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Anti-Coup - Bruce Jenkins, Gene Sharp · The Law

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  Speaker 1: Section one of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
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  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 0:11
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
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  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The anti
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  Speaker 1: coup Supporters of political democracy, human rights, and social justice
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  Speaker 1: have good reasons to be alarmed about cuditar These abrupt
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  Speaker 1: siegures of the state apparatus have occurred with great frequency
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  Speaker 1: in recent decades. Coups have overthrown established constitutional, democratic systems
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  Speaker 1: of government, halted movement towards greater democracy, and have imposed
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  Speaker 1: brutal and oppressive regimes. Couditar are one of the main
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  Speaker 1: ways in which new dictatorships are established. Coups may also
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  Speaker 1: precipitate civil war and international crisises. Coups remain a major
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  Speaker 1: unsolved defense problem. A curditar is a rapid seizure of
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  Speaker 1: physical and political control of the state apparatus by illegal
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  Speaker 1: action of a conspiratorial group backed by the threat or
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  Speaker 1: use of violence. The members of the previous government are
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  Speaker 1: deposed against their will. Initially, the coup group rapidly occupies
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  Speaker 1: the centers of command, decision making, and administration, replacing the
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  Speaker 1: previous chief executive and top officials with persons military or
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  Speaker 1: civilian of their choice. Eventually they gain control of the
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  Speaker 1: whole state apparatus. Successful coups are usually completed quickly, at
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  Speaker 1: most within forty eight hours. Curitar have taken place in
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  Speaker 1: dozens of countries in nearly every region the world in
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  Speaker 1: recent decades, including in Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Liberia, Chile, Fiji, Greece, Libya, Laos, Guatemala, Argentina, Grenada,
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  Speaker 1: Poland and the Soviet Union. Coups have been very widespread
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  Speaker 1: in Africa. In the post colonial independent countries. The first
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  Speaker 1: of these was a military coup which ousked Kwami Necroma
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  Speaker 1: as president of Ghana in nineteen sixty six. There were
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  Speaker 1: five coups in Thailand between nineteen fifty one and nineteen
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  Speaker 1: seventy six, making the growth of a democracy difficult. In Libya,
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  Speaker 1: Mohamma Kadafi took power as a result of a nineteen
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  Speaker 1: sixty nine military coup. The a Land government in Chile
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  Speaker 1: was deposed by a military coup in nineteen seventy three.
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  Speaker 1: The nineteen sixty four military coup in Brazil brought in
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  Speaker 1: a repressive military regime that ruled for years. In Guatemala,
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  Speaker 1: the nineteen eighty two coup was followed by another coup,
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  Speaker 1: which eventually placed retired General Rios Motte in charge. The
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  Speaker 1: nineteen eighty one declaration of Emergency and installation of General
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  Speaker 1: Durrelski as president in Poland to repress the Solidarity Independent
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  Speaker 1: Labor Union, as well as the failed hardline coup attempt
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  Speaker 1: in the Soviet Union in August nineteen ninety one, are
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  Speaker 1: among the best known examples. In recent decades, coups and
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  Speaker 1: coup attempts continue. Some writers have commented that kuritar not
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  Speaker 1: elections have been the most frequent means for chane governments,
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  Speaker 1: and that for post colonial Africa, the military coup has
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  Speaker 1: in effect become the institutionalized method for changing governments. It
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  Speaker 1: has been suggested that coups are now occurring with less
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  Speaker 1: frequency than previously, but also that this decline may be
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  Speaker 1: short lived, and that even when a coup has been
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  Speaker 1: avoided for many years, a country may remain vulnerable. Massive
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  Speaker 1: efforts and sums of money are regularly devoted to prepare
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  Speaker 1: to resist foreign aggression. Yet Virtually nothing is done to
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  Speaker 1: prepare societies to deal with the defense problem of couditar
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  Speaker 1: Despite their frequency in world politics, serious consideration of anti
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  Speaker 1: coup defense is long overdue, and sections.
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  Speaker 2: One section two of the Anti Coup. This is a
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  Speaker 2: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
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  Speaker 2: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
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  Speaker 2: Recording by Lynette Calkins. The Anti Coup by Jane Sharp
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  Speaker 2: and Bruce Jenkins. How coups operate. Seizure of the actual
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  Speaker 2: political machinery of command and administration will often begin by
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  Speaker 2: action against top personnel of the previous government and seizure
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  Speaker 2: of government buildings and offices, military and police headquarters, and
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  Speaker 2: control centers for communications and transportation. Coups normally operate very quickly,
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  Speaker 2: often within a few hours, and therefore secret conspiratorial planning
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  Speaker 2: is important. Coups are most often conducted by a critical
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  Speaker 2: part of the military forces, acting alone or in alliance
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  Speaker 2: with political cliques, intelligence organizations, domestic or foreign, or police forces.
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  Speaker 2: Sometimes coups have been executive usurpations an established head of state,
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  Speaker 2: president or prime minister, for example, falsely claiming an emergency
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  Speaker 2: acts to suspend a constitutional government and establish a dictatorship.
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  Speaker 2: Sometimes coups have been led by a dictatorial political party,
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  Speaker 2: with or without its own paramilitary forces. Coups may also
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  Speaker 2: be initiated by a section of the ruling elite backed
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  Speaker 2: by other groups. If the coup is to succeed, it
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  Speaker 2: is important that non participants in the coup be supportive,
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  Speaker 2: remain passive, or be made ineffective. Because of its minority
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  Speaker 2: and conspiratorial nature, a coup is the opposite of a
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  Speaker 2: mass popular revolution, although Puchists may call their action a revolution.
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  Speaker 2: The group initiating the coup usually intends to use the
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  Speaker 2: power of the section of the state which it already
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  Speaker 2: controls or over which it expects at first, to gain
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  Speaker 2: control against the other sections in order to gain complete
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  Speaker 2: control of the state. Often the other sections readily capitulate.
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  Speaker 2: They may do this in face of perceived overwhelming forces
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  Speaker 2: supporting the coup. They may also capitulate because they do
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  Speaker 2: not strongly support the established government, have active sympathy for
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  Speaker 2: the Puchists, or feel helpless not knowing what else they
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  Speaker 2: can do. The usurpers normally intend to maintain order and
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  Speaker 2: to keep the bureaucracy, civil service, military forces, local government
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  Speaker 2: and police intact at least for the time being, but
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  Speaker 2: to bring them under their command. The new government imposed
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  Speaker 2: by a military coup may be fully military, partially military,
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  Speaker 2: or fully civilian in personnel. The combined power of the state,
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  Speaker 2: under the use usurpers can, then, if necessary, be applied
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  Speaker 2: against the rest of the society to extend and consolidate
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  Speaker 2: the control of the whole country. End of Section.
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  Speaker 1: Two Section three of the Anti Coup. This is a
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  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 8:26
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 8:32
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. When
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  Speaker 1: a coups are likely to occur, in some countries, an
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  Speaker 1: internal coup is unthinkable, as in Norway. In Switzerland, for example,
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  Speaker 1: Some conditions tend to impede coups where democratic constitutional procedures exist,
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  Speaker 1: are respected and provide for peaceful, institutionalized means to resolve
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  Speaker 1: internal conflicts, to change governments, and to hold government officials accountable.
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  Speaker 1: Accurditar will be less likely if the groups capable of
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  Speaker 1: conducting a coup, as the army believe in democratic processes
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  Speaker 1: and respect the limits that have been placed on their authority,
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  Speaker 1: they are unlikely to attempt a coup. They may instead
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  Speaker 1: exert self restraint, believing that it would be wrong to
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  Speaker 1: stage a coup. The social structure of the society is
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  Speaker 1: also influential in determining whether acuditar is likely to happen.
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  Speaker 1: Where the civil non state institutions of the society are
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  Speaker 1: strong and democratically controlled, and military institutions and anti democratic
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  Speaker 1: political parties are in comparison weaker, a cur is not
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  Speaker 1: likely to occur. Where the society works together in a
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  Speaker 1: relative harmony, a cup is not likely. That situation, however,
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  Speaker 1: is rare and is not required to prevent a coup.
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  Speaker 1: If the internal problems are at least of limited severity
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  Speaker 1: and can be dealt with by institutionalized and other peaceful procedures,
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  Speaker 1: a coup is less likely. Or if acute conflicts are
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  Speaker 1: present but are conducted non violently instead of by internal violence,
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  Speaker 1: the stage will not be set for a coup by
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  Speaker 1: a group that promises to end internal violence and to
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  Speaker 1: restore law and order. Where politicians seek to serve the
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  Speaker 1: society and avoid corruption. One justification for a coup will
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  Speaker 1: be removed. On the other hand, when those conditions are
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  Speaker 1: not present, the society may be vulnerable to cuse the
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  Speaker 1: roots of democratic political systems may be shallow or eroded.
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  Speaker 1: The government may be seen as illegitimate, and there may
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  Speaker 1: be widespread dissatisfaction with its performance. Perhaps it may be
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  Speaker 1: charged with incompetence, corruption, or in decisiveness. In times of crisis,
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  Speaker 1: confidence in the capacity of democratic procedures to remedy the
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  Speaker 1: situation may be widely lacking, and in some cases there
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  Speaker 1: may be no agreed procedures for succession of governments. The
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  Speaker 1: civil non state institutions of the society, voluntary institutions of
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  Speaker 1: many types, political parties, independent educational institutions, religious bodies, trade unions,
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  Speaker 1: and many other types may be weak or nearly non existent. Also,
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  Speaker 1: the general population may lack significant participation in the political system. Consequently,
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  Speaker 1: there would be no groups and institutions capable of opposing
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  Speaker 1: a seizure of the state apparatus. The society may have
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  Speaker 1: very serious internal problems associated with violence. Serious social unrest,
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  Speaker 1: acute economic problems, sharp political conflicts, or internal violence and
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  Speaker 1: assassinations may make the major parts of the society willing
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  Speaker 1: to accept a new strong government which promises to act
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  Speaker 1: to restore order and to end the crisis. Unfavorable economic
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  Speaker 1: conditions interacting with political factors may make a society vulnerable
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  Speaker 1: to coups, and it has been argued that the lack
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  Speaker 1: of diversification in exports and excessive dependency on a variable
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  Speaker 1: international market for exports can create conditions in which a
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  Speaker 1: coup is likely. At times, individuals, powerful groups, a dictatorial party,
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  Speaker 1: or a military clique may simply lust for power and domination,
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  Speaker 1: with or without the guise of noble objectives. Such conditions
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  Speaker 1: do not necessarily produce a coup. However, even when conditions
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  Speaker 1: for a coup may be favorable and the potential putchists
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  Speaker 1: lack self restraint, they may not make the attempt because
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  Speaker 1: it would likely fail. This propensity to failure may derive
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  Speaker 1: from several sources. Important sections of the military personnel, the police,
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  Speaker 1: and the civil servants, as well as lower levels of government,
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  Speaker 1: may be viewed as unsupportive of a coup and likely
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  Speaker 1: to resist the attempt. The independent institutions of the society
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  Speaker 1: may be inclined to oppose the coup and are strong
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  Speaker 1: enough to act powerfully against it. The ability of these
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  Speaker 1: possible opponents of a coup to act powerfully against a
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  Speaker 1: coup attempt can significantly influence the decision of potential coup
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  Speaker 1: makers about whether to make the attempt or not. If
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  Speaker 1: a society is likely to resist firmly, an attempt to
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  Speaker 1: take over, a coup is less likely to occur. Those
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  Speaker 1: who attempt a coup must be able to assume that
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  Speaker 1: once they have seized power, they will encounter minimal resistance
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  Speaker 1: from the buocracy in the populace. In societies where the
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  Speaker 1: masses are politically mobilized, involved, and powerful, this assumption cannot
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  Speaker 1: be made.
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  Speaker 2: End Section three, Section four of The Anti Coup. This
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  Speaker 2: is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the
• 15:28
  Speaker 2: public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit
• 15:33
  Speaker 2: LibriVox dot org. Recording by Lynette Calkins. The Anti Coup
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  Speaker 2: by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Support for coups. The
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  Speaker 2: basic prerequisite of a coup is that the pucha's organizational
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  Speaker 2: and repressive forces are believed to be more powerful than
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  Speaker 2: the other institutions and forces of the society. In short,
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  Speaker 2: civil society is weaker than the military forces. Indeed, in
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  Speaker 2: many countries the military forces have been in recent decades
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  Speaker 2: expanded to be by far the strongest institution of the
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  Speaker 2: whole society. These military forces have often been turned against
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  Speaker 2: the very society and population on which their existence has
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  Speaker 2: depended and which they were supposed to defend. Such a
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  Speaker 2: military coup is more likely if the soldiers are more
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  Speaker 2: loyal to their officers than they are to the democratic government.
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  Speaker 2: If the coup is instead an executive usurpation, sometimes called
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  Speaker 2: a self coup, it is necessary that the combined governmental,
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  Speaker 2: civil bodies and military forces assisting the takeover are more
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  Speaker 2: powerful than the civil institutions of the society. Instead, the
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  Speaker 2: coup may be one conducted by a disciplined political party
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  Speaker 2: with its own paramilitary forces. The party's supporters may also
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  Speaker 2: at times operate from key ministries in a coalition government,
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  Speaker 2: or with support from significant sections of the military and police.
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  Speaker 2: To succeed, that party must be more able to act
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  Speaker 2: than are other sections of the society which might oppose
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  Speaker 2: the takeover. In some situations, agents of a foreign government
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  Speaker 2: may assist internal political or military groups in carrying out
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  Speaker 2: a coup. In past coups, supporters of political freedoms have
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  Speaker 2: often been silent and have passively submitted. This does not
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  Speaker 2: mean that when a coup attempt succeeds that the general
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  Speaker 2: population favored it. In many cases, the population may be
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  Speaker 2: actually opposed but does not know what to do. A
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  Speaker 2: civil war against the military forces and their allies, a
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  Speaker 2: war which democrats would certainly lose, has understandably inspired. Few
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  Speaker 2: believers in constitutional procedures and social justice have usually not
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  Speaker 2: known how else a coup backed by the military forces
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  Speaker 2: could be defeated. Without serious preparations for an anti cou defense,
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  Speaker 2: a lasting democratic system is very doubtful in many countries,
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  Speaker 2: especially in those with a history of coups. Even in
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  Speaker 2: countries that have achieved a relatively democratic political situation, anti
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  Speaker 2: coup measures are important despite public statements of innocent intentions
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  Speaker 2: by those individuals and groups that are capable of conducting
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  Speaker 2: a coup. End of Section four.
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  Speaker 1: Section five of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 18:43
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 18:47
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 18:53
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins attempts to
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  Speaker 1: prevent coups. Obviously, it is better to have prevented coup
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  Speaker 1: attempts from recurring than it is to have to defend
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  Speaker 1: against them. One important issue, therefore, is how coups can
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  Speaker 1: be prevented and blocked. In many constitutional democracies, it has
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  Speaker 1: been assumed that if the constitution and the laws prohibit coutitars,
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  Speaker 1: then the democracy is safe. That is demonstratably not true,
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  Speaker 1: as too many countries have discovered to their peril democracies
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  Speaker 1: with constitutional provisions or laws against attempts to seize control
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  Speaker 1: of the state by cous have themselves been victims of coups.
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  Speaker 1: Such legal prohibitions should exist, but many times they have
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  Speaker 1: failed to block cups. Cups are in fact always conducted
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  Speaker 1: by groups which are quite willing to violate constitutional legal
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  Speaker 1: barriers to their intended actions. This does not mean that
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  Speaker 1: such constitutional or legal provisions are not useful, but that
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  Speaker 1: they are insufficient. Means of enforcing them are clearly needed.
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  Speaker 1: Persons and groups willing to push aside or murder executive
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  Speaker 1: officials in order to install themselves as rulers find no
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  Speaker 1: problem in violating existing constitutional or legal barriers to their action.
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  Speaker 1: Military groups determined to save the nation or to establish
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  Speaker 1: their own dominance will not be seriously impeded by a
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  Speaker 1: legal barrier. Disciplined political parties that see themselves to be
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  Speaker 1: the saviors of the people and the makers of a
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  Speaker 1: future ideal society may respect no barriers to their taking
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  Speaker 1: state power in order to implement their mission. Efforts to
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  Speaker 1: remove justifiable grievances in the society are also needed, but
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  Speaker 1: they too are insufficient. Such grievances may genuinely motivate potential putchists,
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  Speaker 1: or may be merely excuses for a coup which is
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  Speaker 1: attempted for less honorable motives. International condemnation and sanctions are
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  Speaker 1: also unlikely to deter determined putchists. It is naive to
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  Speaker 1: expect that international influences will be able to prevent or
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  Speaker 1: unseat an internal takeover. At best, they may support a
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  Speaker 1: strong indigenous capacity to block attempted usurpations. At other times,
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  Speaker 1: certain international influences may support the coup or even be
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  Speaker 1: a main force in its instigation, as for example, has
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  Speaker 1: the United States government been in several cases Obviously, then
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  Speaker 1: something more is required. Strong barriers to coup deteur. This
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  Speaker 1: essay will argue that these barriers can be erected within
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  Speaker 1: the country by a prepared anti coup defense policy. This
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  Speaker 1: policy would not only have the potential of defeating coups,
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  Speaker 1: it could also serve as a potential deterrent to these
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  Speaker 1: attacks rooted in the capacity for effective defense. Because coups
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  Speaker 1: have so often been successful, populations are often unlikely to
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  Speaker 1: think that effective anti coup barriers can be erected. The
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  Speaker 1: confusion and sense of powerlessness which often a company coups
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  Speaker 1: have been aggravated by the population's absence of planning, preparations
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  Speaker 1: and training to block coups. When the coup is commonly
• 23:14
  Speaker 1: backed by the military forces, the supposed defenders of the
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  Speaker 1: society against which there can be no military power applied,
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  Speaker 1: the anguish and despair of the population increases.
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  Speaker 2: End Section five, Section six of the Anti Coup. This
• 23:40
  Speaker 2: is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the
• 23:43
  Speaker 2: public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit
• 23:48
  Speaker 2: LibriVox dot org. Recording by Lynette Colkins, The Anti Coup
• 23:54
  Speaker 2: by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Coups have been defeated,
• 24:01
  Speaker 2: the problem of how to block cou's dedah would seem
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  Speaker 2: insoluble except for the important fact that sometimes coups have
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  Speaker 2: been defeated. Despite often disadvantageous conditions, civilians have at times
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  Speaker 2: been able to block illegal seizures of state power. These
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  Speaker 2: cases have been remarkable. Sometimes coups fail because non cooperation
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  Speaker 2: and defiance break the intended link between physical control of
• 24:29
  Speaker 2: government facilities and the political control of the state. Civil servants, bureaucrats,
• 24:36
  Speaker 2: military groupings, and other state employees at times steadfastly refused
• 24:41
  Speaker 2: to cooperate with puchists, denying control of the state apparatus.
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  Speaker 2: Coups have also been imperiled by severance of the link
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  Speaker 2: between control of the central state machinery and control of
• 24:53
  Speaker 2: the society, including independent social institutions, local governments, and the
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  Speaker 2: populace as a whole. Puchus have also narrowly assumed that
• 25:04
  Speaker 2: dominance of state structures equals political and social control. However,
• 25:11
  Speaker 2: without the submission of all these sections of the society,
• 25:14
  Speaker 2: the coup leadership cannot become a lasting government. The defeat
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  Speaker 2: of the attempted hardline takeover in the former Soviet Union
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  Speaker 2: in August nineteen ninety one is one relatively recent case
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  Speaker 2: of mass non cooperation against a coup. Prominent. Earlier cases
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  Speaker 2: of successful antiku defense occurred in Germany in nineteen twenty
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  Speaker 2: against the cap Pouch, which threatened the new Weimar Republic,
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  Speaker 2: and in France in nineteen sixty one against the Algiers
• 25:45
  Speaker 2: General's Revolt, which aimed to keep Algeria French by ousting
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  Speaker 2: the de Gale de Breus government. In these three cases
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  Speaker 2: and a few others, the coups were blocked by internal
• 25:57
  Speaker 2: non violent resistance. Only a caseasonally, as during the nineteen
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  Speaker 2: ninety one coup in the Soviet Union, has serious supportive
• 26:05
  Speaker 2: international diplomatic and economic action been threatened or taken Germany
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  Speaker 2: nineteen twenty. On twelve March nineteen twenty, unofficial Fraankcorps units
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  Speaker 2: of ex soldiers and civilians occupied Berlin in a coup
• 26:22
  Speaker 2: against the Weimar Republic. Organized by doctor Wolfgang Kapp and
• 26:26
  Speaker 2: Lieutenant General Walter von Lutwitz. The coup aimed to establish
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  Speaker 2: an authoritarian regime of experts. The small German army remained
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  Speaker 2: quote neutral close quote. The legal democratic government under President
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  Speaker 2: Friedrich Ebert fled. Though not well prepared, the coup might
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  Speaker 2: well have succeeded had there been no resistance the legal
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  Speaker 2: government proclaimed that all citizens should obey only it and
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  Speaker 2: that the provinces should refuse all co operation with the
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  Speaker 2: CAP group. After a worker's strike against the coup broke
• 27:03
  Speaker 2: out in Berlin, a proclamation calling for a general strike
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  Speaker 2: was issued under the names of President Ebert and Social
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  Speaker 2: Democratic ministers, though without their official approval. The Cappists were
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  Speaker 2: quickly met with large scale non co operation by civilian
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  Speaker 2: servants and Conservative government bureaucrats, among others. Qualified persons refused
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  Speaker 2: to accept ministerial posts in the new regime. Cappist repression
• 27:31
  Speaker 2: was harsh, and some strikers were shot to death. However,
• 27:35
  Speaker 2: the strength of the non co operation grew and a
• 27:38
  Speaker 2: general strike paralyzed Berlin. The Rachs Bank refused funds to
• 27:43
  Speaker 2: the usurpers. On March seventeenth, the Berlin security police demanded
• 27:48
  Speaker 2: Kapp's resignation. He fled to Sweden the same day. Many
• 27:53
  Speaker 2: of his aides left Berlin in civilian clothes, and Lutwiks resigned.
• 27:58
  Speaker 2: The Freikorps then marched out of Berlin, killing and wounding
• 28:02
  Speaker 2: protesting civilians as they did so. The coup was defeated
• 28:07
  Speaker 2: by the combined action of workers, civil servants, bureaucrats, and
• 28:11
  Speaker 2: the general population who had refused the popular and administrative
• 28:15
  Speaker 2: cooperation that the usurpers required. The Weimar Republic survived to
• 28:21
  Speaker 2: face other grave internal problems. The financial costs of the
• 28:25
  Speaker 2: resistance to the attempted coup were modest, and an estimated
• 28:29
  Speaker 2: several hundred persons had been killed and others were wounded
• 28:32
  Speaker 2: by the Cappists. France nineteen sixty one, French President Charles
• 28:39
  Speaker 2: de Gaulle in early April indicated that he was abandoning
• 28:43
  Speaker 2: the attempt to keep Algeria French. In response, on the
• 28:47
  Speaker 2: night of twenty one through twenty two April, rebelling French
• 28:51
  Speaker 2: military units in Algeria seized control of the capital city
• 28:55
  Speaker 2: of Algiers and nearby quay points. However, the coup there
• 29:00
  Speaker 2: could only succeed by replacing the legal government in Paris.
• 29:05
  Speaker 2: On twenty three April, the political parties and trade unions
• 29:08
  Speaker 2: in France held mass meetings and called for a one
• 29:11
  Speaker 2: hour general strike. That night, DeGaulle broadcast a speech heard
• 29:16
  Speaker 2: also in Algeria, urging people to defy and disobey the rebels,
• 29:21
  Speaker 2: ordering the use of quote all means unquote to bring
• 29:25
  Speaker 2: them down quote I forbid every Frenchman, and in the
• 29:30
  Speaker 2: first place, every soldier, to carry out any of their
• 29:34
  Speaker 2: orders close quote. Prime Minister de Bras warned of an
• 29:38
  Speaker 2: airborne attack from Algiers. However, instead of ordering military action,
• 29:44
  Speaker 2: he called upon the general population to act quote as
• 29:48
  Speaker 2: soon as the sirens sound, go there to the airports
• 29:51
  Speaker 2: by foot or by car to convince the mistaken soldiers
• 29:55
  Speaker 2: of their huge error close quote. Copies of Degaulle's speed
• 30:00
  Speaker 2: each were duplicated and widely distributed by the population and
• 30:04
  Speaker 2: loyal French soldiers in Algeria. De gal later declared quote
• 30:09
  Speaker 2: from then on, the revolt met with a passive resistance
• 30:13
  Speaker 2: on the spot, which became hourly more explicit close quote.
• 30:18
  Speaker 2: On twenty four April, ten million workers took part in
• 30:21
  Speaker 2: the symbolic general strike. At airfields, people prepared vehicles to
• 30:27
  Speaker 2: be placed on runways to block the landing of planes.
• 30:30
  Speaker 2: A financial and shipping blockade was imposed on Algeria. Loyal
• 30:35
  Speaker 2: French troops in Algeria acted to undermine the rebels. Two
• 30:39
  Speaker 2: thirds of the transport planes and many fighter jets were
• 30:42
  Speaker 2: flown out of Algeria, while other pilots blocked airfields or
• 30:47
  Speaker 2: pretended mechanical failures. Army soldiers simply stayed in their barracks.
• 30:52
  Speaker 2: There were many cases of deliberate inefficiency with orders and
• 30:56
  Speaker 2: files quote lost unquote, and communication and transportation delayed. Civil
• 31:03
  Speaker 2: servants hid documents and withdrew. On twenty five April, Degau
• 31:08
  Speaker 2: broadcast an order to loyal troops to fire at the rebels,
• 31:12
  Speaker 2: but there was no need. The coup had already been
• 31:15
  Speaker 2: fatally undermined. The rebel leaders resolved to call off the
• 31:20
  Speaker 2: attempted coup, and during the night of twenty five to
• 31:23
  Speaker 2: twenty six April, the parachute regiment that had originally seized
• 31:27
  Speaker 2: Algiers withdrew from the city. There were a few casualties,
• 31:32
  Speaker 2: probably three killed and several wounded. In Algeria and Paris,
• 31:36
  Speaker 2: the attack on the Degau government had been defeated by
• 31:39
  Speaker 2: defiance and dissillusion the Soviet Union nineteen ninety one. On
• 31:47
  Speaker 2: eighteen August nineteen ninety one, in an effort to block
• 31:50
  Speaker 2: the radical decentralization of power in the Soviet Union, a
• 31:55
  Speaker 2: group of hard line Soviet officials detained Soviet President Mikhail
• 31:59
  Speaker 2: Gorreyov and demanded that he turn over all executive powers
• 32:04
  Speaker 2: to his vice President, Gorbachev refused. The self declared State
• 32:09
  Speaker 2: Committee for the State of Emergency, composed of, among others,
• 32:13
  Speaker 2: the Soviet vice President, prime Minister, defense Minister, Chairman of
• 32:19
  Speaker 2: the KGB, and Interior Minister, declared a six month state
• 32:23
  Speaker 2: of emergency. Opposition newspapers were banned, political parties suspended except
• 32:29
  Speaker 2: the Communist Party, and demonstrations forbidden. The junta's first decree
• 32:35
  Speaker 2: asserted the primacy of the Soviet Constitution over those of
• 32:39
  Speaker 2: the republics and mandated adherents to all orders of the
• 32:43
  Speaker 2: Emergency Committee. It appeared that the junta had the entire
• 32:47
  Speaker 2: military forces of the Soviet Union at their disposal. Armored
• 32:51
  Speaker 2: divisions and paratroops were deployed throughout Moscow. In the Baltics,
• 32:56
  Speaker 2: pro coup forces seized telephone, radio and television facilities and
• 33:02
  Speaker 2: blockaded key ports. Armored assault units outside Leningrad began to
• 33:07
  Speaker 2: move on the city. In Moscow, tens of thousands of
• 33:11
  Speaker 2: people gathered spontaneously in the streets to denounce the coup.
• 33:15
  Speaker 2: In a dramatic show of defiance, Russian Federation President Boris
• 33:20
  Speaker 2: Yeltsen climbed upon a hostile tank and denounced the Pouchist's
• 33:24
  Speaker 2: actions as a quote rightist, reactionary, anti constitutional coup quote quote.
• 33:32
  Speaker 2: Yeltsin proclaimed quote all decisions and instructions of this committee
• 33:36
  Speaker 2: to be unlawful close quote, and appealed to citizens to
• 33:40
  Speaker 2: rebuff the Pouchists and for servicemen not to take part
• 33:44
  Speaker 2: in the coup. Yeltsen concluded with an appeal for a
• 33:47
  Speaker 2: quote universal unlimited strike close quote. Later that day, Yeltsen
• 33:53
  Speaker 2: ordered army and k g B personnel within the Russian
• 33:56
  Speaker 2: Republic to obey him, not the Puchists. Thousands gathered in
• 34:01
  Speaker 2: front of the Russian White House parliament building to protect
• 34:05
  Speaker 2: it from attack. Barricades were erected, trolleybuses and automobiles blocked
• 34:10
  Speaker 2: the streets. Although the call for a general strike went
• 34:14
  Speaker 2: largely unheeded, miners in the Kuzbass coalfields and near Spherdlocks
• 34:20
  Speaker 2: did strike. The Buchs decreed a special state of emergency
• 34:24
  Speaker 2: in Moscow because of quote rallies, street marches, demonstrations, and
• 34:30
  Speaker 2: instances of instigation to riots close quote. On the second
• 34:34
  Speaker 2: night of the coup, resistance organizers pasted leaflets throughout the
• 34:39
  Speaker 2: city's subway system calling for a mass demonstration in front
• 34:43
  Speaker 2: of the White House. The following day, in Leningrad, two
• 34:47
  Speaker 2: hundred thousand people rallied in response to Mayor Anatoly Sobchuk's
• 34:52
  Speaker 2: call for quote the broadest constitutional resistance close quote to
• 34:57
  Speaker 2: the coup. Tens of thousands in Moldavia blocked the streets
• 35:02
  Speaker 2: to keep Soviet troops at bay. Leaders of the Ukraine
• 35:06
  Speaker 2: and Kazakhstan denounced the coup. A large rally in Minsk
• 35:10
  Speaker 2: called for mass civil disobedience. Lithuanian President Landsbergis appealed to
• 35:16
  Speaker 2: citizens to surround the Parliament building in Vilnius for protection
• 35:21
  Speaker 2: from attack. Emergency sessions of the parliaments of Latvia and
• 35:26
  Speaker 2: Estonia declared full independence from the Soviet Union. In Moscow,
• 35:32
  Speaker 2: banned opposition newspapers secretly printed the Common Paper, which called
• 35:37
  Speaker 2: on citizens to resist. A donated radio transmitter allowed the
• 35:41
  Speaker 2: Russian government to broadcast resistance information across the nation through
• 35:46
  Speaker 2: local relay stations. The banned independent radio station Echo Moscow
• 35:52
  Speaker 2: continued to broadcast carrying live speeches from an emergency session
• 35:57
  Speaker 2: of the Russian Parliament. Although prohibited. Russian television technicians put
• 36:03
  Speaker 2: their news programs on videotape and distributed them to twenty
• 36:07
  Speaker 2: cities around the Soviet Union. Officials in the state controlled
• 36:11
  Speaker 2: media refused cooperation with the Puchists. The defiant speeches of
• 36:16
  Speaker 2: Yeltsin and Subchak were aired on the nightly news program,
• 36:20
  Speaker 2: which the Emergency Committee's KGB censor chose not to block. Afterwards,
• 36:26
  Speaker 2: the first deputy chairman of Soviet television, Valentine Lazutkin, received
• 36:31
  Speaker 2: a call from Interior Minister Pugo. Quote, you have disobeyed
• 36:36
  Speaker 2: two orders. You have given instructions to the people on
• 36:40
  Speaker 2: where to go and what to do. You will answer
• 36:43
  Speaker 2: for this quote. Defiant crowds swelled in front of the
• 36:48
  Speaker 2: White House that night to protect the Russian government. Concerted
• 36:52
  Speaker 2: efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the Puchists forces.
• 36:57
  Speaker 2: Leaflets and food were distributed soldiers citizens pleaded with tank
• 37:03
  Speaker 2: crews to switch sides. Yeltsen urged discipline, quote, don't provoke
• 37:08
  Speaker 2: the military. The military has become a weapon in the
• 37:12
  Speaker 2: hands of the Puchists. Therefore we should also support the
• 37:16
  Speaker 2: military and maintain order and discipline in contact with them.
• 37:22
  Speaker 2: In several cases, entire military units deserted the Puchists. Ten
• 37:28
  Speaker 2: tanks in front of the White House turned their turrets
• 37:31
  Speaker 2: away from the Parliament building, pledging to help defend it
• 37:35
  Speaker 2: against attack. Mutinies against the Puchists were reported at the
• 37:39
  Speaker 2: Leningrad Naval Base and at a paratrooper training academy. Units
• 37:44
  Speaker 2: in the far East refused to support the junta. In
• 37:48
  Speaker 2: the Russian Republic, local Interior Ministry, police and KGB units
• 37:54
  Speaker 2: declared loyalty to Yeltsin. Defense Minister Yasov ordered the Tula
• 37:59
  Speaker 2: Divai to withdraw from its positions near the White House
• 38:02
  Speaker 2: because of the troop's uncertain loyalty. Interior Minister Pugo disbanded
• 38:08
  Speaker 2: the Moscow Police out of the fear of disloyalty to
• 38:11
  Speaker 2: the Puchists. In the afternoon of the second day of
• 38:15
  Speaker 2: the coup, the Puchats attempted to put together a new
• 38:18
  Speaker 2: assault team to attack the Russian White House. Army paratroops
• 38:22
  Speaker 2: and Interior Ministry forces were to surround the White House,
• 38:26
  Speaker 2: clearing the way for an attack by the elite KGB
• 38:29
  Speaker 2: Alpha Group. The head of the army's paratroops and the
• 38:33
  Speaker 2: commander of the Soviet Air Force, however, refused to take
• 38:37
  Speaker 2: part in the attack. Hours before the planned attack, the
• 38:41
  Speaker 2: commander of the KGB Alpha group stated that his forces
• 38:45
  Speaker 2: would not take part. Quote there will be no attack.
• 38:49
  Speaker 2: I won't go against the people close quote. The following morning,
• 38:55
  Speaker 2: the Defense Board of the Soviet Union voted to withdraw
• 38:59
  Speaker 2: the troops from Moscow. Members of the Emergency Committee were
• 39:03
  Speaker 2: subsequently arrested, one committed suicide. President Gorbachev returned to power.
• 39:10
  Speaker 2: Casualties were low. A total of five people were reported
• 39:14
  Speaker 2: killed during the coup attempt. The coup had been defeated.
• 39:18
  Speaker 2: Mass public defiance and disobedience in the military thwarted the
• 39:22
  Speaker 2: hardliner's attempt to return to authoritarian rule. These three cases
• 39:28
  Speaker 2: of successful resistance Germany in nineteen twenty, France in nineteen
• 39:33
  Speaker 2: sixty one, and Russia in nineteen ninety one established that
• 39:38
  Speaker 2: successful defense against coups is possible. Certainly, there are other
• 39:44
  Speaker 2: cases in which similar resistance did not succeed, but the
• 39:48
  Speaker 2: existence of successes establishes that under at least some conditions,
• 39:53
  Speaker 2: coups can be defeated. End of section six. Recording by
• 39:59
  Speaker 2: Lyne Kok against Monument.
• 40:01
  Speaker 1: Colorado, Section seven of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 40:11
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 40:17
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 40:24
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Anti
• 40:28
  Speaker 1: coup defense attention to how couditars work and how they
• 40:35
  Speaker 1: can be defeated teach us as much. Together they show
• 40:40
  Speaker 1: that there is no need to be passive and helpless
• 40:43
  Speaker 1: in face of these blows against freedom and justice. Defense
• 40:49
  Speaker 1: can be waged by the attacked society itself. The basic
• 40:55
  Speaker 1: point of this essay is that a defense policy against
• 40:59
  Speaker 1: cuttar is possible. The essence of such a defense policy
• 41:05
  Speaker 1: is twofold. One that those who attack the constitutional system
• 41:11
  Speaker 1: and intend to replace the elected government by a regime
• 41:15
  Speaker 1: of their own choosing must be denied all legitimacy. They
• 41:22
  Speaker 1: have no moral or political right to become the government.
• 41:28
  Speaker 1: And two, they must be denied all cooperation. No one
• 41:35
  Speaker 1: in the government or in the population should assist or
• 41:40
  Speaker 1: obey them in any way. In accoutitur The seizure of
• 41:46
  Speaker 1: government buildings, transportation and communication centers, and key geographical points
• 41:54
  Speaker 1: is not done for its own sake. Rather, the purpose
• 41:59
  Speaker 1: of those US seizures is to control the state apparatus
• 42:04
  Speaker 1: and Hence the country as a whole. The putchists must
• 42:10
  Speaker 1: secure that broad control if the coup is to be successful. However,
• 42:17
  Speaker 1: the seizure of such points does not by itself give
• 42:22
  Speaker 1: the putchists the control they seek over the government and
• 42:26
  Speaker 1: the society. They will not initially control the population, the political, economic,
• 42:33
  Speaker 1: or social organizations, the governmental structures, not even all of
• 42:38
  Speaker 1: the military forces and the police, nor will the putchists
• 42:43
  Speaker 1: be in a position immediately to accomplish any possible ideological objectives.
• 42:50
  Speaker 1: After military or paramilitary forces have occupied government buildings and
• 42:56
  Speaker 1: key centers of communication and transportation, a crucial period inevitably
• 43:02
  Speaker 1: follows in which the putchists must establish and consolidate their control,
• 43:10
  Speaker 1: even in the absence of resistance. That control requires time
• 43:16
  Speaker 1: and effort to achieve. This need to consolidate control and
• 43:21
  Speaker 1: the time it takes to effect this makes an effective
• 43:26
  Speaker 1: defense by the society possible, and section seven.
• 43:37
  Speaker 2: Section eight of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 43:41
  Speaker 2: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 43:45
  Speaker 2: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. Recording
• 43:51
  Speaker 2: by Lynette Calkins. The Anti Coup by Jean Sharp and
• 43:56
  Speaker 2: Bruce Jenkins the Pouchists immediately after the coup is started.
• 44:04
  Speaker 2: The Puchists require legitimacy, that is, acceptance of their moral
• 44:09
  Speaker 2: and political right or authority to rule. Endorsements by moral
• 44:14
  Speaker 2: and religious leaders, respected political personages, and in some cases,
• 44:19
  Speaker 2: royalty or past officials will help them to gain that acceptance.
• 44:24
  Speaker 2: The Puchists require that their control of the state apparatus
• 44:27
  Speaker 2: be accepted by the persons and institutions in whom moral
• 44:31
  Speaker 2: and legitimate political authority resides, whether they are elected officials,
• 44:36
  Speaker 2: unofficial moral leaders, or royalty. The first basic principle of
• 44:42
  Speaker 2: anti coup defense is therefore, to deny legitimacy to the Puchists.
• 44:48
  Speaker 2: The Puchists also require that the civilian leaders and population
• 44:52
  Speaker 2: be supportive, confused, or just passive. The Puchists additionally require
• 44:58
  Speaker 2: the cooperation of start specialists and advisers, bureaucrats and civil servants, administrators,
• 45:05
  Speaker 2: and judges in order to consolidate their control over the society.
• 45:10
  Speaker 2: Journalists and broadcasters, printers and technicians are required to do
• 45:14
  Speaker 2: as they are told. Police, prison officials, and soldiers need
• 45:19
  Speaker 2: to follow orders to make arrests, jail protesters, and execute
• 45:24
  Speaker 2: people as commanded. The pouchists also require that a multitude
• 45:29
  Speaker 2: of people who operate the political system, the society's institutions,
• 45:33
  Speaker 2: and the economy will passively submit and carry out their
• 45:37
  Speaker 2: usual functions as modified by the pouchists orders and policies.
• 45:42
  Speaker 2: In short, in order to consolidate their control, puchists require
• 45:46
  Speaker 2: a significant degree of not only legitimacy, but also cooperation
• 45:51
  Speaker 2: from the society they intend to rule. Few or none
• 45:56
  Speaker 2: of these required acts of submission, cooperation, and assistance may
• 45:59
  Speaker 2: be fulfilled. However, they may be jeopardized by repudiation, non cooperation,
• 46:05
  Speaker 2: and defiance. Both the needed legitimacy and the essential cooperation
• 46:11
  Speaker 2: are vulnerable. All these groups and the general population may
• 46:15
  Speaker 2: refuse to do as ordered. The claims to legitimacy can
• 46:19
  Speaker 2: be rejected, the necessary cooperation, obedience, and support can be denied.
• 46:25
  Speaker 2: The consolidation of the puchist's rule can thereby be blocked.
• 46:30
  Speaker 2: Even moderate opposition may force the attackers to make significant
• 46:34
  Speaker 2: efforts to secure the needed acceptance, cooperation, and support. In
• 46:39
  Speaker 2: a powerful anti coup defense, the population would prevent the
• 46:43
  Speaker 2: attacker's control of the state apparatus and the country by
• 46:47
  Speaker 2: massive and selective non cooperation while maintaining their support for
• 46:51
  Speaker 2: the legal government and its call to resist strong, determined
• 46:56
  Speaker 2: and widespread repudiation. Non cooperation and defiance of the coup
• 47:01
  Speaker 2: by the society can block the pouchis objectives and defeat
• 47:05
  Speaker 2: the coup. The second basic principle of anti coup defense
• 47:10
  Speaker 2: is to resist the pugists with non cooperation and defiance.
• 47:15
  Speaker 2: If both legitimacy and cooperation are denied, the pooch may
• 47:19
  Speaker 2: die of political starvation. End of Section eight.
• 47:30
  Speaker 1: Section nine of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 47:35
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 47:40
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 47:46
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins direct defense
• 47:52
  Speaker 1: of the society. Therefore, an anti coup policy is focused
• 47:59
  Speaker 1: on defa defense of the society by the society itself,
• 48:05
  Speaker 1: not on defensive points of geography nor even governmental buildings.
• 48:13
  Speaker 1: Geography and buildings are ultimately important to coup leaders only
• 48:19
  Speaker 1: when possession is accompanied by human assistants. Seizure of a
• 48:25
  Speaker 1: school building, for example, is of no use to someone
• 48:29
  Speaker 1: seeking to control education without a functioning school, including the
• 48:35
  Speaker 1: cooperative pupils, teachers, and administrators. Occupation of a railroad yard
• 48:42
  Speaker 1: gives no control over that piece of transportation if the
• 48:47
  Speaker 1: railroad workers and managers are unwilling to operate the trains
• 48:53
  Speaker 1: according to orders. Control of a parliament building itself gives
• 48:58
  Speaker 1: no control over the actual members of parliament, or over
• 49:03
  Speaker 1: the population as a whole which believes in parliamentary government.
• 49:09
  Speaker 1: Instead of attempting to provide constitutional defense by fighting over
• 49:14
  Speaker 1: buildings and geographical points, people actively defend their institutions, societies,
• 49:22
  Speaker 1: and freedoms directly. The priorities of action here are crucial
• 49:30
  Speaker 1: insistence on abiding by constitutional procedures, or the maintenance of
• 49:35
  Speaker 1: a free press, for example, are of more direct importance
• 49:40
  Speaker 1: to democracy than possession of a given street, intersection, or building.
• 49:46
  Speaker 1: It is of course true that sometimes certain sites and
• 49:50
  Speaker 1: buildings have a special symbolic importance. Civilian defenders may then
• 49:57
  Speaker 1: want to attempt to block the seizure of these sites
• 49:59
  Speaker 1: by placing their bodies between the attackers and buildings. In
• 50:05
  Speaker 1: nineteen ninety one, for example, both the Lithuanian Parliament building
• 50:10
  Speaker 1: and the Russian White House were so protected by people power.
• 50:16
  Speaker 1: One should not generalize too widely from these two cases. However,
• 50:21
  Speaker 1: it should first be noted that a human barricade is
• 50:26
  Speaker 1: not always realistic. Under extreme weather conditions, especially cold, it
• 50:32
  Speaker 1: would be virtually impossible for a human barricade composed of
• 50:37
  Speaker 1: the same individuals to remain in position for very long. Therefore,
• 50:43
  Speaker 1: it is important to remember the anticoup defense is a
• 50:47
  Speaker 1: defense of the society, not of geographical points of buildings
• 50:52
  Speaker 1: which the Putschists are able to seize if they are
• 50:55
  Speaker 1: willing to kill enough people. If the Putchists are un
• 51:00
  Speaker 1: certain of their own intentions and methods, or if their
• 51:05
  Speaker 1: troops are unwilling to kill many of the defenders, then
• 51:09
  Speaker 1: a defense by human barricades may be successful. However, a
• 51:15
  Speaker 1: serious danger exists in attempts to defend key buildings or
• 51:20
  Speaker 1: other sites by human barricades. If despite the defender's efforts,
• 51:26
  Speaker 1: the building is successfully seized by the Putchists, the defenders
• 51:31
  Speaker 1: and general population may become unjustifiably demoralized. The defenders may
• 51:40
  Speaker 1: then believe not that only the Parliament building has been seized,
• 51:46
  Speaker 1: but the parliament itself has been destroyed. The defenders and
• 51:51
  Speaker 1: population may believe that the mere physical occupation of the
• 51:56
  Speaker 1: former government headquarters has put the puchests in control. Extreme
• 52:02
  Speaker 1: care therefore must be used in formulating strategies and tactics
• 52:07
  Speaker 1: for defensive buildings, so that the defenders and population put
• 52:13
  Speaker 1: the emphasis on defense of the constitutional system and the
• 52:18
  Speaker 1: society's institutions themselves, which can continue whatever the fate of
• 52:24
  Speaker 1: the buildings. The coup leaders cannot control the society's population, institutions, organizations,
• 52:34
  Speaker 1: and government without the submission and cooperation of the population
• 52:42
  Speaker 1: and Section nine.
• 52:50
  Speaker 3: Section ten of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 52:55
  Speaker 3: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 52:58
  Speaker 3: information or volunteer, please visit libvox dot org. The Anti
• 53:03
  Speaker 3: Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The need for preparations.
• 53:11
  Speaker 3: In the three cases reviewed earlier, the defense was improvised
• 53:15
  Speaker 3: without the advantage of advanced planning and preparations. It is
• 53:20
  Speaker 3: surprising how powerful even improvised social action can be. Inevitably, however,
• 53:26
  Speaker 3: such unprepared resistance would be weaker than if careful plans
• 53:30
  Speaker 3: had been laid for defense against such attacks. Confusion, uncertainty
• 53:35
  Speaker 3: as to what to do, ineffectual or counterproductive protests, and
• 53:40
  Speaker 3: costly delays in taking resolute action can all potentially be
• 53:45
  Speaker 3: avoided or reduced significantly by preparations. Conversely, anti coup defense
• 53:51
  Speaker 3: by an assertive citizenry can be greatly strengthened by specific
• 53:56
  Speaker 3: preparations and guidelines. These guidelines would aim to prepare the
• 54:02
  Speaker 3: citizenry and social institutions to offer collective resistance to any coup.
• 54:08
  Speaker 3: Such preparations would need to include both general guidelines for
• 54:12
  Speaker 3: the defense and also designated responsibilities for members of particular
• 54:18
  Speaker 3: population groups and institutions such as civil servants, religious leaders,
• 54:24
  Speaker 3: police journalists, transportation employees, and many others. Such planning and
• 54:30
  Speaker 3: preparations for anti coup defense are possible. Whether independent institutions
• 54:35
  Speaker 3: of the society or the government with cooperation of non
• 54:39
  Speaker 3: governmental institutions and organizations initiate and carry out anti coup
• 54:45
  Speaker 3: defense will largely be determined by the political situation in
• 54:49
  Speaker 3: the country and a degree of strength and vitality of
• 54:53
  Speaker 3: the society. End of Section ten.
• 55:03
  Speaker 1: Section eleven of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 55:09
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 55:13
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 55:19
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, the civilian
• 55:24
  Speaker 1: defenders aims under an anti coup policy. The resistors will
• 55:30
  Speaker 1: aim to repudiate the Putchists as illegitimate with no rightful
• 55:36
  Speaker 1: claim to become the government. Make the attacked society unrulable
• 55:43
  Speaker 1: by the attackers, block the imposition of viable government by
• 55:48
  Speaker 1: the Putchists, maintain control and self direction of their own society.
• 55:58
  Speaker 1: Make the institution of the society into omnipresent resistance organizations
• 56:04
  Speaker 1: against a crew. Deny to the Putchists any additional objectives,
• 56:13
  Speaker 1: make the costs of the attack an attempt at domination unacceptable.
• 56:19
  Speaker 1: Subvert the reliability and loyalty of the Putschist troops and
• 56:23
  Speaker 1: functionaries and induce them to desert their mutinous officers. Encourage
• 56:31
  Speaker 1: dissension and opposition among the Putchist supporters. Stimulate international opposition
• 56:39
  Speaker 1: to the coup by diplomatic, economic, and public opinion pressures
• 56:45
  Speaker 1: against the attackers, and achieve international support in communications, finances, food, diplomacy,
• 56:55
  Speaker 1: and other resources. And Section eleven.
• 57:06
  Speaker 3: Section twelve of the Anti Coup. This is a librivoked recording.
• 57:11
  Speaker 3: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 57:15
  Speaker 3: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 57:20
  Speaker 3: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, Chapter twelve Resistance,
• 57:26
  Speaker 3: General and organized. Strategies of anti coup defense might be
• 57:31
  Speaker 3: grouped initially into two broad categories, general and organized. While
• 57:36
  Speaker 3: in advance of an attack, a number of key points
• 57:39
  Speaker 3: would be selected and identified to the general population as
• 57:43
  Speaker 3: points at which the population should resist, even in the
• 57:47
  Speaker 3: absence of any specific instructions at the time from a
• 57:51
  Speaker 3: leadership group. This type of resistance is called general resistance.
• 57:56
  Speaker 3: These points might include, for example, efforts to promote the
• 57:59
  Speaker 3: attacks regime as legitimate, attempts to remake or abolish the
• 58:04
  Speaker 3: elected legislature, measures or remake the courts, or impose a
• 58:09
  Speaker 3: new constitution, abridgments of freedom of speech and religion, in
• 58:13
  Speaker 3: efforts to control the society's independent institutions. Infringement by the
• 58:19
  Speaker 3: attackers on any of these points would be the population's
• 58:23
  Speaker 3: signal to resist. The advanced provision of guidelines for general
• 58:27
  Speaker 3: resistance would make wise resistance possible even if the legitimate
• 58:32
  Speaker 3: officials or the initial defense leaders have been arrested or executed.
• 58:37
  Speaker 3: General resistance could also be practiced if the defense leaders
• 58:41
  Speaker 3: communications with the population have been blocked. Organized resistance differs
• 58:47
  Speaker 3: from general resistance in that the defenders act in accordance
• 58:51
  Speaker 3: with a call or instructions from an anti coup defense
• 58:54
  Speaker 3: leadership group. This group might consist of members of the
• 58:58
  Speaker 3: legitimate government, officials of the anti coup defense planning body,
• 59:04
  Speaker 3: or persons selected in some other way. This leadership might,
• 59:08
  Speaker 3: for example, be comprised of representatives of voluntary organizations, educational, civic, labor, religious, political,
• 59:17
  Speaker 3: and others who have been informally accepted by the society,
• 59:22
  Speaker 3: whether or not their individual identities are publicly known. Organized
• 59:27
  Speaker 3: resistance would supplement, not replace, general resistance. Often, organized resistance
• 59:33
  Speaker 3: would consist of acts focused on a specific event or
• 59:37
  Speaker 3: would occur in a specific place or at a designated time.
• 59:41
  Speaker 3: Such resistance may take the form of specific acts of
• 59:44
  Speaker 3: symbolic protests or resistance, of which there are dozens of
• 59:49
  Speaker 3: possible types. Examples would include demonstrations, short strikes, protest marches,
• 59:56
  Speaker 3: protest blackouts, tolling of church bells, fly of national flags,
• 1:00:02
  Speaker 3: perhaps at half mass, organized letter writing campaigns, the simultaneous
• 1:00:07
  Speaker 3: reading and religious services of official statements from religious leaders,
• 1:00:13
  Speaker 3: organized hunger strikes, radio broadcasts from hidden transmitters, and expressions
• 1:00:19
  Speaker 3: of mourning, either because of the brutalities by the attackers
• 1:00:23
  Speaker 3: or acts of terrorism by one's own people. Both general
• 1:00:27
  Speaker 3: resistance and organized resistance are very important in defense struggles
• 1:00:32
  Speaker 3: against coutetah. The proportional roles of each will vary with
• 1:00:37
  Speaker 3: the specific situation. End of Section twelve.
• 1:00:48
  Speaker 1: Section thirteen of The Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:00:54
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:00:59
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:01:05
  Speaker 1: Ant Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The importance
• 1:01:10
  Speaker 1: of strategy. The general technique that has been most effective
• 1:01:15
  Speaker 1: in anti coup defense is non violent struggle. This avoids
• 1:01:20
  Speaker 1: fighting the putchists with military weapons, with which the usurpers
• 1:01:25
  Speaker 1: usually have the advantage. The non violent technique also maximizes
• 1:01:31
  Speaker 1: the power of the defenders, vastly increases the possible number
• 1:01:36
  Speaker 1: of resistors over those able and willing to use violence,
• 1:01:41
  Speaker 1: and very importantly helps to undermine the morale and the
• 1:01:46
  Speaker 1: reliability of the putchist's soldiers. The weapons or methods of
• 1:01:54
  Speaker 1: non violent struggle, such as strikes, boycotts, types of political
• 1:01:59
  Speaker 1: non co operation and mutiny are not to be applied randomly.
• 1:02:04
  Speaker 1: These methods should not be selected in accordance with the
• 1:02:08
  Speaker 1: whims of individuals or in response to minor events, nor
• 1:02:13
  Speaker 1: should they be applied in a hodgepodge, improvised or intuitive way.
• 1:02:20
  Speaker 1: These methods instead will be most effective if they are
• 1:02:23
  Speaker 1: applied as component parts of a comprehensive, carefully chosen strategy
• 1:02:30
  Speaker 1: of anticup defense. Attempting to provide defense without formulating a
• 1:02:38
  Speaker 1: strategy for the struggle is foolhardy. It is also potentially disastrous.
• 1:02:46
  Speaker 1: One of the major reasons for the failure of some
• 1:02:49
  Speaker 1: past nonviolent struggles has been the choice of a poor strategy,
• 1:02:55
  Speaker 1: or very often the neglect to develop any strategy at all.
• 1:03:01
  Speaker 1: Strategy is just as important in nonviolent struggles as it
• 1:03:06
  Speaker 1: is in military warfare. There needs to be an overall
• 1:03:14
  Speaker 1: plan for conducting the entire conflict. This is called a
• 1:03:19
  Speaker 1: grand strategy. Within it, individual strategies need to be formulated
• 1:03:25
  Speaker 1: to achieve major objectives in the conflict or for use
• 1:03:30
  Speaker 1: in broad phases of the struggle. A strategy is a conception,
• 1:03:36
  Speaker 1: a general plan of how best to act in order
• 1:03:40
  Speaker 1: to achieve one's objectives in a major phase of a
• 1:03:43
  Speaker 1: conflict within the framework of the chosen grand strategy. The
• 1:03:48
  Speaker 1: aim is to use one's resources to maximum advantage to
• 1:03:53
  Speaker 1: gain one's objective at minimum cost. The chosen strategy to
• 1:03:59
  Speaker 1: turn lemens whether when and how to fight. Within a strategy,
• 1:04:07
  Speaker 1: particular tactics, plans for limited actions, and individual methods. Specific
• 1:04:15
  Speaker 1: forms of action are used to implement the strategy. These
• 1:04:20
  Speaker 1: actions are more limited in time, scale, or specific issues.
• 1:04:25
  Speaker 1: In order to achieve intended limited objectives, strategies for anti
• 1:04:32
  Speaker 1: coup defense need to be planned with much thought and
• 1:04:37
  Speaker 1: extreme care. The strategies need to draw upon the best
• 1:04:42
  Speaker 1: available resources about strategic principles. They also need to be
• 1:04:47
  Speaker 1: based on knowledge of non violent struggle, the dynamics of coups,
• 1:04:53
  Speaker 1: the particular conflict situation, and the strengths and weaknesses of
• 1:04:58
  Speaker 1: both the defending population and the putschists. Issues of strategy
• 1:05:06
  Speaker 1: are more varied and complex than indicated here, and readers
• 1:05:10
  Speaker 1: facing strategic decisions are urged to consult more extensive discussions
• 1:05:16
  Speaker 1: elsewhere and section thirteen.
• 1:05:26
  Speaker 3: Section fourteen of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:05:31
  Speaker 3: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:05:35
  Speaker 3: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:05:40
  Speaker 3: Anti Coup by Genes Sharp van Bruce Jenkins Anti coup Weapons.
• 1:05:48
  Speaker 3: The selection of the most suitable methods of action is
• 1:05:51
  Speaker 3: of vital importance. The initial anti coup strategy may use
• 1:05:56
  Speaker 3: certain of the following non violent weapons may stay up
• 1:06:00
  Speaker 3: home by everyone. Paralysis of each part of the political
• 1:06:04
  Speaker 3: system that the pouchus attempt to seize, persistent operation of
• 1:06:09
  Speaker 3: uncontrolled parts of the political system accorder to pre attack
• 1:06:13
  Speaker 3: policies and laws, ignoring decrees and policies of the pouchas,
• 1:06:19
  Speaker 3: filling streets with demonstrators, conversely leaving the streets completely empty.
• 1:06:25
  Speaker 3: Massive subversion of the attackers, troops and functionaries. Defiant publication
• 1:06:31
  Speaker 3: of newspapers and broadcasts by radio and television with news
• 1:06:35
  Speaker 3: of the attack and resistance, a general strike, and an
• 1:06:39
  Speaker 3: economic shutdown by both workers and managers. It is important
• 1:06:44
  Speaker 3: to give primary responsibility in the defense struggle to those
• 1:06:48
  Speaker 3: methods that directly counter the poochus initial objectives. These objectives
• 1:06:54
  Speaker 3: will be primarily related to achieving and consolidating control over
• 1:06:59
  Speaker 3: the political sects and undermining the opposition to the coup
• 1:07:04
  Speaker 3: economic aims are unlikely to be among the pucha's initial objectives.
• 1:07:09
  Speaker 3: Economic objectives may be, in some cases longer term aims,
• 1:07:14
  Speaker 3: such as to keep control of the economic system primarily
• 1:07:17
  Speaker 3: in the hands of an existing elite, or to use
• 1:07:20
  Speaker 3: the state to take over control or ownership of the
• 1:07:24
  Speaker 3: economic system. Control of the economic system is seldom, if ever,
• 1:07:29
  Speaker 3: an initial objective of a cou deta. Therefore, general strikes
• 1:07:33
  Speaker 3: or economic shutdowns are rarely the most relevant and effective
• 1:07:37
  Speaker 3: substantive resistance methods in anti coup action. Applied in short bursts,
• 1:07:43
  Speaker 3: they can, however, demonstrate the solidity of the will to resist.
• 1:07:48
  Speaker 3: When applied for an extended period, However, these economic weapons
• 1:07:52
  Speaker 3: can imperil the capacity of the attack society to survive
• 1:07:57
  Speaker 3: its own defense. Strike, for example, would usually be used
• 1:08:02
  Speaker 3: only at the very beginning of the anti coup defense
• 1:08:05
  Speaker 3: to show the determination of the society to resist the attack,
• 1:08:10
  Speaker 3: or later in the struggle for some specified but limited purpose,
• 1:08:15
  Speaker 3: such as to protest extreme brutalities. The general strike or
• 1:08:19
  Speaker 3: an economic shutdown might also be used when it was
• 1:08:23
  Speaker 3: thought that a massive and dramatic expression of resistance might
• 1:08:27
  Speaker 3: strike a coup de grass to the attack much more
• 1:08:32
  Speaker 3: important initially will be those specific methods that aim directly
• 1:08:36
  Speaker 3: at the pucha's initial objectives. These would be ones that
• 1:08:40
  Speaker 3: one show repudiation of the poucha's claim to legitimacy. Two
• 1:08:46
  Speaker 3: block their taking control of the political machinery of the state,
• 1:08:51
  Speaker 3: as by non cooperation of civil servants, police, military forces,
• 1:08:56
  Speaker 3: lower levels of government, et cetera. Three demonstrate the population's
• 1:09:02
  Speaker 3: repudiation of the coup and its non cooperation and disobedience
• 1:09:07
  Speaker 3: against it. Four block the poocha's efforts to control the
• 1:09:12
  Speaker 3: means of communication and instead maintain this through various means,
• 1:09:16
  Speaker 3: including print, media and radio. And five defy the poocha's
• 1:09:21
  Speaker 3: efforts to neutralize or control the independent institutions of the society.
• 1:09:27
  Speaker 3: If the means of defense cited here can be applied
• 1:09:30
  Speaker 3: massively and effectively to achieve these aims, the coup can
• 1:09:35
  Speaker 3: only collapse. End of Section fourteen.
• 1:09:46
  Speaker 1: Section fifteen of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:09:52
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:09:57
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:10:03
  Speaker 1: anticup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins guidelines for general resistance.
• 1:10:11
  Speaker 1: Guidelines for general resistance against coups can be formulated in
• 1:10:16
  Speaker 1: advance of any possible coup. Such guidelines would constitute basic
• 1:10:22
  Speaker 1: elements for an effective anti coup strategy, instructing the population
• 1:10:28
  Speaker 1: on how to resist. These could include the following. One.
• 1:10:35
  Speaker 1: Repudiate the coup and denounce its leaders as illegitimate, meriting
• 1:10:40
  Speaker 1: only rejection as a government. The denunciation of the Putchists
• 1:10:46
  Speaker 1: as illegitimate should be supported by moral, political and religious leaders,
• 1:10:52
  Speaker 1: officials and members in all of society's institutions, including education,
• 1:10:57
  Speaker 1: the media, and communications, and national, local, regional, and provincial governments.
• 1:11:04
  Speaker 1: In officials, including heads of state and any royalty, refuse
• 1:11:09
  Speaker 1: to give any legitimacy to the Putists by any means,
• 1:11:14
  Speaker 1: including efforts to negotiate a compromise between them and the
• 1:11:18
  Speaker 1: legitimate political leaders. Two Regard all decrees and orders from
• 1:11:25
  Speaker 1: the Puchists contradicting established law as illegal, and refuse to
• 1:11:30
  Speaker 1: obey them. Three. Keep all resistance strictly non violent in
• 1:11:39
  Speaker 1: order to make the anti coup defense the most effective. Possible.
• 1:11:43
  Speaker 1: Refuse to be provoked into violent or other imprudent action.
• 1:11:50
  Speaker 1: Four Refuse and disobey all attempts by the Putchists to
• 1:11:56
  Speaker 1: establish and extend controls over the governmental apparition, artists and society.
• 1:12:03
  Speaker 1: Five non cooperate with the Putchists in all ways. This
• 1:12:08
  Speaker 1: applies to the general population, all experts and technocrats, all
• 1:12:14
  Speaker 1: leaders of the previous governments and of political parties. All
• 1:12:18
  Speaker 1: branches of the central or federal government, state, regional and
• 1:12:22
  Speaker 1: local governments, including their civil servants and bureaucrats, key occupational
• 1:12:27
  Speaker 1: and professional groups, all staff of the media and communications,
• 1:12:33
  Speaker 1: all staff of transportation systems, the police, members and units
• 1:12:39
  Speaker 1: of the military forces. All judges and employees of the
• 1:12:42
  Speaker 1: judicial system, the staffs of all financial institutions, both governmental
• 1:12:47
  Speaker 1: and private, and officers and members of all other institutions
• 1:12:54
  Speaker 1: of the society. Six persist in maintaining the normal operations
• 1:13:02
  Speaker 1: of the society in accordance with the pre attack constitution,
• 1:13:07
  Speaker 1: laws and policies of the legitimate government and the society's
• 1:13:11
  Speaker 1: independent institutions. This should be continued until and unless the
• 1:13:18
  Speaker 1: persons are physically removed from their workplaces, officers and activity centers.
• 1:13:25
  Speaker 1: Even then, as far as possible, continue normal operations from
• 1:13:30
  Speaker 1: other locations. This applies especially to officials and employees of
• 1:13:37
  Speaker 1: all branches, departments, and levels of government. Seven. Preserve the
• 1:13:44
  Speaker 1: functioning of legitimate political and social organizations. Create back up
• 1:13:50
  Speaker 1: organizations which may need to assume the function of organizations
• 1:13:54
  Speaker 1: attacked or closed down by the Puchists. Eight. Refuse to
• 1:14:00
  Speaker 1: supply vital information to the Puchists and their helpers, for example,
• 1:14:06
  Speaker 1: where it will help remove roads signs, street names, traffic signs,
• 1:14:11
  Speaker 1: house numbers, et cetera, to impede the Puschiest's activities and
• 1:14:16
  Speaker 1: protect people from arrest.
• 1:14:20
  Speaker 2: Nine.
• 1:14:21
  Speaker 1: Refuse to supply the Puchists with needed supplies and equipment,
• 1:14:26
  Speaker 1: hiding these when appropriated. Ten Engage in friendly, creative communication
• 1:14:35
  Speaker 1: with the functionaries and troops serving the Puchists while continuing resistance.
• 1:14:42
  Speaker 1: Explain to them the reasons for the defense struggle, affirm
• 1:14:46
  Speaker 1: the absence of any intended violence against them, Seek to
• 1:14:51
  Speaker 1: undermine their reliability, and try to induce them to be
• 1:14:55
  Speaker 1: helpful to the defenders. This help might take the forms
• 1:15:00
  Speaker 1: of deliberate inefficiency and repression, passing information to the defenders,
• 1:15:06
  Speaker 1: and in extremes to desertion with soldiers instead joining the
• 1:15:12
  Speaker 1: defenders in non violent struggle for freedom. Attempt to persuade
• 1:15:17
  Speaker 1: soldiers and functionaries of the need instead to adhere to
• 1:15:22
  Speaker 1: constitutional and legal procedures. Eleven, refuse to assist the Puchists
• 1:15:31
  Speaker 1: in disseminating their propaganda. Twelve document in writing, sound, and film.
• 1:15:40
  Speaker 1: The Puschist's activities and repression preserve the documentation and also
• 1:15:46
  Speaker 1: distribute the information widely to the defenders internationally and to
• 1:15:51
  Speaker 1: the Puchist's supporters. And Section fifteen.
• 1:16:02
  Speaker 4: Section sixteen of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:16:07
  Speaker 4: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:16:10
  Speaker 4: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:16:15
  Speaker 4: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Treatment of
• 1:16:21
  Speaker 4: the Usurper's troops and functionaries. Very early in the coup,
• 1:16:27
  Speaker 4: the defenders would attempt to communicate with and to warn
• 1:16:30
  Speaker 4: the Pouchists, their functionaries, and their troops about the population's
• 1:16:36
  Speaker 4: hostility to the attack. Words and symbolic actions would be
• 1:16:41
  Speaker 4: used to communicate the will to resist, to show the
• 1:16:44
  Speaker 4: type of defense that would be waged, and to urge
• 1:16:47
  Speaker 4: the Pouchists to withdraw. Efforts would be made at all
• 1:16:52
  Speaker 4: phases of the coup to undermine the loyalty of the pouchists,
• 1:16:56
  Speaker 4: individual soldiers, and functionaries. This would be relatively easier in
• 1:17:02
  Speaker 4: anti coup resistance than in cases of foreign invasion, because
• 1:17:06
  Speaker 4: the soldiers and functionaries would usually speak the same language
• 1:17:10
  Speaker 4: as the resistors, or at least a common language they
• 1:17:13
  Speaker 4: both understood. If this were not the case, then communication
• 1:17:18
  Speaker 4: would still be possible in other ways, such as the
• 1:17:21
  Speaker 4: use of translated leaflets and slogans, or linguistically skilled resistors,
• 1:17:27
  Speaker 4: or through the defender's behavior and symbols. The POUCHA soldiers
• 1:17:33
  Speaker 4: would initially be informed that there will be resistance, but
• 1:17:37
  Speaker 4: that the resistance will be of a special type. In
• 1:17:41
  Speaker 4: this resistance, the defense would indeed be directed against the
• 1:17:45
  Speaker 4: attempt to seize control by the coup, but would be
• 1:17:48
  Speaker 4: conducted without harming the soldiers as individuals. If this could
• 1:17:53
  Speaker 4: be communicated, the soldiers might be more likely to help
• 1:17:57
  Speaker 4: the defending population in small ways, to avoid brutalities and
• 1:18:02
  Speaker 4: to mutiny at a crisis point than if the troops
• 1:18:06
  Speaker 4: expected at any moment to be killed by snipers or bombs.
• 1:18:11
  Speaker 4: Repeated demonstrations that there is no violent intent or threat
• 1:18:15
  Speaker 4: towards the individual soldiers accompanied by clear resistance are very
• 1:18:21
  Speaker 4: important this combination has the greatest chance of increasing the
• 1:18:25
  Speaker 4: effectiveness of the anti coup defense. Strong resistance without personal
• 1:18:30
  Speaker 4: threat or violence may, at least among some soldiers create
• 1:18:35
  Speaker 4: or aggravate their morale problems. The problems may be expressed
• 1:18:40
  Speaker 4: in uncertain loyalties, to the problems of maintaining self respect
• 1:18:46
  Speaker 4: while inflicting repression on non violent people, and in the
• 1:18:50
  Speaker 4: extremes disaffection and mutiny. There can be no guarantee, however,
• 1:18:56
  Speaker 4: that the Pouchus troops will be favorably affected by the
• 1:19:00
  Speaker 4: non violent discipline, especially in the short run. They may
• 1:19:04
  Speaker 4: still perpetrate brutalities and kill nonviolent resistors. Such tragedies do not, however,
• 1:19:11
  Speaker 4: mean the failure of the resistance. Instead, given continued disciplined resistance,
• 1:19:18
  Speaker 4: brutalities can weaken the poochists and strengthen the defense struggle,
• 1:19:23
  Speaker 4: as discussed in later sections. End of section sixteen.
• 1:19:34
  Speaker 1: Section seventeen of The Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:19:40
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:19:45
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:19:51
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, Facing Attack, Obstruction,
• 1:19:57
  Speaker 1: and communication. Although this anticoup defense does not work by
• 1:20:04
  Speaker 1: attacking the Puchist's troops militarily, some limited action effecting the
• 1:20:09
  Speaker 1: troops would be taken even at the first stage of
• 1:20:13
  Speaker 1: an attack. If identified in time, The deployment of the
• 1:20:18
  Speaker 1: Puchist's troops could be temporarily blocked by obstructionist activities on highways, streets, airports, railroads.
• 1:20:27
  Speaker 3: And the like.
• 1:20:29
  Speaker 1: The entry or movement of troops could be delayed by
• 1:20:33
  Speaker 1: such means as refusal to operate the railroads, blocking highways
• 1:20:37
  Speaker 1: and airports with many abandoned automobiles, and at times on
• 1:20:43
  Speaker 1: streets and roads by human barricades. Although such obstructionist activities
• 1:20:50
  Speaker 1: against the deployment of troops would only be effective briefly,
• 1:20:55
  Speaker 1: these actions would make clear to the individual soldiers that
• 1:21:00
  Speaker 1: whatever they might have been told, they were not welcomers
• 1:21:03
  Speaker 1: troops of the coup. The people will also urge the
• 1:21:07
  Speaker 1: soldiers not to believe the coup leader's propaganda. As other
• 1:21:14
  Speaker 1: symbolic actions, the people could wear mourning bands, stages, stay
• 1:21:19
  Speaker 1: at home, conduct a limited general strike, or defy curfews.
• 1:21:26
  Speaker 1: Such actions would serve two purposes. They would give notice
• 1:21:31
  Speaker 1: to friend and foe that the coup will be firmly resisted.
• 1:21:35
  Speaker 1: At the same time, the actions would help to build
• 1:21:39
  Speaker 1: up the people's morale so as to discourage submission and
• 1:21:43
  Speaker 1: collaboration with the Putchists. These actions, however, would be only
• 1:21:48
  Speaker 1: a symbolic prelude to the later substantive resistance. The following
• 1:21:57
  Speaker 1: symbolic methods might be used to help communicate the population's
• 1:22:02
  Speaker 1: will to resist to the Putchists and their forces. Leaflets, letters,
• 1:22:08
  Speaker 1: radio and television broadcasts, personal conversations, newspapers, posters, banners, diplomatic messages,
• 1:22:17
  Speaker 1: statements at regional and United Nations meetings, third party assistants,
• 1:22:24
  Speaker 1: painted messages and slogans, and special types of demonstrations. These
• 1:22:30
  Speaker 1: means of communication and warning could be aimed at the attackers, troops, leaders,
• 1:22:36
  Speaker 1: and current and potential supporters of the coup and Section seventeen.
• 1:22:48
  Speaker 3: Section eighteen of The Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:22:53
  Speaker 3: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:22:57
  Speaker 3: information or to volunteer, please visit the ABox dot org.
• 1:23:02
  Speaker 3: The Anti Coup by Genes Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Chapter eighteen,
• 1:23:07
  Speaker 3: Facing Attack, repudiation and rejection in the first hours days
• 1:23:14
  Speaker 3: and weeks after a coup attap is tempted, it is
• 1:23:18
  Speaker 3: extremely important to take quick and solid action to block
• 1:23:21
  Speaker 3: the pouchus from becoming accepted and from establishing effective control
• 1:23:26
  Speaker 3: over the state, apparatus and the society. An immediate strategy
• 1:23:31
  Speaker 3: of repudiation and rejection of the pouchas and their attack
• 1:23:35
  Speaker 3: is called for in order to defeat the coup quickly.
• 1:23:38
  Speaker 3: That strategy would combine repudiation of claims to legitimacy and
• 1:23:44
  Speaker 3: rejection of cooperation. It would include total or near total
• 1:23:48
  Speaker 3: non cooperation with the pouchas. An early defeat of the
• 1:23:52
  Speaker 3: coup would make unnecessary a later, long term struggle with
• 1:23:56
  Speaker 3: an entrenched and therefore much stronger oppressive regime. Because coup
• 1:24:01
  Speaker 3: attempts are generally at their weakest point in the first
• 1:24:04
  Speaker 3: hours and days, it is vital that anti coup defenders
• 1:24:08
  Speaker 3: undertake immediate and resolute action against the attackers. That defense
• 1:24:13
  Speaker 3: must be broad and deep enough in the society to
• 1:24:16
  Speaker 3: constitute a resolute repudiation of the pouchas. The attackers appeals
• 1:24:21
  Speaker 3: for national unity, meaning supporting them and to allow them
• 1:24:26
  Speaker 3: time to prove their good intentions must be dismissed. End
• 1:24:31
  Speaker 3: of section eighteen.
• 1:24:38
  Speaker 1: Section nineteen of the Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:24:45
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:24:49
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:24:55
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins in control
• 1:25:01
  Speaker 1: by the Putchists, politicians, civil servants, and judges. By ignoring
• 1:25:08
  Speaker 1: or defying the attackers illegal orders, would keep the normal
• 1:25:13
  Speaker 1: machinery of government and the courts out of the Puchist's control,
• 1:25:18
  Speaker 1: as happened in the German resistance to the Kappuch in
• 1:25:21
  Speaker 1: nineteen twenty, The legislature would neither receive the Puchist themselves
• 1:25:28
  Speaker 1: nor comply with any orders or requests from them. Instead,
• 1:25:34
  Speaker 1: the legislature might continue sitting and operating under the established
• 1:25:38
  Speaker 1: constitution unless or until the members were actually physically removed
• 1:25:44
  Speaker 1: by the Putchist's forces, or the legislature could disperse after
• 1:25:50
  Speaker 1: issuing a call for popular and governmental resistance to the coup.
• 1:25:55
  Speaker 1: The members of the legislature could then join the population
• 1:25:58
  Speaker 1: in other aspects of the defense struggle. Neither the government
• 1:26:04
  Speaker 1: treasury nor private banks would provide money or credit to
• 1:26:08
  Speaker 1: the Puchists. In nineteen twenty. For example, the German Reichbank
• 1:26:15
  Speaker 1: refused money to the puchiests, declaring that the name of
• 1:26:20
  Speaker 1: doctor Capp, a main courleader, was not on the list
• 1:26:24
  Speaker 1: of approved signers for the withdrawal of state funds. The
• 1:26:29
  Speaker 1: judiciary would declare the Puchists and their helpers an legal
• 1:26:34
  Speaker 1: and unconstitutional body. The courts would continue to operate on
• 1:26:38
  Speaker 1: the basis of pre invasion laws in constitution. They would
• 1:26:43
  Speaker 1: refuse to give moral, legal and repressive assistance to the attackers,
• 1:26:49
  Speaker 1: even if they had to close the courts. Order would
• 1:26:52
  Speaker 1: then be maintained by social pressures, solidarity and non violent sanctions.
• 1:27:00
  Speaker 1: Underground courts and independent arbeters could be used. The putchists
• 1:27:07
  Speaker 1: should be met with a blanket refusal by the government,
• 1:27:10
  Speaker 1: bureaucracy and civil servants to carry out their instructions, as
• 1:27:14
  Speaker 1: occurred in the resistance to the capuch or. The bureaucrats
• 1:27:20
  Speaker 1: and civil servants might simply continue the old policies, ignoring
• 1:27:24
  Speaker 1: the Puchesst's orders and disrupting the implementation of new policies.
• 1:27:31
  Speaker 1: Police could be most effective when they brazenly defy the Puchists,
• 1:27:37
  Speaker 1: refusing illegitimate instructions while attempting to continue their normal duties.
• 1:27:44
  Speaker 1: When under extreme duress, They could fake compliance with the
• 1:27:50
  Speaker 1: puchist's orders, but by evasion and deliberate inefficiencies never implement them.
• 1:27:59
  Speaker 1: Journalists and printers, refusing to submit to the butcher's censorship
• 1:28:04
  Speaker 1: would publish band newspapers, news sheets, and other publications in
• 1:28:10
  Speaker 1: large or many small editions. Broadcasters and technicians would broadcast
• 1:28:16
  Speaker 1: resistance radio programs from hidden transmitters or from uncontrolled or
• 1:28:21
  Speaker 1: even foreign territory. For example, President de Gaull and Prime
• 1:28:27
  Speaker 1: Minister Debris broadcast appeals from Paris aimed at French army
• 1:28:33
  Speaker 1: conscripts and officers involved in the coup and Algeria, calling
• 1:28:38
  Speaker 1: on them to disobey their rebellious officers. At the same time,
• 1:28:45
  Speaker 1: efforts should be made to persuade persons who are participating
• 1:28:48
  Speaker 1: in the coup, and especially those in lower ranks of
• 1:28:51
  Speaker 1: the military or other organizations, who are being ordered to
• 1:28:55
  Speaker 1: support the coup, that they should instead refuse to obey
• 1:29:00
  Speaker 1: orders to carry out illegal activities where the dangers to
• 1:29:06
  Speaker 1: such persons would be great. They might take various types
• 1:29:10
  Speaker 1: of evasive action or disappear into the general population rather
• 1:29:15
  Speaker 1: than support the anti constitutional dissipation. In some past cases,
• 1:29:23
  Speaker 1: resistors to government oppression have actively attempted to befriend troops
• 1:29:28
  Speaker 1: under hostile command, to induce them to be mild in
• 1:29:32
  Speaker 1: their oppression, or even to join in the democratic resistance.
• 1:29:37
  Speaker 1: At times such efforts have succeeded. Resistors to coups need
• 1:29:43
  Speaker 1: to be aware of such options and prepared to apply them.
• 1:29:49
  Speaker 1: The cumulative impact of such institutional non cooperation is to
• 1:29:54
  Speaker 1: prevent the coup leaders from controlling both the government and
• 1:29:59
  Speaker 1: the society. By blocking such control, the defenders maintain and
• 1:30:05
  Speaker 1: even increase their ability to continue long term resistance should
• 1:30:10
  Speaker 1: that be required in case the coup does not collapse quickly.
• 1:30:16
  Speaker 1: End Section nineteen.
• 1:30:24
  Speaker 4: Section twenty of the Anti cou This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:30:28
  Speaker 4: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:30:32
  Speaker 4: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 1:30:37
  Speaker 4: Antiku buy Jene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Defying repression and intimidation.
• 1:30:45
  Speaker 4: Puchasts facing strong and well prepared anti coup defense are
• 1:30:50
  Speaker 4: likely to be seriously threatened and therefore may respond with repression.
• 1:30:55
  Speaker 4: This is certain to be a difficult time for the
• 1:30:58
  Speaker 4: defenders and the whole population. Arrests, imprisonment, beatings, concentration camps, shootings, executions,
• 1:31:07
  Speaker 4: for example, may take a heavy toll on the defenders. However,
• 1:31:12
  Speaker 4: in themselves, the repressive measures are not decisive unless they
• 1:31:18
  Speaker 4: invoke fear and submissiveness in the defenders. In fact, the
• 1:31:23
  Speaker 4: opponent's repression is evidence of the power of the non
• 1:31:27
  Speaker 4: violent struggle and is no more reason for despair than
• 1:31:32
  Speaker 4: if in a regular war the enemy shoots back, wounding
• 1:31:37
  Speaker 4: and killing one's own soldiers against an anti coup defense,
• 1:31:42
  Speaker 4: repression may be used to crush resistance and also to
• 1:31:46
  Speaker 4: instill fear. The Chinese saying is kill the chicken to
• 1:31:51
  Speaker 4: scare the monkey. However, as has occurred in numerous struggles,
• 1:31:56
  Speaker 4: if the resistors and population refuse to be intimidated into
• 1:32:00
  Speaker 4: submission and passivity, then the repression may fail. Non Violent
• 1:32:05
  Speaker 4: defiance often risks serious casualties, but it seems to produce
• 1:32:11
  Speaker 4: far fewer casualties than when both sides use violence. At
• 1:32:16
  Speaker 4: the same time, persistence in non violent struggle contributes to
• 1:32:20
  Speaker 4: much greater chance for success than if the resisters had
• 1:32:24
  Speaker 4: chosen to fight a military prepared opponent with violence. The
• 1:32:29
  Speaker 4: puchists may demonstrate grave ruthlessness, such as by killing the
• 1:32:33
  Speaker 4: head of the state and other top political leaders. This
• 1:32:38
  Speaker 4: brutality may not only be done to frighten the population
• 1:32:42
  Speaker 4: into acceptance of the coup. Such killings also create clear
• 1:32:47
  Speaker 4: vacancies in government leadership, which the pouchists aim to fill themselves. Therefore,
• 1:32:53
  Speaker 4: an important part of anti coup preparations is to determine
• 1:32:58
  Speaker 4: clearly the line of political sins succession minimally for several replacements.
• 1:33:04
  Speaker 4: End of Section twenty.
• 1:33:12
  Speaker 1: Section twenty one of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 1:33:16
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:33:22
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:33:28
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The
• 1:33:33
  Speaker 1: importance of non violent discipline. Recognizing that violence undermines the
• 1:33:40
  Speaker 1: dynamics and strength of non violent struggle, the putchists may
• 1:33:45
  Speaker 1: often deliberately seek to provoke the resistors to use violence.
• 1:33:52
  Speaker 1: Violence and plans to use violence may be falsely attributed
• 1:33:57
  Speaker 1: to resistors. Repression, particularly brutal repression, may be intended to
• 1:34:04
  Speaker 1: provoke the resistors into a violent response. That other times,
• 1:34:09
  Speaker 1: agents provocateurs are placed within resistance groups to instigate or
• 1:34:15
  Speaker 1: even commit acts of violence in order to support the
• 1:34:19
  Speaker 1: charge that the resistors are using violence. All these provocations
• 1:34:24
  Speaker 1: to violence must be rebuffed if the defenders are not
• 1:34:28
  Speaker 1: to undermine their own defense. This anti co defense is
• 1:34:35
  Speaker 1: based on the technique of non violent struggle. A grand
• 1:34:39
  Speaker 1: strategic requirement of nonviolent struggle is that courageous struggle must
• 1:34:44
  Speaker 1: be combined with non violent discipline see Gene Sharp The
• 1:34:50
  Speaker 1: Politics of Nonviolent Action, pages five hundred and eighty six
• 1:34:54
  Speaker 1: to six twenty. Nothing is to be gained and a
• 1:34:58
  Speaker 1: lot can be lost by the killing of young soldiers
• 1:35:03
  Speaker 1: who have found themselves in the Puchet's army. The perpetration
• 1:35:08
  Speaker 1: of violence, especially killings by the resistors, helps to undermine
• 1:35:14
  Speaker 1: the otherwise non violent struggle in several ways. Resistance violence
• 1:35:20
  Speaker 1: may help unite the puchist's basic supporters and military forces
• 1:35:26
  Speaker 1: against the Anticou defenders. In contrast, the main defense strategy
• 1:35:31
  Speaker 1: regarding such soldiers is to undermine their morale and to
• 1:35:36
  Speaker 1: induce them to become unreliable and even to mutiny. That
• 1:35:41
  Speaker 1: aim is made almost impossible to achieve when the soldiers
• 1:35:46
  Speaker 1: are targets of resistance violence. Violence by the defenders will
• 1:35:53
  Speaker 1: be used by the putchists to justify overwhelming repression which
• 1:36:00
  Speaker 1: they wanted to use. Anyhow, it will be used to
• 1:36:05
  Speaker 1: claim that the puchests are saving the country from terrorism
• 1:36:09
  Speaker 1: or civil war and are preserving law and order. Violence
• 1:36:15
  Speaker 1: by the defenders may also weaken their own side, as
• 1:36:19
  Speaker 1: people may be less willing to support or employ violence
• 1:36:23
  Speaker 1: than participate in a fully nonviolent resistance. Repression of defiant
• 1:36:31
  Speaker 1: and disciplined nonviolent resistors can at times have the opposite
• 1:36:36
  Speaker 1: effect to that intended by the repressor. In this situation,
• 1:36:40
  Speaker 1: there is a strong tendency for the violent repression to
• 1:36:44
  Speaker 1: react against the repressor's own power position. This is the
• 1:36:49
  Speaker 1: process called political jiu jitsu. Repression against courageous but nonviolent
• 1:36:58
  Speaker 1: resistors can harm their represses power position in several ways.
• 1:37:03
  Speaker 1: Such repression and the impact of brutalities may at times
• 1:37:08
  Speaker 1: help to increase the number of resistors among the defending
• 1:37:11
  Speaker 1: population and increase their determination. They may also so doubts
• 1:37:17
  Speaker 1: and reservations in the minds of the puchist's troops and
• 1:37:20
  Speaker 1: other supporters, creating unease or position, and finally, disaffection and
• 1:37:26
  Speaker 1: resistance among the attacker's own population, functionaries, and military forces.
• 1:37:31
  Speaker 1: Heavy repression against the non violent defenders may also arouse
• 1:37:36
  Speaker 1: stronger international opposition to the coup and mobilize international opinion
• 1:37:41
  Speaker 1: and diplomatic and economic action against the putchists. This process
• 1:37:48
  Speaker 1: of political jiu jitsu is a great help when it occurs. However,
• 1:37:53
  Speaker 1: the strategy of the anti coup defense should not depend
• 1:37:57
  Speaker 1: upon it. The strategy should instead concentrate primarily on the
• 1:38:02
  Speaker 1: repudiation of the putchist's legitimacy and defy their attempts to
• 1:38:07
  Speaker 1: gain control through a massive non cooperation and political defiance.
• 1:38:15
  Speaker 1: In summary, maintenance of non violent resistant behavior by the
• 1:38:21
  Speaker 1: anticoup defenders is likely to contribute to one winning sympathy
• 1:38:27
  Speaker 1: and support, two reducing casualties, three inducing disaffection and mutiny
• 1:38:34
  Speaker 1: of the opponent's troops, four attracting maximum participation in the
• 1:38:40
  Speaker 1: non violent struggle, and five winning wider support. Non violent
• 1:38:49
  Speaker 1: discipline is a key factor in achieving these aims. End
• 1:38:56
  Speaker 1: Section twenty one.
• 1:39:03
  Speaker 4: Section twenty two of the Ante Coup. This is the
• 1:39:07
  Speaker 4: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:39:11
  Speaker 4: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:39:17
  Speaker 4: The antikup by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. International support
• 1:39:25
  Speaker 4: only occasionally, as against the August nineteen ninety one Soviet
• 1:39:29
  Speaker 4: coup as well as in opposition to the September nineteen
• 1:39:33
  Speaker 4: ninety one coup in Haiti, has serious supportive international diplomatic
• 1:39:38
  Speaker 4: and economic action been threatened or taken against Guttat. However,
• 1:39:45
  Speaker 4: as the case in Haiti of international sanctions to restore
• 1:39:49
  Speaker 4: President Aristide suggests, successful defense against coups by largely international
• 1:39:57
  Speaker 4: action may not be effective. Instead, successful defense primarily depends
• 1:40:03
  Speaker 4: on non cooperation and defiance within the attacked country. Sometimes, however,
• 1:40:09
  Speaker 4: international support can be influential in assisting antiku struggles. Governments
• 1:40:15
  Speaker 4: could refuse diplomatic recognition of the pouchists and declare a
• 1:40:20
  Speaker 4: prohibition on economic aid, as the United States and other
• 1:40:24
  Speaker 4: countries did in reaction to the nineteen ninety one Soviet
• 1:40:27
  Speaker 4: coup attempt. Such governments and societies could also provide technical
• 1:40:32
  Speaker 4: and economic assistance, publishing, radio and television services, and telecommunications
• 1:40:39
  Speaker 4: support to the civilian defenders. Such measures could be planned
• 1:40:43
  Speaker 4: in advance. The non violent and defiant character of this
• 1:40:48
  Speaker 4: type of antiku defense may stimulate much international publicity and sympathy.
• 1:40:54
  Speaker 4: At times, political sympathy may lead to diplomatic and international
• 1:40:58
  Speaker 4: economic pressures against the pouchists. In the defeat of the
• 1:41:03
  Speaker 4: August nineteen ninety one attempted Kureta in the Soviet Union,
• 1:41:07
  Speaker 4: the internal actions, especially reluctance of soldiers within the military
• 1:41:12
  Speaker 4: to obey the Poochus' orders, seem to have been much
• 1:41:15
  Speaker 4: more important. However, the diplomatic pressures and threats of international
• 1:41:20
  Speaker 4: economic action seem to have been a significant supplementary factor.
• 1:41:26
  Speaker 4: This case illustrates that under certain conditions, international pressures can
• 1:41:31
  Speaker 4: further weaken the pouchists and strengthen the cause of the
• 1:41:35
  Speaker 4: civilian defenders. However, there should be no romanticism that international
• 1:41:41
  Speaker 4: public opinion, or even international diplomatic and economic pressure, can
• 1:41:46
  Speaker 4: defeat a coup without determined and strong defense by the
• 1:41:52
  Speaker 4: attacked society itself. End of Section twenty two.
• 1:42:04
  Speaker 1: Section twenty three of The Anti Coup. This is a
• 1:42:08
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:42:14
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:42:21
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins shifts
• 1:42:26
  Speaker 1: in strategy during the struggle. Shifts in strategy by the
• 1:42:32
  Speaker 1: civilian defenders may be required at certain points to counter
• 1:42:37
  Speaker 1: new objectives of the attackers, to correct for exposed weaknesses
• 1:42:42
  Speaker 1: or unexpected strengths among the defenders, and in order to
• 1:42:47
  Speaker 1: maximize the impact of the defender's resistance. Based on denying
• 1:42:53
  Speaker 1: legitimacy and refusing co operation, the coup leaders may soon
• 1:43:00
  Speaker 1: discover that they are confronted by a comprehensive fighting force
• 1:43:05
  Speaker 1: of the general population organized through its social institutions. The
• 1:43:11
  Speaker 1: putchists may at some point realize that they are unable
• 1:43:16
  Speaker 1: to bring the society under their control, and that the
• 1:43:19
  Speaker 1: defenses strong enough to force them to call off the
• 1:43:23
  Speaker 1: whole venture. If this does not occur, the defenders must
• 1:43:28
  Speaker 1: intensify their efforts to undermine the attacker's regime. Where the
• 1:43:35
  Speaker 1: putchist's control has already weakened significantly or appears likely to
• 1:43:40
  Speaker 1: do so shortly, it may be time for another intense
• 1:43:44
  Speaker 1: application of the strategy of repudiation and rejection. This may prove, however,
• 1:43:52
  Speaker 1: to be simply another phase of the conflict, followed instead
• 1:43:57
  Speaker 1: by a strategy of concentrating resistance only at especially important issues,
• 1:44:04
  Speaker 1: or the total non cooperation strategy may prove to be
• 1:44:08
  Speaker 1: a final blue to the coup end Section twenty three.
• 1:44:20
  Speaker 3: Section twenty four of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 1:44:23
  Speaker 3: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:44:28
  Speaker 3: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:44:32
  Speaker 3: The Anti Coup by Genes Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. A
• 1:44:36
  Speaker 3: durable success. Success in anti coup defense depends on several
• 1:44:42
  Speaker 3: key factors. These include, among others, the spirit of resistance,
• 1:44:47
  Speaker 3: the solidarity of the defending population, the strength of the
• 1:44:51
  Speaker 3: defending society, the ability of the people to maintain resistance
• 1:44:55
  Speaker 3: and non violent discipline, the strengths and weaknesses of the
• 1:45:01
  Speaker 3: the choice of the pucas strategy of attack, and the
• 1:45:04
  Speaker 3: wisdom of the defense strategies. Victory with this antiku defense
• 1:45:09
  Speaker 3: will come only to those who have developed it into
• 1:45:12
  Speaker 3: a refined and powerful political tool operating with wise strategy.
• 1:45:16
  Speaker 3: As with military conflict, genuine power capacity and defense strength
• 1:45:21
  Speaker 3: are required. In this type of defense. Defeat of the
• 1:45:24
  Speaker 3: constitutional defenders is always possible, just as defeat occurs in
• 1:45:29
  Speaker 3: traditional war. However, there are strong signs that a determined
• 1:45:33
  Speaker 3: people will have strong chances of achieving success with such
• 1:45:37
  Speaker 3: an anti coup defense, and that with fewer casualties and
• 1:45:41
  Speaker 3: less destruction than would accompany a military struggle and Section twenty.
• 1:45:48
  Speaker 1: Four Section twenty five of the Anti Coup. This is
• 1:45:59
  Speaker 1: a recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:46:05
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:46:11
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. In
• 1:46:16
  Speaker 1: case of need for long term defense, if the anti
• 1:46:22
  Speaker 1: coup defense is not successful within days or a few weeks,
• 1:46:27
  Speaker 1: a new strategic situation will have been created. The putschists
• 1:46:32
  Speaker 1: will have probably succeeded in establishing a modicum of legitimacy, acceptance, cooperation,
• 1:46:39
  Speaker 1: and control. The conflict will then have been changed from
• 1:46:44
  Speaker 1: a short term anti coup defense to a longer term
• 1:46:48
  Speaker 1: struggle against an established dictatorship. For that rather different conflict situation,
• 1:46:57
  Speaker 1: only some suggestive lines of resistance can be outlined here
• 1:47:02
  Speaker 1: see Gene Sharp from Dictatorship to Democracy, a conceptual framework
• 1:47:07
  Speaker 1: for liberation. In that resistance, a strategy of total non
• 1:47:13
  Speaker 1: cooperation with the new government would probably not be viable
• 1:47:18
  Speaker 1: because of the need of the society to survive a
• 1:47:21
  Speaker 1: longer term struggle. Instead, a policy of concentrating resistance at
• 1:47:29
  Speaker 1: various key points would be needed until a resulting change
• 1:47:33
  Speaker 1: in the balance of forces merited an application of more
• 1:47:37
  Speaker 1: widespread or total non cooperation. In order to bring final success,
• 1:47:45
  Speaker 1: a longer term defense strategy against an established dictatorship needs
• 1:47:51
  Speaker 1: to focus on two main objectives. First, the attackers must
• 1:47:57
  Speaker 1: be prevented from obtaining any other major objectives beyond the
• 1:48:01
  Speaker 1: dictatorship itself. If the dictators seek other forms of domination,
• 1:48:07
  Speaker 1: as economic, ideological, or political, then liberation plans need to
• 1:48:13
  Speaker 1: concentrate on blocking these. This produces a strategy of selective resistance,
• 1:48:20
  Speaker 1: sometimes called resistance at key points. Under a strategy of
• 1:48:28
  Speaker 1: selective resistance, people in various professions and occupations might resist
• 1:48:35
  Speaker 1: only on crucial issues. For example, the police, while attempting
• 1:48:41
  Speaker 1: to keep criminal elements from taking advantage of the situation,
• 1:48:46
  Speaker 1: might selectively refuse to locate and arrest democratic resistors, perhaps
• 1:48:53
  Speaker 1: warning people of impending arrests and repressive actions. Teachers would
• 1:48:59
  Speaker 1: refuse to introduce the regime's propaganda into the schools. Workers
• 1:49:04
  Speaker 1: and managers would use strikes, delays, and obstructionism to impede
• 1:49:10
  Speaker 1: exploitation of the country. Clergymen would continue to preach about
• 1:49:15
  Speaker 1: the duty to refuse to help the dictators. The second
• 1:49:22
  Speaker 1: main objective of long term defense is the protection of
• 1:49:26
  Speaker 1: the autonomy of the society's institutions. When quick success of
• 1:49:32
  Speaker 1: the anti coup resistance has not occurred, the new dictators
• 1:49:36
  Speaker 1: may attempt to control and silence various institutions of the society.
• 1:49:42
  Speaker 1: These attempts would especially focus on those institutions that have
• 1:49:46
  Speaker 1: been involved in the earlier defense struggle, such as the courts, schools, unions,
• 1:49:52
  Speaker 1: cultural groups, professional societies, religious institutions, and the like. If
• 1:49:58
  Speaker 1: control over such institutions is achieved, the future capacity of
• 1:50:02
  Speaker 1: the society for resistance will be further weakened. Therefore, the
• 1:50:08
  Speaker 1: long term democratic struggle must firmly resist any efforts of
• 1:50:13
  Speaker 1: the invader to control the society's institutions. Such institutions are
• 1:50:19
  Speaker 1: not only points of resistance, they are also actual or
• 1:50:25
  Speaker 1: potential resistance organizations which can act to defend the society
• 1:50:30
  Speaker 1: from dictators and to restore the legitimate political system. The
• 1:50:37
  Speaker 1: strategy of selective resistance is cited here only to show
• 1:50:42
  Speaker 1: that an initial failure to defeat a coup need not
• 1:50:46
  Speaker 1: doom the society to long term dictatorship. However, the main
• 1:50:52
  Speaker 1: anticup defense should aim to block the usurpation fully and quickly,
• 1:50:57
  Speaker 1: well before the putschists have consolidated them control. In section
• 1:51:02
  Speaker 1: twenty five.
• 1:51:10
  Speaker 3: Section twenty six of The Anti Coup. This is a
• 1:51:13
  Speaker 3: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:51:18
  Speaker 3: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:51:22
  Speaker 3: The Anti Coup by Genes Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Collapsing
• 1:51:27
  Speaker 3: the coup, such a long term defense against an established
• 1:51:31
  Speaker 3: dictatorship may not be needed. However, the initial anti coup
• 1:51:35
  Speaker 3: defense struggle may well secede. If the civilian defenders maintain
• 1:51:40
  Speaker 3: their discipline and persist in their defiance and non cooperation
• 1:51:44
  Speaker 3: despite repression, and if they involve significant sections of the populace,
• 1:51:49
  Speaker 3: the pushers drive to achieve their aims can be frustrated
• 1:51:53
  Speaker 3: and finally blocked. The resistance of a prepared people and
• 1:51:57
  Speaker 3: their institutions may finally prove to be too much for
• 1:52:01
  Speaker 3: the coup leaders. Their objectives may be denied to them.
• 1:52:05
  Speaker 3: Their effort to establish control over the society may have failed.
• 1:52:10
  Speaker 3: The coup attempt may have merely placed the pouchas in
• 1:52:13
  Speaker 3: a political hornet's nest, the numbers of determined, non cooperating
• 1:52:18
  Speaker 3: and disobedient defenders may steadily grow, may become clear that
• 1:52:22
  Speaker 3: the defiant defenders are headed for success, a victory enhanced
• 1:52:26
  Speaker 3: with new vitality and durability. Great care will then be
• 1:52:31
  Speaker 3: needed in the transition back to the constitutional system, especially
• 1:52:36
  Speaker 3: if former political leaders have been killed by the Pouchas
• 1:52:40
  Speaker 3: where possible, constitutionally selected leaders should be restored to their positions,
• 1:52:45
  Speaker 3: and the previous constitution and laws applied to be amended
• 1:52:50
  Speaker 3: in the future where appropriate steps should be taken as
• 1:52:53
  Speaker 3: soon as possible to begin correcting any legitimate problems and
• 1:52:57
  Speaker 3: grievouses that led to satistisfy people to support the coup.
• 1:53:03
  Speaker 3: The society and government will also do well to consider
• 1:53:05
  Speaker 3: carefully how the government's democratic qualities can be improved and
• 1:53:11
  Speaker 3: as section twenty.
• 1:53:12
  Speaker 1: Six Section twenty seven of the Anti Coup. This is
• 1:53:23
  Speaker 1: a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:53:29
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:53:35
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Jean Sharp and Bruce Jenkins deterring
• 1:53:40
  Speaker 1: curdit Her. A well prepared defense capacity against curdit Her
• 1:53:48
  Speaker 1: can constitute a formidable deterrence against would be purchists. When
• 1:53:54
  Speaker 1: a society is known to have a well prepared anti
• 1:53:57
  Speaker 1: coup defense, would be up anticipating at best a very
• 1:54:02
  Speaker 1: hard struggle and at worst an ignominious defeat, may well
• 1:54:08
  Speaker 1: never even attempt a coupe. If would be purchists or
• 1:54:14
  Speaker 1: even current government leaders know that if they do not
• 1:54:18
  Speaker 1: buye by their constitutional limits on their authority, the democratic
• 1:54:22
  Speaker 1: will of society will be enforced by political defiance and
• 1:54:25
  Speaker 1: non cooperation, then they may well decide to stay within
• 1:54:30
  Speaker 1: their appropriate constitutional roles. This deterrence capacity is completely dependent
• 1:54:39
  Speaker 1: upon a credible capacity to wage effective resistance against coutar. Hence,
• 1:54:46
  Speaker 1: the only way to prepare deterrence of internal usurpations is
• 1:54:51
  Speaker 1: to lay the groundwork for strong non cooperation and defiance
• 1:54:56
  Speaker 1: against such attacks. As in military defense, no deterrence capacity
• 1:55:05
  Speaker 1: is guaranteed to succeed. Attacks may nevertheless occur. If a
• 1:55:12
  Speaker 1: coup is attempted despite extensive preparations for resistance, then this
• 1:55:17
  Speaker 1: type of defense could defeat it effectively and potentially very
• 1:55:21
  Speaker 1: quickly and restore constitutional government without the risk of civil war.
• 1:55:29
  Speaker 1: End Section twenty seven.
• 1:55:37
  Speaker 3: Section twenty eight of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 1:55:40
  Speaker 3: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:55:45
  Speaker 3: For more information or volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:55:50
  Speaker 3: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins promoting
• 1:55:55
  Speaker 3: an anti coup defense. An early step towards this parlace
• 1:56:00
  Speaker 3: will need to be disseminated throughout the society of the
• 1:56:04
  Speaker 3: concept of anti coup defense and exploration of the forms
• 1:56:08
  Speaker 3: of resistance that are most powerful in defending against usurpations.
• 1:56:14
  Speaker 3: An informational and educational program can be initiated by individuals
• 1:56:19
  Speaker 3: and organizations even while the concept is quite new. Articles,
• 1:56:24
  Speaker 3: newspaper reports, public meetings, discussion groups, radio television panel discussions,
• 1:56:30
  Speaker 3: speakers for various organizations, pamphlets and books are among the
• 1:56:35
  Speaker 3: means of communication and education which can be useful. Familiarity
• 1:56:40
  Speaker 3: with the concept that coups can be successfully resisted through
• 1:56:44
  Speaker 3: non cooperation and defiance is a prerequisite for the needed
• 1:56:49
  Speaker 3: careful consideration and act to support from the major civil
• 1:56:53
  Speaker 3: institutions of the society and for organized preparations for such defense. Consideration, adoption,
• 1:57:01
  Speaker 3: and implementation of this anti coup defense should not expect
• 1:57:06
  Speaker 3: support from cliques intent on potentially conducting a coup. However,
• 1:57:11
  Speaker 3: the anti coup policy will be strengthened if it receives
• 1:57:14
  Speaker 3: transpartisan consideration, support, and participation. A transpartisan approach would aim
• 1:57:21
  Speaker 3: to incorporate people in groups with differing convictions and political
• 1:57:25
  Speaker 3: options in support of the development, adoption, and implementation of
• 1:57:31
  Speaker 3: the anti coup policy. Given such varied and wide ranging consideration,
• 1:57:36
  Speaker 3: the support of most of the population or the anti
• 1:57:39
  Speaker 3: coup policy will likely be stronger and more united. And
• 1:57:45
  Speaker 3: of Section twenty.
• 1:57:46
  Speaker 1: Eight Section twenty nine of the Anti Coup. This is
• 1:57:57
  Speaker 1: a liprivox recording. All liprivot recordings are in the public domain.
• 1:58:03
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 1:58:09
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Adopting
• 1:58:14
  Speaker 1: an anti coup defense. There are three main ways in
• 1:58:20
  Speaker 1: which a strong antiku defense capacity can be adopted. One
• 1:58:26
  Speaker 1: through widespread dissemination throughout all levels of the society of
• 1:58:31
  Speaker 1: knowledge and understanding of the Grand strategy and broad forms
• 1:58:36
  Speaker 1: of anti coup resistance as just discussed two through the
• 1:58:42
  Speaker 1: organization of the institutions of civil society so that they
• 1:58:46
  Speaker 1: are prepared to confront and resist such an attack, And
• 1:58:52
  Speaker 1: three through constitutional and legal changes and organizational efforts within
• 1:58:58
  Speaker 1: the governmental structure so that it will not be at
• 1:59:02
  Speaker 1: the disposal of putschists. Ideally, all three of these ways
• 1:59:07
  Speaker 1: should be applied in sequence or some combination, depending on
• 1:59:12
  Speaker 1: what is possible or most feasible at the time in
• 1:59:15
  Speaker 1: the particular situation. However, it is possible to begin the
• 1:59:20
  Speaker 1: process of education and consideration without certainty as to what
• 1:59:25
  Speaker 1: will be the final manner of adoption and implementation. End
• 1:59:30
  Speaker 1: Section twenty nine.
• 1:59:38
  Speaker 3: Section thirty of The Anti Coup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 1:59:42
  Speaker 3: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 1:59:46
  Speaker 3: information or to volunteer, please visit librivax dot org. The
• 1:59:50
  Speaker 3: Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins Preparations by
• 1:59:55
  Speaker 3: the civil institutions. Despite the vulnerability of many democratic governments,
• 2:00:02
  Speaker 3: not all political leaders will see the desirability and feasibility
• 2:00:06
  Speaker 3: of preparing for antiku defense. A capacity for defense against
• 2:00:11
  Speaker 3: coup deties. Nevertheless, important needs to be developed where the government,
• 2:00:16
  Speaker 3: for whatever reason does not take the initiative in adopting
• 2:00:19
  Speaker 3: an anti kup defense policy and preparing for it. The
• 2:00:24
  Speaker 3: way is open in societies with any degree of civil
• 2:00:27
  Speaker 3: liberties for the society itself to take action. In these cases,
• 2:00:32
  Speaker 3: there is a very important role for direct preparations for
• 2:00:35
  Speaker 3: antiku defense by the civil institutions themselves. In many situations,
• 2:00:42
  Speaker 3: the basic concept of anti coup defense and the principles
• 2:00:45
  Speaker 3: of resistance can be disseminated, and preparations for it may
• 2:00:49
  Speaker 3: be initiated by the civil institutions of the society independently
• 2:00:55
  Speaker 3: of governmental involvement. These preparations would not mean, of course,
• 2:00:59
  Speaker 3: that every everyone thinks that the current government is the
• 2:01:02
  Speaker 3: best possible or that it is no serious limitations or problems.
• 2:01:08
  Speaker 3: The view would simply be that the regime that might
• 2:01:10
  Speaker 3: be imposed by possible pouchus would most likely be significantly worse.
• 2:01:16
  Speaker 3: Blocking the imposition through a coup of a more autocratic
• 2:01:20
  Speaker 3: and repressive government would then be a prerequisite to making
• 2:01:24
  Speaker 3: needed improvements in the political system and society. Often, the
• 2:01:29
  Speaker 3: targeted current government may suffer from blatant inadequacies such as
• 2:01:34
  Speaker 3: widespread corruption, or social disruption such as a breakdown of
• 2:01:39
  Speaker 3: law and order. Pouchus may sincerely or falsely claim that
• 2:01:44
  Speaker 3: their coup is necessary to correct these situations. That claim
• 2:01:49
  Speaker 3: may give them significant popular support. Nevertheless, defenses needed against
• 2:01:54
  Speaker 3: those coups. The new regime may not end corruption, and
• 2:01:58
  Speaker 3: the claim to support law and order may be used
• 2:02:01
  Speaker 3: to impose a new authoritarian or dictatorial regime. The use
• 2:02:07
  Speaker 3: of a coup to corrects such problems represents a dangerous
• 2:02:10
  Speaker 3: president as to how a problem regime should be changed.
• 2:02:14
  Speaker 3: That coup might in fact take a very different turn,
• 2:02:17
  Speaker 3: and the next coup might be much more sinister. One
• 2:02:22
  Speaker 3: of the several possible alternative remedies includes carefully focused campaigns
• 2:02:27
  Speaker 3: by conventional forms of action or narrowly directed non violent
• 2:02:32
  Speaker 3: protests or resistance as an anti democratic technique of political change.
• 2:02:38
  Speaker 3: Coup de tas are intrinsically dangerous, even when it is
• 2:02:42
  Speaker 3: claimed that they are intended to correct a serious problem
• 2:02:46
  Speaker 3: in politics. There are often unintended consequences of one's actions,
• 2:02:51
  Speaker 3: and not all intentions are always made public. Non governmental
• 2:02:55
  Speaker 3: institutions and organizations can disseminate the the central concept of
• 2:03:01
  Speaker 3: anti ku defense widely throughout the society through various means
• 2:03:05
  Speaker 3: of communication. Though civil bodies can then, individually and in
• 2:03:10
  Speaker 3: cooperation with others, initiate and implement an anti ku defense policy.
• 2:03:15
  Speaker 3: They may do this by educating their own constituents, making preparations,
• 2:03:20
  Speaker 3: and undertaking planning as to how their sector of the
• 2:03:23
  Speaker 3: population and society might most effectively act to help to
• 2:03:27
  Speaker 3: defeat a future coup. For example, individuals, groups and institutions
• 2:03:33
  Speaker 3: working in communications, transportation, government offices, the police, religious life,
• 2:03:39
  Speaker 3: education in every major aspect of the society would need
• 2:03:43
  Speaker 3: to plan how effectively to block control by the puchas.
• 2:03:48
  Speaker 3: Strong preparations for anti ku defense can merge into both
• 2:03:52
  Speaker 3: education and organization within government structures, even when the national
• 2:03:57
  Speaker 3: anti ku defense policy has not been a In some situations,
• 2:04:02
  Speaker 3: organized preparations by the civil institutions might also involve local
• 2:04:08
  Speaker 3: and regional governments in cooperation with personnel and groups within
• 2:04:12
  Speaker 3: the national governmental structure. This type of planning would need
• 2:04:17
  Speaker 3: to focus to a significant degree on those aspects of
• 2:04:21
  Speaker 3: the society that would be priority areas of legitimization and
• 2:04:26
  Speaker 3: control for the puchas. Among the high priority areas would
• 2:04:30
  Speaker 3: be controlled of the governmental apparatus, civil servants, bureaucrats and
• 2:04:34
  Speaker 3: the like, and control of the police and members of
• 2:04:37
  Speaker 3: the military forces. Also highly important would be newspapers, radio, television, telephones, water, energy,
• 2:04:46
  Speaker 3: and food supplies. Through such initiatives in education, organization, planning,
• 2:04:52
  Speaker 3: and preparations, national plans to block future coups could be
• 2:04:56
  Speaker 3: prepared that are suited to specific national conditions. Such a
• 2:05:01
  Speaker 3: defense policy could be made powerful even without governmental initiative.
• 2:05:07
  Speaker 3: If such institutions are strong and represent the diverse components
• 2:05:11
  Speaker 3: of the society, it is possible for them to prepare
• 2:05:15
  Speaker 3: and to conduct a sufficiently powerful antikoo defense that is
• 2:05:19
  Speaker 3: able to defeat such an attack, even when the government
• 2:05:22
  Speaker 3: itself has not participated in the organization of such a defense.
• 2:05:29
  Speaker 3: And of Section thirty.
• 2:05:36
  Speaker 1: Section thirty one of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 2:05:41
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 2:05:47
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:05:53
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Government
• 2:05:58
  Speaker 1: initiated preparations where the society has a higher degree of democracy,
• 2:06:05
  Speaker 1: or at least the political leaders wish their society to
• 2:06:08
  Speaker 1: evolve peacefully without abrupt changes. By Kuttar, governments may adopt
• 2:06:13
  Speaker 1: anti cou defense policies, legislatures, and other parts of the
• 2:06:18
  Speaker 1: government can establish measures to prepare for effective defense against
• 2:06:23
  Speaker 1: future coups. These measures might be aided by constitutional, legal,
• 2:06:29
  Speaker 1: land organizational changes aimed to bar puchists from seizing control
• 2:06:35
  Speaker 1: of the government and society. For example, in nineteen ninety seven,
• 2:06:42
  Speaker 1: Thailand adopted a new constitution that takes a major step
• 2:06:46
  Speaker 1: in this direction. Its article sixty five states a person
• 2:06:52
  Speaker 1: shall have the right to resist peacefully any act committed
• 2:06:57
  Speaker 1: for the acquisition of power to rule the country by
• 2:07:00
  Speaker 1: a means which is not in accordance with the modes
• 2:07:04
  Speaker 1: provided in this constitution. Obviously, such a constitutional provision is
• 2:07:11
  Speaker 1: of major significance. However, to be effective it requires the
• 2:07:17
  Speaker 1: addition of legal provisions for implementing the principle, and also
• 2:07:22
  Speaker 1: both governmental and non governmental preparations to make the non
• 2:07:27
  Speaker 1: co operation sufficiently powerful so as to be successful. Where possible,
• 2:07:35
  Speaker 1: involvement of the government itself in the dissemination of the
• 2:07:38
  Speaker 1: concept of defense against coups and in the preparations for
• 2:07:42
  Speaker 1: a vigorous defense can have significant advantages. The most important
• 2:07:49
  Speaker 1: advantage would, of course, be the direct preparation of the
• 2:07:52
  Speaker 1: governmental machinery to resist a take over the bureaucracy, civil service,
• 2:07:59
  Speaker 1: minister tries, administrative departments, police, and military forces could be
• 2:08:04
  Speaker 1: trained to offer strong resistance. Specific obligations and guidelines for
• 2:08:10
  Speaker 1: antikup resistance would be developed for and by civil servants,
• 2:08:16
  Speaker 1: media staff, communications operators, police military forces, and employees of local, regional,
• 2:08:24
  Speaker 1: and provincial governments. If these components of the state machinery
• 2:08:30
  Speaker 1: can be kept unusable by purchists, the defense will be
• 2:08:34
  Speaker 1: more extensive and powerful than if this were not the case. Also,
• 2:08:40
  Speaker 1: the struggle is likely to be shorter with fewer casualties
• 2:08:46
  Speaker 1: and Section thirty one.
• 2:08:54
  Speaker 4: Section thirty two of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 2:08:57
  Speaker 4: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings in the public domain. For
• 2:09:01
  Speaker 4: more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:09:06
  Speaker 4: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Possible
• 2:09:11
  Speaker 4: legislation and other plans to mobilize defense. Governmental preparations may
• 2:09:18
  Speaker 4: require new legislation and implementation of its provisions. Among the
• 2:09:22
  Speaker 4: steps that can be taken are these. For a fuller
• 2:09:26
  Speaker 4: discussion of governmental preparations, see appendix one. For a discussion
• 2:09:31
  Speaker 4: of preparations by civil institutions see Appendix two. One A
• 2:09:37
  Speaker 4: constitutional amendment can be adopted that grants citizens the rights
• 2:09:41
  Speaker 4: and responsibility to resist a coup and denies them the
• 2:09:45
  Speaker 4: right to recognize a coup as being legitimate. Two Legislation
• 2:09:51
  Speaker 4: can be enacted that obliges all police and military forces
• 2:09:56
  Speaker 4: to refuse to participate in or assist with a coup.
• 2:10:00
  Speaker 4: Three legislation can be enacted that obligates all government employees
• 2:10:06
  Speaker 4: to refuse cooperation with a coup and obedience to usurpers.
• 2:10:11
  Speaker 4: In the event of a coup, government employees would be
• 2:10:14
  Speaker 4: obliged to carry on their work according to established constitutional
• 2:10:19
  Speaker 4: and legal procedures and policies. Four Legislation can be enacted
• 2:10:25
  Speaker 4: that obliges all personnel in the fields of communications, media,
• 2:10:30
  Speaker 4: and transportation to resist censorship by the puchas and to
• 2:10:35
  Speaker 4: refuse to cooperate with or communicate orders from coup leaders.
• 2:10:40
  Speaker 4: Five Legislation can be enacted that obliges all public and
• 2:10:45
  Speaker 4: private financial institutions to refuse financial relations with the puchas. Six.
• 2:10:52
  Speaker 4: The constitutional government can communicate in advance of a crisis
• 2:10:57
  Speaker 4: with all international bodies or organizations and governments with which
• 2:11:02
  Speaker 4: it has relations that in the event of a coup,
• 2:11:06
  Speaker 4: those bodies should maintain recognition of the constitutional government and
• 2:11:11
  Speaker 4: refuse all relations with the Puchas. Seven. In the event
• 2:11:16
  Speaker 4: of a coup, individuals and bodies within the constitutional government
• 2:11:21
  Speaker 4: can appeal to religious and moral leaders to denounce the
• 2:11:25
  Speaker 4: attack and to oppress upon their adherents that they should
• 2:11:29
  Speaker 4: refuse to cooperate with it.
• 2:11:32
  Speaker 3: Eight.
• 2:11:33
  Speaker 4: The constitutional government can make plans for continuation of leadership
• 2:11:38
  Speaker 4: in case important government buildings are seized or government officials
• 2:11:42
  Speaker 4: are imprisoned or executed. Nine, the legislature can prepare plans
• 2:11:49
  Speaker 4: for how the constitutional government should resume control of the
• 2:11:53
  Speaker 4: country once a coup attempt collapses. Ten the legislature can
• 2:11:59
  Speaker 4: appeal to organizations and educational institutions to develop and implement
• 2:12:04
  Speaker 4: programs to educate citizens on their right and duty to
• 2:12:09
  Speaker 4: refuse cooperation with an attempted coup. In all of this planning,
• 2:12:15
  Speaker 4: it must be made clear that the nature of the
• 2:12:17
  Speaker 4: anti coup resistance is non violent, and that no one
• 2:12:22
  Speaker 4: is to commit acts of violence against fellow citizens who
• 2:12:26
  Speaker 4: illegally support the coup. It should also be made clear
• 2:12:31
  Speaker 4: what the penalties are for individuals who are found guilty
• 2:12:34
  Speaker 4: of either initiating or cooperating with a coup. End of
• 2:12:39
  Speaker 4: Section thirty two.
• 2:12:46
  Speaker 1: Section thirty three of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 2:12:50
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 2:12:56
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:13:03
  Speaker 1: The ant Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins other
• 2:13:07
  Speaker 1: types of preparations. In addition to preparation and dissemination of
• 2:13:13
  Speaker 1: general guidelines for antikoup resistance, several other types of preparations
• 2:13:18
  Speaker 1: for defense are possible. For example, training maneuvers could be
• 2:13:23
  Speaker 1: organized in which imaginary coups would be defied by staged
• 2:13:29
  Speaker 1: civilian resistance. These maneuvers could take place in residential areas,
• 2:13:34
  Speaker 1: offices or factories, cities, provinces, and across the whole country.
• 2:13:41
  Speaker 1: Technical preparations would also be necessary for this type of
• 2:13:45
  Speaker 1: defense against coup. Provisions and equipment would be required for communications.
• 2:13:50
  Speaker 1: After the putschists had occupied key centers and seized facilities
• 2:13:55
  Speaker 1: of established newspapers and radio and television stations, Publishing supplies
• 2:14:01
  Speaker 1: and broadcasting equipment for underground newspapers, resistance leaflets, and underground
• 2:14:07
  Speaker 1: radio could be secured and hidden for use in emergencies.
• 2:14:13
  Speaker 1: Advance arrangements should be made for locating such broadcasting stations,
• 2:14:18
  Speaker 1: communications centers, or printing plants in the territory of a friendly,
• 2:14:23
  Speaker 1: supportive country and Section thirty three.
• 2:14:34
  Speaker 4: Section thirty four of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 2:14:37
  Speaker 4: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 2:14:41
  Speaker 4: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:14:46
  Speaker 4: The Anti Coup by Jane Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Consequences
• 2:14:52
  Speaker 4: of an anti coup defense. The objective of this defense
• 2:14:57
  Speaker 4: policy against Kurtar is chippers the constitutional government by blocking
• 2:15:02
  Speaker 4: the imposition of viable governments by the pouchists, by making
• 2:15:08
  Speaker 4: the attacked society unrulable by the attackers, and by enabling
• 2:15:14
  Speaker 4: the population to maintain control and self direction of their
• 2:15:18
  Speaker 4: society even when under attack. The responsibility for this preservation
• 2:15:24
  Speaker 4: of constitutional government rests with all members of the society.
• 2:15:30
  Speaker 4: It is they who can maintain and expand their freedoms
• 2:15:34
  Speaker 4: and continue to improve their society in accordance with the
• 2:15:38
  Speaker 4: cherished principles of the nation. This anti coup defense policy
• 2:15:44
  Speaker 4: would have major positive qualities. It is a policy based
• 2:15:48
  Speaker 4: on people, not bullets and bombs on human institutions, not
• 2:15:54
  Speaker 4: military technology. It is a policy that can serve freedom
• 2:15:59
  Speaker 4: and instead of threatening civil war or submitting to a
• 2:16:03
  Speaker 4: new dictatorship. Adopted and practiced widely internationally, this policy would
• 2:16:10
  Speaker 4: make a major contribution to removing the curetta as a
• 2:16:15
  Speaker 4: major political problem. This would limit the rise of new dictatorships,
• 2:16:21
  Speaker 4: reducing the prevalence of tyranny and the world. This policy
• 2:16:26
  Speaker 4: is a creative defense based on the power of people,
• 2:16:30
  Speaker 4: even in grave crisis, to become and remain the masters
• 2:16:36
  Speaker 4: of their own destinies. The consequences of this could be profound.
• 2:16:43
  Speaker 4: End of section thirty four.
• 2:16:50
  Speaker 1: Section thirty five of the anticup. This is a LibriVox recording.
• 2:16:56
  Speaker 1: All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more
• 2:17:01
  Speaker 1: information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org. The
• 2:17:07
  Speaker 1: Anti Coup by Genes Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. Appendix I.
• 2:17:13
  Speaker 1: Legislation and of a governmental preparations for ANTICU defense. Important
• 2:17:20
  Speaker 1: preparations can be made by governments to prevent and defeat
• 2:17:24
  Speaker 1: couditar These may require new legislation and implementation of its provisions.
• 2:17:31
  Speaker 1: In all of this legislation and these declarations of responsibilities
• 2:17:35
  Speaker 1: and duties. It shall be made clear that no one
• 2:17:40
  Speaker 1: is to commit acts of violence against one's fellow citizens
• 2:17:44
  Speaker 1: who are acting illegally. The following legal measures and procedures
• 2:17:49
  Speaker 1: are recommended for this purpose. One, a constitutional provision should
• 2:17:58
  Speaker 1: be adopted that no city, of any status, role, or
• 2:18:02
  Speaker 1: position in the society whatsoever, has the right to accept
• 2:18:07
  Speaker 1: as the legitimate government any person or group that has
• 2:18:12
  Speaker 1: conducted accouted her To the contrary, All citizens, without exception,
• 2:18:19
  Speaker 1: have the constitutional duty to deny legitimacy to any group
• 2:18:24
  Speaker 1: of Puchists, and to refuse all cooperation with them and
• 2:18:28
  Speaker 1: all obedience to them. Citizens will persistently continue their usual
• 2:18:34
  Speaker 1: duties and assist in meeting the human needs of their
• 2:18:38
  Speaker 1: fellow citizens while defying the Puchists. Two specific laws should
• 2:18:47
  Speaker 1: be enacted to establish the legal obligations of all government
• 2:18:52
  Speaker 1: employees and civil servants on national, regional, and local levels
• 2:18:56
  Speaker 1: of government to refuse to assist Cote. Their legal obligation
• 2:19:03
  Speaker 1: would be to persist in conducting their work according to
• 2:19:06
  Speaker 1: established pre coup constitutional and legal procedures and policies. Only.
• 2:19:14
  Speaker 1: They would also be legally bound to refuse all cooperation
• 2:19:18
  Speaker 1: with and obedience to any group of usurpers. This refusal
• 2:19:24
  Speaker 1: would be aimed to deny to put it all administrative
• 2:19:28
  Speaker 1: support to carry out their illegal orders and objectives. Three
• 2:19:35
  Speaker 1: specific laws should be enacted to implement the new constitutional
• 2:19:39
  Speaker 1: provision to make it a legal obligation of all members
• 2:19:44
  Speaker 1: of police forces and all members of the military forces
• 2:19:48
  Speaker 1: to swear not only allegiance to the constitutional government, but
• 2:19:53
  Speaker 1: to pledge, perhaps in the induction oath, to refuse to
• 2:19:58
  Speaker 1: participate in any conspiration to organize or conduct accouded her
• 2:20:04
  Speaker 1: in case a coup is then later attempted, It would
• 2:20:08
  Speaker 1: be the duty of these persons to refuse to obey, serve,
• 2:20:13
  Speaker 1: or collaborate with any group that has attempted to seize
• 2:20:17
  Speaker 1: the state. Apparatus, The police at all levels and members
• 2:20:24
  Speaker 1: of the judicial system must be mandated to continue to
• 2:20:28
  Speaker 1: apply the previously established laws, policies, and procedures. Only. They
• 2:20:34
  Speaker 1: must ignore any new policies, edicts and orders received or
• 2:20:39
  Speaker 1: announced from those who have illegally attempted to seize the state. Specifically,
• 2:20:46
  Speaker 1: they may warn persons and groups of the likelihood of arrest,
• 2:20:50
  Speaker 1: and they should refuse to locate and arrest patriotic resistors
• 2:20:56
  Speaker 1: who are defying the push eva by individual acts, actions,
• 2:21:01
  Speaker 1: or by group resistance and demonstrations. At times, this police
• 2:21:06
  Speaker 1: resistance may be quite open, and at other times police
• 2:21:10
  Speaker 1: may pretend to be being the putchists but not actually
• 2:21:14
  Speaker 1: doing so. For example, they may report that it was
• 2:21:18
  Speaker 1: impossible for them to locate and arrest wanted persons. If
• 2:21:24
  Speaker 1: ordered to disperse street demonstrations, police actions may range from
• 2:21:29
  Speaker 1: simply being present at the site but not taking repressive measures,
• 2:21:34
  Speaker 1: to joining the demonstrators as resistors themselves. The police must
• 2:21:41
  Speaker 1: not be allowed to become a tool of repression for
• 2:21:45
  Speaker 1: the usurpers. For in addition to resisting the putchists, police should,
• 2:21:53
  Speaker 1: wherever feasible, be obligated to actively assist the resistance. For example,
• 2:22:00
  Speaker 1: it has happened in past resistance movements that police transport
• 2:22:04
  Speaker 1: its supplies of resistance, newspapers and other literature in police
• 2:22:08
  Speaker 1: cars to other parts of the city or region where
• 2:22:12
  Speaker 1: they were needed. Soldiers and other members of military forces
• 2:22:19
  Speaker 1: must not allow themselves to become a tool of repression
• 2:22:23
  Speaker 1: in the service of those who have attempted to replace
• 2:22:26
  Speaker 1: the constitutional government. Their non cooperation and disobedience may be
• 2:22:33
  Speaker 1: especially difficult when the coup has been conducted by officers
• 2:22:37
  Speaker 1: of the military forces, as compared to a political group
• 2:22:40
  Speaker 1: which seeks the compliance of military forces in enforcing their
• 2:22:44
  Speaker 1: illegal domination of the government and society. Similarly to the
• 2:22:50
  Speaker 1: options for police, soldiers in this difficult situation who oppose
• 2:22:56
  Speaker 1: the coup may take any one of a range of actions,
• 2:23:00
  Speaker 1: none of which serves the usurpers. They may, for example,
• 2:23:05
  Speaker 1: be very gentle in facing street demonstrators, or when ordered
• 2:23:10
  Speaker 1: to fire at protesters, may shoot above their heads so
• 2:23:14
  Speaker 1: as not to injure any one. They may also seek
• 2:23:18
  Speaker 1: to encourage their military unit to openly defy the usurpers,
• 2:23:23
  Speaker 1: or without using their military weapons, soldiers may engage in
• 2:23:27
  Speaker 1: especially dangerous acts of protests and defiance against the puschists.
• 2:23:35
  Speaker 1: Open resistance by both police and military troops is likely
• 2:23:40
  Speaker 1: to be extremely dangerous, as the penalty for disobedience and
• 2:23:44
  Speaker 1: mutiny is often execution. Consequently, other less obvious ways of
• 2:23:52
  Speaker 1: denying usurpers obedience and assistants merit investigation, and application. Six
• 2:24:02
  Speaker 1: specific laws should be enacted to make it a legal
• 2:24:05
  Speaker 1: obligation of all persons and organizations working in communications to
• 2:24:11
  Speaker 1: persist in their loyalty to the constitutional government only. This
• 2:24:17
  Speaker 1: would mean that in the event of accutitar they would
• 2:24:20
  Speaker 1: be legally bound to refuse to submit to the putchiest
• 2:24:24
  Speaker 1: attempts to impose censorship, publish announcements and orders from the Putchists,
• 2:24:28
  Speaker 1: and comply with any other illegal orders from the Puchists.
• 2:24:33
  Speaker 1: In case the regular communications, printing, and broadcasting facilities are
• 2:24:38
  Speaker 1: made unusable for normal activities and for use on behalf
• 2:24:42
  Speaker 1: of the legitimate government as a result of repressive actions
• 2:24:46
  Speaker 1: of the Puchists, it should be the responsibility of people
• 2:24:50
  Speaker 1: in those professions, as well as other citizens, to create
• 2:24:54
  Speaker 1: new means of communication among the population outside the control
• 2:25:00
  Speaker 1: of the usurpers. Seven. All persons and groups working for
• 2:25:06
  Speaker 1: any level of government should, in the event of a coup,
• 2:25:10
  Speaker 1: for as long as possible, continue to apply establish policies
• 2:25:14
  Speaker 1: and procedures, and ignore any new policies, orders, and instructions
• 2:25:19
  Speaker 1: issued by the usurpers. Under likely initial conditions, the government
• 2:25:25
  Speaker 1: employees can continue this defiance at their usual places of work.
• 2:25:30
  Speaker 1: If intolerable repression is launched against them there, these persons
• 2:25:35
  Speaker 1: and groups can go on strike or even disappear. The
• 2:25:40
  Speaker 1: machinery of government must not be permitted to become a
• 2:25:44
  Speaker 1: tool of the usurpers for controlling the society as a whole.
• 2:25:49
  Speaker 1: Eight specific laws should be enacted to make it a
• 2:25:53
  Speaker 1: legal obligation of all persons and organizations working in transportation
• 2:25:59
  Speaker 1: to refuse all all orders from the usurpers and to
• 2:26:02
  Speaker 1: make the transportation system unusable by the putchists and instead
• 2:26:07
  Speaker 1: use it to assist the resistance. Nine specific laws should
• 2:26:13
  Speaker 1: be enacted to make it a legal obligation of all
• 2:26:16
  Speaker 1: governmental and private financial bodies, all banks, business institutions, and
• 2:26:22
  Speaker 1: other financial institutions, and all labor unions and similar associations
• 2:26:28
  Speaker 1: to refuse all financial relations whatsoever with the putchists.
• 2:26:35
  Speaker 3: Sec.
• 2:26:35
  Speaker 1: Ten. While in advance of a coup attempt, the government
• 2:26:39
  Speaker 1: should communicate to all governments with which it has diplomatic
• 2:26:43
  Speaker 1: relations and to all international organizations, including the United Nations,
• 2:26:48
  Speaker 1: that those bodies are requested to refuse to conduct any
• 2:26:52
  Speaker 1: normal political or economic relationships with potential usurpers and instead
• 2:26:59
  Speaker 1: should recognize the constitutional government only. Eleven. The legislature and
• 2:27:07
  Speaker 1: governmental ministries and departments should make various types of contingency
• 2:27:12
  Speaker 1: plans for the continuation of legitimate leadership in case the
• 2:27:17
  Speaker 1: purchases occupy government buildings, in prison, or execute government officials
• 2:27:23
  Speaker 1: and representatives, or take similar repressive actions. Twelve. The Legislature
• 2:27:31
  Speaker 1: should in advance make precise plans as to how constitutional
• 2:27:36
  Speaker 1: government shall resume full normal operations upon the collapse of
• 2:27:42
  Speaker 1: the attempted coup. No other group of usurpers shall be
• 2:27:46
  Speaker 1: permitted undemocratically to impose its own rule during a period
• 2:27:51
  Speaker 1: of transition. In case of loss of life by previous
• 2:27:55
  Speaker 1: officials during the coup and defense against it, provisions should
• 2:27:59
  Speaker 1: be made as to how other persons may legitimately assume
• 2:28:04
  Speaker 1: the constitutional positions that have been vacated.
• 2:28:09
  Speaker 3: Sec.
• 2:28:10
  Speaker 1: Thirteen. The Legislature should, in advance of an attempted coup
• 2:28:15
  Speaker 1: urge and support all independent institutions, organizations, associations, and all
• 2:28:22
  Speaker 1: educational institutions of the country to participate in the education
• 2:28:26
  Speaker 1: of their members and the general citizenry as to their
• 2:28:30
  Speaker 1: appropriate patriotic duties, to repudiate the usurpers, and to practice
• 2:28:36
  Speaker 1: non cooperation and defiance against any attempted cutitar.
• 2:28:42
  Speaker 3: Sec.
• 2:28:42
  Speaker 1: Fourteen. The Legislature may also enact legislation to deny participants
• 2:28:48
  Speaker 1: in a coup any lasting financial gain from their illegal activities.
• 2:28:54
  Speaker 1: They would also be prohibited from holding any future government
• 2:28:58
  Speaker 1: employment or position. Fifteen. The legislature should also consider what
• 2:29:06
  Speaker 1: other types of punishment should be provided in the law
• 2:29:10
  Speaker 1: for initiating and cooperating with a coup. These provisions need
• 2:29:16
  Speaker 1: to take into consideration the need to encourage early supporters
• 2:29:20
  Speaker 1: of the coup to reverse their action and to join
• 2:29:24
  Speaker 1: the defense against it. End Section thirty.
• 2:29:29
  Speaker 4: Five Section thirty six of the Anti qu This is
• 2:29:38
  Speaker 4: a LibriVox recording. Our LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 2:29:43
  Speaker 4: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:29:48
  Speaker 4: The Anti ku buy Jene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, Appendix two.
• 2:29:54
  Speaker 4: Preparations by the civil society for anti coup defense UTAH
• 2:30:00
  Speaker 4: are less likely to be attempted and more likely to
• 2:30:03
  Speaker 4: be defeated if the institutions of civil society are prepared
• 2:30:08
  Speaker 4: and able to resist any attempted seizure of the state.
• 2:30:12
  Speaker 4: This defense would be prepared and waged by the non
• 2:30:15
  Speaker 4: governmental organizations and associations, educational institutions, economic organizations, communications and
• 2:30:24
  Speaker 4: transportation bodies, religious organizations and institutions, and other bodies. This
• 2:30:31
  Speaker 4: resistance action by civil society may be waged either in
• 2:30:36
  Speaker 4: support of planned governmental defense measures or in their absence,
• 2:30:41
  Speaker 4: may be waged independently and directly at the initiative of
• 2:30:45
  Speaker 4: the citizenry. In either case, advanced preparations for anti coup
• 2:30:51
  Speaker 4: resistance by the society's independent institutions are likely to make
• 2:30:56
  Speaker 4: any coup plotters think twice before attempting such an ata.
• 2:31:01
  Speaker 4: If they nevertheless attempt at putish, these preparations would increase
• 2:31:05
  Speaker 4: the power of the anti coup defense. These preparations and
• 2:31:09
  Speaker 4: resistance can be grouped roughly into five types of activity
• 2:31:14
  Speaker 4: one public education, two media, three political organizations, four religious institutions,
• 2:31:23
  Speaker 4: and five specific groups and institutions. One public education. The
• 2:31:31
  Speaker 4: tasks of these non governmental bodies would include educating their
• 2:31:35
  Speaker 4: members and the general citizenry about effective means to reject
• 2:31:40
  Speaker 4: as illegitimate any usurpers, and how to wage widespread non
• 2:31:45
  Speaker 4: cooperation and defiance of the Buddhist's efforts to govern. The
• 2:31:51
  Speaker 4: aim would be to make illegitimate controls and rule impossible.
• 2:31:57
  Speaker 4: While all institutions of civil society should participate in these
• 2:32:01
  Speaker 4: efforts to educate their own members, certain institutions would be
• 2:32:06
  Speaker 4: especially suitable for reaching the general public. These would include
• 2:32:11
  Speaker 4: the formal educational system and various branches of the media
• 2:32:17
  Speaker 4: such as newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the internet, and the cinema.
• 2:32:25
  Speaker 4: The political content of such public education measures would include
• 2:32:30
  Speaker 4: both one the importance of denying legitimacy to any poochists
• 2:32:36
  Speaker 4: and two the importance of non cooperation and defiance to
• 2:32:41
  Speaker 4: make it impossible for them to establish and maintain their
• 2:32:44
  Speaker 4: illegitimate rule. In addition to explicit instructions on how to resist,
• 2:32:51
  Speaker 4: documentaries and film dramas about cases of earlier anti coup
• 2:32:55
  Speaker 4: resistance could be used. Information on consequence in other countries
• 2:33:01
  Speaker 4: of the failure to resist accoupdata could also be important.
• 2:33:06
  Speaker 4: The public will need to be informed about the characteristics
• 2:33:09
  Speaker 4: of non violent struggle, including its many methods and the
• 2:33:14
  Speaker 4: way it operates in conflicts. At times, open street demonstrations
• 2:33:20
  Speaker 4: may be useful to communicate opposition to an illegal seizure
• 2:33:25
  Speaker 4: of the state. However, at other times, such action as
• 2:33:30
  Speaker 4: street marches toward the guns of the Pouchus troops may
• 2:33:34
  Speaker 4: be most unwise. Such action may lead not only to
• 2:33:39
  Speaker 4: massive casualties, but also strike fear into the public and
• 2:33:43
  Speaker 4: therefore submission. Because of these situations, the public must be
• 2:33:49
  Speaker 4: informed well in advance of the crisis about alternative forms
• 2:33:53
  Speaker 4: of protest and defiance that are less obviously dangerous, but
• 2:33:58
  Speaker 4: that make popular opposition unmistakably clear. For example, if the
• 2:34:05
  Speaker 4: mass of the urban population for specified periods simply stayed
• 2:34:10
  Speaker 4: indoors in their homes, schools, or other buildings, the streets
• 2:34:14
  Speaker 4: will be largely empty of people and therefore not be
• 2:34:18
  Speaker 4: suitable shooting ranges to kill and intimidate resistors. The empty
• 2:34:23
  Speaker 4: streets will, however, communicate widespread opposition. Two. Media, the members
• 2:34:32
  Speaker 4: of society's media. Journalists, newspaper and magazine editors, radio and
• 2:34:40
  Speaker 4: television reporters and directors, printing unions, communication aids, and the
• 2:34:46
  Speaker 4: like can organize advanced resistance against Akoudata. This would include
• 2:34:52
  Speaker 4: plans to resist csorship by the pouchists, plans to communicate
• 2:34:56
  Speaker 4: messages from the constitutional government to the general s citizenry,
• 2:35:01
  Speaker 4: and plans to refuse to communicate messages from the poochists
• 2:35:06
  Speaker 4: to the population. In addition, media personnel can make advanced
• 2:35:11
  Speaker 4: preparations for communications in case they lose their operational centers
• 2:35:16
  Speaker 4: or must go into hiding if the pouchists take control
• 2:35:20
  Speaker 4: of the society's media apparatus. Printers, unions, radio operators, and
• 2:35:26
  Speaker 4: others can claim mechanical failures and inability to carry out
• 2:35:31
  Speaker 4: the poochist's instructions. Plans for underground printing presses and secret
• 2:35:36
  Speaker 4: radio broadcasting capacity can also be developed. Preparations to broadcasts
• 2:35:43
  Speaker 4: from neighboring countries can be arranged as well. All of
• 2:35:49
  Speaker 4: these actions will significantly limit the legitimacy and control that
• 2:35:53
  Speaker 4: people could give to coup leaders, because those leaders will
• 2:35:58
  Speaker 4: be unable to exercise full cost control over the information
• 2:36:01
  Speaker 4: to which the society has access, and the defenders will
• 2:36:05
  Speaker 4: be able to communicate widely among themselves and with the public.
• 2:36:11
  Speaker 4: Three political organizations, both political parties and nonpartisan organizations devoted
• 2:36:19
  Speaker 4: to advancing their social, economic, and political agendas should include
• 2:36:23
  Speaker 4: in their missions efforts at educating their members and the
• 2:36:27
  Speaker 4: public as to the importance and methods of anti coup defense.
• 2:36:32
  Speaker 4: Their prior organizational contacts and networks can also help significantly
• 2:36:38
  Speaker 4: in communicating guidance about needed resistance and conducting the anti
• 2:36:43
  Speaker 4: coup defense. Four religious institutions, religious and moral leaders and
• 2:36:51
  Speaker 4: groups should urge their believers and supporters to regard a
• 2:36:55
  Speaker 4: coup as an attack on constitutional democracy that is both
• 2:37:00
  Speaker 4: immoral and a violation of the codes of behavior by
• 2:37:04
  Speaker 4: which their adherents and believers should live. Consequently, if such
• 2:37:10
  Speaker 4: an attack occurs, those religious and moral leaders and groups
• 2:37:15
  Speaker 4: should urge their believers in supporters to apply their beliefs
• 2:37:20
  Speaker 4: by refusing to give any legitimacy to the puchists, refusing
• 2:37:24
  Speaker 4: all cooperation with an obedience to them, and instead by
• 2:37:29
  Speaker 4: participating actively in the anti coup defense five specific groups
• 2:37:35
  Speaker 4: and institutions. The members of officials of individual groups and
• 2:37:40
  Speaker 4: institutions in the society could also organize around preventing the
• 2:37:45
  Speaker 4: pouchists from controlling the areas of the society that they operate.
• 2:37:50
  Speaker 4: For example, members of civil society who work in transportation,
• 2:37:56
  Speaker 4: economic activities, mass media, communicationations, religious institutions, and all other
• 2:38:03
  Speaker 4: major functioning components and services of the society need to
• 2:38:08
  Speaker 4: prepare and apply non cooperation and defiance to retain their
• 2:38:13
  Speaker 4: independence from pouchists. It will be highly important for these
• 2:38:19
  Speaker 4: bodies and institutions to block attempts by the pouchists or
• 2:38:23
  Speaker 4: their supporters to seize internal control of these bodies and institutions.
• 2:38:30
  Speaker 4: Attackers may also even attempt to destroy these independent groups
• 2:38:36
  Speaker 4: and institutions and replace them with new institutions controlled by
• 2:38:41
  Speaker 4: the pouchists or their collaborators. Those efforts, too, will need
• 2:38:45
  Speaker 4: to be defeated. The citizens and their non governmental institutions
• 2:38:51
  Speaker 4: should launch preparations, and, in a crisis, should initiate actual resistance.
• 2:38:57
  Speaker 4: This anti coup resistance be in accordance with an advanced
• 2:39:02
  Speaker 4: governmental anti coup defense plan, or, as noted earlier, could
• 2:39:07
  Speaker 4: be launched independently if no such plan has been prepared.
• 2:39:12
  Speaker 4: Those population groups and institutions that operate or control important social, economic, political,
• 2:39:19
  Speaker 4: or industrial functions will usually be more skilled in determining
• 2:39:24
  Speaker 4: what specific forms of non cooperation and defiance may be
• 2:39:28
  Speaker 4: most effective in keeping that area of the society out
• 2:39:31
  Speaker 4: of the control of usurpers than the theorists of such resistance.
• 2:39:37
  Speaker 4: A few examples follow one. Transportation workers, such as truck drivers,
• 2:39:43
  Speaker 4: railroad employees, or airline operators, are likely to be far
• 2:39:48
  Speaker 4: more skilled in determining how best to slow or paralyze
• 2:39:52
  Speaker 4: the transportation system and to keep it out of the
• 2:39:55
  Speaker 4: hands of the pouchas than staff in a government office.
• 2:40:00
  Speaker 4: They are also likely to be more skilled in knowing
• 2:40:03
  Speaker 4: how despite partial paralysis by resistors or blockages of transportation
• 2:40:08
  Speaker 4: by poochists to move food and other important supplies to
• 2:40:12
  Speaker 4: places where they are most needed.
• 2:40:15
  Speaker 3: Two.
• 2:40:16
  Speaker 4: In the communications field, as long as cell phones and
• 2:40:20
  Speaker 4: email systems are still operating, they can be used creatively
• 2:40:24
  Speaker 4: to help communication resistance plans, to initiate resistance activities, and
• 2:40:30
  Speaker 4: to report the status of poochus controls and resistance struggle.
• 2:40:35
  Speaker 4: Reserve broadcast equipment that has been hidden away for an
• 2:40:39
  Speaker 4: emergency can be used for defense purposes even when government
• 2:40:44
  Speaker 4: offices or previous broadcasting stations have been occupied. Three. Civil
• 2:40:51
  Speaker 4: servants in government offices can continue to function independently even
• 2:40:57
  Speaker 4: if their directors have joined the Poochists. In addition to
• 2:41:01
  Speaker 4: open defiance, civil servants can also quietly resist the coup
• 2:41:05
  Speaker 4: through bureaucratic slowness, misfiling important papers, and similar non provocative
• 2:41:11
  Speaker 4: but effective activities that limit the pouchu's control. Four. Labor
• 2:41:19
  Speaker 4: unions can defiantly refuse to follow Poochus's efforts to direct
• 2:41:24
  Speaker 4: economic activities, and can continue those activities that have been prohibited.
• 2:41:30
  Speaker 4: Whatever the poochus leaders, collaborating administrators, or corporation officials may
• 2:41:35
  Speaker 4: say five special days that honor persons, events, or principles
• 2:41:42
  Speaker 4: of significance to the nation and to the democratic resistors
• 2:41:47
  Speaker 4: may be observed, even when the poochas span them and
• 2:41:50
  Speaker 4: new such days may be instituted to honor events or
• 2:41:55
  Speaker 4: casualties of the anti Coup resistance. End of Section thirty six.
• 2:42:06
  Speaker 1: Section thirty seven of the Anti Coup. This is a
• 2:42:11
  Speaker 1: LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain.
• 2:42:17
  Speaker 1: For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox dot org.
• 2:42:24
  Speaker 1: The Anti Coup by Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins. The
• 2:42:28
  Speaker 1: Albert Einstein Institution Mission Statement. The mission of the Albert
• 2:42:33
  Speaker 1: Einstein Institution is to advance the worldwide study and strategic
• 2:42:39
  Speaker 1: use of nonviolent action and conflict. The Institution is committed
• 2:42:44
  Speaker 1: to defending democratic freedoms and institutions, opposing oppression, dictatorship, and genocide,
• 2:42:52
  Speaker 1: and reducing the reliance on violence as an instrument of policy.
• 2:43:00
  Speaker 1: Is pursued in three ways by encouraging research and policy
• 2:43:06
  Speaker 1: studies on the methods of nonviolent action and their past
• 2:43:10
  Speaker 1: use in diverse conflicts, sharing the results of this research
• 2:43:14
  Speaker 1: with the public through publications, conferences in the media, and
• 2:43:19
  Speaker 1: consulting with groups in conflict about the strategic potential of
• 2:43:24
  Speaker 1: nonviolent action. The Albert Einstein Institution, four hundred and twenty
• 2:43:30
  Speaker 1: seven Newberry Street, Boston, Massachusetts, zero two one one five
• 2:43:36
  Speaker 1: one eight two, United States of America. About the authors.
• 2:43:43
  Speaker 1: Gene Sharp, Doctor of Philosophy, Oxford University, is senior scholar
• 2:43:48
  Speaker 1: at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston, Massachusetts. He holds
• 2:43:53
  Speaker 1: a Bachelor of Arts and Masters of Arts from Ohio
• 2:43:57
  Speaker 1: State University and a career of Philosophy in political theory
• 2:44:02
  Speaker 1: from Oxford University. He is also Professor Emeritus of Political
• 2:44:07
  Speaker 1: Science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. For nearly thirty
• 2:44:12
  Speaker 1: years he held a research appointment at Harvard University's Centre
• 2:44:16
  Speaker 1: for International Affairs. He is the author of various books,
• 2:44:20
  Speaker 1: including The Politics of Nonviolent Action nineteen seventy three, Gandhi
• 2:44:26
  Speaker 1: as a Political Strategist nineteen seventy nine, Social Power and
• 2:44:30
  Speaker 1: Political Freedom nineteen eighty, Making Europe Unconquerable nineteen eighty five,
• 2:44:37
  Speaker 1: Civilian Based Defense nineteen ninety and From Dictatorship to Democracy
• 2:44:44
  Speaker 1: nineteen ninety three, and two thousand two, a new major
• 2:44:48
  Speaker 1: book is now in preparation, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, twentieth Century
• 2:44:53
  Speaker 1: Practice and twenty first Century Potential. His writings have been
• 2:44:57
  Speaker 1: published in more than thirty languages. Bruce Jenkins is Policy
• 2:45:03
  Speaker 1: director of the Bank Information Center in Washington, d C.
• 2:45:08
  Speaker 1: He previously served as Executive director of the Albert Einstein
• 2:45:12
  Speaker 1: Institution from nineteen ninety five to two thousand, and was
• 2:45:15
  Speaker 1: also assistant director of the institutions Policy and Outreach Program.
• 2:45:21
  Speaker 1: He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from
• 2:45:23
  Speaker 1: the University of New Hampshire and a diploma in political
• 2:45:27
  Speaker 1: science in International relations from the Frei Universitat Berlin, with
• 2:45:33
  Speaker 1: a special focus on international economic sanctions. He has extensive
• 2:45:38
  Speaker 1: international experience, working with both policy makers and civil society groups.
• 2:45:44
  Speaker 1: He has participated in consultations, workshops, and fact finding missions
• 2:45:49
  Speaker 1: in China, Sweden, Russia, and the Baltic States on non
• 2:45:54
  Speaker 1: violent democratization processes. And Section thirty seven End the Anti
• 2:46:01
  Speaker 1: Coup by Jeans Sharp and Bruce Jenkins