Latest / Decrypted: The UK Cyber Briefing / AOMEI's update servers were rewritten for minutes at a time, and no vulnerability was involved
Transcript
- 0:03This is Decrypted. Wednesday, the twenty-first of October, twenty twenty-six.
- 0:10This is the morning edition.
- 0:13ay-oh-may's update servers were rewritten for minutes at a time, and no vulnerability was involved.
- 0:22ay-oh-may Backupper, a popular Windows backup tool, spent months handing out malware through its own updat
- 0:29e mechanism. And no software vulnerability was needed.
- 0:33Google's Mandiant team and ManageEngine's threat researchers published the details last week.
- 0:40The Record reported on Tuesday that ay-oh-may had not yet identified or notified the affected customers.
- 0:47So how did the trick work?
- 0:52Think of a post room that obeys any note pinned to its noticeboard.
- 0:56Backupper reads two settings files from ay-oh-may's servers.
- 1:00One says where to download an update and what its fingerprint should be.
- 1:05The other says what message to show and what to run.
- 1:09Neither file is signed, and the fingerprint sits inside the very file it's meant to protect.
- 1:15So an attacker who briefly rewrites the noticeboard can name their own parcel and its fingerprint, and the so
- 1:23ftware accepts both. ManageEngine's researchers said nothing in Backupper was exploited, so there's no C V E,
- 1:32the public reference number every known vulnerability gets, to patch.
- 1:36The edits were brief. Mandiant confirmed tampering for ten minutes on 28 May, six on 16 July and five on 20
- 1:46July, after which the files were restored.
- 1:49Any copy that checked in during those minutes received a legitimate remote administration tool, Radmin, plus
- 1:57a backdoor that ran in memory.
- 1:58On 20 July the attackers added a trick needing no malware at all.
- 2:04A banner made the computer contact an attacker's server and leak its login hashes.
- 2:10So, if you're defending a network, what can you actually see?
- 2:15Mandiant says malware samples appeared in the wild from late April, so the three confirmed windows are a floo
- 2:22r, not a ceiling. Both teams urge hunting across April to July.
- 2:27Useful clues include scheduled tasks named RadminComponentRuntime or NitroRuntime, and unsigned executables
- 2:36inside ay-oh-may's temporary html folders.
- 2:40Google advises blocking outbound file-sharing and WebDAV traffic to external addresses, which also defuses th
- 2:47e hash-leak trick. The sources I read name no UK victim, but backup software sits on UK laptops and servers a
- 2:55ll the same. And fixing ay-oh-may's servers doesn't clean machines already infected.
- 3:00What's the lesson from Secure by Design?
- 3:04The design error is trusting an instruction for where it came from rather than who signed it.
- 3:10Updates should be signed with a key kept off the web servers, and the client should refuse anything that fail
- 3:16s the check. Then a hijacked server can only serve what the vendor already approved.
- 3:22That costs a vendor little against months of silent access.
- 3:27Buyers can ask for it. Does the product verify signed updates?
- 3:32And what is the supplier's promise on notifying you?
- 3:35ay-oh-may says it has found no malicious files since, yet it could not initially find the root cause.
- 3:41ManageEngine says it hasn't independently verified that the attackers lost access.
- 3:46For UK directors, the practical step is an inventory.
- 3:51Which small utilities phone home across your estate, with what privileges, and who would tell you if their se
- 3:57rver were quietly rewritten?
- 3:59As always, this is opinion, not advice.
- 4:03That was Decrypted. The written version and every source are linked in the show notes.
- 4:08Thanks for listening.