be built on any given parcel.
- 26:42And even if a developer manages to find the land and clear all
- 26:46these zoning hurdles, they hit what you call the entitlement
- 26:49quagmire, the sheer amount of time it takes to get approval.
- 26:52The entitlement process is a multi year gauntlet that adds
- 26:56crippling carrying costs and risk premiums to any project.
- 27:00Multi year. In high demand jurisdictions, it
- 27:02can take two to five years just to navigate the municipal
- 27:04bureaucracy and secure the final building permits.
- 27:08And during that whole time, the developer is paying interest on
- 27:11the land loan, legal fees, consultant costs.
- 27:15Which again must be passed directly onto the final buyer in
- 27:18the home price. Yes, but maybe more importantly,
- 27:21it injects massive uncertainty risk.
- 27:23Think about it, if a developer spends 3 years and millions of
- 27:27dollars only to have the project rejected at the last minute by a
- 27:31City Council due to neighborhood opposition.
- 27:34What we call inambiism. Exactly that financial
- 27:37uncertainty has to be priced into every successful project as
- 27:40a substantial risk premium. Can you define inambiism for us?
- 27:43It's more than just a catchy accurate, isn't it?
- 27:45NMB stands for Not in My Backyard, and it's a politically
- 27:50potent phenomenon where incumbent homeowners, who are
- 27:52also the primary local voting base, actively organized to
- 27:56oppose any new development. Especially anything that
- 27:59increases density or introduces more affordable housing.
- 28:03That's right. Their motivation is simple and
- 28:06frankly, self-serving. They want to prevent any
- 28:09increase in supply that might dilute their neighborhoods
- 28:12exclusivity or slow the appreciation of their own
- 28:15property value. And this is the heart of Eisman
- 28:18Score Insight. Supply is a local issue.
- 28:21The structural crisis is created by thousands of local incumbents
- 28:25using these regulatory tools to preserve their own wealth.
- 28:27And the federal government has virtually no authority to fix
- 28:30those local zoning laws. OK.
- 28:32So given this deep structural supply shortage and the local
- 28:35regulatory control, we have to critically examine the solutions
- 28:38being proposed at the federal level.
- 28:40Why are political demand side fixes so counterproductive,
- 28:43maybe even dangerous in this specific market environment?
- 28:47Well, the central analytical conclusion is that you simply
- 28:50cannot solve a problem rooted in physical supply constraints by
- 28:53injecting more money into demand.
- 28:56The sources are absolutely clear on this.
- 28:58Subsidizing demand when supply is fixed is functionally
- 29:01inflationary, and it worsens the crisis for the very people it is
- 29:05intended to help. Let's start with a highly
- 29:07popular political proposal providing significant down
- 29:11payment assistance. DPA something like a $25,000
- 29:16grant for first time buyers. I mean, it sounds helpful on the
- 29:19surface, but why is it inflationary?
- 29:22It acts as an inflationary accelerant because of the
- 29:24mechanics of limited inventory. In a frozen market with a severe
- 29:29housing shortage, giving every buyer 25 grand does not create a
- 29:33single additional house. No, of course not.
- 29:35Instead, it simply increases the purchasing power of all the
- 29:38competing buyers, allowing them to bid $25,000 more for the
- 29:42exact same limited number of available homes.
- 29:45So the buyer's budget goes up, but the supply doesn't, so they
- 29:48just bid each other up. Exactly.
- 29:51Economic theory dictates that in a supply constrained environment
- 29:54like this one, the subsidy is almost entirely captured by the
- 29:58seller in the form of a higher final sale price.
- 30:01So the buyer ends up paying the same high monthly cost they
- 30:04would have otherwise. The buyer is no better off, the
- 30:06seller gets richer, and the taxpayer absorbs the cost of the
- 30:09subsidy. It inflates nominal prices
- 30:12without moving the needle one bit on true affordability.
- 30:16Another proposal that's gaining traction is the idea of the 50
- 30:20year mortgage. It's designed to lower monthly
- 30:23payments by stretching out the amortization term.
- 30:26What is the fundamental illusion embedded in that idea?
- 30:29The 50 year mortgage offers a temporary illusion of lower
- 30:32monthly payments, but it comes at a catastrophic cost to the
- 30:35homeowners financial future. How so?
- 30:37For the first decade or more of a 50 year loan, the payments are
- 30:40almost entirely allocated to interest.
- 30:42Almost zero goes to a principal reduction.
- 30:44So you pay for 10 years and you own virtually nothing more than
- 30:47when you started. That's the reality.
- 30:49It drastically reduces the rate of equity accumulation, turning
- 30:53a home ownership into what the sources describe as futile
- 30:56tenancy. Futile tenancy.
- 30:58The bank retains ownership and financial control for
- 31:00generations and the household gains minimal wealth building
- 31:03benefit. And furthermore, just like down
- 31:06payment assistance, it encourages buyers to use that
- 31:09lower monthly payment threshold to bid up the purchase price
- 31:13until the payment maximizes their budget.
- 31:15So it just fuels higher home prices again.
- 31:17It just fuels higher prices and longer debt terms, guaranteeing
- 31:20less financial stability for the buyer in the long run.
- 31:23Let's turn now to the real world collateral damage of this
- 31:26dysfunction, the market bifurcation and the collapse of
- 31:29what you call the move in economy.
- 31:31This is the asymmetrical impact on various sectors.
- 31:34Yeah, the low transaction volume is just devastating the
- 31:37ecosystem that relies on residential turnover.
- 31:39This is the move in economy. Historically, when people buy
- 31:42and sell homes, they immediately engage in this flurry of
- 31:45spending. Renovations, appliances,
- 31:47furniture, landscaping, all that stuff.
- 31:50All of it. But because the churn has
- 31:52stopped, that spending has evaporated.
- 31:55It's induced A renovation freeze.
- 31:56A renovation freeze. We can actually quantify this
- 31:59impact by looking at major retailers, companies like Home
- 32:02Depot and Lowe's, they rely heavily on the renovation cycle
- 32:05that's spurred by home sales and.
- 32:07What are they reporting? Both have reported weak earnings
- 32:10and inventory contractions that are directly tied to the
- 32:13collapse in existing home sales volume.
- 32:16When half the market is locked into their cheap mortgage and
- 32:18isn't moving, they aren't renovating or upgrading
- 32:21appliances either. Are there other specific
- 32:23industry examples of this? Absolutely.
- 32:26I mean consider the durable goods sector, appliance makers
- 32:29like Whirlpool and building material suppliers like Trex,
- 32:32they specialize in composite decking.
- 32:34They've seen stock declines and earnings performance that
- 32:37clearly correlates with the multi decade lows in transaction
- 32:41volume. So the lock in effect is acting
- 32:43as a very specific recessionary force.
- 32:45It's. Targeted forgetting the durable
- 32:46goods in a retail sectors that really thrive on market
- 32:49liquidity and turnover. OK.
- 32:51So on the other side of this bifurcation, who are the clear
- 32:55winners in this incredibly constrained, illiquid market?
- 33:00The major public home builders are the clear beneficiaries,
- 33:03companies like Dear Horton, Lennar, Toll Brothers.
- 33:07Why them specifically? Well, with existing homeowners
- 33:09refusing to sell, builders are suddenly the only source of new
- 33:13inventory. Historically, new homes made-up,
- 33:16what, 10 to 15% of the available inventory?
- 33:20Today they account for 30% or more in many key markets.
- 33:23So they have a virtual monopoly on liquidity.
- 33:25That's a good way to put it. They have a virtual monopoly on
- 33:27homes for sale. And they possess the financial
- 33:30scale to use tools that individual sellers just cannot
- 33:34match, which gives them a huge competitive edge.
- 33:37That's their major lever mortgage rate buy downs.
- 33:40Yeah, these massive companies have the financial engineering
- 33:42capacity and the deep margins to spend, say, 15 to $25,000 to buy
- 33:48a customer's interest rate down. So they can take the rate from
- 33:51the prevailing 7% down to an artificially competitive 5.5%
- 33:55for the first couple of years. Exactly.
- 33:58And that makes their new construction products
- 34:00significantly more financially appealing to buyers then the
- 34:03existing home listed by a private seller down the street
- 34:06who can't offer that kind of subsidy.
- 34:08They use this power to gain market share and maintain their
- 34:12volume. The ultimate result, though, is
- 34:13a social 1, the solidification of a wealth caste system, which
- 34:17is just exacerbating intergenerational friction.
- 34:20This is the most profound implication of the paralysis.
- 34:23The winners? The incumbent owners with low
- 34:26fixed costs, under 4%. They are completely insulated
- 34:30from housing inflation and they've seen massive unrealized
- 34:33equity gains. They are the defined
- 34:35beneficiaries of this entire cycle.
- 34:37And the losers? The losers are the renters and
- 34:40the first time buyers. They're trapped by that 60%
- 34:43affordability barrier, and they're facing not only high
- 34:46purchase prices, but also rapidly rising rents.
- 34:49And this inability to transition into homeownership means they
- 34:52can't accumulate the wealth that is historically defined the
- 34:55American middle class. Right.
- 34:57It leads to a widening structural inequality gap
- 35:00between generations. So we've established the
- 35:02structural issues. Now let's talk prognosis.
- 35:05Given the lock in the shortage and the policy misdirection,
- 35:09what is the most likely path forward for the housing market?
- 35:12The analysis seems to decisively reject the idea of a quick fix
- 35:16or an imminent crash. Yeah, we have to reject the 2008
- 35:19analogy entirely when we're trying to predict a crash.
- 35:22There are two critical structural reasons why a sharp,
- 35:26deep nominal price crash is really improbable, despite how
- 35:29expensive the market feels. OK.
- 35:30What's the first difference? The quality of the debt?
- 35:33Correct credit quality is night and day compared to 2008.
- 35:37The loans made over the last decade were overwhelmingly made
- 35:40to prime borrowers. So we're talking high credit
- 35:42scores, verified income. High credit scores verified
- 35:45income substantial equity cushions due to the rising
- 35:48prices. There are no systemic risks
- 35:50associated with exotic or predatory lending.
- 35:53The phrase onienja loans no income no job no assets which
- 35:58characterize the speculative bubble.
- 35:59It simply does not apply to the current loan book.
- 36:02The underlying debt is fundamentally sound.
- 36:04And the second reason is what you call the employment floor.
- 36:08Crashes are driven by forced selling, not just a lack of
- 36:12demand. That's the critical difference.
- 36:14Forced selling is driven by mass unemployment, which leads to
- 36:18widespread default. As long as the US economy
- 36:21remains near full employment, as it has stubbornly done,
- 36:25homeowners with cheap, fixed mortgages will simply stay put
- 36:28and continue paying those mortgages.
- 36:30They can afford their monthly payment even if they hate their
- 36:33job or need a bigger house. Exactly.
- 36:36Foreclosure rates are currently near historic lows precisely
- 36:39because people are solvent on their debt.
- 36:42They're not being forced to sell.
- 36:43So if a crash is unlikely, the most likely path is the long
- 36:47stagnation we're calling the grind.
- 36:49What does that mean for transaction volume in the next
- 36:51few years? It guarantees volume stagnation.
- 36:54Transaction volumes will remain deeply depressed for years to
- 36:57come. The lock, in effect, is such a
- 36:59powerful structural force that it will only dissipate slowly
- 37:02through natural, unavoidable life events.
- 37:04Death. Divorce.
- 37:06Death, divorce, or a mandatory relocation for a job one
- 37:10absolutely cannot refuse. Until a significant portion of
- 37:13that 4% debt turns over through natural attrition, the market
- 37:17just remains static and illiquid.
- 37:19And for prices, what does the grind look like sideways?
- 37:23For prices, we will likely see significant stickiness.
- 37:27Nominal prices, the price tag you see on Zillow, will probably
- 37:30trade sideways or maybe rise slowly in real terms.
- 37:34Adjusted for inflation. There might be a slow silent
- 37:36correction. But a sharp nominal crash is
- 37:39prevented by. By the severe physical lack of
- 37:42housing supply. That structural shortage of 5.5
- 37:45million homes acts as a constant upward pressure even with
- 37:48suppressed demand. So the structural crap really
- 37:51means the market has to slowly acclimatize the fact that the
- 37:54era of cheap sub 4% money is is gone and six or 7% rates are
- 37:59simply the new normal cost of capital.
- 38:01That's the final synthesis. the US housing market is paralyzed
- 38:04by this perfect storm. You have the monetary shock from
- 38:06the Fed, the physical neglect of chronic underbuilding, and the
- 38:10regulatory sclerosis of local zoning and fees.
- 38:12So it's not a bubble waiting to pop.
- 38:14No, it's a door that has been fundamentally welded shut.
- 38:19For the 60% of potential buyers who are priced out, the market
- 38:22is simply closed, barring some kind of radical political
- 38:26intervention to force supply through local regulatory.
- 38:29Change This has been an incredibly detailed and frankly
- 38:33an alarming deep dive into the structural dysfunction of the
- 38:36housing market. Let's summarize the three major
- 38:39forces we discussed today, this triumvirate of pain for the
- 38:43excluded 60%. The first is that overwhelming
- 38:4660% affordability burden, which just mathematically excludes the
- 38:50median earner, right. The second is the 4% mortgage
- 38:52lock in which has paralyzed transaction volume by
- 38:55financially forcing half of all incumbent owners to stay put.
- 38:58And the 3rd and the 3rd is that 5.5 million unit supply deficit
- 39:03which is cemented in place by local regulatory choices like
- 39:06regressive impact fees and exclusion zoning restrictions,
- 39:09making it virtually illegal to build affordable housing.
- 39:12And the main insight we keep returning to is the political
- 39:15challenge. You cannot solve a supply
- 39:17problem with demand stimulus. The true solution requires
- 39:22challenging the local political control exercised by these NMBY
- 39:26groups who restrict supply to preserve their own property
- 39:30values, and this requires a political will that seems to be
- 39:33currently absent. It is the most difficult
- 39:35political fight in American governance.
- 39:38And before we leave you with our final thought, just a quick
- 39:40reminder. All analysis is based on
- 39:43publicly available sources and is for educational purposes
- 39:46only. It does not constitute
- 39:48investment advice. Right.
- 39:49Please conduct your own due diligence before making any
- 39:52investment decisions. And if you are looking to track
- 39:54the overall temperature of the market, including some of the
- 39:56economic pressures we discussed today, we'd encourage you to
- 39:59search and download our latest application.
- 40:01Buffett indicator from the Apple App Store, it's a great way to
- 40:05monitor that macroeconomic pulse daily.
- 40:08And if you want to access more advanced content and listen to
- 40:11our full deep dives on these critical topics, welcome to join
- 40:15our Deep Value Club membership or subscribe to us on Apple and
- 40:18Spotify podcast channel Deep value investing.
- 40:22Absolutely. We encourage you to check those
- 40:23out now for the final provocative thought to leave you
- 40:27with something to Mull over that really builds on the severity of
- 40:30this crisis. The market dysfunction we have
- 40:33detailed today has solidified A wealth caste system, and it's
- 40:38severely exacerbating intergenerational friction.
- 40:41So if the American dream of homeownership is now reserved
- 40:45for the 40% who already own it, the incumbent class, what
- 40:49specific non market mechanism, something beyond basic
- 40:52economics, is required to reopen that door for the excluded 60%?
- 40:57That is the question of the next decade.
- 40:59That is something to ponder deeply.
- 41:00Thank you for joining us for this deep dive.
- 41:02We'll see you on the next one.